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From the Journal Team:

Welcome to the seventh issue of the American Public University System (APUS)'s *Saber and Scroll Journal*. This is our "Revolutionary" issue – an issue dedicated "Revolutions that changed the world."

This issue reflects a focus on topics of history and historiography dealing with revolutions, including the American Revolution, the French Revolution, and the Russian Revolution as well as revolutions in communications, transportation, technology, and civil rights - "revolutions" that had a dramatic impact on the course of history. We are pleased that the APUS historical community responded enthusiastically to the fall issue call for papers. This issue contains feature articles and book reviews demonstrating the effect those revolutions have had on people across time and space.

As most *Saber and Scroll Journal* readers are aware, the journal has recently become available in a print-on-demand format. We wish to extend a special thanks to the APUS ePress Team for their advice, technical expertise and hard work. Additionally, we would like to thank our copy editor, DeAnna Stevens, who not only formats our journal, but who also designs the beautiful artwork that graces its cover.

We continue to seek additional volunteers to help create a superb student-led history journal; if interested, please contact any member of the current journal team.

Please enjoy this issue of the *Saber and Scroll Journal*!

Anne Midgley

Journal Staff

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Call for Papers
Winter 2014

The Saber and Scroll Journal is proud to announce that its winter 2014 journal will be **dedicated to “Dynasties, Visionary Leadership, and Great Plagues: Pillars of Continuity and Agents of Change throughout History.”**

The Saber and Scroll Journal is currently soliciting articles and reviews for its winter 2014 edition. Published by APUS’ Saber and Scroll History Club, this edition will accept works on topics of history and historiography which deal with any one of three great historical dynamics - **Dynasties, Visionary Leadership, and Great Plagues**. The topic could be applicable to either history or military history.

Short book reviews, opinion pieces and exhibition reviews should be on recent events or publications. Students are welcome to use previously submitted and corrected coursework, provided it has not been published. All submissions should meet high academic standards and will be reviewed by a group of graduate and undergraduate APUS student editors.

Abstract Deadline: January 1, 2014
Manuscript Deadline: February 1, 2014

The Impact of Technology on a Virtual Campus

Jennifer Souza

Technology has changed the face of many of our everyday formalities. In addition, technology has drastically evolved over the years to become one of the most utilized tools in the world of education. For instance, you attend a fully functioning, 100% virtual institution.

The advent of virtual campuses has changed the look and feel of collegiate life. For better or for worse, the advantage, and the disadvantage, of the virtual world is that our physical identity, and therefore, our difference, is hidden. This mask allows greater participation from some who might otherwise be held back by the multitude of physical world boundaries.

Establishing identity in a virtual community is key to building relationships with other community members, making students feel more connected to the university as a whole. Social Identity Theory, as stated in “Online Behavior in Virtual Space: An Empirical Study on Helping,” argues that “people classify themselves as belonging to various social categories according to age, gender, socio-economic status, interests, skills, etc. The underlying assumption of Social Identity Theory is that individuals feel affinity and desires connection with the referent team, which in turn influences their behaviors.”¹

As traditional brick-and-mortars begin to explore virtual options, American Public University and American Military University, fully online universities, understands that there are challenges and successes of working with students at a distance. We strive to create virtual environments to build relationships and to keep the community connected by programs such as our various student organizations, promoting student and/or alumni involvement and engagement, The Quad platform and utilizing social media to bridge this gap. In order to launch this identity, we must not be afraid to display difference, in essence, being “bold without boundaries.”

The revolution in technology over the past few decades has

enabled American Public University and American Military University students, faculty, and staff to form a vibrant on-line community with the shared goal of educating today's and tomorrow's leaders. While it has created opportunities unimaginable a mere twenty years ago, it has also created challenges. Working together as a virtual community, we are creating an exceptional university experience for all our constituents.

Notes

¹Jung-Lung Hsu, Wu-Yuin Hwang, Huang Yueh-Min, and Liu Jui-Jung. "Online Behavior in Virtual Space: An Empirical Study on Helping." *Journal of Educational Technology & Society* 14, no. 1 (2011): 146. <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1287032155?accountid=8289>.

The Consumers' League of New Jersey:
Major Campaigns and Activism of the Twentieth Century
Patricia Chappine

Progressive America was a period when social reform organizations sprang up in response to a wide range of societal problems. Among the many issues facing reformers was the issue of labor laws, specifically for women and children. The rapid industrialization of America led to unprecedented problems which were only rectified when citizens formed organizations working towards common goals. Ultimately, the reform organizations of the progressive era led to better working conditions and equality for women. While much attention has been paid to the National Consumers' League (NCL), the unique strategies and crucibles of the state branches have been largely ignored. With this in mind, this research will focus primarily on the archives concerning the activities of the Consumers' League of New Jersey, hereafter referred to as the CLNJ, during the twentieth century. This paper will show the legislative campaigns, prominent leaders, and strategies of the CLNJ. How did the CLNJ use the ideology of the NCL and still function as a separate and distinct entity? What was the impact of the CLNJ on legislation in New Jersey?

This research will build on a number of secondary sources, such as Alan Dawley's *Changing the World: American Progressives in War and Revolution*. Dawley provides a concise examination of the American Progressive movement from 1900 until 1930. He analyzes the changing patterns of society and shows how reform movements arose in response. Similarly, Steven Diner's *A Very Different Age: Americans of the Progressive Era* deals with the same time period, but divides chapters into social groups such as immigrants, women, industrial workers, white-collar workers, African-Americans, and busi-

ness operators.¹ In *American Women in the Progressive Era: 1900-1920*, Carl and Dorothy Schneider provide a description of women-centered campaigns such as suffrage, women's labor, and the search for equality.² Cecilia Tichi's *Civic Passions: Seven who Launched Progressive America (and what they Teach us)* provides a detailed focus on seven particularly influential people, including Florence Kelley, leader of the NCL from 1898 until 1932. Since Kelley was such a large part of the NCL, her personal papers and statements are useful primary source documents to include in any analysis of the CLNJ.

The literature on the CLNJ is by no means expansive. Joan Burstyn's *Past and Promise: Lives of New Jersey Women* chronicles the lives of hundreds of women who have influenced the history of New Jersey. While not specifically about the CLNJ, the organization appears throughout the book, notably in the section on Katherine Wiley, former executive secretary and director of the CLNJ. Wiley was also responsible for the campaign to receive compensation for the women who suffered from radium poisoning while working at the U.S. Radium Corporation in Orange, NJ. Furthermore, Claudia Clark's *Radium Girls, Women and Industrial Health Reform 1910-1935* provides a chronicle of the effect the acknowledgement of radium poisoning had on industrial health reform in New Jersey and the United States as a whole. Ross Mullner's *Deadly Glow: The Radium Dial Worker Tragedy* tells the story with a greater focus on the medical effects of radium, detailing the story of New Jersey physician Harrison S. Martland, who carried out the clinical investigations of dial painters that led to the labeling of their symptoms as radium poisoning.³

Background

On March 29, 1937, the U.S. Supreme Court announced its ruling in the case of *West Coast Hotel v. Parrish*. In this landmark ruling,

the question of the scope of authority of the federal versus the state government in regulating labor affairs would finally be addressed. Many scholars point to this decision as the moment when the welfare state was established. The background of this case began in 1933, when a woman named Elsie Lee (whose married name would soon be Parrish) began working as a chamber maid for the Cascadian Hotel in Wenatchee, Washington. In 1935, she was fired from the hotel. She filed a lawsuit against the owner of the hotel, the West Coast Hotel Company, shortly thereafter. Her complaint was that the hotel owed her back pay because they had failed to comply with a Washington state law regulating minimum wage for women. At the trial, Parrish testified, "I had in mind that I should be paid—should have been paid—the state wage and that it would be paid. I took what they gave me because I needed the work so bad and I figured they would pay what was right."⁴

The Supreme Court ruled that the state could impose minimum wage laws on private employers without violating the U.S. Constitution. Particularly, the ruling stated, "The State has a special interest in protecting women against employment contracts which through poor working conditions, long hours or scant wages may leave them inadequately supported and undermine their health."⁵ By placing the responsibility to regulate and enforce laws that protected workers' rights in the hands of the state, this case laid the groundwork for the effectiveness of state reform organizations such as the CLNJ. This ruling acknowledged, "State legislatures and Congress should be permitted to protect workers against greedy and unscrupulous employers."⁶ The door was now open for state regulations on protective labor legislation for women.

This background led to a more favorable climate for reform in women's rights as workers. It is not surprising that the National Consumers' League, founded in 1899, would lead the charge for la-

bor standards and regulation enforcement. Importantly, “Their influence on litigation was a new phenomenon in U.S. legal circles; even though previous organizations of reformers (in particular abolitionists) had sought to influence public policy, they had not launched systematic campaigns in the courts.”⁷ The CLNJ would take this victory and use it to change New Jersey policies.

The Influence of the National Consumers’ League

Florence Kelley served as the General Secretary of the National Consumers’ League from 1898 until the time of her death in 1932. Her strategies for legislative campaigning and focus on statistics gathering provided the foundation for the success of the organization and its many state branches. Kelley understood clearly that public opinion was a great weapon and thus focused on educating the masses on issues such as the permanent damage of child labor, the anti-immigrant fervor, the necessity of fair labor practices, and the importance of leisure time.⁸ Her famous statement, “To live means to buy, to buy means to have power, to have power means to have responsibility,” was the creed that all members of the organization strived to adhere to.⁹

Throughout Kelley’s public speaking engagements, she would often state that, “There is one evil spirit, one figure which serves to symbolize the statistics of industrial injuries to working people—the symbolic figure of Greed.”¹⁰ Kelley’s answer to this rampant greed was to educate the public about the responsibilities of the consumer. She stated, “That the responsibility for some of the worst evils from which producers suffer rests with the consumers who seek the cheapest markets, regardless how cheapness is brought about.”¹¹ This focus on the strength of the members of the NCL was used to launch many successful campaigns.

An examination of the archives of the CLNJ clearly shows that

the leaders of the state branch also recognized this power. For instance, in a letter to the editor of the *New York Times*, Anna Rochester, Stella G.S. Perry, and Alice Jaynes of the CLNJ wrote in support of the ten hour cap on the workday for women and girls. Calling for the support of all citizens, they pleaded, “Is a ten-hour day too short for our young girls and women? Do our citizens really believe that after working from 7a.m. to 6 p.m. women should have no time for home life, no time for their families- husbands, parents, and children - no time for rest or pleasure, no time for self-improvement?”¹² Significantly, Kelley worked closely with Katherine Wiley, director of the CLNJ. These two women would share many of the same ideologies and reform strategies throughout their time as leaders.

The NCL shaped the foundation for the CLNJ in various ways. Kelley stated that, “The prime responsibility of the consuming public is its own ignorance.... The principal task of the League is, therefore, to enlighten men and women who are eager to do right if they can but know what right is.”¹³ As a branch of the NCL, the CLNJ shared this ideology. However, the state branches faced their own unique challenges because every state had different regulations and laws and thus required unique approaches to reform. Kelley herself encountered this problem, especially in regards to her quest for a uniform child labor amendment to establish age limits and school attendance policies. In a commentary for the *Congressional Digest* in 1923, Kelley wrote, “There is not equal protection of the law even within a State like New York, because enforcement is different in different parts of the State and different in different industries.”¹⁴

The CLNJ was founded by Juliet Clannon Cushing on March 1, 1900. It is worth mentioning that credit for the formation of the New Jersey branch is sometimes given to Cornelia Foster Bradford,

who held several meetings where she explained the need for a Consumers' League in New Jersey. Cushing served as president of the CLNJ for the first thirty years of its existence. She described the reason for the organization as "... to teach us to want right things, rightly made."¹⁵ Among the many campaigns the CLNJ was involved with during its early years was the quest for a bill limiting child labor and regulating school attendance. To further this effort, the CLNJ created the New Jersey Child Labor Committee in 1904. In 1911, the CLNJ successfully campaigned for a bill that required seats for employees in retail stores and less than a full day of work on Saturdays. In 1912, the CLNJ supported Senator Walter Edge's "Ten Hour Law" which placed a limit on the workday of women throughout the state.¹⁶

The New Jersey Workforce

The population of New Jersey was 3,155,900 in 1920. Largely due to its close proximity to New York City and Philadelphia, the Garden State became a natural settling point for many immigrants coming to the United States. New Jersey's industrial economy offered a diverse and expansive job market. Because of the state's advanced system of railroads, many workers commuted to the large cities for jobs. With this unique atmosphere, women and young girls came to comprise a significant portion of laborers in the early part of the twentieth century. Women performed jobs such as farm laborers, retail workers, garment makers, pottery decorators, secretaries, clerks, telephone operators, and many others.¹⁷

New Jersey hosted many women's clubs and reform organizations in the late nineteenth century. The first such club was the Women's Club of Orange, which formed in 1871. The number of clubs in New Jersey led Susan B. Anthony to remark, "New Jersey has so many associations of women that they have acted as a bar

against the formation of suffragist clubs, women feeling that they had already too many meetings to attend.”¹⁸ While this comment was not meant to disparage the existing clubs, it served as a testament to the sheer amount of social activity New Jersey women were engaging in at the time. This setting led to a climate of activism that would prove important for the growth and influence of the CLNJ.

The Case of the Radium Girls

In 1917, Katherine Schaub and her cousin Irene Rudolph were given jobs as watch dial painters at the U.S. Radium Corporation in Orange, NJ. Schaub was born in Newark, NJ on March 10, 1902. She and her cousin were among 200 young ladies employed at the U.S. Radium Corporation. Their main job was to hand paint numbers on the faces of watches. The radium added to the paint would make the dials glow. A fast worker could earn twenty dollars per week. Schaub and Rudolph worked as dial painters from 1917 to 1919. By 1920, work had become inconsistent. After attempting to stay despite the lost hours, the girls finally left the factory in 1921. In the same year that they left the factory, Rudolph became seriously ill with problems of the jaw and face. Her sickness progressed rapidly and she died approximately one year and a half later. Schaub began to have health problems around November of 1923.¹⁹ As with Rudolph, her trouble began with her teeth and jaw. She wrote, “I kept thinking about Irene and all the trouble she had with her jaw.”²⁰

Schaub began to meet with other girls who were also having health problems and suspected that the glowing paint had something to do with their conditions. Schaub contacted New Jersey’s Health and Labor Department with her concerns. Unfortunately, the state offered little help, finding no dangerous compounds in the paint and giving the U.S. Radium Corporation permission to continue their operations. It seemed that the victims of the radium paint

would not receive any help. Finally, in 1924, the CLNJ, under the direction of executive secretary Katherine Wiley, began advocating for the victims. After interviewing Schaub, Wiley was convinced that the paint had caused her illness. Schaub would eventually testify in trial that, “I instructed them to have a very good point on the brush... . I instructed them to put the brush in their mouth to get the best point on it.”²¹

The quest for compensation would not be an easy one, for New Jersey had a very specific list of industrial poisonings covered under worker’s compensation. Radium poisoning did not fall under any such category. The CLNJ helped secure legal representation for the victims. Raymond Berry of Newark, NJ accepted the case. The CLNJ also unearthed evidence of a cover-up by the U.S. Radium Corporation. In 1925, Schaub had been examined by Dr. Frederick Flinn, who had reported that her illness was not related to radium. After an investigation, the CLNJ found that Dr. Flinn was in fact employed by U.S. Radium. The media picked up the story and added to the pressure to settle. The *Newark Ledger* reported, “Fryer and the others bravely tried to keep smiling, but friends and spectators in the courtroom wept. Edna Hussman told the court about the financial troubles the medical bills were causing: ‘I cannot even keep my little home, our bungalow. I know I will not live much longer, for now I cannot sleep at night for the pains.’”²²

Several other early deaths led to more suspicion. For instance, Amelia Maggia, a former dial painter and sister of two of the plaintiffs in the case against the U.S. Radium Corporation (McDonald and Larice) died in 1922. While the cause of death was originally listed as syphilis, Maggia’s dentist, Joseph P. Knep remained suspicious. Knep had removed Maggia’s decayed jawbone months before her death and suspected that she suffered from some sort of occupational disease. When Knep asked representatives at the U.S. Radi-

um Corporation for the chemical formula of the glowing paint, they refused. Increasingly convinced that foul play was involved in the deaths, Knep continued to see patients complaining of similar jaw and teeth problems. Upon the request of Knep, the two remaining Maggia sisters, and Raymond Berry, Amelia's body was exhumed and found to be highly radioactive.

The networks of influence within the CLNJ put considerable pressure to settle the lawsuit. In April of 1925, Alice Hamilton, a prominent leader of Hull House, wrote to Katherine R. Drinker, who along with her husband Cecil was also investigating the U.S. Radium Corporation. Hamilton urged,

... Mr. Roeder is not giving you and Dr. Drinker a very square deal. I had heard before that he tells everyone he is absolutely safe because he has a report from you exonerating him from any possible responsibility in the illness of the girls, but now it looks as if he has gone still farther... [The New Jersey Department of Labor] has a copy of your report and it shows that 'every girl is in perfect condition.' Do you suppose Roeder could do such a thing as to issue a forged report in your name?²³

Hamilton was determined to uncover any unethical statements regarding the investigation. She continued to put pressure on the people involved in all aspects of the case.

Even Marie Curie, who with her husband Pierre had discovered radium, was contacted about the New Jersey cases. Curie responded, "I would be only too happy to give any aid that I could, however, there is absolutely no means of destroying the substance once it enters the human body."²⁴ The CLNJ was instrumental in gaining an out-of-court settlement for Schaub and four other women (Edna Hussman, Quinta McDonald, Albina Larice, and Grace Fryer). They each received \$10,000 and \$600 per year as long as they suf-

ferred from the effects of radium poisoning. They also received full payment of any medical fees incurred. Schaub succumbed to her illness on February 18, 1933, at the age of 31.²⁵

The Archives of the CLNJ: Other Significant Campaigns

In the early part of the twentieth century, child labor was common and consumers and workers had few rights. The archives of the CLNJ revealed campaigns well ahead of their time in the search for social justice. Among the League's earliest victories were the Factory Act establishing the State Department of Labor in 1904, the Law Requiring Seats for Women in Commercial Employment in 1909, and the Law Regulating Hours for Minors in Messenger Service in 1911. The next campaigns brought the following successes: the Hour Laws for Women in 1912, the Child Labor Law of 1914, the Compulsory Education Law (children under 16) of 1914, the Law Requiring Age and Schooling Certificates for Child Workers of 1914, and the Law Limiting Night Work for Women in 1923.

Much of the reference material available for the early campaigns of the CLNJ can be found in letters appealing to members of the organization. For instance, Susanna Peirce Zwemer, who served as president of the CLNJ for fifteen years (from 1940 to 1947 and then from 1963 to 1971) wrote a great deal of correspondence about labor legislation and wage reform.²⁶ In a letter to a Miss Stevenson on January 28, 1941, she wrote, "They saw the steady growth of night work for women, the longer hours, the expansion of industrial homework at starvation wages, and from that experience came a demand for much of the legislation the League has sponsored."²⁷ Zwemer made clear the fact that the campaigns of the CLNJ have been in response to the appearance and promulgation of injustices. The regulation of night work and industrial homework were championed by members of the NCL and the CLNJ alike.

In 1900, factories were dangerous places where men, women, and children labored for long hours without any protection against injury or financial compensation in the event of an accident. Many endured a seven-day workweek. While appealing to a sense of social morality, Zwemer also spoke to the sensibilities of business owners. In an address to members of the CLNJ on December 29, 1941, she wrote, “Faced with continued threats to hard-won labor standards, we in the Consumers’ League have stressed the need for careful planning to secure the greatest efficiency of production. We have reiterated our belief that a tired worker is like a broken down machine- neither produces enough.”²⁸ Among the many trials faced by Zwemer in her time as League president, was the inadequacy of health and injury protection in New Jersey. She repeatedly spoke about the need for cooperation among government departments. She wrote, “No adequate health protection exists for one half the workers in New Jersey and those in the small plants. The Labor Department has no money for the prevention of industrial diseases; the Health Department is helping some of the plants from the funds, but there is no cooperation between the two departments.”²⁹

The years of World War II brought a shift in focus for the CLNJ. As Zwemer stated, “Now that we are in the war, new and greater risks lie ahead.”³⁰ Among the problems facing the CLNJ was the growth of the defense industry. The main issue affecting the League was that many of the hard-won legislation were now being threatened because of the focus on war production. In the war years, many standards put in place to protect workers, including women and minors, were being ignored. The focus of much League activity was now how to keep a check on these labor standards. To this effect, the CLNJ published a newsletter in October of 1945 which expressly declared that any discrimination against New Jersey citizens because of “. . . race, color, creed, national origin, or ances-

try, are a matter of concern for the government of the state, and that such discrimination threatens not only the rights and proper privileges of the inhabitants of the states but menaces the institutions and foundation of a free democratic state.”³¹

The CLNJ was also adamant about protecting New Jersey’s children. In a letter from Vice-President Mary Dyckman on July 17, 1940, she wrote, “... The new child labor and school attendance laws have both been passed and go into effect in September... Some few amendments were added, but the laws do what we wanted most, which was to assure all New Jersey children minimal educational opportunities similar to those in other states, together with effective protection against injurious child labor.” It is evident that state legislation was often the first defense against unfair labor practices.

Conclusion

The CLNJ was founded in an era when the legislative protections against discriminatory employment practices and unsafe conditions we enjoy today were non-existent. The CLNJ’s original goals of food regulations, healthy working environments, regulations on child labor, minimum wage laws, and union policies were not realized until thirty-five years after its creation. The social campaigns of the CLNJ have resulted in major advantages for the workers of New Jersey. Among the many legislative victories of the CLNJ were laws regulating industrial homework, school attendance regulations, minimum wages, maximum work hours per day, protections against health hazards at work, and child labor laws.

One of the most noteworthy campaigns the CLNJ was involved with was the case against the U.S. Radium Corporation. The compensation received by the victims, with the help of advocates at the CLNJ, was a significant step in stopping the exploitation of industrial workers. The radium girls helped to secure regulations on radium

and industrial responsibility to provide a safe environment for workers. After hearing about the cases of radium poisoning in New Jersey, Florence Kelley launched her own campaign to investigate factories using radium in other states such as Pennsylvania and Illinois. In a meeting held in New York, Kelley, Alice Hamilton, and lawyer Raymond Berry discussed a conference on universal standards for industries using radium. The conference was supported by many prominent public figures, including Eleanor Roosevelt. On December 20, 1928, the conference set up two committees; one to investigate existing conditions within these factories and the second to recommend practices for the protection of employees. James P. Leake, an official of the Public Health Service, said, "By focusing public attention on some of these horrible examples, the broader problems of disease prevention... can be greatly reduced. It was so in the tetraethyl lead work. The martyrdom of a few may save many."³²

The CLNJ used the networks of influence available by virtue of New Jersey's unique activist community. The sheer volume of social reform organizations existing in New Jersey during the twentieth century spurred legislative changes that branches in other states later attempted to replicate. The leadership of the CLNJ worked closely with the NCL, notably Florence Kelley, to change the face of labor laws and industrial regulations. The records of the CLNJ show an undeterred commitment to achieving a better quality of life for the citizens of New Jersey.

Notes

¹ Steven J. Diner, *A Very Different Age: Americans of the Progressive Era* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), 5.

² Carl and Dorothy Schneider, *American Women in the Progressive Era: 1900-1920* (New York: Anchor Books, 1993), 10.

³ Ross Mullner, *Deadly Glow: The Radium Dial Worker Tragedy*, (Washington: American Public Health Association, 1999), 15.

⁴ Julie Novkov, *Constituting Workers, Protecting Women: Gender, Law, and Labor in the Progressive Era and New Deal Years*, (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2001), 3.

⁵ *West Coast Hotel v. Parrish*, U.S. Supreme Court, 300 U.S. 379 (S.C. 1937), Cornell University Law School.

⁶ Novkov, 6.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 80.

⁸ Cecelia Tichi, *Civic Passions: Seven who Launched Progressive America (and what they Teach us)* (North Carolina: Chapel Hill, 2009), 152.

⁹ Florence Kelley, "Women in Trade Unions," *Schlesinger Library on the History of Women in America* (1906): <http://nrs.harvard.edu/null?n=3> (accessed June 14, 2012).

¹⁰ Florence Kelley, "Our Lack of Statistics," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 38 (1911): 96.

¹¹ Florence Kelley, "Work of the National Consumers' League," *American Academy of Political and Social Science* 25 (1905): 7.

¹² Alice Jaynes, Stella G. S. Perry, and Anna Rochester, "New Jersey Women's Ten-Hour Bill," *New York Times*, February 9, 1912.

¹³ Florence Kelley, "The Responsibility of the Consumer," *American Academy of Political and Social Science* 32 (1908): 108.

¹⁴ Florence Kelley, "National and State Views of the Child Labor Amendment: Pro," *Congressional Digest* 2, no. 5 (1923): 140.

¹⁵ Joan N. Burstyn, ed., *Past and Promise: The Lives of New Jersey Women*, (Metuchen, NJ: The Scarecrow Press Inc. 1990), 120.

¹⁶ Susanna P. Zwemer to Stevenson, January 28, 1941, box 7, folder 1, New Jersey Consumers' League Papers, Rutgers University-New Brunswick, New Jersey, Special Collections Department.

¹⁷ Burstyn, 96.

¹⁸ Susan B. Anthony and Ida Husted Harper, *History of Woman Suffrage: Volume 4, 1883-1900*, (New York: Fowler and Wells, 1902), 25.

¹⁹ Burstyn, 392.

²⁰ Katherine Schaub, "Radium," *Survey Graphic* 68 (1932): 138.

²¹ Burstyn, 393.

²² "5 Women Smile, Fearing Death, in Radium Case" *Newark Ledger*, January 12, 1928.

²³ Alice Hamilton to Cecil Drinker, April 4, 1925, Records of the National Consumers League, Raymond H. Berry files, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

²⁴ Ethelda Bedford, "Radium Victims too Ill to Attend Court Tomorrow," *Newark Ledger*, May 17, 1928.

²⁵ Burstyn, 394.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 438.

²⁷ Zwemer, December 29, 1941, box 7, folder 1, New Jersey Consumers' League Papers.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ Mary Dyckman, October, 1945, box 7, folder 16, New Jersey Consumers' League Papers.

³² Josephine Clara Goldmark, *Impatient Crusader: Florence Kelley's Life Story*, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1953), 203.

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A Beloved Headache: Lafayette and his Reputation

Joseph J. Cook

Marie-Joseph-Paul-Yves-Roch-Gilbert-DuMotier Lafayette, better known to history as the Marquis de Lafayette, gained lasting fame for himself as a proponent of freedom throughout the world. He personally took part in republican revolutions in two countries – his home nation of France and his adopted home thousands of miles away in America. Strangely, this international hero has become more universally praised and honored in New York and Washington than in Paris and Marseilles. This is true not only in modern scholarship and remembrance, but also – and more substantially – during Lafayette’s own lifetime. While a young Lafayette found an adoptive father in George Washington and a family in the Founding Brothers of the United States, his contemporaries in the leadership of France came to scorn and despise him during their own revolution. This study will examine the personal and professional relationships which General Lafayette established and maintained throughout his revolutionary career on two continents. For the purpose of providing a general overview which will demonstrate the evolution of Lafayette’s position and reputation, these individuals will primarily be the most popular historical figures of the era such as Washington and Thomas Jefferson in America, Maximilien Robespierre and Napoleon Bonaparte in Europe.

The Motier family, to which the general belonged, could trace its title of nobility in France as far back as the year 1250. Yet Louis XIV, in an attempt to move himself toward absolutism, had “withdrawn power from the old Sword families and had given them patronage instead.” The Motier family was one of these Sword families that had gained nobility titles through military service to a mon-

arch. Later, Louis XVI took away *both* power and patronage from these old Sword families, infuriating the nobility and thereby encouraging anti-royal sentiments in the Second Estate.¹

The revolutionary career of the young Marquis de Lafayette began over a decade prior to any French action against the power of the Bourbon royal family. Orphaned at a young age, when his father was killed in combat against the British and his mother perished of disease, Lafayette grew up as an incredibly rich and prominent youth in the Court of Versailles; but upon his development into adolescence and the advancement of his education, he began to grow apart from the social class from which he came. Along with his brother-in-law the Vicomte de Noailles and another young friend the Comte de Segur, Lafayette adopted the principles of the Enlightenment and of the French reformer Abbé Guillaume Raynal. They “disdained the aristocracy, colonialism, and the Church” and “rejected the decadent lifestyle of their parents and embraced the American Revolution as the struggle for human dignity.”² Each had received a military education at the Académie de Versailles, and was anxious for adventure.

