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Welcome Letter

As we close down the year 2020, the year of COVID, we at *The Saber and Scroll Journal* continue to try to put out the best possible in historical scholarship. There are hints of optimism that 2021 will be a far better year with vaccines and therapies to treat this awful pandemic. To ignite this optimism, *The Saber and Scroll Journal* presents an edition focusing on American military history from the Era of the Revolution to the contemporary War on Terror.

Any reader interested in American military history will find something to like in our current issue.

For the reader of the military aspects of the Revolutionary War, there are superb articles on the continued relevance of General George Washington, irregular warfare pioneer Nathaniel Greene, and the Continental Navy. Revolutionary War scholarship has been enjoying a resurgence in recent years, and these works add to the expanding historiography.

World War II is of course the most voluminous subject investigated by military historians, and this issue offers works on a variety of subjects. Our Managing Editor, in addition to his constant diligence in preparing this and other volumes, still managed to pen an article detailing the famous and tragic story of the Sullivan brothers and the USS *Juneau*. If interested in the European Theater of Operations, the subject of landing craft shortages and the impact of those shortages on Operation OVERLORD will pique your interest. Rounding out the World War II section of this issue is an article by this author, part one of a two-part series, on one of the forgotten Army infantry divisions of the war, the 32nd, and their toils on the island of New Guinea.

America's most destructive conflict, the Civil War, also has a spot here. Can we all have a cup of coffee together? That is the central theme of an article on the impact of coffee on the Union Army and its importance to group cohesion and task orientation. America's need for coffee is not a phenomenon of only recent times.

The post-World War II era is not ignored. Our examination begins with a fine article on one of the Korean War's famous battles at the Chosin Reservoir. We then examine the root causes of the conflict in Vietnam, which claimed the lives of 55,000 Americans and 2,000,000 Vietnamese. Finally, America's longest war, the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, rounds out our forum of military topics. From beginning to end, American military history is illustrated.

We have also been quite busy reviewing five different books. This writer reviewed a recent work on General Ulysses Grant's impact on the final outcome of the Civil War. Our other five reviews cover some of the smaller, less known American conflicts, such as the Quasi War with France during the 1790s, President Rea-

gan's deployment of Marines to Lebanon, and the many American interventions in Central America. Finally, a book on the Chosin Reservoir is examined, adding to the article on the subject earlier in this edition.

To complete this issue, our Managing Editor conducts a virtual battlefield tour of the Bloody Ridge National Peace Park on Guadalcanal in the South Pacific. Even in these difficult times, we can still avail ourselves of what the world has to offer for those interested in the long story of American military history.

Future issues will continue our quest to provide the best history has to offer. Stay safe, and let us hope for a return to normalcy in the near future.

All the best,

Dr. Robert Young

Associate Professor

Department of History and Military History

American Military University

THE HISTORICAL MINATURE GAME SOCIETY—
PACIFIC SOUTHWEST ESSAY CONTEST
TIM KEENON GRAND PRIZE WINNER

Allied Amphibious Doctrine, the Landing Craft Shortage of 1943-1944, and Operation OVERLORD

William F. Lawson

American Military University

ABSTRACT

The Allied invasion of Normandy on 6 June 1944 is rightly considered a touchstone event of the Second World War. The Allies' success marked the beginning of the war's final phase in Western Europe. Without the Normandy operation, it is difficult to see how the Allies could have achieved final victory in the West. Most accounts of the Normandy invasion deal with the assault troops, sea-borne and airborne, but rarely do the means of transporting those troops to the objective receive more than passing mention. The story of those landing craft, and their critical contribution to the Allies' capability to launch such an operation, is as important as the training and deployment of the troops they carried onto those hostile shores. The design, manufacture, and deployment of suitable amphibious landing craft and their availability ultimately proved to be a deciding factor in the final operational plan as well as the overall Allied strategic picture in Europe in 1944.

Keywords: Allied amphibious doctrine, landing craft shortage 1943-1944, Operation OVERLORD, D-Day, Normandy invasion, Andrew Higgins, landing craft, LCA, LCI, LCM, LCP, LCT, LCVP

Doctrina anfibia aliada, escasez de embarcaciones de desembarco de 1943-1944 y operación OVERLORD

RESUMEN

La invasión aliada de Normandía el 6 de junio de 1944 se considera, con razón, una piedra de toque de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. El éxito de los aliados marcó el comienzo de la fase final de la gue-

rra en Europa occidental. Sin la operación de Normandía, es difícil ver cómo los aliados podrían haber logrado la victoria final en Occidente. La mayoría de los relatos de la invasión de Normandía se refieren a las tropas de asalto, por mar y por aire, pero rara vez los medios de transporte de esas tropas al objetivo reciben más que una mención de pasada. La historia de esas naves de desembarco y su contribución fundamental a la capacidad de los aliados para lanzar una operación de este tipo es tan importante como el entrenamiento y el despliegue de las tropas que llevaron a esas costas hostiles. El diseño, la fabricación y el despliegue de embarcaciones de desembarco anfibia adecuadas y su disponibilidad finalmente demostraron ser un factor decisivo en el plan operativo final, así como en el panorama estratégico general de los Aliados en Europa en 1944.

Palabras clave: Doctrina anfibia aliada, escasez de lanchas de desembarco 1943-1944, Operación OVERLORD, Día D, invasión de Normandía, Andrew Higgins, lanchas de desembarco, LCA, LCI, LCM, LCP, LCT, LCVP

同盟军登陆原则、1943-1944年登陆艇短缺以及霸王行动

摘要

1944年6月6日同盟军入侵诺曼底一事被合理视为二战的一次重大事件。同盟国的胜利标志着二战西欧地区最终阶段的开始。没有诺曼底行动，则很难判断同盟国能如何在西方取得最终胜利。关于诺曼底入侵的大多数记录有关于海上和空中突击部队，但却几乎没有关于这些部队到达目的地的运输途径的详细记录。这些登陆艇的故事以及其对同盟军发动行动的能力所作的贡献，与他们在敌军海岸上进行的部队训练和部署一样重要。适宜的两栖登陆艇的设计、批量生产和部署，以及其可用性最终证明是1944年欧洲最终行动计划以及整个同盟战略计划中的决定因素。

关键词：同盟军登陆原则，1943-1944年登陆艇短缺，霸王行动，D日，诺曼底入侵，安德鲁·希金斯（Andrew Higgins），登陆艇，LCA, LCI, LCM, LCP, LCT, LCVP

Introduction

The Allied invasion of Normandy on 6 June 1944 is rightly considered a touchstone event of the Second World War. The Allies' success marked the beginning of the war's final phase in Western Europe as German forces were steadily pushed back from their conquered territory into Germany itself. Without the Normandy operation, it is difficult to see how the Allies could have achieved final victory in the West.

Most accounts of the Normandy invasion deal with the assault troops, seaborne and airborne, but rarely do the means of transporting those troops to the objective receive more than passing mention. Without the amphibious landing craft employed by the Allies on that June morning, there would have been no invasion at all. The story of those landing craft, and their critical contribution to the Allies' capability to launch such an operation, is as important as the training and deployment of the troops they carried onto those hostile shores.

The design, manufacture, and deployment of suitable amphibious landing craft capable of transporting men and equipment to the Normandy beaches were critical factors in the planning and execution of the operation. Landing craft availability influenced the size, makeup, organization, operational area, and landing schedule of the invasion force and ultimately proved to be a deciding factor in the final operational plan as well as the overall Allied strategic picture in Europe in 1944.

Doctrinal Development

The development of the specialized landing craft of the Second World War dates to the early 1920s and the Washington Naval Conference, which placed limits on the naval power of the United States, Japan, Great Britain, France, and Italy. The treaty prohibited the expansion and development of naval bases and facilities beyond certain well-defined areas, which led to the recognition of the need to take or establish forward bases during wartime. This problem applied in particular to the United States, which anticipated a war with Japan in the Pacific Ocean as the most likely scenario for future conflict.¹

War Plan ORANGE articulated the US strategy for a war in the western Pacific and the Philippines. Given the Japanese mandates in the central Pacific following the First World War, the US Navy foresaw the need to seize bases to stage and project American power where it would be needed. It is important to note that, though War Plan ORANGE underwent several evolutions, the Philippines were understood to not be defensible given the restrictions of the Washington Naval Treaty.²

In order to ensure its ability to execute such a plan, as well as take back any lost territory, the Navy identified the need to develop an amphibious doctrine aimed at successfully landing troops on hostile shores in the face of determined opposition. Though the US, Japan, and Great Britain each had a long history of amphibious operations, the program undertaken by the US Ma-

rine Corps in the 1920s was the first to attempt to create a doctrine for landing under fire. The establishment of such a doctrine necessarily included the capability to execute unopposed landings. Thus the latter was generally ignored during training and development exercises.³

Under the leadership of Commandant John A. Lejeune, the Marine Corps took the lead on the program as it would be the task of the Marines to seize the naval bases in question. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, amphibious exercises were conducted by the Marines, to include the Navy and the Army, which examined a wide variety of techniques and scenarios. The exercises emphasized a combined arms approach including naval gunfire, light armor and artillery, engineering, and air power.⁴

In 1938, the Navy published Fleet Training Publication 167 (*Landing Operations Doctrine*), a document that had been in development by the Marines since 1934 as the *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations*. FTP 167 was a sober assessment of the lessons learned over the previous 17 years of work. The Marines recognized that opposed amphibious operations were possible, but they would be difficult. The basic principles read like a broad summation of the Normandy operation itself: the target area would have to be isolated; a violent barrage of naval gunfire and close air support would precede and support the landing force; the landing itself would be carried out on a broad front by a combined arms team employing the utmost speed and

violence and immediately followed up by reinforcements including tanks and artillery. The greatest threat to the operation was a naval or air attack against the supporting fleet elements, but the most immediate concern was an enemy counterattack against the landing force.⁵

The new doctrine was the result of realistic training and an honest assessment of the needs in an ever more likely Pacific war with Japan. The nature of such a war would severely curtail, if not eliminate, the opportunities to land forces unopposed and move to assault a suitable port from the landward side, a problem that would face Allied planners in Europe as well. As a result of the efforts of the Marines, with Navy and Army participation, the US military possessed the most modern amphibious doctrine in the world by the outbreak of war, if not the forces or resources to implement it.⁶

The British also studied amphibious doctrine during the interwar period, though they lacked an organization to take the lead on the issue, as the Marines had in the United States, until 1938. The Admiralty grew concerned over the development of amphibious capability in the United States and Japan and finally established the Inter-Services Training and Development Centre, under the command of Royal Navy Captain L.E.H. Maund, to conduct research and development on amphibious operations. With such a late start, the most significant achievement of the program was to educate British defense officials, including the Chiefs of Staff and the Committee of Imperial

Defence, about the necessity of combined operations, especially those of an amphibious nature.

Thanks to indifference on the part of the British Army and Royal Air Force, who saw themselves fighting sweeping battles on the European Continent, only the Royal Navy had any enthusiasm for amphibious operations. Without the support of the other two services, the development of amphibious capability beyond what already existed received low priority. Maund began the study and design of dedicated specialized landing craft based on his observations of Japanese operations in China as well as examining the principles of beach defense and overcoming such defenses. Only with the rise of Winston Churchill in 1940 would the supporters of combined amphibious operations finally receive the attention they merited.⁷

Developing the Tools

After the ignominious evacuation from Dunkirk in May 1940, the British Army realized that, in order to defeat the Germans, they would have to develop the capability to land a sizeable force on the Continent against determined opposition. To this end, Maund's program to develop specialized craft such as the Landing Craft Assault (LCA) and the Landing Craft Mechanized (LCM) received more funding and resources. The LCA and LCM were small craft designed respectively to carry infantry and vehicles onto a hostile beach.

Upon becoming Prime Minister in May 1940, Churchill, long an advocate of amphibious capability, ordered the development of larger craft capable of landing troops and equipment directly onto a beachhead without the need to capture a port. The result was the Landing Craft Tank (LCT) and the ocean-going Landing Ship Tank (LST), a ubiquitous design that saw service into the Twenty-First Century.⁸

In the United States, the Marine Corps had developed the doctrine, but still lacked suitable craft with which to implement it. The US Navy Bureau of Ships had submitted several designs, but none had proven satisfactory. To make matters worse, the Bureau of Ships jealously guarded its prerogative regarding ship and boat design, hampering the contributions of private enterprises.⁹

The performance criteria for such craft were specific and demanding. First, they had to be seaworthy. Operating against hostile beaches did not guarantee the protection of a breakwater during the approach, so the craft must be capable of reliable handling in rough seas. Second, they had to combine shallow draft with heavy lift capacity. Third, they should be able to efficiently disembark troops, equipment, or cargo directly onto the beach. This last meant that the craft must be able to drive themselves onto the beach itself while still maintaining the capability to retract after unloading. Finally, the craft had to be rugged enough to handle heavy surf, debris-strewn water, and possible enemy fire and remain operational.¹⁰

Feb. 15, 1944.



A. J. HIGGINS

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LIGHTER FOR MECHANIZED EQUIPMENT

Filed Dec. 8, 1941


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
Mason Fenwick Lawrence
Attorneys

Andrew Higgins, a New Orleans boatbuilder, built his wooden infantry landing craft for the US Marines based on a design intended for civilian use. With considerable power for their size they easily retracted from the beach. Subsequent variants were constructed of steel and featured a bow-mounted ramp for the debarkation of personnel and vehicles. Pictured an early-model Higgins Landing Craft, Mechanized (LCM). US Navy Division of Naval Intelligence.


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
Pictured are two later-model ocean-going Landing Craft, Infantry (LCI). The LCI on the left features a centerline debarkation ramp, which was standard on all models built after 1 June 1944. The LCI embarked six officers, 182 enlisted men, or 72-tons of cargo. US Navy Division of Naval Intelligence.




Landing Craft, Infantry, Gunboats (LCI-G) supplied close fire support of amphibious landings. LCI-G armaments varied depending upon which weapons systems were available when the vessels arrived in theater. Configurations were a mix of 3-in/.50cal. DP, twin-40mm MG, 20mm MG, and 2 ½-in rockets. US Navy Division of Naval Intelligence.



The Higgins Landing Craft, Mechanized (LCM 1) (top) in trials against a Navy Bureau of Ships tank lighter (bottom). The LCM could land one light tank or motor vehicle. US Navy Division of Naval Intelligence.



Higgins Landing Craft, Mechanized (3) (LCM 3) could land one 30-ton vehicle, e.g. M4 Sherman medium tank, 60 troops, or 60,000lbs. (27,000 kg) of cargo. US Navy Division of Naval Intelligence.



The Landing Craft, Tank (3) (LCT 3) was capable of landing five 40-ton tanks, ten 3-ton trucks, or 300 tons of cargo. US Navy Division of Naval Intelligence.

Enter Louisiana boat-builder Andrew Jackson Higgins. Higgins had entered his Eureka shallow draft workboat in a contest sponsored by the Navy in 1936. The Eureka was designed for use in the swamps and bayous of Louisiana and already featured many of the requirements for an amphibious landing craft. It was stable, powerful, operated well in shallow water, and could even traverse sandbars and small spits of land when underway. It could also retract itself efficiently from being grounded and was of extraordinarily robust construction.¹¹

In 1939 the Marines and the operational Navy tested the Higgins design, which won universal praise. In 1941 Higgins adapted his design, now known as the Landing Craft, Personnel (LCP), to include a bow ramp for easier discharge onto a beach. At the same time, Higgins won a contest between his design for a tank lighter and one offered by the Bureau of Ships. This craft became known as the Landing Craft, Mechanized (2-6) (LCM 2-6).¹² This craft should not be confused with the British boat of the same designation which it eventually supplanted.¹³

Higgins endured long battles with the Navy bureaucracy, particularly the Bureau of Ships, which was determined to see its own boats adopted over the clearly superior Higgins designs. This struggle continued until March 1943 when a Bureau-designed landing craft failed in an exercise, costing the lives of nineteen men. Higgins had criticized the design as unsound, and his Landing Craft, Vehicle, Person-

nel (LCVP) had beaten it soundly in a head-to-head competition. Under pressure from the Navy and Marine Corps, the Bureau of Ships finally relinquished its less-than-effective hold on the design of small boats. Higgins eventually produced over twelve thousand landing craft for the US Navy and the British with thousands more being produced under license by other builders.¹⁴

By the time the British accepted the need for modern amphibious capability in 1940, the doctrine existed, as did the recognition of the necessity of specialized landing craft. The problem was that the development of such craft was in its infancy. The late start toward the design and development of suitable landing craft meant that there were chronic shortages throughout the war. The Allies struggled to establish production priorities, and the needs of amphibious forces in the Pacific and Mediterranean competed directly with the buildup and deployment of craft for the invasion of France.

The first Higgins-built LCPs were not ordered until September 1940, and the first major contracts were not let until the spring of 1942. The British took delivery of the first LCT in November 1940 and, though development was rapid, the workhorse fourth-generation LCT (4) was not ordered in large numbers until December 1941. The spring of 1942 saw the beginning of mass production of landing craft in the United States, including the entire production of the LST (2), the model which had been accepted by the Admiralty and the US Navy.¹⁵

Though production began in earnest, it was not without its problems. The US Navy Bureau of Ships continued its obfuscation for another year while small boat manufacturers and major shipyards tooled up to produce the new designs. There was fierce competition for resources, especially steel, wood, and marine engines. With the Battle of the Atlantic still raging and the Navy trying to expand its fleet of escorts as well as carriers and capital ships for the Pacific, the President's list of "must-have" programs for 1943 did not include landing craft.¹⁶

There was also a severe shortage of trained operators for the new craft. The Navy and Coast Guard established special training programs but there was a lack of experience even among the cadre. Andrew Higgins stepped in again. At the request of the Navy and Marine Corps, he had established the Higgins Boat Operators and Marine Engine Maintenance School in New Orleans in July 1941. Higgins Enterprises fully funded the school.¹⁷

By mid-1942, Higgins had trained over two thousand Navy, Marine, and Coast Guard personnel, but the demand was insatiable. In June, the Amphibian Command of the United States Engineers assumed control of the school to accommodate Army students as well. Even this was not enough, so Higgins helped the Navy establish its own schools throughout the country which were more accessible to the naval bases themselves. Most of the instructors were graduates of the original Higgins school in New Orleans.¹⁸

The Problem of Lift

The first British examination of a cross-Channel operation conceived a comparatively small undertaking launched in the Pas-de-Calais area in the event of a collapse of German power in the West. Code-named ROUNDUP, the plan was envisioned as the beginning of the final act in a protracted war aimed at disrupting the orderly withdrawal of German forces as opposed to defeating them in battle. As the British were fighting alone at the time, its scale was commensurate with projected British capabilities.¹⁹

With the entrance of the United States into the war in December 1941, the form and aim of ROUNDUP began to evolve toward a true offensive operation.²⁰ When strategic decisions regarding North Africa and the Mediterranean pushed the cross-Channel operation back to 1943 and then 1944, Allied planners faced a vacuum of official direction. In 1943 the continued planning for ROUNDUP was undertaken by the office of the Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Command (COSSAC). There was some wrangling over the makeup of the planning staff and the command structure, but by March, British Lt. General Sir Frederick Morgan was named Chief of Staff and charged with continuing plans for the operation.²¹

Even before Morgan's appointment and the handover of the planning responsibilities to COSSAC, Allied planners under the auspices of the Combined Chiefs of Staff had begun to review the previous two years' worth

of data generated by the ROUNDUP effort. Most telling among this information were the lessons learned from the Dieppe raid of August 1942. Dieppe demonstrated that, in light of modern weapons and fortifications, a seaborne attack on an enemy-held port was not feasible. Also, the ongoing fortification of the Northwestern European coast would deny the Allies any opportunity to land unopposed and move on an enemy port. It became quite clear that any invasion of Northwest Europe would have to be an amphibious attack against a defended coastline. Such an attack could only be carried out by the use of specialized landing craft.

The primary lesson gleaned from Dieppe, however, was that the German defenses were more formidable than previously thought. Earlier iterations of ROUNDUP had called for widely dispersed landing sites to prevent the enemy from concentrating and to create confusion as to the location of the main effort. Upon examination of Dieppe, Allied planners determined that any landing force would have to be concentrated and mutually supporting in order to crack the German defenses and withstand the inevitable counterattack. A concentrated front also eased logistical concerns and allowed the invaders to reinforce the landing quickly and with greater depth.²²

The new approach called for numerous conditions necessary for success, such as suitable beach gradients, exits, tides, shelter from the prevailing winds, and access to nearby port facilities to be taken after the landings. By early 1943 the planners had determined

that the Caen sector of the Normandy coast was the best, indeed the only, choice for such an operation. Secondary landings were planned for the east coast of the Cotentin Peninsula to provide access to the port of Cherbourg. On 1 March the new analysis was approved and code-named SKYSCRAPER.

SKYSCRAPER was deliberately ambitious, calling for no less than ten assault divisions afloat, four in the first wave and six in the immediate follow-up, supported by four airborne divisions dropped to block enemy reinforcements. All ten amphibious divisions were to land on the first four tides, that is, before the end of D plus 1. The stated reason for such a bold enunciation was to bring to light the problems inherent in such an operation so they could be planned for and dealt with. It did not disappoint in this regard.²³

Although the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved SKYSCRAPER as a basis for planning, immediate questions arose as to its methodology. The British Chiefs challenged the planners' assertion that SKYSCRAPER'S force allocation was the bare minimum required for the operation given the justification that they expected "determined opposition" from the Germans. The Chiefs pointed out the impossibility of basing an operation on projected enemy strength over a year in the future.

The SKYSCRAPER planners countered that a firm decision must be made to ensure that the resources needed to accomplish the mission would be made available. Refusing to do so, they believed, opened the door to

using a lack of resources to justify delaying or even canceling the operation. The Chiefs did not agree and revoked their approval for SKYSCRAPER for its flawed approach which based resource allocation and force structure on unknowable enemy strength.²⁴

When Morgan took charge in March, he made use of the work done on SKYSCRAPER, quickly agreeing with its conclusion that the assault would have to be in France, preferably in the Caen sector.²⁵ He also recognized that the logistical requirements for SKYSCRAPER had been enormous and, frankly, unrealistic. Concerning landing craft, subsequent studies based on projected availability indicated a likely shortfall of fifty percent for the assault divisions. Morgan's approach to the size and structure of the force, however, was not based on guessed-at enemy strength, but upon the resources that could reasonably be expected to be available at the time the operation was to take place.²⁶

In March 1943, influenced by the SKYSCRAPER estimates and Morgan, the British requested an increase in landing craft production. US planners immediately rejected the proposal citing the urgent need for escort vessels in the Atlantic and the continuing buildup in the Pacific. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Ernest J. King and his staff believed that the proposed increase would siphon off resources and once again delay desperately needed construction in other areas.

King's staff justified their stance by citing the 1942 crash program to produce craft for Operation TORCH


in North Africa. Thanks to the use of emergency directives and the creation of special expediting machinery, the 1942 production run of landing craft ended with a record of 106,146 light displacement tons for February 1943.²⁷ The Navy maintained that the dislocations caused by the building program of 1942 had reverberated across every other building effort in every shipyard in the nation, claiming that the shortfalls would not be made good until the fall of 1943. Another such delay could not be justified in light of current threats, especially the record shipping losses of March 1943 to the German U-boat offensive.²⁸

Thus the Navy blocked the proposed increase and influenced the tentative plans for the invasion. The planners would have to make do with the current landing craft production schedules which held steady at about 60,000 tons per month for deliveries into the first half of 1944.²⁹ The landing craft situation was poised to impact strategic priorities on a theater-wide and even global scale. March 1943 saw the prediction by Morgan that, although the exact number of landing craft required for the operation could not yet be forecast, the figure would be "large enough...to present a very serious problem, which has no precedent." Even Churchill had gotten wind of the problem. He wrote in an April memorandum that "the destinies of two great empires ... seemed to be tied up in some god-damned things called LSTs whose engines themselves had to be tickled on by ... LST engine experts of which there was a great shortage."³⁰


Publication and Distribution Branch—Division of Naval Intelligence



The Higgins Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel, the ubiquitous LCVP, could land 36 troops, one 6,000lb vehicle, or 8,100lbs of cargo. US Navy Division of Naval Intelligence.



▼ British LSI(L) unloading by davits.




The DUWK, or “Duck” was the logistical workhorse of Allied amphibious landings the world over from mid-1943 on. Built on a 2 ½-ton, 6x6 truck chassis, the Duck could carry 25 combat loaded troops, 12 litters, small-caliber artillery pieces, or 25-tons of cargo.

May also saw the arrival of British planners in Washington to discuss, among other things, the allocation of resources for 1944. Despite the rejection of SKYSCRAPER, the British statement of requirements for what was again being called ROUNDUP included lift capacity for ten assault divisions simultaneously loaded. The statement called for 8,500 landing ships and craft to provide the needed lift. American planners,

comparing this figure with current and projected production capacity, came to the rapid conclusion that such demands would be impossible to meet.


The stated requirements were so unrealistic that US planners suspected the British of deliberately making an impossible demand in order to justify delaying or scrapping the plan altogether. Such unfounded suspicions ignored the fact that a combined plan-



LANDING CRAFT, TANK (ROCKET) LCT(R)

Operational use	To deliver a large volume of preparatory rocket fire on landing beaches.
Description	British conversions from LCT Marks (2) and (3). False deck and rocket stands are readily removable so that the craft may continue as a tank-landing unit, once the initial landing is accomplished. Electrically fired in 24 salvos, the rockets cover an area of 750 x 160 yards, with a density of one rocket per 100 sq. yards.
Armament	792 (LCT (2)) or 1,064 (LCT (3)), 5" rockets in stands of six @ 45° fixed elevation, 3,500-yard range. Rockets are fitted with (a) 29-lb. HE head with 7-lb. burster; (b) CSA smoke head; (c) incendiary head (for ranging at night). Two 20 mm.
Endurance	2,700 miles @ 9 kts. Speed, 11½ kts. (max.) 1,400 miles @ 11½ kts. Draft, 4'3" for'd, 7'6" aft.
Protection	Blast screen and wooden shelter on bridge.
Propulsion	As in LCT (2), (3).

UK



Armed with between 792 and 1,064, 5-in rockets, each with a 29lb HE warhead, the Landing Craft, Tank (Rocket) or LCT-R was used for close in fire support. US Navy Division of Naval Intelligence.

ning staff developed the SKYSCRAPER estimates, but given the British preference for a Mediterranean strategy, the idea seemed logical. Admiral King was the most outspoken in this regard, openly declaring that he believed the British had no intention of supporting a cross-Channel operation in 1944. The more temperate General George C. Marshall merely stated that it must be concluded that a ten division assault was a logistical impossibility for 1944.

The US Chiefs concluded that, in order to argue successfully against the British preference for operations in the Mediterranean, the plan for the invasion of France must be scaled back within the realm of the logistically possible.

They determined that such a course would eliminate any possible justifications on the part of the British to postpone the operation on the grounds of resource availability. Increasing landing craft production was no longer entertained or discussed, and efforts turned to maximizing the craft that were and would be available.³¹

As mentioned earlier, Morgan had already reached a similar conclusion, though for different reasons. The new attitude of the Americans dovetailed nicely with his doubts about the feasibility of the SKYSCRAPER force structure. Absent an executive authority in the form of a commanding officer, he continued to operate in the realm of the theoretical, but he correctly viewed



At 2,160-tons landing-load displacement, the Landing Ship, Tank (LST), is the largest sea-going amphibious support ship, second only to the Landing Ship, Dock (LSD). A ramp, behind the clamshell bow doors, allowed the LST to deposit its 500-ton load of motor vehicles directly on the beach. Where coastal geography did not allow the LST to beach, a pontoon causeway was streamed to span the gap and tanks, truck, half-tracks or jeeps rolled-off onto the beach.

the rejection of the ten division plan as the break that was needed to begin anew.

Morgan's assessments quickly reduced the figure of 8,500 landing craft to around 4,000, a much more manageable number. He estimated that, by the spring of 1944, the Allies could provide lift for five divisions afloat, three in the initial assault and two in the immediate follow-up. He further determined that two additional divisions could be landed using craft returning from the assault and immediate follow-up.

Morgan arrived at these figures by allowing for two major Mediterranean operations for 1943 after the invasion of Sicily and the projected production figures for delivery by late spring, 1944. The completion of those operations should allow for the transfer of sufficient craft, added to the new inventory, for the cross-Channel operation. Twenty-six to thirty Allied divisions were projected to be present in Britain by the time of the operation and available for use in the reinforcement, buildup, and expansion phases. Mor-

gan's estimates were accepted, and he was instructed to confine his plans to the availability of 4,504 landing ships and craft by the target date.³²

With the number of available landing craft settled, for the time being, a new problem emerged: what was the load capacity of each ship or craft and how would the loads be structured? The definitive answer would only be apparent once the final target was selected, a detailed estimate of enemy forces compiled, a tactical plan developed, and the force structure decided upon. While the number of craft would determine the options for how the landing force would be structured and employed, the plan and structure, once settled upon, would dictate the loading and mission for each ship or craft.

The preliminary figures for loading were necessarily vague. The British and Americans each had different opinions regarding lift capacity, needs for individual units, and loading philosophy. By May, COSSAC had adopted a "Standard Method for Forecasting Landing Craft Requirements." This method, however, was not used at the Washington Conference that month when Morgan was directed to move ahead. In an example of the differences of calculation, COSSAC, using its "standard method," allotted 3,000 vehicles to each assault division. The planners in Washington, at the same time, arrived at the figure of 4,380.

Why the difference? "Vehicle" was a relative term and could mean anything from a small trailer to a tank. Only with the finalization of the actu-

al force structure and the tactical plan, would such numbers come close to being accurate. In the meantime, they served to demonstrate the complexity of the task before the planners and provided data that could be used later to assemble the final loading plan.

COSSAC planners, unlike Washington, also took into account the question of combat losses among landing craft and the effect those losses would necessarily have on the buildup phase. It is true that there was no real way for the Washington planners to assess possible losses given the lack of a confirmed target area and the time distance from the operation itself, but the American calculations tended more toward the higher end of projected capacities than those of the British.

Finally, the Washington planners failed to account for specialized support craft mounting guns, rockets, and mortars that employed landing craft hulls. These craft were essential for the close support of the landing, especially in the time between the lifting of the naval barrage and the landing of the supporting armor. The support craft would have to be included in the production and availability figures for landing craft but could not count in the total lift capacity for such craft.³³

The Washington Conference of May 1943 accomplished the American goal of committing resources to the cross-Channel operation in the spring of 1944 while also setting the material parameters within a range unlikely to be challenged by the British. At the same time, the setting of a definite time

frame for the invasion limited the operational and tactical flexibility of the planners and commanders by setting a definite ceiling on available resources, not least of which were landing craft.

Priorities

The differences of opinion between the Americans and the British regarding European strategy are well-documented. It is well-known that the British favored an opportunistic strategy based in the Mediterranean while the Americans advocated a concentrated assault across the English Channel into France as soon as possible.³⁴ In truth, the differences in the two sides were more nuanced than is generally indicated. These nuances manifested themselves in the months leading up to what eventually became Operation OVERLORD, and the availability of landing craft was at the center of the debate.

The Quebec Conference of August 1943 saw several stormy sessions between the American and British Chiefs of Staff regarding strategy and resource allocation for 1944. The Americans submitted a report recommending that OVERLORD have "overriding priority" for resources to ensure readiness by the target date, which was still undetermined.

The British were uncomfortable with the term "overriding priority" because it implied the operations in the Mediterranean were of secondary importance, which is precisely what the Americans meant. The difference of

opinion flowed from the American view that OVERLORD was the prime goal and everything else should be either subordinated to it or done in support of it. The British agreed that OVERLORD should be the primary operation of 1944 but that efforts in Italy and elsewhere in the Mediterranean were an integral part of preparing for it and were thus equally important.³⁵

After much discussion, the Chiefs issued a joint statement reaffirming the precedence of OVERLORD when there was a question of competing needs but that Mediterranean operations should continue with the resources already allocated for their use. The Americans also conceded that unforeseen events or opportunities in the Mediterranean could change the priorities set forth at the conference. General Marshall had stated that the commitment to OVERLORD should be taken "without conditions and without mental reservation."³⁶ He was unable to achieve either in Quebec, though he did lay the groundwork for such.

The Americans did manage to hedge against a possible British push for an increased commitment to Italy or a rumored Balkan expedition. By proposing a landing on the Mediterranean coast of France to coincide with the cross-Channel operation, the Americans were able to focus the British more to the west and show a direct correlation between Mediterranean operations and OVERLORD. The British Chiefs agreed to the proposal and General Eisenhower, then commander of Allied forces in North Africa, was ordered to draw up

a plan for such an operation using only the resources already available to him.³⁷

The Quebec Conference also saw the beginnings of an increase in the size of the OVERLORD assault force. Churchill requested an increase of at least twenty-five percent. Marshall concurred, and Morgan was instructed to take such an expansion into account in his plans. Morgan, on his own, had already been examining just such an increase. Still, without a commander to make executive decisions, he could only operate with theoretical models, though OVERLORD'S higher priority started to give him firmer ground on which to stand.³⁸

This priority quickly brought OVERLORD into competition with the just-ordered invasion of Southern France, Operation ANVIL. A study of Eisenhower's available capability revealed only enough lift for about one division. Also, the lift capacity was not properly balanced in terms of its capability to land even that one division in such a way for it to be effective. The Chiefs denied a request to augment the lift capacity because it would take resources away from OVERLORD.³⁹

As planning went forward, it became clear that if ANVIL were to take place, there would have to be additional resources allocated. As ANVIL began to take on a life of its own, not least because of Eisenhower's advocacy, it became a primary drain on scarce resources needed for OVERLORD. Again, landing craft and lift capacity were the centers of contention. As the commitment grew and began to threat-

en operations in Italy, British support for ANVIL began to wane.

As General Morgan expanded his plan to accommodate the increased assault force, he immediately saw his landing craft start to slip away. In August, before the Quebec Conference concluded and priorities set, the Royal Navy appropriated 44 LCTs for net duty at its anchorage at Scapa Flow. It was unknown if they would return in time. Also, the allocation of close-support craft was wholly inadequate.

Morgan was invited to address the British Chiefs of Staff on 12 August regarding the rapidly-eroding landing craft situation. His estimates showed that of the 653 LCTs allocated by the Washington Conference, up to twenty-five percent were no longer available due to reassignment to other tasks or the need to convert them to close-support craft. His figures were actually low, as he had underestimated the number of support craft required by the American assault divisions. Even worse, Morgan based his estimates on a three-division assault front which would soon increase to four.⁴⁰

Inquiries into increased production of landing craft met with no particular success. Admiral King grudgingly agreed to an unspecified increase, but it was not clear whether it would positively affect deliveries in time to impact OVERLORD. The British landing craft industry was operating at full capacity, and British authorities were unwilling to make the changes necessary to increase it. Only in the late fall, when the shortage became acute, did Churchill

directly intervene in order to create capacity for about sixty more craft.⁴¹

Shortly after his presentation to the British Chiefs of Staff regarding the shortages for a three-division assault, Morgan received orders to expand his plan for a four-division front. Given the difficulties he already faced, Morgan decided to start his plans anew based on the increased allotment of forces. He quickly concluded that the expansion to four assault divisions was unwise based on the lift capacity he had and expected to have. Upon examination of the ordered increase, he wrote:

Detailed analysis of the present plan shows that while the three assault divisions are only barely adequately mounted in craft of suitable types, the immediate follow-up formations are most inadequately mounted, and there is a dangerous gap on D-plus-1-day We already have far too high a proportion of our goods in the shop window. To consider any increase in this proportion without adequate stocking of the back premises would in my opinion be basically unsound.

In other words, the follow-up formations were in no real position to provide follow-up at all, at least not in the immediate sense. The follow-up units were already inadequately loaded on unsuitable vessels which meant they would not be able to operate until at least twelve hours after landing. Morgan strongly recommended addressing this problem and creating a viable floating reserve before introducing

another assault division into the mix. His new calculations for the creation of an adequately mounted follow-up force showed a deficit of 251 LCTs for a three-division assault and 389 for the four-division plan. He would also need an additional 150 LCTs or equivalent craft for the fourth assault division.

The British Chiefs of Staff rejected Morgan's opposition to the strengthened attack but allowed that increasing the number of landing craft had become a top priority. In September, the Chairman of the U.S. War Production Board, Donald Nelson, traveled to London and met with Morgan regarding landing craft shortages. He left the meeting convinced that LSTs and LCTs were the "most important single instrument of war from the point of view of the European Theater," and that the need for them had been "grossly understated."⁴²

Despite Nelson's determination and King's agreement to increase production, no action was taken other than to study the problem. As the November production schedule was allowed to mirror that of October, it became clear that the only way to increase landing craft availability for OVERLORD would be to maximize the craft that already existed or would be delivered through the established production priorities.⁴³

Command Decisions

General Bernard Montgomery arrived in London on 2 January 1944 to assume command of the Allied ground forces, under Eisenhower, for OVERLORD. He immediately

demanded an expansion of the assault force from four to five divisions and the frontage for the landing from twenty-five to about forty miles. Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, Major General Walter Bedell Smith, concurred and apprised Eisenhower of the recommendations.

Despite his misgivings, Morgan was now able to operate with some express authority under a command staff that could make decisions. He was told to plan for the expansions under the assumption that the required landing craft would be made available. The additional landing craft needed for Montgomery's expansion included 72 Landing Craft Infantry, Large (LCI-L), 47 LSTs, and 144 LCTs.⁴⁴

In addition to the five infantry divisions, lift had to be found for the equivalent of four armored brigades, five regiments of self-propelled artillery, shore control groups, air force and naval personnel, and an immediate follow-up force of two-thirds of an infantry division. All these units had to be combat-loaded on landing craft so as to be operational as soon as they arrived on the beach. The rest of the follow-up, one and one-third divisions, would be loaded on transports and not available until D plus 2.⁴⁵

In order to accumulate the necessary craft for OVERLORD, training areas in the US and Britain were scoured, serviceability rates were improved, load capacity calculated and recalculated to improve efficiency, and, most significantly, the competition for resources between OVERLORD and ANVIL came to the forefront.

Montgomery and Smith informed Eisenhower in early January that the only way to procure the necessary craft would be to pull them from ANVIL. Eisenhower was a strong advocate of ANVIL from the start, believing that it would tie down German forces that might otherwise be brought to bear against OVERLORD. He resisted drawing resources from the complementary operation as long as he could.

ANVIL retained the capacity to lift three divisions. British planners, including Morgan, felt that a one division threat would be enough to hold the German units in place while diverting the rest of the landing craft to OVERLORD. The British believed that the ANVIL beaches, 500 miles away, were too distant to have a positive impact on OVERLORD. Churchill heartily agreed and pushed for the cancellation of ANVIL.

Eisenhower was still determined to salvage ANVIL if he could. At his direction, plans were changed for the loading of landing craft, especially concerning vehicles. The requirement per division for combat-loaded vehicles was cut from over 3,000 to 2,500, thus freeing up additional craft.

Serviceability requirements also increased across the board. The COSSAC outline for OVERLORD had placed the expected serviceability rate, the rate of craft that were operational at any given time, at eighty-five percent for landing craft and ninety percent for ships. In order to squeeze more lift out of the available assets, the acceptable rates increased in January to ninety percent for LCTs and ninety-five

percent for LSTs. These new rates only applied to US craft, as the British insisted on retaining the lower COSSAC figures because they were more realistic. As it turned out, the new rates were pessimistic. On D-day, the rates for all American landing craft were above ninety-nine percent, and the British were above ninety-six percent.⁴⁶

In February, Eisenhower met with Admiral Charles Cooke of the CNO's War Plans Division and General John Hull, Chief of the US Army's Operational Planning Department to discuss the landing craft situation. Cooke and Hull were able to convince Eisenhower that he possessed more than enough lift for OVERLORD without having to pull extensively from ANVIL.

On 13 February, Eisenhower, Cooke, and Hull proposed reducing the numbers of landing ships and making up for the loss by overloading others. The plan was criticized by the command of 21st Army Group, the command headquarters for the ground forces, as taking a narrow logistical view toward loading as opposed to a tactical view. Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, the Allied Naval Commander, Expeditionary Force, echoed this criticism. Ramsay noted in his diary that Eisenhower, Cooke, and Hull were "forgetting that we have to look tactically to assault a strongly defended coast & any arithmetical calculation is bound to be impractical operationally."⁴⁷ The British Chiefs of Staff rejected the proposal.

The British Chiefs also took the opportunity to reiterate their opposition to ANVIL, which they saw as not

only draining resources from OVERLORD but also Italy. Italian operations retained a high priority with the British, a sentiment echoed by Eisenhower, which put the Supreme Commander in a tight spot.

The difference of opinion revolved around Eisenhower's belief that ANVIL was vital to the success of OVERLORD, a view, as noted previously, not shared by the British. Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff, made a strong case that the needs of Italy and ANVIL would create either a shortage of badly needed divisions in the former or a lack of adequate buildup forces for the latter. Doing both was impossible.

The wrangling continued between Eisenhower and the Combined Chiefs, including some horse-trading of landing craft resources as Mediterranean needs spiked thanks to the difficulties at Anzio. By March, Eisenhower began to realize that the resources in men and materiel did not exist to execute ANVIL simultaneously with OVERLORD while also maintaining the needs of Italy. On 21 March, he recommended the cancellation of ANVIL. With the decision made, OVERLORD was assured of the landing craft needed to execute the operation.⁴⁸

Conclusion

The landing craft employed in Operation OVERLORD performed admirably. It is impossible to think of the operation without conjuring images of the assault troops hitting

the beach in waves of Higgins LCVPs and other craft. It is difficult to surmise how the Allies might have gained a lodgment on the European Continent without the development and employment of these highly-specialized but essential craft.

