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Editorial Welcome

Welcome to the Spring/Summer 2019 issue of GSIS. This first issue of the year features three original research articles, a research note, a unique perspective from a field setting, commentary on a policy-relevant issue, and two book reviews. Together, the research articles examine a breadth of issues related to intelligence and global security. First, in *Forging Consensus? Approaches to Assessment in Intelligence Studies Programs*, Jonathan C. Smith explores how assessment structures function in Intelligence Studies degree programs in the United States, including the extent to which evidence supports a cross-institutional consensus on methods of assessment. Based on an analysis of eight programs, the findings have implications for how well the current assessment structures help to advance the discipline as a whole. Next, Aidan Parkes offers a theoretically informed study in *Power Shifts in the Saudi-Iranian Strategic Competition*. In contrast to studies that view the rivalry as an example of the broader Sunni-Shia debate, alliances, or great power patrons, Parkes critically analyzes how tensions and conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia develop parallel to global shifts in power. His article sheds light on how polarity theory can add a novel perspective to the Saudi-Iranian contest, as opposed to viewing it as isolated and regional. Finally, Fábio Nogueira de Miranda Filho's article, *Legitimacy of Intelligence According to Political Thinkers*, is grounded in political philosophy. Nogueira de Miranda Filho examines the ideas of twelve prominent Western political thinkers, and then assesses the extent to which their political philosophies support the legitimacy of the modern intelligence service apparatus. Ranging from Machiavelli to Rousseau, Marx, Hayek, and many others, Nogueira de Miranda Filho evaluates an impressive breadth of political thought in offering a philosophical basis on which society may (and in some cases, may not) grant legitimacy to the intelligence service.

In addition to these thought-provoking research articles, with this issue comes GSIS's inaugural research note publication by Michelle Watts and Mark Colwell. Their note, *Exploring the Digital Divide: Information Technology Governance and Native Nations*, advances a novel research program that focuses on assessing information technology needs and current usage patterns among members of Native Nations across the United States, as well as exploring perceptions of the digital divide among indigenous populations. Through their research, which was carried out over a two-year time span, the authors develop the concept of information technology governance and discuss its policy implications. Their findings provide a first glimpse at some of the key challenges and opportunities of information technology on tribal lands, establishing a foundation for further research and study.

The Spring/Summer Voices from the Field section features a report by Jim Schnell entitled *Considering Context as a Factor in HUMINT Collection and Analysis: A Voice from the Field*. Schnell, who is currently conducting a Fulbright Scholar

project in Myanmar, argues that an understanding of the role that cultural context plays in human communication holds value and relevance for both the collection and analysis of human intelligence. Although Schnell's piece primarily reflects his (fascinating) HUMINT experiences in China, he argues that an awareness of context has relevance in any cross-cultural context, including his present-day work in Myanmar.

In addition, with this issue we are very pleased to share the first Policy Relevant Essay authored by a doctoral student. In *What Social Psychology Tells Us about International Tolerance of Gross Human Rights Abuses*, Morgan Randolph Rust applies insights from two social psychology theories—cognitive dissonance and social exchange theory—to shed light on why there are inconsistencies when it comes to the enforcement of international law to prevent mass atrocities. Rust centers his analysis around several specific examples, including events in World War II, the genocides in Rwanda and Kosovo, Chinese and Myanmar human rights transgressions, and more, to better understand why states take swift action in regards to some human rights violations whereas they opt to ignore or overlook others.

Lastly, we present two book reviews in this issue. Joel Wickwire offers a review of Joanna Kulesza's book, *Due Diligence in International Law*, which provides a timely commentary on states' obligations to international law, particularly in light of rising tides of nationalism and isolationism, and Margaret S. Marangione reviews *Reasoning for Intelligence Analysts* by Noel Hendrickson, delivering insights into tools and methodologies for intelligence professionals in a complex world.

In closing, I would like to remind authors that GSIS is currently accepting submissions for its next issue (Fall/Winter 2019). Although GSIS accepts submissions on a rolling basis, the deadline for consideration in the Spring/Summer issue is August 1, 2019. We are currently seeking a diversity of both peer- and editorially-reviewed formats including original empirical research, research notes, action notes from the field addressing contemporary global security and intelligence issues of practice, policy relevant essays, and book reviews. In addition, GSIS provides a forum for small groups of authors to collectively submit several short articles built around a particular topic, similar to a symposium. Potential authors should consult the GSIS website for more details about the various types of contributions that the journal accepts and follow the instructions for authors in preparing their submissions.

Publishing an academic journal is a collaborative process. I would like to extend a sincere thanks to the authors, to our peer reviewers for their feedback and commitment, and to the members of the editorial board for their support and input.