Fortunately for them, a friend was available in Paris: American Congressman Silas Deane. Deane had been passing out commissions to many French officers, and by the time the young Lafayette and his friends arrived at Deane’s doorstep, he was feeling pressure to stop this unauthorized elevation of foreigners.³ However, Deane was inspired by the youth and enthusiasm of these new volunteers, and “allowed himself to imagine that these three might inspire a generation and ensure France’s continued support for the American struggle.”⁴ This was a gross miscalculation by Deane, who despite the great services he provided the American cause, was prone to gross miscalculation. Rather than strengthen Franco-American relations, the recruitment of these extremely prominent young French-

men created a chaotic situation for French diplomats and could have unraveled the nascent bond between the two countries. The British (along with the young aristocrats' families) charged that France was collaborating with the American rebels, and matters were made worse by the fact that Noailles's uncle had just become the French ambassador to England. French Minister of Foreign Affairs the Comte de Vergennes "feared that Britain would view the enlistment of these three famous aristocrats as a declaration of war. He prohibited any ships carrying French officers or arms to America from leaving port and ordered the arrest of the three young officers...Unsatisfied by French actions, the British blockaded the French coast and threatened to cut off trade."⁵ Lafayette and his companions would not be deterred, however. At his own expense, Lafayette outfitted a warship and set sail with Noailles and Segur, "leaving behind a diplomatic brouhaha: a pregnant sixteen-year-old wife and a two-year-old daughter, an enraged father-in-law, an anxious General Broglie, and a bellicose British ambassador."⁶

Acting on their own beliefs, Lafayette and his friends had set off a political firestorm for their home nation – in an unfortunate portent of what was to come in Lafayette's life. In what would become a pattern in his long and eventful life, his actions were tremendously appreciated by the American on the scene, but deplored by many of his own compatriots due to unleashing unintended trouble for France. It can be accurately said that Lafayette possessed a great many talents in his life, but political sense and foresight were not among them. He was an idealist, and he genuinely believed that if he acted toward achieving his goals others would come along and the world would be bettered. Unfortunately for him, his life was played out on a stage with other actors, and the best of intentions do not sway the minds of all.

Despite Silas Deane's enthusiasm about the prospects of the

young French aristocrats, Lafayette's arrival in America was far from filled with fanfare. After trouble finding a landing spot, he and his friends made their way to Philadelphia where a frustrated Congress dismissed them and forwarded them to Washington's army. The Congressmen had had enough of dealing with Deane's foreign officers, many of whom were terribly unqualified. However, influenced by letters from Deane and other sources of information (including Ben Franklin), Congress gave qualifying instructions to Washington about the young marquis. They stated that his rank as a major general was only honorary, that he was not to be placed in a position superior to any American generals, and that he essentially was to be baby-sat and kept out of trouble – even given an allowance due to worries about his wisdom with finances. Washington had an available space on his staff for an aide, and decided that it suited the young man he was forced to safeguard. Members of Congress made sure Washington was well-aware that there were very prominent people in France “who interest themselves in the welfare of that amiable young nobleman.”⁷

Lafayette was severely disappointed by this appointment, and pestered Washington and Congress for command of a division as befitted his rank. However, he could take pleasure in the fact that he was recognized and accepted at all; frustrated by the influx of French officers, and having no place for many of them, his two companions were forced to return home (which Lafayette again paid for personally). This is when the crucial moment in Lafayette's life occurred: a deeply personal conversation with George Washington stemming from one of Lafayette's appeals and Washington's awareness of his own duty in regard to the young marquis. Assuring Washington, “I have come here to learn, *mon general*, not to teach,”⁸ Lafayette charmed the American commander, as he did just about every American he came across. There was an undeniable allure of

this energetic teenaged nobleman of republican convictions. Washington explained his position to the young man, and requested his support. The Virginian concluded with his hope that Lafayette would have his confidence as a “friend and father.” For the rest of his life, Lafayette would refer to this as the “great conversation.”⁹ As one biographer put it, “The orphan of Auvergne, exiled, timid behind his swagger, found what he had missed all his life. He set out to be a dutiful son...He fell completely under Washington’s influence, seeking his approval, wanting to do things as his hero would do them.”¹⁰ It is easy to imagine that the teenaged marquis who had only faint memories and stories of his father the soldier would be immeasurably impressed by the tall, stately, martial-looking Washington. Others would be quick to take note of their inseparability for the rest of Lafayette’s tenure of service under Washington’s command.

Lafayette would prove to be both a blessing and a curse for Washington, and as was typical of Lafayette, it typically depended on the presence or absence of fellow prominent Frenchmen. Among his prominent actions were his first battle at Brandywine, his appeals to France for aid, Washington’s first meeting with the French general the Comte de Rochambeau, and the Virginia campaign which saw the war on the American continent come to an end.

As General Sir William Howe drove toward Philadelphia, Washington’s army was forced to respond in a major battle south of the city at Germantown. Lafayette was wounded in the leg in this, his first battle, and although it was not a life-threatening wound, the commander-in-chief worried terribly, especially due to the admonishments to keep the marquis safe. Lafayette never should have been on the front line at Brandywine. “As Washington had been ordering Greene to move to Sullivan’s support, the marquis asked if

he could ride up to observe the situation. Distracted, the commander in chief agreed.”¹¹ Washington arrived at his side in the medical tent, and ordered the surgeons and other officers there to “Take care of him as if he were my son...for I love him the same.”¹² Their relationship was clear, and on top of the satisfaction of finding a father, Lafayette could now take pleasure in the acclaim he began to receive from the American public as a wounded hero of the cause. He continued to charm Americans by joking in the hospital. When officers came to check on him, he said he worried about their hungry appearance, and begged them not to eat him as he lay on the table.¹³

Lafayette spent his recovery time attempting to further aid the American cause. He had been appalled by the state of the American army when he had first arrived in camp, and was determined to see them better equipped. To this end, he sent ceaseless appeals to Vergennes and directly to the royal family – the privilege of a life spent at court. For their part, the French government officials were receptive to these appeals, along with those from American commissioners such as Ben Franklin. Like John Adams in his dealings in Versailles, Lafayette had little patience for temporizing and the delicacies of diplomacy. He wanted immediate and dramatic action. On several occasions, Vergennes, who was less amused by the young aristocrat than the royal family was, complained bitterly that Lafayette seemed to wish to bankrupt the French coffers. Washington, on the other hand, “approved these side-channel communications, exploiting the young general’s popularity as a way to raise people and goods for his army, and it worked.”¹⁴

When relations with France finally resulted in a full military alliance and French entry into the war, Lafayette was ecstatic. Never one to shy away from praise, he undoubtedly gave himself a good deal of credit for this development. “Lafayette wrote letters describ-

ing the American uniforms so that French officers could tell one rank from another. He sent out periodic updates on the military situation for Rochambeau to receive when he arrived. And he revived his dream of invading Canada.”¹⁵ Unable to leave camp himself at the time of Rochambeau’s arrival in Rhode Island, Washington sent Lafayette to deal with the French general. This was a miscalculation by Washington, who believed that Lafayette’s stature in French society would do him good here as it had in appeals for material aid. But Lafayette was not made for diplomacy. He immediately endangered future Franco-American cooperation by his abrasiveness and by seemingly issuing orders to the French generals and admiral present. The French officers were well aware of the fact that Lafayette was only a captain in their own army, and largely resented his haughtiness. Even Rochambeau, who “was famous for not getting angry about anything,” was sent into a furor by Lafayette’s tone.¹⁶ He began a private correspondence with Washington which resulted in an alleviation of the situation, but Washington was embarrassed by his mistake. Rochambeau wrote to the French ambassador that he would ignore all messages from then on from “some young and ardent persons” who were close to the American commander.¹⁷ In his embarrassment, and anxiety over the future of the alliance, Washington forced Lafayette to pen an apology to Rochambeau. “The marquis turned on his boyish charm in a private note.” His conclusion was bizarre but effective enough: “My error was in writing officially with passion what you would have excused to my youth had I written it as a friend to you alone.”¹⁸ Lafayette certainly respected the old French general; his primary objections were with the admiral who accompanied him. He made two assurances to the French ambassador, La Luzerne. He swore his shame for having embarrassed Washington, admitting presciently that “I am considered too American,” and he promised, “I shall not meddle in politics anymore.”¹⁹

His life may have played out much more happily if he kept that second promise after his return to France.²⁰

The tact of Generals Rochambeau and Washington smoothed relations between the two nations. Rochambeau accepted Lafayette's apologies, as he was "too big a personality to nurse a grievance." Rochambeau biographer Arnold Whitridge put it poetically: "In Greek mythology the goddesses had eagerly seized on the apple of discord, but luckily mortal men do not always behave as gods."²¹ For him, the matter was closed; the goal was to defeat the British, and there were larger matters at hand than the impetuosity of a young officer. He certainly could have insisted on the dismissal of Lafayette or some other punishment. But his personality was not a vindictive one, and this was fortunate for all. The end result of the fracas was simply that "Washington had learned that there were limits to the duties he could hand even to Lafayette. The war continued, and he would need him for things the young general did have talent for."²²

One thing Lafayette possessed tremendous talent for was commanding light infantry. When Rochambeau convinced Washington that there was little hope of achieving the American's dream of recapturing New York City, another course of action was needed. Attention was turned to the south, not only to Lord Charles Cornwallis's campaign in the Carolinas, but also to a new threat that arose: a British force that was rampaging through Virginia. Washington needed a general to command the detachment that would oppose this new threat while his main army kept Clinton's army in check in the north. Partly in recognition of the young marquis's talents and partly to be relieved of his constant irking of the French officers, he selected Lafayette.²³

Lafayette set about his task with enthusiasm, stemming from both his natural *élan* and from personal issues. Among the personal

issues which fueled Lafayette in this campaign were the identities of the two British commanders in Virginia: William Phillips and Benedict Arnold. It had been troops under the command of Phillips who had killed Lafayette's father. As an adolescent, Lafayette had written a tribute to his father, describing that when his father assumed command from his wounded superior, he "was at once carried off by a ball from an English battery, commanded by a certain General Phillips."²⁴ Lafayette was thrilled at the chance to avenge his father, and in his memoirs claimed credit for killing Phillips with his artillery. This was untrue; Phillips died of disease during the campaign in Virginia, but that minor detail did not concern Lafayette in his quest for revenge and honor. His determination to kill Phillips was equaled by his fervor for catching Benedict Arnold, the man who had betrayed his adopted father, Washington. He never succeeded at this task, as Arnold left Virginia shortly after Lafayette's arrival to return to New York. However, he had pushed his troops hard in his pursuit of this goal, and was now in position to threaten British operations in the South.²⁵

Lord Cornwallis, frustrated in his operations in the Carolinas, pushed north to reinforce Phillips. He was quite dismissive of Lafayette as an opponent, boasting that "The boy cannot escape me."²⁶ He referred repeatedly to Lafayette simply as "the boy." This disrespectful dismissal of his rank and stature may have actually satisfied Lafayette, as it was similar to the British refusal to call Washington by his rank. Anything that connected Lafayette to Washington, or made them similar in any way, was pleasing to the young aristocrat. Cornwallis, despite his boasts, failed to "bag the boy." Notably, despite his great desire to lead troops, Lafayette expressed a wish during this time to leave his detachment to return to Washington's side in the north. "I am homesick and if I can't go to head quarters wish at least to hear from there."²⁷ An element of this was an honest fear

the marquis had of Cornwallis. "I would rather be rid of Lord Cornwallis than of a third of his army," he admitted to the French ambassador.²⁸ Despite this anxiety, he performed exceptionally well, falling back toward Fredericksburg until he could be reinforced by General Anthony Wayne, and then slowly following and harassing Cornwallis's army as it withdrew to a new base at Yorktown, Virginia, trapping the British in that coastal city.

Lafayette's ability to force Cornwallis back into Yorktown set the stage for the war's final act on the American continent. Showing the boldness which Lafayette had impetuously insisted upon since his arrival, Rochambeau moved his army down from Rhode Island along with Washington's army from New York and New Jersey. Due in large part to the cautiousness of General Sir Henry Clinton, and to a rare naval victory by a French fleet under Comte De Grasse, Cornwallis's army was doomed. After Cornwallis was forced to surrender, Lafayette was surprised by one final scene of the drama. Cornwallis paid a visit to the marquis at his headquarters. "The marquis had always admired Cornwallis, and found him polite, even charming," and was pleased that the British general "showed honest respect for the balding redhead he had...dismissed as 'the boy.'" As always with diplomatic matters, however, the event was not without a problem. Lafayette rebuked the British for holding Henry Laurens as a prisoner in the Tower of London. Cornwallis, a gentleman, agreed to be exchanged for Laurens himself.²⁹

Lafayette returned home to France to a hero's reception. Being among the first to arrive with news of Cornwallis's surrender, he was not shy about promoting his own achievements. His greatest pride, however, came from recognition being heaped upon him not only as a military hero, but also as a "friend of Washington."³⁰ Never letting his adoptive home drift far from the front of his mind, he shared lasting friendships with two Americans of high station in

particular long after his return to France at the conclusion of America's war with England: George Washington and Thomas Jefferson.³¹

Lafayette was a companion of Washington in the fight for independence, served as one of his lieutenants, and commanded a wing of the southern forces which – along with Washington and Rochambeau – trapped the British army of Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown. When the war was concluded, Lafayette traveled with General Washington to Mount Vernon and other locations, and endeared himself to the rest of Washington's family – as he did to nearly every American he met. Their last meeting was on December 1, 1784, and shortly after Washington wrote to Lafayette, "In the moment of our separation upon the road as I travelled [sic], and every hour since, I felt all that love, respect and attachment for you, with which length of years, close connexion [sic] and your merits have inspired me."³² Lafayette responded that it was "with an unexpressible [sic] pain that I feel I am going to be severed from you by the Atlantick [sic]."³³ Lafayette named his son George Washington after his revolutionary idol, and later sent this son to America to live with General Washington during the chaos in France. However, Washington was forced to keep a distance from the younger Lafayette due to the condition of American foreign relations with France – then ruled by the Jacobins – and with Prussia and Austria – both of whom imprisoned General Lafayette after his attempt to flee to America himself. Lafayette still planned to travel to America after his release from prison, but the poor health of his wife forced him to remain in France.³⁴ Washington did make efforts to secure the release of Lafayette from incarceration, but was careful to always point out that his entreaties were simply of friendship, not official statements by the government. General Lafayette was released from prison after Napoleon's vic-

tories, but the “Austrian chancellor took pains to make it clear that the emperor had consented to the release...largely because of the ‘particular interest which the United States appears to attach to it.’”³⁵ Yet correspondence between Lafayette and Washington never resumed following Lafayette’s imprisonment due to the Quasi-War between their two countries. George Washington died in 1799.³⁶

Whereas the relationship between Washington and Lafayette has always been described as similar to that between a father and a son, Lafayette’s connection with Thomas Jefferson was much like one between two brothers or classmates. They met during the American Revolution when Lafayette received his commission from Congress, and again when Jefferson was stationed in Paris as an American diplomat. For the remainder of Jefferson’s life they exchanged congenial letters debating political and philosophical topics, but neither one ever professed in any way to be the superior or inferior of the other. They were kindred spirits dedicated to liberty and order. Lafayette’s final letter to Jefferson was written on February 25, 1826, and discussed a topic which had become of great interest of Lafayette: his desire for the “Gradual Emancipation of Slavery” throughout the world.³⁷ It closed with affectionate words: “Adieu, My dear friend, I don’t force you to write knowing it fatigues you, But Mrs. Randolph³⁸ and My Young friends will Be very kind to give me every particulars concerning you and them. Remember me most Affectionately to Mr. and Mrs. Madison.”³⁹ On July 4 of that year, Thomas Jefferson passed away.

In sharp contrast to his American friends, unfortunately for General Lafayette, his relations with those who came to lead the French Revolution were far from affectionate. Lafayette was thoroughly opposed to the radical Jacobins led by Maximilian Robespierre in the period which led to the Great Terror. Due to Lafayette’s persistent advocacy of a constitutional monarchy, Robes-

pierre and his followers branded Lafayette as an anti-revolutionary and a traitor,⁴⁰ which led to the general fleeing France in an attempt to escape to the land of his great celebrity: the United States. Lafayette was unsurprised by the ability of Robespierre to rally the mob in order to dominate the country. He credited this to the fact that France was under attack from all around. As Lafayette wrote:

In time of peace, this society, as at first instituted, may be very useful in pointing out any encroachments of government upon the liberties of the people. But when the country is at war with foreign nations...artful emissaries find little difficulty in converting weak men, into instruments, affecting to admire them for excellencies, which the hyperborean nature of the soil could never produce, they wind up their vanity, and take possession of the heart, by astonishing them with the new discovery of their importance. Rendered thus far ductile, the evil genius, holds up the *ignis fatuus* of suspicion to their ignorance, tempts them along, until it thinks proper to act upon the nitrous portion in their composition, and securely level destructive thunders, at the devoted object, and it is not difficult to foresee what characters are likely to be sacrificed.⁴¹

Those likely to be sacrificed were those dedicated to maintaining a bourgeois sense of law and order. The leader of this group was Lafayette himself. He considered the words of the Jacobins to be nothing but “idiotic phlegm” which would lead to “so dangerous a monster, that its destruction becomes necessary to the honour, and safety of its own former species.”⁴² Lafayette viewed Robespierre’s government as having “broke loose from the chains applied by reason...furiously overturning all things that bore any appearance of resistance, and marked its horrid career with blood, and destruction.”⁴³

General Lafayette clearly recognized that he placed his own rep-

utation and safety at risk by so vehemently opposing Robespierre and the Jacobins, yet his dedication to law and public order would not tolerate the chaos brought on by their elevation to the top of the government. While “The legislative body, terrified..., suffered itself to be dictated into measures, which the necessity of the moment only, could justify, or rather apologize for,”⁴⁴ Lafayette fought his final battle of the First Republic of France. As he recalled:

It was my misfortune to oppose the progress of such violence, with the utmost spirit I was master of, and my overthrow was the consequence of the contest. Reduced to the necessity of yielding my neck to the murderer’s knife, or of availing myself of the alternative...I preferred a submission to any law, rather than to the blind vengeance of a fury, which was governed by no law.⁴⁵

It was at this time that Lafayette decided to flee from France. He speculated later that his political enemies were more than happy to allow him to escape the borders of the country. He was certain that Robespierre used his escape to give the government’s “persecution the important appearance of vigilance, and also gave their unjust, or pretended suspicions, an apparent justification.”⁴⁶ All of this was possible only because the mob was distracted by the presence of France’s foreign enemies all around, and these enemies had tightened their noose enough to prevent Lafayette from abandoning Europe. General Lafayette received his wish to live in “submission to any law” rather than under the turmoil of the Jacobins. He would spend the next several years of his life in prisons of first Prussia and then Austria.

Lafayette had a terribly complex relationship with Napoleon Bonaparte upon Napoleon’s ascension to power. In the old days,

one of those who counted Lafayette as a political opponent was the Vicomte de Barras, who had – at the same time – been the political sponsor and advocate of General Bonaparte. Bonaparte and his brothers had been associated with Robespierre – specifically to Maximilian Robespierre’s brother – and this could potentially serve as yet another wedge between France’s military hero of the 1780s and the new national military hero of the 1790s and 1800s.

Napoleon’s effort to become Emperor of the French appalled the old revolutionary and constitutional monarchist, Lafayette. As the *Rhode Island American* recounted, “The Marquis de Lafayette strenuously and steadily resisted the change – he saw all securities as to freedom about to be annihilated.”⁴⁷ Lafayette, like several other men who actively opposed the emperorship of Napoleon and voted against it, was forced into retirement from public life. Lafayette held strong doubts that Emperor Napoleon I of the French would uphold the oath he had taken as First Consul to the “inviolable fidelity to the sovereignty of the people; to the French Republick [sic] one and indivisible, to Equality, to Liberty and to the Representative system.”⁴⁸ Bonaparte was content to allow Lafayette to live in peace at his estate. However, he never forgave the perceived treachery of Lafayette’s vote against his life-long rule. Before he died in exile on Saint Helena in 1821, Bonaparte wrote in his will that he had “been defeated by the treachery of Marmont, Augereau, Talleyrand, and Lafayette.”⁴⁹

The basis of Napoleon’s personal disdain for Lafayette was probably not found in Bonaparte’s connection to Robespierre and Barras in the earlier days of the French Republic, but rather in the fact that Napoleon believed he was owed loyalty from Lafayette due to his securing the old hero’s release from the prisons of the Austria-Prussia alliance after Bonaparte’s victories in Italy. Even an obituary of Bonaparte which was published in numerous American news-

papers contained a paragraph on Lafayette which stated that he was driven from France “when the places of justice and power were usurped by assassins,” and was imprisoned in Germany, “where he remained and would have remained, had not the increasing power of Napoleon rescued him from those who held him prisoner.”⁵⁰ However, he never made any sort of pledge of loyalty to Bonaparte. “Lafayette never bowed down to the splendid idol. When the world went wild with adoration, aloof and in retirement, the republican General, unawed, unflattered, and unintimidated, preserved his consistency and his principles.”⁵¹ The Emperor relied on his own understanding of the methodology of human gratitude, and believed that the grateful feeling Lafayette would hold for escaping his prison cell would compel the old general to abandon his political convictions. But Lafayette would not be halted in his crusade for the constitutional state he envisioned. His most powerful belief was that “the professors of the common law, are a great blessing in every country; they are guardians to a good Constitution; and if a bad one affords but one good spark, they will not fail to improve it to the utmost advantage.”⁵² An emperorship reeked of absolutism in Lafayette’s mind, and he recognized in Napoleon the ambition and avarice which had plagued earlier revolutionary leaders who had turned away from republican ideals. “When Bonaparte became invested with the imperial dignity, he wished to employ La Fayette, who thinking he could not, with the liberal principles he possessed, enter into all the views of the Emperor, declined his overtures, and retired altogether to his Chateau.”⁵³

Napoleon was disappointed by Lafayette’s refusal to submit to his power, but held some level of respect for the old general’s character. Lafayette was “protected in his civil rights, and respected by Napoleon as an honest man.”⁵⁴ He said Lafayette “would make a good country Justice of the Peace.”⁵⁵ Perhaps this job would have

been fitting for General Lafayette, for it would give him a chance to devote himself to maintaining the law and order which he desperately desired in all aspects of French society and life. A return to his military life seemed clearly out of the realm of possibility, as Napoleon was deeply suspicious of any subordinate whose popularity could rival his own.⁵⁶ Lafayette remained in his quiet retirement until Napoleon's first abdication.

During the period of the Second Bourbon Restoration following Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo and banishment to Saint Helena, Lafayette took the opportunity to finally travel again to America, touring the nation from July 1824 to September 1825. American newspapers rejoiced at the "probability of a visit from this early and chivalric champion of American freedom."⁵⁷ They had worked to keep track of the nation's favorite Frenchman over the years, including publishing numerous calls for his release from prison during those dark days of the 1790s. The Quasi-War between the United States and France was over by the time Lafayette felt healthy enough to make the trip for his farewell tour to the United States – though Americans would have surely greeted Lafayette as no less of a hero simply due to the complicated relations between the two nations during that time. At the invitation of James Monroe, a fellow veteran of the American Revolution, "Lafayette's American tour everywhere had attracted immense crowds grateful for his service, nostalgic for the virtue of an earlier time, and eager to venerate a disappearing cohort of aging veterans."⁵⁸ America had been divided in recent years by issues such as the slavery question and internal improvements, and people yearned for reminders of civic virtue. "Lafayette, himself aged and infirm, nonetheless remained a vibrant symbol of the Revolution's idealism, a reminder of the long odds and improbable triumph of a motley people over the world's most powerful empire."⁵⁹ He visited all of the original thirteen states,

each of which was eager to name cities for him. He was also honored by Congress with \$200,000 and a 24,000-acre township from public lands. Lafayette was the last of the great heroes of the Revolution, and the American people and government would not forget it.⁶⁰

Lafayette would remain a greater hero to his contemporaries in America than to those in France. His opposition to popular leaders at different stages of the French Revolution – and the impression that his early actions were responsible for setting off the powder-keg – guaranteed that many in that nation would deny him the rank of a “great man.” Americans of the time had a very different perspective. What is it that makes a great man? Several American newspapers printed an opinion piece examining this question only a few years before Lafayette’s death:

Are military courage and conduct the test of greatness? Lafayette was trusted by Washington with all kinds of service...Are the willingness to meet tremendous responsibility, and the cool and brave administration of gigantic-power, proofs of greatness? Lafayette commanded in chief the national guard of France, three million of bayonets. Is the fortitude, required to resist the urgency of a multitude pressing onward their leader to crime, a trait of true greatness? Behold Lafayette, when he might have been the chief, becoming the fugative [sic] of the French Revolution. Is the solitary and unaided opposition of a good citizen to the pretensions of an absolute ruler, whose power was as boundless as his ambition, an effort of greatness? Read the letter of Lafayette to Napoleon Bonaparte, refusing to vote for him as consul for life.⁶¹ Is a voluntary return, in advancing years, to the direction of affairs, at a moment like that when the ponderous machinery of the French empire was flying asunder, stunning, rending, crushing, annihilating thousands on every side, a mark of

greatness?...And add to all this the dignity, the propriety, the cheerfulness, the matchless discretion of his conduct, in the strange new position, in which he was placed in this country. Those who deny such a man the meed of greatness, may award it, if they please, to their Alexanders and Caesars, their Frederics and their Wellingtons.⁶²

Lafayette's place in American history and legacy was set. Only his status in French memory remained in question.

In the year this tribute was published, Lafayette returned to the forefront one final time in his home country of France, the land which denied him the "meed of greatness."⁶³ In the Revolution of 1830, it was Lafayette, once again commanding the National Guard of Paris just as he had in 1789, who introduced to the people the new king of France, Louis-Philippe. Lafayette himself wrote to an American friend describing the events: "We have just accomplished, my dear fellow soldier, a wonderful revolution... 'the Royal family had ceased to reign!'"⁶⁴ Lafayette continued his letter with a collection of statements about this 1830 revolution which must have brought great joy and pride to him personally: "The Parisians manifested a degree of courage, intelligence, disinterestedness, and generosity, supassing [sic] all that [one] can conceive ... The regiments of the line submitted successively to the public will...We came to the conclusion that it would be proper to rally all opinions...under the safe guard of a constitutional throne, with popular institutions. We have chosen the Duke of Orleans, who I esteem more and more as I know him better."⁶⁵ Lafayette had his constitutional monarchy at last, and it had been gained in a revolt which he himself described as orderly and without insult. In his introduction of Louis-Philippe, Lafayette said to the Tribune, "I am not yielding to a momentary impulsion, nor am I courting popularity, which I never preferred to my duty. The republican principles, which I have professed

throughout my life, and under all governments, do not prevent me from being the defender of a Constitutional Throne raised by the people. The same sentiments animate me under the present circumstances.”⁶⁶ He proclaimed that he would remain in command of the National Guard of France.⁶⁷ The old general was back in uniform, and his fame – which had been lost or tarnished for so long – had been returned to him.

In 1834, two sides of the Atlantic Ocean joined together in mourning. It was the “death of the last surviving General of the glorious army of the American Revolution – the immortal LAFAYETTE!”⁶⁸ The Americans, who even then were fully aware that they held the great Frenchman in higher regard than his own countrymen, noted in obituaries that “the French papers unite in bearing testimony to the eminent political qualities and private virtues of the departed patriot.”⁶⁹ Lafayette had filled “the highest and the proudest station in public opinion, that was perhaps ever occupied by a mortal.”⁷⁰ He had been “the morning star of one revolution, and the guiding light of another – he lived to see his principles triumphant and his glory complete – by saving his country at the most tremendous crisis of its whole history.”⁷¹ This was perhaps the essential key to his reputation in France. He would always be a hero to the United States, but in France, it was necessary for him to survive. The “idiotic phlegm” of Robespierre passed at the end of his Reign of Terror, the unacceptable ambition of Napoleon was banished and he passed away over a decade prior to Lafayette. But the man who sought liberty, law, and public order at all times in his life had persevered through it all with dignity and determination. This secured for him in the minds of the younger and yet unborn French people a reputation which was denied to him by those who partook in the events of the period around him. His famous friends and admirers in America are still held in esteem by the people of the United

States, whereas the most powerful enemy of Lafayette in Paris, Robespierre, is remembered for a terrible period in French history. Even Napoleon, who was disappointed by Lafayette, respected his character, and these two men share similar mixed reputations in the memory of Frenchmen. The relationships of Lafayette with revolutionary leaders were complicated and diverse, but in the end, he had made friends and enemies out of the right people to guarantee himself “an honor, a celebrity, and a purity of reputation rarely if ever before attained by any public character.”⁷²

Notes

¹ Daniel L. Wick, “The Court of Nobility and the French Revolution: the Example of the Society of Thirty,” *Eighteenth Century Studies* 13, no. 3 (Spring 1980): 283.