4,126 landing craft were employed at Normandy on 6 June 1944. Over 4,000 were of a specialized variety developed for amphibious assaults.⁴⁹ 291 landing craft of all types were lost or damaged during the assault. Most of those damaged were repairable, a testament to their rugged construction.⁵⁰

The success of the landing craft of World War II is also a testament to the designers, engineers, and craftsmen who created them as well as the

visionaries who determined the need for them in the first place. Though they never fired a shot during the war, the people responsible for the existence and eventual deployment of the landing craft were in their own way just as vital to eventual victory as those who did.

In a postwar interview, historian Stephen Ambrose was asked by Dwight D. Eisenhower whether he had ever met Andrew Higgins. When Ambrose said that he had not, Eisenhower replied, "That's too bad. He is the man who won the war for us. If Higgins had not designed and built those LCVPs, we never could have landed over an open beach. The whole strategy of the war would have been different."⁵¹

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Afghanistan: America's Forever War

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ABSTRACT

Within weeks of the attack of September 11, 2001, the United States began a campaign to eradicate Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. This campaign would shift from a campaign of “clear and hold” to a focus of rebuilding that nation within two years after the initial American presence. More than eighteen years, several billion dollars, and roughly twenty-four hundred US casualties later,¹ the US military still maintains a significant presence in Afghanistan, not significantly closer to exiting than they were in the early days of 2002. The United States’ failure to officially end the war in Afghanistan is founded principally upon the United States’ lack of both sound counterinsurgency (COIN) applications and inconsistent objectives prior to the 9/11 attack on New York’s Twin Towers.

This paper explores the years prior to 9/11, the United States’ failure to apply sound COIN concepts, and the inconsistent objectives related to the United States’ failure to officially end the war in Afghanistan.

Keywords: counterinsurgency (COIN), FM 3-24, SIGAR, Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda, Bin Laden, terrorism, Taliban, RAND Corporation

Afganistán: La guerra eterna de EE. UU.

RESUMEN

A las pocas semanas del ataque del 11 de septiembre de 2001, Estados Unidos inició una campaña para erradicar a Al Qaeda en Afganistán. Esta campaña cambiaría de una campaña de “limpiar y mantener” a un enfoque de reconstrucción de esa nación dentro de los dos años posteriores a la presencia estadounidense inicial. Más de dieciocho años, varios miles de millones de dólares y aproximadamente dos mil cuatrocientas bajas estadounidenses después, el ejército de Estados Unidos todavía mantiene una presencia significativa en Afganistán, no mucho más cerca de salir de lo que estaba en los primeros días de 2002. El fracaso de Estados Unidos Poner fin oficialmente a la guerra en Afganistán se basa principalmente

en la falta de Estados Unidos de aplicaciones sólidas de contrainsurgencia (COIN) y objetivos inconsistentes antes del ataque del 11 de septiembre a las Torres Gemelas de Nueva York.

Este documento explora los años anteriores al 11 de septiembre, el fracaso de Estados Unidos en aplicar conceptos COIN sólidos y los objetivos inconsistentes relacionados con el fracaso de Estados Unidos de poner fin oficialmente a la guerra en Afganistán.

Palabras clave: contrainsurgencia (COIN), FM 3-24, SIGAR, Afganistán, Al-Qaeda, Bin Laden, terrorismo, Talibán, Corporación RAND

阿富汗：美国的持续战争

摘要

2001年9月11日恐怖袭击之后的几周内，美国开始了一项消灭阿富汗基地组织的战役。这场战役计划在美军首次到达阿富汗的两年内从“清除和控制”战役转为重建阿富汗。超过18年过去了，花费了几百亿美金、近2400名美军伤亡，如今美军仍然在阿富汗保留大量部队，比起2002年早期，如今保留的数量距离撤离还有一段距离。美国在正式结束阿富汗战争上的失败之举主要基于美国缺乏健全的反叛乱（COIN）战略，以及9•11纽约双子塔袭击事件之前不持续的目标。

本文探究了9•11之前的几年、美国在应用健全COIN概念上的失败、以及与美国无法正式结束阿富汗战争相关的不持续目标。

关键词：反叛乱（COIN），FM 3-24，阿富汗重建特别监察长（SIGAR），阿富汗，基地组织，本·拉登，恐怖主义，塔利班，兰德公司



Air Force OSI members pay respects to six American Soldiers killed in a Taliban attack while on joint patrol near Bagram, Afghanistan. (Winter 2016). Author's Personal Collection.

An entire generation of Americans born near the turn of the twenty-first century is currently reaching legal adulthood. Although these young people may not understand or appreciate America's ongoing war with Afghanistan, this military conflict has been in effect for almost their entire lives. As a result, they may be among the first to ask, "Why have we been at war in Afghanistan for more than nineteen years?" The answers lie in a timeline of delays that have prohibited US soldiers from coming home.

These obstacles include a delayed beginning, a stark lack of oversight in economic and infrastructure development, weakness in unified efforts (including cultural and language difficul-

ties), and perceptions of an illegitimate Afghan government. To fully understand the United States' failure to withdraw from Afghanistan and how US officials passed down efforts to rebuild the nation through two succeeding administrations, a look at the events leading up to—and immediately after—the invasion of Afghanistan is essential.

Long before President George W. Bush declared his War on Terror, the events of September 11, 2001 had already been set into motion. The lack of strong military responses following the 1983 bombing of the Marine Barracks in Lebanon, the bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, and the bombing of USS Cole in 2000 created the impression that the US would be unwilling to

take retaliatory action against terrorist organizations. Usama Bin Laden and his followers believed, however, that although America would be slow to react, a large enough attack would eventually draw the US into conflict, “bogging them down,” similar to the Soviet Union during their occupation from 1979 to 1989. The goal was to deplete the US government of both power and influence.²

Bin Laden had already played a significant role in the August 7, 1998, bombings of the US embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, Nairobi, and Kenya and in conspiring to kill US nationals traveling abroad. The United Nations (UN) passed Resolution 1267 on October 15, 1999, calling for the indictment of Usama bin Laden and his associates. The resolution reaffirmed its commitment to the sovereignty of Afghanistan while condemning the ongoing violations of international humanitarian law and human rights and the production of opium. Resolution 1267 also established an al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee and granted this panel the ability to prevent the departure of any aircraft from land owned, leased, or operated by either group and froze assets or financial resources owned or generated by the Taliban.³

Two years after the implementation of Resolution 1267 and two days before September 11, 2001, two suicide bombers posing as news correspondents assassinated the former defense minister of the post-Soviet interim Afghan government and chief commander of the Northern Alliance, an anti-Taliban

force, Ahmad Shah Masoud, known as the “Lion of Panjshir.”⁴ Journalists later called Masoud’s murder “the curtain-raiser for the attacks on New York City and Washington, DC.”⁵ Just two days later, on September 11, Al-Qaeda operatives hijacked four commercial airliners. Two crashed into the World Trade Center in New York, one struck the Pentagon in Washington, DC, and the fourth and final plane crashed in a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania. In total, the coordinated attacks were responsible for the death of approximately three thousand people. Although none of the nineteen hijackers were Afghan nationals, and the attack originated from Saudi Arabia, President George W. Bush immediately zeroed in on al-Qaeda, Usama Bin Laden, and the terrorist safe-haven of Afghanistan.⁶

Knowing that Pakistan and Afghanistan would not extradite Bin Laden to the US, President Bush then turned to Congress, who subsequently authorized a Joint Resolution. This resolution determined (with the understanding of the war in Afghanistan) “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons [whom they] determined had planned, authorized ... committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the US by such nations, organizations or persons.”⁷

There has been much debate over the legality of the US invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. On October

7, 2001, the same date as the initial air-strikes against Afghanistan, US Ambassador to the UN John Negroponte sent a letter to the President of the UN Security Council stating that the US had initiated the strikes in an act of self-defense. This letter acknowledged the perception of military action against Afghanistan as an act of aggression. Still, the right to self-defense permitted the US military to prosecute its alleged attacker, i.e., Bin Laden and the haven of Afghanistan, both of which had been relatively unchecked. The same constraints bound the United Kingdom; however, under the UN Charter, the United Kingdom offered aid under the claim of “collective self-defense,” meaning that a state may assist a nation under attacks should they request it.⁸ The first conventional ground forces arrived in Afghanistan twelve days later,⁹ mark-

ing the beginning of more than a nineteen-year American presence there.

The first and most blatant issue facing US ambitions was the reputation as a reactive nation due in part to “soft” retaliatory actions against the previously mentioned attacks. Because of this perception, it is not entirely incorrect to assert that the US entered Afghanistan unprepared. Asymmetric warfare, which encompasses insurgency and terrorism, was written into US National Security Strategy policy only as recently as 1997.¹⁰ The preface of Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24 underscores this lack of preparation where it states, “Counterinsurgency operations generally have been neglected in broader American military doctrine and national security policies since the end of the Vietnam War over 30 years ago.”¹¹



US Troops boarding a CH-47 Chinook following a Clearing Operation in the Shah-I-Kot Valley. Gardez, Afghanistan. (Summer, 2002). Author's Personal Collection.

Early operations in Afghanistan, four years after the release of the 1997 National Security Strategy, were still based upon the false assumption that the insurgency would mirror those of the 20th century, following the Maoist model of “Protracted Warfare,” centralized organization and a hierarchical command structure, with clearly defined goals;¹² however, it quickly became apparent that the insurgents of the twenty-first century, aided by transnational networks, satellite and internet communications,¹³ had abandoned the rigidity of the past and replaced it with complex “matrices of irregular actors with widely differing goals.”¹⁴

The Taliban adopted strategies of protraction and exhaustion, utilizing ambushes, bombings, or attacks on crucial infrastructure to exhaust opposition, intimidate the local population, or compel security to expend scarce resources.¹⁵ An update of the 2013 Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency in April of 2020, reiterated the commitment to “long-term partnering and engagement,”¹⁶ thus demonstrating that the United States may be no closer to achieving its goals of combatting insurgency in Afghanistan than it was in 2001. Why has the world’s largest superpower failed to withdraw from a continuum of operations in an underdeveloped nation?



US Soldier Stands in a Temporary Dining Facility. Asadabad, Afghanistan. (Winter, 2002). Author’s Personal Collection.

Despite American occupation beginning in 2001, many guiding documents on counterinsurgency were not released until years later, such as *FMI 3-07.22 Counterinsurgency Operations*

in 2004, which was then replaced by the *FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency Manual* in 2006,¹⁷ the *US Government Counterinsurgency Guide* of 2009,¹⁸ the *Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency* in 2013,

an updated *FM 3-24* in 2014, and an updated *Joint Publication 3-24* in 2020. Each publication expanded on its predecessor, yet failed to yield the changes needed to end the conflict.

Significant audits of COIN efforts did not occur until the US was eleven years into the conflict. COIN is defined as “the blend of comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes simultaneously.”¹⁹ In 2013, the RAND Corporation published an analysis of the performance of twenty-four COIN concepts addressed in the aforementioned publications. The concepts analyzed by RAND were those of legitimacy in government, cultural awareness putting a “local face on it,” and implementation of democracy,²⁰ in addition to the concepts of civil security, civil control, essential services, governance, and economic and infrastructure development, as provided by the *US Army FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency Manual*.²¹

The citizens of a country will pursue the “best deal,” in terms of services, whether government officials or insurgent organizations provide them.²² It is for this reason that military advisors decided in April of 2002 that the best way to separate the Taliban and its support base was to rebuild the economy and infrastructure of Afghanistan.²³ Within six years after the United States’ initial announcement of Afghan reconstruction plans, the US completed approximately \$7 billion worth of projects. These include the completion of 1,056 miles of paved and 685 miles of gravel roads, reconstruction of approximately

445 miles of the Herat Highway, construction or refurbishment of 670 clinics or health facilities, the distribution of \$6 million worth of pharmaceuticals, the training of 10,600 health workers and 65,000 teachers, the repair or construction of 670 schools, the printing of sixty million Dari and Pashto textbooks, irrigation systems for 1,220,700 acres of land, and vaccinations for and veterinary medical treatment of twenty-eight million livestock.²⁴

The scale of these projects and those that would come in the future, necessitated independent and objective audits to identify and eliminate fraud, waste, and abuse. Coincidentally, the 2006 *FM 3-24* had mandated that “Commanders should identify contractors operating in their AO and determine the nature of their contract, existing accountability mechanisms, and appropriate coordination relationships.”²⁵ Yet it was not until the release of the updated *FM 3-24* in 2014 that criteria expanded to include “enforcing accountability, building transparency into systems, and emplacing effective checks and balances to guard against corruption are important components to any relief, reconstruction, or development program.”²⁶ Under the authority of Section 1229 of the National Defense Authorization Act, Congress authorized the creation of the office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) in 2008.²⁷ SIGAR is currently “the only inspector general with the interagency authority to audit and investigate the activities of all U.S. government agencies and international organizations that receive U.S. funding

for Afghanistan reconstruction.”²⁸ In the years between 2002 and 2020, the costs of reconstruction projects have swelled to \$133 billion,²⁹ much of which was either mismanaged, unaccounted for, or like the rule-of-law programs, counterproductive.³⁰ By 2015 SIGAR had issued thirty-seven inspection reports on a sampling of forty-five Department of Defense projects with a combined value of \$1.1 billion.³¹ This figure grew to six hundred audits and inspections by 2019.³² The reports serve as a means to ensure that tax-funded projects have followed three primary criteria:

1. Construction met contract requirements and technical specifications
2. The intended recipients were using the facilities
3. The facilities are structurally sound, completed on time, and were within budget.³³

Of the forty-five Department of Defense reconstruction projects inspected by SIGAR personnel members in 2015, only seventeen met contract requirements and/or construction standards. Several of those investigated had structural deficiencies so severe that they posed physical dangers to the occupants. For example, a 2013 inspection of the Bathkhak School in the Kabul province found that the contractor used a wood-trussed roof rather than the contract-mandated concrete slabs. A nearly \$500,000 dry-fire range at the Afghan Special Police Training Center began to disintegrate within four months of the range’s completion. Still, authorities failed to hold the contractor

responsible before the expiration of the contractor’s construction warranties. This range eventually required demolition.³⁴ Academic and administrative reports assessed that inadequate government oversight and subpar contractor performances were the most significant contributors to these issues. Officials in the Nangahar province stopped asking about timelines or quality of projects simply out of fear that Afghan laborers would falsely accuse them of seeking bribes.³⁵ US Ambassador Ryan Crocker reflected in a 2016 interview, “I always thought KARZI had a point, that you just cannot put those amounts of money into a very fragile state and society, and not have it fuel corruption. You just can’t.”³⁶

Crocker’s statement should have come as no surprise, as problems with project management surfaced as early as 2011 during the proposed military draw-downs. Many facilities were not accessible to inspectors because of increased violent or volatile insurgent activities. SIGAR personnel were unable to inspect reconstruction projects personally, and they relied upon an agreement for “vetted and well-trained Afghan civil society partners” to conduct the inspections.³⁷ In 2020 testimony before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, SIGAR claimed to have completed more than one thousand criminal and civil investigations.³⁸ These investigations lead to 130 convictions,³⁹ and saved US taxpayers \$3 billion;⁴⁰ however, despite these accomplishments, SIGAR maintains that the Department of Defense is still incapable of managing the \$4 billion allotted to Afghanistan this fiscal year.⁴¹



Two troopers from the 1/505 Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR), 82nd Airborne Division (ABN DIV) patrol a small village in the Khost Province. (Summer 2002). Author's Personal Collection.



Villagers from the Shah-I-Kot Valley pose for a photo, Gardez, Afghanistan (Summer, 2002). Author's Personal Collection.

It is of note that the Taliban are not against Western development, but the presence of foreign troops.⁴² Author James Ferguson argues that “The Taliban are representatives of an ideology as much as they are an army. It follows that

we need to win arguments with them, not just battles—and we can't do that without talking to them.”⁴³ For years, US policymakers had failed to consider ideology as a center of gravity, instead, measuring progress with firefights and

forward lines of effort. It was not until the release of early COIN manuals that culture and societal norms were taken into consideration.

The RAND Corporation's concepts of cultural awareness and putting a "local face on it" overlap with *JP 3-24*'s references to sociocultural factors in working with host nation governments,⁴⁴ *FMI 3-07.22*'s instructions on coordination with host nation civil authorities,⁴⁵ and Chapter Two of *FM 3-24*, titled "Unity of Effort: Integrating Civilian and Military Activities," which explains the criteria for building unity between military and civilian organizations. Failure to build unity of effort failed to such an extent that the US-trained Afghan National Army had an attrition rate of 20 percent as late as 2017.⁴⁶ However, complications in building Afghan cohesion, much like the attacks of September 11, 2001, are the products of events that occurred decades prior. In 1893, Mortimer Durand of British India and Afghan Amir Abdur Rahman Khan signed an agreement establishing what is commonly known as the Durand Line.

This line currently serves as the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan maintains that the Durand Line is a valid international boundary, but no modern Afghan government has ever accepted or acknowledged it as legitimate. Furthermore, the negotiation of the Durand line failed to recognize local and/or indigenous ethnic groups, thus geographically dividing the Pashtun, Waziris, and Mohmand tribes.⁴⁷

Many of these tribal members who travel across the porous border fail to claim residency in Afghanistan or Pakistan. These tribes often lack a sense of nationality, claiming loyalty only to their clan, and view their leaders as the only legitimate authorities. Even at the national level, officials in the Afghan capital have always had to contend with the smaller, regional leaders, which is problematic due to Afghanistan's status as a multi-ethnic state. The country is comprised of several and often warring tribes, of which the Pashtuns are the majority. Census data estimates that the Pashtun tribe comprises as many as four hundred clans, accounting for 40-42 percent of the total population of Afghanistan.⁴⁸ After the Pashtuns, the next largest group is the Tajiks at 27-30 percent of the populace, the Hazaras at 15 percent, and the Uzbeks and Turkmen at an estimated 9-10 percent.⁴⁹ The Nuristani, Pashai, Aimaq are the minorities at a mere 13 percent.⁵⁰ Each tribe has its own traditions, customs, values, and views concerning deep-seated religious practice and government rule.

Language has always been an ongoing issue in building a unified Afghanistan. The various tribes do not speak the same language, nor are they able to communicate coherently with US military members, who mainly speak only American English. Roughly 50 percent of the population speaks a dialect known as "Dari."⁵¹ Another 35 percent speak "Pashto" or "Pashtu," and 11 percent speak Turkic languages.⁵² These statistics do not account for the other thirty minor languages also spoken in Afghanistan.⁵³

Finally, the majority of Afghan nationals, approximately 80 percent,⁵⁴ appear different from their Sunni counterparts in that, due to their geographic location, they tend to show distinct Mongolian physical features. In conjunction with the Sunni-Shia rift, the Afghan majority often treats Shia Muslims quite poorly, isolating them socially and politically. Western scholars argue that the Sunni-Shia rift is often overgeneralized as an archaic, religious conflict, rather than a modern conflict in failed or nationalist or geostrategic rivalry.⁵⁵ The inability of policymakers to account for modern political relations in lieu of religious differences demonstrates yet another failure to understand the sociocultural situation in Afghanistan, as mandated by *FM 3-24*, *JP 3-24*, *FMI 3-07.22*, and the *US Government Counterinsurgency Guide*.

If one were to put a “local face” on COIN efforts, would that face appear as Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Turkmen, Nuristani, Pashai, or Aimaq? What language should one print the literature aimed at garnering all Afghan public support? Dari, Pashto, or Turkic? How would anyone adequately represent the Shia minority that is shunned by the Sunni majority? The diverse aspects of Afghanistan’s multi-ethnic culture have been a long-time enigma for secular Westernized nations. Along with cultural and language barriers, US forces have had to work with partner military, police, and government officials whose values or societal norms greatly differ from those in the United States.

The concept of an elected leader falls within US political norms as well as the COIN strategy of “providing a framework of political reconciliation, genuine reform, popular mobilization, and governmental capacity-building around which all other programs and activities are organized.”⁵⁶ The US has always operated under the assumption that all nations desire democracy. Residents often perceive new regimes brought to power with the assistance of the US as American proxies rather than a fair representation of the nation’s peoples.⁵⁷ In December 2001, the UN, the United States, and Iran appointed Hamid Karzai, leader of the Popalzai tribe of Durrani Pashtuns, as the administrative head of the post-Taliban interim government. During an emergency meeting of 1,550 delegates, the UN elected Karzai as the leader of the Afghan government.⁵⁸ However, Karzai’s election was not without issue.

His Pashtun origin granted him the popular vote, but this failed to appease the Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Nuristani, Pashai, and Aimaq tribes. Throughout, the Tajiks served as a form of power check due to sheer tribal numbers.⁵⁹ Karzai also allegedly tolerated corruption throughout the various levels of government while simultaneously demonstrating an unwillingness to pursue the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. It became a popular joke throughout Afghanistan that Karzai was “no more than the mayor of Kabul, and even that only until it is dark,”⁵⁵ meaning the Afghan government ruled during the day, and the Taliban ruled at night. Karzai’s efforts alone are said to have single-



Three troopers of D Co., 1/504 PIR, 82nd ABN DIV on patrol stop briefly on “Bull Run,” an observation post near Camp Wright, Asadabad, Afghanistan. (2002). Author’s Personal Collection.

handedly and significantly undermined the COIN effort in Afghanistan.⁵⁶

The Bush administration had little interest in a nation-building mission in the years surrounding Karzai’s appointment, nor had they adequately pursued him to reduce corruption in Afghanistan. Many economic, social, and political responsibilities were then handed to NATO, creating different goals or levels of commitment among the Afghan, US, and other governments.⁶⁰ These two factors, corruption and varying degrees of dedication, several authors later identified as poor practices in COIN, not only in Afghanistan but as proven in previous military mission theaters.⁵⁸

The lack of Afghan national pride has caused issues with the legitimacy of the current Afghan government in the eyes of the country’s people. Of the many tribes, the Pashtuns seem to be the only ones who acknowledge the Pashtun-majority government. The United States has failed to exit from Afghanistan for many reasons. The shift in motives (removing insurgents, followed by nation-building) created a delay in guidance for all US military members, which manufactured an arena of trial and error. At the same time, remaining Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Nuristani, Pashai, and Aimaq groups continue to look only to their tribal leaders for guidance. The immediate government of the post-Taliban world was either

unwilling or unable to combat corruption, seriously undermining COIN efforts and attempts to create a secure environment. In the meantime, over twenty-four thousand US soldiers have died, and many more were wounded in a futile effort to help that country rebuild according to US initiatives. Finally, efforts to reconstruct infrastructure and social projects have been less than fruitful due to lack of government over-

sight. Of those completed, only a fraction have been evaluated or inspected, leaving a large portion in an unknown state. Retaliatory attacks and rebuilding have been ongoing for almost two decades. However, a significant lack of oversight in economic and infrastructure development, barriers to unified cultural and language efforts, and perceptions of illegitimate government officials continue today.

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They Gave Their All: The Sullivan Brothers and Tragic Sinking of the USS *Juneau*

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ABSTRACT

The loss of the *Juneau* near Guadalcanal in the British Solomon Islands on Friday the Thirteenth (November 1942) was a seminal event in the United States' World War II experience. The death of the five brothers, in the most ferocious naval battle of the Pacific War, created a windfall of patriotism, which the US government leveraged to boost war bond sales and increase war material production. The siblings' deaths had both immediate and far-reaching consequences on the military's prosecution of the Second World War and the deployment of its troops in the nation's future conflicts. Finally, this tragedy left an imprint on American popular culture, renewed by the discovery of the *Juneau's* wreck on St. Patrick's Day 2018.

Keywords: World War II, Guadalcanal, USS *Juneau*, the Sullivan Brothers, Sole Survivor Policy (1944), Special Separation Policies for Survivorship (5 January 2007), Department of Defense Directive 1315.15, Hubbard Act of 2008

Lo dieron todo: los hermanos Sullivan y el trágico hundimiento del USS *Juneau*

RESUMEN

La pérdida del *Juneau* cerca de Guadalcanal en las Islas Salomón Británicas el viernes 13 (noviembre de 1942) fue un evento fundamental en la experiencia de Estados Unidos en la Segunda Guerra Mundial. La muerte de los cinco hermanos, en la batalla naval más feroz de la Guerra del Pacífico, generó una ganancia inesperada de patriotismo, que el gobierno de Estados Unidos aprovechó para impulsar las ventas de bonos de guerra y aumentar la producción de material de guerra. La muerte de los hermanos tuvo consecuencias inmediatas y de gran alcance en el enjuiciamiento militar de la Segunda Guerra Mundial y el despliegue de sus tropas en los

conflictos futuros de la nación. Finalmente, esta tragedia dejó una huella en la cultura popular estadounidense, renovada por el descubrimiento del naufragio de Juneau en el Día de San Patricio de 2018.

Palabras clave: Segunda Guerra Mundial, Guadalcanal, USS Juneau, los hermanos Sullivan, Política de superviviente único (1944), Políticas especiales de separación para la supervivencia (5 de enero de 2007), Directiva del Departamento de Defensa 1315.15, Ley Hubbard de 2008

他们献出了全部：苏利文五兄弟和朱诺号轻巡洋舰的悲剧沉没

摘要

1942年11月13日（星期五）朱诺号沉没于瓜岛（英国所罗门群岛之一）附近，这是美国二战经历中的一次重大事件。苏利文五兄弟在太平洋战争之最激烈海战中的丧生掀起了激昂的爱国主义，美国政府充分利用这一情绪增加战争债券销售和战争材料生产。五兄弟的死亡对二战美国军事进行以及美国未来冲突中的军队部署产生了立即的效果和深远的影响。最后，这一悲剧事件给美国流行文化打下了烙印，2018年圣帕特里克节期间朱诺号残骸的发现加深了该烙印。

关键词：二战，瓜岛，朱诺号轻巡洋舰，苏利文五兄弟，仅存者政策（1944），幸存者之特别分离政策（2007年1月5日），国防部1315.15指令，2008年哈伯德法案（Hubbard Act of 2008）

The solemn pride that must be yours, to have laid so costly a sacrifice upon the altar of freedom.

—President Abraham Lincoln “Bixby Letter of 1864”

On November 20, 1942, an old four-stack destroyer rescued the last survivor of the torpedoed cruiser USS *Juneau*. Six hundred *Juneau* crewmen, including all but one of the Sullivan brothers, died in the initial explosion. Miraculously, more than one hundred men survived the detonation of *Juneau*'s torpedo magazine, and endured thirst, starvation, exposure,

and an armada of circling sharks while awaiting rescue. After eight desperate days, only ten men lived. None were named Sullivan.

The loss of the *Juneau* near Guadalcanal in the British Solomon Islands on Friday the Thirteenth (November 1942) was a seminal event in America's World War II experience. The death of the five brothers in the most ferocious naval battle of the Pacific War created a windfall of patriotism, which the US government leveraged to boost war bond sales and increase war materiel production. The siblings' deaths had both immediate and far-reaching consequences on the military's prosecution of the Second World War and the deployment of its troops in the nation's future conflicts. Finally, this tragedy left an imprint on American popular culture, renewed by the discovery of the *Juneau's* wreck on St. Patrick's Day 2018.

With the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939, the United States—and the entire world, for that matter—were on the precipice of the most dramatic and all-encompassing conflict in world history. No corner of the globe was untouched, and no family was exempt from harm. Not even the Sullivans of Waterloo, Iowa. “Farm families were close because they have to be,” explains Sullivan biographer John R. Satterfield, “in the Sullivan house, these bonds especially were strong, forging a sense of loyalty that bridged generations.”¹

Father, Thomas F. “Tom” Sullivan (1883–1965), was a union man who worked hard for the Illinois Central

Railroad to provide for a stable home for his family. Starting as a yard laborer, he was steadily promoted into jobs with increasing responsibility, security, and commensurate wages, until his promotion to freight train conductor. Family friends described Tom's wife, Alleta May (Abel) Sullivan (1895–1972), as a pleasant woman with an energetic personality who enjoyed socializing within the rural community. Still others described her as “high-strung and prone to bouts of nervous exhaustion that kept her bedridden for days.”²

On February 4, 1914, Tom married Miss Abel, then nineteen years old, and twelve years his junior. It was Alleta's widowed mother, Mary, however, who anchored the Sullivan family. Mrs. Abel instilled the values of family and loyalty in the children, the first of which, George Thomas, arrived in 1914 (1914–1942). Sullivan children came steadily over the next two decades until there were five more: Francis Henry “Frank” (1916–1942), Genevieve Marie (1917–1975), Joseph Eugene “Red” (1918–1942), Madison Abel “Matt” (1919–1942), and Albert Leo “Al” (1922–1942).

Tom's gainful employment freed his children from the need to work to contribute to the household income, as was the case with many local families. Never studious or driven to any particular profession, the boys were free to follow their frivolous pursuits. These usually involved fishing and hunting, but always outdoors, and they were always together.

“Nearly everybody who knew them agreed they were happy-go-lucky,

average, working-class kids,” observes Satterfield, “they reflected the values of a tough neighborhood in a town that offered scant privileges to its residents.”³ “They did not get into any more trouble than anyone else,” recalls Phyllis Eldridge-Friesner in a 1989 phone interview with Satterfield.⁴ Former Waterloo resident S.G. Heronimus remembers the boys differently, however: “They were all fighters. They took and gave no shit.”⁵ True to their creed, a scrap with any Sullivan brother inevitably led to a contest with all five.

One incident on the Cedar River cemented the brothers’ solidarity. While paddling a dilapidated rowboat downstream, the craft began to take on water. Four of the five boys jumped out and swam to the shore, but Albert, still a toddler, had to be rescued as the water lapped over the gunwales. Only quick-acting adults, who rescued Albert from the sinking craft, averted a tragedy. Afterward, the boys swore, “We stick together.” This motto became the creed that defined the brothers’ relationship.

In 1937, George and Frank enlisted in the military to escape the monotony of the American Midwest. The two accepted the challenge to join the Navy and see the world. The pair served together on an old four-stack destroyer, a customary practice in the peacetime Navy, until honorably discharged in 1940.

After the attack on Pearl Harbor, the boys met to discuss their options. Unanimously they decided to enlist in the Navy, but not solely based on patriotic sentiments or the older brother’s

Navy experience. The Sullivans wished to avenge the deaths of their childhood friends Bill and Masten Ball, also Waterloo residents, both of whom died aboard the battleship USS *Arizona*. George, always the leader, prophetically announced the decision to their anxious parents by saying, “Well, guess our minds are made up, aren’t they fellows? And when we go in, we want to go together. If the worst comes to worst, why we’ll all have gone down together.”⁶

A few days later, the boys marched into the local Navy recruiting office to enlist and made serving together a requirement for their enlistment. The Navy challenged this condition but relented after George wrote a letter of protest to the Navy Department. Al, married with a son named Jim, was eligible for a deferment, but he followed his brothers into the service with his wife’s blessing. Katherine “Kena” (Sullivan) MacFarland (b. 1922), who passed away in 2016 at the age of ninety-three, said, “Albert would have been unhappy if all the other Sullivans had gone to war, but he had stayed at home.”⁷

After basic training at Great Lakes Naval Training Center, the brothers became able seamen in the US Navy. George and Frank were rated Gunners and Coxswain Mates 2nd-Class, respectively, because of their previous service, but new to the Navy, Red, Matt, and Al were all rated Seaman 2nd-Class. The five then traveled to the Brooklyn Naval Yard and joined up with their ship, the USS *Juneau* (CL-52AA) being fitted-out in Kearny, New Jersey, at the Federal Shipyard and Drydock Company.

Juneau was the second of eleven *Atlanta*-class light anti-aircraft cruisers. *Atlantas* were built to perform fleet screening duties that the older and slower *Omaha*-class scout cruisers (1920s) were no longer able to perform. The ships of the class measured 542 feet in overall length, had a 53-foot beam, and drew 21 feet of water with a fully loaded displacement of 8,340 tons.⁸ As designed, the *Juneau* rated a crew of 638 seamen and petty officers and thirty-five officers; however, the ship's compliment swelled to over seven hundred with the addition of more sophisticated electronics and weapons systems.⁹

Juneau's would be a familiar crew. Early in the war, many siblings

served together despite the Navy's war-time prohibition. Brothers who enlisted together served together to satisfy the demand for sailors to crew ships rushed into service. The five Sullivans were joined by the Rodgers siblings of Monroe, Connecticut; however, Joseph, James, Louis, and Patrick heeded the Navy's warnings and separated before sailing.¹⁰ Eight other pairs of brothers boarded *Juneau* with the Sullivans; Louis and Patrick Rodgers, Williams and Harold Weeks, Russell and Charles Combs, Albert and Michael Krall, George and John Wallace, Curtis and Donald Damon, Richard and Russell White, and Harold and Charles Caulk.¹¹



Unlike the Sullivans, the Rodgers (left to right) Joseph (24), Patrick (22), Louis (20), and James (18), split up before the *Juneau* left the United States. Source: Naval History and Heritage Command, Catalog No. NH 52363.

Although the *Atlanta's* mounted two quadruple 21-inch torpedo mounts and two anti-submarine depth charge racks, the ship's primary role was fleet anti-aircraft defense. *Juneau's* main and secondary batteries were ideally suited for this purpose. Her main battery consisted of sixteen 5-inch/38 caliber, high angle, rapid-fire guns, in six twin mounts arranged along the centerline (turrets numbered 1-3 and 6-8) and one more on either side of her aft deckhouse (turrets numbered 4 and 5). The *Juneau's* remaining guns, 1.1-inch and 20 mm anti-aircraft machine guns put up an impressive curtain of flak but were woefully ineffective against capital ships.¹²


Two powerful high-pressure Westinghouse turbines gave the *Juneau* an average top speed of 32.5 knots. Every knot was necessary to keep pace with the fast carrier task forces, the Greyhounds of the Pacific. With a fuel capacity of 1,436 tons, the *Juneau* had a range of 8,500 nautical miles at 15 knots.¹³ Speed and range came at the expense of protective armor, however. Her hull armor was thickest on her sides (3¾-inches), and her deck and gun house armor were 2-inches thick.¹⁴ By comparison, the Imperial Japanese Navy's battleship IJN *Hiei*, *Juneau's* future opponent, sported eight 14-inch guns and two-and-a-half times the armor thickness of the out-gunned little cruiser.¹⁵

Juneau's keel was laid down in May 1940, when escorts for the Atlantic convoy duty were in critical demand. She was launched on the Hackensack River in October 1941, a full

four months ahead of schedule. Rushed into service, she was the first ship in the Navy commissioned in her North Atlantic camouflage war paint.¹⁶

The United States added Hull No. CL-52(AA) to the Navy roster on February 14, 1942. Transfer from the builder to the Federal government occurred when her sponsor, Mrs. Harry I. Lucas, the wife of Juneau, Alaska's mayor, broke a bottle of champagne on the ship's prow.¹⁷ She was the first ship named for a city in the Territory of Alaska, the remote and mostly uninhabited land that would not become a state for another seventeen years. In the same ceremony, forty-nine-year-old Captain Lyman K. Swenson, of Pleasant Grove, Utah (Naval Academy Class of 1916) became *Juneau's* first and only commanding officer.

The Navy, having overcome its hesitancy to their joint service, embraced the brothers as a valuable propaganda tool. After the commissioning concluded, the Sullivans gathered on the *Juneau's* fantail to visit with family and pose for photographs. As newsreel cameras whirred, press cameramen took one of the most iconic photographs of the Second World War. The picture captured the five Sullivans, dressed in pea coats, buttoned to the neck, wearing brimless flat caps circled with embroidered "US Navy" ribbons, gathered around a ship's open hatch. The next day their bashful, self-consciousness grins dominated the front page of the *Waterloo Daily Courier*, the last time their friends and family in Iowa would see them.



The USS *Juneau* in New York Harbor, February 11, 1942. Naval History and Heritage Command, Catalog No. 19-N-31267.



Knute Swensen holding a photograph of his grandfather Captain Lyman Knute Swenson. Surnames are spelled differently because the Navy made an error when Lyman entered the Naval Academy and then refused to correct the misspelling. Source: Author's Personal Collection.



The Sullivans of Waterloo Iowa (left to right) Joseph (24), Francis (26) Albert (20), Madison (23), and George (28). Source: Naval History and Heritage Command, Catalog No. NH 52362.

After a brief shakedown period along the Atlantic seaboard, *Juneau* participated in the blockade of Vichy French naval units in Martinique and Guadalupe.¹⁸ *Juneau* then made a port call to Annapolis, Maryland in April, and Captain Swenson visited his son Robert, a midshipman at the Naval Academy for the last time. While the Navy publicly delighted in the Sullivans, the elder Swenson, while proud of the brothers' service aboard his ship, was not happy about it. Robert wrote later, "He [Captain Swenson] felt the risk of a family tragedy outweighed the advantages for public relations."¹⁹

From mid-May to mid-July 1942, *Juneau* escorted convoys from Brazil

to Key West, Florida, before receiving orders to transit the Panama Canal to the Pacific. On September 11, *Juneau* joined Task Force 61, escorting carriers USS *Wasp* and USS *Hornet* already in the theater.

Submarine IJN *I-19* torpedoed *Wasp* on September 15, 250 miles northwest of Espiritu Santo in the New Hebrides, the submarine-infested waters christened "Torpedo Junction."²⁰ George Sullivan, whose battle station was the depth charge racks on *Juneau's* fantail, had a front-row seat for the action as his ship searched for the offending submarine. The escort dropped depth charges to no effect. *Juneau* continued to screen TF 61 until the Bat-

tle of the Santa Cruz Islands (October 26) when *Hornet* succumbed to Japanese air attack. After the battle, *Juneau* transported seventeen officers and 193 enlisted men from the *Hornet* to New Caledonia.

For nine days, *Juneau* rode at anchor in Dumbea Bay in the Free French town of Nouméa. *Juneau's* crew had performed well during the Santa Cruz battle, with eight confirmed kills —four dive-bombers and four torpedo planes.²¹ Despite the satisfaction of earning their first battle star, a curious incident left Captain Swenson and crew crestfallen over the *Hornet's* loss. *Juneau* had misunderstood a signal from the carrier, causing *Juneau* to transfer to *Enterprise's* screen, leaving the “Happy Hornet” with diminished anti-aircraft protection at the time the carrier needed it the most.

Now bloodied veterans, the Sullivans and their shipmates set about the grim task of transferring the *Hornet's* wounded to hospitals and replenishing the ship's magazines with ammunition and its larder with dry and perishable goods. Decades later, none of the *Juneau* survivors remembered how the brothers felt about the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands. Still, they did remember, and not surprisingly, “They spent a lot of time together in the enlisted mess, just sitting and talking when they got time off.”²² Each officer, petty officer, and sailor had privately answered the question of how they would acquit themselves in battle. The stoic determination of men who had glimpsed their mortality replaced the cocky invincibility of boys spoiling for a fight.

When *Juneau* finally departed Nouméa, the Allies' first offensive campaign of the Pacific War was just four months old. The fighting on land, at sea, and in the air, which began with the First Marine Division's assault on Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands, would be the bloodiest fighting anywhere. The Marines were holding on, but just barely. The Leathernecks needed help to hold “Cactus,” the island's codename, and the crushed coral airstrip whose polyglot of Army, Navy, and Marine planes kept the Japanese from reinforcing their garrison, at least during daylight.

At sunset, the Allies ceded control of the sea to Dai Nippon, whose guns, large and small, cratered the airfield and grounding the Cactus Air Force. If the planes were grounded, the “Tokyo Express” could land Imperial Japanese Army soldiers, artillery, and even tanks in daylight and in plain sight of the Marines who could do nothing about it.

Twice since the Marine landing on August 7, the Navy had confronted the nocturnal intruders. In the first instance, the joint American-Australian task force screening the invasion transports were totally surprised and thoroughly defeated by a numerically inferior force at the Battle of Savo Island: the worst defeat in the US Navy's history. The second occasion, two months later off Cape Esperance, a marginal tactical victory for the Blue Jackets failed to prevent Japanese battleships from bombarding Henderson Field the following night. At dawn, Allied sea and air power reasserted local control.

November 8 found the *Juneau* attached to Rear Admiral Norman Scott's task force escorting three troop transports. On the 11th, Scott rendezvoused with Rear Admiral Daniel J. Callaghan's task force escorting four more troop transports bound for Guadalcanal. Together, the two groups were combat loaded with six thousand troops from the Army's 182nd Infantry Regiment, the 4th Marine Replacement Battalion, and 1st Marine Air Wing personnel.

The decision to commit all available resources, land, sea, and air, to support the First Marine Division was a promise Admiral William F. Halsey Jr., newly appointed Commander of the South Pacific Fleet, made to his subordinate officers in mid-October. Reinforcement put an exclamation mark on the Allies' willingness to begin the long road to Tokyo from where Major General Archer A. Vandergrift (USMC) was standing in his headquarters south of the airfield.

Like the Allies, Imperial Japanese Headquarters concluded that the Solomon Islands, and not Papua, had become the defining action of the Pacific War. Decoded Japanese radio messages revealed plans to reinforce the island garrison with seven thousand fresh troops, initially intended for New Guinea, were already underway. Halsey knew a valuable Tokyo Express, such as this, would be heavily defended by big-gunned escorts. The dual tasks of escorting the troopships and interdicting the Japanese force fell on Callaghan and Scott. The carrier USS *Enterprise* and the battleships USS *Washington* and

USS *South Dakota* were in the theater but too far away to help.