On behalf of the editorial team,

Dr. Melissa Schnyder

American Public University System

ABOUT THE JOURNAL

Global Security and Intelligence Studies (GSIS) publishes high-quality and original research on contemporary security and intelligence issues. The journal is committed to methodological pluralism, and seeks to bridge the gap between scholars and practitioners engaged in global security and intelligence issues by publishing rigorous research, book reviews, and reflections on the field that are relevant to both communities. We will, on occasion, also seek to publish special issues on timely intelligence and global security topics, and welcome proposals that fit with the scope and aims of the journal. The journal actively encourages both former and current intelligence and global security practitioners to participate in important scholarly and policy debates, and invites them to contribute their research to the journal. As a result, we hope that the journal is a vibrant platform for informed, reasoned, and relevant debates on the most important global security and intelligence issues of our time.

Le damos la bienvenida a la edición de primavera / verano 2019 de GSIS. Este primer número del año presenta tres artículos de investigación originales, una nota de investigación, una perspectiva única desde un contexto de campo, comentarios sobre un tema relevante para la política y dos reseñas de libros. Juntos, los artículos de investigación examinan una variedad de temas relacionados con la inteligencia y la seguridad global. ¿Primero, en forjar el consenso? Enfoques para la evaluación en programas de estudios de inteligencia, Jonathan C. Smith explora cómo funcionan las estructuras de evaluación en los programas de grado de estudios de inteligencia en los Estados Unidos, incluida la medida en que la evidencia apoya un consenso interinstitucional sobre los métodos de evaluación. Sobre la base de un análisis de ocho programas, los hallazgos tienen implicaciones en la forma en que las estructuras de evaluación actuales ayudan a mejorar la disciplina en su conjunto. A continuación, Aidan Parkes ofrece un estudio teóricamente informado sobre los cambios de poder en la competencia estratégica saudí-iraní. En contraste con estudios que consideran la rivalidad como un ejemplo del debate más amplio entre sunitas y chiítas, alianzas o patrocinadores de grandes potencias, Parkes analiza críticamente cómo las tensiones y los conflictos entre Irán y Arabia Saudita se desarrollan en paralelo a los cambios globales en el poder. Su artículo arroja luz sobre cómo la teoría de la polaridad puede agregar una nueva perspectiva a la competencia entre Arabia Saudita e Irán, en lugar

de verlo como aislado y regional. Finalmente, el artículo de Fábio Nogueira de Miranda Filho, Legitimidad de la inteligencia según los pensadores políticos, se basa en la filosofía política. Nogueira de Miranda Filho examina las ideas de doce prominentes pensadores políticos occidentales, y luego evalúa hasta qué punto sus filosofías políticas apoyan la legitimidad del aparato moderno del servicio de inteligencia. Nogueira de Miranda Filho, desde Maquiavelo a Rousseau, Marx, Hayek y muchos otros, evalúa una impresionante amplitud de pensamiento político al ofrecer una base filosófica sobre la cual la sociedad puede (y en algunos casos, no) otorgar legitimidad al servicio de inteligencia.

Además de estos artículos de investigación que provocan la reflexión, con este número viene la publicación de notas de investigación inaugural de GSIS por Michelle Watts y Mark Colwell. Su nota, Explorando la brecha digital: Gobernanza de la tecnología de la información y naciones nativas, avanza un nuevo programa de investigación que se centra en evaluar las necesidades de tecnología de la información y los patrones de uso actuales entre los miembros de las naciones nativas en los Estados Unidos, así como en explorar las percepciones de la brecha digital entre las poblaciones indígenas. A través de su investigación, que se llevó a cabo durante un período de dos años, los autores desarrollan el concepto de gobierno de la tecnología de la información y discuten sus implicaciones políticas. Sus hallazgos ofrecen un primer vistazo a algunos de los desafíos y oportunidades clave de la tecnología de la información en las tierras tribales, estableciendo una base para futuras investigaciones y estudios.

La sección Voces del Campo de primavera / verano presenta un informe de Jim Schnell titulado Considerar el contexto como un factor en la recopilación y análisis de HUMINT: una voz desde el campo. Schnell, quien actualmente está llevando a cabo un proyecto Fulbright Scholar en Myanmar, sostiene que comprender el papel que juega el contexto cultural en la comunicación humana tiene valor y relevancia tanto para la recopilación como para el análisis de la inteligencia humana. Aunque la pieza de Schnell refleja principalmente sus (fascinantes) experiencias HUMINT en China, argumenta que la conciencia del contexto tiene relevancia en cualquier contexto intercultural, incluido su trabajo actual en Myanmar.