² Joel Richard Paul, *Unlikely Allies: How a Merchant, a Playwright, and a Spy Saved the American Revolution* (New York: Riverhead Books, 2009), 204.

³ *Ibid.* The situation in the Continental Army resulting from Deane’s overzealousness was similar to that of Napoleon upon his return from Elba, when he has been credited in popular stories with sending King Louis XVIII a mocking message asking him to please send him no more generals; he had enough – as so many who had been sent to stop him had instead re-joined him in his quest to regain the throne.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.* 205.

⁶ *Ibid.* Of course, his enraged father-in-law was also the father of his companion, Noailles. General Broglie, mentioned here, was a French general who volunteered as a major general for American service; the Comte de Vergennes was urging the Continental Congress, through a reluctant Silas Deane, to replace George Washington with Broglie. When France officially entered the war, Broglie was designated to command France’s forces on the European continent to oppose England.

⁷ David A. Clary, *Adopted Son: Washington, Lafayette, and the Friendship that Saved the Revolution* (New York: Bantam Books, 2007), 97-98.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 98.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 99.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 99-100. Clary also tells stories of Lafayette curling up to sleep at the foot of Washington’s bed, in the way a young child may do.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 115.

¹² *Ibid.*, 117.

¹³ *Ibid.* James Monroe, the future president who would invite Lafayette for his final celebrity tour of America, used the opportunity to console the marquis and try out some of his own limited French. Monroe had been wounded at the Battle of Trenton.

¹⁴ Ibid, 263-264.

¹⁵ Ibid, 265. This dream of invading Canada stuck with Lafayette throughout the war, and was evidence of his over-enthusiasm for American arms. He also shared Washington's obsession throughout the war with re-taking New York City by force.

¹⁶ Ibid, 271.

¹⁷ Ibid, 272.

¹⁸ Ibid, 273.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Rochambeau, like Washington, spoke to Lafayette in familial terms. Accepting Lafayette's apologies, he wrote, "This is still the old father Rochambeau speaking to his dear son Lafayette, whom he loves and will continue to love and esteem to his last breath" (275). This was a popular opinion of Rochambeau among young French officers, among them the future Napoleonic Marshal Berthier, who served on the general's staff in America and considered him "like the father of a family," according to Arnold Whitridge, *Rochambeau: America's Neglected Founding Father* (New York: Collier Books, 1974), 141.

²¹ Arnold Whitridge, *Rochambeau: America's Neglected Founding Father* (New York: Collier Books, 1974), 124.

²² Clary, 275.

²³ Arnold Whitridge explains in detail the discussions between Rochambeau and Washington concerning strategy, with Washington typically deferring to the experience and wisdom of his French counterpart, who had to coddle Washington and his aggressiveness in a manner similar to Washington's own soothing of Lafayette. When Lafayette came into trouble as Cornwallis moved into Virginia, Rochambeau insisted on concentration of force in the Chesapeake area, forcing Washington to finally give up his obsession (167).

²⁴ Clary, 10.

²⁵ Dave R. Palmer, *George Washington and Benedict Arnold: a Tale of Two Patriots* (Washington: Regnery, 2006), 378-379.

²⁶ Palmer, 379.

²⁷ Clary, 318.

²⁸ Clary, 323.

²⁹ Clary, 340.

³⁰ Clary, 345.

³¹ James Madison may be added to this group if one prefers, but letters between Lafayette and Madison were unavailable at the time this research was conducted.

³² Louis Gottschalk and Shirley A. Bill, ed., *The Letters of Lafayette to Washington, 1777-1799* (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1976), xix.

³³ Gottschalk and Bill, xx.

³⁴ Gottschalk and Bill, xxii-xxiii. In a truly romantic story of history, Madame de Lafayette and her daughters traveled to the prison where the General was being held and asked to see him, in order to bring him certain necessities and emotional comfort. The Austrians offered them a choice: they could turn away and go back to France without meeting with the prisoner, or they could be allowed to meet with him very briefly, but then be incarcerated themselves in a separate cell

for an indeterminate length of time. The Lafayette women were determined to see their husband/father, and as a result they all remained imprisoned for several years.

³⁵ Gottschalk and Bill, xxiii.

³⁶ Gottschalk and Bill, xxiv.

³⁷ Gilbert Chinard, ed., *Letters of Lafayette and Jefferson* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1929), 436-438.

³⁸ The wife of Thomas Jefferson Randolph, Thomas Jefferson's grandson.

³⁹ Chinard, 438.

⁴⁰ The other French hero of the American Revolution, Comte de Rochambeau, had also been in charge of one of France's revolutionary armies before falling into disfavor with the Jacobins and being removed from command, just as Lafayette was.

⁴¹ La Fayette, Marquis de. *The Marquis de La Fayette's Statement of His Own Conduct and Principles* (London: Whig Club, 1793), 20-21.

⁴² La Fayette, *Statement*, 21-22.

⁴³ La Fayette, *Statement*, 22.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ La Fayette, *Statement*, 22-23.

⁴⁷ "From the National Gazette. Political History," *Rhode Island American*, October 16, 1821.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ A.G. MacDonell, *Napoleon and His Marshals* (London: Prion, 1996), 287. Marmont and Augereau were two of Napoleon's marshals and oldest friends who he believed had betrayed him during the 1814 battle for Paris. Talleyrand was France's leading diplomat and had served as Napoleon's Foreign Minister.

⁵⁰ "Napoleon Bonaparte," *Essex Register*, October 13, 1821.

⁵¹ "Very Late and Important, From the *New York Commercial Advertiser of Thursday*," *Essex Gazette*, June 28, 1834.

⁵² La Fayette, *Statement*, 60.

⁵³ "From the *National Intelligence*, Oct. 23," *City Gazette and Daily Advertiser*, October 30, 1821.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ "From the National Gazette. Political History," *Rhode Island American*, October 16, 1821.

⁵⁶ John Gallaher, "Davout and Napoleon: A Study of Their Personal Relationship," *The Journal of the International Napoleonic Society* 1, no. 1 (April 1997): http://www.napoleonicsociety.com/english/scholarship97/c_davout.html (accessed October 12, 2012).

⁵⁷ "La Fayette," *Boston Patriot*, July 31, 1824.

⁵⁸ David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler, *Henry Clay: the Essential American* (New York: Random House, 2010), 176.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 177.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 177. The eminent Clay, himself a friend of Lafayette's from Clay's time as a diplomat in Europe, despised this generous grant to Lafayette, believing

federal funds and land would be much more useful in building internal improvements, but he realized that to oppose the popular measure would be useless.

⁶¹ Unfortunately this letter could not be found in the preparation of this paper.

⁶² "Lafayette," *Christian Register*, February 27, 1830.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ "Gen. Lafayette," *Newport Mercury*, September 25, 1830.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ "Foreign News. New-York, Sept. 20. Important from France," *Newport Mercury*, September 25, 1830.

⁶⁷ "Gen. Lafayette," *Newport Mercury*, September 25, 1830.

⁶⁸ "Death of Lafayette," *Essex Gazette*, June 28, 1834.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid.

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Samuel Adams: The Grand Incendiary of the Province
Rebecca Simmons Graf

Samuel Adams is, for some, an admired Founding Father and the man who brought about the Revolution and for others, an instigator who was a master of manipulation. However, while his motives may have been questionable, his ability with a pen was not. Adams, considered a great writer in his own time, is still admired for his writing ability today. He wrote many essays, pamphlets, letters, petitions, and newspaper articles. He aided in the formation of the Declaration of Independence and Articles of Confederation. However, Samuel Adams' writings are best known for the part they played in convincing people to join the cause of the American Revolution. He successfully argued for the rights that he believed the people already possessed. Samuel Adams used his pen to ignite the people; he wrote persuasive essays aimed at forming a unified group to begin and sustain the colonial rebellion against oppressive British taxes and legislation. According to journalist Mark Puls, Adams, at the time that the rebellious colonists' argument with Britain erupted into armed conflict at Lexington, Massachusetts on April 19, 1775, "had already spent a decade working to convince colonists young and old alike that independence could only be secured with a break from England."¹ To keep the rebellion on track, even when there was a lull in the resistance activities, Adams still wrote. Many of his letters have been lost, but his published essays have been saved and republished many times in an effort to understand what drove him. While it may seem to some that Samuel Adams was simply following in his father's political footsteps or was just attempting to advance his personal interests, Adams had his own knack for politics. Eventually, he chose to return to local politics when the new nation

was fully formed.

Samuel Adams was born September 16, 1722, in Boston, Massachusetts. His ancestors had been part of the Puritan migration to the New World. They were searching for a return to a purer form of Protestant worship in the wake of the marriage of Charles I to a Catholic and the ensuing persecution of Protestants. Growing up, Adam's family life centered around the church, as was proper for a Puritan family. His father, Samuel the elder, was very active in his church and eventually became a deacon. Deacon, as Samuel the elder was sometimes called, also participated in local politics. He was a justice of the peace, member of the colonial legislature, and was involved in other politically relevant positions in Boston. Adams would be greatly influenced by his father's position in the city, his religious leanings, and his political activities.

Young Adams entered Harvard at the age of fourteen to study theology. His family had hopes that he would enter the ministry; however, that was not to be. Following Adam's graduation with the degree of master at the age of twenty, Deacon Adams set his son up in a countinghouse and later staked him to trade for himself, but "[t]emperament and the times conspired to steer Samuel away from commerce and into the political activity he really loved."² It appears that Adams did not have the head, or possibly the desire, to conduct business, for historian Jack Rakove noted that he "somehow pulled off the neat trick of ruining the family brewery" following his father's death. Adams seemed to have had an aversion to the collection of money; Puls noted that the brewery went bankrupt because Adams "failed to put pressure on those who owed him money," much as he failed to collect the taxes he was elected to collect during the 1750s.³ Regardless of his family's desires for him to join the ministry or to become a businessman, Adam's true interests evolved during his time at Harvard. His in-

terests switched from the theology that he originally set out to study, to the political issues of the period. In fact, editor Ira Stoll, along with Puls, noted that to receive his master's degree, Adams argued affirmatively the question "Whether it be lawful to resist the supreme magistrate, if the commonwealth can not be otherwise preserved?"⁴ He had grown up listening to his father and his father's associates discuss the issues of the day, and he was fascinated with their discourse. This may well be where his first ideas on politics were formed.

Therefore, Adam's temperament and interests were largely shaped by the combination of "his Calvinist upbringing, Harvard education, and early entrance into politics" as well the influence of his father.⁵ This combination "placed him squarely within the tradition of opposition politics."⁶ Adams' early life, family, education, and religion all worked together to make him into a politically astute man with a goal, many say, for eventually gaining the independence of the colonies. As early as 1748, Adams began his public, political writing career. Puls pointed to Adams and his friends' creation of a club in that year where they could hold debates and form a publication geared toward shaping public opinion. Adams first article of the publication, *The Public Advertiser*, was on loyalty. He argued "that allegiance should be given to laws rather than to government leaders."⁷ Stoll noted that Adams' debut was focused on liberty as "the choicest gift that Heaven has lent to man," combining religious rhetoric with enlightenment theory.⁸ This argument may have been directly influenced by the writings of John Locke, which Adams would have likely read in his efforts to find precedent for the limitation of increasing government intervention.

As it was, Massachusetts had become a center of political activity throughout the 1760s and 1770s, unlike most other colonies where cooler heads prevailed after the initial anger over the Stamp

Act and other such actions of Parliament.⁹ Historians Larry Schweikart and Michael Allen noted that Samuel Adams was the main person who was working to disturb the lull; he published more than forty articles in the two years following the March 5, 1770 Boston Massacre.¹⁰ He is attributed with success in this venture due to his ability to write in “a clear and concise style that appealed to less-educated citizens.”¹¹ In contrast, Puls noted that the colonists who read Adams’ writings were “highly literate, and well versed in the allusions to ancient Latin and Greek writers and examples from antiquity from which he drew his analogies.”¹² Adams’ chances to write would increase upon his election to the Massachusetts House of Representatives and his continued publication in other papers, in particular the *Boston Gazette*. As Stoll noted, Adams wrote frequently, passionately, and elegantly throughout the early Revolution era.¹³

Adams was first elected to the Massachusetts House of Representatives in 1765. His multiple elections to the House, and his subsequent election to be its clerk, are evidence of his popularity within Boston. Puls noted that Adams’ early stint as a tax collector had put him in touch with a variety of inhabitants, which led to him being well known and may have aided in his knowledge of public opinion.¹⁴ However, his time in the House, combined with his writings for the *Gazette* may have led to Governor Thomas Hutchinson’s dislike and opinion that Adams was the cause of the rebellion in Boston. Rakove noted that “Hutchinson’s two... great foes, [were] Samuel and John Adams.”¹⁵ As clerk for the Massachusetts House of Representatives, and as a regular contributor to the *Boston Gazette* through the use of multiple pen names, Adams became a thorn in Hutchinson’s side. By the early 1770s Adams was a vocal political leader in the Bay Colony. He had emerged as the leader who was most suspicious of the British Parliament’s motives. He also proved

to be the most likely candidate for an active role in the resistance to what he saw as increasing government infringement of the people's rights.¹⁶ Why Adams believed that the British government was attempting to do away with the rights of their subjects on the American continent seems to have stemmed from Britain's bungling of their North American policy.

As historian Barbara W. Tuchman noted, Great Britain's policy toward the American colonies prior to the American Revolution made little sense. Parliament made multiple decisions that were detrimental to their relationship with their American colonies, and "[i]n the end Britain made rebels where there had been none."¹⁷ Samuel Adams and his friends were some of those rebels. Through the placement of a standing army in the colonies – for the colonists' protection – and the repeated attempts to tax the colonists – to pay for the previous wars on the continent, as well as for the funding of the army placed in the colonies – Parliament did not endear themselves to the American people. The argument that came from the people focused on the right to representation, which the colonies did not have in Parliament, and the principle that Englishmen had the right not to be taxed except by their own representatives.¹⁸ These offensive moves from across the ocean were seen as tyrannical by many in the colonies; and the people feared that these threats to their liberties were intentional.¹⁹ Samuel Adams in particular seemed to believe that "a raw lust for power was driving Britain's leaders to seek dominion over America."²⁰ He began working publically to undermine the decisions of Parliament shortly after the passage of the Sugar Act.

Initially, Adams was isolated in his beliefs and concerns over the acts of Parliament, at least in Boston. Puls noted that Adams "was shocked to find himself alone in speaking out at the Boston town meeting and at political clubs and the caucus." When he made in-

quires as to whether any complaints had been lodged, the answer was none.²¹ As such, Adams determined that he would have to incite the people; he would need to find a way to unite them in a common cause. His first step was to trigger a boycott of goods imported from Britain.

Some historians believe that Adams may have intentionally set out to begin a revolution. Rakove noted that “[w]ith the possible (and doubtful) exception of Samuel Adams, none of those who took leading roles in the struggle actively set out to foment rebellion or found a republic.”²² Similarly, Schweikart and Allan noted that Adams was among the early advocates for a full separation from Great Britain.²³ Rakove also stated that Adams used the rebellion to “advance his own political ambitions” but further notes that “it is far from clear that Adams possessed ambition as we define that term, or that if he did, he could ever admit it to himself. . . His identity and his politics fused so completely that he probably did not know where one left off and the other began.”²⁴ He described Adams “As an ideologue, [who] already knew how events were destined to turn out. But [Adams] also believed that the exact timing of this decision [independence] was not critical.”²⁵ Therefore Adams could afford to be patient while working toward his ultimate goal; an independent American nation.

Historian Edmund Morgan, like Rakove, portrayed Adams in a negative manner. He stated that “Adams went after what he wanted with relentless and frightening singleness of purpose. He was a politician with a politician’s sense of timing, and ability to move men where he wanted them to go, and he wanted the people of Massachusetts to go in the direction of independence.”²⁶ Again Adams is painted as a master of manipulation with a single purpose. However, Adams used a rhetoric that his fellow colonists would understand. When advocating for independence in 1776, he asked “whether our

pious and generous ancestors bequeathed to us the miserable privilege of having the rewards of our honesty, industry, the fruits of those fields which they purchased and bled for, wrested from us at the will of men over whom we have no check.”²⁷ He argued that the colonists had a divine right to their liberty by saying that “[t]he hand of Heaven appears to have led us on to be, perhaps, humble instruments and means in the great providential dispensation which is completing. We have fled from the political Sodom; let us not look back lest we perish and become a monument of infamy and derision to the world.”²⁸ This religious reference was one of Adams’ recurring themes when writing for the cause of liberty and the peoples’ rights.

Adams’ writings focus on a couple of themes and had multiple influences. Rakove noted that “[w]hen Adams wrote for the press, he restated familiar themes and arch warnings that generations... on either side of the Atlantic had long pronounced.”²⁹ Adams used the writings of John Locke as inspiration for his beliefs on the civil rights of the American people. Locke argued that men were born with God given natural rights that could not be taken away. These included the rights to “life, liberty and property” that were listed in the Declaration of Independence, as well as being featured in many of Samuel Adams’ essays and declarations prior to the Declaration.

Essentially quoting Locke, Adams wrote that “[a]mong the natural rights of the Colonists are these: First, a right to life; Secondly, to liberty; Thirdly, to property; together with the right to support and defend them in the best manner they can. These are evident branches of, rather than deductions from, the duty of self-preservation, commonly called the first law of nature.”³⁰ He further noted that “[t]he absolute rights of Englishmen and all freemen, in or out of civil society, are principally personal security, personal liberty, and private property.”³¹ In addition to referencing Locke’s writings, Ad-

ams used many ancient Roman references when writing his essays, in particular in his use of pen names.

Adams frequently wrote for the *Boston Gazette* using over a dozen different pen names. He commonly used names that brought to mind ancient Roman orators, senators, and Emperors. Adams would have learned much about the Roman world through the common education that colonists received; Stoll points out that at the Boston Latin School he read “letters, essays, and orations of the Roman politician Marcus Tullius Cicero” among others.³² Adams’ main pen name was “Vindex,” the name of a Roman senator who first revolted against Nero. Others included “Cotton Mather” and “A Puritan,” which would refer to his Puritan roots. Also included in the range of Adams many pen names were “Candidus” (a Roman cognomen), “Valerius Poplicola” (a Roman aristocrat who lead a revolt), and “Determinatus” (a Latin word meaning defined). Stoll noted historian Douglass Adair’s assertion that “the number of names ‘created the impression of a host of Massachusetts opinions, all ‘patriotic,’ of course, and all squinting with suspicion toward England.’”³³ In an early essay published in the *Boston Gazette*, Adams, writing as “Determinatus” stated,

Where did you learn that in a state or society you have a right to do as you please? And that it was an infringement of that right to restrain you? ... Be pleased to be informed that you are bound to conduct yourselves as the Society with which you are joined, and pleased to have you conduct, or if you please, you may leave it. It is true that will and pleasure of the society is generally declared in its laws: But there may be exceptions, and the present case is without doubt one.³⁴

Stoll describes each of Adams’ pen names as “a window into a different aspect of Adams’s personality and role in the Revolution.”

For example, “Candidus” was described as “satirical, wry, intellectually combative, acid, scathing toward the British and their allies” while “Vindex” was seen as “a logical defender of the rights of the colonists” and “Determinarus” was described as “defiant and stubborn.”³⁵ Yet, there are still common arguments throughout the writings under the various pen names used by Adams. For in addition to the use of ancient Rome, Adams used religious references often.

As with other colonists that wrote on the threats to their liberty prior to the start of the Revolutionary War, Adams used a common theme in his publications: God. Adams and others would frequently question Parliament’s rights, but they stopped short of questioning the King, unless it was to invoke a higher power. For example, Adams wrote for the Massachusetts House of Representatives in 1765, “Resolved, that there are certain essential rights of the British Constitution of government, which are founded in the law of God and nature, and are the common rights of mankind... no law of society, can, consistent with the law of God and nature” take them away.³⁶ A year later, Adams wrote to the people of Plymouth stating that Plymouth’s support of Boston’s resistance was evidence that the people of Plymouth “still retain the truly noble Spirit of our renowned Ancestors.”³⁷ Stoll pointed to Adams’ preference of likening the American people to the Israelites or Jews. He cites as example an article signed by “A Puritan” in which Adams wrote “But who would have thought that the oblig’d and instructed Israelites would so soon after they were delivered from the Egyptian Task-masters, have fallen down before a *golden Calf!*”³⁸ The evident themes throughout most of Adams writings therefore, include multiple biblical references, Enlightenment ideas, and references to ancient Rome. Although focused on the natural, God-given rights of man to life, liberty, and property; Adams focused mostly on

property.

As Stoll noted, Adams cited property rights nearly as often as religious rights. In a letter for the Massachusetts House of Representatives, Adams wrote:

It is an essential, natural right, that a man shall quietly enjoy, and have the sole disposal of his own property... It is observable that though many have disregarded life, and contemned liberty, yet there are few men who do not agree that property is a valuable acquisition, which ought to be held sacred. Many have fought, bled, and died for this, who have been insensible to all other obligations.³⁹

Yet, Adams felt the need to do more and write more to encourage a sense of unity among the colonies in order to achieve their independence.

As part of Samuel Adams' continued efforts, he worked hard to persuade his cousin John Adams to join him and his friends in their cause. However, initially, as historian John Ferling noted, John Adams was leery of joining the rebellion; he believed that Samuel Adams and his cohorts were seduced by power.⁴⁰ But by 1768, John Adams had learned that to gain important office, avoidance of politics and anonymity were not the routes to take; one had to be politically active if he hoped to achieve high office.⁴¹ Ferling noted that Samuel Adams, in order to sway John Adams to the cause, "utilized every stratagem in his bag of tricks to allay his cousin's fears. Mostly, he adopted the persona of a political moderate."⁴² Here again, Samuel Adams appears to be a manipulative politician, but he was working toward a goal that he believed to be the best solution. His attempts to gain his cousin's participation would serve him and his cause well, for John Adams was an accomplished writer who was knowledgeable about the law. Where Samuel Adams used his reoc-

curing themes, John Adams was more original and academic in his writing. He was also better equipped to track down the evidence to follow a legal argument.⁴³ Another prolific writer on the side of the Revolution was a good thing, but John Adams was also hard at work with political activities that were seen by some as incendiary.

The Boston Tea Party of December 16, 1773, at it came to be called, has been attributed to the work of Samuel Adams and his friends the Sons of Liberty. The events preceding the destruction of property included the institution of the Tea Act by Parliament and the refusal of Governor Hutchinson to allow the tea to be returned to England. When it was announced at the Old South Church that Hutchinson refused, “Samuel Adams, the driving force on the town’s Committee of Correspondence, arose to declare that ‘they had now done all they could for the Salvation of their Country.’”⁴⁴ Was this declaration a signal to head to the docks? Had Samuel Adams orchestrated the work of dumping the tea into the harbor? Some writers state that the Tea Party’s leading planner was possibly Samuel Adams, even if he was not an actual participant.⁴⁵ In addition to a perceived role in the Boston Tea Party, Adams was believed to have been a party to the events that led to the Boston Massacre of March 5, 1770.

Despite the horrific slaying of multiple people in Boston, Adams was not deterred in his zeal for the cause. He continued to write essays to encourage the people of Boston and other areas to come together in a united front against Britain’s tyranny. He was sent to the First Continental Congress by the Massachusetts House of Representatives, along with his cousin and two others, in 1774. There he would continue to push for opposition to the British policies that he perceived as onerous and eventually for full independence.

Historian Joseph Ellis noted that by the time of the First Conti-

mental Congress of 1774, Samuel Adams, along with his cousin John Adams, had become the “most conspicuous opponents of British authority in New England.”⁴⁶ The First Continental Congress voted on and set up the embargo of British goods unless the Coercive Acts were repealed. The Coercive Acts were an effort by the British to restore order in Massachusetts, as well as punish the colonists for the Tea Party. The Acts closed the port of Boston, restricted town meetings, gave British officials immunity, and required colonists to house British soldiers. Congress also made a resolution suggesting that the colonies begin preparations for war. The delegates went home in late October, but were scheduled to return the following May. By that time, events had already pushed the colonists and Great Britain into war.

A little less than a month before the delegates of the Continental Congress met for the second time, the first shots of the war were fired at Lexington and Concord on April 19, 1775. Thanks to the efforts of another well known patriot, Paul Revere, the militia was in place when the British Regulars filed onto Lexington Common. While the British were the aggressors in the shots at Lexington, the militiamen regrouped along the Concord road and began to ambush the Regulars on their march back to Boston. Adams has been quoted as stating “It is a fine day” when he heard the shots fired from a distance.⁴⁷ The shots would have been pleasing to Adams as they propelled the colonists even further toward the eventual independence of the colonies.

The Second Continental Congress met in May 1775. Once convened, Ferling noted that Samuel Adams began to play a more open role, but it was his cousin that came to be viewed as the leader of the radicals.⁴⁸ However, even after the string of events – the Boston Massacre, the Boston Tea Party, and the shots fired at Lexington and Concord – the delegates were still not prepared to declare inde-

pendence. It took more time, and the possibility of assistance from France before the delegates believed they could declare their independence. However, on July 1, 1776, just one day prior to the signing of the Declaration of Independence, Samuel Adams delivered a speech before the Continental Congress. In his speech, he stated “The hand of Heaven appears to have led us on to be, perhaps, humble instruments and means in the great providential dispensation, which is completing. We have fled from the political Sodom; let us not look back, lest we perish and become a monument of infamy and derision to the world.”⁴⁹ Even knowing that he had achieved his ultimate goal – that the Declaration of Independence would be signed shortly – Adams was still using his religious rhetoric to guide the soon to be new country.

When Paul Revere, William Dawes, and Samuel Prescott set out to warn that the British were coming to Lexington, Revere had another job to perform. He was also supposed to warn Samuel Adams and John Hancock, who were staying in Lexington at the time, that the troops had orders to arrest them.⁵⁰ Samuel Adams in particular was seen by certain circles to be the main antagonist of the rebellion in America. As Edmund S. Morgan noted “A noose around the neck of Samuel Adams and a few others, it was suggested would be wholesome medicine.”⁵¹ In fact, it has been stated that Adams was the proverbial “public enemy number one” for the British Parliament. Had he been captured, or the Revolution failed, Samuel Adams and a few select others were to be the first hanged.

Long after American independence was declared, and the war led by George Washington finally won, the new nation would look to the leaders of the Revolution for their leaders of the new country. Some of the earliest prospective presidents included: Samuel Adams, Alexander Hamilton, Patrick Henry, and James Madison. However, these men were ousted by bigger names; great men such

as George Washington, Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson.⁵² As is well known, George Washington became the first president of the newly independent colonies. However, following Washington there were questions about who should or could follow Washington. Many believed that no one could do the job as well as Washington, and it was because of this belief that Washington served two terms instead of the one he had originally sworn to serve. Despite some belief that Samuel Adams may have made a good executive, he would never serve in that capacity. He had largely left national politics after the war ended and prior to George Washington's election to his first term.

While Samuel Adams was integral to beginning and sustaining the Revolution, he later became a much less important figure on the national scale. He chose to stop being involved in the national debates and set up of the new nation, and began to express an earnest desire to go back to Massachusetts as early as July 1778.⁵³ It was nearly a year after that before he finally returned to his home and family. Once ensconced back on his home turf, Adams worked in the same capacity he had previously; he began attending town meetings again. However, he did work with the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention as well as serving as president of the Massachusetts senate. He was later elected lieutenant governor of Massachusetts in 1789, and upon the death of John Hancock, became governor in 1793. He was elected to the office in his own right in 1794, but after only a few years decided it was time to retire.

Samuel Adams ended his time in politics completely in 1797. He even delivered a farewell address as the governor of Massachusetts in which he spoke on how "piety, religion, and morality have a happy influence on the minds of men, in their public as well as private transactions" as part of his encouragement to embrace the education of the younger generations.⁵⁴ Stoll notes that while Adams be-

came much less active following his retirement, possibly due to the increasing agitation of the palsy that had bothered him since the early 1770s, he was still attending church services and keeping in touch through letters with his old friends from the Continental Congress. In the end, it appears that the Revolution outgrew Adams. Jack Rakove noted that “Samuel Adams was ultimately eclipsed by the independence movement to which he once seemed indispensable.”⁵⁵ Where Samuel Adams was once the famous Adams, John Adams came to eclipse him and became better known through his continued activities on the national stage.