Scott was junior to Callaghan by just a few days. Although he led the victorious American fleet at the Battle of Cape Esperance, Callaghan, in his flagship USS *San Francisco*, assumed overall tactical command. "Uncle Dan," formerly President Roosevelt's Naval Attaché, and most recently chief-of-staff to Halsey's predecessor, was commanding a wartime task force for the first time. Despite the relative experience of the commanders, Callaghan did not seek, nor did Scott offer, advice on formation or tactics.

Neither task force had operated together before that day, necessitating a comprehensive battle plan, or at the very least a meeting of the captains. Neither of those events occurred, nor does history record the two admirals meeting while in the theater.

Before dawn on the 12th, the combined task forces navigated between San Cristobal and Guadalcanal, through Indispensable Strait and Lengo Channel, the southern entrance to "Ironbottom Sound." Arriving at their destination off Lunga Point, the transports dropped anchor and began disembarking troops. The escorts assumed anti-aircraft dispositions and waited for the inevitable air attack, which materialized that afternoon. Warned by Coastwatchers, the transports stopped unloading, weighed anchor, and maneuvered with all their available speed.

The Japanese arrived, as predicted at 1400 hours. Anti-aircraft cruisers *Juneau* and her sister *Atlanta* (Scott's

flagship) were placed at the outer edge of the screen and were the first to engage. In his unpublished memoir "Seven Days in Hell," Seaman 1st Class Wyatt Butterfield recalls, "It was like ten Fourth of July's all rolled into one."²³

While Wildcat fighters scrambled from Henderson to engage thirty Japanese Zero fighter planes, sixteen twin-engine "Betty" bombers split into two groups and began their torpedo runs. South Pacific captains, however, had become adept at dodging Japanese torpedoes. *Juneau* was strafed by Zeros and lifted out of the water by a near miss, but Dr. Roger O'Neil, *Juneau's* surgeon, remembers there were no casualties.²⁴

Unfortunately, the Navy did not go unscathed by the air raid. *San Francisco*, the largest ship in Savo Sound, was intentionally targeted by a burning Betty. The collision and fire in the after-deckhouse killed two dozen and wounded fifty, including the ship's executive officer. A low-trajectory, 5-inch shell from an American ship hit destroyer USS *Buchanan* and wrecked its torpedo tubes killing five while wounding seven.²⁵

The air raid was over in eight minutes, and the transports were moving back into position to continue unloading by 1430. At dusk, their task completed, the transports hauled out of the Sound, escorted by damaged *Buchanan* and four more ships, for Espiritu Santo, where they arrived without incident on the 15th.

Naval Intelligence reported a heavy surface force north of Guadalca-

nal on the 12th. Callaghan had received an abundance of aircraft intelligence about the Japanese disposition throughout the day, and the morning's aerial observation sighted two battleships or heavy cruisers and six destroyers.²⁶ No doubt, this was the bombardment group intending to lay waste to Cactus and ensure follow-on transport units could unload troops and supplies at their leisure, returning home unmolested. At their current course and speed, the Japanese would arrive off Lunga Point at thirty minutes after midnight.

Vice Admiral Hiroaki Abe was perturbed that his bombardment was behind schedule. He had canceled the mission once that night after the Imperial Army Headquarters on Guadalcanal failed to give timely reports of the weather over the airfield. When Headquarters finally reported clear weather in the Sound, his fleet, centered on 14-inch gunned battleships *Hiei* (Abe's flagship) and *Kirishima*, became separated while reversing course in a local rainsquall. Valuable time was lost trying to organize his escorts: cruiser *Nagara* and eleven destroyers. Despite Abe's best efforts, the Raiding Group looked like a flock of migrating geese. At least the area was empty of enemy shipping, or so he thought.

Rear Admiral Callaghan, a profoundly religious man, was resigned to his fate. He and his subordinates understood the approaching Japanese armada was superior in number and firepower. He had no choice. Running from this fight meant the Japanese would be free to level Henderson Field, and the Japanese garrison would receive fresh

reinforcements. When the battle commenced, Callaghan made no effort to maneuver for advantage but struck the enemy head-on. The clash was sudden and incredibly violent, one that Commander-in-Chief of the US Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King called, "One of the most furious sea battles ever fought."²⁷

The thirteen American ships assumed disposition B-1, a long snake-like column resembling the line-of-battle from the age of sail. Cruisers *Atlanta*, *San Francisco*, *Portland*, *Helena*, and *Juneau* followed the lead division of four destroyers, with another four destroyers in the rear. Several of Callaghan's ships had the newest radar, which spotted the Japanese at a range of 32,000 yards (18.1 mi), but *San Francisco* was not one of them. Blind for want of an adequate radar picture, Callaghan made frequent and urgent requests for the enemy's course and distance from his seeing-eye dog *Helena*, until the radio circuits became hopelessly overloaded. The Americans lost their radar advantage as Callaghan dithered for ten minutes while the two fleets closed at 40 knots or 46 mi/hr.

Like *Helena*, *Juneau* possessed the newest "Sugar George" centimeter-wave surface-search radar. Merely possessing the technology, however, did not guarantee accurate interpretation of the images on the repeater scope. Further examination of *Juneau's* first contact proved it to be the volcanic cone of Savo Island, imposing but quite harmless. Dr. O'Neil remembered, "We first thought [the contact] was the enemy, but later found it to be land."²⁸

As the last ship in the cruiser column, her radar became masked, and *Juneau* made few other contacts. Captain Swenson was therefore surprised when at 0130 hours the message was passed by blinker to "Stand-by for enemy contact momentarily."²⁹

Those ships with the less capable SC meter-wave radar, or no radar at all, were virtually blind. Partially overcast, the weather was punctuated by sheet lighting from friction storms over Guadalcanal, which reduced visibility to almost nothing. *Juneau* survivor, Seaman 1st Class Joseph Hartney, recalls the darkness as "a blackness so thick, so heavy, so velvety, you felt you could take the night in your hands and wring it like a rag."³⁰

At 0141, the destroyer *Cushing*, first in the column, nearly collided with an enemy destroyer. Turning quickly to avoid *Yudachi*, *Cushing* caused a four-ship pile-up in the vanguard. Commander Thomas M. Stokes, leading Destroyer Division Ten in *Cushing*, asked Callaghan for permission to fire torpedoes, but the admiral hesitated. At 0145, Callaghan gave the order to "Stand By to Open Fire!"³¹

The Japanese were startled but not asleep. Cruiser *Atlanta*, next in line behind *Cushing*, longer and heavier than the smaller ships swung wide. Its high superstructure presented Japanese gunners with a juicy target. At 0150, Japanese searchlights snapped on and illuminated the lead cruiser. This kind of light, the kind sailors fear, startled Callaghan to action. He ordered, "Commence Firing! Counter Illumi-




Diagram of night cruiser action on November 12-13 1942.
Source: Author's Personal Collection.

nate!”³² The misnamed “Lucky A” was soon a smoking hulk, being smothered with Japanese shells fired from a scant 1600 yards.³³

The *San Francisco* was next into the melee, coming face to face with the 14-inch guns of Abe’s flagship. With Japanese ships all around him, Uncle Dan issued a series of orders, which sounded quite heroic, but only added to the confusion. “Odd ships commence firing to starboard, even ships to port!”³⁴ “Give her hell!”³⁵ “We want the big ones! Get the big ones first!”³⁶ Chaos reigned. This situation became so chaotic that one participant summed the action perfectly: “A barroom brawl with the lights turned out.”³⁷

Atlanta, now dead in the water, began drifting backward into the *San Francisco*’s line of fire, just as *Hiei* came into *San Francisco*’s gun sights. The heavy-cruiser fired every 8-inch gun whose muzzle would bear, and her secondary 5-inch battery targeted the *Hiei*’s pagoda superstructure. Callaghan realized *Atlanta*’s peril a salvo too late. A horrified Callaghan watched as *San Francisco*’s fire destroyed *Atlanta*’s bridge. He immediately ordered, “Cease firing, own ships,” but it was too late. Scott and all his staff were all dead.³⁸

Callaghan’s directives ceased suddenly when a salvo from *Hiei* wrecked *San Francisco*’s superstructure, mortally wounding her captain and killing Cal-

laghan and his staff. Had Japanese shell hoists been loaded with armor-piercing shells, and not thin-skinned bombardment rounds, *San Francisco's* damage would have been fatal. Furthermore, the two ships were so close, often just a few hundred yards, that the battleship could not depress its guns sufficiently to hit *San Francisco* below the waterline.

Cruiser *Portland*, seventh in the column, came to *San Francisco's* aid but only momentarily. "Sweet Pea" loosed several 8-inch salvos at *Hiei*, but a Japanese torpedo struck her fantail. A massive hunk of steel from her stern acted as an auxiliary rudder and jammed her steering hard over. As *Portland* made endless circles, her main battery got off a few rounds aimed at Abe's flagship before checking fire to avoid hitting friendly ships.

Helena also came to San Francisco's aid by sinking destroyer *Akatsuki* in place and pouring small-caliber rounds into cruiser *Nagara*. Always considered a good (lucky) ship, *Helena* received minimal damage, but a Japanese shell struck her bridge, freezing the wall-mounted clock at 0148.³⁹

Last in the cruiser column, *Juneau* plowed ahead as hell swarmed all around her. Her sixteen 5-inch guns spewed a continuous stream of fire, first at destroyer *Yudachi* or *Harusame* and then *Hiei* and *Kirishima*. Seaman Allen Heyn and George Sullivan, standing just a few feet apart at their battle stations on the fantail, watched the growing danger. Heyn, who handled the 1.1-inch machine gun, could do something about it, while George's depth charges

were useless in a fight against surface ships. Heyn remembered seeing a Japanese battleship materialize out of the dark and firing right at him, "so close you'd think you could almost throw something at it."⁴⁰

Moments later, as she turned to avoid *San Francisco*, a Japanese "Long Lance" torpedo struck *Juneau's* forward fire room on her port side, causing an enormous explosion. The blast disabled central fire control, which powered her gun turrets, and crippled the ship's steering controls. Captain Swenson had little choice now but to get clear of the action and labor to keep his ship afloat.

The four rearmost destroyers were last to join the slugfest, but their opening ranges were greater than the side-scraping distances at which the vanguard destroyers fought. Station keeping and target selection were nearly impossible among the shattered debris that was the American column. Individual ships maneuvered as best they could, avoiding the sinking *Cushing* and *Laffey*, the dead-in-the-water *Atlanta*, and the un-steerable *Portland*. They fired on targets of opportunity and checked fire when the range became fouled. Eventually, however, luck ran out for all but one destroyer. Only tail end Charlie, the *Fletcher*, reported to the rendezvous at daybreak.

No American knew, but by four bells of the midwatch, Abe decided to withdraw. There would not be enough time to gather his dispersed ships and complete the mission before daylight, and so at 0200, the Japanese commander ordered a general retreat. Hen-

derson Field and her precious planes would live to fight another day and fight they would. In the morning, Cactus dive-bombers caught up with damaged *Hiei* and her consort *Yukikaze* and bombed the battleship mercilessly until it capsized and sank north by northeast of Savo Island.

So ended the most ferocious night surface action of the Pacific War, one that historian Samuel Eliot Morison described as “the most desperate sea fight since Jutland” and “a struggle that recalled the Anglo-Dutch naval battles of the seventeenth century.”⁴¹ In

the end, however, mistakes were canceled out by courage as the Japanese bombardment of Guadalcanal had been thwarted.

As dawn broke, the US vessels that were able departed Iron Bottom Sound via Indispensable Strait. The formation included three lame ducks. *San Francisco’s* topsides were demolished by her duel with *Hiei*. *Juneau*, with a broken keel, settled four feet lower in the water with a slight list to port. More concerning, she developed a crack along the short axis aft of turret no. 5.⁴²



Starboard side 5-inch gun mount (turret no. 5). The transverse crack in the *Juneau’s* deck developed behind this turret. Photo reprinted with the permission of Vulcan, Inc.

Fearing she might tear apart at any minute, Captain Swenson ordered lashings loosened on all the life rafts. Finally, destroyer *O’Bannon*, whose sound gear had been damaged by an underwater explosion, was sent ahead to trans-

mit a message to Admiral Halsey. Captain Gilbert Hoover in *Helena*, as the senior surviving officer and Swenson’s Naval Academy classmate, ordered his formation of six ships to zigzag on a southeasterly base course for Nouméa.

As *Juneau* and her consorts passed San Cristobal, the southernmost island of the Solomon chain, the Japanese submarine *I-26*, skippered by Commander Minoru Yokota, lurked nearby.⁴³ Cruising at periscope depth, *I-26* fired a spread of torpedoes at *San Francisco*, the largest ship in the formation, but missed. With no means of warning the others, its radios wrecked and signal flags shredded, *San Francisco's* crew watched helplessly as a single torpedo shot past her stern and straight towards *Juneau*.

At 1101, the torpedo detonated on *Juneau's* port side under the bridge, igniting the cruiser's torpedo magazine. The *Juneau* seemed to disintegrate wholly and instantaneously. The only trace was a pillar of smoke seen forty miles away. "The *Juneau* didn't sink ... she blew up with all the fury of an erupting volcano," recalled Lieutenant Commander Bruce McCandless, who witnessed the detonation from *San Francisco*.

Similarly, *Fletcher's* executive officer Lieutenant Commander Joseph Wilely watched in awe as a 40-ton, 5-inch gun mount flew a mile through the air and crashed into the destroyer's wake just 100 yards astern of his ship.⁴⁴

When the smoke cleared, the *Juneau* had disappeared. Captain Hoover did not believe anyone could have survived such an explosion. Fearing the submarine inside his destroyer screen, he chose to exit the area at top speed. Hoover did not even order a life ring thrown overboard, so firm was his conviction. Nor did he break radio silence,

later testifying that he did not want to give his position to the enemy. In retrospect, Hoover's was a specious argument considering that *I-26* must have already reported the cripple's location.

A B-17, piloted by Lieutenant Robert Gill (USAAF), was attracted to the location by the pillar of smoke, and Hoover signaled the patrolling aircraft to report the *Juneau's* sinking and position. Gill's crew saw the vast oil slick and approximately 180 men in the water. Later, the *Juneau* survivors estimated that, at the time, there were between 125 and 140 men in rafts and clinging to floating nets and debris.⁴⁵

Hours passed before Gill, who also elected not to break radio silence, landed at Espíritu Santo and reported the *Juneau's* location and the number of survivors to an Army Intelligence officer.⁴⁶ Another three days would pass before anyone read Gill's report, as it became buried deeper and deeper in the officer's inbox. In the meantime, Gill dutifully overflew the survivors daily and reported their dwindling number and position to the same officer.⁴⁷

For the men in the water, hours turned into days, and the surviving *Juneau's* crewmen began to die. Mercifully, the severely wounded men perished quickly. For a short time, the survivors had fresh water and meager rations stored in the rafts that survived. However, when the water was gone, sailors drank seawater and became delirious.

By day, the drifters were scorched by the tropical sun, despite a coating of fuel oil, which gave them some protection. At night, men urinated on them-

selves in a futile effort to stay warm. After the first few died and drifted out to sea, an ever-increasing armada of sharks shadowed the rafts. As delirious sailors left their rafts (for whatever reason), they were set upon and devoured. With airplanes periodically flying overhead, this deadly pattern repeated for eight days.

George Sullivan survived the explosion, but no other brothers lived. Several survivors remember an anguished George swimming from raft to raft calling out in vain to his brothers and wiping the faces of the dead and unconscious to be sure.

The dead included Joseph and James, two of the four Rodgers brothers who elected to split before departing the United States. The Sullivans had also considered splitting up, but now it was too late. George lived until the third or fourth day, when he too succumbed to delirium caused by drinking seawater and dove into the sea. Allen Hyen, a fellow raft mate remembers George saying he was going to swim to the island and get some buttermilk before he disappeared.⁴⁸

The Navy organized a determined rescue effort once they awoke to the fact that some of *Juneau's* crew were alive and adrift in the Solomon Sea. Roger O'Neil, *Juneau's* surgeon, and three of his Pharmacist Mates were already accounted for, having been transferred to *San Francisco* the morning of the sinking to assist with her casualties.⁴⁹ Lieutenant j.g. Charles Wang, the only officer to survive being adrift, and his two raft mates, Signalman 2nd Class

Joseph "Jimmy" Hartney and Seaman 1st Class Victor Fitzgerald, were blown by the wind to a nearby island where they were taken by friendly natives to a Dutch planter.⁵⁰ Seaman 1st Class Wyatt Butterfield, Seaman 1st Class Arthur Friend, Machinist Mate 2nd Class Henry Gardner, Seaman 2nd Class Frank Holmgren, Chief Gunner's Mate George Mantere, and Signalman 1st Class Lester Zook were rescued by two PBV Catalina flying boats, the second nearly crash landing in rough seas.⁵¹ Finally, Allen Heyn, the sole survivor of one raft, was plucked from the water by the seaplane tender USS *Ballard*.⁵² The total number of survivors was ten.

The Navy made Captain Hoover the scapegoat for failing to rescue the survivors. As his punishment, Admiral Halsey relieved him, effectively ending the career of the three-time Navy Cross recipient. But there was plenty of blame to go around. Both Hoover and Gill were handcuffed by woodenheaded Navy regulations that prevented breaking radio silence even to broadcast distress calls. The Army Intelligence Officer who failed to sound the alarm is at least as culpable, if not more so. This fact became apparent to Halsey after Gill demonstrated that on three separate occasions, he tried to escalate his reports to higher headquarters within the 5th Army Air Force, to no effect.

Not since President Abraham Lincoln consoled Mrs. Lydia Bixby on the death of her five sons had an American family been so tragically affected by war. The Navy did not dare report the loss of the *Juneau* to the public. Nor did it notify the next of kin until after vic-

tory in the Solomons was guaranteed. But neither could they ignore the patriotic harvest that would be reaped from the loss of all the male children of one family during the most ferocious naval battle of the war.

Once announced, the family's tragedy was an even bigger boost to the war effort than their recruitment and insistence on serving together. Both circumstances the Navy put to good use in its recruiting campaigns. The reaction of the family to the inevitable deluge of reports and government officials, however, would be critical to steering the public perception of the tragedy. Had the Sullivan family reacted negatively, public support for the war effort could have diminished.

The Navy informed the Sullivans that their boys were missing in action on January 11, 1943. A telegram from Vice President Henry A. Wallace encouraged the parents to remain hopeful in light of "the most extraordinary tragedy which has ever been met by any family in the United States."⁵³ Still, his news did not come as a complete surprise to Tom and Alleta. The couple had been warned by a neighbor whose son, also in the Navy, had written her to say, "Wasn't it too bad about the Sullivan boys?"⁵⁴ A handwritten note from an anonymous *Juneau* survivor, who felt he owed the family the truth about their sons, crushed any hope that their boys would be found alive.

These revelations, however, failed to destroy the shield of hope the family outwardly projected. Mother, father, and sister "enveloped themselves in a

vortex of public attention after January 11, avoiding, for the time being, those doubts and the misery the doubts evoked,"⁵⁵ observes Satterfield. Alleta, with Tom watching pensively in the background, gave a multitude of radio and newsreel interviews in which she repeated over and over again the phrases that whitewashed the family's façade, "Keep your chin up."⁵⁶ "Our boys did not die in vain."⁵⁷ "They went together like they wanted."⁵⁸ "It's a big loss to lose them, but I know they did a big service to their country."⁵⁹ Her most famous platitude adorned recruiting posters for the remainder of the war; "They did their part."⁶⁰

In February, the Navy's Industrial Incentive Division arranged for Tom, Alleta, and Genevieve to come to Washington DC to "tour of war plants in the hope their fortitude in their time of sorrow might inspire workers to maximum production efforts."⁶¹ While at the capitol, Alleta met with Eleanor Roosevelt and newspaper reporters to encourage all America to "work harder to turn out more ships and win the war," but more poignantly "mothers should pray for their boys and, above all, be brave and keep their chins up."⁶²

So began the Sullivan's morale tour, which would conclude in San Francisco four months later. The trio visited sixty-five cities, attended 235 rallies, and spoke to millions of war industry workers.⁶³ At each gathering, they repeated their mantra of hope and increased industrial output. Within a few weeks, the government, with the media's help, "had transformed the Sul-

livals' tragedy into an inspiring national call to arms."⁶⁴ As a result, the Industrial Incentives Division received dozens of letters from factory managers attesting to the increased worker productivity after the family's visit. Consequently, the Navy "credited [the Sullivans] with increasing the output of war materials during the tour."⁶⁵

While in Connecticut, Chicago, and San Diego, the Sullivans met with *Juneau* survivors. They also met with the Rodgers family to offer their condolences and repeat their message of hope that the boys were just missing in action. In Los Angeles, the Sullivans were guests of Paramount Motion Pictures who were casting a film tribute to their sons. While in Chicago, Genevieve announced that she would follow in her brothers' footsteps and enlist in the Navy as a WAVE, a Woman Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service, taking the oath at tour's end.

The Navy further honored George, Francis, Joseph, Madison, and Albert by renaming a *Fletcher*-class destroyer hull just then coming off the builder's ways. The USS *The Sullivans* (DD-537) was the first instance where the Navy gave a ship a plural name.⁶⁶ Alleta Sullivan christened the vessel in a ceremony on San Francisco Bay on April 4.

The Sullivans would survive the war after participating in the bombardment of Truk, the Saipan and Iwo Jima campaigns, and dangerous *Kamikaze* picket duty off Okinawa in 1945. During the latter battle, she rescued 118 sailors from the torpedoed cruiser *Houston*

and 166 from the carrier *Bunker Hill* after it was struck by a suicide plane,⁶⁷ earning a total of nine battle stars.

DD-537 *The Sullivans* also served in both the Korean Conflict and the Cold War under its green and white shamrock flag. The ship whose motto, like that of the brothers', was "We stick together," earned three more battle stars and never lost a single man. Decommissioned in 1965, after twenty-two years of active duty, it still serves the American people as a Sullivan Memorial and World War II museum ship in Buffalo, New York.

The Navy once again honored the memory of the brothers in 1995. On August 12, Kelly Sullivan Loughren, granddaughter of Albert, christened the second USS *The Sullivans* (DDG-68) then under construction by the Bath Iron Works in Bath, Maine. This ship is an Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer that will serve the US Navy well into the twenty-first century.

At the conclusion of the April 4, 1943 commissioning ceremony, which everyone knew would be the climax of the tour, Alleta caved in emotionally. Unable to put off her grief any longer, sobbing and on the verge of collapse, doctors accompanying the family forbade her from attending any further christening functions. The family returned to Waterloo to care for their grandson and daughter-in-law, hospitalized with pneumonia.

In early August, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, sent a personal letter to the Sullivans. Given the eight-month lapse since the sinking of the *Juneau*

and the circumstances surrounding the disaster, the Secretary reluctantly concluded that the boys were not missing in action but “were in fact killed by enemy action.”⁶⁸ The Navy’s official statement found that, “The loss of the five Sullivan brothers ranks as the greatest single blow suffered by any one family since Pearl Harbor and, probably, in American Naval history.”⁶⁹ The Navy then declared that the four-month tour of Mr. and Mrs. Thomas F. Sullivan had ended. Biographer Satterfield concludes that “Americans had fought too many other battles and lost too many other sons to preserve the Sullivan brothers’ special significance.”⁷⁰ The nation had moved on from the loss of the *Juneau* and her crew.

Ironically, the crew of the *Helena*, the ship whose commander had left the *Juneau* survivors in her wake, would benefit from the new sensitivity to the plight of survivors that arose after the loss of the *Juneau*. During the Battle of Kula Gulf (July 7, 1943), the *Helena*, now under the command of Captain Charles Cecil, was struck by three Japanese torpedoes causing the cruiser to jackknife amidships and sink in less than twenty minutes. Immediately, two destroyers picked up 735 *Helena* survivors despite the presence of Japanese warships.⁷¹ A flotilla of whaleboats and life rafts, commanded by Captain Cecil, made landfall on New Georgia, and destroyers *Radford* and *Nicholas* rescued more. Of *Helena*’s 1267 crew, fewer than three hundred died during the sinking and the remainder rescued.⁷²

The tragic death of the siblings had immediate and far-reaching conse-

quences on how the military deployed its personnel. Immediately, the US military began to strictly enforce its policy forbidding siblings to serve together on the same ship, same unit, or even in the same theater of war. This strict enforcement spared the Niland family of Tonawanda, New York a loss like that experienced by Tom and Alleta.⁷³

With an end to the War in the Pacific in sight, Congress debated several bills related to family members serving together in military units. However, no “Sullivan Law” ever passed. Instead, Congress approved the Sole Survivor Policy (1944), which permitted the “discharge of the last surviving child of parents whose other children died in the war.”⁷⁴ In light of this new legislation, Navy officials encouraged Genevieve to accept an honorable discharge and return home after serving twenty-one months.

Over the decades, the Sole Survivor Policy evolved into the Department of Defense Directive 1315.15, the Special Separation Policies for Survivorship (January 5, 2007), and this revised policy protects American military families today. The Hubbard Act of 2008 expanded the definition of a sole survivor to include the missing-in-action or 100% service-related disabled status of the sole survivor’s siblings.⁷⁵ Its protections have been activated twice in the last decade with the most profound appreciation of the Hubbard (Jason Hubbard, Iraq, 2007) and Wise (Beau Wise, Afghanistan, 2011) families.⁷⁶

Finally, this patriotic, and at the same time tragic, story of the Sullivans has had a profound effect on US popular

culture. The movie entitled *The Fighting Sullivans* premiered in New York with both Tom and Alleta in attendance. The film, which concentrated on the boy's childhood, required two sets of actors to play the brothers. Columnist Walter Winchell, who accompanied the parents to the first showing, heaped high praise on the film calling it "Twentieth's great tribute to the Sullivans ... but not a tear-jerker ... done in grand taste."⁷⁷

The movie won critical acclaim and garnered Anne Baxter a Best Actress Academy Award nomination for her role as Katherine Sullivan. The movie opened in Waterloo on March 9, 1944 where five hundred people paid \$1.10 each to see the film, with all proceeds going to the Sullivan Memorial Fund.⁷⁸ Kena, who saw the opening in the boy's hometown, thought, "the picture was a wonderful tribute to the boys and what they fought for."⁷⁹ While *The Sullivans* earned respectable box-office receipts, the profits were nowhere near what would be needed to provide for Jimmy's education.

Jimmy Sullivan followed in his father's footsteps and joined the Navy in 1958. He steadfastly refused to serve aboard the ship that bore his family name because "he did not want the publicity or possible favoritism."⁸⁰ After active duty service, he joined the Naval Reserves and served as a SeaBee for more than thirty years.

Fans of Steven Spielberg's *Saving Private Ryan* (1998) will recognize the Sullivans' story as an integral part of the film's plot. However, *Saving Private Ryan* is a composite of several sole

survivor stories, but most closely resembles the predicament of Sergeant Frederick "Fritz" Niland. In the case of the four Niland brothers, the US Army believed that all but one of the brothers had died in combat: Edward, a Technical Sergeant in the USAAF, was killed in Burma; Preston, a 2nd Lieutenant in the 22nd Infantry Regiment, 4th Infantry Division, died on D+1 near Utah Beach; and Robert, a Technical Sergeant from the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division, killed on D-Day near Neuville-au-Plain.⁸¹ Several days after D-Day, Fritz, a Sergeant in the 501st Parachute Infantry, 101st Airborne Division, traveled to the 82nd Division area to locate his brother. There he learned that Robert died manning a machine gun so that two other men could escape.

News of the deaths of Preston and Robert and the presumed death of Edward reached Mrs. Niland in Tonawanda, NY, on the same day. When the War Department realized that Fritz was the sole surviving Niland son, the Army brought the young man home. Unlike the fictitious Private Ryan, however, no patrol was dispatched to retrieve Sgt. Niland. Father Francis Sampson, the 501st Regimental chaplain, informed Fritz of the death of his brothers and was charged with making sure he got home safely.⁸² He transferred to England before being shipped to New York, Sgt. Niland served as an MP for the remainder of the war.

To the family's relief, Edward survived the war, held in a Japanese prison camp in Burma, and released

in late 1945.⁸³ Fritz, awarded a Bronze Star for his World War II service, died in 1983, at the age of sixty-three, fifteen years before the premiere of *Saving Private Ryan*.⁸⁴

Almost eighty years have passed since the tragic loss of the USS *Juneau* and her crew. In the intervening decades, no one has attempted to photograph the wreck. Unlike countless ships that have disappeared without a trace, the *Juneau* location was well documented: 10-33S, 161-03E.⁸⁵ No fewer than four individuals witnessed the explosion and noted the cruiser's precise coordinates: *San Francisco's* Lieutenant Commander Bruce McCandless, *Helena's* skipper Captain Gilbert Hoover, the B-17 pilot, Lieutenant Robert Gill, and of course Commander Minoru Yokota of *I-26*.

The explanation lies in the depth of the ocean in this part of the world. Unlike the shallow lagoons of Truk Atoll in the Caroline Islands and Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands, the depth of the Solomon Sea did not give up her secrets so easily. There was also the question of how much of the *Juneau* remained to be discovered. Recall that Robert Gill likened the torpedo magazine detonation to that of the atomic bomb blast. How could there be anything left to find?

Enter the Research Vessel *Petrel*, owned and operated by Vulcan Inc., a philanthropic venture of Microsoft co-founder Paul Allen. *Petrel* began operating in the Western Pacific in 2015 and subsequently located and photographed some of the iconic shipwrecks

of the Second World War. With stunning regularity, Allen-led expeditions explored USS *Astoria* (February 2015), Japanese battleship IJN *Musashi* (March 2015), the USS *Indianapolis* (August 2017), and the aircraft carrier USS *Lexington* (March 2018) lost at the Battle of Coral Sea. His team, under the direction of Robert Kraft, Director of Sub-sea Operations, was also responsible for retrieving the ship's bell from the HMS *Hood* for presentation to the British Navy in honor of its heroic service.

In the spring of 2018, *Petrel* arrived in the southern Solomon Sea, an area called "Torpedo Junction" by US sailors. Armed with the latest is side-scan sonar, remotely operated vehicles (ROVs), and autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs), Allen completed a winning season and located the *Juneau*.

The *Petrel's* AUV first identified the ship with its side-scan sonar on March 17, 2018. Upon analysis of the sonar data, the *Petrel* crew deployed its ROV the next day and verified the wreck's identity with its high-definition video cameras. "We certainly didn't plan to find the *Juneau* on St. Patrick's Day. The variables of these searches are just too great," said Kraft.⁸⁶

Juneau lies on her side at a depth of 4200m/13,780ft, a little more than 2.5 miles down.⁸⁷ The video and still photos released by Vulcan, Inc. are of the aft one-third of the ship. Images show *Juneau's* stern is surprisingly well preserved, but with the expected accumulation of marine organisms. The fact that the stern is still very much intact jives with survivor accounts and the

fact that most *Juneau* sailors who survived the initial blast were stationed on or near the fantail: Allen Hyne, George Sullivan, and Charles Wang.

Locating the USS *Juneau* on Saint Patrick's Day was an unexpected coincidence that honored not only the Sullivan brothers but also all crewmembers

who were lost on that Friday the Thirteenth. Perhaps the short life of the ship and its valiant crew were summed up best by Vice Admiral Richard A. Brown, commander, Naval Surface Forces, US Pacific Fleet: "The story of the USS *Juneau* crew and Sullivan brothers epitomize the service and sacrifice of our nation's greatest generation."⁸⁸



Juneau's fantail as photographed on St. Patrick's Day 2018. Top center, one of the two depth charge racks that were George Sullivan's battle station. Photo reprinted with the permission of Vulcan, Inc.

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Why Washington Matters: How General George Washington Saved the American Revolution

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ABSTRACT

On January 6, 1783, three senior officers, then stationed at Newburgh, New York, arrived in Philadelphia with a dire warning for the Continental Congress. The officers were General Alexander McDougal from New York, Colonel Matthias Ogden from New Jersey, and Colonel John Brooks from Massachusetts. Their warning to the members of Congress was that the Continental Army at Newburgh was on the verge of mutiny. Congress did not immediately understand how this could have happened, but America's newfound independence was in danger of being lost after eight long years of warfare. In dealing with this event, General George Washington faced the greatest threat to the American Revolution: a disgruntled army and some of the senior officers plotting against the Continental Congress.

Keywords: American Revolution, Thirteen Colonies, United States, Continental Congress, Continental Army, mutiny, George Washington, Newburgh Address

Por qué es importante Washington: Cómo el General George Washington salvó la Revolución Americana

RESUMEN

El 6 de enero de 1783, tres oficiales superiores, entonces apostados en Newburgh, Nueva York, llegaron a Filadelfia con una terrible advertencia para el Congreso Continental. Los oficiales eran el general Alexander McDougal de Nueva York, el coronel Matthias Ogden de Nueva Jersey y el coronel John Brooks de Massachusetts. Su advertencia a los miembros del Congreso fue que el Ejército Continental en Newburgh estaba al borde del motín. El Congreso no entendió de inmediato cómo pudo haber sucedido esto, pero la recién descubierta independencia de Estados Unidos estaba en peligro de perderse después de ocho largos años de guerra. Al lidiar

con este evento, el general George Washington enfrentó la mayor amenaza para la Revolución Americana: un ejército descontento y algunos de los oficiales superiores conspirando contra el Congreso Continental.

Palabras clave: Revolución Americana, Trece Colonias, Estados Unidos, Congreso Continental, Ejército Continental, motín, George Washington, Discurso de Newburgh

为什么华盛顿十分重要：上将乔治·华盛顿如何挽救了美国革命

摘要

1783年1月6日，彼时驻扎在纽约州纽堡的三名高级军官来到费城，给大陆会议(Continental Congress)带来一个可怕的警告。这三名军官分别是纽约州上将Alexander McDougal、新泽西州上校Matthias Ogden和马萨诸塞州上校John Brooks。他们给会议成员的警告是，纽堡大陆军快要发生兵变。会议并未立刻明白如何会出现这一情况，但美国新建立的独立在8年战争之后有丢失的危险。在应对这次事件中，上将乔治·华盛顿面临了美国革命的最大威胁：一支不满的军队和策划反对大陆会议的部分高级军官。

关键词：美国革命，13个殖民地，美国，大陆会议(Continental Congress)，大陆军，兵变，乔治·华盛顿，纽堡演说

It is usually taught, erroneously, that the Revolutionary War ended in October 1781 at Yorktown after General Cornwallis surrendered to the US and French forces under the command of General George Washington. Although the British did surrender at Yorktown, they still occupied Wilmington, North Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina, Savannah, Georgia, New York, and a sizeable portion of Maine.

The British Navy, while it was defeated at the Battle of the Capes during the Yorktown campaign, was still dominant against what remained of the Continental Navy, as it was known as the mistress of the ocean.

The British were far from beaten, and the commander-in-chief of the Continental Army, General Washington, understood this better than anyone else. He feared that the US effort would

be weakened after the news of the Yorktown victory. Shortly afterwards, Washington wrote to Governor Thomas Nelson of Virginia: "Instead of exciting our exertions, the victory at Yorktown will produce such a relaxation in the prosecution of the war, as will prolong the calamities of it."¹ He wrote a few days later to the US commander in the South, General Nathanael Greene, "that my greatest fear is the Congress may think our work is closed and will fall into a state of languor and relaxation."² Just after these correspondences, Washington briefly visited his home in Mount Vernon; this was only the second time that he had returned home during the war. He and Martha subsequently traveled to Philadelphia, where they spent the winter of 1781–1782. Washington arrived in Philadelphia to great acclaim with massive parades and fireworks, many banquets, and toasts. An opera was even written in his honor. Indeed, he was having a wonderful social time in Philadelphia. Washington pointedly avoided the Congress's sessions, feeling it would have been improper for the commander-in-chief of the army to attend.

As the winter months progressed, George and Martha enjoyed themselves, but accomplished virtually nothing politically. Instead, every Monday night, he, Robert Morris, who was the financier, which is equivalent to a Secretary of the Treasury; Gouverneur Morris, an essential figure in the Congress; Alexander Hamilton; and James Madison met for dinner. They discussed the happenings in Congress that day: how the nation was bankrupt, the Congress was nearly powerless, and the

Continental Army had not been paid for the last couple of years. These men formed the core of an early nationalist movement in Congress. They believed the United States could become a great nation, but only if it had a more powerful central government that could levy taxes. However, general feeling in Congress was that the rights of the states were paramount and should not be overridden by a central government.

In the meantime, the Continental Army, unpaid and waiting, was in winter quarters in the Hudson Valley. Although it was not certain, rumors were circulating that the war was coming to an end, even though the information was not forthcoming from the negotiations in Paris, France. Washington presented himself to the Congress in March 1782 and asked their permission to return to the army. They called on him to meet before them and said, "we have nothing particular to give you, and have appointed this audience, only to assure you of our esteem and confidence and to wish you happiness and success."³

Washington departed for New York to rejoin the Continental Army, still occupied watching the British. The British Army was under the command of newly arrived General Sir Guy Carleton. He served as His Majesty's commander-in-chief, but Sir Guy was instructed to take no offensive action against the Continental Army. Instead, he was to prepare to evacuate the Colonies.

While Washington observed the British preparations, the French Army

under General Rochambeau arrived. The French had spent the winter near the Yorktown battlefield in Virginia, but with the approach of spring, it was time for them to move. The French Army was leaving the United States and intended to pass through New York to Boston and depart from there for the West Indies. There was a grand ceremony at the Newburgh encampment where troops from both armies passed in review. Rochambeau and Washington reviewed each other's armies and then bade one another farewell. Once the French Army was gone, the Americans would be very much on their own.

During this time, General Washington received an extraordinary letter from Colonel Lewis Nicola, commander of the "Corps of Invalids." These were men who had been injured in combat, suffered from disease or infirmity, and were deemed unfit to serve in combat. They were perfectly able to perform guard duty and support services, however. Colonel Nicola had seen firsthand every day the cost of war in the faces and disabilities of his men. His Corps had not been paid, either. Nicola wrote to General Washington:

When this war is over. We who have born the heat and labor of the day will be forgot and neglected. The army will not submit to this grave in justice. From several conversations I've had with officers I believe it is generally intended, not to separate after the peace to all grievances redressed, engagements & promises fulfilled This war must have shown to all, but to military

men, in particular, the weakness of Republics.⁴

Usually, when he received a communication from one of his subordinates during the war, he would surely reply, but the reply came within a few days or perhaps longer. Washington was so stunned by the letter that he replied to Nicola the very same day his letter was received. Washington wrote to the colonel:

With a mixture of great surprise & astonishment, I have read with attention the Sentiments you have submitted to my perusal. Be assured, Sir, no occurrence in the course of the War, has given me more painful sensations than your information of there being such ideas existing in the Army as you have expressed ... no man possesses a more sincere wish to see ample Justice done to the Army than I do, and as far as my powers & influence, in a constitutional way extend, they shall be employed to the utmost of my abilities to effect it.⁵

Colonel Nicola quickly tried to recant, and there were several more letters sent to the general apologizing for his statements. Nevertheless, Colonel Nicola's letter reflected the feelings of many officers serving in the army. About two weeks after Colonel Nicola's first letter, General Washington received another communication from Major General James Mitchell Varnum. He was from Rhode Island and served in Congress after retiring from the Continental Army. He was an indi-

vidual of significant influence and notoriety. General Varnum wrote: "The Congress is a baseless fabric. My fellow citizens are totally destitute of the law of equality. That is requisite to support a republic. Only an absolute monarchy or a military state alone can save us from the horrors of subjugation."⁶

All of this weighed heavily on Washington's mind. Instead of responding to Varnum directly, he sought out Secretary at War Benjamin Lincoln, who previously served as a major general in the Continental Army and was Washington's second in command throughout the Yorktown Campaign. Washington wrote: "if these men who, have spent the flower of their days in establishing the freedom and independence of their country are sent home without a one filing of money, great discontent will arise. The patience and long-suffering of this army are almost exhausted."⁷ With a year passed since the end of the Yorktown Campaign and very little activity among the Continental Army, the frustration among the soldiers and ranking officers continued to grow. Washington was well aware of this and stressed to Lincoln that he was particularly concerned because the army was about to go into winter quarters once again, and he knew the misery of winter quarters. The Continental Army had come through miserable times before in the Revolution, such as at Morristown and Valley Forge, but the winter of 1782 to 1783 seemed different.

Unlike previous winters, there would be no campaign in the coming spring during which the army could

look forward to securing American independence. Keeping these men together and preventing a mutiny weighed heavily on Washington. During the winter, several Continental Army officers, including some regimental leaders and members of the senior staff, gathered without Washington's permission. They drafted a memorial and asked the general's permission to take it to the Congress in Philadelphia. This made Washington uneasy; it was a violation of military protocol and could be seen as a challenge to civilian authority, which Washington had always respected. Nevertheless, the situation was so dire that he feared the consequences if he prohibited his officers from taking their memorial to Philadelphia.

Colonels Ogden and Brooks and General McDougal were assigned to deliver the memorial to Congress. It began by asking the Congress, "as the head and sovereign to hear our plea. We have borne all that men can bear in further experiments on our patients may have fatal effects."⁸ Congress accepted the memorial and gave it to a committee that deliberated for weeks. In the meantime, those previously mentioned nationalists, Morris, Morris, Madison, and Hamilton, began to devise a plan. They saw an opportunity to use the disgruntled army against the states and the Congress and force them to give greater power to the Congress. The army would demand their pay from Congress, but the only way for Congress to deliver would be if the states sent money and increased the power of the central government. Under the Articles of Confederation, the Congress was forbidden

from levying taxes on the states. The nationalists began to play an extremely dangerous game of using the army.