Además, con este tema, nos complace compartir el primer Ensayo Relevante sobre Políticas creado por un estudiante de doctorado. En *Lo que nos dice la psicología social sobre la tolerancia internacional de los abusos graves contra los derechos humanos*, Morgan Randolph Rust aplica los puntos de vista de dos teorías de la psicología social, la disonancia cognitiva y la teoría del intercambio social, para aclarar por qué existen inconsistencias cuando se trata de hacer cumplir el derecho internacional. Para evitar atrocidades masivas. Rust centra su análisis en varios ejemplos específicos, incluidos los sucesos de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, los genocidios de Ruanda y Kosovo, las transgresiones de derechos humanos en China y Myanmar, y más, para comprender mejor por qué los estados toman medidas

rápidas con respecto a algunas violaciones de derechos humanos, mientras que opta por ignorar o pasar por alto a otros.

Por último, presentamos dos reseñas de libros en este número. Joel Wickwire ofrece una revisión del libro de Joanna Kulesza, *Debida diligencia en el derecho internacional*, que proporciona un comentario oportuno sobre las obligaciones de los estados con el derecho internacional, particularmente a la luz de la creciente ola de nacionalismo y aislacionismo, y Margaret S. Marangione reseña *Razonamiento para analistas de inteligencia*, por Noel Hendrickson, que proporciona información sobre herramientas y metodologías para profesionales de inteligencia en un mundo complejo.

Para finalizar, me gustaría recordar a los autores que GSIS está aceptando presentaciones para su próximo número (otoño / invierno 2019). Aunque GSIS acepta presentaciones de forma continua, la fecha límite para su consideración en el número de Primavera / Verano es el 1 de agosto de 2019. Actualmente estamos buscando una diversidad de formatos revisados por pares y editorial, incluida la investigación empírica original, notas de investigación, notas de acción desde el campo que aborda los problemas contemporáneos de seguridad e inteligencia global de la práctica, ensayos relevantes para políticas y reseñas de libros. Además, GSIS ofrece un foro para que pequeños grupos de autores envíen colectivamente varios artículos breves sobre un tema en particular, similar a un simposio. Los autores potenciales deben consultar el sitio web de GSIS para obtener más detalles sobre los distintos tipos de contribuciones que acepta la revista y seguir las instrucciones para que los autores preparen sus presentaciones.

Publicar una revista académica es un proceso colaborativo. Me gustaría extender un sincero agradecimiento a los autores, a nuestros revisores por sus comentarios y compromiso y a los miembros del comité editorial por su apoyo y aportación.

En nombre del equipo editorial,

Dra. Melissa Schnyder
American Public University System

ACERCA DE LA REVISTA

Global Security and Intelligence Studies (GSIS) publica investigaciones originales y de alta calidad sobre temas contemporáneos de seguridad e inteligencia. La revista está comprometida con el pluralismo metodológico y busca cerrar la brecha entre académicos y profesionales involucrados en temas de seguridad e inteligencia global mediante la publicación de investigaciones rigurosas, reseñas de

libros y reflexiones sobre el campo que son relevantes para ambas comunidades. En ocasiones, también trataremos de publicar números especiales sobre inteligencia oportuna y temas de seguridad global, y recibiremos propuestas que se ajusten al alcance y los objetivos de la revista. La revista alienta activamente a los profesionales de la inteligencia global y de la seguridad actual y anterior a participar en importantes debates académicos y políticos, y los invita a contribuir con su investigación a la revista. Como resultado, esperamos que la revista sea una plataforma vibrante para debates informados, razonados y relevantes sobre los temas de seguridad e inteligencia globales más importantes de nuestro tiempo.

欢迎阅读2019年《全球安全与情报研究》（GSIS）春夏季期刊。本期是2019年第一期，聚焦于三篇原创研究文章、一篇研究报告、一篇来自情报领域设置的独特视角文章、一篇针对政策相关问题的评论文、以及两篇书评。综合而言，原创研究文章检验了一系列与情报和全球安全相关的问题。第一，在《制造共识？情报研究计划中的评估方法》一文中，作者Jonathan C. Smith探索了美国情报研究学位课程中评估结构的运作形式，包括证据在多大程度上支持就评估方法达成的跨机构共识。基于八个项目得出的分析，研究结果可能就“现有情报评估结构能在多大程度上从整体上帮助提高该学科”产生影响。在第二篇文章《沙特-伊朗战略竞争中的权力转变》中，作者Aidan Parkes提出了一项具有理论意义的研究。与那些“将竞争作为逊尼派-什叶派辩论、联盟或大国支持者案例”的研究形成对比的是，Parkes批判地分析了，伊朗和沙特阿拉伯之间的紧张关系和冲突是如何与全球权力转变相类似的。Parkes的文章阐明了权力极化理论如何能以新奇视角看待沙特和伊朗之间的竞争，而不是将其进行孤立作为区域事务看待。第三篇原创文章《政治思想家所认为的情报合法性》由Fábio Nogueira de Miranda Filho撰写，这篇文章基于政治哲学。Nogueira de Miranda Filho 检验了十二名杰出西方政治思想家的看法，随后评估了政治思想家的政治哲学在多大程度上支持现代情报服务机构的合法性。从马基雅维利到卢梭、马克斯、哈耶克及其他政治家，Nogueira de Miranda Filho 评价了一系列影响深刻的政治思想，以期“为社会可能（在某些情况下则不可能）赋予情报服务合法性”一事提供哲学基础。