One interesting note about Samuel Adams’ writings is that unlike many other Founding Fathers, there are little of his writings left unless they were published or saved by the recipients. Puls noted that Adams, unlike other Founding Fathers, was “indifferent about his place in history.” Adams did not write memoirs, an autobiography, or choose to write letters simply for posterity’s sake. Furthermore, he did not make any attempts to collect his writings and letters, and in an effort to protect his friends and associates, destroyed many letters that could have established his part in shaping the American Revolution.⁵⁶ In fact, Ferling noted that John Adams saw Samuel Adams “burn many of his papers before fleeing Philadelphia in 1777.”⁵⁷ Whether his ultimate goal was the protection of himself and his friends or not is subject to speculation. Many other revolutionaries did not destroy their papers; most saved them and hoped for the best. It appears that Samuel may have been a pessimist in this regard. Fear of capture, his person or his correspondence; lead him to destroy many historical documents.

Because of Adams’ penchant to destroy papers, the main sources that are available to historians now are his essays in the *Boston Gazette*, his letters to other revolutionaries that were saved, his writings as clerk while in the Massachusetts House of Representa-

tives, and his contributions while serving in the Continental Congress. These can be interpreted to include some of his personal opinions, but they are typically written in the way of the times and focused as much as possible on the facts in such a way as to gain attention and supporters. Most of his writings prior to and during the Revolution do not appear to contain much in the way of describing Adams' personal feelings about how things were shaping up or if all was going according to his plan.

In general, Adams is loved, hated, or grudgingly admired. For instance, Ferling seemed to have a mixed view of Adams. He noted that Adams "was a tireless organizer. He was manipulative, an extrovert with an innate facility for discovering and appealing to what he called the 'Humours...Prejudices...Passions and Feelings, as well as [the] Reason and Understandings' of those he wished to lead." However, Ferling also noted that Adams had an "almost unerring political judgment. As if guided by some mysterious sixth sense, he seemed to know when to act, to pause, to move slowly, to accelerate."⁵⁸ Ferling falls into the grudging admiration category; he painted Adams as a manipulative genius who used whatever tools were available to him, but used them well.

Samuel Adams's cousin, John Adams, appeared to have believed him to be more responsible for the Revolution than many others. Ferling noted that John Adams "labeled Samuel Adams the greatest man of the era, the politician who has sculpted the protest movement in Massachusetts, influenced the resistance elsewhere, and both openly and covertly led the First Congress to embargo the mother country and the Second toward independence."⁵⁹ Other historians have mentioned John Adams' beliefs about Samuel Adams' leading role and through their own studies attributed him with an impressive leadership.

Puls noted many historians who studied Samuel Adams. Includ-

ed in his inventory is George Bancroft whose *History of the United States from the Discovery of the American Continent* demonstrated Bancroft's belief that Adams was the major figure of the rebellion leading up to the actual war. Also mentioned is James K. Hosmer's biography in which Samuel Adams is second only to George Washington as an important founding father. However, Puls also stated that Adams' reputation suffered due to some Revolutionary propaganda being attributed to him in error; most notably "The Horrid Massacre in Boston" by James Bowdoin, an essay signed "An American" that was included in Cushing's edited *The Writings of Samuel Adams*, and a speech from August 1, 1776 included in *The World Famous Orations* of William Jennings Bryan and Francis W. Halsey.⁶⁰ Puls notes that Adams' reputation further suffered at the hands of historians of the 1920s such as Ralph V. Harlow and John C. Miller, both of whom "portrayed Adams as a propagandist and zealot." More recently, writers such as Russell Kirk have cast Adams as a "well-born demagogue."⁶¹ Adams' reputation may have suffered at the hands of various historians in the years since he first became politically active, however, this negative attention does not detract from the fact that he was one of the first colonists to so much as utter the word independence.

As a Founding Father, Samuel Adams ranks high. He started his political career as the little known son of a brewer and rose to the Continental Congress. He participated in the early events that lead to the founding of an independent United States and worked diligently to gain support for the rebellion that led to the complete break from Great Britain. Adams' writings were integral to the Revolutionary Era. His persuasive techniques aided him in gaining support for the rebellion. He additionally used religious rhetoric as well as ancient Roman and Latin references that were easily understandable to most of his target audience. Samuel further worked to estab-

lish the Revolution through his involvement in events that spurred the people of Boston as well as other colonies to question London's policies. Samuel had many influences, including: his father, a Harvard education, the Enlightenment writings of John Locke and others, ancient Roman and Latin orators, his Puritan ancestors, and his Calvinist upbringing. All of these combined to make him an able politician with a varied knowledge of political precedents to aid his writings.

While some question his motives, which are far from clear, the primary contribution from Adams was his writings. He managed to write a multitude of essays as well as work within the Massachusetts House of Representatives to encourage the people to work together against the perceived tyranny of the British Parliament. He continued his writing during his time in the First and Second Continental Congress, where as a delegate from Massachusetts he argued for independence. While his cousin John Adams later overshadowed him, Samuel Adams still proved to be an able politician who received the admiration of many of his contemporaries and the disapproval of the Royal governor in his home state.

Many historians have studied Samuel Adams' activities and writings during the Revolutionary Era. Some seem to view him in a positive light; as a great Founding Father, great orator, and great politician. Others have painted him as a propagandist who was bent on his own advancement and a manipulative writer who intentionally set out to incite a rebellion. He could not have achieved the Revolution alone however; he had the help of a bumbling British Parliament that pursued a policy that was not in their best interest. Had Great Britain not begun to pursue a course that could and did anger the colonists, Adams would have not had an audience for his writings, nor a growing group of people to push for the independence he so desired.

Throughout Samuel Adams' time in national politics, he gained many allies, including his cousin John Adams. John Adams must have had a high opinion of Samuel Adams at one time. John Adams has been quoted as saying "Without the character of Samuel Adams, the true history of the American Revolution can never be written. For fifty years his pen, his tongue, his activity, were constantly exerted for his country without fee or reward."⁶² As John Adams points out, Samuel Adams was integral to the Revolutionary cause, and to the eventual independence of the colonies. Without men such as Samuel Adams, the history of the Revolution could not have been written, for there would not have been a Revolution at that time.

Notes

¹ Mark Puls, *Samuel Adams: Father of the American Revolution* (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2006), 13.

² Jack Rakove, *Revolutionaries: A New History of the Invention of America* (New York: Mariner Books, 2010), 39.

³ Rakove, 86; Puls, 34.

⁴ Ira Stoll, *Samuel Adams: A Life* (New York: Free Press, 2008), 22; Puls, 27.

⁵ Rakove, 39.

⁶ Rakove, 39.

⁷ Puls, 29.

⁸ Stoll, 24.

⁹ Rakove, 26.

¹⁰ Larry Schweikart and Michael Allen, *A Patriot's History of the United States: From Columbus's Great Discovery to the War on Terror* (New York: Penguin Group, 2004), 66.

¹¹ Schweikart and Allen, 66.

¹² Puls, 16.

¹³ Stoll, 9.

¹⁴ Puls, 34.

¹⁵ Rakove, 38.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 38.

¹⁷ Barbara Tuchman, *The March of Folly: From Troy to Vietnam* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1984), 128.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 129.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 130.

²⁰ Rakove, 101.

²¹ Puls, 38.

²² Rakove, 17, 101.

- ²³ Schweikart and Allen, 66.
- ²⁴ Rakove, 41.
- ²⁵ Ibid., 99.
- ²⁶ Edmund S. Morgan, *The Birth of the Republic, 1763-89* 3rd Ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 56.
- ²⁷ Samuel Adams, "Samuel Adams Advocates American Independence" August 1, 1776 <http://www.nationalcenter.org/SamuelAdams1776.html> (accessed May 18, 2012)
- ²⁸ Samuel Adams, "Samuel Adams Advocated American Independence"
- ²⁹ Rakove, 42.
- ³⁰ Samuel Adams, "The Rights of the Colonists: The Report of the Committee of Correspondence to the Boston Town Meeting, Nov. 20, 1772" *Old South Leaflets* no. 173, (Boston: Directors of the Old South Work, 1906), 417 <http://history.hanover.edu/texts/adamss.html> (accessed May 15, 2012).
- ³¹ Samuel Adams, "The Rights of the Colonists," 420.
- ³² Stoll, 18.
- ³³ Ibid., 59.
- ³⁴ Samuel Adams, *The Writings of Samuel Adams* ed. Harry Alonso Cushing vol. II (Middlesex: The Echo Library, 2006), 11. http://books.google.com/books?id=4kwIFEY6QdkC&source=gbs_navlinks_s (accessed May 20, 2012).
- ³⁵ Stoll, 59.
- ³⁶ Samuel Adams, *The Writings of Samuel Adams* ed. Harry Alonso Cushing vol. I (New York: G. P. Putnum's Sons, 1904), 23-24 http://books.google.com/books/about/The_Writings_of_Samuel_Adams_1764_1769.html?id=KIXKN2DNfWYC (accessed May 20, 2012).
- ³⁷ Adams, vol. I, 71.
- ³⁸ Stoll, 65; Adams, vol. I, 202.
- ³⁹ Stoll, 66; Adams, vol. I, 135-137.
- ⁴⁰ John Ferling, *Setting the World Ablaze: Washington, Adams, Jefferson, and the American Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 59.
- ⁴¹ Ibid., 73.
- ⁴² Ibid., 85.
- ⁴³ Rakove, 42.
- ⁴⁴ Ibid., 30.
- ⁴⁵ Rakove, 44; Schweikart and Allen, 67; Stoll, 115; Puls, 146.
- ⁴⁶ Joseph J. Ellis, *Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary Generation* (New York: Vintage Books, 2000), 165.
- ⁴⁷ John Ferling, *A Leap in the Dark: The Struggle to Create the American Republic* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 129-135.
- ⁴⁸ Ibid., 162.
- ⁴⁹ Samuel Adams Heritage Society, "Speech About the Declaration of Independence, 1776" <http://www.samuel-adams-heritage.com/documents/speech-about-declaration-of-independence.html> (accessed May 22, 2012).
- ⁵⁰ Rakove, 31.
- ⁵¹ Burke, 48.
- ⁵² Ellis, 163.
- ⁵³ Stoll, 204.

⁵⁴ Samuel Adams, *The Writings of Samuel Adams* vol. 4, ed. Harry Alonso Cushing, (New York: G. P. Putnum's Sons, 1908), 401. http://books.google.com/books/about/The_Writings_of_Samuel_Adams_1778_1802.html?id=6pILAAAAIAAJ (accessed May 24, 2012).

⁵⁵ Rakove, 38.

⁵⁶ Puls, 15.

⁵⁷ Ferling, *Setting the World Ablaze*, 280.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 106.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 282.

⁶⁰ Puls, 15.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 15-16.

⁶² Puls, following title page.

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Mercy Otis Warren, The Historiographical Motivation
of an Unlikely Patriot

Michelle Wheeler

It is true there are certain appropriate duties assigned to each sex; and doubtless it is the more peculiar province of masculine strength...to describe the blood-stained field, and relate the story of slaughtered armies. Sensible of this, the trembling heart has recoiled at the magnitude of the undertaking, and the hand shrunk back from the task...

-Mercy Otis Warren¹

For many Americans, today, the American Revolution was a war in which thirteen American colonies broke free from the bondage of Britain's tyrannical rule and became a free and independent nation. Little do Americans know that there was a lesser-known, undeclared gender war being fought on the home front during the revolution. Until the twentieth century, American women typically served as submissive wives to their husbands, caretakers for their children, and were responsible for the daily operations of the household. A woman depended solely on her husband's prosperity for her family's material needs. With limited opportunity for formal education and no political rights, eighteenth century American women appeared to be bound to their traditional domestic roles.

However, during the 1760s and throughout the American Revolutionary War period, some American women, who became active participants in the patriotic movement that broke out across the colonies, sought opportunities that would free them from their traditional domestic roles and allow them to become more independent. In many cases, as their husbands left home to fight, women were provided opportunities to step outside their traditional roles. Wom-

en began making decisions their husbands previously made, they took care of legal matters, and in many cases would become the wage earner for the family. Women evolved beyond their domestic roles. Although, it was not just within their domestic roles that women were evolving. Women of the Revolutionary Era began participating in “civic processions, political salons, and street protests” while cultural influences fused “classical republicanism and Lockean liberalism” together, challenging the “...masculine [nature] of republicanism.”²² The American Revolution provided the impetus for women to envision broader roles for themselves in civic affairs. The Revolution allowed women to “imagine themselves as political beings for the first time and to act on this revelation.”²³ Writing about history and politics allowed women to express themselves in a way that would contribute to the overall well-being of the nation. What was unique was that history, itself, “furnished women with a rhetoric of resistance to many of the master narratives subordinating them politically and intellectually.”²⁴ Change was on the horizon. The American Revolution provided one woman, Mercy Otis Warren, the perfect opportunity to become one of America’s greatest political thinkers and historians in the gender exclusive realm of republican ideology.

In modern history, Warren is commonly revered as the ‘Conscience of the Revolution,’ however history has not always been so kind to America’s first female historian and playwright. Historians and historiographers have often trivialized Warren’s writings of the late eighteenth century as they “tend not to see women as important political thinkers,”²⁵ and therefore, have neglected her poetry, plays and *History of the American Revolution* as important contributions to America’s past. However, historian Judith B. Markowitz noted that the ‘new left’ historians of the late 1960s began to re-envision the American Revolution as a radical movement versus the

‘consensus historians’ of post-World War II who saw the Revolution as anything but revolutionary. As a result of the ‘new left’ and ‘feminist’ movements of the 1960s, Warren’s political writings, history and poetry have been reexamined. She is no longer seen as a peripheral contributor to the Revolution, based on her relationships to certain male political figures of the time, but rather as a revolutionary steeped in republican ideology who sought to unite America based on the principles fought for during the Revolution.

Warren was born on September 9, 1728 to the politically prominent, Puritan Otis family of Barnstable, Massachusetts. In a time when women did not receive much education beyond what modern society would call the elementary level, Warren’s father saw to it that his daughter received a liberal education through individual study where she gained a strong appreciation for history and poetry.⁶ Her brother, James Otis, Jr., introduced his sister to the enlightened philosopher John Locke and his theory on the governments’ duty to serve the ‘natural rights of man.’ The private education she received would be the beginning of her political genius. At the age of twenty-six, she married James Warren, a prosperous Plymouth merchant and long-time friend of her brother James Otis, Jr. James Warren and Mercy Otis were blessed with a deep love for one another. He took “much pride in his wife’s literary talent as he did in her housewifely competence and admired her mind...”⁷ In 1765, James Warren entered the political arena and joined the rebellious cause against England. He became acquainted with John Adams and Samuel Adams, and the three men rounded out their rebellious cabal with Mercy’s brother, James Otis, Jr.

As the American patriot cause progressed in the 1760s, Mrs. Warren became politically connected to whom her biographer, Alice Brown, called her intellectual comrades.⁸ Patriot leaders and political thinkers, like John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, Elbridge Gerry and

occasionally General George Washington, wrote Mrs. Warren to engage her political genius and republican ideologies in the wake of the Revolution. Warren, also, frequently visited General Washington's headquarters near Watertown, Massachusetts, where her husband served as paymaster for the colonial army. With such political connectivity and opportunity, Mrs. Warren began collecting first-hand accounts, letters and other materials on the Revolution "at a period when every manly arm was occupied."⁹ Her desire was to write a history on the American Revolution. Furthermore, being "connected by nature, friendship, and every social tie, with many of the first Patriots,"¹⁰ Mrs. Warren became "active in the 'masculine sphere' – in politics and in the historian's craft."¹¹ As she grew more active and connected in the causes of the American Revolution, she began slowly escaping the bonds of cultural subordination and was well on her way to becoming what John Adams would dub as the "most accomplished lady in America."¹²

By the early 1770s Mercy Otis Warren possessed a "deep knowledge of the political and religious issues of her day and wished to voice her opinions on the changes occurring around her."¹³ After witnessing her brother James Otis Jr.'s mental deterioration after an assault by a British customs officer in 1769, she felt it was now her duty to champion the patriot's cause.¹⁴ Keenly aware of her femininity, she developed the pen-name, "The Columbian Patriot," and began publishing poems and satirical plays about the British and Loyalists, anonymously, in New England newspapers. Her first drama entitled *The Adulateur* was a "satirical play mocking the administration of the newly appointed – and already detested – Governor Thomas Hutchinson."¹⁵ Thomas Hutchinson, the royal governor of Massachusetts, wrote a series of letters, dubbed by history as the Hutchinson-Oliver letters, to British Parliament asking for more troops to be sent to Boston to fight the colonial rebels. In 1772,

Benjamin Franklin anonymously received the Hutchinson letters, and sent them to Boston as a warning to the colonists. Franklin's only stipulation was that the letters not be published or circulated. In June of 1773, the letters were published in the *Boston Gazette* and the people of Boston forced Hutchinson to flee for England. Appearing in the *Massachusetts Spy*, *The Adulateer* told the story of a tyrannical leader named Rapatio (the fictional characterization of Hutchinson), who ruled the fictional country of Upper Serbia and vowed to eradicate his rebellious subjects. Fighting against Rapatio's tyranny were the virtuous Patriots. What was remarkable about Mrs. Warren's satire of Governor Hutchinson was that a woman was commenting on the political crisis in 1772, albeit anonymously, and she showed an "analytic and educated mind attempting to solve the moral and social crises of her day."¹⁶ She followed up *The Adulateer* with *The Defeat* in 1773, delivering her final blows to Governor Hutchinson's tyrannical rule over Massachusetts after the Hutchinson-Oliver letters made their public debut. Warren became inherently aware that she was not necessarily writing for the popular audience, but rather for "intellectuals and such leading American figures as Adams, Jefferson, Gerry and Washington. Since she appealed primarily to the minds of her audience, Warren expected her readers to be as intellectually critical as she was."¹⁷ Her intellectual comrades applauded Mrs. Warren for her political genius and deemed her literary talent brilliant.

In November and December 1773, the British East India Company docked three tea ships, the *Dartmouth*, the *Beaver* and the *Eleanor*, in Boston Harbor. Abigail Adams wrote to her close friend, Mercy Warren, to share with her that "the Tea, that bairfull weed, is arrived. Great and...effectual opposition has been made to the landing of it. Our citizens have been united, spirited, and firm. The flame is kindled and like lightning it catches from soul to soul."¹⁸

Not wanting the tea unloaded, stored or sold in Massachusetts, the Bostonians demanded the tea be returned to England. Governor Hutchinson refused. On December 16, one hundred and fifty-five members of the Sons of Liberty, a secret society of patriot men that formed in 1765 to protest British authority and taxes in the colonies, disguised themselves as Mohawk Indians. The group proceeded to Griffin's Wharf, boarded the three British vessels, and threw 342 chests of tea overboard into Boston Harbor, protesting the Tea Act of 1773, a law that provided the British East India Company a monopoly on the tea trade in the American colonies. John Adams found the act of defiance magnificent, bold and daring, and "so lasting that I cannot but consider it an epoch in history."¹⁹ Adams would have liked to have written about the event himself, however, he felt he lacked the poetical talent to do so and called upon the talent of Mercy Warren, whom he said had no equal in the country that he knew.²⁰ As a result, Warren penned the satirical poem, "The Squabble of the Sea Nymphs - The Sacrifice of the Tuscaroroës." Published on the front page of the *Boston Gazette* in March of 1774, the poem once again attacked Governor Hutchinson. Sticking with the suggested subject of sea nymphs, hinted at by John Adams, Warren's poem depicted Neptune's rival wives fighting over tea. As in the Boston Tea Party, disguised Bostonians assist the sea nymphs in their decision and cast the tea into the water in act of defiance. The public admired the patriotism the poem exuded and became aware that the "Columbian Patriot" was Mercy Otis Warren. She was praised for her talent, and she confessed that "she had never dreamed it in her power to amuse, much less benefit, the world by the unstudied composition of her leisure hours. If her pen gave pleasure to her little circle of friends, she would be happy."²¹

Where some of her literary contemporaries commented on the mediocrity of her satires and poems, it should be noted that

“timeliness was an important factor.”²² Literature Professor Sandra J. Sarkela of the University of Memphis stated that “if we read them [her satirical sketches] from the perspective of her intended audience within the specific context of their newspaper publication, we begin to understand how Warren’s appropriation of the dramatic form advanced a radical narrative that mobilized support for a public cause.”²³ Warren’s writings in the 1770s indulged the popular sentiment of the period. She served as an effective propagandist and in essence became the voice of the Massachusetts’s patriots.

As the war came to its conclusion, Mercy Otis Warren became more focused on the republican principles that the war had been founded on. As she took up her pen and began writing her *History of the Revolution*, she became engrossed in “the times” and saw that the republican ideals of liberty and virtue that began the Revolution were being corrupted by avarice and greed in the development of the post-war government system. She boldly broke away from writing propaganda and now began writing for a partisan cause, democratic republicanism. Never far from her mind, however, was her Puritan background. Warren was a product of the eighteenth century. The historian’s function was to record, not interpret, and to “trace the hand of God in events instead of the working of natural laws.”²⁴ However, as a disciple of the Lockean theory of natural rights, she fused her New England Puritanism with democratic republicanism, “a view of human nature derived from her religious beliefs combined with the ideal of individual equality and freedom. History revealed both the nature of human beings and the existence of a divinely ordained plan for the achievement of human happiness.”²⁵ Even though religion played a central role in her thoughts on the formation of a good society, according to historian Markowitz, it did not overshadow the other object of Warren’s desire, the secular government. For Warren, “religion keeps alive in the com-

munity those values which will allow for a just and humane government,"²⁶ in which man is born free and possesses certain unalienable rights and a government protects those rights. Therefore, teaching morals in the course of writing of her history became another goal, while trying to recapture the republican ideologies that America seemed to be falling away from post-Revolution.

Now that America had won her freedom and independence from Britain, Mercy Warren noted that the real test of American freedom would be the ability of the people to protect their individual rights from the greed that was running amuck post-Revolution. She saw Americans in danger of losing their newfound liberty to a new class of men, an aristocracy that arose out of the Revolution. She found American society was in a state of decay post-war, and it was sectionally divided between the North where property was divided more equally and education was available versus the South where slavery and wealth created an aristocracy.²⁷ As she began writing her *History of the American Revolution*, she focused on two fundamental categories of historical explanation, virtue and avarice. As a result, she "self-consciously wrote in the tradition of exemplary history both because she was convinced philosophically that historical models instructed youth and because tradition provided a framework for developing her ideological commitments."²⁸ Mercy felt it was her duty as a historian to teach morality and ethics, while using her writings to comment on the political and social criticisms of her day. She was less concerned about the past and more concerned about the present state of decay of the nation and a future where the Federalists, who desired a strong, centralized government, run by the wealthy, corrupted American society to the point that America would fall like other great Republics in history. The goal of her *History* was to generate a vision of an American future that would fulfill the promise of the Revolution's republican ideologies and "instruct

on the principles of personal morality and public virtue.”²⁹ Ultimately, the people were in control of their future, but it was her role as an historian to instruct the people to be ethically responsible for the future of the nation by showing how republicanism was the greatest form of liberty that would ensure individual rights.

Warren’s *History* became her expression of the Revolution’s commitment to republicanism. Because of her Lockean beliefs and the ‘nature of man,’ she knew it was in man’s nature to distinguish himself from his fellow citizens and open the door to corruption. However, as an historian she wanted to keep the people informed on the dangers of corruption and tyranny and alert them when their rights were threatened. She stated in Volume III of her *History* that, “they [Americans] have struggled with astonishing success for the rights of mankind, and have emancipated themselves from the shackles of foreign power,” but “Americans are already in too many instances hankering after the sudden accumulation of wealth, and the proud distinctions of fortune and title.”³⁰ She felt that her *History* would serve as an instruction manual on how to avoid the corruption and decay that led to the fall of the great republics in history. If people would understand what was corrupting them and how to avoid those temptations of avarice, then they could finally unite into a great nation and maintain their individual and natural rights they fought for in the Revolution. Her *History* was her way of teaching the younger generation about the ideologies of republicanism by using the old patriots as models of virtue. In essence, she was seeking “to establish hegemony over the future...and establish the very categories in which interpretation [of her *History*] was properly to be conducted.”³¹

Mercy Warren began writing her *History of the Rise, Progress and Termination of the American Revolution* shortly after the war concluded. She was almost finished writing it by 1791, however, it was not pub-

lished until 1805. There was a roadblock in the completion of her *History*. It was the Constitutional Convention and the rise of party factions that halted the completion of her monograph. She stopped working on her narrative by 1791 because “the virulence of party spirit shuts up the avenues of just information until truth has a chance for fair play.”³² Political partisanship threatened the very core of her beloved republican ideology and opened the door to corruption. Fearing that republicanism was dwindling into theory with the drafting of the Constitution, she launched an attack on the Federalists with an essay written in 1788 entitled, “Observations on the New Constitution, and on the Federal and State Conventions.” In the essay, she criticized the power of the new federal government and listed eighteen reasons why the Constitution would result in tyranny and establish an aristocracy in America. The federal Constitution provided no protection for man’s individual rights and the people were in danger of losing the freedoms they so valiantly fought for in the Revolution. Warren firmly believed that “the origin of all power is in the people, and that they have an incontestable right to check the creatures of their own creation, vested with certain powers to guard the life, liberty and property of the community...”³³ She also felt that “if certain selected bodies of men, deputed on these principles, determine contrary to the wishes and expectations of their constituents, the people have an undoubted right to reject their decisions.”³⁴ Mercy Warren saw the Constitution as an ambiguous document that adapted to the purposes of immediate aristocratic tyranny.³⁵ It did not provide the very people who fought for independence from a despotic Britain their unalienable rights. She called for a Bill of Rights to safeguard the individual liberties of America’s citizens. Writing with a staunch Antifederalist tone in her essay, she “warned her readers not to be fooled by popular pretence of justice, consolidation, and dignity, for the Constitution would draw the

reins of the government too taught..."³⁶ Warren felt civil liberties must be protected and the power to control the Constitution must be laid in the hands of the people and not in the aristocratic hands of the Federalists.

She continued working on her *History* as the Constitutional Convention concluded. Once published in 1805, it was thought of mainly as political commentary on the era of the Revolution. She was also up against strong literary competition when her book was published. Both David Ramsay and William Gordon published their histories of the Revolution in 1788 and 1789. However, Warren's narrative was different from popular male historians of the day. Her monograph was "devoted to a strongly patriotic theme that had become a staple of a new American nationalism."³⁷ Americans, at the turn of the century, were not used to thinking in 'national' terms. What Warren set out to accomplish in her *History* was setting aside her partisan beliefs and focusing on the success of the union, and what the nation and its inhabitants had in common versus the issues that divided them. She chose not to write for the posterity of her chosen political party, but rather that "the United States form a young republic, a confederacy which ought ever to be cemented by a union of interest and affection, under the influence of those principles which obtained their independence."³⁸ She used her *History* to foster pride in the fledgling nation, while using the actual historical events of the war to unite the American people under republican ideals to prevent the further decay of the union and to promote its welfare.

One thing that Mercy Warren was never capable of shedding was her womanhood. Her own credibility rested on men's willingness to tolerate her in a male dominated society.³⁹ She often apologized for being a woman and writing on topics that historically only men were allowed to write about. In her introductory comments to

her *History of the American Revolution*, she asked readers to look upon her *History* with kindness and “in consideration of her sex.”⁴⁰ While she desired intellectual equality between the genders, she still believed in the appointed subordination of women for the sake of the family unit, and oftentimes chose to avoid public criticism by falling back on her femininity. Warren believed in placing domestic duties above intellectual endeavors. She was also aware that she could not be too critical about the topics on which she wrote, as it could “openly challenge the existing ‘order in families’ in the ‘promised land.’”⁴¹ Therefore, she carefully worked within traditional gender roles, while teaching the virtues of republicanism to her own children and the future generations of America. Where she wrote about and preached on the theories and application of republicanism in a virtuous society, in practice, she never broke free from the traditional role that society defined for women and could not practice republicanism, herself.