Peace was what the nationalists feared most. They knew that if peace was made, the army would disband and their plans to use them would fall apart. They had not heard anything from the commissioners in Paris, John Adams, John Jay, and Benjamin Franklin, who did not correspond with Philadelphia. Rumors were circulating in Congress that peace was near, and the nationalists would need to act quickly before peace came. Gouverneur Morris wrote to his friend Matthew Ridley, "not much for the interest of America, that peace should be made at present."⁹ He suggested that it was in the best interests of the nationalists for the war to continue.

Meanwhile at the Newburgh encampment, army officers were grumbling and frustrated when a new general arrived. The newcomer was not much troubled by loyalty or principle. His name was Horatio Gates, and he had distinguished himself as the commander of the Continental Army at the Battle of Saratoga, the great victory of 1777, where General Burgoyne was defeated. It is interesting to note that the British called 1777 the year of the hangman, the three sevens being gallows. In the same year that Americans celebrated the victory at Saratoga and the accomplishments of General Gates, General Washington had not lost Philadelphia but also retreated from Germantown and Brandywine. These losses sank Washington's reputation fast, and there were those in the Congress,

particularly Samuel Adams and other New Englanders, who suggested that General Gates might make a better commander-in-chief. Plans were made to place Gates in Washington's position, which Washington knew, but none of these plans were ever followed through.

General Gates was put in command of the Continental Army's Southern Department, where he fought the Battle of Camden. This was one of the worst defeats the Continental Army ever suffered. After the smoke cleared from the battlefield, General Gates was nowhere to be found. He had retreated nearly 60 miles, supposedly to reorganize his army, then went another 120 miles to Hillsborough before sending his report to Congress. As a result of this embarrassing defeat, he was replaced by General Nathanael Greene. Gates was now in disgrace and Washington deeply disliked him. Nevertheless, Gates was an influential politician, and he convinced Congress to appoint him as the commander of the army encamped at Newburgh without the consent of General Washington. Congress advised Washington to use Gates as he wished.

Washington was still commander-in-chief of the entire Continental Army, while Gates arrived to be the commander only of the army at Newburgh, which consisted of nearly seven thousand soldiers. Gates ordered them to build their huts at nearby New Windsor. There, they built nearly seven hundred wooden huts neatly laid as they prepared for winter quarters. To keep the soldiers busy, Gates had them

drill and build more huts, build roads and clear forests. Despite the work, the growing discontent in the army was evident. Chaplain Evans suggested that a "Temple of Virtue" be built to serve as a gathering place for Sunday services. During the week, it could also be where the administration of the army took place. The soldiers accordingly built the Temple in the middle of the New Windsor encampment.

Washington remained deeply concerned about the murmurings of great discontent in the army, as rumors of peace were still circulating with no mention of the soldiers being paid. Pressed now, fearing that peace was coming, the nationalists in Congress decided to make their move. Gouverneur Morris wrote to his good friend, General Henry Knox, the bookseller from Boston who now commanded at West Point. Knox had been with Washington since the early days of the war and he was Washington's closest friend in the field. Morris suggested that if Knox agreed, he could lead the army to put pressure on the states. Morris continued, "the army may now influence the legislatures and if you will permit me a metaphor from your own profession after you have carried the post the public creditors will garrison it for you."¹⁰

As Morris wrote to Knox, Alexander Hamilton was asked to write to General Washington. Hamilton and Washington had a tumultuous relationship. Alexander Hamilton came to the United States just before the Revolution and attended Kings College, now Columbia College and the oldest un-

dergraduate college of Columbia University. He became a lawyer just as the Revolutionary War started. After joining the Continental Army and distinguishing himself as a captain, he caught the attention of General Washington. The General invited Hamilton to serve as his secretary. This was a fine arrangement until Hamilton once kept Washington waiting to see him longer than the general liked. Washington turned on Hamilton and scolded him in front of the other officers, leading him to resign as Washington's secretary. Hamilton returned to the army and served honorably at the Battle of Yorktown, which earned him new respect from General Washington. Hamilton later left the army and served as a congressman from New York.

As Hamilton addressed General Washington, the nationalists never thought Washington would take part in any plot, but they believed he needed to be tested. Hamilton informed Washington that the army was on the verge of mutiny and advised that he might wish to "direct the torrent."¹¹ He went on with something the general found hurtful and insulting.

Washington was told that there were rumors in the Congress and the army that the soldiers were disappointed with his leadership. The rumors also suggested that the commander-in-chief did not do enough for them in passing their grievances about not being paid to Congress.

Hamilton concluded the letter by suggesting that Washington speak with General Knox, as their headquarters



The Resignation of George Washington December 23, 1783, c.1822 (oil on canvas) by John Trumbull (1756–1843); Yale University Art Gallery, New Haven, CT, USA.

were roughly 10 miles apart. Both Knox and Washington had an idea of what was being planned in Philadelphia, but now it appeared they were being drawn in. It is likely both generals shared the letters they received, as it was suggested that they speak with one another. Both replied to the nationalists from Philadelphia.

The first to respond, Knox wrote to Gouverneur Morris that “I consider the reputation of the American army, as one of the most immaculate things on Earth. We should even suffer wrongs and injuries to the utmost verge of toleration rather than sully it in the least degree. I hope to God, that the army will never be directed that against the enemies of the liberties of America.”¹² Just after Knox sent his response to

Morris, Washington replied to Hamilton that “the fatal tendency to involve the army in political matters, would be productive at civil promotions and end in blood. I stand as citizen and soldier.”¹³

The nationalists had clearly been rejected by Knox and Washington. This turned the nationalists’ attention to a man with whom they knew they could work with, General Horatio Gates. General Gates had his headquarters at a place called Ellison House, where he was surrounded by young staff majors and lieutenant colonels, several cooks, and the Ellison family, who had not vacated the house. It is often suggested that Gates was unaware of what was being planned by his junior officers at Ellison House.

This is hard to imagine, given the number of people crowded into four rooms on the first floor and four rooms on the second floor of the house. And so now at Ellison House, the plot begins.

Colonel Walter Stewart, the Inspector General of the Continental Army in the North and a former aide to General Gates, arrived at the Newburgh Encampment on Saturday, March 8, 1783. He went first to greet General Washington, who was none too pleased with Colonel Stewart. After leaving Washington, Stewart went immediately to General Gates, who later wrote to a friend that Colonel Stewart arrived with “interesting information from our friends in Philadelphia.” Those friends could only have been Madison, Hamilton, Morris, and Morris.¹⁴

The next day was terribly at the Newburgh Encampment. Colonel John Armstrong at Ellison House was asked to write an address to the army at Newburgh. The original document is in Armstrong's handwriting and was copied that night to be taken to the Temple of Virtue on Monday morning, where the soldiers would get their daily orders. Armstrong's address began:

“A fellow soldier, whose interests, and affections bind him strongly to you, whose past sufferings have been as great, and whose future fortunes may be as desperate as yours would beg to leave to address you will.”¹⁵ The address went on to rally the officers, and then declared at the end “we will meet tomorrow, Tuesday, the 11th at the Temple of Virtue.” As soon as Washington learned of this address, he immediately issued

a general order canceling the meeting, but knew he was running a risk of his top officers moving against him and the Continental Congress with this plot forming. He knew he had to act quickly by controlling any meeting that was set. Immediately following the cancellation of the first meeting, Washington called another meeting, which he would control. Washington's meeting was scheduled for noon on Saturday, March 15, at the Temple of Virtue, but Washington announced that he would not be in attendance.

Throughout the entire course of the war, Washington met with his staff, but never addressed the army's officers as a group. He believed this was not proper protocol for the commander-in-chief. Washington would not attend the meeting, but left it for the senior officer in command to preside over. The senior officer in command was General Horatio Gates. Upon hearing this, Gates and the others swung into action. As soon as Washington issued his general order, another anonymous address was put out suggesting that General Washington was with the plotters. This gave Washington and his staff time to plan; Washington believed that those plotting were attempting to draw him in, and he was unable to trust his generals at this moment.

Nevertheless, there was one thing that Washington did understand. Although the generals made the plans, it was the junior officers, lieutenants, captains, and majors who actually commanded and controlled the troops. Washington began to lay out a plan with

Colonel Brooks, who later became Governor of Massachusetts, and his secretary Jonathan Trumbull. They decided to prepare a speech and address the junior officers directly.

Several days were then spent writing what is probably the most important speech in US history. All was done in secret because Washington had already announced that he would not attend the Saturday meeting.

On March 15, about three hundred officers entered the Temple of Virtue. Everyone snapped to attention as General Gates entered the Temple. As he started the meeting and the officers took their seats, the sounds of rattling sabers and thundering hooves came from outside. General Washington's bodyguard entered the temple, and a moment later, to everyone's shock, General Washington stood in the doorway. Of course, the officers again stood at attention. General Washington went to the front of the room and General Gates stepped aside.

Washington pulled a sheaf of papers from his pocket and informed the officers that the meeting was so important that he had committed his thoughts to paper. He then began to address them. In a short speech that was no more than ten minutes in length, General George Washington saved the American Revolution.

Washington's Newburgh Address began:

Gentlemen,

By an anonymous summons and attempt has been made to

convene you together. How inconsistent with the rules of propriety how on military and how subversive of all order and discipline. Let the good sense of the army decide

Thus much, Gentlemen, I have thought it incumbent on me to observe to you. To show you upon what principles I oppose the irregular and hasty meeting, which was proposed to have been held on Tuesday last. And not because I wanted a disposition to give you every opportunity, consistent with your own honor and the dignity of the army to make known your grievances. If my conduct here to for has not events to you that I have been a faithful friend to the army. My declaration of it at this time will be equally one availing and improper. But as I was among the first to embarked in the cause of our common country, as I have never left you aside. One moment. But when called from you on public duty, as I have done the constant companion and witness of your distresses and not among the last to feel and acknowledge your merits. I have ever considered my own military reputation as inseparably connected with that of the army. As my heart has ever expanded with joy when I have heard its praises and my indignation has arisen when the mouth of detraction has been opened against it. It can scarcely

be supposed at this late stage of the war that I am indifferent to its interests ...

And let me conjure you in the name of our common country. As you value your own sacred honor. As you respect the rights of humanity. As you regard the military and national character of America to express your utmost horror and detestation of the man who wishes under any species pretenses to overturn the liberties of our country, and who wickedly attempts to open the floodgates of civil discord and deluge our rising empire in blood by dust determining, and thus acting, you will pursue the plain and direct road to the attainment of your wishes you defeat the insidious designs of our enemies who are compelled to reason from open force to secret artifice, you will give me one more distinguished proof of an example patriotism and patient virtue, rising superior to the pressure of the most complicated sufferings; ... And you will, by the dignity of your conduct afford occasion for posterity to say when speaking of the glorious example you have exhibited to mankind had this day been wanting the world has never seen the last stage of perfection, to which human nature is capable of attaining.¹⁶

When Washington finished his speech and there was silence. For that one terrible moment he thought he had

lost his officers and stood not with his army, but in opposition to it. Fearing this, he reached into his pocket and pulled out a letter from Virginia congressman Joseph Jones. Washington began to stumble over his words as he read the letter and stunned the officers by reaching for his glasses. The commander-in-chief had never been known to wear glasses. Washington had received the glasses two weeks prior from David Rittenhouse in Philadelphia and was having a hard time adjusting to them. To read Jones's letter, Washington wore his glasses for the first time in public. He looked out at the officers seated and said, "Gentlemen, you must forgive me. Through the course of the war, my eyes have grown dim, and my hair has grown gray in the service of my country."¹⁷ There was not a dry eye in the room. In that moment the officers understood that General Washington had sacrificed as much as they had.

After reading Jones's letter, Washington gathered his papers, removed his glasses, and walked out. General Knox that jumped from his seat and offered resolutions in support of Congress and the commander-in-chief. The resolutions were proposed, voted on, and adopted unanimously. It is worth noting that General Gates and Colonel Armstrong did not cast a vote for the resolutions. The resolutions were sent to Congress to assure the legislative body that the army, while disgruntled, remained loyal. Nearly at the same moment the resolutions arrived from Newburgh, news arrived from Paris, France that peace had been reached with England. The final treaty that would take a little

bit longer, but King George III finally conceded independence for the Thirteen Colonies. The war was essentially over. When the news reached General Washington, he announced a cessation of hostilities. The Treaty of Paris of 1783 was ratified shortly after.

Washington made the announcement at the Temple of Virtue on April 19, 1783, exactly eight years to the day of the Battles of Lexington and Concord, which began the Revolutionary War. Once the army heard the news, they erupted in cheers. Although they had not been paid, and they would not be for quite some time, they just wanted to leave the encampment and go home. This left Washington with one last task to complete.

On December 23, 1783, Washington arrived at the Maryland statehouse in Annapolis to meet with the Continental Congress after the legislative body temporarily relocated there in the late fall of 1783. Washington acknowledged the many sacrifices and professionalism of the Continental Army, then returned to the Con-

gress what they gave to him in June of 1775: his commission as commander-in-chief. In a very brief, but somber ceremony, General George Washington returned command of the Continental Army to the Congress, setting the precedent (which still stands today) that the US military is subordinate to civilian authority. Washington arrived home at Mount Vernon on Christmas Eve, 1783 thinking that his time in public service was over, not knowing what truly lied ahead.

This does not suggest that the Continental Army was plotting to overthrow the Continental Congress in March of 1783. Nevertheless, if the army had taken up arms or marched against the Congress as a means of protest, the separation that stands in our republic between the military and civilian government would have been shattered and could never have been put back together. It can be difficult to understand why some revolutions fail while others succeed, but history is clear as to why the American Revolution was successful: the leadership of George Washington.

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Notes

- 1 George Washington to Governor Thomas Nelson, October 27, 1781, FW, 23:271.
- 2 George Washington to Nathaniel Greene, 1781.
- 3 Washington leaving the Congress to join his army at Newburgh. JCC, 22:141
- 4 "To George Washington from Lewis Nicola, 22 May 1782," *Founders Online*, National Archives, <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-08500>.
- 5 "From George Washington to Lewis Nicola, 22 May 1782," *Founders Online*, National Archives, <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-08501>.
- 6 George Washington Papers, Series 4, General Correspondence: James M. Varnum to George Washington. 1782.Manuscript/MixedMaterial.<https://www.loc.gov/item/mgw431326/>.

- 7 George Washington Papers, Series 4, General Correspondence: George Washington to Benjamin Lincoln. 1782. Manuscript/Mixed Material. <https://www.loc.gov/item/mgw431472/>.
- 8 Memorial delivered to Congress by Ogden, Brooks, and McDougal.
- 9 G. Morris to Matthew Ridley, 1783
- 10 G. Morris to Knox, Feb. 7, 1783, Burnett, ed., Letters, VII, 34n. Since the two letters are dated so closely, and because Morris's was so incriminating, it is likely that Brooks c.
- 11 Hamilton to Washington, Feb. 13, Apr. 8, 1783, Syrett and Cooke, eds., *Papers of Hamilton*.
- 12 Knox to McDougall, Feb. 21, 1783, Knox Papers, XI, 148.
- 13 Washington to Hamilton, Mar. 12, 1783, Syrett and Cooke, eds., *Papers of Hamilton*, 286.
- 14 There is no record of Stewart's meeting with Gates. But judging by the rumors that began circulating (see next paragraph) and by what Armstrong told Duer (King, "Notes on conversation," Oct. 12, 1788, King, Rufus King, I, 622), Stewart undoubtedly pledged Morris's help.
- 15 Armstrong's "address" is printed in JCC, 24:295-97.
- 16 Washington's Newburgh Address, Mar. 15, 1783
- 17 Quincy, *Journals of Shaw*, 104.

Forging the Vision: Nathanael Green

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ABSTRACT

The American Revolution was a time when ordinary men were often put in positions to accomplish extraordinary things. Major-General Nathanael Greene was no exception; however, his accomplishments far surpassed many of his contemporaries. A journey that began in his youth, Greene crafted a vision throughout his life that often defied the laws of tradition. As a result, Greene's methods were oftentimes unorthodox, which led to a certain degree of criticism. His circumstances were often unfavorable; therefore, he believed that success must be achieved through non-traditional means. He developed his understanding of success through his studies and the culmination of his life events, developing and executing bold yet unconventional strategies with a great degree of success. The following explores Nathanael Greene's evolution as a visionary leader from his humble Quaker beginnings through the apex of his accomplishments during the Southern Campaign.

Keywords: Nathanael Greene. American Revolution, military history, leader development, Southern Campaign, visionary leadership, military strategy, self-development

Forjando la visión: Nathanael Green

RESUMEN

La Revolución Estadounidense fue una época en la que a menudo se colocaba a hombres comunes en posiciones para lograr cosas extraordinarias. El general de división Nathanael Greene no fue una excepción; sin embargo, sus logros superaron con creces a muchos de sus contemporáneos. Un viaje que comenzó en su juventud, Greene elaboró una visión a lo largo de su vida que a menudo desafiaba las leyes de la tradición. Como resultado, los métodos de Greene fueron a menudo poco ortodoxos, lo que generó cierto grado de crítica. Sus circunstancias eran a menudo desfavorables; por lo tanto, cree que el éxito debe lograrse por medios no tradicionales. Desarrolló su comprensión del éxito a través de sus estudios

y la culminación de los eventos de su vida, desarrollando y ejecutando estrategias audaces, pero poco convencionales con un gran grado de éxito. A continuación, se explora la evolución de Nathanael Greene como líder visionario desde sus humildes comienzos cuáqueros hasta la cúspide de sus logros durante la Campaña del Sur.


Palabras clave: Nathanael Greene. Revolución Americana, historia militar, desarrollo de líderes, Campaña del Sur, liderazgo visionario, estrategia militar, autodesarrollo

打造愿景：纳瑟内尔·格林

摘要

美国革命期间，普通人经常被置于需要完成非凡任务的位置上。少将纳瑟内尔·格林也不例外；不过，他的成就远超过同时代的人。从青年时期开始，格林便构想了一个经常违反传统法则的愿景。结果则是，格林的方法经常是非正统的，这引起了一定程度的批判。他的情况经常是不利的；因此，他相信必须通过非传统手段取得成功。通过学习和重大生活事件，他形成了对成功的理解，提出并执行了一系列大胆又非传统的战略，并在很大程度上取得了成功。以下内容探究了纳瑟内尔·格林作为一名愿景领导者的历程—从卑微的贵格会成员开始到南方战役期间取得的最高成就。

关键词：纳瑟内尔·格林，美国革命，军事历史，领导者发展，南方战役（Southern Campaign），愿景型领导，军事战略，自我发展



Major General Nathanael Greene, August 7, 1742–June 19, 1786, oil on canvas by Charles Wilson Peale. Bridgeman Images: Peter Newark American Pictures.

At the onset of the American Revolution, the rebel forces had many disadvantages in comparison to their British adversary. Aside from insufficient funding and resources, perhaps the Patriots' most significant shortcoming was the lack of a unified, standing military, a problem that was exacerbated by a serious deficit of men skilled in the broader administration of warfare. If the Patriots were to be successful, they required men of vision who could find possibilities and solutions where others could not. While many Patriot military leaders demonstrated a capacity for visionary leadership, Nathanael Greene's (1742–1786) unlikely ascendency and unorthodox

wartime exploits made him the most significant antihero of the Revolutionary War.

At the onset of the war, very few Patriot military leaders could have been considered extraordinary and experienced by traditional standards. Overall, rebel leaders lacked training and experience compared to the officers they took the field against. Although many Patriots experienced combat alongside the British during the American-Indian campaigns and French and Indian Wars, few served in positions that would provide them the skills necessary to develop, design, and execute broader context strategic planning. Thus, many Patriots were thrust into positions of leadership

out of necessity, oftentimes based solely on socioeconomic status rather than previous military accomplishments. As such, the learning curve was steep, as the unprepared bands of loosely organized militias assembled in 1775.¹

Among these inexperienced leaders was Nathanael Greene, a man with little formal schooling and extremely limited professional military training; however, what he lacked in terms of experience, he made up for in prescience, determination, an ability to bring concepts to fruition, and synthesizing these concepts into broader strategies. These are but a few of the qualities Greene possessed that eventually found him as Washington's "favorite officer."²

Nothing from Nathanael Greene's upbringing would have suggested his ascendancy into military leadership. Born into the Society of Friends, Greene was confined to the strict tenets of Quakerism that not only included pacifism but also viewed an education outside of religious texts; Quaker-approved books; and basic reading, writing, and arithmetic as a "worldly luxury" that only paved the way for "temptation, heresy, and other sins."³ Therefore, the young Greene received only a basic education while being raised to appreciate labor and business per the demands of his inherited faith and his father's business ventures. Nonetheless, Greene developed an insatiable thirst for a liberal education that he religiously quenched once he was given the gifts of time and space. In 1770, when he took over his father's forge in Coventry, Rhode Island, 10 miles east of the family homestead, he was provided that opportunity.

Early on, Greene read whatever books he could acquire. However, around 1760, he befriended educated minds who introduced him to the vast expanse of secular education. Greene befriended future president of Yale University, Reverend Ezra Stiles, and a man only known as "Giles," who played significant roles in expanding his educational endeavors.⁴ On their recommendations, Greene's independent studies included the histories, mathematics, sciences, philosophy, and a multitude of other subjects his religious upbringing had previously denied him. Using his blacksmithing abilities and spare resources from the forge, Greene crafted souvenirs to sell in Boston to fund his educational endeavor.

Circumstances brought new focuses for Greene as he began using his desire for knowledge, not only for general interest, but also for deliberate self-development. He began studying law, which paid dividends when his father's businesses required legal representation. He immersed himself not only in law books, but also observed legal proceedings that provided him a significant foundation in the law. Although he never intended on pursuing law as a profession, he believed that an understanding of the legal system was important for him to be a "useful or conspicuous citizen."⁵

Greene entered politics as a member of the Rhode Island General Assembly in 1770. His ascent to politics together with his affection for the anti-British writings of his favorite author, Jonathan Swift, accusations of involvement in the *Gaspée* affair in 1772,

and the subsequent seizure of one of his merchant ships ignited a fire in him.⁶ Although he was exonerated from the accusations of involvement in the *Gaspée* affair and his ship and goods were returned, these events made him a prime candidate for the rebellion. Greene never abandoned his Quaker roots; however, he determined that while pacifism was a righteous idea, it was simply impractical under the circumstances. Echoing the sentiments of Swift's *Drapier's Letters*, Greene stated that, "the injury done my country, and the chains of slavery forging for posterity, calls me forth to defend our common rights, and repel the bold invaders of the sons of freedom. The cause is the cause of God and man... I am determined to defend my rights, and maintain my freedom, or sell my life in the attempt."⁷

By 1774, Greene shifted his educational focus toward military manuals, tactics, strategy, and history. He immersed himself in the writings of Plutarch, Turenne, and Saxe. He studied *Sharp's Military Guide*, Bland's manual on tactics, *The Instruction of Frederick the Great for His Generals*, and Caesar's *Commentaries*. From his studies, Greene developed a dynamic understanding and interpretation of military science by analyzing the military successes, failures, tactics, and strategies of various cultures throughout history. Furthermore, on his visits to Henry Knox's bookstore, the two discussed military tactics and strategy and formed a bond that would serve them long and well as they worked together during the war.⁸

Greene's passion for learning undoubtedly gave him a broad wealth of knowledge that established not only his view of the world but provided him with a baseline understanding of tactics, strategy, and a multifaceted philosophical perspective. Although one could argue that consuming such a vast amount of information on as many different subjects would be counterproductive, it seems that he had an uncanny ability to retain only what he found useful while disregarding the rest. Greene biographer William Johnson noted that those who knew him were curious about his limited knowledge of history, despite that being his favorite subject.⁹

Ultimately, Greene's book collection was comprised of between 200 and 250 volumes. He worked diligently shaping his mind, refining his skills, and building a repertoire that would serve as the basis for his future exploits. The work ethic he developed and the knowledge he acquired paid dividends not only for himself, but also for the country he so loved.

Although Greene worked to develop his mind, he lacked perhaps the most important aspect of any military leader: experience. Quakers, by nature and virtue, were farmers rather than fighters. As devout pacifists, they viewed weapons as instruments of war; thus, Greene did not own or ever use a gun. However, he was far from the staunch Quaker of his upbringing. Like many other things in his life, he seemed to adopt what resonated with him from the faith and discarded the rest to build something that suited him. Therefore,

just as he abandoned his religiously restricted education in pursuit of obtaining a liberal education in his youth, he also abandoned the pacifistic tenets of Quakerism so he could do his part to correct the wrongs he perceived in British-colonized America. Accounts vary as to why Greene was removed from the Society of Friends, but in 1773, he was excommunicated for either attending a military parade or being at an alehouse. Nonetheless, this removal gave him the freedom he needed to pursue his military ambitions.

On October 29, 1774, the men of East Greenwich, Rhode Island established the Kentish Guards as a means of protecting their province from the threat of potential attacks by local Tories.¹⁰ Nathanael Greene was a founding member and financier of the group, but when he volunteered to serve as an officer, he was not selected. Although Greene was regarded as one of the most informed minds on military matters in Rhode Island, he ultimately became a Private in the group he helped found and fund.

Greene was already an unlikely candidate for military leadership given his Quaker background, but his physical ailments sealed his fate in terms of achieving a foothold in the Kentish Guard. He walked with a pronounced limp and was prone to severe bouts of asthma. Although he provided the militia with funding and support, he joined the militia at the lowest rank, Private, where his peers viewed him as a “blemish” on the organization for his physical ailments.¹¹

As a result, Greene contemplated leaving the militia altogether. However, despite his damaged ego, he promised his friend, and newly selected Captain of the Kentish Guard, James Mitchell Varnum, that he would continue to support the militia financially even if he did not participate. Varnum, also frustrated with the treatment of Greene, also felt compelled to leave the militia. Varnum knew that Greene should have been selected as an officer and certainly did not appreciate his friend being treated with such contempt. However, neither man left, training together through the winter of 1774 and into 1775: Varnum as the commander and Greene as a Private.¹²

In the autumn of 1774, the Rhode Island Assembly determined that it needed to review its provincial laws concerning the militias. To accomplish this, the Assembly established a defense committee to which Greene was assigned. The panel consisted primarily of senior military officers, so the fact that Private Greene was among them speaks volumes of the Assembly’s faith and confidence in his military knowledge.

Greene made quite an impression on the members of the committee, while his military superiors certainly took note of his abilities and potential. In response to Greene’s contributions to the committee, he received “magnanimous” recognition of his “fitness for command” based on his energy and the “ascendency of his intellect.” He was considered unanimously by those superior to him in rank as more qualified than any other in the colony to serve

as the head of the colony's armed forces. According to biographer Theodore Thayer, Greene's performance on this committee removed any doubt of his military competence.¹³

In late 1774, when Greene made his usual trek to Boston, instead of books, arming himself was the mission. Although he did acquire a rifle, he brought home something perhaps even more valuable. He engaged and enlisted the aid of William Johnson, a deserter from the British army. Greene convinced Johnson to come back to Rhode Island and become the drillmaster for the Kentish Guard. Johnson agreed, relocated to East Greenwich, and trained the Guard in the style of the British army. The installment of this former British soldier paid dividends for the Guard as Johnson drilled them three times per week, preparing them for the fight ahead.¹⁴

Immediately following the engagements at Lexington and Concord on April 19, 1775, the Kentish Guards were activated and marched as far as Pawtucket, Rhode Island, when a messenger intercepted them with a message from the governor. They were instructed not to engage and return to their homes. While most of them complied, Greene, two of his brothers, and at least one other man ignored the order and pressed on until hearing that the British had retreated to Boston. Only then did they return to their homes.¹⁵

In response to the outbreak of the war, Rhode Island decided that in addition to its requirement for each militia-aged male to be prepared to defend

the province, they also needed a regular army. The result was the establishment of a fifteen-hundred-man army dubbed the Army of Observation on May 8, 1775. This new outfit needed a commander, and while most sources lead one to believe that Greene was the first choice, he was not. Rather, their first choice was an Episcopalian and their second choice was a Congregationalist. Both declined. Rhode Island then settled on Private Greene, commissioning him as Brigadier General in charge of all of Rhode Island's forces.¹⁶

Meanwhile, the colony of Massachusetts understood that it would only be a matter of time before the British forces would seek revenge on their embarrassments at Lexington and Concord. They called for all New England troops to assemble at Cambridge, and the Rhode Island assembly ordered Greene and his brigade to the rebel rally point. It did not take long for Rhode Islanders to take notice of Greene's efforts as he worked tirelessly "raising, equipping, and drilling" his troops. The way he handled the problems he encountered, and the progress he made with his brigade, ensured Rhode Island that Greene was the right choice. On May 20, 1775, twelve days after receiving his commission, Greene began moving his army in waves to join the New England militias' rallying point in Massachusetts.¹⁷

At Cambridge, Greene was quick to make a good impression on the more seasoned generals roaming the rebel encampment outside Boston. Among generals such as Israel Putnam, Philip Schuyler, and Charles Lee, Greene was

a fledgling; however, he possessed qualities that quickly set him apart from his contemporaries. These qualities quickly found Greene in the graces of the eventual Commander-in-Chief, George Washington.

It could be reasonably argued that many Americans have an overly romanticized mental image of the American Revolution. One where American Patriots set aside their disagreements, banded together, and worked seamlessly to win their independence. This image was largely propagated by nineteenth-century poets and authors, such as William Gilmore Simms, and it seems that any deviance from this narrative would be viewed as almost unpatriotic. However, the reality of the situation throughout the war was a far cry from the charming portrayals commonly found in pop culture.¹⁸

Although there were certainly social, economic, and cultural divisions between the Northern and Southern colonies, perhaps the most significant divisions among the colonies were provincial. Boundary disputes between provinces were commonplace and did not simply dissipate when the war began. Rather, these divisions transcended civil affairs and manifested among the provincial militias who remained autonomous and suspicious of one another. In early 1775, there was no formal, overarching command structure or even a common supply line. Seemingly, the only unifying factor at this time was the cause itself.¹⁹

Greene saw this dynamic and felt that only through unity did the rebel

forces stand a chance. While most of the other colonial militia leaders stood stubborn in their independence and suspicions, Greene did not hesitate to become subordinate to another colonial commander. On May 23, 1775, Greene offered his services to Artemas Ward, commander of the Massachusetts militia, requesting to serve as one of Ward's subordinate commanders.²⁰

This is not to say that Greene was alone in this idea of a consolidated army. On the contrary, Greene attended a meeting on June 5, 1775, featuring Generals Joseph Spencer, Israel Putnam, William Heath, and John Thomas, who were trying "to give shape and order" to the mobs in the encampment. However, an idea of a "single head" to command the army only "crept in" over time. Greene, on the other hand, did not hesitate to offer his services under Ward and had done so nearly a month before Congress established the Continental Army. The Continental Army was established on June 14, 1775, under the command of George Washington, with Greene selected as one of its first Brigadier Generals.²¹

As evidenced by George Washington's General Orders from July 1775, troop discipline was a major concern. Greene, however, stood at the forefront of troop discipline. He understood in 1775 what Baron Friedrich von Steuben proved two years later at Valley Forge: that discipline and drill were vital keys to the success of the military. Greene held his soldiers to the highest standards, which not only garnered him the favorable attention of Washington and other generals but also made his

troops an example for others to emulate. Furthermore, Greene understood the broader context of military discipline, not only how discipline applied to combat, but how it also impacted public perception.²²

On the surface, military drills can seem mundane and burdensome, and it is something that soldiers complain about even today. However, at its core, drill provides soldiers with many practical and necessary skills. It instills instant obedience to orders, discipline, standardization, synchronization, and organization. In linear warfare, especially, these skills were of the utmost importance.

As a Private in the Kentish Guards, Greene participated in the drills of William Johnson three times per week for approximately eight months. While not an exorbitant amount of time, it seemed enough for Greene to comprehend its importance as drill became a priority for his troops when he took command of the Rhode Island forces. At his direction, his troops were required to drill and parade daily even after their arrival outside Boston. Every day at four o'clock, his troops "mustered and paraded" unless sick or otherwise engaged.²³

The discipline and presentation of Greene's army stood in stark contrast to the chaos at Cambridge. Greene was fortunate to be supported by stellar officers, including James Varnum, who shared his vision. Greene and his officers toured their encampment with regularity, ensuring that their high standards were maintained. Everything, including

the setup of their encampments, was to be clean and orderly. Personnel were required to maintain personal hygiene and to keep their uniforms clean and serviceable. Greene's army religiously conducted maintenance and cleaning of their weapons and equipment and were subject to routine inspections. This was undoubtedly a breath of fresh air to George Washington, who, upon arriving at Cambridge, described the New England militiamen as "an exceedingly dirty and nasty people."²⁴

Greene understood that if his troops were to be disciplined, he needed to be a leader who exhibited discipline, inspired, and commanded respect. He seemingly never spared himself, working diligently and tirelessly on his personal affairs while ensuring that his presence was known and felt among the troops. Although Greene was one of the most inexperienced general officers, his self-discipline and the discipline of his troops earned him accolades and praise from his contemporaries and senior officers alike.

This was especially true in his relationship with George Washington, who eventually considered Greene his favorite officer, and whom many presume was Washington's heir apparent. Washington understood Greene's value and used him to his strengths. He knew that if something needed to be fixed and the need was urgent, more often than not, Greene was the man for the job. Unfortunately for Greene, sometimes this meant his assignments removed him from the battlefield, such as his appointment to the position of Quartermaster General.

When Greene was promoted to the rank of Major General in August 1776, he was once again the youngest and most inexperienced of his contemporaries. The other Continental Major Generals had largely obtained their rank based on military service before the American Revolution. Nonetheless, he did not earn the rank of Major General by accident. Rather, he was driven by an uncanny desire to solidify his legacy that was coupled with an undying desire to impress his commander-in-chief, George Washington. As a result, Greene performed commendably both on the battlefield and through his auxiliary roles.

Greene seemed to hide his inexperience behind a bold, intrepid personality and strong demeanor. He was a student of human nature, which he used not only to mask his weaknesses but also to give him valuable insight into other people. Through his life experiences, his studies of history, and his deliberate attention to human nature and behavior, Greene became so adept in human psychology that it was almost as if he possessed the ability to “read the thoughts of others as if they had been his own.” He understood the significance of this ability and used it to such a degree that within a few months in command, his voice was listened to with the respect that “is only accorded to acknowledged superiority.”²⁵

While Greene’s façade was convincing to most, he still experienced resistance, especially within the council of war. Given that Greene would not command in direct combat until the Battle of Trenton at the end of 1776, it

seems early on that, although he made his presence known within the council, he remained somewhat outside the circle of Washington’s more seasoned generals. Their seeming lack of faith in his judgment, although arguably warranted, sometimes proved fateful, as it could be argued that the British would not have established themselves so quickly in New York had they taken his advice.

On September 5, 1776, Greene suggested that they burn New York City and its suburbs before evacuating it. He understood and openly expressed its indefensibility based on the number of available troops. He knew that the army could not stop a British attack on the region, and should it fall into British hands, they would be gifted a ready-made military garrison at the Patriots’ expense and that if it were lost they would never again regain control of the city.²⁶

The council disagreed with Greene’s assessment of New York’s defensibility and argued against abandoning it, while Congress refused to permit the burning of the city. The council decided to defend the city. At the pressing of Greene, in what could have been perceived as an act of insubordination, a re-vote was requested via a petition on September 11. A second council was summoned the following day, and the decision was reversed “with only three dissenting voices,” but it was too late. With only enough time to evacuate in what was described as a “miserable and disorderly retreat,” the British seized New York and its assets on September 15, when “Howe landed between Kips’s

and Turtle Bay.” Britain maintained control of the city for the duration of the war, just as Greene predicted.²⁷

However, while Greene’s foresight and intuition were acute, he was not always correct. Only a few months later, in November 1776, he was responsible for the fall of Fort Washington, which proved to be the most significant loss of the American Revolution until the fall of Charleston. While initially instructing Greene “to defend the post to the last Extremity,” Washington later modified this order, giving Greene full authority to act as the situation dictated. Greene, although encouraged by Washington to evacuate the fort, decided to reinforce it. When the British attacked, the fort and its three thousand troops, along with arms and supplies, were captured in a mere five hours. The subsequent loss of Fort Lee, also under Greene’s charge, left him feeling “mad, vext, sick, and sorry,” but the lessons he learned were a valuable part of his maturing process.²⁸

Greene’s experiences in combat led him to the conclusion that direct combat with Britain was a failing strategy. Therefore, he gravitated towards the Fabian strategy of the Roman Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus, one that maximized the army’s strengths while compensating for its limitations. Washington, on the other hand, tended to ebb and flow between a conservative Fabian and aggressive Hannibalic strategy, but ultimately Washington envisioned a Hannibalic victory that would give the British a final crushing blow. Greene found this approach impractical and

unfeasible as the Continentals stood at nearly every disadvantage. Although subservient to Washington, it is well documented that Greene had Washington’s ear above the other generals. The marriage of these contrasting strategies was arguably one of the most significant relationships of the war.²⁹

Greene understood that traditional ideas would be difficult to overcome. He keenly observed the civilian pressure on Washington to take on the British head-to-head. Greene believed this was an impractical, if not reckless, strategy. In 1777, Greene wrote to Washington, expressing the concerns of his observations, stating that he has seen the “difficulty of [Washington] ... to satisfy the Expectations of an ignorant Populace, with great Concern.” However, Greene felt he understood what the army needed to do to be successful, and had no qualms about relaying these ideas to Washington.³⁰

Greene told Washington that he believed Washington had two strategic options: to fight “upon the common Principles of War” without “the least Prospect of Success” or to “remain inactive, & be subject to the Censure of an ignorant & impatient populace.” Greene suggested that if he went with the former, it would make a bad situation worse, and when it failed he would forever “stand condemned.” However, if he opted for the latter, he could rely on his own judgment, giving himself the necessary time to overcome the army’s deficiencies, and in doing so, would prevail and be revered by “all future Generations.”³¹

Greene's time as a combatant commander in the Northern Theater (1775–1777) served as a significant learning period. Seemingly, he learned his lessons well, as he continued to develop and refine his repertoire, preparing him for subsequent assignments of increased responsibility and autonomy. His next assignment played to his strengths and experience learned not only from his time as a commander, but also from running his father's businesses: Quartermaster General of the Army.

When the army arrived at Valley Forge in the winter of 1777, the supply situation was in shambles. Simply put, the soldiers did not have the resources required to survive the impending winter, let alone be comfortable. The future of the war also hung in the balance, as supply problems routinely plagued Washington's army. Crucial items such as gunpowder and ammunition were in short supply, in addition to a shortage of food, blankets, and even shoes.

Greene possessed a great understanding of logistics, as evidenced by his letter to George Washington on December 1, 1777, where Greene not only outlined how the winter encampment at Valley Forge should be established, but also provided a list of necessary actions to be taken for their sustainment. Additionally, he warned of the adverse effect of too much leisure time, addressed troop psychology, and emphasized the necessity for exercise during the army's winter hiatus. He even discussed leveraging logistical warfare against the British in their quarter.³²

The large quantities of agricultural goods provided by the approxi-

mately seventy-five thousand farmers throughout the Northern Theater had dried up for many reasons: "bad planning, no planning, inexperience, ineptitude, criminality, villainy, the structure of governance in America, and a large dose of bad luck." By the end of 1777, the Continental Army's Quartermaster General, Major General Thomas Mifflin, and Commissary General, Colonel Joseph Trumbull, had abandoned their posts in pursuit of other endeavors, leaving Washington's commissary general lost as to what to do. Thus, to supplement the quartermaster and commissary departments, Washington relied on his aspiring young General Greene to scour the countryside for provisions and equipment.³³

Greene headed out with his detail of troops numbering in the thousands to procure supplies for the suffering masses collected in Valley Forge. He was given full authority to seize whatever assets deemed vital to the sustainment of the army. Well aware of his authority, Greene also understood the power of public opinion. Thus, he implemented a system of providing receipts for all goods commandeered for the army's use. It was a system of goodwill that promised repayment for any materials or livestock surrendered.

However, this goodwill was not always enough for those who were desperate, had no interest in assisting the cause, or had legitimate concerns about the grossly inflated Continental currency. To protect their resources from being seized, some locals began hiding their wagons, livestock, and other provisions in the woods or wherever they

could to try to maintain their property. Greene's solution for this was to offer no receipts or any repayments for items taken that were found in hiding.

There was also the problem of locals supplying the British. For those caught doing so, Greene ordered them publically whipped. Greene believed this lesson was not only necessary for the perpetrators, but for his subordinate officers as well. Greene lamented the tactics he felt he had to employ. However, he believed he had to harden not only his own heart but also the hearts of his subordinate officers so that they could fulfill their mission. He made it known that he would inflict the severest of punishment for the minutest neglect to maintain the order and discipline necessary to accomplish this difficult, necessary, yet ethically questionable task.³⁴

Forage was another issue that he encountered around Valley Forge. The amount of forage required to sustain the army wreaked havoc on the surrounding landscape. Greene instructed the Commissary-General to forage the country bare, which caused the subsequent problem of starving out the local animals. However, Greene was a problem-solver and, to mitigate civilian complaints about forage shortages, ordered his troops to confiscate all animals that were fit for either military service or slaughter to ease their burden.³⁵

The army still needed a long-term solution for keeping the troops supplied. Greene's command of this mission proved to Washington that he was a capable leader with a keen sense

of logistics and an aptitude for problem solving. The army was in such need of transport equipment and animals that many units were reduced to building makeshift wagons that the soldiers, themselves, were yoked to or they simply carried the cargo on their backs.³⁶

Although Greene did not desire to be "taken out of the Line of splendor," Washington impressed to him the importance of the Quartermaster General. While Greene felt this responsibility was in line with his previous experiences, he believed a position of this magnitude was greater than his abilities. Nonetheless, he accepted the position and was appointed as Quartermaster General on March 24, 1778. Five months passed between the exodus of Quartermaster General, Thomas Mifflin, and the appointment of Nathanael Greene, which only served to intensify the supply crisis.