The American Revolution not only provided America with a war to win its freedom and independence from Britain, but it provided female patriots, like Mercy Otis Warren, the opportunity to wage war on gender roles and become politically active in a male dominated society. Not having the ability to be directly involved in the Revolution and post-war events, Mercy “took up the pen as an alternative to the sword or the ballot.”⁴² She created literary masterpieces that not only drew attention to the vices that threatened the republican spirit of the Revolution and the infancy of the new nation, but she evolved from strictly being a Revolutionary era propagandist to post-Revolutionary historian and radical political activist who sought to unite the nation on the principles of republicanism. Her talent and genius allowed her to creatively portray the virtue she sought to engrain throughout her *History*, plays and poems. Where she was never able to break free from the bonds of womanhood, she did

break free from the conventional state of gender subordination and ennobled women to believe that they had a significant political function in the cause of the Revolution.⁴³ Warren fused the roles of republican, woman, writer, intellectual and political analyzer into one, while using the spirit of the past as a means to create hegemony over the future and to engrain the principles of virtue and patriotism into the youth of post-Revolutionary America.

Notes

¹ Mercy Otis Warren, *The History of the Rise, Progress and Termination of the American Revolution* (Boston: Manning and Loring, 1805), iv.

² Philip Hicks, "Portia and Marcia: Female Political Identity and Historical Imagination, 1770-1800," *The William and Mary Quarterly*, Third series, 62, no. 2 (April 2005): 266.

³ *Ibid.*, 267.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 268.

⁵ Judith B. Markowitz, "Radical and Feminist: Mercy Otis Warren and the Historiographers," *Peace and Change* 4, no. 2 (Spring 1977): 10.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁷ Maud Macdonald Hutcheson, "Mercy Warren, 1728-1814," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 10, no. 3 (July 1953): 380.

⁸ Alice Brown, *Mercy Warren* (Cambridge: University Press, 1896), 56.

⁹ Mercy Otis Warren, *The History of the Rise, Progress and Termination of the American Revolution* (Boston: Manning and Loring, 1805): iii.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Lawrence J. Friedman and Arthur H. Shaffer, "Mercy Otis Warren and the Politics of Historical Nationalism," *The New England Quarterly* 48, no. 2 (June 1975): 210.

¹² Rosemarie Zagarrri, *A Woman's Dilemma: Mercy Otis Warren and the American Revolution* (Wheeling: Harlan Davidson, 1995): xv.

¹³ Edmund Hayes and Mercy Otis Warren, "The Private Poems of Mercy Otis Warren," *The New England Quarterly* 54, no. 2 (June 1981): 200.

¹⁴ Nancy Rubin Stuart, "Conscience of the Revolution," *American History* 43, no. 3 (August 2008), 51.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Hayes and Warren, "Private Poems," 200.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 201.

¹⁸ Nancy Rubin Stuart, *Muse of the Revolution: The Secret Pen of Mercy Otis Warren and the Founding of a Nation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2008): 55.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 55.

²⁰ Maud Macdonald Hutcheson, "Mercy Warren," 385.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 386.

²² *Ibid.*, 389.

²³ Sandra J. Sarkela, "Freedom's Call: The Persuasive Power of Mercy Otis Warren's Dramatic Sketches, 1772-1775," *Early American Literature* 44, no. 3 (November 2009): 542.

²⁴ Hutcheson, 397.

²⁵ Markowitz, "Radical and Feminist," 11.

²⁶ Markowitz, 11.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 13.

²⁸ Lester H. Cohen, "Explaining the Revolution: Ideology and Ethics in Mercy Otis Warren's Historical Theory," *The William and Mary Quarterly*, Third Series, 37, no. 2 (April 1980): 205.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 204.

³⁰ Warren, *History*, 333.

³¹ Cohen, "Explaining the Revolution," 214.

³² Friedman and Shaffer, "Politics of Historical Nationalism," 194.

³³ Mercy Warren, "Observations on the New Constitution, and the Federal and State Conventions," (Boston 1788), 6. Note that the original publication was thought to be authored by Elbridge Gerry until it was traced to Mercy Warren in the 1930s, as the *Columbian Patriot*. <http://archive.org/stream/cu31924020874099#page/n21/mode/2up> (accessed September 2, 2013).

³⁴ Warren, "Observations on the New Constitution," *Ibid.*

³⁵ Markowitz, "Radical and Feminism," 12.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 13.

³⁷ Friedman and Shaffer, "Politics of Historical Nationalism," 197.

³⁸ Warren, *History*, vii.

³⁹ Zagari, *A Woman's Dilemma*, xvi.

⁴⁰ Warren, *History*, viii.

⁴¹ Friedman and Shaffer, "Historical Nationalism," 214.

⁴² Cohen, "Politics of Language," 494.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 495.

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Napoleon: Apex of the Military Revolution

Patrick S. Baker

Without a doubt, Napoleon was a great general. Even his enemies thought so; the Duke of Wellington once famously remarked that Napoleon's presence on the battlefield was worth an extra forty-thousand men.¹ However, his prominence was not limited to the military arena. He revised the legal, tax, education systems and civil administration of France and several other European nations. In short, Napoleon was the colossus that stood astride his times.² However, some have suggested that while he was great field commander, Napoleon was no great innovator in military affairs, neither tactically, strategically nor technically.³ Rather, he was the mere beneficiary of the innovations of others.⁴

This article will discuss "The Military Revolution" in Western Europe and will analyze how Napoleon became the apotheosis of this "Revolution" by creating, managing and organizing the most devastating and successful army to that point in history. Napoleon and *Le Grande Armee* became the models for all other generals and armies for the next two hundred years and capped the Military Revolution.

The Military Revolution Defined

Napoleon was the beneficiary of a three-hundred-year-long progression in military affairs often called the Military Revolution. However, the term "revolution" is something of a misnomer as the process of military innovation encompassed by the Military Revolution actually fits the model of "punctuated equilibrium evolution" rather than a single distinct and rapid revolution. That is to say,

“The Military Revolution” was actually a “series of intense revolutionary episodes, each built on a more extended base of slow evolutionary change.”⁵ However, the term, “the Military Revolution” is still useful shorthand in describing and delineating the process of advancement in military affairs within the three-hundred year time frame between 1500 to 1800.

The Military Revolution was not spread uniformly throughout Europe in either time or space. The great leap forward in military affairs that may be conveniently defined using the term revolution started in France, the Low Countries, the northern Holy Roman Empire and Northern Italy around 1500, spread into the British Isles by around 1700 and then into Russia and the Balkans by about 1800.⁶ Napoleon fought most of his wars in the areas where this great leap forward in military affairs started and continued the longest. That the Emperor took advantage of developments of this “revolution” is therefore not surprising.

The major components of the Military Revolution were a massive increase in the destructive power of armies through the development and use of gunpowder weapons and the construction of colossal fortifications designed to resist those gunpowder weapons. There were also advances in tactics and strategy to make better use of this destructive power. Lastly, there was a huge increase in the size of standing armies with corresponding advances in training, professionalism, administration, and bureaucracy to manage these new military organizations.⁷

Military development in Europe was coming to the end of a period of slow, evolutionary change as Napoleon graduated from the relatively new French Military Academy; the *Ecole Militaire*. In much of Western Europe, this was the era of small wars fought for limited objectives. The concept of limited wars was strongly defended by many crowned heads in Europe, such as Prussia’s Frederick the

Great. Fredrick said in 1775: “The ambitious ought never to forget that arms and military discipline are much the same throughout Europe... And policy has established a certain balance of power... [and that] great enterprises rarely produce such effects as might be expected.”⁸

However, the limited and rather gentlemanly “cabinet wars” of the early and middle years of eighteenth century were soon superseded by the *levee en masse* of 1793 and the advent of what became known as “National War” on yet another of the “intense revolutionary episodes” in the overall Military Revolution.⁹ Thus, as Napoleon rose through the military hierarchy to become First Consul of the French Republic in 1799 and then Emperor of the French in 1804, he was poised to benefit from this latest development in the Military Revolution as he set about the task of creating a vast and ruthlessly efficient war machine.

Fiery Weapons

By Napoleon’s time, gunpowder weapons almost completely dominated the battlefields of Europe. After all, even the bayonet was attached at the end of a musket and cavalry was at least partly armed with short carbines and pistols. The dominance of gunpowder weapons had been slow in coming since the introduction of gunpowder into Western Europe in the middle of the 1300s. However, since that introduction, both artillery and infantry gunpowder weapons pursued parallel paths of development, in that each type of weaponry increased in power, range, numbers and mobility.

Tracing the development of gunpowder weapons in Europe may start with the first mention of handheld guns in a 1364 inventory of an arsenal in Italy. This armory had: “500 bombards . . . held in the hand . . . able to pierce any armor.”¹⁰ These hand-cannons were often mounted or rested on wooden frames and were set off by a

slow burning match held to a drilled touchhole. They fired lead balls, properly sized stones or metal arrows called bolts. Most of these “hand gonnies” had to be moved and fired by two-man teams. By the middle of the fifteenth century, the size of hand weapons had been reduced so that they could be held and fired by one man from the shoulder.¹¹ Despite these advances, in the middle 1400s even the most forward looking rulers, such as Duke Charles the Bold of Burgundy, still trusted in bowmen more than in gunmen during battle.¹²

The initial innovation which inspired confident use of firearms in battle was the invention of the matchlock. In a matchlock, a slow match was held in a clamp at the end of an S-shaped piece of metal -- called the lock -- and then lowered to the touchhole by pulling a trigger. The matchlock was so unwieldy that a balancing rod designed to hold the barrel of the gun had to be used to fire the weapon. From the late 1400s to the late 1600s it was the matchlock that came to dominate the battlefields of Europe, ultimately supplanting the longbow and crossbow as the primary long-range infantry weapon.¹³ The infantry firearm still had several disadvantages versus the longbow or crossbow, though, including a slower rate of fire, significantly shorter range and less stopping power. Despite these enduring disadvantages, firearms had one great advantage over bows: they could be mastered with virtually no training, whereas a longbow or a crossbow took years to learn how to use effectively.¹⁴ By the time of the English Civil Wars fought between 1642 and 1651, the matchlock had gotten shorter and lighter, negating the need for the balancing rod and making the firearm much more maneuverable. However, the slow rate of fire for the matchlock still required that they be protected by pikes, with a ratio of two guns to five pikes, by 1691 that ratio had dropped to two guns to one pike.¹⁵

The next development in infantry arms was the flintlock mus-

ket. By the 1690s the flintlock musket with the plug bayonet was used to equip elite units such as King William III's Dutch Guards at the Battle of the Boyne in 1690.¹⁶ The problem with the plug bayonet was that soldiers could not fire their weapons while the bayonet was in place. In ten years, plug bayonets were "universally replaced" by the ring bayonet.¹⁷ The ring bayonet allowed the musket to fire with the blade affixed. Therefore, by 1700 the development of the bayonet had finally banished the pike from the battlefield and completed the shift from bladed pole arms to gunpowder weapons for the foot soldier.¹⁸ However, the cavalry continued to use sabers and lances in combination with firearms up to the first part of the twentieth century.¹⁹

In 1346, a "hand-gonne" was used at the Battle of Crecy to simply frighten some crossbow-men.²⁰ Four hundred and sixty years later, in the Napoleonic era, a well-trained infantryman could load and fire a one-ounce lead ball, two times a minute and hit a target one-hundred feet long and six feet tall at one-hundred yards half the time.²¹ Also, the infantry shoulder-fired weapon was much reduced in size and weight, making it easier to carry and therefore as mobile as the man himself.

The first illustration of any cannon in use in Western Europe is from 1327 and shows a bottle shaped "fiery weapon" firing a giant metal arrow at a castle gate. For the next century, cannons were considered no more than an adjunct to the traditional *trebuchets* and other siege engines. The cannon started to come into its own as a siege weapon in the 1450s, but due to its massive size their use was limited to campaigns where they could be transported by water, or when the armies only moved at the very slow pace set by having to cart the huge guns over land.²²

This kind of war in slow motion changed suddenly in 1494 when Charles VIII of France crashed over the Alps with a siege

train of some forty brass guns, all wheeled and all firing iron shot.²³ These guns were both more mobile and more powerful than anything yet seen. Contemporaries recognized this as a revolutionary change. Before 1494, “the capture of a castle took up almost a whole campaign ... and wars lasted a very long time ... the French came upon all this like a tempest which turns everything upside down . . . Wars became sudden and violent . . . cities were reduced . . . in a matter of days and hours rather than months.”²⁴ Charles had also brought thirty brass field guns, which were mobile enough to keep up with the infantry. But the cannons still had a very slow rate of fire and were not very effective in open field battles.²⁵ Yet less than twenty years later, field artillery was a key element in the French victory at the Battle of Ravenna.²⁶

The next two major steps in the development of field artillery took place in Northern Europe in the seventeenth century with Maurice of Nassau standardizing the Dutch artillery to four different calibers, thereby simplifying logistics for the guns. Meanwhile, Maurice’s primary opponent, the Spanish, had some fifty kinds of guns with more than twenty different calibers. The Swedish king, Gustavus Adolphus, took Maurice’s reforms and advanced them by having very light guns cast and also by using interchangeable parts. His guns also achieved significant tactical mobility and a rapid firing rate. Lastly, Gustavus organized his guns into permanent batteries, with a fixed organization and chain-of-command.²⁷

In the mid and late 1700s the French artilleryman, Lieutenant General Jean-Baptiste Vaquette de Gribeauval, developed and imposed a new artillery system on the French army. Appointed Inspector of Artillery in 1776, Gribeauval also developed a new aiming sight, a more mobile gun carriage and larger ammunition caissons. By enforcing higher manufacturing standards and finer bore tolerances, the weight of the guns was reduced and smaller powder

charges could be used to achieve the same results. By the time young Napoleon Bonaparte was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the *Artillerie Régiment de la Fère*, the standard French four-pounder weighed a mere six-hundred pounds and could be moved by a team of three horses and serviced by a crew of eight men. These guns moved almost as fast as marching infantry and could hit targets up to a thousand meters away.²⁸

Napoleon said after the 1809 Battle of Loebau: “It is with artillery that one makes war.”²⁹ The “Little Corporal” was an artilleryman *par-excellence* and even as Emperor, he would sometimes help site guns before a battle.³⁰ But he also believed in supporting the infantry, admitting that infantry should be supported “with good batteries.”³¹

Napoleon, in a number of ways, capped the Military Revolution in the area of gunpowder weapons. First, he believed that fire, not shock, decided battles, and he acted on that belief.³² In what became known as “the system of the Year XIII”, he ordered at least two six-pounder guns for each infantry regiment, replacing the lighter four-pounder guns. He reorganized the rest of the guns -- usually the heavier twelve-pounders and howitzers-- into divisions, corps or army artillery reserve formations. The army-level artillery was usually under his personal control. He also attempted to have five guns per one thousand infantrymen, but the best he managed was in 1813 at the Battle of Leipzig with three guns per thousand men.³³

Next, Napoleon replaced the civilian contracted drivers for the artillery with soldiers and also insisted that the caissons of ammunition travel with the guns.³⁴ The Emperor could never have enough guns and ammunition. He insisted that the basic load of ammunition be doubled for all his guns.³⁵ Napoleon made the French artillery the best in the world.³⁶ He also created a system of artillery organization and deployment that endured until the large-scale devel-

opment of rapid-firing rifled artillery and indirect fire methods in the early twentieth century.³⁷

“Super-Forts”

The other side of the gunpowder “arms race” was the development of massive fortifications to resist the new and awesomely destructive gunpowder weapons. In the Middle Ages, the lord in his castle or the burghers in their walled city were very nearly invulnerable. Sieges would drag on for months, if not years. The advent of cannon spelled the end of these curtain wall defenses. During the 1494 French invasion of Italy, the walls of the Neapolitan fortress of Monte San Giovanni were breached in a mere eight hours. This fortress had previously withstood a siege of seven years.³⁸ Machiavelli put it this way: “. . . for the impetus of the artillery is such that a wall has not yet been found which is so strong that in a few days it will be battered down.”³⁹

Machiavelli was right for the old styled, tall curtain walls, but was wrong for the new styled forts already being built even as he wrote. The new super fortresses, called *trace italienne* forts, had low and massive angled walls to avoid and deflect cannon balls. They were supplied with heavy artillery of their own and had ditches and flanking positions to prevent direct infantry assaults. In less than one hundred years these defenses had returned warfare to a series of sieges.⁴⁰

Without a doubt, the master of these new forts was Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban (1633-1707). He was not only a master engineer but also a master besieger. The adage was “a town besieged by Vauban was one taken, while a town defended by him was one saved.”⁴¹ Yet, with the example of formulas of Vauban, still as late as the first decades of the eighteenth century, sieges were the major form of military engagement. The Duke of Marlborough, who campaigned

almost exactly a century before Napoleon, fought only four major open field battles, but conducted thirty sieges in ten years.⁴² These modern forts, where they existed, limited warfare. When battles were fought, the beaten army could quickly retreat behind the next set of forts where the winning force could not reach.⁴³ Even after Napoleon, modern forts were still a problem for many military commanders, with Clausewitz offering advice on how these defenses could be overcome.⁴⁴

Napoleon tried to cut the Gordian knot of defeating these super-forts in a number of ways. First, using a new and excellent road system, he would merely bypass them, like he did in 1797 in Italy.⁴⁵ By a series of rapid marches on the right bank of the River Po, Napoleon's army turned the Austrians out of a series of forts, especially the powerful position at Pavia.⁴⁶ Or by using the massive and very fast armies he had available, he would cut off the fort with one part of his force while maintaining the strategic offensive with another part, as he did at Ulm.⁴⁷ However, when Napoleon could not use either of these methods he fell back on straight forward frontal assaults as he did against "the Great Redoubt" at the 1812 Battle of Borodino and it cost his army dearly.⁴⁸ In short, the *trace italienne* style of super-fort, (indeed any massive, fixed and well-defended fortification) still posed a serious problem for Napoleon when he was on the offensive. Further, he developed and used methods that were only partly successful in thwarting these fixed fortifications.

Strategy, Operations and Tactics

From the time that gunpowder weapons came to the fore, generals and strategists struggled to find effective ways to employ them, particularly on the offense. From the start of the Military Revolution gunpowder weapons favored the defense. Given the slow firing rates of gunpowder weapons, the infantry would dig in, the artillery

would build field fortifications, and the army on the offense would be forced into frontal assaults which generally failed. Therefore, generals on the move would attempt a strategic offense with a tactical defense, or use ambushes to prevent the opposing army from digging in. For example, at Pavia the two sides dug in for three weeks before the Spanish, with a surprise night march, turned the French flank. Or the Battle of Battle of Saint-Quentin when the Spanish ambushed and defeated a French force.⁴⁹

During the seventeenth century the firing rate for all gunpowder weapons increased. They also became lighter and more maneuverable. Soldiers now formed up in lines rather than blocks; allowing more fire power to be deployed to the front and lessening the effect of incoming firing as well.⁵⁰ Advancing volley fire was developed as a tactic.⁵¹ Also, “horse, foote and artillerie” started to work closely together in combined arms tactical operations.⁵²

After the Wars of Religion (circa 1524 to 1648), Europe drifted into the time of so-called Cabinet Wars: wars fought by small, professional, highly trained militaries with large mercenary elements for limited objectives. While married to maneuver rather than battle to decide the issue, the armies were still slow moving and tied to supply depots. Civilians were generally left alone and the continued existence of the belligerent nations was not at stake.⁵³

The French Revolution ended the era of these slow moving, gentlemanly contests. Threatened from every side and with the Royal Army a hollow force, the revolutionary leadership, in the person of Lazare Carnot, declared the *levee en masse* and created a nation-at-arms. Unfortunately, it was a largely untrained, if enthusiastic, army at first. Therefore new tactics had to be developed to utilize this large force to its best advantage. The long thin line was replaced by the column of attack with a swarm of skirmishers in front to help break the enemy’s line. However, the Revolutionary Army had at

best a mixed record with these tactics, losing as many battles as it won.⁵⁴

In the area of strategy and tactics Napoleon was the master. At Saint Helena, he wrote, “My great talent, what characterizes me the most, is that in everything I see clearly.”⁵⁵ What he saw most clearly was that wars should be, as Frederick the Great said: “short and lively . . . a long war depopulates our country and exhausts our resources.”⁵⁶ The Napoleonic strategy for these short and lively wars was designed to accomplish the destruction of his enemies’ will to resist.⁵⁷ There were no “cabinet wars” for the Emperor.

Napoleon’s method to crush his opponent was the destruction of their field forces in one climatic battle.⁵⁸ There were three essential elements of the Emperor’s operational planning, which he used to gain advantage on the battlefield. First was the *la manoeuvre sur les derriere*, or “the move to the rear”; in which one part of the French Army would sweep into the rear of the enemy to cut his lines of communication, while another part attacked and fixed the enemy force in place. Napoleon used this move some thirty times between 1796 and 1815, for example at Ulm in 1805, Wagram in 1809 and Smolensk in 1812. His other favorite was the *strategie de la position centrale*, or “the strategy of the central position”; such as at Lodi where Napoleon would place his army between two enemy forces, then concentrate his strength against a weaker part of the enemy first, then turn and defeat both part in detail.⁵⁹ It was his failure to seize the central position that lead to his defeat at Waterloo.⁶⁰ The Emperor explained: “Generalship consists in, when actually inferior in [total] numbers to the enemy, being superior to him on the battlefield.”⁶¹ The last type of strategic move he used was the *penetration strategique* or “strategic penetration” wherein Napoleon would break the enemy’s defensive cordon at some weak point to push his army into a strategically advantageous position. This last strategy was only

made, though, as a preface to Napoleon transitioning to one of the other two.⁶²

Unlike the previous generation of military leaders, Napoleon saw campaign and battle as a seamless whole designed to reach a favorable politico-military decision.⁶³ He applied the same basic system of maneuver and attack to his strategy and his tactics. First, he was wedded to the offensive – both strategically and tactically. He stated clearly: “Make war offensively, like Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Eugene and Frederick . . . model yourself on them, it is the sole means to become a great captain and fathom the secrets of the art.”⁶⁴ Next, as mentioned above, he was a firm believer in firepower to win battles. Further, Napoleon often said: “It is by turning the enemy, by attacking his flank, that battles are won.”⁶⁵

The ideal Napoleonic battle had a certain rhythm and flow of action: After penetrating deeply into enemy territory and finding the main enemy field force, one of Napoleon’s corps would fix the enemy in place by attacking their front, while another force would be moving to turn the enemy’s flank. At the same time, Napoleon would organize a “grand battery” of artillery to breach the enemy’s battle line. All these moves were made to break the enemy’s “equilibrium.” Then the Emperor would use his reserves, commonly a cavalry force, to effect the final rupture of the line and engage in a pursuit to annihilate the enemy army.⁶⁶

Only Napoleon’s reorganization of the French Army into permanent *Corps d’Armee* made this battle tempo possible. Each *Corps* was essentially a miniature army; each possessed cavalry, artillery and infantry and each was large enough that it could fight independently until another *Corps* could come to its support. Also included in the *Corps* organization was a strong central reserve under Napoleon’s personal command. It was this strong central reserve

that Napoleon used to break the enemy's line and then pursue the defeated army.⁶⁷ In this aspect of the Military Revolution, Napoleon was not a radical innovator but rather applied his genius to the ideals of others, such as those of Frederick the Great and Pierre-Joseph Bourcet, then combined those ideals into a practicable and nearly infallible strategic and tactical system of war.⁶⁸

Vast Armies, Professional Officers, Effective Administration

Over the course of the Military Revolution armies vastly increased in size. From 1500 to 1700 France's army grew from fifty thousand to over three-hundred and ninety thousand. Even a small, and at that time, relatively poor country like England managed a fourfold increase in military numbers.⁶⁹ By the time of Austerlitz, the French Army could deploy over four-hundred and fifty thousand men and by 1812 over seven-hundred and fifty thousand; however, many of those were from allied, or client states, not just France.⁷⁰ Merely supplying, feeding, paying, and organizing these vast numbers required training, professionalism, administration, and bureaucracy.

Napoleon, while a firm believer in training and professionalism (and their handmaiden, meritocracy), was not much of an innovator in these areas. The Emperor benefited from Lazare Carnot's system of promoting for skill and merit. Certainly, Carnot recognized talent when he saw it; after all, he promoted eight of Napoleon's later marshals (Jourdan, Massena, Moncey, Bernadotte, Augereau, Berthier, Brune, and Soult) to general. Napoleon merely continued the meritocratic system of promotions and advancement.⁷¹ He also believed that "drill, instruction, and skill are what make real soldiers."⁷² Napoleon firmly believed that every soldier carried a marshal's baton in his knapsack, but it was up to the soldier to bring it out. Certainly the Napoleonic Army represented a true professional meritocracy.

Regardless of background or upbringing every man could achieve. For example, Napoleon's Marshals came from diverse backgrounds including the peasantry, the middle class (like Napoleon himself) and the old nobility. Further, many of the Marshals were also raised to the new Napoleonic nobility. Two Marshals of the Empire became kings: Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte, became King of Sweden and Joachim-Napoléon Murat was made King of Naples.⁷³ Background did not matter, but ability certainly did.

Napoleon greatly expanded the existing system of both civil and military education. He reorganized the French education system by taking it out of the church's hands and putting it under centralized state control. The Lycees system was very militaristic in its organization, with drums calling the students to class.⁷⁴ The new school system was surprisingly narrow in its curriculum, focusing on Latin and mathematics, leaving out almost all advanced sciences. Those that did study the advanced sciences, such as physics or chemistry, were destined for the advanced military academy *De École Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr* or "The Special Military School of Saint-Cyr" created by Napoleon in 1802. It was generally assumed that those students that studied math would enter the army directly. He also "militarized" the *Ecole Polytechnique*, or "The Polytechnic School," turning it into a school for artillery officers and military engineers. The Lycees system was designed, at least in part, to provide an educated military and bureaucratic cadre for the Napoleonic war machine. This link between the Lycees and the military was best demonstrated in 1812 when the War Ministry simply requested and received the finest mathematics students and sent them straight from school to the battlefield.⁷⁵

Napoleon's motto may have been "a career open to talent, without distinction of birth,"⁷⁶ but ultimately that meant just military talent. For example, the famed Legion of Honor in August 1804

was 99.5 percent military; that is to say, only ten charter members out of the original two thousand were civilians. Even by 1814, of the Legion's thirty-eight thousand members fewer than four percent were civilians.⁷⁷

Napoleon rationalized, centralized and secularized France, all to feed a vast military machine. To pay for his military, Napoleon created *De Banque de France* "The Bank of France." Further, he eliminated internal tariffs and imposed a central auditing system.⁷⁸ His tax collection apparatus was so efficient that, even while supporting a four-hundred thousand man army as well as a large navy, he managed to balance the budget.⁷⁹ Napoleon claimed his financial system was the envy of all other nations.⁸⁰

Conscription, the tool that allowed Napoleon to build his vast armies, was under the control of the Ministry of the Interior: "the only ministry that counted."⁸¹ The Emperor believed in conscription as a way to not only raise a large number of troops but also to impose strong social discipline on the French and to equalize society.⁸² He allowed almost no exemptions to the draft.⁸³ The Emperor paid close attention to conscription rates.⁸⁴ He often put a great deal of political pressure on officials that failed to produce.⁸⁵ From 1800 to 1815 the French state drafted more than two million men and imposed the draft on its allied and client nation-states as well.⁸⁶

However, Napoleon, despite his genius in other areas, was never able to solve the problem of logistics for his armies. The Napoleonic supply system has been described as "ramshackle" at best.⁸⁷ By freeing his army from long, slow moving supply trains and fixed supply depots, he made it fast and deadly, but living off the land had its limits. In poor areas, regions with bad weather, or regions with limited chances to forage, French armies could and did suffer from serious food shortages such as at Ulm and in Poland and Russia. Efforts to improve the supply and transportation systems by creat-

ing specialized supply battalions equipped with wagons and by establishing some limited supply depots generally fell short.⁸⁸ Napoleon, as one writer observed: “failed the logistics test.”⁸⁹

Conclusion

John of Salisbury once remarked about what his old teacher and mentor, Bernard of Chartres, used to tell his students: "(He) used to compare us to dwarfs perched on the shoulders of giants. He pointed out that we see more and further than our predecessors, not because we have keener vision or greater height, but because we are lifted up and borne aloft on their gigantic stature."⁹⁰ The same may be said for Napoleon. From within the epoch of the Military Revolution, Napoleon stood on the shoulders of giants such as King Charles VIII of France, Maurice of Nassau, Gustavus Adolphus, Frederick the Great, Gribenauval, and Carnot -- to name just a few. This does not diminish him or his accomplishments. Napoleon stood at the top of the three-hundred-year edifice of military innovation and development. In many ways, he represented the apex or apotheosis of the Military Revolution and set his seal on many aspects of war and the military – and continued to hold influence for the two centuries that have elapsed since his death.

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⁹⁰ John of Salisbury, *The Metalogicon: A Twelfth-Century Defense of the Verbal and Logical Arts of the Trivium*, trans. Daniel D. McGarry (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1955), Book III, 167.