Greene went to work procuring the supplies necessary for the army to survive the winter and to fight when spring came. Greene was told by Washington to spare no expense to outfit the army, and he did so much to Congress's dismay. The military spending by the Quartermaster and Commissary Departments ballooned from between \$5.4 and \$9.2 million under Mifflin from 1776 to 1777, to an astounding \$37 million in 1778 under Greene.³⁷

Inflation, supply, and demand issues increased the cost of goods; however, these facts seemed to elude Congress. The Continentals were also competing with the British for resources from the local economies and the

British not only paid better, but also did so in coin money, as opposed to the inflated paper currency the Americans could offer. Greene's expenditures put him at odds with Congress, which accused him of inflating purchases and profiteering.³⁸

Regardless of the pushback from Congress, Greene diligently carried out his duties as Quartermaster. Brokering deals with New England and French companies, he obtained much-needed supplies and equipment. He enlisted skilled tradesmen to build and repair transport vehicles, weapons, and a myriad of other equipment that required routine maintenance. He even established standards for encampments that mitigated many of the messes he had encountered as a commander. These standardizations included site selection considerations, latrine locations, and security checkpoints emplacements. Additionally, Greene established chains of supply stores and magazines, the construction of boats, and transportation routes that took into consideration both land routes and waterways.³⁹ Greene made vast improvements to the Quartermaster Department, seemingly making the best of a less than ideal situation for a man who pined for battlefield glory.

Regardless of his improvements to the department, his conflict with Congress only grew worse over time. When a projections report was submitted to Congress proposing a supply budget for 1779, the number came in at over \$200 million, a figure that infuriated Congress, which opened an investigation into the quartermaster and

commissary departments.⁴⁰ Congress subsequently halted all bills of credit and recommended that the army look to the colonies to support the war, a burden they ultimately refused. This left the army with no way to fund itself. Greene saw the proverbial "writing on the wall," and wrote Congress his conditional resignation as Quartermaster General. His request was ignored.

Greene was adamant about moving out of the department, but Congress ignored his repeated requests for resignation. When he finally got a response, it was in the form of an investigation into his department on accusations of inflation and profiteering. Fortunately, for Greene, the results of the investigation were favorable, finding no fault in either his organization or the administration of the department. Nevertheless, Congress felt it was in their best interest to intervene anyway, proposing a complete overhaul of the department aimed at cutting costs while bolstering accountability. Congress' interference with Greene and his department provoked him to write Congress a scathing letter that almost cost him his commission. However, at Washington's pressing, Greene maintained his commission and Congress finally honored his resignation on July 26, 1780.⁴¹

Between his resignation from the quartermaster department and his assignment as the commander of the Southern Department, Greene was sent to preside over the trial of Major John André in the wake of the Benedict Arnold affair. André was sentenced on September 29, 1780, and was hanged October 2. Following the tribunal,

Greene requested to fill the void left by Arnold as the commander of West Point. Greene's request was granted on October 14, but it would be a short-lived assignment.⁴²

After Horatio Gates was routed at Camden on August 16, 1780, the Southern Department was in a desperate state. The militia had scattered: many of the Continentals were slaughtered, while just as many were captured, conscripted, or imprisoned by the British. The war in the South had been raging on in the background since the beginning of the war. However, its significance and intensity were amplified when Britain tried to use the South as a back door into the country starting with Savannah, GA on December 29, 1778. Britain quickly capitalized on its new strategy, seizing the whole of Georgia in late 1779 before moving up into the Carolinas.

Britain planned to use its Loyalist following in the Southern colonies to bolster their war effort. The intent was to employ a small force of British regulars to orchestrate and inspire the Loyalist militias; however, the turnout of Loyalist fighters did not meet expectations. Nonetheless, it certainly aggravated the ongoing civil war between Whig and Tory partisans. While Britain planned to only supplement the militias in the South, Lord Charles Cornwallis was ultimately given about one-third of the British force to execute the strategy.

Greene was appointed as the commander of the Southern Department on October 14, 1780. Like the Quartermaster Department he inherit-

ed, the Southern Department was just as dire. Command of the department had changed hands four times since the beginning of the war, with little strategic success. When Greene arrived in North Carolina to replace Gates on December 2, 1780, he was met with what little remained of the department. Although officially authorized seventeen thousand troops, he had 2,307 on paper, 1,482 of whom were present for duty and of those, less than eight hundred who were properly fit and equipped for combat.⁴³

Greene believed that an offensive strategy was a failing endeavor and felt that establishing a defensive posture would provide the army the time and space required to build a formidable fighting force of regular troops. Greene believed that Britain's offense-driven strategy in the North was flawed. He likened their efforts to a ship "a ship plowing the Ocean." He observed that as soon as the British had passed, the rebels reformed around and behind them. He figured that as long as the army could prove they could provide support to the people, the army could not be beaten. However, if the army were destroyed, the people would not rally.⁴⁴

Greene sensed the same dynamic in the Southern colonies. Much of what Greene had determined was shaped by the conclusions he had made regarding public opinion. Where he once would have justified the killing of Loyalists out of principle, he now understood that this would only exacerbate the problem. By considering public opinion he hoped to embolden Patriots and leverage neutrals while mitigating Tory upheavals.⁴⁵

Greene felt that the troops were “living symbols” of the American cause and that the “righteousness of the cause” would be judged by how the troops were perceived.⁴⁶ This dynamic would arguably be more significant in the South where atrocities were being committed by both sides. Greene believed that if his soldiers lacked discipline, not only could they lose local Whig support, but also could energize dormant Loyalists and turn neutral parties against them. By conducting themselves appropriately, they could bolster support while mitigating resistance.

Public opinion had long been a part of Greene’s strategy. This is evidenced through his general orders and directives dating back to 1775 where he ordered his troops “to prevent plundering, destruction to property, or even insults to civilians.” However, at the time Greene only applied these orders to the Whigs. In the South, Greene came to believe that these same courtesies needed to be extended to the Tories if they were to succeed. His orders during the Southern Campaign stated that there needed to be “a happy medium between too great severity and too much indulgence [and that] [a]ny punishment for Tories should not extend to ‘proscription and confiscation.’”⁴⁷

Greene’s defensive strategy was also out of necessity for his lack of a standing army. Though he understood that neither side could maintain a large force in the region, he needed to buy time until he could build a regular army strong enough to take on Cornwallis. There was no shortage of Partisans

in the Southern colonies, but Greene loathed militiamen. His experience had shown him that they were unreliable and that they often scattered in battle. Nonetheless, the bulk of Greene’s force throughout the Southern Campaign was comprised of militiamen.⁴⁸

The Partisans in the south had been fighting their war since the beginning of the revolution and possessed a unique set of skills obtained from fighting irregular warfare with Natives. They also possessed an unparalleled knowledge of the Southern landscape, one that differed greatly from those in the northern and middle-Atlantic colonies. While Greene may not have cared for irregular troops, they were indispensable to him, and he put them to work the best way he could when they decided to show up.⁴⁹

Supplies were also an issue in the Southern colonies. While the northern and middle-Atlantic colonies were more densely populated and established, the Southern colonies contained vast expanses of wilderness. The supply issues experienced in the North were naturally worse in the South. Furthermore, the years of bloody civil war had wrought havoc on the southern landscape, which found both armies scrounging for resources. Although Greene had done well to establish contracts for supplies in preparation for his command of the Southern Department, there was no shortage of problems facing his supply crisis.

Greene’s Southern Department needed a strategy that took all of these elements into account. Against con-

ventional wisdom, Greene did the unthinkable and divided his forces into two major elements in the face of a numerically superior force. He sent eight hundred light troops, dubbed the “flying army,” west under the command of Brigadier General Daniel Morgan while Greene maintained a force of one thousand troops as the main army. His orders to Morgan were to protect the people in his quarter, while rallying their spirit, antagonizing the British, collecting supplies, and establishing supply stores.

Greene understood that he could not keep all of his troops in one location. To do so not only held the potential to exhaust local resources, but also put him in a position to place the whole of his army in harm’s way at one time should Cornwallis engage. By splitting his forces, he could move faster, spread out resource consumption over a larger area, and subsequently cause Cornwallis to thin out his forces in pursuit, thus creating a more manageable enemy for Greene.

Greene’s Southern Campaign relied heavily on small-scale operations. It is estimated that 80 percent of the fighting during the American Revolution was conducted in the South; however, most of them were minor skirmishes that remain unnamed.⁵⁰ Nonetheless, the few pitched battles Greene’s army engaged in proved successful. The Battle of Cowpens was a tactical victory for Daniel Morgan, and the Battle of Guilford Courthouse, though a tactical loss, proved to be a strategic success for Greene. The casualties the British

incurred by Greene’s army at Guilford Courthouse were a sour victory for Cornwallis. Britain knew they could not continue to sustain such burdensome victories.

Greene’s Southern strategy is often considered an integral link between conventional and unconventional warfare. He figured out how to effectively use conventional forces and strategy in concert with unconventional forces and strategy, ebbing and flowing as the situation dictated. Elements of his strategy are found in Maoist mobile warfare, the conflict in Vietnam, and even the current conflicts in the Middle East. Seemingly, over two hundred years ago, Greene helped design a strategy that wreaks havoc on those who find themselves on the receiving end of it.

Nathanael Greene was certainly not the only Continental officer to ascend to military fame with a limited background in military affairs, but it seems certain that no other rose either higher or faster than he. Greene possessed an unparalleled ability to observe, learn, synthesize, design, apply, and execute winning strategies. The development of his intellect that started in his youth came to an apex during his command of the Southern Department. While he may be considered by some as a conservative, mediocre battle captain with a losing record, Greene challenged tradition by learning that the key to success was not necessarily in one’s ability to compile decisive victories. His strategy is validated in that he won one of the most significant campaigns of the war without a single decisive victory. He

understood that attempting to achieve traditional measures of success could ultimately lose the war, but that tactical losses could be considered strategic victories, and that these strategic victories held the potential to lead to total victory. This strategy proved true and effective for Greene during the Southern Campaign.

Nothing about Greene suggested that he would become one of the most significant military leaders of the American Revolution. His physical ailments coupled with his meteoric rise to military leadership without having the requisite experience are arguably

major areas of concern when predicting success. Nonetheless, he possessed exactly what the army needed: superior intellect, competence, a vision, and the audacity to carry out that vision. Realizing Greene and his ability to develop, implement, execute, and succeed at the seemingly impossible proves that he was not the overly conservative commander with a lack of battlefield splendor as he is sometimes depicted. Rather, he was a man who understood his circumstances, determined what was possible, and executed successful strategies, thus making him the most significant anti-hero of the American Revolution.

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Notes

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America at War: The Common Cup

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ABSTRACT

“The Common Cup” is an approximately four-thousand-word discussion of the importance of coffee in the Union armies during the American Civil War. The history of Civil War coffee is traced, including the lack of coffee in the Confederacy due to the blockade of Southern ports. Several letters and diaries are quoted concerning the importance of coffee to a soldier’s daily routine, and how distressed a soldier became when there was no opportunity for even the briefest coffee break.

The Christian Commission’s “Coffee Wagon” is noted as one of the ways volunteer citizen groups could provide comfort to their fighting men in the field and in hospitals. The story of the Sharps Carbine “Coffee Grinder” Rifle is told; exposing it as a hoax, although there was no proof it was perpetrated intentionally.

Finally, the importance of coffee to group cohesion and task orientation is noted. Coffee was more than just a beverage. An “Afterward” presents several links to video offerings concerning Civil War coffee. This is included because of the quality of the videos and the belief of the author that video offerings such as these are a vital part of the changes in the way history will be presented in the twenty-first century.

Keywords: Christian Commission “Coffee Wagon,” coffee substitutes in the South, *Hardtack & Coffee*, Sharps Carbine “Coffee Grinder” Rifle, trading coffee for tobacco, Union blockade, video blogs

EE. UU. en guerra: The Common Cup

RESUMEN

“The Common Cup” es una discusión de aproximadamente cuatro mil palabras sobre la importancia del café en los ejércitos de la Unión durante la Guerra Civil estadounidense. Se rastrea la histo-

ria del café de la Guerra Civil, incluida la falta de café en la Confederación debido al bloqueo de los puertos del sur. Se citan varias cartas y diarios sobre la importancia del café en la rutina diaria de un soldado, y lo angustiado que se sentía un soldado cuando no había oportunidad ni siquiera para un breve descanso para tomar café.

El “Coffee Wagon” de la Comisión Cristiana se considera una de las formas en que los grupos de ciudadanos voluntarios pueden brindar consuelo a sus combatientes en el campo y en los hospitales. Se cuenta la historia del rifle Sharps Carbine “Coffee Grinder”; exponiéndolo como un engaño, aunque no había pruebas de que fuera perpetrado intencionalmente.

Finalmente, se destaca la importancia del café para la cohesión del grupo y la orientación a las tareas. El café era más que una bebida. Un “Afterward” presenta varios enlaces a ofertas de videos sobre el café de la Guerra Civil. Esto se incluye debido a la calidad de los videos y la creencia del autor de que las ofertas de videos como estas son una parte vital de los cambios en la forma en que se presentará la historia en el siglo XXI.

Palabras clave: “Coffee Wagon” de la comisión cristiana, sustitutos del café en el sur, Hardtack & Coffee, fusil Sharps Carbine “Coffee Grinder”, cambio de café por tabaco, bloqueo sindical, blogs de video

战争中的美国：The Common Cup

摘要

“The Common Cup” 是一次关于美国内战期间咖啡对联邦的重要性的近4000字的讨论。追溯了内战咖啡史，包括联盟因南方港口被封锁而缺少咖啡。引用了几封信件和日记，它们记录了咖啡对士兵的每日流程的重要性，以及当连最简单的咖啡休息机会都没有时士兵的沮丧程度。

基督教委员会（Christian Commission）的“咖啡车”被认为是志愿公民团体能为战场和医院中的士兵提供舒适的其中一种方法。讲述了能“研磨咖啡豆”的夏普斯卡宾步枪的故事；这是一个骗局，虽然没有证据证明这是有意为之的。

最后，提到了咖啡对团队凝聚力和任务定向的重要性。咖啡

不仅仅是一杯饮料。提供了几个关于内战咖啡的视频链接。提供这些链接是因为视频的高质量 and 作者的信念—即这样的视频是变革（21世纪历史呈现方式的变革）的重要部分。

关键词：基督教委员会“咖啡车”，南方的咖啡替代物，《硬饼干和咖啡》（*Hardtack & Coffee*），夏普斯卡宾步枪（伴有“咖啡研磨”功能），以咖啡换烟草，联邦封锁，视频博客

America may have begun as a tea-drinking collection of colonies, but that did not last long. “Boston Harbor Sun Tea” never caught on, but coffee did. Even John Adams called for the universal adoption of coffee. “Tea must be universally renounced!”¹ And so coffee it was, except in the military, which got a daily ration of alcohol. Until October 1832, that is. In response to complaints from officers and the public about injuries and insubordination, President Andrew Jackson substituted coffee and sugar for the daily military allotment of rum and brandy.² This caused the average importation of coffee to rise from twelve million pounds a year to over thirty-eight million pounds. By 1840, New Orleans became the second-largest importer of coffee beans due to proximity to Brazil and public demand. By 1860, America imported over 182 million pounds of the unroasted bitter green beans. New Orleans gained fame for its careful roasting and blending of coffee, although it also shipped green (unroasted) beans to the South, the North, and the Midwest. Then came the Civil War and the Anaconda Plan.³

To many, Union General-in-Chief Winfield Scott’s far-reaching “Anaconda” plan to encircle the seceded Confederate states seemed like a purely economic approach instead of a plan of action that would get the North’s blood in a boil. The blockade of southern ports appeared passive. A noisy faction of Union generals who wanted a more vigorous prosecution of the war widely derided Scott’s idea. They likened the plan to the coils of a snake suffocating its victim. The image caught on, giving the proposal its popular name. The Union generals proved to be shortsighted in the extreme.

But back to coffee The capture of the port of New Orleans early in the war cut off most of the available coffee beans in the South. Union General Ben Butler was able to reroute coffee ships up the coast to Boston and New York. The North never had a problem getting coffee or paying far too much for it. The South was another matter.

For Confederates—soldiers and civilians alike—real coffee was in very short supply. President Jefferson Davis’s commissary did not even attempt to



“Coffee Call,” by Winslow Homer. Print shows Army of the Potomac soldiers waiting for coffee at a campfire in an encampment. Library of Congress, 2013650297.



Coffee advertisement, US Standard Coffee, Inline Images, Getty Museum.

supply the Southern armies with a hot beverage. Gray-clad soldiers tried everything they could think of to replace the magic bean, including alternatives like roasted acorns, malted barley, cottonseed, sweet potato peels, and the ever-present chicory root.⁴ Each was toasted or mixed with a little bit of coffee so that the drink would be brown. It looked like coffee, anyway. The most successful of the substitutes was chicory root. In 1863, a small stand opened in the French Market, New Orleans. The coffee sold at Café du Monde is still one of the most popular coffees in America. Confederate General George Pickett grew very fond of one of these substitutes, preferring a cup of morning sweet potato to one of actual coffee. No one is certain if this continued after the war.⁵

The Union, however, had coffee. Prices went up, but the value of the dollar held up as well. It was plentiful and affordable for most. At 1.25 ounces per day per soldier, the average blue-clad drank over thirty-six pounds of coffee in a year. What is known about Civil War soldiers and their beverage of choice comes from several sources: diaries, letters, and memoirs are the primary places in which coffee is mentioned. According to historian Jon Grinspan, the curator of political history at the Smithsonian Institution's National Museum of American History, "The word 'coffee' is mentioned more times than 'bullets,' 'war,' 'cannon,' 'Lincoln,' and even 'mother.' You can only ignore what they're talking about for so long before you realize that's the story." Even around the campfire, much of the talk centered on the quality of that day's joe. Letters

indicated that a soldier was miserable when he missed his cup of coffee. The worst thing possible was for someone to accidentally spill coffee or ground beans, depriving others of their rightful ration. The North's access to caffeine may have given Union soldiers a strategic advantage. General Benjamin Butler ordered his men always to carry coffee in their canteens. He was said to have planned attacks based on when his men would be most wired. His advice to other generals: "If your men get their coffee early in the morning, you can hold."⁶

John D. Billings, in his appropriately named book *Hardtack & Coffee*, wrote:

The rations may have been small, the commissary or quartermaster may have given us a short allowance, but what we got was good. And what a perfect Godsend it seemed to us at times! How often, after being completely jaded by a night march,—and this is an experience common to thousands,—have I had a wash, if there was water to be had, made and drunk my pint or so of coffee, and felt as fresh and invigorated as if just arisen from a night's sound sleep!⁷

Billings argued that bread, not coffee, should top the list of importance to a soldier. He then offers several examples of pertinent coffee information that, collectively, prove him wrong:

Whatever words of condemnation or criticism may have been bestowed on other government



P0345_PLATE35_TRADING_COFFEE_FOR_TOBACCO

“Trading for Coffee and Tobacco Between the Fortified Lines During a Truce” plate35 is from Edwin Forbes’ publication “Life Studies of the Great Army.”⁸

rations, there was but one opinion of the coffee which was served out, and that was of unqualified approval.⁹

It was coffee at meals and between meals; men going on guard or coming off guard drank it at all hours of the night. and to-day, the old soldiers who can stand it are the hardest coffee-drinkers in the community, through the schooling they received in the service.¹⁰

Private Wilber Fisk of the 2nd Vermont Volunteers mentioned coffee several times in his diary, published as *Hard Marching Every Day*. He evidenced con-

cern about the safety of his coffee and regularly noted when he had made his daily cup:

I had an excellent breakfast that morning; if you doubt it, allow me to tell you what I had. I had a slice of fat pork, good enough for anybody to eat, plenty of hard tack, and COFFEE. I doubt if ever the Prince of Wales enjoyed a meal better.¹¹

Often Fisk related stories concerning the results of the lack of coffee:

One fellow ... had been assiduously preparing him a cup of coffee for his dinner, and which he seemed to regard as of more


than ordinary value because it was the last that he had the material for making. He has ... just got his coffee heated to the boiling point when the officer of the day came along, and he was ordered with the rest of us to fall in. Everybody knows that when coffee first boils, it takes a mischievous fancy to running over. This fellow waited a little too long. His coffee made out to boil, and in his hurry to remove it from the fire, he spilled the whole of it and burned himself in the bargain it was more than this soldier could muster, and the consequence was that he invoked terrible imprecations of wrath upon the heads of all officers in general and this one in particular.¹²

In April 1865, at the bloody, bitter end of the Civil War, Ebenezer Nel-

son Gilpin, a Union cavalryman, wrote in his diary, "Everything is chaos here. The suspense is almost unbearable. We are reduced to quarter rations and no coffee," he continued. "And nobody can soldier without coffee."¹³

The lack of coffee in the Confederacy affected soldiers and civilians alike. The acquisition of "magic beans" became a major preoccupation. An American Battlefield Trust article on coffee relates an oral history from one Virginia family:

As Union soldiers moved out after a small skirmish in the Northern Neck, Confederates scoured the campsites for every bean left behind, regardless of the dirt and debris clinging to the dropped bits. It was too precious of a commodity to leave in the field.¹⁴



The Coffee Wagon," The US Christian Commission. The Coffee Wagon was invented, built, and presented to the Commission, by Mr. Jacob Dunton, of Philadelphia.¹⁵

Union soldiers suffered, although not as much, from a lack of tobacco. The blockade cut both ways, and Civil War soldiers were enterprising. When armies were camped close together, informal truces were created to help alleviate the tobacco-caffeine situation. Some degree of stealth was involved, and stories abound of ways in which soldiers communicated their disparate needs.

Soldiers frequently mentioned physical truces with the opposing side. In Petersburg, Virginia, James Hall, a soldier in the Thirty-First Virginia Infantry, wrote that his troop and a Union unit maintained a truce “for a few minutes,” while he “exchanged papers with a Yankee,” and others received coffee before “both parties resumed firing.” Charles Lynch, a soldier in the 18th Connecticut Infantry, describes a similar situation:

Our boys and the Johnnies on the skirmish line entered into an agreement not to fire on one another. For proof, they fixed bayonets on their guns, sticking them in the ground, butts up Boys would meet between the lines, exchange tobacco for coffee.¹⁶

There are Civil War coffee tales, and there are Civil War coffee legends, some true, some not so much. A couple of these legends revolve around devices created specifically for coffee. The US Sanitary Commission, Clara Barton, and the Christian Commission all recognized the importance of coffee to the Union soldier. However, it was the Christian Commission that took their commit-

ment to soldier comfort to new heights. Firm in the belief that caring for bodies was a conduit to caring for the soul, the men and women of the YMCA went so far as to invent and use a new-fangled contraption called the Coffee Wagon.¹⁷ Jacob Dunton of Philadelphia designed, built, and presented the first one to the Commission. Reverend C.H. Richards, a commissioner who rendered service to the Ninth and Eighteenth Corps, in July 1864, described its use:

There was a call for coffee. A party of Delegates at once volunteered to respond to the call. The fires were lighted, the water boiled, the coffee made, and soon the vehicle, drawn by two powerful horses, and attended by half a score of willing laborers, was on its way from division to division.

Up the hospital avenue it rumbled and rolled, past the long rows of white tents, stopping at this cluster and that, giving to all from its generous supply. You should have seen the wondering look of the men as it passed by. They rolled themselves over to get a glimpse of it. They stretched their necks for a sight of it. The wounded heads forgot to ache, and the wounded limbs almost forgot to cry for nursing in that moment of eager curiosity. Was it a new sort of ambulance? It didn't look like one. What did those three black pipes mean, and those three glowing fires? Is it a steam fire-engine, and are they going to give us a shower-bath?

But the savory odor that saluted their nostrils, and the delicious beverage the engine poured into their little cups, soon put the matter beyond all doubt. They soon found that there was no necromancy about it, for it had a substantial blessing for each of them, giving it their blessings in return. One by one, such as were able, crowded about it with curious faces, and the wagon, as it stood steaming and glowing in the midst, was the theme of many affectionate comments. ‘I say, Bill, ain’t that a bully machine?’ ‘Yes, sir; it’s the greatest institution I ever saw.’ ‘That’s what you might call the Christian Light Artillery,’ says a third. ‘Good deal pleasanter ammunition in it than the Rebs sent us this morning.’ ‘Well, doctor,’ said a Delegate to a surgeon, ‘what do you think of this?’ ‘I thank the Lord for it. That’s all I can say,’ was his reply.

And so the new invention was crowned with the praises and benedictions of the admiring crowd. It was a marked feature in the work of the day, and must be set down as one of the ‘peculiar institutions’ of the Commission.”¹⁸

George Stuart, the Philadelphia dry goods merchant who served as President of the Commission throughout its lifespan, was not shy about singing the coffee wagons’ praises: “How many lives


of men wet, muddy, battle-worn, lying down on the ground, without shelter or fire,” he asked, “have been saved by the hot draught of coffee thus administered to them?”¹⁹

The second “contraption” involving coffee and the Civil War has a less illustrious, and probably more dubious story behind it—The Sharps Carbine Coffee Grinder Rifle. Legend has it that Missouri cavalryman Lieutenant Col. Walter King developed a grinding mill that could be incorporated into the buttstock of a Sharps carbine. In January 1865, King’s invention was tested and reviewed by Lincoln’s inspection board. However, their reports claim that the mill was actually to be used to grind grain, not coffee. According to plans, the purpose of such an invention was to supply one man in each cavalry company one of these grinder guns. That soldier would be responsible for grinding grain for the men in his unit when they were living “out of the saddle.”

There were issues:

- efficiency—if soldiers were lucky enough to stumble upon a sizable amount of grain while out foraging, chances are that it would have been near a mill that could be used to grind the grain in a much more efficient manner.
- compatibility—the mill was designed to work with a solid buttstock, meaning it could not be adapted for use in a Spencer carbine because the magazine tube was located where the grinder would need to go.

- weight—officials believed that if a soldier was going to have to add weight to his kit, it should come in the form of ammunition, not a novelty grinder. Nevertheless, Lt. King's contraption certainly looked like a coffee grinder. Since grain is usually ground in larger quantities than the amount held by the Sharps grinder, many assumed it was, in fact, a coffee grinder.²⁰



"William McKinley Serves Coffee." "Coffee Bill" Monument, Antietam National Battlefield, National Park Service.

Several years ago, the gun at the Springfield Armory in Massachusetts was discovered with coffee grounds still in the mill when it was cleaned by museum staff. The leftover coffee was not from the Civil War. It was from a more recent test done by the armory's director, who did not thoroughly clean it afterward. His results indicated that the mill could grind coffee, but not particularly well. Even the redoubtable historians at the National Park Service tested the coffee mill. They attempted to

grind coffee beans with one of the rifles in their collection. They, too, found that it was unsuitable. As impressive as the idea might be, and intriguing as the images are, the Sharps Carbine Coffee Mill Rifle was never really a "thing." Several museums claiming to have original versions of this gun have probably been taken in. Most of America's gun collectors claim that there are perhaps twelve authentic versions in existence. There were Coffee Wagons, but no coffee mill guns.²¹

One of the most memorable examples of just how much a cup of coffee meant to a Union soldier is illustrated by a monument on the Antietam battlefield near Burnside's Bridge. It was erected in 1903 and commemorates the place where an enlisted nineteen-year-old brought pots of hot coffee to his battling regiment during combat in the battle of Antietam. It was the morning of September 17, 1862. The Twenty-Third Ohio had marched two miles to enter the firefight at a stone bridge spanning Antietam Creek. They had left camp without breakfast or even a cup of coffee. It was the job of young Private William McKinley, former Ohio schoolteacher and current Commissary Sergeant, to feed his men, and there had been no time to do so. From McKinley's position back at camp, he could hear the sound of battle. He quickly decided what he could do to help the cause. He brewed as much coffee as possible, grabbed some food, and loaded everything into two wagons. Driving a couple of mules, McKinley guided his team toward the battlefield. General J. L. Botsford of the Ohio Volunteers later wrote:

It was nearly dusk when we heard tremendous cheering from the left of our regiment. As we had been having heavy fighting right up to this time, our division commander, General Scammon, sent me to find out the cause which I very soon found to be cheers for McKinley and his hot coffee. It was like putting a new regiment in the fight.²²

The men held out tin cups, gulped Private McKinley's brew, and started firing again.

The monument at Antietam reads:

William McKinley

January 29, 1843 - September
14, 1901

Fourteen Years Member of
Congress

Twice Governor of Ohio 1892-
2 and 1894-5

Twice President of United
States 1897-1900-1901

Sergeant McKinley Co. E. 23rd
Ohio Vol. Infantry, while in
charge of the Commissary
Department, on the after-
noon of the day of the battle of
Antietam, September 17, 1862,
personally and without orders
served hot coffee and warm food
to every man in the Regiment,
on this spot and in doing so had
to pass under fire.²³

When William McKinley braved enemy fire to bring his comrades a warm cup, he knew what it meant to them.

Almost every event of the Civil War has a coffee aspect, and this deserves attention for one specific reason. In general, Americans have always supported their military—from the earliest militias before the Revolution to today's armed forces spread over the globe. Citizens have sought ways to show our people in uniform that they are supported. Coffee has long been recognized as essential to good unit cohesion. Making

and drinking coffee helps soldiers bond. They help each other make the brew, talk about its pros and cons, collectively attempt to make better coffee, and complain about its absence when it is not there. To have coffee in common contributes to building and sustaining the will and the commitment to each other and the unit that is essential to success, despite combat or mission stress. This is as true today as it ever was. Making and sharing coffee brings aid and comfort to the battlefield and the camp. The Coffee Wagon, the steaming tin cup, and the communal pot draw troops together for a moment of camaraderie amid the realities of war.

As the Civil War continued and the Union army grew, its camps became

makeshift cities, housing hundreds of thousands of men. “They were in battle maybe one or two weeks of the whole year,” according to John Grinspan. “They weren’t always shooting their rifles at enemies, or being chased or fired upon, but every day they made coffee. Here’s an irony. These soldiers who were fighting ostensibly to end slavery were fueled by coffee from slave fields in Brazil.”²⁴

Afterword

This piece was written during the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020. One of the interesting ideas to come from adapting to life in quarantine was the increase in podcasts and



Private William McKinley, Twenty-Third Ohio Vol. Infantry,
Co. E. National Park Service.

videos concerning a variety of subjects. Most Civil War museums and many Civil War bloggers created a variety of videos that, cumulatively, brought the Civil War to the viewer at a time when it was impossible to travel to Civil War sites and museums. I watched many of these presentations and was inspired enough to choose coffee as a topic for this offering. Being a soldier is sort of like being in quarantine, after all. The links I am listing will inspire you as well, I am sure.

The first three are created by the Civil War Digital Digest blog, or vlog. Reenactors provide a look at hands-on demonstrations of how to make an authentic cup of Civil War coffee—no room for farbs in these presentations. “Coffee on Campaign” demonstrates how to make an individual cup of coffee while marching toward Georgia, or anywhere else. “How to Roast Coffee” shows how green coffee beans—which are what were often delivered to the camps—were cleaned, separated, and carefully roasted by the individual soldier. This is trickier than it sounds, and the viewer can almost smell the results through the computer screen. “Coffee *a la Zouave*” demonstrates how camp cooks and commissary workers made coffee in larger batches, tending the beans while the rest of the unit set up or cleaned camp. These are relatively short, beautifully filmed, and very accurate. Whether creating a personal living history impression or doing research into the common soldier, each of these offerings is first-rate.

The last two are videos of Zoom presentations created by the National Museum of Civil War Medicine, in Frederick, Maryland. These are excellent examples of how a museum can extend its influence beyond its walls. Hopefully the success of such offerings will start a trend. Jake Wynn and Kyle Dalton—young historians of great personality and presence—discuss a variety of topics, interacting with a computer audience at the same time. “Coffee & the Civil War” explains the history of coffee as a military brew, adding the unique perspective of the NMCWM and their own quirky personalities. One topic that comes up several times is the one of coffee substitutes used in the Confederacy. This lively exchange led to the second video, “Confederate Coffee Substitutes.” This is a “home-made” offering shot in Kyle Dalton’s kitchen. Kyle, a coffee lover in real life, cooks up five types of coffees from Civil War recipes. Only one—the “control”—is actual coffee. There are four varieties of faux coffee: coffee with whipped egg creamer, “Essence of Coffee,” sweet potato coffee, and acorn/bacon coffee. Kyle’s long-suffering girlfriend is asked to try them all and rate them. Spoiler alert! She survives.

Please, readers—brew up a cup of your favorite coffee, check these online offerings out, and enjoy them. And always remember those who drank their coffee out of tin cups while under fire. Huzzah!

Civil War Digital Digest Vol. 1, Episode 7, “Coffee a la Zouave.” <https://video.search.yahoo.com/yhs/search?fr=yhs-Lkry-SF1&hsimp=yhs-SF1&hspart=Lkry&p=civil+war+digest+coffee#id=3&vid=ad9886307b86d9f38da6939c35337b8e&action=view>.

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- 7 John D. Billings, *Hardtack & Coffee* (Chicago: The Lakeside Press, 1960), 123.
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- 11 Emil & Ruth Rosenblatt, ed., *Hard Marching Every Day: The Civil War letters of Private Wilber Fisk-1861-1865* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1992), 119-20.
- 12 Ibid., 156-57.
- 13 Grinspan
- 14 Webb
- 15 <https://www.asymca.org/coffee-wagon>.
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The Continental Navy's Shakedown Cruise

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ABSTRACT

Eight ships of the recently established Continental Navy set sail from Philadelphia in February 1776. They were under orders from the Continental Congress to clear the Southern states' waters of marauding British naval forces, such as those organized by Lord Dunmore of Virginia. Instead, Commodore Esek Hopkins led his squadron to New Providence in the Bahamas, where they captured desperately needed military stores. On the return trip, the Continental crews contended with outbreaks of smallpox and tropical fever aboard ship. Approaching New England, the squadron captured two small British vessels and chased the 20-gun HMS *Glasgow* into port. Despite Hopkins' casual disregard of orders, Congress and the general public hailed the expedition as a great success upon the squadron's return in April 1776. The ships of the Continental Navy had gathered valuable experience at sea and in combat that would serve the infant service well in the years to come.

Keywords: American Revolution, Continental Navy, New Providence, HMS *Glasgow*, Esek Hopkins, John Paul Jones, Nicholas Biddle, Samuel Nicholas, naval warfare, eighteenth century

El crucero Shakedown de la Marina Continental

RESUMEN

Ocho barcos de la Marina Continental recientemente establecida zarparon de Filadelfia en febrero de 1776. Estaban bajo las órdenes del Congreso Continental de limpiar las aguas de los estados del sur de las fuerzas navales británicas merodeadores, como las organizadas por Lord Dunmore de Virginia. En cambio, el comodoro Esek Hopkins llevó a su escuadrón a New Providence en las Bahamas, donde capturaron provisiones militares que se necesitaban desesperadamente. En el viaje de regreso, las tripulaciones de Continental se enfrentaron a brotes de viruela y fiebre tropical a bordo del barco. Al acercarse a Nueva Inglaterra, el escuadrón capturó dos pequeños buques británicos y persiguió al HMS *Glasgow*

de 20 cañones hasta el puerto. A pesar de la indiferencia casual de Hopkins hacia las órdenes, el Congreso y el público en general elogiaron la expedición como un gran éxito tras el regreso del escuadrón en abril de 1776. Los barcos de la Armada Continental habían acumulado una valiosa experiencia en el mar y en combate que serviría bien al servicio infantil. en los años venideros.

Palabras clave: Revolución Americana, Marina Continental, New Providence, HMS *Glasgow*, Esek Hopkins, John Paul Jones, Nicholas Biddle, Samuel Nicholas, guerra naval, siglo XVIII

大陆海军的试航巡洋舰

摘要

1776年2月，新成立的大陆海军派出8艘巡洋舰从费城启航。它们受大陆会议（Continental Congress）的命令，清理在南方州肆意掠夺的英国海军的水域，诸如这类由弗吉尼亚自治领的邓莫尔勋爵组织的活动。然而，海军准将伊萨克·霍普金斯（Esek Hopkins）将中队带到了巴哈马的新普罗维登斯岛，他们在那获取了急需的军事储备。返程途中，大陆海军船员与天花爆发及热带性发热病（tropical fever）作斗争。靠近新英格兰时，中队俘获了两艘小型英国船只，并将装有20炮的皇家海军舰艇“*Glasgow*”赶进了港口。尽管霍普金斯随意忽视命令，但当中队于1776年4月返回后，大陆会议和公众将这次探险称赞为一次巨大的成功。大陆海军巡洋舰在海上和战争过程中获得的宝贵经验将在未来几年里为这一初期海军事业服务。

关键词：美国革命，大陆海军，新普罗维登斯岛，皇家海军舰艇“*Glasgow*”（HMS *Glasgow*），伊萨克·霍普金斯（Esek Hopkins），约翰·保罗·琼斯（John Paul Jones），尼古拉·比德尔（Nicholas Biddle），塞缪尔·尼古拉斯（Samuel Nicholas），海战，十八世纪

On 5 January 1776, as newly appointed “Commander-in-Chief” of the Continental Navy, Esek Hopkins (1718–1802) was ordered to take his squadron to sea and engage any British forces they encountered in the waters of Virginia and the Carolinas, returning to do the same off Rhode Island. He made use of an “unforeseen accidents” clause in his orders

from the Continental Congress rather than following them directly and adopted his plan: the squadron conducted an amphibious raid on the British colony of New Providence in early March, weathered an outbreak of disease at sea, and fought an unsuccessful engagement with the 20-gun HMS *Glasgow* before arriving at New London, Connecticut on 8 April. While the Continental Congress initially praised the squadron's performance, Hopkins was eventually censured and relieved of his command for violating his orders and

other perceived shortcomings. However, by disregarding his orders, Commodore Hopkins provided the Continental Navy with a valuable initial experience that demonstrated its viability without risking its early destruction. This paper demonstrates the above thesis by examining Hopkins's orders and the squadron's resources at his disposal and then analyzing British naval strength in Virginia as of spring 1776, the squadron's performance at Nassau and against *Glasgow*, and the immediate aftermath of their expedition.



Esek Hopkins, Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet of the United Colonies, 1775–1777. Citation: Painting by Orlando S. Lagman after a nineteenth-century engraving by J.C. Buttre, Naval History and Heritage Command Photograph Collection, NH 85750-KN.

Esek Hopkins was born on 26 April 1718 in Scituate, Rhode Island. He began to build his fortune from the sea early on when he used money acquired from his marriage to Desire Burroughs to purchase a merchant ship. The ship would prove to be a wise investment, as, during the French and Indian War, Hopkins made the transition from merchant captain to successful privateer. During the interwar years, he commanded the slave ship, *Sally*, during a calamitous voyage in which 109 of his 196 human cargo perished in transit. By the outbreak of the American Revolution, the Hopkins family had accumulated much political influence in Rhode Island: Esek received a commission as a Brigadier General in the militia, while his brother Stephen was appointed to the Continental Congress. Shortly after Stephen became Chairman of the Naval Committee, Esek was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet of the United Colonies on 5 November 1775.¹ This rather wordy title was occasionally shortened to “Admiral” in contemporary letters and newspapers (though the United States did not officially appoint an admiral until well into the next century). However, today’s US Navy lists Esek Hopkins as a commodore.²

Commodore Hopkins received his “Orders and Directions” from the Naval Committee on 5 January 1776. In response to appeals made by the Southern delegates to the Continental Congress, his squadron was to proceed directly to the Chesapeake Bay and determine the strength of British forces in Virginia. If the conditions were favorable, Hopkins and his ships were to “at-

tack, take or destroy all the Naval force of our Enemies”³ that could be found. The squadron was then to repeat the process in the Carolinas and again in Rhode Island upon their return north. The squadron was also under orders to “seize and make prize of all such Transport Ships and other Vessels as may be found carrying Supplies of any kind to or any way aiding or assisting our Enemies.”⁴ A clause toward the end of the Naval Committee’s instructions would eventually form the basis of Hopkins’s plans: “if bad Winds, or Stormy Weather, or any other unforeseen accident or disaster disable you to do so You are then to follow such Courses as your best Judgment shall Suggest to you as most useful to the American Cause and to distress the Enemy by all means in your power.”⁵

Those were remarkably bold orders given the limited resources of the nascent Continental Navy. The ships of Commodore Hopkins’s squadron were all converted merchantmen, coastal traders, or pilot boats. Loading such vessels down with the cannon, military stores, and extra crew necessary to turn them into warships inevitably changed their sailing qualities for the worse. The merchantman *Black Prince*, for example, logged the fastest day of sailing recorded in the eighteenth century in September 1775, but crammed with twenty-four guns and rechristened *Alfred* barely three months later, she proved to be “clumsey [sic] and crank” throughout her military career.⁶ Until the thirteen purpose-built frigates ordered by the Continental Congress in December 1775 were completed, Hop-

kings would have to make do with converted merchantmen. In addition to *Alfred*, and the squadron consisted of the ship *Columbus* (twenty guns), the brigs *Andrew Doria* and *Cabot* (fourteen guns each), the sloops *Providence* and *Hornet* (twelve and ten guns respectively), and the schooners *Wasp* and *Fly* (eight guns each).⁷ Military service was also a new experience for the majority of the officers and men. Like Commodore Hopkins, Captain Dudley Saltonstall of *Alfred* had served in privateers. Nicholas Biddle, commanding *Andrew Doria*, was the only captain in the squadron who had served in the Royal Navy, and then only as a lowly midshipman.⁸

Incessant winter weather and icy conditions kept the squadron stuck in the Delaware River well into February 1776. On the 14th, Commodore Hopkins distributed signals and general instructions for the anticipated expedition. The eight ship captains were ordered to sail in company with the Commodore, and also “to use all possible Means to join the Fleet as soon as possible” at Abaco in the Bahamas if foul weather or other accident caused the squadron to separate. However, in his April 1776 report to President John Hancock of the Continental Congress, Hopkins wrote, “I did not think we were in a Condition to keep on a cold Coast.”⁹ The Commodore smartly had never intended to sail for Virginia; Congress’s plan for the squadron had become public knowledge almost immediately. As early as 25 December 1775, General George Washington had written to Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Reed in Philadelphia:

I fear the destination of the Vessels from your Port is so generally known as to defeat the end. two Men of War (40 guns) it is said, put into New York the other day & were instantly ordered out—supposed to be for Virginia.¹⁰

Even without two additional frigates at their disposal, British forces in Virginia would have met Hopkins and his squadron with significant organized resistance. The beleaguered royal governor, Lord Dunmore, had fled the capital at Williamsburg in June 1775. Dunmore spent that summer and fall raising military support from loyalists and slaves from rebel masters and gathering what few regular British forces he could find. By December, Dunmore had seized the merchantman *William* for use as his headquarters and augmented his naval power with the sixteen-gun sloops-of-war *Otter* and *Kingfisher* and the twenty-eight-gun frigate *Liverpool*, in addition to the numerous armed tenders these vessels could deploy. Dunmore’s forces quickly became adept at raiding rebel plantations on the James River, capturing munitions, provisions, and other supplies while based out of Norfolk and Gosport.¹¹

Congress had recently been informed that “a frigate of thirty guns, with metal proportionate ... would not only become master of these, [*Otter*, *Kingfisher*, and *Liverpool*] but of Dunmore’s ship *Wm.* & a vast many other vessels loaded with the floating property of Tories.”¹² Hopkins’s squadron, however, would have been no match

for such a concentration of force. By the time the Continental squadron sailed, Dunmore's vessels had already spent months operating together and navigating the rivers and small waterways of southeastern Virginia. By contrast, Commodore Hopkins's ships and crews were thoroughly inexperienced and untested. Given their haphazard performance against HMS *Glasgow* in April 1776, an engagement with Lord Dunmore's vessels could easily have resulted in severe damage to, if not the outright destruction of, Hopkins's squadron.

The Continental squadron finally got underway for the Bahamas on 18 February 1776. Interestingly, Congress had met in secret session late the previous November to discuss "a large quantity of powder" held on the island of New Providence and the feasibility of sending a naval force to capture it.¹³ No records survive of Congress issuing any orders to raid New Providence. Still, if his brother Stephen had informed him of these discussions, Commodore Hopkins would have seen his chosen destination as a tempting target of opportunity.

In any case, the expedition got off to a tempestuous start. Two days after departure, *Hornet* and *Fly* ran afoul of one another in a storm off the Virginia Capes, resulting in their separation from the squadron. *Fly* rejoined on 11 March but was detached again before the squadron left New Providence; word subsequently reached Commodore Hopkins that they had gotten into port in South Carolina. *Hornet* remained off the mid-Atlantic coast

and spent the next year patrolling Delaware Bay.¹⁴ Ten subsequent days of clear weather allowed the remaining ships to repair their storm damage and begin gunnery drills.¹⁵ The squadron dropped anchor off the southern end of Abaco on 1 March.

Almost immediately upon their arrival, the squadron took two sloops from the island of New Providence. Several of the captured crew informed Hopkins that a large amount of gunpowder, military stores, and cannon were held in two forts near the town of Nassau, defended only by the inhabitants instead of British regulars. The Commodore and his captains developed a plan to load the captured sloops with sailors and marines and send them in to take the forts by surprise while the rest of the squadron remained hidden nearby. Inexplicably, when the sloops entered Nassau harbor on 2 March, the entire Continental squadron went in with them. The locals manning the fort fired alarm guns as the Americans approached. With the element of surprise lost, Commodore Hopkins ordered a retreat.¹⁶

The following day, the captured sloops supported by *Providence* and *Wasp* staged an amphibious attack on Fort Montague, a short distance from Nassau. The defenders fired a total of five cannon, doing no damage to the approaching Americans. The 270 men who landed under the command of Captain Samuel Nicholas of the Continental Marines were initially mistaken for attacking Spaniards, but Captain Nicholas soon "undeceived" them. Ac-



Continental forces land at New Providence on 3 March 1776. Oil on canvas by V. Zveg, 1973. US Navy Art Collection, Washington, DC. US Naval History and Heritage Command #NH 79419.

According to the letter published later by Nicholas, a messenger from the Royal Governor of the Bahamas approached the Americans to ask their intentions. When Nicholas declared his intent to seize all the Crown's military stores on the island and advanced on the fort, the defenders opened fire with three 12-pound shot. Even though the Americans had escaped damage once again, Captain Nicholas called a halt and sent a messenger to Fort Montague, who insisted the Americans would only seize military resources and promised not to take any private property or harm the inhabitants except in self-defense. The defenders promptly sabotaged the guns and retreated to Fort Nassau within the town itself. After capturing

and easily repairing seventeen 32-, 18-, and 12-pound cannon, Nicholas raised American colors and had his men camp at Fort Montague for the night.¹⁷

Meanwhile, in anticipation of an advance on Fort Nassau on the morning of 4 March, Commodore Hopkins sent the following manifesto to the inhabitants of the Island of New Providence:

The Reasons of my Landing an armed force on the Island is in Order to take Possession of the Powder and Warlike Stores belonging to the Crown, and if I am not Opposed in putting my design in Execution the Persons and Property of the Inhabitants Shall be Safe, Neither shall they

be Suffered to be hurt in Case they make no Resistance.¹⁸

While this echoed the tone of the messages sent to the town by Captain Nicholas, Governor Montfort Brown was determined to resist anyway. No armed attack was made against the Continental Marines holding Fort Montague, but the governor arranged to have 150 half-barrels of gunpowder removed from Fort Nassau and secreted aboard a sloop that easily eluded Hopkins's squadron, which had not blockaded the harbor. According to John Paul Jones, second-in-command of *Alfred* at the time, "This was foreseen, and might have been prevented, by sending the two brigantines [*Andrew Doria* and *Cabot*] to lie off the bar."¹⁹ Writing in 1974, Nathan Miller was more direct: "The commodore's carelessness cost him the bulk of the powder that had brought him to New Providence in the first place."²⁰

After spending the night at Fort Montague, Captain Nicholas and his men marched into town, seized Government House, and demanded the keys to Fort Nassau. The local defenders did not fire a shot to prevent the Americans from taking possession from the fort. Therein they found a veritable treasure trove: seventy-one cannon from 9- to 32-pounders, fifteen mortars from 4 to 11 inches, thousands of shells and various types of shot, 140 "hand Grenadoes," assorted military implements and provisions, and twenty-four half barrels of gunpowder. When Hopkins and Nicholas learned that Governor Brown had gotten most of the

gunpowder away during the night, they placed him under arrest along with his secretary, James Babbidge, and Thomas Arwin, the Inspector General of His Majesty's Customs in North America.²¹

The Continental crews spent two weeks following the capture of Fort Nassau loading their captured munitions. They had taken so much ordnance that Commodore Hopkins had to hire a privately owned sloop to carry a portion of it to Rhode Island.²² An outbreak of disease delayed the squadron's work. Hopkins later reported that four of his ships had many men sick with smallpox when they first set sail, and the disease had spread during the intervening weeks. *Andrew Doria* served as a hospital ship for a time, as Captain Biddle previously had his crew inoculated. Protecting against smallpox did little against the wave of tropical fever that spread throughout the squadron in early March, and soon Biddle had a long sick list of his own. When the squadron arrived at New London in April, *Andrew Doria* reported three men dead and forty-nine sick out of an original complement of 110.²³ Other ships in the squadron reported illness in similar proportions; difficulties in replacing men discharged sick resulted in significant delays to future deployments of Hopkins's ship, which was a factor in his eventual censure and relief.

The squadron departed New Providence on 18 March, passing Georgia, the Carolinas, and Virginia again without a thought of stopping; if it had been unwise for the Commodore to engage Dunmore's forces in February,

smallpox and tropical fever had reduced their chances even further. The weather during the return trip proved troublesome as well; *Wasp* was separated from the squadron in a storm and made her way independently back to Philadelphia by 4 April.²⁴ That same day would prove an auspicious one when *Columbus* came across the 6-gun schooner *Hawke* (a tender to the British squadron operating out of Newport, Rhode Island) near Long Island and compelled her to strike her colors without having to fire a shot. The brief action was the first time a Continental Navy ship captured a Royal Navy vessel. The following day, Hopkins's squadron captured the bomb brig *Bolton*, designed to lob explosive shells from two howitzers, armed with eight additional cannon, and "well found with all sorts of Stores, Arms, Powder &c."²⁵ While the expedition had not been without its challenges up to that point, Commodore Hopkins and his squadron approached Rhode Island with a respectable haul of captured vessels and military supplies.

Around half-past one in the morning on 6 April, as the squadron approached Block Island off southern Rhode Island, the American crews were suddenly roused by shouts to prepare for action. With the brig *Cabot* (commanded by the Commodore's son, Captain John Burroughs Hopkins) in the van of the squadron, her crew detected an unknown ship steering directly for them. The newcomer was the 20-gun HMS *Glasgow*, one of the vessels of the British squadron at Newport. Commodore Hopkins, in *Alfred*, was a short distance behind his son's brig but issued

no signals to the rest of the squadron. In the words of Captain Biddle aboard *Andrew Doria*, "Away we went all Helter Skelter one flying here another there to cut off the Retreat of a fellow that did not fear us. I kept close to the Admiral that I might sooner receive his orders. But he had none to give." As *Glasgow's* captain called out for the Continental ships to identify themselves, an over-eager marine threw a grenade from *Cabot*, which was promptly answered by a full British broadside.²⁶

Cabot returned fire but *Glasgow's* better-drilled gun crews and heavier cannon quickly outmatched the American vessel. Multiple broadsides smashed into *Cabot's* hull and rigging, killing four men and wounding seven others, including young Captain Hopkins. Barely under control, *Cabot* broke off for the rest of the battle and nearly ran afoul of *Andrew Doria*, forcing Captain Biddle to steer away and delayed his entry into the action. Next to engage *Glasgow* was *Alfred* herself, which kept in close combat for nearly a half-hour until *Alfred's* tiller ropes were shot away. As *Alfred* drifted out of control, *Glasgow* was able to rake the Continental flagship fore-and-aft, inflicting heavy damage, and killing six men and wounding six more. *Andrew Doria* was then able to join the battle, along with *Columbus*. According to Biddle, "we exercised Great Guns and small arms and had two men hurt by it." *Alfred* was able to regain steering control, and the three Continental vessels chased *Glasgow* towards Newport until daylight. At that point, Commodore Hopkins felt they were being drawn imprudently close

to the rest of the British squadron and broke off the chase. The sloop *Providence* had never attempted to engage the enemy. By mid-morning, *Glasgow* was safely in Newport with extensive damage to her masts and rigging. The British crew suffered only a single death and three men wounded, all from musket fire from Captain Nicholas's Continental Marines.²⁷

The battered Continental squadron arrived at New London, Connecticut, on 7 April 1776 and were greeted by the local population as conquering heroes, their two hundred sick and wounded notwithstanding. When Hopkins's official report reached Philadelphia, the Continental Congress was ecstatic with the expedition's results. While the squadron had not traveled to any of the destinations in Hopkins's orders, they had certainly proven "most useful to the American cause" and "distressed the Enemy" as Congress had enjoined. President Hancock wrote to the Commodore:

I beg Leave to congratulate you on the Success of your Expedition. Your Account of the Spirit and Bravery shown by the Men, affords them the greatest Satisfaction; and encourages them to expect similar Exertions of Courage on every future Occasion. Though it is to be regretted, that the *Glasgow* Man of War made her Escape, yet as it was not thro' any Misconduct, the Praise due to You and the other Officers, is undoubtedly the same.²⁸

During this first expedition of the Continental Navy, the leadership of Commodore Hopkins was certainly not without its flaws. On 2 March 1776, for example, Hopkins failed to enforce the provisions of his plans when the entire squadron accompanied the landing force to attack Fort Nassau, giving the inhabitants time to prepare their defenses and plan the removal of the majority of their gunpowder. Just over one month later, he never issued instructions or made a single signal that could have possibly resulted in the capture of HMS *Glasgow*. Once the initial glow of the squadron's arrival at New London had faded, criticisms of the battle soon made their way through letters and newspapers. Captain Nicholas Biddle wrote that "a More imprudent ill conducted Affair never happened And yet I do not see how the Admiral can be Blamd [sic] for whether it was against his judgement or not he could not help the Action being brought on." Biddle was nonetheless so soured on the idea of sailing under Hopkins's command that he "had Rather have Dawson's Pilot Boat to Cruise where I please than be even in the A.Doria and follow the fleet."²⁹

Soon after his arrival, Commodore Hopkins wrote to the governors of Connecticut and Rhode Island, offering some of his captured cannons and ammunition for the defense of their colonies, despite having no authority from Congress to distribute any Continental stores.³⁰ He would also soon be criticized for failing to see that the squadron's officers and men were paid promptly and an apparent inability to

run Newport's British blockade and thereby protect the New England coast. These factors and the reminder that he had technically disobeyed his initial orders led to Hopkins's censure by the Continental Congress on 16 August 1776. When delays in refitting and re-manning the squadron persisted for more than six months after, Hopkins was suspended from command on 26 March 1777. He promptly embarked on a campaign of self-vindication and criticism of Congress, which brought about his dismissal from the Continental Navy on 2 January 1778.³¹

The Continental Navy's expedition from February to April 1776 proved the viability of the infant service. Commodore Hopkins wisely chose not to sail to Virginia and risk a dangerous engagement with a well-organized enemy force that likely would have known the squadron was coming. Instead, Hopkins struck at more lightly defended targets on New Providence. This raid captured cannons, gunpowder, ammunition, and other military stores that Continental forces were in desperate need of at the time. The squadron's capture of small warships such as *Hawke* and *Bolton* demonstrated that the Royal Navy was not invincible. While *Glasgow* did succeed in fending off four ships

single-handedly, the fact that she fled for the support of nearby reinforcements was taken by Congress and the American public alike as a moral victory similar in scope to that achieved by Massachusetts soldiers at Bunker Hill.

The squadron also endured its share of mistakes and mishaps. Three of Commodore Hopkins's original eight vessels were separated at different points from the west in stormy weather. The squadron departed Philadelphia with smallpox raging among the crews, which were further ravaged by tropical fevers. Commodore Hopkins's shortcomings in executing the New Providence raid and the battle with HMS *Glasgow* are now obvious. However, this same expedition gave the Continental Navy valuable shakedown time and experience in single-ship and squadron operations and gave them their first taste of naval combat. They completed the expedition without the loss of a single vessel and relatively few combat casualties.

While his tenure as Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet of the United Colonies was not a lengthy or particularly glorious one, Esek Hopkins successfully demonstrated that America could stand against Great Britain on the sea.

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Into the Maelstrom: America and Vietnam, 1945–1956

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ABSTRACT

In 1945, the United States began its involvement in Vietnam -- an involvement that spanned thirty years and ended up causing the deaths of over 55,000 American servicemen and women, as well as many as 2,000,000 Vietnamese. This involvement was tragic and avoidable. Beginning with the Administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt and continuing through the administrations of Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon, the United States labored under the misguided impression that the suppression of Communism in Southeast Asia was vitally important to the security of the United States. Was the war in Vietnam a civil war, or a proxy war between the United States, Russia, and China? Or was it the Vietnamese people's determination to rid themselves of foreign domination?

Keywords: Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh, France, Japan, Dien Bien Phu, Communism, OSS, Viet Minh, Domino Theory.

Dentro del maelstrom: EE. UU. y Vietnam, 1945-1956

RESUMEN

En 1945, Estados Unidos comenzó su participación en Vietnam, una participación que duró treinta años y terminó causando la muerte de más de 55.000 hombres y mujeres estadounidenses en servicio, así como de 2.000.000 vietnamitas. Esta participación fue trágica y evitable. Comenzando con la administración de Franklin D. Roosevelt y continuando a través de las administraciones de Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson y Nixon, Estados Unidos trabajó bajo la impresión equivocada de que la supresión del comunismo en el sudeste asiático era de vital importancia para la seguridad del Estados Unidos. ¿Fue la guerra de Vietnam una guerra civil o una guerra indirecta entre Estados Unidos, Rusia y China? ¿O fue la determinación del pueblo vietnamita de deshacerse de la dominación extranjera?

Palabras clave: Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh, Francia, Japón, Dien Bien Phu, Comunismo, OSS, Viet Minh, Teoría del dominó

进入大混乱：1945-1956年的美国和越南

摘要

1945年，美国开始参与越南事务——这一参与延续了30年之久，并最终导致超过55,000名美国军人死亡，以及2,000,000名越南军人死亡。这次参与是悲惨的，可避免的。从富兰克林·D·罗斯福政府开始，再到杜鲁门、艾森豪威尔、肯尼迪、约翰逊、尼克森政府，美国的行动源于一个错误印象，即对东南亚地区的共产主义进行压迫对美国的安全而言至关重要。越南战争是一场内战，还是美国、俄罗斯和中国之间的一次代理人战争？又或者，是越南人民决定摆脱外国统治的一次战争？


关键词：越南，胡志明，法国，日本，奠边府，共产主义，OSS，越盟，多米诺理论

It has been 45 years since Saigon fell, ending American involvement in the Vietnam War. “Decades after the first U.S. soldier set foot in Saigon, the Vietnam War remains one of the most tragic and unresolved events in American history and foreign policy.”¹

The United States could have avoided the Vietnam conflict, but Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, and later Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon, along with Senators and Congressmen, had divorced themselves from losing ground to Communism. The theory that suppression of a communist takeover of Vietnam was vital to United States security became policy. From the beginning of America’s involvement until its final withdrawal in 1975, America’s “polit-

ical, military, and diplomatic leaders deluded themselves, accepting a series of myths and illusions about Vietnam that exacerbated and deepened the ultimate catastrophe.”² Today millions of people in both Vietnam and the United States suffer from the quarter-century war that shattered both countries social and political fabric. The Vietnam War still impacts our elections as well as our foreign and defense policies.

Although there are many books about America’s involvement in Vietnam, there is still no explicit agreement about the character of the war or its roots. What was (or were) the origin(s) of the conflict? Was it a civil war, or was it the Vietnamese people’s resistance against the domination of foreign pow-



Hồ Chí Minh, also known as Nguyễn Ái Quốc, and “Uncle Hồ” (19 May 1890 – 2 September 1969), served as Prime Minister of North Vietnam from 1945 to 1955 and President from 1945 to 1969. Ideologically a Marxist–Leninist, Hồ served as Chairman and First Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Vietnam. This photo has been used on the face of North Vietnamese currency since 1951.³

ers? Or was it, as some argue, another proxy war between the United States and the Soviet Union. Todd Gitlen, a well-respected sociologist, believes that the Vietnam War caused a division in how America views itself, writing, “America, whatever its rights and its wrongs, stands triumphant, its glorious destiny manifest. On the other, America knows defeat, even shame.”⁴

Most historians agree that the Vietnam War began in the 1950s; however, the struggle for control over Indochina had roots that reached back to the first century B.C. Over the succeeding years, many countries—the United States, France, China, the Soviet Union, Cambodia, Laos, Australia, Korea, and others became involved in one of the most protracted, most violent, and

complex conflicts in modern history.

The early struggle began when the Han dynasty of China began a rule that would have China controlling Indochina for the better part of a thousand years. When the Tang dynasty collapsed in 907 AD Vietnam was able to gain and maintain its independence for over 900 years. This period of independence ended in the mid-1800s when Vietnam’s emperor, Tu Duc, agreed to cede the provinces of Bien Hoa, Gia Dinh, and Din Tuong to France. In 1887, France imposed a colonial government system in Vietnam and began referring to the area as French Indochina. This system included Tonkin Annam, Cochin-China, and Cambodia, and eventually added Laos.



Ngo Dinh Diem (3 January 1901 – 2 November, 1963) served as the South Vietnamese President from 1955 until his assassination.⁵

During World War II, Japan occupied Vietnam but left the French government in place, even though they had little or no authority. The Japanese did not believe they had enough resources for a total occupation, so by leaving the French government in place, Japan was able to develop Vietnam as a client state. It was the Japanese occupation of Vietnam that first attracted the attention of the United States. Even though the United States and Japan were not at war at this time, the United States actively attempted to thwart any Japanese expansion in Asia that would disrupt the importation of raw rubber and tin. Southeast Asia was also a producer of petroleum products as well as other commodities. During this time of Japanese occupation, the Americans worked with Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh

to get information regarding the movements and numbers of Japanese troops. While there was no formal alliance, Ho Chi Minh believed that his aid might help sway Washington to support his fight for Vietnamese independence.

Following their defeat in 1945, Japan abandoned Indochina, giving rise to a period where there were no foreign governments involved in the running of the country. This opened the door for two competing forces to struggle for control. Because the Japanese did not totally disband the French colonial government, in March 1945, the French took total control of the country and installed Emperor Bao Dai as a puppet leader. This vacuum also provided an opening for Ho Chi Minh and his revolutionary movement which was dedicated to ending all colonial control over



Hồ Chí Minh in 1945 (fifth from left standing) with members of the clandestine Office of Special Services (OSS) Deer Team (from l. to r.: Rene Defourneaux, (Ho), Allison Thomas, (Giap), Henry Prunier and Paul Hoagland, far right. Kneeling, left, are Lawrence Vogt and Aaron Squires). *Black and White Photographs of U.S. Air Force and Predecessors' Activities, Facilities, and Personnel, Domestic and Foreign, 1930 – 1975.*⁶



In 1945, members of the American "Deer Team," part of the OSS, worked with Vietnamese guerrilla fighters to throw Japanese troops out of Indochina. As the war ended, the people of Vietnam looked to the United States to support their dreams of independence. Source: *The OSS in Vietnam, 1945: A War of Missed Opportunities* by Dixee Bartholomew-Feis.⁷

Indochina and the guarantee of a new and better life for the Vietnam peasants. In September 1945, Ho Chi Minh declared North Vietnam an independent state and rejected France's proposal of allowing for limited self-government in Vietnam. This declaration began a war between the Viet Minh and France that lasted for nearly a decade, ending in the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu on May 7, 1954. One of the revelations of the Pentagon Papers, released in 1971, showed United States involvement in this reconquest by paying approximately 80 percent of France's expenses. From Truman's administration forward, the United States had shown no interest in helping the Vietnamese achieve self-determination.

Using a beginning date of 1950 and an ending date of 1975, historians have centered their arguments on three different causes of the conflict: America's focus on containing the spread of Communism, European imperialism, and one of several Cold War-era proxy wars between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. However, there has been little or no consideration "to what the nature of the conflict in Vietnam was, and to what the goals of all the major actors involved in the drama were."⁸ Forty years later, there is still no consensus about what the government of the United States learned from the Vietnam War and how to approach situations like this in the future.

In September of 1945, Ho Chi Minh addressed a crowd in Ba Dinh Square in Hanoi, declaring Vietnam's independence from France. In his speech, Minh repeated the first sen-

tence of the American Declaration of Independence. He concluded, "[t]he entire Vietnamese people are determined to mobilize all their physical and mental strength, to sacrifice their lives and property in order to safeguard their independence and liberty."⁹ These words proved to be prophetic in the years to come. Dr. Tran Duy Hung, a leader of the Viet Minh resistance and a medical doctor, remembered that moment in 1945, saying, "I can say that the most moving moment was when President Ho Chi Minh climbed the steps and the national anthem was sung. It was the first time that the national anthem of Vietnam was sung in an official ceremony."¹⁰ Hung did not mention that the crowd broke into cheers when an aircraft bearing the Stars & Stripes flew low over the ceremony. He also did not mention that Captain Archimedes Patti, head of the American mission to Hanoi, shared the stage with Minh and that the band played the American national anthem in honor of their foreign guest.

During the early years of the Vietnam War, most of the players were flexible and evolving. In 1945, what was taking place was a conflict between France, who wanted to regain control over Indochina, control that they lost to the Japanese during World War II, and the Viet Minh, who were seeking total Vietnamese independence. Both players were more than willing to use force to accomplish their objectives if necessary. It is at this point that the United States first entered the picture. The United States became convinced that the Viet Minh was totally under the



On 2 September 1945, Hồ Chí Minh declared the independence of Vietnam from France. The proclamation paraphrased the U.S. Declaration of Independence in declaring, “All men are born equal: the Creator has given us inviolable rights, life, liberty, and happiness!”¹¹

control of the Soviet Union and needed to be defeated, so its involvement in Vietnam was “a political reaction to events elsewhere in Asia.”¹²

Between 1945 (the end of World War II) and 1948, the United States’ position on Vietnam underwent a change. President Franklin Roosevelt opposed colonialism, especially French colonialism, and supported the Atlantic Charter, which, in one section, “affirmed the right of all peoples to choose their own form of government; in his opinion, it was as applicable to the peoples of Asia as to those of Europe.”¹³ After Roosevelt’s death and the ascension of Harry Truman to the presidency, attitudes began to change. Even though the Office of Strategic Services recommended assisting the Viet Minh in their fight against the French, the State Department argued against supporting Ho Chi Minh because the United States was trying to keep France from becoming allied with

the Soviet Union and was concerned that supporting Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh would antagonize the French, leading them into a partnership with the Soviet Union. Truman was determined to do everything in his power to contain the growth of Communism, especially in Southeast Asia, and this policy of containment came to be referred to as the Truman Doctrine. This argument for containment led to the use of the term “Domino Theory” to justify America’s involvement in Vietnam, just as it had done in Korea. On April 24, 1950, Truman “endorsed NSC64, with its requirement that ‘all practicable measures be taken to prevent further communist expansion in Southeast Asia.’”¹⁴ The “Domino Theory” argued that “the neighboring countries of Thailand and Burma could be expected to fall under Communist domination if Indochina were controlled by a communist-dominated government.”¹⁵ The

United States first mentioned the defeat of Communism as an objective in Indochina in a speech given to Congress by President Truman. In this speech, Tru-

man stated that the United States would provide assistance to any country that was threatened by Communism.



President Hồ Chí Minh read the Declaration of Independence at Ba Dinh Square, 2 September 1945.¹⁶

In June 1952, a secret memo written by the National Security Council stated that “Communist control of all of Southeast Asia would render the U.S. position in the Pacific offshore island chain precarious and would seriously jeopardize the fundamental U.S. security interests in the Far East.”¹⁷ Even though Ho Chi Min wrote “eight letters to President Truman reminding him of the self-determination promises of of the Atlantic Charter,”¹⁸ the NSC could not (or would not) believe that the events taking place in Vietnam were not under the direct control of the Soviet Union. One of the stipulations of the Atlantic Charter that Minh pointed out in his letters seny sent between October 1945 and February 1946 was a declaration by Roosevelt and Churchill to “respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which

they will live.”¹⁹ Truman never responded to any of these letters.

One major event that proved influential in the future of the Vietnam conflict was the establishment of the People’s Republic of China by Mao Zedong in 1949. The loss of China to Communism was a thorn in the side of the United States from that point forward. In early 1950, both the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union gave formal recognition to the communist-led Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and began to ship military and economic supplies to North Vietnam, which allowed the Viet Minh to increase their offensive movements against French military installations. This recognition and support led to the identification of the Viet Minh as a communist organization. The United States, at this time,

also began to increase the amount of military assistance given to the French, assistance that would help them defend their installations and increase their operations against Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh.

In April 1954, the French suffered a humiliating defeat by the forces of the Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu. The battle lasted for fifty-seven days and ended France's influence in Indochina. The Geneva Accords, which settled the issue of the war, stipulated that Vietnam would become an independent nation, as would Laos and Cambodia. Vietnam was to be divided along the 16th parallel, a division "that was not to be interpreted as constituting a political or territorial boundary." The Geneva Accords also included a stipulation that elections would be held within two years -- elections that would unify North and South Vietnam under one government. These elections never took place because Eisenhower was a firm believer in the Domino Theory. The Republican Party had accused the Truman administration of losing China to the Communists, and Eisenhower was going to make sure that he did not lose Indochina. Eisenhower's commitment to not lose Indochina, in effect, prevented the unification of Vietnam.

Prior to the signing of the Geneva Accords (the United States never agreed with the Accords, never signed them, and were not bound by them), Emperor Bao Dai appointed Ngo Dinh Diem as prime minister of Southern

Vietnam. Diem was the perfect person for the United States to support because he was both anti-French and anti-Communist, and a western-educated nationalist. The United States, while backing Diem as a potential leader of Southern Vietnam, had misgivings because he had no experience in politics.

The summer of 1956 came and went without the election stipulated in the Geneva Accords. Many argue that Diem's refusal to hold an election could be considered an unofficial declaration of war. However, Ho Chi Minh still held out hope that an election would take place and that Vietnam would become unified. Many attribute this refusal to hold an election because both the United States and Diem were certain that Ho Chi Minh would win.

From this point forward, North Vietnam, under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh (and backed by the Soviet Union and China) and South Vietnam, under the leadership of Ngo Dinh Diem (backed by the United States), could never reach a compromise. The Geneva Accords, meant to unify Vietnam, failed miserably.

Over the next twenty years, the conflict in Vietnam raged not only claiming millions of lives, but also destroying forests and farmlands, polluting rivers, and virtually devastating the entire region. The Vietnam War also saw the people of the United States beginning to question the truthfulness of their government and the need to be the policeman of the world.

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Chosin Reservoir: The Battle That Stalled a War

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ABSTRACT

The onset of the Korean War was indicative of the superpowers' quest for ideological supremacy, with multiple factors setting the stage for massive confrontation. North Korean forces were able to quickly overwhelm those of South Korea. The United States entered the conflict and was able to reverse the North Korean gains and drive them to their border with China. Unknown to NATO forces, the Chinese Army was mobilized to intercept the allied forces at the Chosin Reservoir. Despite having superior numbers, US forces were able to retreat and save the majority of their personnel in North Korean territory. The combined North Korean and Chinese armies won a pyrrhic victory that shocked both sides into a stalemate.

Keywords: Chosin Reservoir, Chosin Few, Korean War, Cold War, 1950, General Douglas MacArthur, Major General Edward "Ned" Almond, Major General Oliver Smith, People's Volunteer Army

Embalse de Chosin: la batalla que detuvo una guerra

RESUMEN

El inicio de la Guerra de Corea fue indicativo de la búsqueda de las superpotencias por la supremacía ideológica, con múltiples factores preparando el escenario para una confrontación masiva. Las fuerzas de Corea del Norte pudieron abrumar rápidamente a las de Corea del Sur. Estados Unidos entró en el conflicto y pudo revertir las ganancias de Corea del Norte y llevarlos a su frontera con China. Desconocido para las fuerzas de la OTAN, el ejército chino se movilizó para interceptar a las fuerzas aliadas en el embalse de Chosin. A pesar de tener un número superior, las fuerzas estadounidenses pudieron retirarse y salvar a la mayoría de su personal en territorio norcoreano. Los ejércitos combinados de Corea del Norte y China obtuvieron una victoria pírrica que dejó a ambos lados en un punto muerto.

Palabras clave: Embalse de Chosin, Chosin Few, Guerra de Corea, Guerra Fría, 1950, General Douglas MacArthur, General de Divi-

sión Edward “Ned” Almond, General de División Oliver Smith,
Ejército de Voluntarios del Pueblo

长津湖战役：让战争停止的一次战役

摘要

朝鲜战争的开端表明了超级大国对意识形态主导的追求，伴随着多个因素（为大范围冲突奠定基础）。朝鲜军力迅速战胜了韩国。美国进入这场战争，逆转了朝鲜优势并将其驱逐到与中国交界处。北约军并不知道中国军队的加入，后者被动员在长津湖拦截联盟军。除了在数量上占优，美军还成功撤离战场并挽救了在朝鲜境内的大多数人员。朝鲜和中国军队的合作赢得了一场让交战双方都陷入僵局的惨胜。

关键词：长津湖，长津精英，朝鲜战争，冷战，1950，上将道格拉斯·麦克阿瑟，少将爱德华·“奈德”·阿尔蒙德（Edward “Ned” Almond），少将奥利弗·史密斯（Oliver Smith），中国人民志愿军

The Korean War was the initial culmination of the geopolitical and ideological struggle for dominance at the onset of the Cold War. The two superpowers sought to support their ideological platforms, but the concept of Nuclear War, or World War Three, prevented a direct confrontation. The Korean Peninsula provided multiple nations with an opportunity to prevent the spread of an opposing political system on a neutral stage. All major powers rose to bring their influence to bear, culminating in the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir. That confrontation became inevitable and the results of the battle left both sides in a stalemate

that neither could recover from without risking all-out global war. In the end, the Chosin Reservoir was the climax of a war that stalled efforts on both sides to secure a total victory.

The Korean Peninsula became a political stage for the world powers to flex their respective ideologies. Like all stages, this one has a number of actors that had their own motivations behind their support that played a factor in the decisions leading up to the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir. These motivations show how the confrontation between US and Chinese forces became inevitable. It all begins with the end of the Second World War.

At the end of the Second World War, there was an ideological divide between the two major superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, and their respective political ideologies, capitalism and communism. Former Nazi Germany-held territories were divided into spheres of influence dominated by occupying countries. A split into East and West was created by both superpowers in a bid for dominance. This gave rise to a military alliance in the form of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) between all nations allied with the United States. Some nations became battlegrounds for the spread of communism, such as Turkey and Greece.¹ In response to this, President Truman developed the Truman Doctrine, which stated that the United States would provide necessary support to prevent, or contain, the spread of communism. In Turkey and Greece, this was in the form of economic and military aid. Korea was a different matter.

The Soviet Union had committed itself to supporting growing communist governments all over the world. In Europe, this meant that it supported puppet regimes in the Eastern European territories taken from Nazi Germany.² In other locations around the world, the Soviet Union provided economic and military aid and advisors to facilitate the overthrow of democratic governments. The most significant case was that of China. China had been embroiled in a civil war beginning in 1927, which was essentially paused during the Japanese invasion of Mainland China. Once Japan was defeated, the forces

of the Communist Party of China, led by Mao Zedong, and the Kuomintang resumed fighting, with the Communist Party taking the country by 1950. Once firmly in power, China was able to begin to support communist parties in countries along its own borders, such as Burma, Laos, North Vietnam, and North Korea.

Europe was split into the two ideological spheres of influence based on whichever country had effective control of that area. Korea was arbitrarily divided during the Yalta Conference into two halves along the 38th Parallel, with the former Korean capital of Seoul lying within the southern, US-controlled territory.³ Once World War II ended, both superpowers provided support to their controlled territory. Additionally, North Korean fighters supported the Communist Party of China during the Chinese Civil War. The North Koreans returned to North Korea with their arms and equipment and the valuable experience they gained fighting the Kuomintang. The bonds between Josef Stalin, Mao Zedong, and Kim-Il Sung bolstered North Korean interests for a forcible reunification. As evidence of this, Kim-Il Sung sought approval for all war plans against South Korea before acting on them.⁴

With that approval, the North Korean forces moved south of the 38th Parallel on June 25, 1950, meeting minimal resistance from South Korean emplacements.⁵ Two months into the conflict, the South Korean forces and those US Army units that had arrived from Japan had been pushed back into

a perimeter around the port city of Pusan. The attacks were repelled due to the combination of well-entrenched defenders and constant attacks on the North Korean supply lines by the newly minted US Air Force.

The United Nations officially condemned the attack. However, this was primarily due to the absence of the Soviet Union and China's veto authority, which was still in possession of Taiwan's government in exile. The Truman administration was initially hesitant to get involved, due to its focus on preventing the spread of communism in Europe. However, the United States decided to intervene to protect Japan after the interception of a Soviet communiqué stating that the Soviet Union would not deploy forces in support of North Korea. President Truman entrusted the plan to General Douglas MacArthur. MacArthur had developed a living legend persona and was viewed as "a man with a solemn regard for his own divinity."⁶ MacArthur put together a brilliant plan to turn the tide of war. He planned to use the US Marine Corps' amphibious landing capabilities to insert at the port city of Inchon, located in close proximity to Seoul. The landing was thought impossible due to low tide waters and treacherous inlet sandbars. To accomplish this, MacArthur brought in two individuals. The first was one of his most trusted, or at least most agreeable, generals: Major General Edward "Ned" Almond. Almond was a devoted believer in MacArthur's cult of personality and was guaranteed to follow any order presented to impress MacArthur.⁷ Almond would be given command of

X Corps, which comprised forty thousand men from the 1st Marine Division and the 7th Infantry Division. MacArthur also brought in Major General Oliver Smith to help devise the landing. Despite some counterintuitive guidance from MacArthur, the invasion of Inchon was a success, and the troops attacking Pusan were forced to withdraw to North Korea.⁸ However, Almond and Smith clashed frequently with MacArthur supporting Almond's positions.

The North Korean forces withdrew past the 38th Parallel by the beginning of October 1950. Initially MacArthur was instructed not to pursue them, as the United States did not want to bring the Soviets or Chinese into the war.⁹ South Korean forces continued to push past the 38th Parallel and the United Nations task force followed. MacArthur himself felt that the only possible outcome was to push all the way into China to fully crush the North Korean forces. However, China was expecting a confrontation with the United States and had been preparing since June of that year. As United Nations forces approached the North Korean/Chinese border along the Yalu River, Chinese forces secretly entered North Korea and engaged the South Korean and United Nations forces. They first engaged in battle on October 25 at Onjong, surprising the Republic of Korea (South Korean military – ROK) forces. The battle was a disaster for ROK forces, which were forced to retreat south and were separated by impassable terrain in the form of the Taebaek Mountains along the eastern peninsula. As part of the First Phase Campaign, China was able to win



Marines talking cover at the Battle of Chosin Reservoir, Korean War. Photo by Sergeant Frank C. Kerr, US Marines.

withdrawn to Chinese territory.¹⁰ To this end, Almond formulated a plan for the X Corps to move west into Yudami-ni, while the Army's 7th Infantry Division moved east to Sinhung-ni. The 3rd Infantry Division providing security along the western flank of the advancing task force became spread over 400 miles of front lines. The Americans, along with the ROK forces, had begun to envelope Lake Jangjin, which maps referred to by their Japanese pronunciation as the Chosin Reservoir. The PVA had also staged around the Chosin Reservoir with fifteen divisions of approximately 120,000 infantry. The stage was now set, with both sides seeking the complete destruction of the other, and

both sides having to endure harsh cold weather conditions.

Almond and Smith continued to clash over strategy, as the former only wanted to meet MacArthur's arbitrary deadline for victory. Smith cautioned Almond about the overextended Marine Division but was overruled. X Corps' Marines moved into Hagaru-ri, which they simply called Hagaru, and began to fortify it.¹¹ There were also battalion-sized Forward Operating Bases (FOB) at Koto-ri and Chinhung-ri along the supply route from the south. The 7th Marines continued to push forward from Hagaru and into Yudam-ni while the 5th Marines enveloped right of the reservoir. Smith opposed this



A column of the US First Marine Division move through Chinese lines, Battle of Chosin Reservoir. Photo by Corporal Peter McDonald, USMC

form of deployment and convinced Almond to make some concessions. First, Colonel Allan MacLean split from the 7th Infantry Division and replace the 7th Marines in the east. The second concession was to allow the Marines to construct an airfield at Hagaru, which Almond only allowed because only Marines would perform the labor. The date was November 27, 1950 and the PVA forces were about to attack in force.

The PVA 9th Army crossed the border of China mainly on foot due to fears of being targeted by the US Air Force. Five divisions moved down from the north on both sides of the Chosin

Reservoir. Simultaneously three divisions moved around the reservoir to the south of Hagaru in order to attack Koto-ri and thereby cut US supply lines. In the evening of November 27, the PVA launched attacks at Hagaru, Koto-ri, and Yudam-ni. Thanks in large parts to Smith's preparations, the 5th and 7th Marines recognized the need to dig in for the evening and were prepared to do so. The PVA 59th Division attempted to block the road between Hagaru and Yudam-ni, but Company F, referred to as Fox Company, 7th Marines were defending the Toktong Pass. US forces were able to hold out against

the Chinese onslaught, with the exception of Task Force MacLean, which was spread out across the eastern shore of the Chosin Reservoir. Task Force MacLean withdrew to Hagaru with approximately 75 percent killed in action and 50 percent of the remaining forces able to continue fighting.¹² Additionally, Smith and Colonel Lewis “Chesty” Puller had ordered a convoy to move from Koto-ri to Hagaru in order to reinforce Hagaru. The PVA was able to ambush the convoy and separate it into three. One-third was able to press on to Hagaru, while another third was forced to return to Koto-ri. The remaining third did not survive the battle.