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Operation AJAX: Roots of a Tree Grown in Distrust

Carter Matherly

The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms.

– U.S. President Harry Truman, March 12, 1947

President Truman made the above statement during his famous speech in which he sought congressional approval to increase aid to Greece and Turkey, two countries whose economies were on the brink of failure. The collective fear was that their governments would turn to communism as an economic fix for continued survival. Truman's speech quickly formed the basis of U.S. policy towards communism and political entities that threatened democracy.¹ Even though this laid the groundwork of the U.S.'s public international policy, a far different and ironic action emerged. Just a few short years later President Eisenhower authorized the CIA, in conjunction with Britain's MI6, to carry out Operation AJAX.² At the heart of the operation's targets sat an elected Iranian prime minister, new-found Iranian national pride, a power-hungry shah, and a plot to overthrow a fledgling democracy. Overall, the operation was considered a success with regard to its objectives, but when compared to U.S. policy and interests, it was a horrible failure and arguably the focal point of almost a half-century of soured Iranian-U.S. relations.

The Operation

Operation AJAX was a false flag operation, a covert plan where CIA involvement was masked to look like an Iranian military coup to overthrow Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq. The hope of the operation was to realign political control of Iran in fa-

vor of an extremely U.S.-friendly monarch.

In late 1952 representatives of MI6 and the CIA met to discuss future warfare and involvement in Iran. During the two-month discourse MI6 mentioned its interest in the possibility of overthrowing Iran's Prime Minister Mossadeq. The CIA, surprised by the suggestion and completely unprepared for the topic, agreed to study the situation further before committing to such an action.³

Prior to this proposal the CIA had not been in the business of actively overthrowing governments. In fact, the CIA had only very limited experience in assisting coups, primarily as technical advisors, and had never attempted to take the lead in orchestrating the overthrow of a government. The CIA is credited with providing analytical and planning support in 1949 to Syrian Army Chief of Staff Husni al-Zaim for Syria's first coup d'état in March of that year.⁴ It has been proposed that the coup was also financially backed with funds provided by the CIA, however this remains unconfirmed. In 1952 the agency supported General Batista's coup to overcome his almost guaranteed loss in Cuba's presidential election.⁵

The first communication seeking approval for the CIA-led Iranian coup d'état came from the agency's director, General Walter Bedell Smith.⁶ General Smith established the official policy that the U.S. could no longer approve of the Iranian government and the continued influence that the National Frontist party had on it. He further cited a trend of overwhelming recklessness and destructive attitudes by the Iranian government, all inspired by Mossadeq, who was attempting to consolidate power for an eventual dictatorial bid.⁷ Citing Mossadeq's communist leanings is generally viewed as propaganda aimed at disguising the true inspiration for his removal from power – oil. Mossadeq was working to nationalize Iranian oil production, a move that would violate the terms of a questionable oil production contract that heavily favored the British.⁸

A complex plan involving protests, propaganda, exiled leaders and royalist military members was formulated and dispatched for immediate implementation. The operation dubbed TP-AJAX, AJAX for short, was intended to oust Mossadeq and reduce the influence of the National Frontists in an effort to reinstall Shah Reza Pahlavi to the forefront of political power in Iran.⁹

The operation commenced on August 15, 1953, barely nine months after MI6 first approached the CIA with its desire. Execution of the operation was intended to last approximately 18 hours, but ended up lasting a full 72 hours, coming close to failure numerous times. The first twelve hours went completely awry; the morning of August 16 found agents scrambling to salvage the operation by all means possible. Key components of the military portion of the operation had not come to fruition, setting in motion a cascade of failures. Numerous members of Mossadeq's cabinet were not arrested as planned. In turn, Mossadeq had received warning of the coup and had ample opportunity to fortify security around several governmental buildings, including his own residence.¹⁰

The fortification allowed Mossadeq to arrest Colonel Nematollah Nassiri as a conspirator when the colonel delivered the shah's farman (royal decree), announcing the dismissal of Mossadeq and installation of General Fazlollah Zahedi as the new prime minister.¹¹ As word spread, violent protests erupted in the streets. The shah, fearing for his life, fled to Italy. Mossadeq, believing the shah's departure signaled the end of the coup, called off the fortified security and quelled the protests in the streets.¹²

Seizing an opportunity, agency case officers hurriedly circulated documents and fabricated interviews that spun the events as a plan by Mossadeq to overthrow Iran's increasingly democratic government in an attempt to place himself at the head of a new communist government.¹³ The plan created much confusion. When the shah's

newly appointed prime minister, now on the run, gave a speech via a pirate radio broadcast denouncing Mossadeq and accepting the shah's appointment, no one noticed that during the first few seconds the music playing in the background was the U.S. National Anthem! This of course was an accident and was quickly corrected by agents behind the scenes who were relaying the broadcast across Iran.¹⁴

This set the stage for an orchestrated pro-communist demonstration. The hired demonstrators began attacking private businesses and destroying shops in the bazaars. General Zahedi then rallied fearful citizens against the staged communist revolution. As the protest turned violent, General Zahedi mobilized the military to seize remaining elements of Mossadeq's cabinet. Initially fleeing arrest, Mossadeq eventually turned himself in to prevent further bloodshed.¹⁵ It was not until Mossadeq's arrest that the shah returned to Iran.

Despite these setbacks, the shah was in power, Mossadeq was tried and sentenced to life in prison though later commuted to house arrest, and the U.S. arguably now had a puppet monarchy at its disposal in control of Iran. For all intents and purposes Operation AJAX was considered a resounding success by all involved in the planning and execution of the operation. However, even though the primary goal was realized, an objective eye could easily note that the operation was a complete failure in accordance with standing U.S. policy as dictated by the Truman doctrine.¹⁶ Operation AJAX also failed in securing long-term U.S. relations and other interests within Iran.

His Imperial Majesty

As the dust settled, the irrevocable harm went undetected by key players behind the coup. Over three hundred Iranian Nationalists

were killed in front of Mossadeq's home, defending not only him, but democracy.¹⁷ Whether they ever knew or realized that the leaders of the free world and purveyors of democracy were actually behind the entire affair is unknown.

What followed was a long and oppressive reign of forced modernization and censorship under Shah Reza Pahlavi. The U.S. was no longer hidden behind the cloak and dagger veil of the CIA. President after president hosted the shah in the U.S. and brokered oil deals and weapons sales that predominantly benefited the U.S. economy.¹⁸ All the while, the working class of Iran suffered in poverty.

The shah had extravagant taste and spent enormous amounts of money to fund his lavish lifestyle rather than bestowing wealth on Iran and its populace for their betterment. A principal example of this excessive lifestyle was in his celebration of the 2500th anniversary of the Iranian monarchy. The event took place in a tent city spanning 160 acres near the ancient but now impoverished city of Persepolis. The event itself cost over \$200 million in 1971 dollars and featured breast of peacock, a hard to find delicacy that can cost upwards of \$75 per pound.¹⁹

Outside of irresponsible economic decisions, political tyranny ran rampant. The principal organization behind the oppression was the infamous Ministry of Security known as the SAVAK. The product of another joint effort with the CIA, the SAVAK strove to eliminate threats to the shah through questionable tactics and policy. During his reign, the SAVAK scoured Iran, imprisoning thousands of political dissenters, subjecting them to various torture techniques, and summarily executing those seen as major threats to the monarch.²⁰ Amnesty International reported that by 1978 as many as 2,500 people were being held by the SAVAK. The number did not include those who had been released or killed and would only grow exponentially as protests and dissent ran deeper. Eventually this

strife culminated in the overthrow of the shah for—ironically—an even more repressive regime in 1979.²¹

Sixty Years Later

Most U.S. citizens do not realize that both the core of Iranian distrust towards the U.S. and the 1979 revolution that deposed the shah have significant ties to Operation AJAX. To test this claim, one hundred deployed U.S. military members of various ages and ranks were asked on an informal basis for the purposes of this paper to name a major event contributing to the fragile relationship the U.S. shares with Iran. Only one person polled cited Operation AJAX as a factor.²² By far, more recent events, including the 1979 revolution, the failed Operation EAGLE CLAW, nuclear threat, hatred towards Israel and violations of human rights, were the most common replies. All of these events rest on the forefront of American minds while Operation AJAX still evokes anger from most Iranians.²³

Prime Minister Mossadeq's government was the closest the Iranian people have ever come to having a true democracy. Mossadeq was not only a symbol of Iranian pride; he was the first leader in decades, if not at least a century, to whom the majority of the country's populace freely gave their loyalty as a true leader of the people.²⁴ Sadly AJAX did not just kill Iran's fledgling democracy before it could truly rule; it silenced the pride of a people and a nation.

At the time America was seen as an ally by the Iranian people. Mossadeq visited the U.S. on numerous occasions and even visited the Tomb of the Unknown, laying a wreath in honor of fallen American soldiers.²⁵ Just a year later Iranian troops loyal to Mossadeq would die at the hands of an American-sponsored plot. It is no wonder that Mossadeq and the rest of Iran felt betrayed by the U.S.

Today Iran is comprised mostly of a population too young to

remember Operation AJAX, the rule of the shah, or even the revolution of 1979. Seventy-five percent of the country is under age 30.²⁶ The staggering percentage of youth in Iran is due to the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) that claimed the previous generation's youth in a horrible slaughter of World War One style trench warfare, landmines and chemical weapons.

Iranians as a whole have a decidedly different view of the period of history leading to the 1979 revolution than their American counterparts. Iranians are taught about Operation AJAX in school. Amongst many Iranians the coup is still thought of as a feat of American might; both a blessing and a curse. A declassified CIA report notes that the average Iranian believes that Americans are omnipotent, given their ability to depose Mossadeq, and that the U.S. must have not only supported the 1979 revolution that brought the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to power and later Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, but have also helped the ayatollahs maintain an oppressive grip over Iran.²⁷ This view can be seen intensifying as the Ayatollah Khamenei has traveled throughout Iran giving speeches that call for an increasingly conservative government in order to deflect Western influence. The 2012 parliamentary elections and legislative actions have greatly favored Khamenei's political agenda.

Today many of the persons currently in power in Iran were alive to witness Operation AJAX, the rule of the shah, and the subsequent 1979 revolution. These were the planners and the participants that overtook the embassy and held 52 Americans hostage for 444 days.²⁸ As the Ayatollah Khomeini gained power during the revolution, rumors and fears began to circulate throughout Iran that the shah and CIA were plotting to remove the Ayatollah and his supporters. It is believed in a few circles that the taking of the embassy was a preemptive plan by Khomeini to avoid the same fate Mossadeq had suffered in 1953 at the hands of the CIA.²⁹

Constant Reminders

The fear of continued American plotting can be seen at the heart of several recent high profile media stories breaking in Iran. These stories often showcase alleged U.S. spies and tell of foiled attempts to disparage the current Iranian national or political machine in light of its perceived divinely inspired Islamic course.

On July 13, 2010 Iranian nuclear scientist Shahram Amiri appeared in the Iranian interests section of the Pakistani embassy in the U.S. after disappearing during a religious pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia over a year earlier. The story he and the Iranian media put forth as the truth claims that the CIA kidnapped him at gunpoint on the way to a mosque in a plot to shake up Iran and its nuclear program. The CIA has had little to say on the matter and has maintained that Amiri came to the U.S. as a voluntary defector. For his defection and information on Iran's nuclear program he was to receive five million dollars and was never considered a prisoner in the U.S.³⁰ Before appearing at the embassy Amiri posted several videos online. One video claimed he was being tortured and held against his will under armed guard. Another alleges that he was in the U.S. under his own will, happily studying at a university. Amiri quickly returned to Iran, promising to make public the details of his entire ordeal and failed to do so. In an odd twist several news outlets reported that shortly after Amiri returned he was jailed on several counts of treason. Official Iranian news outlets maintain that he is still a hero of the Iranian people and has returned to work but have produced no verifiable evidence of his current whereabouts or condition.

A year earlier on July 31, 2009, three young UC Berkeley students hiking in Iraq were arrested and accused of spying in Iran. The Iranian judiciary claimed the trio was venturing into Iran with

“suspicious objectives” and would be tried appropriately.³¹ As the case was tried over two years, one student was returned on bail to the U.S. for humanitarian reasons due to her failing health. The verdict resulted in the two remaining backpackers’ conviction as spies “for the American intelligence agency” and illegal entry into Iran, with five and three year sentences, respectively, for a total of eight years in prison.³² The reference to “the American intelligence agency” is obviously a direct referral to the CIA. Despite Iran’s claims and the convictions, no evidence beyond the hikers’ nationality was ever publically offered.³³

A series of attacks inside Iran spanning from July 2010 to January 2012 have claimed the lives of four people and wounded one.³⁴ All the people targeted have been identified in the international media as scientists associated with Iran’s nuclear program in some way. Despite official condemnation for the killings, Iran continues to implicate the CIA as being, at least in part, behind the killings.³⁵ The sophisticated nature, surgical precision, and the fact that the killings directly benefit the U.S.’s policy of a non-nuclear Iran all give a strong backing to the argument that the U.S., or more specifically its clandestine specialists in the CIA, was somehow involved.

Today

Iran, once an ally of the U.S., was the victim of a covert CIA operation to overthrow its prime minister in favor of an oppressive shah. This single act became the catalyst of over a half-century of sour relations between America and Iran. Today little has changed; high tensions and fierce rhetoric are mostly still as prevalent as they were during the 1979 revolution.

The results of the 2009 Iranian presidential election were widely disputed amongst the Iranian people and the international community. Many of the citizens united in a very similar fashion as during

the 1979 revolution. Popularly dubbed the Green Revolution, this movement was short-lived as the government brutally suppressed it. In the 2012 legislative and 2013 presidential elections Ayatollah Khamenei toured the country, warning of Western plots brewing in order to influence the elections through Iranian solidarity. He told his countrymen to be wary of Western pressure, hinting at the possibility of a subversive plot against not just Iran but Islam itself.³⁶ His hopes were to unite the younger generation—not yet born to witness the 1979 revolution—with the ruling regime to try to prevent the West, specifically the U.S., from influencing Iranian citizens. Shortly after the elections the candidates supported by Ayatollah Khamenei claimed victory, including Hassan Rouhani as the new president. The Ayatollah later thanked the people for thwarting the enemies of Iran and those that conspire against it. This was pointedly directed at the U.S. and its allies.

This younger generation holds the only possible key to freeing Iran from its dictators and oppression. They blame Khamenei and his regime for creating a republic based on Islamic fascism with no opportunity for success in the emerging global economy.³⁷ These Iranians were just young children during the Iran-Iraq war and have little firsthand knowledge of the terror associated with chemical weapons and trench warfare. They do know, however, the pain that comes from being orphaned by warfare. Even before the most recent round of international bitterness aimed at Iran's nuclear program this large demographic struggled to earn a living. The susceptibility of this generation to external influence is extremely high. To them Western ideology presents an opportunity for prosperity and freedom to choose their path.³⁸ Much like Martin Luther's famous stance against the elitism of priests within the Catholic Church, Iranian youth are Islamic but want to be able to worship without fear of jail or torture for not conforming to the Ayatollahs' oppressive

brand of Islam.³⁹

Reza Kahlili's book *A Time to Betray* asserts that a number of younger Iranians are willing to work for the U.S. Kahlili claims that he was a CIA proxy who worked inside Iran under the codename Wally.⁴⁰ Even though credibility issues surround the author's story and claims, perhaps the ruling regime is right to worry about subversive covert action. Operation AJAX demonstrated the U.S.'s ability and willingness to take action to guarantee its interests are maintained. The successful use of covert operations lends credibility to the possibility of future operations. While the most critical was AJAX, another notable operation conducted within Iranian borders was Operation ARGO. ARGO was a successful bid to rescue a few U.S. embassy workers in 1979 with CIA operatives posing as a Canadian film crew.⁴¹

Conclusion

In 1947 the U.S. had proclaimed that one of its major international roles was to support nations struggling to maintain a democracy, demonstrated by Truman's plea to increase aid to Greece and Turkey to thwart the threat of communism. This policy was completely ignored when it came to approval of Operation AJAX in 1953, creating the ironic act of destroying a fledgling democracy. Twenty-six years after the U.S.-backed coup, the shah was deposed in a revolution headed by the Ayatollah Khomeini. From that time until very recently relations between Iran and the U.S. have been severely strained. Iranian leaders are fearful of another coup attempt or other event sponsored by the CIA to further undermine their power.⁴² Moreover, younger Iranians do not see the U.S. as their ally; they believe the U.S. placed the Ayatollahs in power and are keeping them there. Both beliefs are founded in the failure of Operation AJAX to legitimately support stated U.S. international doc-

trine. As this research shows, operation AJAX was a major factor causing almost a half-century of soured Iranian-U.S. relations. Most recently there have been signs of compromise between the two nations. Only continued time and diplomacy will show if operation AJAX is no longer relevant to these stated international relations.

Notes

¹ Speech by U.S. President Harry Truman to the U.S. Congress on March 12, 1947.

² Moyara Ruehsen, "Operation 'AJAX' Revisited: Iran, 1953," *Middle Eastern Studies* 29 (1993): 467-486.

³ Donald Wilbur, *Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran* (Washington, DC: Clandestine Service History, CIA, 1954), 20.

⁴ Irene Gendzier, *Notes from the Minefield: United States Intervention in Lebanon and the Middle East, 1945-1958* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 98.

⁵ Howard Lewis, "The Cuban Revolt Story," *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly* 37 (1960): 19.

⁶ Ludwell Montague, *General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence October 1950 - February 1953* (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University, 1992), 55-56.

⁷ Wilbur, *Overthrow*, 20.

⁸ Stephen Kinzer, *All the Shah's Men* (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2003), 106.

⁹ Abbas Milani, *The Shah* (New York: Macmillan, 2011), 72.

¹⁰ Wilbur, *Overthrow*, 26.

¹¹ Mark Gasiorowski, *U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah, Building a Client State in Iran* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1991), 17.

¹² Milani, *The Shah*, 182.

¹³ Mark Gasiorowski and Malcom Byrne, *Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004), 261.

¹⁴ Wilbur, *Overthrow*, 56.

¹⁵ Milani, *The Shah*, 189.

¹⁶ Howard Jones, *A New Kind of War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 43.

¹⁷ Wilbur, *Overthrow*, 43.

¹⁸ Marvin Zonis, *Majestic Failure: The Fall of the Shah* (Chicago: University of Chicago press, 1991), 240.

¹⁹ D. Streusand, "Contemporary Iran," *Marine Corps University Command and Staff College, Cultural and Interagency Operations* 2 (2011): 11.

²⁰ "Ministry of Security SAVAK," FAS Intelligence Resource Program, <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/iran/savak/index.html> (accessed February 20, 2012).

²¹ FAS Intelligence Resource Program.

²² An informal polling that occurred from February 2012 until March 2012. Participants were approached at random in an area of public commerce and verbally asked what they thought to be the major originating cause of tensions between the US and Iran.

²³ Gasiorowski and Byrne, *Mosaddeq*, 274.

²⁴ Gasiorowski and Byrne, *Mosaddeq* 262.

²⁵ Truman Library, "Prime Minister Mossadegh of Iran at Tomb of the Unknown Soldier of WWI," (Truman Library, 1951) Image #66-8010.

²⁶ *CLA World Fact Book* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2009).

²⁷ Scott Koch, *Zendeabad, Shahl: The CIA and the fall of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh* (Washington, DC: History Staff CIA, 1998), 46.

²⁸ David Houghton, *US Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage Crises* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1.

²⁹ Chua Lu Fong, "Operation Eagle Claw, 1980: A Case Study in Crisis Management and Military Planning," *Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces* 28 (2002): 42.

³⁰ Richard Spencer, "Iranian nuclear scientist Shahram Amiri flies home from US," *The Telegraph*, July 14, 2010.

³¹ Jack Healy, "Iran says 3 hikers will be tried over crossing," *The New York Times*, December 15, 2009.

³² Aljazeera, "Iran convicts US 'hikers' as spies," *Aljazeera*, August 21, 2011.

³³ David Goodman and Alan Cowell. "American Hikers Leave Iran After Prison Release." *The New York Times*, September 21, 2011.

³⁴ Brian Murphy and Akbar Dareini, "Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan, Iran Nuclear Expert, Dead In Car Bomb," *The Huffington Post*, January 11, 2012.

³⁵ Aljazeera, "US condemns Iranian nuclear scientist killing," *Aljazeera*, January 12, 2012.

³⁶ Robert Worth, "Iran invokes west to motivate voters," *The New York Times*, February 29, 2012.

³⁷ Elliot Hen-Tov. "Understanding Iran's New Authoritarianism." *The Washington Quarterly* 30 (2007):163-179.

³⁸ William O. Beeman, *The Great Satan vs. the Mad Mullabs* (Chicago: University of Chicago press, 2005), 185.

³⁹ Beeman, *Great Satan*, 86.

⁴⁰ Reza Kahlili, *A Time to Betray* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010), 1.

⁴¹ Antonio Mendez and Matt Baglio, *Argo* (Penguin Group: 2012), 10.

⁴² Kahlili, *Betray*, 62.

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First Empire Unraveled: Why the British Lost the
War of American Independence

Anne Midgley

Oh God! It is all over.

Frederick, Lord North's reaction to news of General Charles Lord Cornwallis' defeat at Yorktown¹

Frequently accused of incompetence, as noted by British historian Eric Robson, the British government and its military leaders faced an almost insurmountable challenge in their battle to restore the American mainland colonists to loyalty. The American War for Independence can be divided into three periods, each with its distinct opportunities and challenges for the British. The first stage began with Britain's decision to address its dire financial circumstances following the Seven Years' War by seeking increased revenue through colonial taxation and enforced trade restrictions. This period of the conflict lasted through the outbreak of armed hostilities at Lexington and Concord, Massachusetts on April 19, 1775. It was followed by the Northern Campaign, lasting through the staggering British loss at Saratoga on October 17, 1777 and the subsequent entry of France into the war as an American ally. Seeking an end to the stalemate in the North, the British launched the Southern Campaign as they sought to bring the war to a successful conclusion by basing strategies on the perceived strength of the Loyalist population in the Southern colonies. In each stage of the war, Britain's ministers, men, and martial might were challenged beyond the capabilities of eighteenth century warfare to gain a military victory. Her admirals and generals faced nearly impossible odds as they struggled to end what started as a colonial revolt but became a global affair.

Maintaining nearly sixty thousand troops across the Atlantic and supplying them and their animal-powered transportation in hostile country across the vast ocean was an almost unthinkable feat. However, lack of strategic coherence and unity of command, personality conflicts, and lack of appreciation for the political, social and cultural differences that had developed between the colonies and Britain frustrated attempts to mend the breach between Britain and her mainland American colonists.²

Following the Seven Years' War, Britain stood at the pinnacle of power, but was close to drowning in the debt that had financed its triumph over Britain's traditional enemy, France, and its allied nations, Russia and Austria. Having created a highly effective fiscal-military machine during the period following the Glorious Revolution of 1688-1689, Britain had the mechanisms in place to finance the Seven Years' War. Those same mechanisms had been strained to the limit by the time the war ended in 1763. Britain's ministers gazed across their newly expanded empire for new sources of income to augment the empire's existing internal revenue as the burden of debt had grown to £130,000,000 by 1763.³ Challenged on the economic front, Britain had also entered a period of political instability which surfaced during the Seven Years' War. The political stability which had accompanied the rise of the British Hanoverian monarchy began to fracture and fragment by the mid-1750s and by the end of the Seven Years' War, both the political and economic foundations of Britain's power were facing severe tests.⁴

As Britain sought to consolidate gains and seek greater financial advantage from the empire's far-flung holdings, initial attempts to wring greater return from British colonies faced unanticipated hurdles, for American colonists sought to preserve and protect the political and financial freedoms that had evolved during Britain's period of relative neglect earlier in the century.⁵ Critical decisions were

made by George III and his ministers which ignored the economic, social, and political realities of the American colonists. The Quartering Act of 1765 and the Stamp Act of the same year touched off colonial fury. In passing an act that allowed for the quartering of British troops in America, British ministers had ignored the long-standing British antipathy towards standing armies which was stubbornly shared by most American colonists. American colonists were proud supporters of Britain's constitutional government; "the best model of Government that can be framed by Mortals."⁶ Their British political heritage led many colonists to adopt the English "country Whig" political philosophy with its definition of personal liberty opposed to monarchical power ideally managed through a balanced government design which pitted legislative against executive authority. Nevertheless, neither the American colonists nor the British monarchy and its ministry appreciated the extremist nature of the colonists' political leanings. The Whig philosophy adhered to in the colonies was not mainstream political thought in Britain, but rather that espoused by the more radical British element. Therefore, as colonists devoured British and American political tracts they formed what became an aberrant view of the ideal form of Britain's constitutional balance.⁷

At the same time, their new King, George III, was asserting a stronger monarchy than had existed under his Hanoverian predecessors. George III was bent on upholding the supremacy of Parliament against the claims of the colonists for the power of their colonial assemblies. These assemblies had grown in clout through the neglect of Britain during the eighteenth century and had become the core of colonial demand for self-government. Each side believed fervently in their constitutional position and unknowingly widened the rift between the monarch and his American subjects.⁸

The initial period of the American Revolution, therefore, took

place largely in the political rather than the military realm, where British decisions to raise revenue and post a standing army clearly went against the colonists' understanding of their rights as "free-born" Englishmen to representation in the key political decisions that affected their lives. The colonists' militia tradition, another element of their British heritage, their political grasp of their rights, the broad, forested expanse of their geography and the distance between Britain and the mainland colonies were all to play a part in the American Revolution and pose problems to Britain's army and Royal Navy which became insurmountable during the war.⁹

Colonial unrest raged in Boston, Massachusetts. Following the Boston "Tea Party" of December 16, 1773 the British were determined to suppress the uprising, which appeared centered in that tumultuous port city. The situation facing Britain at this juncture appeared to be the need to defuse civil unrest while not upsetting and alienating the presumably vast Loyalist population. Confronted by unanticipated broad-based colonial resistance, the circumstances faced by the British continued to evolve as riots, mob actions and unrest turned into armed rebellion. The Coercive Acts of 1774; the latest in a series of political measures aimed at restoring allegiance, had the opposite effect and hardened colonial opposition. Boston's distress rallied the efforts of other mainland colonies to her aid. General Thomas Gage, Commander in Chief of the British forces and his redcoats faced a firestorm of rebellion in early 1775 as they sought to subdue Boston's agitators through intimidation.¹⁰

Gage, more so than other British generals, recognized that unless sufficient force was applied in the colonies "[it] will in the end cost more blood and treasure."¹¹ His persistent calls for significant strength to put down the uprising were not answered by the ministry, which could not accept the level of colonial resistance in effect at this stage of the conflict. The nature of the game changed dra-

matically on April 19, 1775. Gage noted the growing unrest in Massachusetts and meant to send troops to confiscate a cache of military weapons and powder stored in Concord, Massachusetts while at the same time he intended to arrest and silence two of the most outspoken rebel leaders, John Hancock and Samuel Adams, who were then in Lexington, Massachusetts. Alerted to the danger, the rebel militia was called out. The bloodbath on Lexington Green occurred as British soldiers faced armed militia. British troops fired, killing eight and wounding ten. At Concord, the Americans had concealed or carried off most of the military supplies targeted by the British. Upon the arrival of British troops, militia units fired on the soldiers. There began an unimaginable nightmare for the redcoats, as for miles they were targeted by rebel militia who fired on them from behind cover while the British struggled to return to Boston. Exhausted, the troops were saved by General Hugh, Lord Percy, who had been dispatched by Gage with reinforcements to rescue them.¹² As Percy reported to Gage, the redcoats retreated for fifteen miles “under incessant fire all round us...His Majesty's troops during [the] whole of the affair behaved with their usual intrepidity and spirit” but all were horrified by the behavior of the rebels, who scalped some of the wounded British.¹³ British strategic thinking needed to evolve quickly to adjust to the changed nature of the conflict in America. The American rebel militia did not behave in the set and accepted tradition of European combatants. The British army may have been the best in the world at the time, but its commanders and men were not accustomed to fighting insurgents who did not follow accepted norms.¹⁴

Between the outbreak of hostilities at Lexington and Concord until General John Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga, the British endeavored to find a balanced approach that would defeat the rebels militarily, yet return them to their former position as loyal subjects.