The PVA did not fare much better and received heavy casualties from their attacks on Yudam-ni and Hagaru compared to casualties for the Americans, which ranged from 30-50 percent. The PVA 58th Division was nearly completely destroyed, as was much of the 20th Corps. To the east, the PVA successfully turned back the US Eighth Army at the Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River inflicting heavy losses. In response, MacArthur ordered the X Corps to withdraw from the Chosin Reservoir. The issue became how to move the entirety of the X Corps out of the battlespace under threat of Chinese attack, which had become more precarious once the PVA 26th Corps, comprised of the 76th and 77th Divisions, arrived at Hagaru on December 6. Almond initially wished to fly out all troops from Yudam-ri and Hagaru, but Smith refused to abandon the Marines' heavy equipment and artillery. Smith famously declared that those garrisons

would “attack in a different direction” and head to Hagaru.¹³

The withdrawal involved the movement of all United Nations forces south to the port of Hungnam with the 7th Marines in the lead and the 5th Marines covering the rear flank. The 26th Corps attacked Hagaru on the night of the 6th but were repulsed as the 7th Marines continued to clear the route between Koto-ri and Hagaru. The breakout continued well for the Americans, but the PVA began to destroy roadways and bridges in order to trap the X Corps north of Hungnam. This included the pivotal Funchilin Pass south of Koto-ri. With the bridge destroyed, the Chinese were successful in stopping the retreat of US forces and had a solid defensive point. The Marines contested the defenders and were able to airdrop several bridges to allow for the Marines' withdrawal to Hungnam, although the Chinese continued attacks on Hungnam.¹⁴

Evacuations at Hungnam had begun as early as December 8, while the Eighth Army continued south. Supporting aircraft and naval gunfire were able to aid in the defense, while the remaining X Corps personnel and equipment was evacuated, along with approximately one-third of the Korean refugees. The last ship departed Hungnam on December 24, and the port was destroyed to prevent its use by Chinese forces, which took what remained of the port the following day.¹⁵ The original intent of the withdrawal was to Wonsan north of the 38th Parallel, but X Corps returned to South Korea in early 1951 instead.

At the end of the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir, both sides were devastated. US and ROK losses totaled 17,833 casualties as a result of combat and non-combat related injuries.¹⁶ The 1st Marine Division reported over seven thousand of these non-combat casualties, a direct result of the intense cold weather.¹⁷ Smith's successful withdrawal of troops and equipment allowed for those troops to reinforce the Eighth Army almost immediately. The PVA forcing US troops to retreat resulted in a huge blow to the concept of US military superiority. Chinese intervention and the withdrawal of troops from North Korean territory ended all hopes of a quick United Nations victory and MacArthur's Home-by-Christmas campaign. MacArthur's opinion of US forces remained unchanged and shortly after, he challenged China by declaring to them that they had been defeated. His initial belief that China would not enter the war, his refusal to acknowledge the full scope of the situation, and his conflicts with President Truman led to his relief as Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command.

North Korean territory lost to the United Nations Command was returned to North Korea by January 1951. The combined Chinese and North Korean army would have been able to occupy the whole peninsula. However, the

PLA was forced into a pyrrhic victory at a cost of an estimated forty thousand casualties with some estimates ranging from sixty to eighty thousand troops lost. A total of twelve PVA divisions were no longer combat effective and the entirety of the PVA Ninth Army was unable to return to the war effort until March of 1951. Two PVA divisions were disbanded as a result of the battle. Despite these losses, China pushed forward and was able to retake Seoul, bolstered by the victory at the Chosin Reservoir. As the Eighth Army was able to survive and rejoin the war effort quickly, US forces were able to retake Seoul again in March 1951. This caused the Chinese Fourth Phase Offensive to fail and the Fifth Phase Offensive was a catastrophic failure for China. The resulting United Nations counteroffensive stabilized the front lines just north of the 38th Parallel. The combination of all of these losses forced China to change their focus from driving the United States from the Korean Peninsula to defending Chinese assets. Both sides bore terrible losses that made the concept of a quick total victory impossible, resulting in two more years of relative stalemate due to stalled peace talks regarding prisoners of war. As such, the outcome of the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir produced conditions that stalled the Korean War and prevented either side from gaining a decisive advantage.

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3 T.R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War* (Dulles, VA: Brassey's, 2000), 18.

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12 Lynn Montross and Captain Nicholas Canzona, *US Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume III: The Chosin Reservoir Campaign* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1957), 243–44.

Chosin Reservoir: The Battle That Stalled a War

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A Division At War—Part I

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ABSTRACT

Often forgotten in the discussions of the ground war in the Pacific during the Second World War are the contributions of several prominent US Army infantry divisions. The 32nd Infantry Division was one such unit. They spent more days in combat in the Pacific than any other US Army unit. The 32nd had its baptism of fire on the southeastern coast of New Guinea at Buna in November 1942. A brutal two-month campaign saw an unprepared, inexperienced 32nd victorious. The division returned to combat on New Guinea's northern coast in 1944 at Aitape before another grueling campaign along the Driniumor River. Although victorious, the 32nd Infantry Division left New Guinea in the fall of 1944 for the Philippines tired and depleted.

Keywords: 32nd Infantry Division, Buna, MacArthur, Eichelberger, Driniumor River, Krueger, Port Moresby, Japanese Eighteenth Army, US Sixth Army

Una división en guerra—Parte I

RESUMEN

A menudo se olvidan en las discusiones sobre la guerra terrestre en el Pacífico durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial las contribuciones de varias divisiones de infantería prominentes del ejército estadounidense. La 32ª División de Infantería fue una de esas unidades. Pasaron más días en combate en el Pacífico que cualquier otra unidad del ejército estadounidense. El 32 tuvo su bautismo de fuego en la costa sureste de Nueva Guinea en Buna en noviembre de 1942. Una brutal campaña de dos meses vio a un 32º sin preparación y sin experiencia victorioso. La división regresó a combatir en la costa norte de Nueva Guinea en 1944 en Aitape antes de otra campaña agotadora a lo largo del río Driniumor. Aunque victoriosa, la 32ª División de Infantería salió de Nueva Guinea en el otoño de 1944 hacia Filipinas cansada y agotada.

Palabras clave: 32a División de Infantería, Buna, MacArthur, Eichelberger, Driniumor River, Krueger, Port Moresby, Decimoctavo Ejército Japonés, Sexto Ejército de EE. UU.

战争中的一个师—第一部分

摘要

关于二战期间太平洋地区陆战的探讨经常忽略由几个杰出美国陆军步兵师所作的贡献。美国陆军第32步兵师就是其中一个。比起其他美军部队，第32步兵师在太平洋地区的战斗时间最长。1942年9月，第32步兵师在新几内亚东南海岸的布纳镇经历了战火洗礼。血腥的两个月战斗后，毫无准备的、经验不足的第32步兵师取得了胜利。该师于1944年返回到新几内亚北部海岸的艾塔佩参战，在这之后又在德林乌莫尔河上进行了另一场疲劳战。尽管取得了胜利，第32步兵师于1944年秋季离开新几内亚，精疲力竭地前往菲律宾。

关键词：美国陆军第32步兵师，布纳（Buna），麦克阿瑟，艾克尔伯格，德林乌莫尔河（Driniumor River），克鲁格，莫尔兹比港，日本第18军，美国第6集团军

The American Army and Marine Corps each had many famous divisions during the Second World War. In Europe, the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions, the 1st and 2nd Armored Divisions, and the 1st Infantry Division achieved legendary status. In the Pacific, most of the fame belongs to the Marine divisions that fought across the Central Pacific. The Army and its contribution are almost forgotten. In a part of the war known as the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), the Army did the fighting and though seemingly devoid of accolades, several of its divisions experienced this war

from beginning to end and fought gallantly throughout, despite doing so in the most deplorable battlefield conditions possible. One such division was the 32nd Infantry Division. They fought in every major campaign of the SWPA, from Buna to Luzon and stood ready to join in the war's biggest operation, the invasion of Japan. It was not an easy war for the 32nd. Thrust into their first battle at Buna unprepared and ordered to the Driniumor River undermanned and to Luzon exhausted, they fought on and saw more combat than any American unit in the Pacific.

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor started the Pacific War. General Douglas MacArthur's forced escape from the Philippines in April 1942 and subsequent vow of "I shall return" started the war in the SWPA and the World War II résumé of the 32nd Infantry Division.

Before returning to the Philippines, MacArthur first had to protect his new base of operations, Australia. Immediately to the north of Australia lies the world's second largest island, New Guinea. To protect Australia, New Guinea could not become a major Japanese base. To retake the Philippines, it must become a major US base. This early in the war, the former was the main concern. In May 1942, the Japanese also recognized this and planned a major operation to take Port Moresby, a port on New Guinea's southern coast. US code breakers penetrated the Japanese code and knew of the exact date and location of the operation. The famous naval battle of the Coral Sea happened on 4 May and resulted in an American strategic victory. The Japanese invasion force turned for home.

Undeterred, the Japanese managed to land a force on New Guinea's northern coast, approximately two thousand men, that summer at Gona. Port Moresby was only 100 miles away. It may as well have been 1,000. Between Gona and Port Moresby stood the Owen Stanley Mountains, unmapped and impenetrable jungle, a small Australian ground force, and the US Fifth Air Force, commanded by General George Kenney. All these obstacles convinced Australian and US intelligence

the Japanese could never reach Port Moresby. They were wrong. The small Australian force gradually gave ground, lengthening the Japanese supply lines to the breaking point. The jungle with its constant heat, hunger, thirst, and disease, and by mid-September, Kenney's planes whittled down Japanese strength. Moving back towards Gona in November, they eventually occupied defensive positions there and at nearby Buna. US and Australian intelligence believed that what was left of the Japanese was a force of skeletons. Buna had two airstrips, and Australia could be attacked from them. General MacArthur saw this as the perfect opportunity to send in US ground forces. He only had two divisions to choose from, the 32nd and 41st Infantry Divisions, both former National Guard units and completely unprepared to fight a war in the jungle. Buna became the 32nd Infantry Division's baptism of fire.¹

The geography of the Buna battlefield was the last place an army would want to fight a battle:

The principal swamp in the Buna area lies between Entrance Creek and Simemi Creek It is absolutely impenetrable, a fact of vital importance in the campaign. Between the closely spaced trees, which are 25 to 100 feet high, is a tangle of roots, creepers, and underbrush. Much of the other ground in the area, though not actually swamps, is thoroughly waterlogged. Much of the drier land is covered with a thick growth of kunai grass or plantations of coconut palms. This

coarse grass grows to a height of more than 6 feet, but its height varies greatly, depending on how recently it has been, burned over or cut. Its leaves are broad and sharp-edged: its stems are about the thickness of a pencil. The coconut palms are usually planted about 18 feet apart and the growth under them is relatively clear of cover.²

General MacArthur was aware of Buna's difficulties, noting:

In addition to all our other difficulties there was New Guinea itself, as tough and tenacious an enemy as the Japanese. Few areas in the world present so formidable an obstacle to military operations. The jagged mountains rear their tall peaks amid sudden plunging gorges, towering above the trackless jungle that covers nearly the entire surface of the sprawling island In the jungle itself, trails were a sea of mud, with little relief from the swollen rivers and the razor-edged kunai grass that grows in treacherous bunches higher than a man's head Nature did not stop with adverse terrain however Health conditions matched the world's worse.³


The Japanese enhanced the natural potential available in defending the airstrips. They constructed a series of bunkers impervious to all but heavy weapons. The 32nd Infantry Division had few such weapons. The bunkers were constructed in shallow trenches

and reinforced with coconut logs; earth and sand protected the top of them from mortar and artillery fire. The walls were reinforced with logs, rocks, sand-filled ammunition boxes, and oil drums. Fast-growing vegetation camouflaged everything.⁴

The Japanese force defending Buna, even with all their defensive advantages, lacked the physical stamina to fight alone. Unbeknownst to US intelligence, the weakened enemy force of 1,250 received approximately fifteen hundred reinforcements only days before the attack.⁵ These reinforcements were veterans, unlike their opponent, the 32nd Infantry Division.

The 32nd Infantry Division was an upper Midwest (Michigan and Wisconsin) National Guard unit activated after the US originally entered World War II. They received their orders for Australia in March, yet did not arrive until the middle of May. From there it was move after move, one area to another. They never had their feet grounded; they were unable to set up a cohesive training program in an environment none had ever experienced. The division commander, General Edwin Harding, was clearly frustrated:

Unfortunately we had no opportunity to work through a systematic program for correcting deficiencies. From February, when I took over until November when we went into battle we were always getting ready to move. No sooner would we get a systematic training program started then orders for a move came along to interrupt it.⁶



The very simple Buna battlefield. The airstrips dominate and were the main objectives. Of particular note is the jungle that surrounds everything.⁷

MacArthur also recognized this fretting: “none of the three elements of my command: naval, air, or ground, was adequate for the job The ground troops ... not only were they too few in number, but they lacked the equipment and strenuous training necessary for combat.”⁸ Yet, he still sent them to Buna because, given his intelligence section and their appraisal of Japanese strength, even the inexperienced 32nd should have had little trouble. Even after sending the soon to be famous General Robert Eichelberger to evaluate this unit, a unit he rated “barely satisfactory” and “high on itself, full of confidence, but quite unprepared for the miseries and terrors of jungle warfare so alien to the experience of boys from the clipped green lawns and serene streets of small-

town Middle West,” he still sent them into action.⁹ This division, severely understrength before leaving for Australia, received a huge influx of basic trainees, bringing its three infantry regiments (126th, 127th, 128th) up to strength, although most of the division support units lacked men and equipment. Neither the veteran National Guardsmen nor the new basic trainees knew anything about fighting in the jungle. General Eichelberger instituted a rigorous conditioning and jungle warfare-training program that the 32nd did not reap the benefits of because they went to Buna in November.

The battlefield itself was barely two miles wide. The objectives were the two airstrips, the Old Strip and New Strip, and a small footbridge across Si-

memi Creek linking them. Other positions such as Buna Mission and Buna Village also saw major fighting. The first attack on 19 November would mirror all the attacks that followed for the next month. There was no air support and one, only one American artillery piece without ammunition. There were no tanks. Not expecting much of a fight, the 1st Battalion of the 128th Infantry Regiment advanced. No reconnaissance preceded the attack. While approaching the bridge, they were stopped cold by murderous small arms fire, fire they could not respond to because they could not see it, the Japanese used flashless weapons and their positions were

brilliantly camouflaged. Major David Parker, an observer sent by the War Department, noted:

It was impossible to see where the enemy fire was coming from; consequently, our own rifle and machine gun fire was ineffective during the early stages Grenades and mortars were difficult to use because, first, it was difficult to pick out a nest position to advance upon with grenades, second, the thick jungle growth and high grass made throwing and firing difficult, and third, because it was nearly impossible to fire.¹⁰



The Simemi Creek Bridge. This is clearly not much of a bridge and is meant for only foot traffic. It is also an easy point for Japanese fire to concentrate on and US infantry would be limited to that bridge as it is surrounded by jungle.¹¹

Another observer emphatically stated: “We were stopped cold.”¹² The next attack, hopefully, would be better. Scheduled for 21 November, the 32nd’s 126th Infantry Regiment would make the main attack. They now had a general idea of the Japanese position’s location. An air attack followed by a mortar and artillery preparation (with several Australian guns) preceded the infantry attack. The air attack was late and off target (even hitting some US troops). The mortars and artillery also had little effect. They all used ammunition with quick fuses (exploding on contact) because delayed action fuses were in short supply. All the bombardment did was blow the jungle camouflage around. The infantry still advanced, and once again machine gun fire stopped them. For the next several days, the 32nd continued to probe forward and continued to be thrown back. Many factors were in play here. Inexperience, the tenacity of the Japanese, and the lack of proper weapons to deal with bunkers all began to break the 32nd Infantry Division. The jungle also took its toll.

Imagining what it was like for the infantry in those first attacks is chilling. These green soldiers, already worn from their first few weeks in the jungle, are told of their first attack. Tired and uneasy, they are given confidence by all their officers repeatedly telling them there will not be much opposition and that the Japanese are already defeated. They advance. They can see their objective several hundred yards ahead. This is all too easy. There is an eerie silence that the men do not realize is dangerous; they are all experiencing a battle

for the first time, including their leaders. Suddenly the noise of machine gun fire erupts. The lead rank is cut down; there are dozens of killed and wounded. Scared but resilient, they look for the Japanese so they can return fire. They cannot see them; they cannot see the fire from the enemy weapons. The easy fight is no longer easy. The lack of reconnaissance now rears its ugly head. The wounded from the lead ranks now have a general idea where the Japanese are so that the next attack should fare better. The men, still shocked but ready to move again, are told there will be an air attack and artillery barrage before the attack. The air attack is late, forcing the men to boil in the heat of their forward positions. When it does come, it is not all on target; some US positions are hit. The resulting chaos is alleviated a bit when the guns and mortars start firing. They see them hitting the area where the Japanese had stopped the previous attack. The men think this should now be OK. When they advance, the same enemy fire stops them again. What good was the artillery? Frustration sets in; exhaustion takes an even greater toll. Something has to change.

As November came to a close, the men of the 32nd were drained, their lack of preparation and acclimation to a jungle environment making its mark. General Eichelberger sent an officer to observe the frontline infantry. He was appalled at what he saw: “The troops were deplorable. They wore long, dirty beards. Their shoes were uncared for or worn out. They were receiving far less than adequate rations and there was little discipline or military courtesy.”¹³

Physical deterioration also led to a deteriorating state of mind. The realization that they had no weapons capable of destroying the Japanese bunkers created a sense of hopelessness, the worst state of mind a soldier can have. What they had did not work. What they needed (tanks, flamethrowers, bazookas) was unavailable. Yet, the division commander, General Harding, ordered another major attack for 26 November.

Harding had little choice but to order another attack. General MacArthur consistently prodded him and was growing impatient. Harding put together everything he had to support the new attack. Six Australian guns, a dozen 81-mm mortars, heavy machine guns, and thirty-five aircraft would play a role. None of it mattered. The air attack was inaccurate (precise bombing in the jungle is nearly impossible), the artillery and mortars did little damage, and the infantry was once again driven back. Defending against these attacks was not difficult; they were all frontal attacks. The terrain gave US commanders little choice. To break the stalemate and to drive the Japanese from their bunkers, tanks and better artillery were needed. General Harding pleaded for tanks. They would come. Harding was gone when they arrived.¹⁴

General MacArthur was not a patient man. He never visited the battlefield; he never saw the conditions his men were fighting and dying in. He also had Australian officers in his headquarters chirping in his ear about the “inadequate” fighting abilities of US soldiers.¹⁵ He wanted Harding out and

looked to Robert Eichelberger to replace him. Eichelberger received one of the more famous sendoffs in American military history:

I want you to go to Buna and capture it. If you do not do so I don't want you to come out alive and that applies to your Chief of Staff also. Do you understand Bob? Time is of the essence! I want you to relieve Harding Bob. Send him back to America. If you don't do it I will. Relieve every regimental and battalion commander. Put corporals in command if necessary. Get somebody who will fight. When do you want to start Bob?¹⁶

Eichelberger left for Buna the next morning. He did not launch an immediate attack, a decision that no doubt infuriated MacArthur. After inspecting the front he noticed several major deficiencies:

1. The state of mind of the troops must improve. They above all needed a sense of aggressiveness, a desire to close with and defeat the enemy.
2. All indirect fires would be placed under the control of a Fire Direction Center and the location of all Japanese positions would be registered. Vigorous scouting and patrolling would begin immediately to pinpoint those positions.
3. Commanders would operate from the front, not rear command posts.

4. They needed change of tactics: no more frontal attacks unless absolutely unavoidable.¹⁷

Eichelberger also wanted tanks, the same tanks Harding wanted, and the right ammunition for his one US gun before launching another attack. MacArthur would not wait, and Eichelberger ordered an attack on 5 December.

The Buna battlefield had essentially become two separate fights: the first at the airstrips and the other at Buna Village. Each had a force dedicated to it named after the senior com-

mander at each location. The airstrips were the responsibility of the Warren Force, Buna itself the Urbana Force. Tanks had yet to arrive, so Eichelberger received five Bren Gun Carriers, lightly armored, open at the top vehicles, with little armament and very unreliable in jungle terrain. Attached to the Warren Force, they moved with the infantry after another ineffective preliminary air and artillery attack. All five Bren Gun Carriers were quickly knocked out. Unlike previous battles the infantry did not wait to attack.



The first so-called armored vehicles to arrive at Buna, Bren Gun Carriers. They were useless since they could not engage bunkers, did not offer much protection, and were prone to mechanical failure in the jungle.¹⁸

They followed right behind the exploding shells and managed to advance within 150 yards of the Simemi Creek Bridge, destroying several bunkers in the process. The attack against Buna

Village was more successful. The village was now isolated and its bunkers could be systematically destroyed. By 15 December Buna Village was totally secure, but the airstrips remained under Japa-

nese control. Eichelberger would not attack again until the tanks arrived.

At this point, although their month in combat had been a constant struggle, the 32nd Infantry Division had grown as a fighting unit. Although most attacks did not succeed, the men con-

tinued to drive on without the weapons they needed. If only the tanks and the proper ammunition for the one gun existed for the first attack on 18 November. Would the Buna campaign have already ended? It is a relevant question since all took place in the attack of 18 December.



The M3 Stuart Light Tank. While small in size and armament its armor allowed it to advance to effective distance of the Japanese bunkers where its 37-mm gun could engage.¹⁹

These tanks were not the monsters often cited when discussing World War II. Eichelberger received eight M3 Stuart light tanks. With a 37-mm main gun, a machine gun, and light armor, they did not seem like much. Against the Japanese, they were plenty. The Japanese had few anti-tank weapons and once approaching the bunkers, they seemed to forget the infantry even ex-

isted. Five tanks and two veteran Australian infantry companies attacked toward the Duropa Plantation, followed by the 3rd Battalion, 128th Infantry Regiment. They reached Simemi Creek, allowing the 1st Battalion, 126th Infantry Regiment and the 1st Battalion, 128th Infantry Regiment to reach the Bridge at the Creek. The airstrips were now in sight.²⁰

The tanks allowed this advance. Colonel MacNab, one of the battalion commanders, described their effects:

The tanks really did that job. They apparently completely demoralized the Japs ... who fought like cornered rats when they were forced into the open as a result of having their fires masked when the tanks broke through their final protective line There were few holes knocked in the bunkers except where the tanks stood off and blasted them at short range with their 37-mm guns.²¹

The Stuarts ran right through the heavy small arms fire. Two were lost: one to a Molotov cocktail and the other to mechanical failure. The remaining three tanks advanced to within 500 yards of Cape Endaiadere, destroyed a strong-point, and then moved to the New Strip, where another attack with three more tanks took place. A system of twenty bunkers, a system that had held up a month of repeated attacks, was engaged and destroyed.²²

The Old Strip still remained. All of the Japanese heavy weapons (two 75-mm guns, two 37-mm guns, several 25-mm dual and triple pom-poms, three 3-inch dug in naval guns) defended the Old Strip. Getting there meant crossing the bridge, which the Japanese had blown a hole in. It was repaired and on Christmas Eve, Eichelberger launched his next attack.²³

The attack, preceded by the fire of the lone US gun, went well, at first. The Japanese then knocked out three more tanks. The infantry advance stalled. The

US gun destroyed one of the 3-inch enemy naval guns but could not locate the others. The infantry resumed their advance and seized all the big Japanese guns, finding them out of ammunition. Any remaining Japanese bunkers were eliminated over the next week. By 3 January 1943, the battle finally ended.


Six weeks of combat in the jungle had taken its toll: 707 killed in action and 1,680 wounded in action. Those numbers were compounded by 7,125 non-battle casualties (sickness, heat exhaustion, battle fatigue). The 32nd Infantry Division entered this battle with 10,825 men. Ninety percent at some point were not effective. It is remarkable they fought as well as they did. New Guinea was their wartime home for the next two years. The next major battle along the Driniumor River saw the 32nd Infantry Division once again in an avoidable, precarious situation.

After Buna, the 32nd needed rest. They also needed intense training, both for replacements and veterans, and plenty of heavy weapons and equipment. Never again would they enter battle with only one artillery piece and no tanks. The year 1943 would be a year of training, integration of new weapons and equipment, and assimilation of a new command structure. General Eichelberger moved on. The new division commander was General William Gill (leading the division through the end of the war). The 32nd Infantry Division became part of the US Sixth Army, General Walter Krueger commanding. Krueger was responsible for the tactical part of the New Guinea campaign. Strategically, MacArthur and

his headquarters determined objectives and timetables.

In addition to men and material, the SWPA received another major tool: *ULTRA*. *ULTRA* was the information gleaned from enemy military codes, both Japanese and German. It enabled Allied cryptologists to secure information as specific as exact times, locations, and attacks. It was why commanders at the corps level (this information did

not go below army commanders) and below often received orders from army commanders that may have seemed nonsensical yet always seemed to work. General Walter Krueger received a continuous flow of *ULTRA* information throughout the 1944 New Guinea campaign, and that information determined the majority of the 32nd Infantry Division's deployments throughout that year.



The march across the coast on northern New Guinea, 1944.²⁴

As the spring of 1944 approached, the Sixth Army was ready to bound across the northern coast of New Guinea as they moved closer to the Philippines. *ULTRA* provided the locations and numbers of Japanese forces throughout the island. Enemy forces were scattered, although still strong in isolated positions. The main Japanese

force, the fifty-five-thousand-strong Eighteenth Army, occupied Wewak. Generals MacArthur and Krueger of course knew this, so they decided to land the 24th and 31st Infantry Divisions at Aitape and Hollandia in April, 300 miles further west. Only scant enemy forces defended the proposed landing sites and the operation was easy and

losses small. Not only had MacArthur set up a great anchorage and base for future operations, he had also bypassed and isolated an entire Japanese army. Half of the 32nd garrisoned Aitape and Hollandia, while the rest essentially became a theater reserve. A few months later, they reentered the fight.

The Japanese Eighteenth Army found itself in a precarious position after the US landings. Cut off, they had no hope for reinforcement or resupply. US naval dominance prevented any hope of rescue. They could remain at Wewak, move west to try and link up with another Japanese force, or surrender. Surrender was not an option. Staying in place meant starvation as supplies whittled away. So, the Japanese army commander, General Hatazo Adachi, decided to take approximately thirty-five thousand men west. Their ultimate objective: Aitape and Hollandia. To get there, they had to cross the nearby Driniumor River. Only fifteen thousand of that force ever reached the vicinity of the Driniumor, the jungle savaging their ranks, and only five thousand were combat troops. *ULTRA* told General Krueger all of this.²⁵

The Japanese were expected to reach the Driniumor in early July. At that time, in addition to garrisoning Aitape and Hollandia, Sixth Army units were conducting operations further west at Sarmi and Biak and other operations were imminent. Suddenly, a substantial enemy force could appear in Sixth Army's rear, threatening everything else. Krueger received two vital *ULTRA* messages in late June. The first quoted General Adachi, stating: "we are

staking all on an encounter with the enemy in the vicinity of Aitape about 10 July. At present we are preparing to attack."²⁶ The second was very specific as to troop and equipment strength, intentions, and dispositions.


The attack planned against Aitape is scheduled to begin about 10 July and to be made by approximately 20,000 troops ... the 20th and 41st Divisions are to participate in the attack and enumerates the following additional troops to be attached to the 41st Division: the 66th Infantry Regiment of the 51st Division, 1 mortar company, and a provisional Army artillery unit composed of Army and Navy Anti-Aircraft troops The 20th Division is believed to be located on the right bank of the Driniumor River (about 20 miles east of Aitape). The 41st Division and the attached troops are scheduled to be concentrated in the Yakamul-Ulau area about 5 July. The plan calls for the 20th Division to attack west across the Driniumor River, while the 41st Division moves around to the south and attacks north and northwest towards the Aitape and Tadjji airfields. The 18th Army has made a number of urgent requests for submarine shipment of materials (principally wire-cutters and signal equipment) necessary for the Aitape operation. An indication that it has been having serious local supply difficulties as well appears

in a 21 June message in which the Army reported that it had only 60 usable trucks.²⁷

Given this wealth of information, the destruction of the Japanese Eighteenth Army should have been easy. It may have been if adequate forces engaged them as they reached the Driniumor River. Those forces were employed elsewhere.

The fighting along the Driniumor River is not even referred to as a defensive battle but a covering force op-

eration. The standard operational manual of the time, FM 100-5, defines a covering force operation as “providing time for the main force to prepare itself for combat, to deceive the enemy as to the actual location of the main battle position, to force the enemy to deploy early, and to provide a deeper view of the terrain over which the attacker would advance.”²⁸ Delay, delay, delay. What units received this mission? Three battalions of the 32nd Infantry Division and the 112th Cavalry Regiment.



This map displays the hopeless situation presented to the US covering force. The 128th Infantry Regiment, specifically two companies of its 2nd Battalion, had 2 miles of front to cover. The Japanese poured through that line, often outnumbering the American defenders ten to one. The 128th Infantry's 1st Battalion could have helped, some, but was sent on a reconnaissance to find the Japanese.²⁹

At Buna, the 32nd was sent to attack without experience or proper weapons. At the Driniumor, the elements of the division employed had an impossible task. They were given far too much front to cover with too few troops. Only three of the division's nine infantry battalions participated and only two of them were actually defending the river. Each battalion at full strength only had 871 men and none of the battalions were at full strength.³⁰ Further, not all of that 871 were infantry. The one cavalry squadron deployed forward had but five hundred men: roughly two thousand men for five miles of front.³¹ It broke down as follows:

1. 1st Squadron, 112th Cavalry Regiment – Afua to the right flank of the 3rd Battalion, 127th Infantry Regiment (1 mile)
2. 3rd Battalion, 127th Infantry Regiment – 1.5 miles to the 2nd Battalion, 128th Infantry Regiment
3. 2nd Battalion, 128th Infantry Regiment – 2.5 miles to the end of the line

They would have plenty of fire support: forty-eight 105-mm howitzers (the entire 32nd Infantry Division artillery regiment) and sixteen 155-mm guns. Thanks to *ULTRA*, the US units knew where the Japanese attack would take place, so the artillery could register and deliver accurate fire almost immediately. Given that the Japanese were expected to attack at night, this became even more vital. There was plentiful air support, but darkness and the jungle made

it of little use. There were two other units available, the 32nd's 1st Battalion, 128th Infantry Regiment and the 2nd Squadron of the 112th Cavalry. They were held back, not as a reserve for a counterattack but to conduct a long-range reconnaissance. As July came and the Japanese had yet to attack, Krueger became frustrated. Despite the line desperately needing these men and above the vocal protests of the commanders, on 8 July the two battalions moved out along the flanks of the line, approximately five miles apart.³² It accomplished nothing.

The jungle was as thick and unbearable along this route as it was everywhere else in New Guinea. The heat was debilitating. There was an enormous gap between the two units and it should have surprised nobody they did not find the Japanese. During the night of 10-11 July, they heard the Japanese several miles in their rear as the enemy stormed across the Driniumor River.

Several thousand Japanese soldiers initially attacked the weakest part of the 32nd front, 1.5 miles held by a mere two rifle companies (E and G) of the 2nd Battalion, 128th Infantry Regiment. The enemy announced their attack, screaming as they emerged from the jungle. Artillery wreaked havoc, in one case killing 370 of a four-hundred-man Japanese battalion. As the Japanese hit the barbed wire, the infantry fired. Bodies of enemy soldiers began piling up, but dwindling ammunition and overheated machine gun barrels allowed the enemy through sheer numbers to achieve a breakthrough. River

X, some 4,500 yards west of the Driniumor, was the fallback position. It took the 2nd Battalion, 128th Infantry Regiment three days to reach the river. The 127th Infantry Regiment and 1st Squadron, 112th Cavalry also withdrew. It was necessary, although some disagreed.³³

General Charles Hall commanded the entire front. His superior, General Krueger, believed the withdrawal unnecessary.³⁴ He believed this despite the defenders being outnumbered ten to one and the Japanese pouring through huge gaps in the line. He ordered Hall to drive the Japanese back and sent him three more battalions to do so, two from the 31st Infantry Division, the other from the 32nd's 127th Infantry Regiment. Before any attack could be launched, units had to consolidate and cut off groups brought back into friendly lines and eliminating scattered pockets of Japanese. By 15 July, only five days after the initial attack, General Hall was already pushing General Gill to get the 32nd Infantry Division and other units moving again:

Careful analysis of your situation discloses at your disposal 127, 128(-), 124 (-), 112th, some tank-destroyers and engineers. Confronting you west of Driniumor is an undetermined number of Japs but certainly not your equal in either numbers or firepower. It appears to me with the forces at your disposal if the proper offensive action is instituted at once you should be able to clear the area west of the Driniumor within 48 hours.

Troop movements have been delayed and I cannot promise you any reinforcement. I don not attempt to tell you what measures to take to counter an offensive from the east and at the same time clean up the situation west of the Driniumor. It cannot be done by defensive action. I expect you to take all offensive measures not only to clarify the situation but to eradicate the enemy west of the Driniumor. You must do it with your own forces which are considered adequate for the purpose. We cannot waste time by dilatory tactics. While I appreciate that some of your troops are tired I know of no battle which was entered into with fresh troops. Please give this your personal attention and push it to a conclusion in order that incoming troops may be used to finish up this situation outside of your area.³⁵

This message, while worded differently, parallels that which MacArthur gave Eichelberger before dispatching him to Buna. Hall said the Japanese were not Gill's equal in numbers. Wrong. He could not give him any more men or support. The use of the word "dilatory" was insulting to all who absorbed that attack and prepared to launch their own. Yet, in New Guinea, such was the life of the 32nd Infantry Division. The situation was never ideal, even this late in the war. By the end of August, all had returned to normal. The line was restored and the Eighteenth Japanese Army was shattered. The entire Amer-

ican force, mostly the 32nd, lost 440 men KIA, 2,550 WIA, and ten MIA.³⁶ Japanese losses, mostly dead, were between twelve and fourteen thousand.³⁷ The 32nd soon left New Guinea for the Philippines, tired but ready for an entirely new set of challenges.

It was nearly two years earlier that the 32nd Infantry Division first entered combat at Buna. A vicious campaign made worse by their unpreparedness, inadequate weapons, and poor leadership at the highest level still resulted in a victory, although at high cost. The division trained and prepared for their next campaign that started in the spring of 1944 at Hollandia and ended in another bitter struggle along the Driniumor River, against superior numbers and once again with poor direction from top leadership. The 32nd seemed to always find itself in the worst possible situation. Buna, the Driniu-

mor: there never seemed to be a positive scenario that the Division faced. Yet, they persevered. Throughout their two years on New Guinea, they operated under the massive shadow of MacArthur and his unrealistic expectations. At Buna, they were supposed to take airfields and defeat Japanese positions with one piece of artillery, a few tanks that came a month after the campaign started, and no support from higher headquarters. Buna cost the Division its commander. Along the Driniumor River, only part of the Division was expected to hold a line several full strength divisions would find challenging and again with little support, in this case from their Army commander, General Walter Krueger. They persevered once again. After the Driniumor, the 32nd was placed in reserve for the upcoming Leyte operation. MacArthur was returning to the Philippines.

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Notes

- 1 Robert Young, *They Too Fought the Japanese*, 5–10.
- 2 Military Intelligence Division, *The Buna-Sanananda Operation*, 10.
- 3 Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 155.
- 4 Young, *They Too Fought the Japanese*, 22.
- 5 *Ibid.*
- 6 Samuel Milner, *Victory In Papua*, 133.
- 7 Ibiblio.org.
- 8 MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, 153.
- 9 Robert Eichelberger, *Our Jungle Road To Tokyo*, 22.
- 10 Milner, *Victory In Papua*, 175.
- 11 Milner, 269.
- 12 *Ibid.*, 176.
- 13 Eichelberger, *Our Jungle Road To Tokyo*, 25.
- 14 Young, 32.
- 15 George Kenney, *George Kenney Reports*, 153.
- 16 *Introduction To The Eichelberger Papers*.
- 17 Young, 33–34.
- 18 Milner 239
- 19 Milner, 265.
- 20 Young, 37.

21 Milner, 263.

22 Young, 37–39.

23 *Ibid.*, 39.

24 Edward Drea, *Defending the Driniumor*, 17.

25 *Ibid.*, 62.

26 *Ibid.*, 156.

27 Young, 124–25.

28 FM 100-5, *Field Service Regulations (Operations)*, para. 597.

29 Robert Ross Smith, *The Approach To The Philippines*, 141.

30 Drea, *Defending the Driniumor*, 141.

31 Smith, *The Approach To The Philippines*, 135.

32 *Ibid.*, 136.

33 Young, 133–36.

34 Smith, 158.

35 Drea, 95–96.


36 Smith, 204.

37 *Ibid.*, 205.

Book Review: Roy E. Appleman's *East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea, 1950*

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American Military University



Roy E. Appleman. *East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea, 1950*. College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1987. ISBN 9780890962831. 399 pages.

Roy E. Appleman was an army combat historian, a World War II and Korean War veteran, a National Park historian, and the author of several Korean War historical works including *East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea, 1950*. With Korea known as “The Forgotten War,” Appleman elected to investigate the 31st Regiment Combat Team’s (RCT) experience at the Chosin Reservoir near Manchuria, China. *East of Chosin* is a vital entry in Korean War historiography since, previous to its publication, the Battle of Chosin Reservoir received very little documentation or research. Appleman combed through documents, written interviews, and oral histories to piece together the story of the 31st RCT. Therefore, *East of Chosin* is a critical book for any historian to examine to see if Appleman’s theories have stood the test of time.

Appleman’s central thesis is that the loss of life at the Battle of Chosin Reservoir occurred as a result of deficient divisional leadership and organization; almost nonexistent communication; shortage of weaponry, ammunition, and supplies; insufficient planning; and inhospitable environment and terrain. He also argues that with some changes, such as more reliable radios for effective communication between officers and assigning Brigadier General Henry I. Hodes to command, as he was familiar with 31st RCT, more soldiers would have survived the breakout.

Having clearly stated his argument, he supports his theories concisely with well-written chapters and the excellent use of written histories and oral interviews. For instance, he includes interviews about the deficiency of experienced command leadership. Marine

Captain Edward P. Stamford, Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) Commander assigned to 31st RTC, declared, "Most of the Army officers and many of the NCOs seemed to be very well trained and apparently good leaders. The weakness lay in that the 7th Infantry Division lost many of its senior NCOs through transfers to units in Korea prior to its departure from Japan" (319). Also, First Lieutenant Hugh R. May of the 31st RCT acknowledged that "As long as the men had leaders they performed without questioning orders from their officers; once the officer ranks were decimated it was impossible to maintain control" (318).

Appleman portrays the role of the Commander of X Corps, Army General Edward Almond, accurately in the 31st RCT's disaster at the Battle of Chosin Reservoir. He demonstrated the concern of Almond's staff while depicting Almond's desire to please General Douglas MacArthur, Commander of the United Nations Forces and Far East Command. For example, Lieutenant Colonel William J. McCaffrey, Almond's deputy chief of staff, expressed concerns about the operation and Marine Colonel Edward H. Forney, the liaison officer and amphibious-movement expert, had opposed the race to Yalu River through the Chosin Reservoir (11). Nonetheless, Gen. Almond disregarded the advice of his staff while attempting to please MacArthur. For example, General Almond had received reports on the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) in the Chosin Reservoir and interviewed captured CCF soldiers. Furthermore, Major General O.P. Smith

of the 1st Marine Division had encouraged Almond to permit the commanders of the 31st RCT to remain together. Instead, Almond ignored the CCF intelligence and ordered the 31st RCT to advance towards the Chosin Reservoir to spread out over the area, which led to the 31st RCT disaster, as the CCF overwhelmed the small American units throughout the reservoir. Chaos reigned among the ranks as numerous senior combat-experienced officers lost their lives, and the 31st RCT ceased to exist with everyone trying to survive.

Appleman takes the time to focus on the different officers of the 31st RCT, introducing the reader to the men with small snippets about them. While chronicling the Battle of Chosin Reservoir, Appleman makes sure to bring the human element to the historical event with his vivid portraits of the officers and soldiers. For example, he introduces Colonel Robert E. Jones, who became Lieutenant Colonel Don C. Faith's adjutant. After Jones graduated college, he attended the army's airborne training at Fort Benning. Then, he joined the 502nd Parachute Regiment in the European Theater of the Second World War and fought at Inchon and Seoul, Korea, where he earned a purple heart. Finally, after surviving the Battle of Chosin Reservoir, he proceeded through the ranks until he attained the rank of Colonel (58–59).

Likewise, he presents a balanced perspective on the Korean Augmentation United States Army (KATUSA), also known as the Republic of Korean Army (ROK). He depicts the KATU-

SA as an army of young South Koreans compelled into service by President Syngman Rhee's impressment unit. They had virtually no training before the US Army attached them to X Corp. In the Battle of Chosin Reservoir, the KATUSA became a hindrance to the 31st RCT. Yet, Appleman also praises the KATUSA as good soldiers when they obtained the proper training and, indeed, they produced some great officers. Appleman believes that any study of the Battle of Chosin Reservoir required the inclusion of the KATUSA (61).

Additionally, the maps, pictures, and appendices are a noteworthy addendum to the book. Interspersed throughout the paperback edition are maps and pictures of the region, allowing the reader to discern the movements of the 31st RCT in the challenging terrain. The appendix is useful for grasping the elements of the command structure.

Another compelling component of the book is the arrangement of the chapters. Beginning with an introduction to the Korean War in "War in Korea, November 1950" (3). Appleman poses many questions, which he pro-

ceeds to answer in "Could Task Force Faith Have Been Saved?" (305). By taking his readers through the journey with him, exhibiting all the elements, Appleman ultimately elucidates the disaster at the Chosin Reservoir.


However, Appleman has not included all of X Corp in his analysis since he has not examined the 1st Marine Division's combat on the western side of the reservoir. Furthermore, he has not asked why the Marines had fewer casualties than 31st RCT or why the Marines had not disintegrated into chaos when the CCF had surrounded them. Without researching the 1st Marine Division, Appleman excludes a significant part of the battle, and yet, he has still written a compelling 31st RCT's history of the Battle of Chosin Reservoir.

Among Korean War historiography, *East of Chosin* in an excellent and important history of the battle, supported by a wealth of documentation and oral history, which presents a coherent chronicle of the 31st RCT at the Chosin Reservoir. For any inspiring historian of the Korean War, Roy E. Appleman's *East of Chosin: Entrapment and Break-out in Korea, 1950*, is a must-read book.