It was this complex strategic goal; in essence, as historian Eric Robson describes it “two incompatible aims” which frustrated much of their efforts.¹⁵ Furthermore, while George III and his ministry faced vocal opposition at home for their hardline stance against the colonists, their aims were complicated by the sympathy that several senior British military leaders held for the American cause. General William Howe’s failure to pursue and destroy the American forces following the Battle of Brooklyn Heights was attributed to Howe’s desire not to “shed the blood of a people so nearly allied.”¹⁶ His brother, Admiral Richard Lord Howe, was so sympathetic to the colonists that his instructions to Commodore William Hotham for a blockade of the Southern colonies instructed Hotham and his captains to “cultivate all amicable correspondence... and to grant them every other indulgence,” scarcely the terms that would allow a successful blockade.¹⁷ General Charles Lord Cornwallis, like the Howe brothers, was politically sympathetic to the Americans, having voted in the House of Lords against both the Stamp Act and the Declaratory Act. Compared to a situation with well-defined political and military strategic objectives, the circumstances faced by the British in America did not lend themselves to a clear, unwavering strategic direction.¹⁸

While some portion of the blame for the British loss at Saratoga, New York on October 16, 1777 can be placed upon the lack of strategic cooperation between Burgoyne and Howe, it was also the logistical challenges faced by Burgoyne that defeated him. Far removed from any support that could be provided by the Royal Navy, Burgoyne, his men and his baggage train struggled through the harsh terrain and exhausted their capabilities. His campaign clearly illustrates some of the most critical challenges facing the British throughout the war. America’s harsh and forbidding terrain posed significant challenges; the rebel militia rose in great numbers, the

British were unable to “move light” as they must supply all their own needs - quite unlike their ability to rely on local support as during the French and Indian War. Their tenuous communication network and inability to coordinate efforts clearly played a large role, but the very nature of the American landscape was a key contributor to the British defeat. All the while, any sizeable loss of British troops was devastating, for while the Americans were able to continually replace troops, each highly trained British soldier was practically irreplaceable.¹⁹ Burgoyne’s campaign also produced a public relations nightmare for the British; one which jeopardized any chance they might have of winning the hearts and minds of the colonists in the North. For Burgoyne’s army included five hundred Indians and their “savagery made effective propaganda to rally the enemy’s militia.”²⁰ The murder of Jane McCrea at the hands of Native Americans warriors fanned the flames of the rebel cause and drove an outpouring of militia to meet Burgoyne’s threat.²¹

Following the devastating defeat suffered at Saratoga, France entered the war as an American ally; adding to its already crucial support for the American cause out of vengeful determination to humiliate Britain. The British Loyalist strategy and Southern Campaign became the central focus of Britain’s plan to win the war. The strategy was in part based on the belief held by the King, the North Ministry, and particularly Lord George Germain, Secretary of State for America that the Southern Colonies contained a significant population of Loyalists, together with the strategic assumption that numerous Loyalists would flock to support the British cause, providing men, material, and logistical support.²²

The British believed that numerous Loyalists would flock to the British standard and would overwhelm the rebel movement, dissuading neutrals from actively supporting the rebels. As the rebels lost the battle for the hearts and minds of the overall population,

their network of support, material, and field intelligence would wither, shifting the advantage to the Crown forces and their Loyalist allies. The substantial neutral element of the population would then perceive that their own best interest lay in returning to firm allegiance to the Crown, which in turn would emphasize to the rebels that their own ill-conceived cause could not be successful. This would return the South to the British fold, alienating them from the Northern colonies, and putting the entire rebellion at risk. However, as the Loyalist strategy was based on inflated claims from Loyalist refugees and ousted Royal governors of Loyalist numbers and strength, combined with ministerial wishful thinking, it proved infuriatingly elusive and never effective for long. The actual allegiance of Southern colonists was largely driven by self-interest, tempered by ideological inclinations. Some were indeed staunchly devoted to the Crown, while others shifted their allegiance with the vagaries of war. Many were better termed as neutrals and wished simply to be left alone.²³

The initial results of the British campaign in the South were spectacular. Savannah, Georgia quickly fell to the British on December 29, 1778. Charleston, South Carolina, the largest city in the South, fell in May 1780 to the British after a lengthy siege, which devastated Major General Benjamin Lincoln's Continental Army and militia forces. Virtually Lincoln's entire command was trapped in the city and gave up thousands of men and enormous amounts of weapons and supplies. Complications almost immediately ensued. General Sir Henry Clinton left Lieutenant General Charles Lord Cornwallis a powder keg when he issued an amnesty proclamation, almost immediately complicated by his second proclamation which mandated that all those on parole were required to take an oath to support the British, including, if called upon, to take up arms against their former comrades, in effect, leaving no room for neutrality.²⁴

Meanwhile, the British lost momentum as they fanned out into the backcountry to establish strongholds and rally the Loyalists. Major Patrick Ferguson, the “inspector of militia” and his Loyalist troops made a costly mistake when Ferguson threatened to lay waste to the homes of the “Over-mountain” men and inflamed the backcountry. The Battle of King’s Mountain on October 7, 1780 resulted in the death of Ferguson and the destruction of his Loyalists troops. King’s Mountain was a turning point, and afterward, fewer Loyalists came forth to join the British troops. The once grand plan to rally the Loyalists, retake the Southern colonies, and cripple the rebel cause ended at King’s Mountain. The British faced mounting obstacles, as fewer and fewer Loyalists actively supported or aided them, while the neutrals moved into the rebel camp. The Loyalist Strategy, built on misinformation and wishful thinking, quickly began to unravel.²⁵

The British efforts in South Carolina were further hampered by small bands of guerilla fighters. These insurgents continually harassed the British communications and supply lines as well as their troop movements, particularly as Cornwallis and his men moved inland away from their coastal stronghold and naval-based supply chain. Their far greater impact, however, occurred in other roles they played, including providing intelligence and support to Major General Nathanael Greene’s Continentals, keeping their Loyalist neighbors from gaining the upper hand by discouraging their desires and efforts to join the British forces while simultaneously encouraging the dispirited rebels, and eliminating the threat of Britain’s Native American allies.²⁶

At this stage in the conflict, the hostilities had broadened far beyond the thirteen mainland colonies. With the entrance of France into the war, its nature became extraordinarily complex. No longer were the British simply stymied by the lack of a “military or political

center of gravity” at which to strike in America, they now had to stretch their military and naval resources to the breaking point to defend their possessions in the valuable West Indies, as well as India, Gibraltar, and the home waters surrounding the British Isles.²⁷ In September 1779, fear for the safety of Jamaica caused Clinton to order Cornwallis “to go with another five thousand troops... [from New York] to the defence (*sic*) of Jamaica.”²⁸ It is estimated that had the threat to Jamaica not passed, the British would have lost over twenty five percent of their troop strength in the mainland colonies for the defense of a single island colony.⁹

Personalities played a large role in the ability of the British to effectively pursue their military ends, particularly during the Southern Campaign. Clinton, a neurotic, complex, and tortured character, had flashes of brilliance but his failure to exert overarching strategic initiative and his propensity to allow the aggressive Cornwallis too much operational leeway, doomed the British by failing to “ensure unity of command and unity of effort.”³⁰ Cornwallis took a broad interpretation of his orders from Clinton and did not communicate with his commander-in-chief for months following the British defeat at Cowpens. Clinton, for his part, issued frequent and conflicting instructions to Cornwallis, particularly during the summer of 1781, leading to Cornwallis’s occupation of Yorktown. Though the inability of the Royal Navy to attain control of the Chesapeake Bay paved the way for the American and French victory, it was also the lack of a unified vision and strategy between Clinton and Cornwallis that led to the British disaster at Yorktown in October 1781.³¹

The British were challenged by other unanticipated foes, particularly in the Southern theatre; yellow fever and malaria. These lethal diseases brutally assaulted the British, yet had nowhere near the same effect on the Southern rebels. Yellow fever’s mortality rate among populations with no previous immunity approached eighty

five percent and it was particularly deadly for young adult populations; precisely those represented by the typical British invasion force. Survivors receive a life-long immunity and large populations of immune people stop the transmission of the disease. Living with significant slave populations and their relative imperviousness to the disease protected the Americans colonists to a degree, while the British soldiers had no defense from the illness.³² Fear of disease influenced Cornwallis's decision to not move northward along the coastline; he feared that the route was too disease-ridden for his troops and he elected to move further inland – away from his naval lifeline. At Yorktown, twenty five percent or more of Cornwallis's troops “were too sick to fight, compared to roughly [five] percent of American and French troops.”³³

In the end, it was the combination of an extraordinary number of factors, many that no amount of military genius could account for, that won independence for the American colonists. British failure to achieve naval control of the Chesapeake Bay led directly to Cornwallis's defeat at Yorktown; however, the logistical cards were stacked against the British and were the true cause of their inability to hold the mainland colonies.

Notes

¹ Don Higginbotham, *The War of American Independence: Military Attitudes, Policies, and Practice, 1763-1789* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1971), 383.

² Piers Mackesy, *The War for America: 1775-1783* (1964; repr., Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1993), xxiv, 31; Stanley D. M. Carpenter, “British Strategic Failure in the Southern Campaign, 1778-1781,” *Naval War College Paper*, 2008, 3; Eric Robson, *The American Revolution In its Political and Military Aspects 1763 – 1783* (1955; repr., New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1966), 93.

³ Henry Horwitz, “The Political Economy of War” review of *War and Economy in the Age of William III and Marlborough* by D. W. Jones and *The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783* by John Brewer, *Journal of British Studies* 29, no. 3 (July 1990): 276-281. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/175731> (accessed June 16, 2012); Robert Middlekauff, *The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763-1789* Rev. ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 9, 23-24.

⁴John Brewer, *Party Ideology and Popular Politics at the Accession of George III* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 3-9.

⁵Middlekauff, *The Glorious Cause*, 28-29; Robson, *The American Revolution In its Political and Military Aspects*, 10.

⁶Gordon S. Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787* (1969; repr., Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 11.

⁷Merrill Jensen, *The Founding of a Nation: A History of the American Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 15; Philip H. Round, "The discursive origins of the American Revolution: The case of Nathaniel Rogers, merchant of Boston," *Early American Literature* 30, no. 3 (1995): 233. <http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy1.apus.edu/docview/215390395?accountid=8289> (accessed June 23, 2012); Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic*, 13-15.

⁸Jensen, *The Founding of a Nation*, 40-41; Higginbotham, *The War of American Independence*, 52; Robson, *The American Revolution In its Political and Military Aspects*, 10-11.

⁹Higginbotham, *The War of American Independence*, 23.

¹⁰Higginbotham, *The War of American Independence*, 46.

¹¹Robson, *The American Revolution In its Political and Military Aspects*, 89.

¹²Christopher Hibbert, *Redcoats and Rebels: The American Revolution Through British Eyes* (1990; repr., New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2002), 27-32; Higginbotham, *The War of American Independence*, 61-63.

¹³General Hugh, Lord Percy to General Thomas Gage, April 22, 1775. <http://www.winthrop.dk/reports.html> (accessed June 23, 2012).

¹⁴Higginbotham, *The War of American Independence*, 63-65.

¹⁵Robson, *The American Revolution In its Political and Military Aspects*, 113.

¹⁶Benson Bobrick, *Angel in the Whirlwind: The Triumph of the American Revolution* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997), 215; Robson, *The American Revolution In its Political and Military Aspects*, 113.

¹⁷Mackesy, *The War for America: 1775-1783*, 74, 101.

¹⁸John Buchanan, *The Road to Guilford Courthouse: The American Revolution in the Carolinas* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1997), 76; Mackesy, *The War for America: 1775-1783*, 102.

¹⁹Higginbotham, *The War of American Independence*, 191; Robson, *The American Revolution In its Political and Military Aspects*, 93-100; John A. Tokar, "Logistics and the defeat of Gentleman Johnny: Army Logistician," *Sustainment* 32, no. 4 (July/August 2000): 46-50.

²⁰Mackesy, *The War for America: 1775-1783*, 130.

²¹Higginbotham, *The War of American Independence*, 191.

²²Carpenter, "British Strategic Failure in the Southern Campaign," 8; Higginbotham, *The War of American Independence*, 232-237; John S. Pancake, *The Destructive War: The British Campaign in the Carolinas, 1780-1782* (1985; repr., Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 1992), 25-26.

²³Higginbotham, *The War of American Independence*, 353; Robert Stansbury Lambert, *South Carolina Loyalists in the American Revolution*. 2nd ed. Clemson: Clemson University Digital Press, 2010. <http://www.clemson.edu/caah/cedp/cudp/pubs/lambert/lambert.pdf> (accessed December 18, 2011). Robson, *The American Revolution In its Political and Military Aspects*, 41.

²⁴ Pancake, *The Destructive War*, 66-70.

²⁵ J. B. Cheaney, "Patrick Ferguson, the loyalists, and the American Revolution," *The World & I*, 15, 5 (May 2000): 316-327. <http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy1.apus.edu/docview/235874328?accountid=8289> (Accessed December 22, 2011).

²⁶ Pancake, *The Destructive War*, 53-55.

²⁷ Mackesy, *The War for America: 1775-1783*, 35, 192-197, 204.

²⁸ Andrew J. O'Shaughnessy, "The Formation of a Commercial Lobby: The West India Interest, British Colonial Policy and the American Revolution," *The Historical Journal* 40, no. 1 (March 1997): 93 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3020953> (accessed June 26, 2012).

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Carpenter, "British Strategic Failure," 3.

³¹ Buchanan, *The Road to Guilford Courthouse*, 334; Carpenter, "British Strategic Failure," 9, 22.

³² J. R. McNeill, "Yellow Jack and Geopolitics: Environment, Epidemics, and the Struggles for Empire in the American Tropics, 1650-1825," *Magazine of History* 18, no. 3 (April 2004): 11. <http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/docview/213746088?accountid=8289> (accessed June 25, 2012).

³³ Richard M. Ketchum, *Victory at Yorktown: The Campaign that Won the Revolution* (New York: Henry Holt and Company, LLC, 2004), 96; Matthew Mulcahy, review of *Mosquito Empires: Ecology and War in the Greater Caribbean, 1620-1914*, by J. R. McNeill, *The William and Mary Quarterly* 67, no. 4 (October 2010): 790. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5309/willmaryquar.67.4.0788> (accessed July 7, 2012).ac

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Stephen McFarland and Wesley Newton. *To Command the Sky: The Battle for Air Superiority over Germany, 1942-1944*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2006.

On par with some of the most interesting and well researched pieces regarding World War II, Stephen McFarland and Wesley Newton's *To Command the Sky: the Battle for Air Superiority over Germany, 1942-1944*, is a wonderful read that offers much to the historical field. McFarland, a distinguished professor at Auburn University, and Newton, a well-versed and noted historian, combined their knowledge and abilities to create a work that documents the importance of American air superiority and its effects on the outcome of the war, most notably that of the D-Day invasion at Normandy. By purposefully choosing to leave out topics such as the British contributions to Allied air superiority and the ethical matters of strategic bombing, the authors were able to concentrate on exactly how the American effort was molded and changed from a bomber- first mentality to one that realized the necessity of gaining air superiority. McFarland and Newton go further into the subject than most other researchers and flush out the exact events and shifts that allowed for the American Eighth, Ninth, and Fifteenth Air Forces to take command of the skies away from the German Luftwaffe. Finally, the authors discuss the importance of having air superiority over Germany and how it impacted the final years of the war as well as how the shift from a bomber-first strategy to one of gaining command of the skies altered the future of the Air Force and its doctrine.

Other than the fluid writing style that makes the book an enjoyable piece to read, the authors' meticulous attention to detail is a defining factor in why *To Command the Sky: the Battle for Air Superiority over Germany, 1942-1944* has been the beneficiary of so much praise. The authors' desire to inform the reader exactly how the American Air Force took command of the skies before the all-important D-

Day invasion on June 6, 1944, shows in their inclusion of facts that have been overlooked for decades. A prime example of this is when McFarland and Newton discuss the shift in gasoline mixtures that the American's utilized for better fuel economy and performance. Statistics and other data are given that demonstrate how the German Luftwaffe's choice to switch to synthetic fuel with an octane rating of 95-97 in an attempt to keep up with the American mixture with a rating of 100 actually limited their fighter planes' performance by noting how it decreased the quantity of available fuel and resulted in more overheated or stalled engines (pp. 57-58). The switch of fighter plane fuel is a small factor in the overall scope of World War II; however McFarland and Newton include it in their book in a way that impresses upon the reader the significance of the decision. The above example allows the reader to easily comprehend the authors' stated goal of explaining the significance of air superiority.

So just how important was American air superiority in determining the outcome of World War II? The authors go to great lengths to describe to the reader exactly how American fighter missions from 1942-1944 pushed the German air force back to a defensive position along the German border and away from the planned Allied offensive area. This in effect guaranteed that for the invasion of Normandy the only planes flying would be on the Allied side of the conflict. McFarland and Newton make much of this fact, pointing out that with the heavily concentrated placement of soldiers on the beaches, any German fighter planes allowed to make strafing runs would have caused incredible amounts of damage to the Allied ground forces on D-Day. The missions that were flown prior to the invasion at Normandy were numerous and often costly for the Allies, but nevertheless paved the way for eventual success by reducing the number of German fighters despite the fact that German indus-

trial centers continued pumping out large numbers of replacements. This fact was not lost on the authors as McFarland and Newton use this to point out the inability of the bomber-first strategy to win the war in Europe or even to achieve any of its major goals such as causing a shortage or cessation of production.

Overall, *To Command the Sky: the Battle for Air Superiority over Germany, 1942-1944* by Stephen McFarland and Wesley Newton is a strong example of a well-researched and superbly written historical piece. The authors succeed in their goal of describing the importance of the American ability to gain air superiority over the German Luftwaffe and the significance of the shift of the leadership's mentality from a staunchly bomber-first strategy to one that recognized the value of air dominance. The primary example of the D-Day invasion of Normandy and how it was such a success because of American control of the skies is well documented by the authors as well. In the end, this review of *To Command the Sky: the Battle for Air Superiority over Germany, 1942-1944* may come off as sounding too praiseworthy, but that is only due to the fact that the piece had no significant flaws to denote, which makes the book one that should be recommended for anyone interested in learning more about the history of air power in World War II.

CHRIS BOOTH

Alex Von Tunzelmann. *Red Heat: Conspiracy, Murder, and the Cold War in the Caribbean*. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2011.

Perhaps the most memorable events of the Cold War come from the events in Cuba in the 1950s and 60s. The ongoing tension between the United States and Cuba has outlasted the Cold War itself and remains a pivotal point in the history of the era. Von Tunzelmann's *Red Heat: Conspiracy, Murder, and the Cold War in the Caribbean* is not only a detailed history of the relationship between

the Superpowers and the Caribbean, focusing on Cuba, but a scintillating tale that delivers on the title's promise. From the machinations of the United States in its ideological blind rage against Communism, to the antics of the players that would rival a modern romance novel, the story of the Cold War in the Caribbean is well cited and well told by Von Tunzelmann.

Conventional wisdom paints Fidel Castro as a hard-liner Communist despot who shoehorned himself into the role of dictator of Cuba with the help of the murderous terrorist Che Guevara. While this is true, it is only part of the story. The image of John F. Kennedy and his staff is traditionally painted as one of a modern day Camelot, with Kennedy's Arthur, the tragic character of wholesome American righteousness cut short in his prime. While this is also true from a particular point of view, this is also an image painted in the American Ministry of Propaganda that perpetuated the infallibility of Kennedy's legacy. The truth is not hard to find – but Von Tunzelmann aggregates the story peeling back the veneer to expose the ugly truth that makes all of the players look worse in the light of day.

As the new Cuban revolution sought to depose Fulgencio Batista y Zaldívar, men like Castro and Guevara were indeed on the front lines of the war, pushing for a Cuban government that represented the people, instead of foreign interests. However, as Batista's grip loosened, Von Tunzelmann points out that Castro and company were not the all-powerful Communist revolutionaries frequently portrayed in popular history; but rather the beneficiaries of circumstances. They were in the right place at the right time to fill a power vacuum and not the masters of *realpolitick* as so often portrayed. Further, she confirms what most serious students of Castro understand: he only turned to socialism, and ultimately Soviet sponsorship, after the American military bombed Cuba in support of Batis-

ta. Moreover, Castro only received that sponsorship as a personal dig by Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev directed at Kennedy, as Khrushchev felt slighted over the terrible crime of not being allowed to visit Disneyland. This insight is just one example of many that the author gives, showing that the story of revolutionary Cuba was as much about personality as it was ideology.

As an interesting aside, Von Tunzelmann introduces the reader to the vile, yet intriguing character of Che Guevara. Apparently not only was he a terrorist and a murderer; and one severely lacking in normal personal hygiene practices, but he also maintained a voracious appetite for relations with the opposite sex. Of course, Guevara is not the only player of the era with appetites for human companionship. Von Tunzelmann does not shy away from the iniquities of the Kennedy family or anyone else in the periphery. In fact, one could easily imagine a Showtime series like the *Borgias* set in the White House of the early 1960s.

Von Tunzelmann's story is not all sex and revolution though. More importantly, she focuses on the obsession that a drug-fueled Kennedy had with dispatching Castro, as well as the ever-present communist bogeyman that the United States battled throughout the Caribbean – largely by supporting the worst despots in modern history. According to Von Tunzelmann, American support of the François Duvalier and Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina dynasties in Haiti and the Dominican Republic respectively was specifically aimed at preventing another power vacuum that the communists personified by Fidel Castro. The sad fact is that the people of Hispaniola were no better off during the Cold War than the people of Cuba. In fact, one could argue the contrary quite easily. Once again, the author has shown that the machinations behind nations great and small were focused on personality and ideology as opposed to altruism.

Other interesting tidbits turn the entirety of the Cuban Missile Crisis on its head. According to Von Tunzelmann the “Farewell Letter” from Castro to Khrushchev was meant to assure the Soviets that the Cubans were ready and willing to side with the Soviets should war come. However, the translation made it seem that Castro was vowing a suicidal plan of hostility toward the United States and was ready to sacrifice all of Cuba in the name of glorious revolution. Khrushchev now saw Castro as a madman ready to start World War III. This is a decided departure from the typical historiography that paints the resolution of the crisis as a masterstroke of Kennedy diplomacy. It seems that the Soviets were more afraid of Castro sparking nuclear holocaust than they were of Kennedy’s blustering and concessions in Turkey.

In a seemingly counterintuitive move, Von Tunzelmann discounts the likelihood of conspiracy in the assassination of John F. Kennedy, especially conspiracy led or fostered by the Cubans and Soviets. Of course, they had the most to gain with the elimination of Kennedy, and both Castro and Khrushchev had personal distaste for the darling of Western media – but as Von Tunzelmann points out, the actual evidence gleaned in multiple investigations does not support the numerous theories that have surfaced and pointed the accusing finger at the united Red banners.

In analyzing the veracity of any historical writing, one must look first at the sources provided, and a detailed look at Von Tunzelmann’s citations shows that she was both meticulous and scholarly in her endeavor. Her sources are a good mix of primary and secondary sources that allow the reader to confirm the facts on which her analysis is based. Of course, the further from the subject matter in time that a writer conducts research, the more out of context of the times the point of view of the author. However, in an age of declassified documents and a Soviet Union that no longer exists, Von

Tunzelmann has been able to take advantage of a plethora of information that writers of the day would not have had the benefit of using.

Likewise, analysis itself must be logical, well founded and supported by the research. Many histories of the era have all of these factors in play, but historians that wrote in the aftermath of the events, or in the interceding years, were limited by their own perceptions and biases, along with a dearth of information from behind the scenes. The simple fact is that most of the private conversations of the time were classified or suppressed for other reasons and could not be taken into account. Thus, Von Tunzelmann's analysis could meet a considerable amount of criticism from those who are completely bought into more conventional analysis or those that are unwilling or unable to see new evidence in any other light than that supporting the altruism of the United States in its glorious war against the forces of communism.

This is not to say that Von Tunzelmann has written an anti-American tour-de-force. In fact, the honest historian will see that the Kennedy administration was doing what it thought was right, in the circumstances, for both the United States and the future of the Western Hemisphere. Unfortunately, the Kennedy Administration had a myopic view of communism and who communists were, as well as the impact of the spread of communism. Von Tunzelmann illustrates that they saw the strange bedfellows of brutal dictators as a necessary evil to check the greater evil of communism spreading to the New World. She shows that the United States, led by Kennedy and his men, would do almost anything -- including supporting dreadful criminals at home and abroad -- to protect the United States from this danger. One can hardly blame the President and his men for poor decisions based on ignorance -- but made with pure intentions.

Overall Von Tunzelmann's book is an enthralling read that provides both the serious student of the era and the casual reader with an accurate picture of the situation in the Caribbean in some of the most crucial days of the Cold War, while providing an entertaining story of intrigue, murder and sex. Indeed, what more could one want from a history? Levity aside, the book is well written and addresses many issues that needed reexamination in the light of the many sources that were unavailable in previous years. Perhaps most important is the accessibility of Von Tunzelmann's work, in that the importance of history cannot be held close and kept to the dusty halls of academia. The average reader can pick up the book and read cover to cover without being deluged with statistics and analysis that only other historians would find interesting.

E. MICHAEL DAVIS II

David McCullough. *1776*. New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2005.

When discussing the theme of "revolutions of the world" perhaps no other revolution sticks out in Americans' minds quite as much as the American Revolution. The year of 1776 certainly stirred Americans into an action that impacted at least the New World and the British portion of the Old World.

David McCullough wrote a book about such a struggle. A glance at the front and back material reveals his book is popular, well-accepted, and received the accolade of the *Pulitzer Prize*. He has penned several other books related to this period, and others outside it as well.

A quick flip to the contents page will give the reader a chronological time line for the historic events that took place in that year. The contents page takes the reader through the announcement of the colonists' rebellion by the king, the mustering of untrained sol-

diers, the raising of a new American flag, the “Fateful Summer,” and the “Long Retreat” from New York after it was lost to the British, all in chronological order. McCullough’s book opens with a discourse on King George III, showing how King George preferred a more simplistic life managing royal farmlands, a picturesque life of a colonial in rural early America. McCullough draws a sharp contrast between the royal cavalcade as shown in the opening of the book to King George’s more unpretentious preference of dabbling about on his farms at Windsor in old farmer’s clothes in seemingly American fashion. McCullough explains this to reach a final note: King George declared the colonists in the New World under a state of rebellion, and Parliament must act accordingly. From this point on, the book’s setting is set strictly within the colonies.

As any American might say, the year 1776 was one of great importance and each year on the fourth day of the seventh month, fireworks light up the sky to celebrate the declaration of American independence from the British, which occurred in 1776. David McCullough’s *1776* focuses on the struggle during that year of both American and British forces in the colonies. He follows Commander-in-Chief George Washington, Generals Nathanael Green and Israel Putnam, other officers such as Adjutant General Joseph Reed, and rank-and-file soldiers like Joseph Plum Martin. A typical chapter in *1776* records interesting facts of famous names, tactical situations, dire straits and dilemmas of the Continental Army, and the desperate struggle of Washington to keep his army in order. His historical discourse is not limited to the Americans however; McCullough presents the British in understandable style. McCullough uses primary sources for both the British and American forces; McCullough achieves this by revealing the private thoughts of certain members of British chain of command taken from letters sent back to England by General Hugh, Lord Percy,

General Sir William Howe, Admiral Richard Lord Howe, General Sir Henry Clinton, and General Charles Lord Cornwallis. While there is a slightly more intense focus on the Americans' plight, McCullough saved space for the British.

The author does not singularly fixate on British and American militaries however; he constantly pictures Washington through his own letters as the general reporting back to Congress the actions of battle, state of the army, and more so often his reflections of the war to his family. Washington's business letters, often so quoted by the author are usually accompanied by one or more quotes from Washington and Congress's reaction to what Washington penned (for an example of this, see page 219 on Washington's report for the Battle of Harlem Heights). This and other accounts perhaps give more insight into the decisions or indecisions of the Continental Congress.

One of the most masterful aspects of *1776* is found in McCullough's ability to describe the stark reality of how fragile the cause really was. The author has no qualms or hesitation in describing the dilemma the Americans faced. McCullough makes the situation clear – a rabble in arms, drinkers, farmers, tanners, foundrymen, untrained men versus the world's largest and most powerful empire (chapter two, "Rabble in Arms"). On more than one occasion the author states that the situation is not a patriotic sense as the American Revolution is thought of to be, but he seeks to expose the hardships and fragile nature of the conflict by sharing the close shaves with destruction that Washington's army narrowly escaped.

It is evident by his style of writing and frequent quotations that his sources draw heavily from primary documentation. In his source notes section, McCullough has a list of corresponding abbreviations and subsequent notes. This reveals that an overwhelming majority of his sources are based on primary periodicals, journals, letters, and

archives. His style of writing is not monotonous but informative; intellectual, yet facile. The writing is free of jargon and wordiness, conveying the information in simple text. These are several strengths of the book.

1776 includes source notes, an impressive bibliography, and an index for special topics, names, and events. There are a few maps showing the British plan of attack and siege of New York, portraits of Lord George Germain, Lord Frederick North, British parliamentary officials, Washington, Reed, Greene, General John Sullivan, and others; these add color to the book and give a face, even if by portrait only, to the reader.

This piece contributes to the field of history based on its sound scholarship and informative text – a must have for any interested reader concerning the American Revolution. As the events turned out, the story of the American Revolution would go on to even darker periods than those Washington suffered from his losses in New York, yet that is not part of McCullough's story of *1776*. In the end, his goal is met: to educate Americans of their revolutionary heritage and to completely uncover the courage, strengths, weaknesses, and shortcomings of the American heroes that changed the world. If considering for purchase, it is a valuable contributive piece of work for a greater understanding of the dire straits the Revolution of 1776 had for both sides, but history can be popularized and America has as many myths as any other country does. David McCullough's *1776* has been labeled popular history, and some do not recommend it for academic research projects. The author of this review disagrees somewhat, and thinks that it can be used for general knowledge and while there is detectable patriotic bias in the work, McCullough's facts are still proven with research.

JORDAN GRIFFITH

Christopher A. Snyder. *The Britons*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing. 2003. xvii + 330 pp.

In his preface, Christopher Snyder notes that at the time of the 1707 Act of Union the terms “Britons” and “British” became highly popular, reflecting an increasing fascination with early British myth, legend and history. This curiosity towards early heritage became attached to a wider interest in ancient Celtic culture, the resulting “history” of which was partly truthful and partly fanciful. In light of continued interest to this day and in spite of strides to correct mistakes of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Snyder believes scholars and skeptics have not fully addressed the contributions of the ancient Britons to their descendants.

Snyder states his book is partially a deconstruction of the identity of the ancient inhabitants of Britain in order to examine their origins and legacy. He begins by addressing the ongoing debate of British vs. Celtic identity and ethnicity with regards to who, exactly, were the people of the island. He proposes his thesis by asking (1) whether these ancient people ever saw themselves as Britons, (2) were they ever a unified group with a single, identifiable culture, and (3) how were they distinct from their neighbors?

The first two questions were intended to test whether the identity of the island’s people was truly cohesive enough to be given the “Celtic” name. Snyder cites that some archaeologists of the European Iron Age have questioned whether the terms *Keltoi* and *Celtae*, the ancient Greek and Roman labels for the continental Celts, should also have been applied to the Iron Age people of the British Isles. Some argue that the Greeks and Romans inconsistent use of the terms (the Greeks especially had a habit to stereotype non-Greeks, lumping those “barbarians” under blanket ethnic names) may or may not have included the Britons. Additionally, others claim “Celtic” identity only began with philologists such as Edward Llyud,

who used the classical *Celtae* name to identify language groups—his Celtic language theory was published in the same year as the Act of Union.

Unsure of which way to swing, some scholars have gone the “politically correct” route by claiming skepticism of anything called Celtic. Medievalists, however, are not so eager to join this wave and continue to use the Celtic term. Snyder questions why the Celts have been targeted for criticism as a group when other “mongrel nations,” such as the Romans, English, French, Americans, and Russians, are not (p. 3). After this discussion, Snyder ends up using the “Britons” term even though his entire study applies to what amounts to the Celtic element in Britain. Along with this introduction, he then gives a brief description of his methodology and sources. He also admits that he is not covering much new ground, nor is he an expert in fields related to history (e.g., anthropology, archaeology), the perspectives of which are included in this work. An honest admission, but one that can make the reader a bit leery.

The core of the book takes the reader on a detailed survey of the history of the Britons from the Late Pre-Roman Iron Age (c.100 BC to AD 50) to current times. Snyder only mentions outside Celtic lands such as Ireland or pre-Roman Gaul when British activity interacts with them. The account begins at the point when the Britons become truly distinct, recognized by neighbors and with some unification militarily and politically. Though much of the evidence for this period is from archaeology and inscriptions, Snyder employs written sources that point out the effects the Roman conquest in Gaul had on Britain’s people leading up to Caesar’s expeditions, the Claudian conquest and the Roman occupation. A graphic demonstrates the varying degrees of influence from Roman and continental interaction on the islanders, but Snyder is careful not to generalize about any one area. He recognizes that the labels “Celt” or “Briton”

ignore tribal distinctions within the culture.

Two chapters cover the Roman occupation, the gradual withdrawal of the legions to try to quell problems on the continent, and the shift to local leadership. One point that appears to be new is the firming up of the date of AD 410 as the end of Roman control. Previous thought had waffled among several dates. Snyder also cites increasing caution among historians and archaeologists about calling all “signs of fire, demolitions and reconstruction” as suggestive of overwhelming foreign invasions or battles (p. 66). Current thought is moving towards gradual settlement instead. Moreover, in a morsel of new contextual interpretation, he posits that the role of the last Roman units stationed along Hadrian’s Wall were more like military police than deployed soldiers, and that once discharged from their duties (or having abandoned them), the men became part of the local population.

Chapters under the section “The Brittonic Age” cover the period most often identified as sub-Roman, post-Roman or Arthurian. Snyder dislikes these terms for the fifth and sixth centuries because he feels they are misleading, choosing instead “Brittonic,” the ethnic term writers used in that period. The era’s literary material is thin at best, consisting mainly of writings from Gildas, Patrick, two Gallic chronicles, and Constantius of Lyon’s *Life of Germanus of Auxerre*. All other historiography was written centuries later, preserved in Welsh works, Bede’s *Ecclesiastical History* and the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*. Curiously, Snyder says epigraphic and archaeological evidence is also in short supply; however, he then spends quite a bit of effort examining both kinds.

The third section runs from the Anglo-Saxon conquest (c.600) to the Norman conquest (1066), a period when the individual Celtic “nations” become separated from each other due to Saxon, Irish, and Viking raids, settlement, and kingdom building. Here Snyder

includes Brittany and Galicia, established in what is now northwest France and western Spain respectively, due to their close connections to Britain since the Bronze Age. Mostly this is a straightforward survey of how the various regions took on their identities. Snyder employs historiography, supplemented and corroborated by archaeological and epigraphic evidence. For the expert in the field, a few minor but well known items that have been omitted might be concerning: he mentions the material disappearance of early churches because they were mostly made of wood and thatch, which is certainly possible, but some of those early churches could have been of stone as well. Quite often, disused stone buildings were dismantled and the stones used elsewhere. Next, he quotes from Gregory of Tours' *History of the Franks* that Brittany was "dominated by regional hereditary chieftains engaging in vicious feuds with one another and with the Merovingian Franks" (p. 152). This statement echoes the typical Celtic raid for plunder that enhanced a chieftain's wealth and status, a point that probably should have accompanied the quote. Another missing point is that the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle* is typically silent on battles the Saxons lost—they always refused to admit their shame. Also, each time Snyder mentions the Welsh genealogies, he does not note their chronic manipulation by aristocrats in order to find an illustrious, heroic ancestor, such as Henry VIII who very much desired to have descended from King Arthur!

The concluding section, "Conquest, Survival and Revival," moves from the Norman Conquest to the present day. Though the Norman state quickly gave the impression of completely absorbing the Britons, a series of subsequent "Celtic revivals" occurred periodically beginning in the twelfth century that demonstrates the resilience of the Britons. Revivals were inspired by popular "histories," such as Geoffrey of Monmouth's 1136 *History of the Kings of Britain* and the antiquarian William Camden's 1607 *Brittania* as well as

Welsh nationalistic movements under Llywelyn Fawr and Llywelyn ap Gruffydd in the 1200s, or the outright rebellion of Owain Glyn Dŵr, begun in 1400. Even Napoleon tried to attempt a Gallic revival. The late nineteenth century also saw Tennyson's poetry and Pre-Raphaelite painters take up popular Celtic themes.

Regarding the renewed interest, Snyder gives a great deal of attention to the Welsh element. This is due to much of the knowledge of the Britons in the post-Norman era being preserved in Welsh historiography and literature, yet perhaps he has leaned too much on it, giving short shrift to the other elements and creating an imbalance in the work. He also expounds overly much on the Arthurian aspect—one which recurs often throughout the book and demonstrates Snyder's favoritism for the specialty on which he has written extensively elsewhere.

A general reader would need to have read additional material to understand some of the book's explanations. For an intermediate student with a solid background on the subject, the work makes a nice overview or it could suffice as a companion book to related studies. For the scholar, *The Britons* tries to incorporate too many elements outside the author's expertise in order to cover a scope that is too broad. The result does not offer enough depth to satisfy the thesis questions, the first two of which are never fully addressed.

KATHLEEN GULER

Axtell, James. *Beyond 1492: Encounters in Colonial North America*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1992.

James Axtell, historian and professor of history at the College of William and Mary, wrote and compiled this collection of essays in 1992, the 500th anniversary of Columbus's discovery of the western hemisphere. Axtell states in his preface "after 1492 the world became a very different place" and he is correct; the first contact be-

tween Columbus and the indigenous people he discovered changed the course of history (p. vii). Axtell examines the history of first contact and beyond from the perspectives of both Native Americans and Europeans. Three essays are from the point of view of Native Americans whose lands were invaded but whose first meetings with the Europeans were always peaceful. The other essays cover a wide variety of views of the explorers and colonists. Axtell covers the entire gambit from missionaries to settlers and traders, the triumphs and the tragedies. He also examines the extensive amount of material that was arriving on the scene for the 500th anniversary of Columbus's voyage of discovery.

Interestingly, Axtell is not out to assign blame to any of the parties involved, but he analyzes the contact through the eyes of the Indians, the Europeans and from a modern historian's view. Differing views of events that took place centuries earlier are still important in the modern era; it is imperative that we continue to attempt to forge a peaceful co-existence with that past. Axtell writes:

The quincentenary of Columbus's epochal voyage is a perfect time for the citizens of the "global village" he helped create to reassess the initiation, conduct, and long- and short-term results of those encounters. We need to learn to live together on an increasingly shrinking planet. One way is to avoid the mistakes of the past; another is to draw more positive lessons from past encounters which were not so lopsided that each side could not reap some advantages. It might be satisfying to drag Columbus and other European colonists before our moral bar and to condemn them for not living up to our more enlightened standards (whoever "we" are and however those standards are defined). But it is more important -- because more humanizing -- for us to understand the actors of the past in their full complexi-

ty and humanity, just as we would like to be appraised by future historians (pp. viii-ix).

Lessons need to be learned from the encounters in the past and Axtell re-enforces the lessons, using his years of teaching to write balanced narratives from each perspective.

Professor Axtell repudiates the stereotypes of the Europeans and the natives that they encountered. He also questions the long-standing opinion of using genocide, a word that in essence did not exist until the twentieth century, as a blanket term to discuss the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Native Americans. Axtell does not believe that the settlers and the governments set out upon a course of killing off the inhabitants of the Americas. The natives would have been far too valuable as forced labor. Many of the deaths of the indigenous peoples were caused inadvertently by diseases brought to the New World, from which they had no immunity.

Axtell's arguments are well researched and presented, as one would expect from an educator in his position. The text is very readable for both the academic and the public. It is informative, well documented and scholarly without being condescending.

KAY O'PRY-REYNOLDS

Carla Gardina Pestana. *Protestant Empire: Religion and the Making of the British Atlantic World*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009. viii + 311 pp.

In *Protestant Empire: Religion and the Making of the British Atlantic*, author Carla Pestana brings together Atlantic and religious history, combining the two subjects and regions into one. Pestana starts with the beginning of the sixteenth century, ca. 1500 A.D. in her quest to investigate both religious and Atlantic history. The underlying theme of *Protestant Empire* is the need to expand from Western

Europe through Protestantism. Through religious beliefs splintered into various sects, British Protestantism won out in many ways over staunch Catholicism of the period. Pestana uncovers the underlying factors that caused Western European leaders to explore around the Atlantic rim and the desire to advance Protestantism versus Catholicism.

Christian religion changed in the sixteenth century as a result of clashes with various foreign religious beliefs, according to Pestana. Various aspects from foreign religions were adapted into local customs and traditions and some parts of local tradition were allowed to be blended in with Christianity (p. 1). Other religions from Europe and other parts of the world were introduced as well; Judaism and Islam made their way into the Atlantic World. Thus a wide diversity of religious beliefs existed in the New World that followed, including Catholics, Protestants, followers of Judaism and Islam, as well as various splintered sects of Protestantism and local religious beliefs. Pestana shows how attempts were made to convert the locals to Christianity and the desire to see they were brought to the right version of faith (p. 10).

Pestana claims that what puzzled the British monarchs especially was why they were unable to mesh the peoples of their various realms together in one common religious adherence in the same manner as the Spanish kings had done through Catholicism. (p. 11). Pestana argues that the British monarchs attempted to exercise control through the use of the Church just as the Spaniards had done (p. 7). Pestana covers how the differences in Protestant denominations brought about less authoritarian observances than the Catholic faith had produced. People moved across the ocean and established new lines of religious belief and communication that molded Old World with New World beliefs. For Catholics, Pestana points out that the Church hierarchy would not allow such deviation from the

accepted norm.

In the beginning of *Protestant Empire* Pestana gets right to the heart of the matter, exploring the realm of religion in the world prior to the breakout of the British expansion, and with it the advent of Anglican Protestantism. Pestana points to the innumerable amount of religions and religious beliefs that were present in Western Europe as well as Western Africa and Eastern North America ca. 1500. She points out the vast differences in the practice of religion by Europeans to local tribesmen (pp. 16-18). The causes of grief, life and death are explored through the lens of various customs and beliefs, many times clashing with organized religion brought by the Europeans.

Pestana also delves into the practice of witchcraft; used quite often in the regions of Africa and the Caribbean (p. 25). Catholicism and Protestantism instituted a religious battle that demanded total removal of other religious beliefs, especially those considered demonic in nature. Pestana covers how the transition was supposed to affect people who were being transformed or brought to salvation through the Christian faith; and how confused Christian converts were when their new disciples failed to shed all the tenets of the old religions.

The struggle for the souls of people engendered a deep-seated hatred between Protestants and Catholics that included a political battle as well. Pestana does a fine job of examining the underlying motivation of the monarchs of England, France and Spain in their quest for more land. Not only was this a battle between Catholics and Protestants, there was internal strife in the Protestant camp as well. This turmoil would spill over into campaigns for land, gold and people as explorers took with them priests and missionaries of the various religious denominations who converted the native population, many times by force.

Pestana covers the various factors related to political and mili-

tary conflicts that actually had early American religious underpinnings to them such as King Phillip's War and Bacon's Rebellion (p. 129). She also ties in how Native Americans were dragged into the religious and political wars, each side using various tribes in an effort to make their version of Christianity seen as the only right and true faith. Many times natives would convert simply to avoid problems with the Europeans. Once the foreigners left, natives would return to their natural religious beliefs.

With transplantation of religious cultures and entire groups, the New World set up a powder keg of religious strife and various conflicts broke out among the differing sects in Europe. Pestana navigates through the various aspects of religious tensions and trouble in Europe and how that translated to tensions trouble abroad in the colonies. Pestana also discusses how various differences in beliefs through the Protestant denominations were cycled in and out of use by monarchs such as James I and Charles I of England. Pestana discusses the differences among the Protestant denominations that caused such a divergence of beliefs (pp. 35-37). These men were unable to fathom why Protestants could not mutually agree to follow the Church of England's articles of faith.

Protestant Empire also shows that conversion by Protestants was more difficult to achieve than conversion by Catholics. According to Pestana, this was due to the wide variety of beliefs popping up within the Protestant camp while Catholics held completely to one set of beliefs and doctrines. Two major areas of difference for Protestant and Catholic converts were marriage and the conversion experience itself. Pestana explores the differences between the two major faiths, and she states Protestants had a more difficult time accepting new converts due to their propensity to cling to some versions of an old life style (p. 71).

In chapter four of *Protestant Empire*, Pestana turns to a pivotal

period in British and Protestant history: the Restoration of 1660 that ended the long Civil War and stimulated the growth of diversity in the British Empire (pp. 100-127). During the Restoration period that followed, the crown adopted a more lenient policy, thus paving the way for greater tolerance and diversity among the sects of Protestantism (p. 101).

Protestant Empire also highlights England's pivotal Glorious Revolution of 1688. Pestana analyzes how the removal of Catholic James II in favor of his Protestant daughter Mary and son-in-law William of Orange, provided a boost to the Protestant cause (p. 128). The revolution would also help re-establish a long rivalry with Catholic France through the Atlantic World. The arrival of Dutch William of Orange on the throne of England gave the Low Countries a much-needed ally against Catholic France at home and abroad.

Pestana points out how the influx of people strengthened the hand England and later, the British Empire, in its ongoing struggle with Catholic France, which was finding itself with less and less friends. By the early eighteenth century, Britain was a firm bastion of Protestantism, with Protestant dissidents and emigrants traveling to both Britain and her colonies to escape Catholic persecution. The British continued to come out ahead in the religious war against France. With William on the throne of England, the Dutch now joined the struggle against Catholicism and the incursions of Catholic France.

Pestana also touches on the evangelicalism of the mid-eighteenth century, and how this further splintered the *Protestant Empire* while spreading the basic tenets of Protestantism (pp. 187-188). Though later decades of the eighteenth century would find the British colonies separating from Britain, the Protestant faith was securely inculcated within the hearts and minds of the colonists.

Pestana believes this would ensure a lasting bond between Britain and her former colonial possessions (p. 218).

Pestana finalizes *Protestant Empire* with a well-rounded perspective of the influence of British Protestantism in the Atlantic World. Pestana shows how, though Protestantism had a difficult time gaining inroads into the New World, it did end up fostering a diverse population of sectarian Protestants throughout the Atlantic World from North America to the Caribbean. Fueled by the fear of a return of Catholicism into Protestant realms, religious fervor evangelizing and proselytizing removed any doubt the Atlantic World would be largely anti-Catholic.

Pestana concludes the material succinctly; British Atlantic political boundaries encompassed three continents and a multitude of faiths. However, the regions were united by the common bonds of Protestantism, and would continue to cement together people and communities. *Protestant Empire* includes maps and visuals that give the reader a better sense of the direction of the book. Scholars and students will benefit from reading *Protestant Empire* because it lays out the entire scope with clarity and purpose.

KEN OZIAH

Max Boot. *Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present*. New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2012.

Since the attacks of 9/11 and the world's response to Islamic terrorism and the growth of global terrorism, we've seen an exponential growth in the publication of books on terrorism. Many of these books suffer from a number of faults. Many are simply not very good. But we have seen few historical survey books on the subject. Boot's *Invisible Armies* is a bold foray into taking a well-conceived stab at covering most of the antecedents of terrorism,

and doing so in a readable fashion. Without doubt Boot has wildly succeeded to such a degree that this book belongs in many graduate level courses – and the briefcases and knapsacks of leaders everywhere.

Books on terrorism are exceedingly prevalent these days, so much so that they can make the best of us turn aghast at reading another. The chapters in *Invisible Armies* are small and though some feel breezy they engage the reader, and usually in well-crafted writing Boot makes his point about a given period well. These sixty-four chapters or mini-stories span from early uncivilized warfare to the present. His chapter on “Akkad and the Origins of Insurgency” in Mesopotamia 2334-2005 BC is simply fascinating. What Boot successfully manages to do is give form and substance to periods readers would otherwise ignore and instead gives a marker of the importance of this type of warfare through history. Boot is at his best when he subtly leads readers to understand that one end state of terrorism still poorly understood is its use to shape the political and social narrative.

However, there are some less than compelling areas. Boot sort of skips over or condenses some areas. The Philippines Insurrections, and U.S. intervention in Central America and the Caribbean get a “Cliffs Note” version, it seems. Even Vietnam is underplayed as Boot seems to focus only on the U.S. micro-management of the air campaign. Nor does he reference Graham Cosmos’s book *MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Escalation, 1962-1967* and he underestimates Andrew J. Birtle’s *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1942-1976*. Surprisingly Boot does not emphasize the totality of the Nazi rule that led to their inevitable counterinsurgency. The *unterschied* philosophy underpinning much of National Socialism found its ultimate expression in *Vernichtungskrieg* or war of annihilation. Boot should have devoted more to

this and the entire partisan war on the eastern front. In fact, ignoring the scope of this war is a bit mystifying. The danger here is in trying to shoe-horn this subject over the span of hundreds of years which can lead to some odd conclusions. Even at the end, Boot likes his readers to realize the definition of terrorism depends upon its historical context and the events shaping it.

Yet even with those valid criticisms, Boot's book is simply an indispensable read for the casual reader and scholar alike. His crafting of some different themes is disguised by its eminently readable style. Boot's style makes this foray both fascinating and full of perceptive insights that one might be surprised to find in a best seller. Overall the book makes the subject accessible. The major shortcoming is perhaps an overall emphasis on counterinsurgency vs. guerilla campaigns, but that is a minor quibble. It was a hard book to put down, and how often are readers faced with that cruel dilemma? This is simply a "must have" book in this era.

ROBERT SMITH

Anna Geifman. *Death Orders: The Vanguard of Modern Terrorism in Revolutionary Russia*. Oxford: Praeger, 2010.

Critical thinking scholars can rejoice; finally there is an empirical offering that ties together Russia's late nineteenth and early twentieth century terrorism experience with the calculated actions of modern terrorism. Anna Geifman writes neither dully nor anything less than factual as she provides a historical analysis of terrorism in revolutionary Russia. This psycho-historical writing rises above the majority of others that ponder Russia's radical traditions. Geifman then ups the intellectual ante, comparing Russia's past and present radicals to today's "terrorist" of the Middle East. Randall D. Law's *Terrorism: A History* and Matthew Carr's *The Infernal Machine: a history of terrorism*, offer a documented historical view of Russia's early anar-

chist/terrorist revolutionaries but not with the flair that Geifman presents in this writing. Geifman applies her research with intellect, erudition, and technical skills to suggest that although terrorist justifications vary according to the movements, they all carry a common feature; Geifman's words say it best when she writes the driving force for terrorists is a preoccupation with thanatophilia; love of death.

Just as Geifman's argument is compelling so is her expertise on her chosen subject. Her writings include *Thou Shalt kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia 1894-1917* (Princeton University Press, 1993) and *Entangled in Terror: The Azef Affair and the Russian Revolution* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2000). Geifman is a professor of history at Boston University, teaching classes on the USSR, imperial Russia, psychohistory, and modern terrorism. There have been charges that Geifman's "love of death" argument is lacking because the Russian movement was "avowedly atheist" and the Islamic "fanatically devout." Such an argument is neither accurate nor defensible. Geifman's *Death Orders* is a historical account, graphic at times, but without religious suppositions other than her claim of the worship of death by terrorists. This death wish can be witnessed through both terrorists' and anarchists' writings and actions.

If any part of Geifman's argument is remiss it was a direct challenge to those who wish to excuse the orders of deaths by terrorist leaders who became state leaders. Certain Western intellectuals, due to either their love of communism or its hypnotizing effect on them, were unable to recognize the millions of victims under terrorist leadership. Instead of directly charging these "intellectuals" Geifman references the title of the French philosopher Raymond Aron's 1955 masterpiece, *L'Opium des intellectuels* where Marx belittles religion as the opium for the masses; she suggests that communism is the opium of the intellectuals. It is difficult to find an argument

throughout her text that is not worth considering for the critical thinker. The research conducted for *Death Orders* was abundant and characteristic of a scholar who leaves out political correctness and simply states the facts.

While nothing is perfect it is difficult to criticize the hypothesis laid out in full form. Thousands of excuses can be and have been made for terrorist killers. Societies worldwide have heard the callings of the Islamic radicals “Death for the sake of Allah!” Lenin and the Bolshevik leaders acclaimed “sacrificial death.” The constant in the terrorist repertoire is “love of death.” Geifman’s book should be read and re-read by students and teachers of terrorist history as well as all who attempt to define terrorism. The theme of death applies to the coercive ways of terrorist quest and Geifman provides the scholarly proof. *Death Orders* is a must-have book for anyone seeking knowledge of the terrorist quest. Without any ifs, ands, buts, or speculation there is an abundance of argument in *Death Orders*. This book is a must-read for anyone involved or simply interested in national security.

GEORGE W. THORNDYKE, JR.

Catherine Clinton. *Fanny Kemble’s Civil Wars*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Fanny Kemble’s Civil Wars offers readers an intricate glimpse into the roles of upper-class society women during the nineteenth century, specifically the antebellum period in the United States. Catherine Clinton’s biography of Fanny Kemble explores her tumultuous life as a famous British stage actress-turned-abolitionist who, through her husband’s inheritance, became a plantation mistress of the second largest slaveholding empire in Georgia.

Utilizing the nearly-dozen memoirs that Kemble authored during her lifetime, as well as letters that Kemble wrote to her longtime

friend, Harriet St. Leger, Clinton chronicles the life of a complex, passionate woman, whose unconventional independence and outspoken nature often made her the center of controversy and complicated her relationships with those closest to her.

Born to the famous theatrical Kemble family in England, Francis Kemble, known as Fanny, entered the acting business as a young teenager to help salvage her family's dwindling fortune, putting aside her first love: writing. She took London society by storm during her stage debut in 1829 as Juliet in *Romeo and Juliet*. The critics raved about her performance, comparing it to that of her legendary aunt, Sarah Siddons. Her talent was evident in the sold-out performances for three solid seasons in London. Kemble became an overnight celebrity, but the financial burden of supporting her family took a toll on her. She confessed in a letter to St. Leger that she found the idea of acting "repugnant" (p. 42).

Her success brought her on tour to the United States in 1832, where Clinton describes the rocky relationship Kemble developed with American society. She consistently broke the rules of American etiquette, which she did not understand. Kemble made it very clear she was not impressed with the American cities or their residents, whom she described as "title sick as a banker's wife in England" (p. 52). But despite her initial distaste of America, she felt a certain affinity for Philadelphia, where she met and married her husband, Pierce Butler, in 1834.

Clinton's biography of Kemble reveals deep undertones of Southern antebellum marriage where the white male patriarch ruled unchallenged. From the beginning of their union, Kemble and Butler were ill-matched; her fierce independence and Butler's need to wield his power as the family patriarch caused deep divides in their union. Butler complained that her preference for her own views gave rise to a "sense of imagined oppression" and that she needed

to agree with him in “every regard” (p. 77). Only four months into their marriage, Kemble packed her bags and ran away from their Philadelphia home, only to return the same evening.

Throughout the book, Clinton continues to discuss Kemble’s struggles with the life that she chose with her new husband, Butler, who expected her to give up all of her interests and pleasures, while he continued indulging his own, including the company of other women. Soon after the birth of her first daughter, Sarah, she started to hint at her desire to leave the marriage, even if it meant giving up her child. Butler dismissed Kemble’s wishes, but as an attempt to find some sort of individual self-identity, she began to follow Philadelphia politics. Kemble was well-versed in politics and issues such as slavery; this newfound interest revived her spirit.

Philadelphia was a staging ground for the abolitionist movement. Kemble read anti-slavery essays from abolitionists like William Ellery Channing, and she responded with some of her own. This renewed her love of writing. While Clinton details the birth of Kemble’s abolitionist views, she also offers a brief historical overview of the abolitionist movement in Philadelphia.

Kemble may have been an abolitionist in her heart, but because of her husband wielding power over her, she did not express her sentiments in public. When her husband inherited the Butler plantation and became the second-largest slaveholder in Georgia, Kemble found herself in a precarious situation. Her anti-slavery leanings had always been a source of discontent in their marriage. In an effort to sway her opinion, Butler took her to his plantation along the Georgia Sea Islands in 1838-39, where she wrote her now-famous *Journal of a Residence on a Georgia Plantation*, which described the horrors of human bondage. Butler forbade her from publishing the journal (and her writing of it also alienated her daughters), but once their divorce was finalized and he no longer had influence in her deci-

sions, she published it in 1863, when slavery was on the brink of extinction. Any influence the *Journal* had on the American abolitionist movement was minimal, as it only circulated in her small circle of friends in Philadelphia. However, Clinton emphasizes the reception it received in Kemble's native home, where it influenced British politics and their decision to not become involved in the American Civil War.

Kemble's independent nature and tendency to do the unconventional came at a price, as Clinton's biography makes clear. *Fanny Kemble's Civil Wars* is a biography that any audience could both enjoy and learn from, especially those who are interested in antebellum history and women's studies. Clinton's study of Kemble reflects the struggle that many women faced during this time period: finding a place in the restrictive society of the 19th century.

MELANIE THORNTON

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