Book Review: Patrick J. Sloyan's *When Reagan Sent in the Marines: The Invasion of Lebanon*

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Patrick J. Sloyan, *When Reagan Sent in the Marines: The Invasion of Lebanon*. New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2019. ISBN 9781250113917. Pp 240. Hardcover \$29.99

In the long annals of American military operations, the deployment of U.S. troops to Beirut in 1982 to stabilize a war-torn city is one typically under-reported or studied. In Patrick J. Sloyan's new book, *When Reagan Sent in the Marines: The Invasion of Lebanon*, the author redresses this oversight with an extremely harsh analysis of the events leading up to America's befuddled involvement, which ultimately climaxed with the horrific death of 241 U.S. Marines in the worst terrorist attack upon Americans until the events 9/11, 18 years later.

Sloyan, a Pulitzer-Prize winning journalist, covered the momentous stories of the 1960s and 1970s, including the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal. He won the Pulitzer for his exposé of U.S. friendly fire deaths during

Operation Desert Storm in the 1991 Gulf War. His penchant for fearless "muckraking" journalism was on full display in his 2015 book, *The Politics of Deception: JFK's Secret Decisions on Vietnam, Civil Rights, and Cuba*. Sloyan's eye for truth-telling (as he sees it) is also hard to miss in his latest—and last—book. Sadly, Sloyan died at age 82 in February 2019, shortly after completing *When Reagan Sent in the Marines*.

Sloyan begins his narrative 10 years before America's official "boots on the ground" entry into Beirut in August 1982, setting the countdown clock of American involvement to Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat's surprise attack on Israel during the Yom Kippur War of 1973. This highly effective offensive shattered Israel's military arsenal. Consequently, America responded to

its wounded ally by showering Israel with billions of dollars worth of new, state-of-the art weaponry. Even after the Yom Kippur War wound down and peace was achieved with Israel in October 1983, the rearmament of Israel would not be forgotten by America's enemies in the Middle East.

Up until this point in Sloyan's brief book (less than 200 pages, minus notes and bibliography), the tone is straightforward and relates events in a mostly objective light. It begins to lose its tight historical focus when it introduces memoir-like vignettes from the author, however, who was a reporter for *Newsday* during the time of the events beginning with the assassination of Anwar el-Sadat in 1981. What reads like a third-person history suddenly moves into a jarring first-person account, as Sloyan remembers walking in Sadat's funeral procession along with former presidents Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter. "As we arrived at the viewing stand where Sadat was gunned down, I pointed out bullet holes to Nixon. He alerted Carter and Ford. We all gawked," Sloyan writes. These random reminiscences lead the reader to wonder whether the book was incorrectly categorized as history rather than memoir.

There are a lot of people who come off very badly in Sloyan's book (President Ronald Reagan and Secretary of State Alexander Haig topping the list), but one nation specifically comes across decidedly ugly and Machiavellian in his telling: Israel. Between Israel's "obsessed" prime minister, Menachim Begin, and his "duplicitous"

minister of defense, Ariel Sharon, Sloyan paints a dark portrait:

"Their ambition was to use American military hardware and Israeli troops to change the map of the Mideast. They sucked the unwitting Reagan into a confrontation with ferocious and relentless opponents who conducted diplomacy with knives and bombs. It ended in defeat and blood-spattered humiliation for both Israel and the United States." (p. 1)

According to Sloyan, America and Israel "embarked together" on a war to oust Syria and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) from Lebanon in order to remake the Levant into a more pliant political entity, devoid of perceived Soviet influence (which was Reagan's obsession). Sloyan is at his reportorial best when he lays out the unfolding events of Israel's chaotic and blood-drenched invasion in June 1982, as well as the horrors of the 56-day Israeli siege of West Beirut, which ultimately drove Reagan to send in the U.S. Marines to lead a multinational force to maintain some semblance of order. His chapter on the complicated relationship of Bashir Gemayel's Maronite Christian Phalangists and Israel are as riveting as they are repulsive. One will not forget Sloyan's chapter on the Sabra and Shatila massacres, one of the most heinous events in a most heinous war.

While Sloyan has some good moments in this slim volume, he often loses his focus and jumps from one hot-button topic to the next. Just

when his established narrative thread is thrumming with action, a new chapter takes us to another place or person that eventually ties us back into the overarching picture. For example, he digresses into the role of Iran in Syria as well as their involvement in the terrorist attack on the Marine barracks, leading us into a segue of America's non-response and where it leaves us today. Also, a final chapter in the book is devoted expressly to Reagan after the slaughter of the U.S. Marines in Beirut and his re-election campaign, his subsequent Iran-Contra scandal, and his ability to get away with so much because of "his ability to make listeners laugh" (p. 163). One is left to conclude that a stronger editor could have sculpted this into a more seamless work.

One of the most puzzling omissions of *When Reagan Sent in the Marines*, however, is the lack of a dramatic minute-by-minute telling of the Marine barracks bombing on October 23, 1983, which was the nadir of American foreign policy in the Mideast and Reagan's biggest failure as commander-in-chief. The bombing is explored mostly via the grim after-images that met the eyes of French president François Mitterrand, who lost 58 French soldiers in a simultaneous truck bombing that fateful October morning.

While one would like more of a before-and-during telling of the barracks bombing, Sloyan's description of Mitterrand's visit afterwards is quite


evocative and powerful. More than any other head-of-state, Mitterrand saw and smelled the horror wreaked upon the American Marines. The bar-rack images Sloyan shares are visceral and gut-churning, but Mitterrand toured them dutifully and prayed over the physical remains of more than 200 American soldiers. "In a classic Gallic gesture, Mitterrand raised both arms with palms skyward. He implored heaven for an answer to the enormity of so many young men in tragic death" (p. 136) Sloyan recounts eloquently. He contrasts this French display of solidarity in mourning to the silence of President Reagan, who did not call to offer personal condolences to Colonel Timothy Geraghty, the Marine battalion commander on the ground.

In terms of readability, the book unfortunately suffers from the lack of a diligent copy editor. Certain phrases, titles, and timelines are repeated unnecessarily in every new chapter, and sloppy typos or redundant words mar an otherwise interesting, if somewhat wandering, narrative. *When Reagan Sent in the Marines* is not the last word in the history of America's involvement in Lebanon, which deserves a study more robust and less strident in tone. However, this book does raise serious questions about America's judgment and leadership in Middle East foreign affairs with ramifications extending to current times.

Book Review: Michael Palmer's *Stoddert's War: Naval Operations during the Quasi-War with France, 1798–1801* (Classics of Naval Literature)

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Michael Palmer, *Stoddert's War: Naval Operations during the Quasi-War with France, 1798–1801* (Classics of Naval Literature). Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000. ISBN 1557506647, pp. 350. Hardcover, out of print.

Michael A. Palmer served in the US Navy, worked for the Naval Historical Center, and worked for many years in the history department at East Carolina University. His books on history cover material on land and at sea from the sixteenth century to beyond the first Gulf War. Originally published in 1987 by the University of South Carolina Press and rereleased as one of the US Naval Institute's *Classics of Naval Literature* in 2000, Michael Palmer's first book, *Stoddert's War*, is currently accessible only through libraries and used booksellers. This is a problem that needs rectifying, as Palmer's examination of the nascent US Navy at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries offers surprisingly relevant lessons to the present day.

Michael Palmer wrote to fill a void when the first edition of *Stoddert's War* was released; as of 1987, there had been no scholarly treatment of the Quasi-War published since Gardener Allen's *Our Naval War with France* in 1909. Allen's book concentrated primarily on the "stirring exploits" of the different tactical actions which took place, but Palmer sought to write more of an operational history that examines the strategy and policy of Benjamin Stoddert, the first Secretary of the Navy and illuminates the events in Europe that brought about the Quasi-War in the first place. Palmer accomplishes this through an exhaustive study of letters, logbooks, policy documents, and especially the seven volumes of *Naval Documents Related to the Quasi-War Between*

the United States and France published in the 1930s. In general, Palmer's work is both entertaining and exceptionally informative, providing valuable insight into a rarely discussed conflict in early US history.

It is relatively common knowledge that the US Navy was established in 1794 in response to depredations committed against US shipping by the Barbary States. Construction of six frigates was authorized with the stipulation that work would halt if a peace treaty were concluded with Algiers. Such a treaty was ratified in 1796, but after strong encouragement from President George Washington, Congress authorized completion of the three frigates in the most advanced state. Lesser well known is that subsequent legislation in 1797 and 1798 authorized the arming of the first three frigates, the completion of the second three frigates, and the purchase and construction of additional warships to counteract rising privateer activity from France, America's first ally.

Stoddert's War begins with the infant United States trying to claw its way out of the economic depression that followed the 1783 Treaty of Paris. When war broke out between Great Britain and Revolutionary France, America strove to remain neutral and carried on a lucrative maritime trade with both belligerents. Britain and France alike regularly halted, searched, and seized American merchant vessels, straining contemporary definition of the rights of neutrals. Ratification of the Jay Treaty in 1796 improved America's relationship with Britain at the expense

of the relationship with France. French depredations against American shipping worsened, and when a 1797 diplomatic mission refused to pay a \$220,000 bribe before they could be received by the French foreign minister, the two nations effectively broke off all relations. The United States began preparing to fight a foreign war for the first time since the ratification of the Constitution.

Palmer takes valuable time to study the creation and growth of the Navy Department during the administration of President John Adams, which made for a great parallel to the purchase, construction, and launch of the navy's first warships. Upon his appointment as secretary, Benjamin Stoddert literally built the Navy Department up from nothing. Palmer deftly brings to life Stoddert's travails in supervising the completion of multiple warships, creating naval strategy (such as the desire to confront French privateers near their bases in the Caribbean after they had been mostly cleared from the US coast), adjudicating disputes between touchy politicians and even touchier naval officers, and everything required to fight a maritime war. Through Stoddert's tireless efforts, the US Navy established itself as a viable military service, survived the massive cuts of the Jefferson Administration, and blooded the officers who would be called upon to fight a similar war with Tripoli less than a decade later.

While Palmer briefly disparaged himself in the preface by suggesting that his concentration on strategy and planning do not make for the kind of

“rattling good history” that Thomas Hardy spoke about (xvii), there is plenty of action to be found in *Stoddert's War*. Captain Thomas Truxtun's capture of the French frigate *l'Insurgente* while commanding USS *Constellation* in 1799 is heavily featured as the Quasi-War exploit most celebrated by contemporary Americans. Coast Guard historians will be thrilled to read of USS *Pickering's* (a vessel borrowed from the US Revenue Cutter Service) defeat of *l'Egypte Conquise*, a privateer with three times *Pickering's* firepower and four times her manpower. Such figures from John Paul Jones to David Farragut to William Halsey and beyond could take great pride in the young navy described by Palmer's work.

I found it interesting to discover that Michael Palmer apparently was not quite through with the Quasi-War when *Stoddert's War* was published. In the author's own words, “I still suspect that the US Navy was more active in and around St. Domingue during the Quasi-War than we will ever know” (xiv), although he was unable to document anything beyond shipping armaments and supplies to support Toussaint l'Ouverture's rebellion in what later became Haiti. Such open support of rebels in the French colonies would certainly have escalated the conflict if it had been discovered, and the topic definitely merits further study. Palmer also lamented the lack of a history of the common seaman in the early US Navy, similar in scope to the light that Stephen Taylor's recently published *Sons of the Waves* has shined on the British Royal Navy during the Age of Sail. As

thorough as *Stoddert's War* certainly was, it makes evident the need for more research into the Quasi-War.


While it has certainly come a long way since the 1790s, the US Navy is in a period of transition today. Current leaders have repeatedly called for expansion of the navy from today's 280-plus vessels to 355, even as many as five hundred when the latest concepts of unmanned platforms are considered. Even as naval planners are taking hard looks at Russia and China as potential future adversaries, multiple new technologies are being developed and deployed throughout the fleet ... arguably prematurely in some cases. As the US Navy continues to grow and sail into an uncertain future, the lessons of the Quasi-War remain quite relevant. The forward-thinking and flexible Benjamin Stoddert, the initiative of the navy's first squadron commanders, and the tenacity and courage of eighteenth-century sailors provide many examples worthy of emulation.

Given the recent announcement from Secretary of the Navy Kenneth Braithwaite that the US Navy's next generation of frigates will be named *Constellation*-class, partially in honor of Truxtun's celebrated ship, it is obvious that the Quasi-War's examples are still being examined. For that reason, *Stoddert's War* is well deserving of another reprint, and historians would be wise to answer Michael Palmer's call to dig deeper into US naval history of the 1790s.

Book Review: Bruce L. Brager's *Grant's Victory: How Ulysses S. Grant Won the Civil War*

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Grant's Victory: How Ulysses S. Grant Won the Civil War, by Bruce L. Brager. Lanham, Maryland: The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc., 2020. ISBN 9780811739191. Notes. Index. Bibliography. Pp. 167. Hardcover \$20.85, Electronic version available.

Bruce L. Brager is a writer of the US Civil War, having previously published titles including *Here He Stands: The Story of Stonewall Jackson*, *Petersburg*, and *Monitor vs. Merrimack*. In *Grant's Victory: How Ulysses S. Grant Won The Civil War*, Brager demonstrates the major differences between the Chancellorsville and Wilderness campaigns, specifically the change in leadership from General Joseph Hooker to General Ulysses S. Grant. Brager dedicates most of this work to a synopsis of the campaigns in the Civil War's Eastern Theater, with an emphasis on leadership deficiencies in the Army of the Potomac. It does leave the reader at times in its early pages wondering when Grant will enter the discussion, as Grant is not really mentioned until the

Chancellorsville chapter, and then only because he was squeezing Vicksburg at the same time.

Given the work's title, one would expect major decisions or moments initiated by Grant to dominate its pages. They do not. Progressing from chapter to chapter, it seems like a concise though typical history of the Civil War in the East, most of it from the Union perspective. The text portion of the book is 133 pages, and three-quarters of that seem unrelated to Brager's title. Once the chapter on the Wilderness Campaign begins, the reader still wonders how this could possibly be "Grant's Victory." Finally, Brager states that the moment Grant decided to head south after several repulses by Robert E. Lee

was the most decisive single military decision of the war. Grant's vision of the war, a vision wholly supported by President Abraham Lincoln, was to fight the Confederates everywhere until they were overwhelmed by superior Union numbers and resources. This vision won the war. General Joseph Hooker had the same numbers and resources at Chancellorsville a year earlier and squandered them. Brager examines the long line of Union failures from First Bull Run to Chancellorsville. With each battle, Brager examines the failures of the commanders of those battles (McClellan in the Peninsula and at Antietam, Pope at Second Manassas, Burnside at Fredericksburg, and Hooker at Chancellorsville). These failures are well known and nothing original tactically is seen in these chapters. General Grant's superiority is informally established as those Grant is compared to exhibit their many poor decisions. Brager is complimentary of General George Meade, the commander of the Army of the Potomac from Gettysburg until the end of the war.

In addition to demonstrating Grant's path to victory, Brager takes the time throughout his book to dispel common Civil War moments and decisions accepted as fact. On Hooker at Chancellorsville, the traditionally accepted belief is that Hooker floundered when an attack was needed or that the Army of the Potomac commander seemed out of touch at critical junctures. Brager reminds the reader that an artillery shell hit the pillar of a house Hooker was leaning against during the battle, throwing him to the

ground with a concussion. Hooker was also given brandy after that, no doubt further weakening his faculties (69). Hooker's lack of aggression can therefore at least be partially understood. At Gettysburg, Brager refutes the idea that Confederate General Ewell cost Robert E. Lee the battle on Day 1 when Ewell did not take Culp's Hill. "If practicable," the phrase Lee sent to Ewell when deciding if Ewell could take the hill left the decision to the general on the ground. Ewell, with federal troops beginning to entrench, viewed the situation as not practicable. According to Brager, Ewell was only following orders and does not deserve the criticism that it was the fact that Ewell was new to Corps command that stopped him from taking Culp's Hill (81). Later in the battle, Brager also defends Meade for not attacking Lee right after repulsing Pickett's Charge, as Lee had a strong position and could have likely thwarted any counterattack (89). The fact that Meade's army was exhausted and battered, according to Brager, never even seems to enter the equation. These points would intrigue any avid reader of the Civil War.

There is little in *Grant's Victory: How Ulysses S. Grant Won the Civil War* that has not been described and analyzed in hundreds of other books. The US Civil War is one of military history's most overanalyzed topics and while Brager does a good job refuting traditional beliefs such as Hooker at Chancellorsville, there is little original analysis. Grant's decision to head south after his repulse in the Wilderness has been analyzed countless times. Grant's decision's effect on the Army of the Poto-

mac's morale has been analyzed countless times. An avid reader of the Civil War will find little new here.


The book contains fourteen pages of notes and an extensive bibliography of prominent Civil War literature. Further, Brager actually walked/drove the ground, and his intimate portray-

al of where the fighting took place is a welcome part of this work. While it does take some time to note Brager's purpose, it becomes obvious as the book progresses. *Grant's Victory: How Ulysses S. Grant Won the Civil War* is a good addition to Civil War history, especially for a synopsis of the key battles of the war's Eastern Theater.

Book Review: Russell Crandall's *Gunboat Democracy: U.S. Interventions in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama*

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Gunboat Democracy: U.S. Interventions in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama by Russell Crandall. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006. ISBN 978-0742550483. Pp 256. Paperback \$41.

The military actions of the United States during the Cold War have been well researched and documented, and while not as regularly discussed as wars from other periods such as World War II or the Civil War, its military efforts during the latter half of the 20th Century were still incredibly impactful to American foreign policy and the global power struggle. One piece of solid literature based on American military operations during the Cold War is Russel Crandall's *Gunboat Democracy: U.S. Interventions in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama*, an engaging and thought-provoking book that focuses on three of the least discussed military actions in American history. Overall, the book is well researched and strikes a fair balance of giving credit

where it is due for the various successes of each military intervention, while also exacting sharp criticisms when warranted for leadership errors or miscalculations. However, the book is not without its flaws. The author's choice to focus solely on the strategic and operational levels of war while ignoring almost completely the tactical level of decision making is an omission that leaves the book with a lack of depth and context, otherwise easily achieved with even a token observation of ground-level military action.

Historically speaking, U.S. military actions in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama are some of the shortest conflicts in which the country has participated. Nevertheless, many important books have been writ-

ten on these conflicts, with many more that focus on how these three military actions fit into the United States' ever-shifting foreign policy during the Cold War. Seyom Brown's *Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in Foreign Policy from Truman to Clinton* (Second Edition), Gabriel Kolko's *Confronting the Third World, United States Foreign Policy 1945-1980*, and Lars Schoultz's *Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy toward Latin America* are all excellent examples of great works that focus on higher-level foreign policy in the Caribbean region. Other well renowned books that revolve around the specifics of each of the aforementioned conflicts are Eric Chester's *Rag-Tags, Scum, Riff-Raff, and Commies: The U.S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, 1965-1966*, Mark Adkin's *Urgent Fury: The Battle for Grenada*, and Thomas Donnelly's *Operation Just Cause: The Storming of Panama*. Crandall's *Gunboat Democracy* fits right in the middle of these groups, using each conflict to discuss overall foreign policy in the region on a case-by-case basis.

The best feature of *Gunboat Democracy* is the solid manner in which the author describes how the passage of time and ever-changing administrations that occurred between each military action influenced the overall determination to go to war in the first place. Crandall explains how, other than the omnipresent fear of the spread of communism that existed throughout the Cold War, each president had his own reasoning to send in the U.S. military to the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama. For instance, Crandall hits

on President Reagan's desire to avoid a Tehran-like hostage situation in Grenada that crippled the Carter presidency, while later delving into how the perception of being a "wimp" during the presidential election unconsciously impacted President Bush's determination to invade Panama to oust strongman Manuel Noriega. These vignettes help give the read a better understanding of why various leaders decided to resort to armed conflict, outside of the already pre-existing parameters of containing communism and promoting democratic regimes abroad.

However, as mentioned earlier, one of the major shortcomings that keeps *Gunboat Democracy* from being an even more influential study is the lack of a tactical perspective. Throughout the book, the author clearly makes the choice to focus almost exclusively on the strategic and operational levels of decision making and how these conflicts fit into the overall legacy of American foreign policy. The absence of any type of tactical analysis of military actions places the fighting in a seemingly theoretical realm and dehumanizes it almost completely. Crandall does occasionally mention the deaths of U.S. soldiers (as in the invasion of Grenada) when he writes of the passing of a SEAL team who "vanished in rough seas during a reconnaissance mission," but these details are seemingly few and far between during the author's brief descriptions of the conflicts. There are no detailed maps of troop placement, nor any discussion of actual fighting between opponents in *Gunboat Democracy*, and that is a tactical mistake in its own right. These

conflicts were not war games, but rather life-or-death situations for thousands of soldiers. Including their exploits in more depth would have provided the book the gravity it lacks.

Russell Crandall's *Gunboat Democracy: U.S. Interventions in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama* is a decent contribution to the study of American foreign policy in the Caribbean during the Cold War. To those new to the field, it can serve as a solid starting point, providing background

and strategic analysis of why the U.S. spent millions of dollars to send troops to these three countries. But readers wanting more tactical details should look to some of the other books mentioned in this review, since this book does not deliver on that front. In the end, *Gunboat Democracy's* brief examination of the three U.S. military actions in the Caribbean during the Cold War is a worthwhile contribution to the study of American foreign policy during that fascinating period.

Virtual Battlefield Tour: Bloody Ridge National Peace Park

Jeff Ballard

American Military University




Bloody Ridge National Peace Park, Guadalcanal Province, Solomon Islands
Google Earth: 9°26'48" S 160°03'41" E

The Battle

On 4 July 1942, an Allied reconnaissance plane photographed Japanese airfield construction on Guadalcanal in the British Solomon Islands. When completed, Japanese twin-engine bombers could fly deep into the Coral Sea and threaten the United States and Australia's vital lifeline.

The 1st Marine Division subsequently assaulted and captured Gua-

dalcanal and adjacent Tulagi Island between 7-9 August. The Marines then completed the captured airfield and named it for a Marine Corps pilot and hero of the Battle of Midway. Henderson Field, its defense, and Japanese efforts to recapture it became the vortex of combat in the South Pacific during the waning months of 1942. Few battles in World War II matched the sustained violence on the land, sea, and air than the Guadalcanal Campaign (7 August 1942 to 9 February 1943).



1st Marine Division Lunga Point perimeter, 12-14 September 1942. Source: West Point Atlas of the Second World War Asia and the Pacific, Diagram 17C.

Imperial Japanese General Headquarters reacted quickly to the threat. However, their response was ineffective because estimates of the landing force's size and Marine intentions were flawed. IGHQ believed fewer than 2,000 Marines landed on Guadalcanal, and like the 2nd Raider Battalion's raid on Makin Atoll (17 to 18 August 1942), the Marines would destroy the airfield and depart. The Japanese were wrong on both counts.

By mid-September, Major General Archer A. Vandergrift's 1st Marine Division, 11,000 strong, had scratched out a defensive perimeter surrounding

Henderson Field despite being short of men and critical supplies. Fearing a Japanese counter-landing on Lunga Point more than an attack from the island's interior, Vandergrift's lines were weakest to the south.

After heavy fighting on Tulagi and a commando-style raid on the Japanese supply depot at Tasimboko, the depleted 1st Raider and the 1st Parachute Battalions needed a rest. Vandergrift placed the exhausted Marines on a grassy hog-back ridge several thousand yards south of the airfield for rest and recuperation. Lieutenant Colonel Merritt A. (Red Mike) Edson, in over-

all command of the composite Battalion, had reconnoitered the terrain the week before the Tasimboko Raid and knew they were in for trouble. The high ground running straight towards the airfield would provide a well-defined line of approach for a night attack on the airfield. Marine patrols that frequented the area south of Henderson Field amplified Edson's concerns, reporting increasing numbers of Japanese soldiers and many small artillery pieces. Finally, on 10 September, native scouts reported the Japanese were cutting a trail through the jungle east of the Tenaru River, about five miles from the Lunga perimeter. Both observations indicated that a major Japanese offensive was in the making.

The Japanese mid-September offensive to recapture the airfield would be their second attempt. When word of the 7 August landings reached Tokyo, IGHQ dispatched the 28th Regiment, under Colonel Kiyonao Ichiki, to evict the Marines from Guadalcanal. Ichiki, whose Regiment had been designated to occupy Midway Island, was a former instructor of "bamboo spear" tactics or "Banzai charges" at the Toyama Infantry School. Hyper-aggressive, Ichiki did not wait for his entire Regiment to gather before leading his men in an uncoordinated Banzai charge against the Marine perimeter. At Alligator Creek (21 August), eight hundred men of the Ichiki Detachment charged across the Tenaru River's mouth into the prepared Marine positions and died. The combined arms fire from rifles, machine-guns, and mortars was murderous.

Ichiki and the Regiment's surviving officers committed suicide.

Next into the breach was Major General Kiyotake Kawaguchi's 35th Infantry Brigade, the victors of the fighting in British Borneo. IGHQ was so sure the Brigade would be victorious, it dispatched 1,500 soldiers to occupy Guadalcanal. The 35th, however, would not engage the Marines as a single brigade but as individual battalions with little coordination. Kawaguchi lost unity of command before his troops arrived on Guadalcanal. Units embarked in the "Tokyo Express" fast destroyer-transport arrived unharmed and in the correct location. The troops transported by open flat-bottomed barges suffered a slow and tedious journey, traveling only at night and hiding in island coves and mangrove swamps during the day. One barge-borne battalion, caught in the daylight, was strafed mercilessly by Henderson Field planes, lost its commander, half its men, and landed on the wrong end of the island. Consequently, Kawaguchi could only gather four battalions from three different regiments in the main body for the assault on Henderson by way of the ridge Japanese maps labeled "the Centipede."

At noon on 12 September, the daily Japanese air raid arrived and dropped its bombs, not on the airfield, but along the ridge's length. At about the same time, the Raiders attempted a reconnaissance in force south of their position and encountered unexpected Japanese resistance and broke contact. Vandergrift now knew what Red Mike suspected all along—the fight was com-

ing to him. Edson's men strung barbed wire and settled into their positions on the ridge complex. [See Image F]

The terrain around the ridge was deceiving. The jungle, which lapped at the ridge's slopes, was so close the Raiders and the late-arriving Parachutists, that they would have little time to react to a sudden attack. Edson had no choice but to place his first line companies, Baker and Charlie Companies, 1st Raider Battalion and Baker Company, 1st Parachute Battalion, in vulnerable jungle outposts.

The steep slopes of the saddle-back ridge were covered with kunai grass and ascended to two modest crests. The Marines labeled the southern knoll "Hill 1" (100-ft elevation) and the northern knoll "Hill 2" (120-ft elevation). [See Image A] The Lunga River anchored the Marines' western flank, and a swampy marsh separated the Raider's Baker, and Charlie positions. Edson positioned the remainder of his forces in a 1,800-yard horseshoe around Hill 2. [See Image D] A broad footpath connected the two hilltops and then continued north past Vandergriff's headquarters to Henderson Field.

The attack began at 2130, when the Imperial Japanese Navy cruiser *Sendai* began to bombard the ridge with its seven 5.5-in guns. Five shells stuck the Raider Command Post. Only one exploded, but caused no casualties. The scene became even weirder when *Sendai's* searchlight snapped on and swept the ridge, causing the Marines to feel "naked and exposed." The cruiser bombarded the ridge for well over an hour,

but most shells overshot the crest and landed in the jungle.

However, *Sendai's* beacon must have come as a godsend to Kawaguchi's 1st and 3rd Battalions (124th Infantry Regiment). The two battalions advanced through the jungle, trying to stay on schedule at nearly a dead run, but having difficulty locating the Marine position.

The long and noisy naval bombardment masked the sound of the advancing Japanese until they were near or within the Raider's lines. Major Kokusho's I/124 came closest to meeting the timetable and jumping-off point but was pushed west across the Lunga when it became entangled with Lieutenant Colonel Watanabe's surging III/124. Kawaguchi regretted the loss of control over his battalions, but the soldiers who did penetrate Marine lines did so with the deadly skill of veteran jungle fighters.

The Japanese attacked either side of the swamp, driving a wedge between the two forward Raider companies, forcing elements of each to fall back towards the western slope of the ridge. Some I/124 soldiers crossed the Lunga and overran Charlie company positions nearest the river. Kawaguchi's men captured several Raiders and brutally tortured them with bayonets and swords. The screams of the dying haunted the men dug in around the ridge's crest as they waited for a Japanese surge that did not come that night.

The first night's fighting on the ridge alarmed Edson's company commanders. For the first time, the Japanese

had driven the Raiders from prepared positions and forced them to abandon weapons and wounded. Had Charlie company, and its attached Easy company machinegun platoon, not withdrawn, which it did about midnight, it would have been flanked, cut-off, and destroyed. Marine casualties were high, more than fifty, with KIA accounting for half. The Japanese likely suffered twice that. For his part, Red Mike was concerned but not discouraged. "The Nip will be back. I want to surprise him."

The attitude of the two commanders could not have been more different. Despite the 124th Regiment's success in forcing a bulge in the Marine lines, Kawaguchi regarded the attack as "a tragedy ... a miserable failure." The Brigade commander could not have known how close the 124th had come to a breakthrough, but 12 September was a night of missed opportunities for the Japanese. After translation and study of Japanese unit diaries, historian Richard Frank summed up the first night of the battle on Bloody Ridge this way:


"The [Japanese] battalions lost their sense of direction, almost entirely missed the ridge, and instead drifted into the low, waterlogged swath of jungle between the ridge and the Lunga. Units became lost; lost units became scattered; scattered units became intermingled. Control slipped away from Kawaguchi and battalion commanders."

Despite Kawaguchi's dismay at the performance of his battalions on the first

day, the General failed to alter his plan in any meaningful way and gave no more insightful orders than: "The Brigade will again execute a night attack tonight. The duty of each Battalion is the same as before."

The next morning Edson attempted to use his reserve companies to dislodge the Japanese that occupied Charlie's old position. Edson ordered Able and Dog companies to probe the flanks of the salient. Throughout the day, the Marines engaged in small unit actions made most difficult by the extreme heat. Despite repeated efforts, a few under-strength companies would not be able to eject the Japanese. To make matters worse, the jungle surrounding the ridge complex was teeming with Kawaguchi's veteran infantry. With the pocket still in Japanese hands, Baker's position was untenable, its right flank exposed. Red Mike had no choice but to order the Raiders and Parachutists to concentrate their positions around Hill 2, dig in, wire up, get some sleep, and be ready for the inevitable night attack.

Lieutenant Colonel Merrill B. Twining, Vandergrift's assistant operations officer, visited Edson's forward command post on Hill 2 in the mid-afternoon and was impressed with Edson's handiwork. [See Image C] The concentrated positions significantly improved the automatic weapons' fields of fire. Furthermore, the Japanese would now have to cross a hundred yards of open ground, once they emerged from the jungle, before reaching the Marine lines.



Marine disposition on the first night of the battle. Author's collection.

Twining was, however, concerned about Edson, who was “terribly fatigued and glassy-eyed.” Twining recommended that the Division Reserve (the 2nd Battalion 5th Regiment) relieve Edson, but an air raid prevented the 2/5 from moving until after dark. The best he could do was to shore up Edson’s right flank with a company of engineers to act as riflemen.

Throughout the day on the 13th, Japanese planes attacked the Lunga perimeter but avoided the ridge complex because the “Sea Eagles” were unsure of Kawaguchi’s position.

Kawaguchi’s attack on the second night attack began much like the first. IJN destroyers standing off Lunga Point shelled the ridge but without

using searchlights. The illumination that night was provided by rocket flares which proceeded each Japanese attack. The General knew that in order to capture Henderson Field, his three battalions would have to overwhelm the Raiders and Parachutists completely. Consequently, he ordered a dozen separate attacks on the Marine positions. Each wave succeeded in driving the Marines back towards the northernmost knoll of the ridge. [See Images B and D] From their final positions on Hill 2, the Marines held back the Japanese onslaught in fierce fighting, much of it at hand grenade-range. [See Image G] Edson now realized his men were no longer just fighting to save Henderson Field—they were fighting to save their lives.

The 75mm and 105mm howitzers of the 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines fired continuously throughout the night with murderous results. Flares fired by Kawaguchi's troops served as a signal to attack, but also made an excellent reference point for Marine artillery. As each successive wave pushed the Marines closer and closer to Edson's CP, Red Mike walked the artillery back towards his "Alamo" position despite his forward artillery observers' safety concerns. Bullets ripped at Edson's clothing as he stood erect directing fire on his field telephone until the lines were cut either by artillery or the infiltrating Japanese. With all communications lost and his command in the final extreme, Edson and Major Kenneth D. Bailey chanted, "BILL WHALING! BILL WHALING!" until the 2nd Battalion 5th Marines commander Bill Whaling

understood the message and brought his men forward. With 2/5 reinforcement and Colonel Pedro de Valle's guns firing direct support at close range, the defending Marines held.

Before dawn on the 14th, Edson sent Bailey to Henderson Field to beg for close air support from Army Captain John A. Thompson's 67th Fighter Squadron. At first light, Thompson led a trio of P-400s in repeated passes over the ridge and nearby jungle clearings. The trio's six wing-mounted .50-caliber machine and nose-mounted 20mm cannon cut down exposed Japanese like a scythe through a wheat field from their first pass.

With the departure of the Army olive-drab fighters, Kawaguchi knew he was defeated. The majority of his troops lay dead or dying in the jungle or on the slope of the Centipede. Once the victor of Borneo, the rising sun set on the General's career. Kawaguchi was recalled to Rabaul to explain the disastrous campaign, which concluded with the airfield still in Allied hands. Thereafter, he was placed on indefinite inactive status until Japan's imminent invasion in 1945 brought him out of retirement.

Once again, Marine combined arms, individual courage, and inspired leadership overcame Japanese Bushido and unimaginative direction. Had Kawaguchi been able to gather his entire Brigade, it is unlikely Edson could have held the ridge. Or, had the General chosen to attack on a two, rather than a three-battalion front, his reserve battalion could have exploited the significant penetrations made by the II/124 and

II/4 battalions, forcing a breakthrough to the airfield. A small group of Japanese penetrated so far north that they wandered into the 1st Division CP and bayoneted a Marine before being cut down.

During these two nights, the Marines achieved a significant victory over a superior Japanese force, which undoubtedly saved Henderson Field from capture. Edson's casualties are difficult to validate and range from between 133 and 166. However, the most accurate estimates come from Edson's definitive biography, which reports 34 Raiders dead and 129 wounded (a total of 163), or one-quarter of Edson's command. Nine Raiders are listed as missing in action. The Parachutist casualties were proportional.

After the war, Kawaguchi reported his losses as 41 officers and 1,092 enlisted men killed or wounded, a little less than twenty percent of the Brigade's 6,700-man compliment. The number was undoubtedly higher. The 2nd Battalion 5th Marines, who replaced the Raiders, reported burying six hundred slain Japanese. Richard Frank estimates Japanese losses on the ridge could have been as high as 800 killed or missing. The jungle certainly took the seriously wounded as they trekked east to relative safety west of the Matanikau River. [See Image E]


The "Battle of Bloody Ridge," alternatively "Edson's Ridge," or just "The Ridge," instantly became a Marine Corps legend. Edson and Bailey received the Medal of Honor. The latter was AWOL from a hospital on Espiritu

Santo and arrived just in time for the battle still wearing his hospital tennis shoes. Bailey's MOH was awarded posthumously, as he was killed in fighting on the Matanikau less than two weeks later. Thirteen Raiders received the Navy Cross, the nation's second-highest decoration. One Raider received his second Navy Cross in as many weeks. An impressive number, no doubt, but disproportionately low considering the countless acts of individual bravery displayed during the battle. Also confusing is that of the 24 U.S. Navy ships named after Raider heroes and alumni; only the USS *Edson* (DD-946) was named for a veteran of the battle for "The Ridge."

Visiting the Battlefield

The Battle of Bloody Ridge took place in one of the most remote locations in the world. In 1942, other than a few British government officials and Australian coconut plantation owners, few had ever heard of the Solomon Islands and fewer reasons to go there. Likewise, nobody in the United States had ever heard of Guadalcanal; however, by 1943, every American knew the name and what happened there.

Almost eight decades later, the Solomon Islands are still very much off the beaten track, but with careful planning, one can arrange a visit to the island. Before the COVID pandemic, several United States and Australian tour companies offered multi-day tour packages to explore the Bloody Ridge National Peace Park. The number of tours that will survive is unknown, but interested parties should begin plan-



Marine disposition on the second night of the battle. Author's collection.



Merritt A (“Red Mike”) Edson, (25 April 1897–14 August 1955)
as a Brigadier General in the field 1946.

ning their visit by visiting <http://www.guadalcanal.com>.

This virtual battlefield tour intends to demonstrate that technology has made Guadalcanal and all its battlefields accessible to everyone. In the “Bloody Ridge—Then and Now” section that follows, readers will find a series of images that show the battlefield as it looks today beside a photo of how it looked in the 1940s. Each image, reprinted with the permission of Peter Flahavin, is annotated with the loca-

tion’s Google Earth coordinates to facilitate independent exploration. Peter, an Australian who made ten visits to Guadalcanal between 1995 and 2013 (<http://www.guadalcanal.homestead.com>), has bound hundreds of more photos into a book titled, not surprisingly, *Guadalcanal Then and Now*, available for purchase at <https://au.blurb.com/b/9543395-guadalcanal>.

Other famous Guadalcanal battlefields are worth a virtual visit because their names loom just as large in the

lexicon of American military history as Edson's Ridge. Virtual visitors wishing to explore the battlefields at Alligator Creek, Coffin Corner, Galloping Horse, the Gifu, Matanikau River, and Mount Austen will find their Google Earth coordinates in a book titled *Guadalcanal Battlefields* by John Innes. Mr. Innes's book is available on Amazon and other fine retailers.

Other exceptional resources are the Facebook page and YouTube channel, both titled GUADALCANAL: WALKING A BATTLEFIELD. Both are chock full of photos, videos, and sto-


ries about life on the island today and during the War. A bonus is that visitors can chat with the site's creator David Holland, a former Marine. A veteran of several deployments to Guadalcanal while serving with the Australian Federal Police, Mr. Holland has walked the terrain and extensively explored the battlefields.

Many thanks to both Mr. Flahavin and Mr. Holland for their time and insight as this author takes his virtual battlefield tour of the Bloody Ridge National Peace Park.

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Guadalcanal Diary by Richard Tregaskis
Guadalcanal: The Definitive History of the Landmark Battle by Richard B. Frank
The Guide to Guadalcanal Battlefields, 2nd Edition by John Innes

Bloody Ridge—Then and Now



Edson's forward Command Post on Hill 2, then and now, as viewed from Hill 1. Looking north towards the final defensive knoll. On the 2nd night, the Raiders retreated from here to Hill 2. The 1st Division Command Post was behind the trees on the top right. Google Earth: 9°27'02.91" S 160°02'52.78" E. Photo courtesy of Peter Flahavin.



On the second night, hours after this photo was taken, Japanese soldiers from the I/124 overran this position and advanced down the ridge trail towards Hill 2. Google Earth: 9°27'10.29 S 160°02'52.78" E. Photo courtesy of Peter Flahavin.

Virtual Battlefield Tour: Bloody Ridge National Peace Park



Col. Edson and Gen. Vandegrift explain the battle to Marine Commandant Holcombe during his visit to Guadalcanal. The group is standing near Edson's forward Command Post on Hill 2, now the site of the Battlefield Monument. Google Earth: 9°26'49.28" S 160°02'50.78" E. Photo courtesy of Peter Flahavin.

Raider defensive position at the foot of Hill 2. On the 2nd night the Marines were forced to fall back to the top of the hill. Google Earth: 9°26'50.33" S 160°02'48.90" E. Photo courtesy of Peter Flahavin.



Raider observation post at the southern end of Hill 1, 15 September 1942, looking southwest, for signs of the retreating enemy. Google Earth: 9°27'11.97" S 160°02'47.15" E. Photo courtesy of Peter Flahavin.




Barbed wire was strung liberally in front of the Raider positions at the southern end of Hill 1. When the grass is tall it can still bite the unwary. Google Earth: 9°27'13.53" S 160°02'46.99" E. Photo courtesy of Peter Flahavin.

Raider MG position on final knoll (Hill 2) on Edson's Ridge, looking south towards Hill 1. Peter Flahavin found the two expended rounds (Inset) at the bottom of the slope in 2004. The well-known photo of the four dead Japanese on the ridge trail was taken near the top center Japanese flag. Google Earth: 9°26'49.28" S 160°02'50.78" E. Photo courtesy of Peter Flahavin.



Saber & Scroll Historical Journal

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
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



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While there is literature about the maritime transportation system, and about cyber security, to date there is very little literature on this converging area. This pioneering book is beneficial to a variety of audiences looking at risk analysis, national security, cyber threats, or maritime policy.

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
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Edited by Mohammed M. Aman PhD and Mary Jo Aman MLIS

The book brings together reviews of books published on the Middle East and North Africa. It is a valuable addition to Middle East literature, and will provide an informative read for experts and non-experts on the MENA countries.

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Unworkable Conservatism looks at what passes these days for “conservative” principles—small government, low taxes, minimal regulation—and demonstrates that they are not feasible under modern conditions.





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Edited by Margaret Tseng

This edited volume addresses the increased political nature of impeachment. It is meant to be a wide overview of impeachment on the federal and state level, including: the politics of bringing impeachment articles forward, the politicized impeachment proceedings, the political nature of how one conducts oneself during the proceedings and the political fallout afterwards.

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



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