本期GSIS不但包括上述三篇激发思考的研究文章，还收录了首篇由Michelle Watts 和 Mark Colwell撰写的研究报告。这篇报告名为《探索数字鸿沟：信息技术治理和原住民族》，其提出了一项新奇研究计划，聚焦于评估信息技术需求和美国当前原住民成员对信息技术的使用模式，文章还

探索了原住民人口对数字鸿沟的感知。作者通过耗时两年之久的研究，提出了信息技术治理的概念，并探讨了其政策意义。作者的研究发现揭开了有关部落地区信息技术的一些关键挑战和机遇，为今后研究奠定了基础。

本期“领域之声”版块聚焦于由Jim Schnell撰写的报告《将背景作为人工情报收集和分析中的考量因素：一篇情报领域见解》。Schnell目前在缅甸进行一项富布赖特学者项目，他认为，理解文化背景在人类传播中产生的作用，对人工情报的收集和分析都具备价值和相关性。尽管Schnell的文章主要反映了其在中国期间的（精彩）人工情报经历，但他认为，对文化背景的感知在任何跨文化背景下都具备相关性，包括其目前在缅甸的研究也是如此。

此外，笔者很高兴在本期中分享一篇首次由博士生撰写的政策相关论文。在《社会心理学如何诉说国际对严重侵犯人权的容忍》一文中，作者Morgan Randolph Rust应用两种社会心理学理论——认知失调理论和社会交换理论——中的见解，阐明了为何当涉及启用国际法来预防大屠杀时，会存在不一致。Rust的分析聚焦于几个特定案例，包括二战期间的事件、卢旺达和科索沃种族屠杀、中国和缅甸人权侵犯问题、以及更多事件，以期更好地理解为何国家会在某些人权侵犯问题上采取快速行动，而在另一些人权侵犯问题上却选择无视或忽视。

最后，本期还收录了两篇书评。Joel Wickwire评论了Kulesza的著作《国际法尽职调查》，Joel及时评论了国家在国际法上的义务，尤其鉴于民族主义和孤立主义趋势愈演愈烈。Margaret S. Marangione评论了Noel Hendrickson的著作《情报分析师的推理》，就复杂世界中情报专业人员的工具和方法发表了见解。

我想在文末提醒各位作者，GSIS目前正在征集下期（2019年秋冬季）投稿。尽管GSIS全年都接受投稿，但春夏季期刊投稿截止时间为2019年8月1日。同时我们正在寻找通过同行评审和编辑评审的一系列作品，包括原创实证研究，研究报告，应对当代全球安全和情报实践问题的行动报告、政策相关文章和书评。此外，GSIS还为一些作者提供论坛，以集体的方式提交数篇基于特定主题的短文章，类似于论文集。有兴趣的作者请浏览GSIS网站获取更多关于不同投稿类型的信息，并依照指示投稿。

发行学术期刊是一个集体过程。我衷心感谢各位作者和同行评审所给出的反馈和投入，同时感谢编委会成员的支持和付出。

谨代表编辑组，

Melissa Schnyder博士
美国公立大学系统

关于期刊

《全球安全与情报研究》(*Global Security and Intelligence Studies*,GSIS)发布高质量原创文章,研究当代安全与情报问题。本刊坚持方法论多元主义,并通过发布严谨学术研究、书评,致力在参与全球安全和情报问题的学者和从业者之间搭建桥梁。我们有时也会发布有关及时情报和全球安全主题的特刊,并欢迎适合本刊范围和目标的提议。GSIS积极鼓励所有曾任和现任情报从业者参与重要的学术辩论和政策辩论,同时邀请他们为本刊投稿。最终,我们希望本刊成为相关辩论的活跃平台,用于研究当代最重要的全球安全和情报问题。

Forging Consensus? Approaches to Assessment in Intelligence Studies Programs

Jonathan C. Smith¹

ABSTRACT

While the intelligence studies literature has given substantial attention to program learning objectives and pedagogy, there is not substantive exploration of assessment structures in these programs. This is significant, because in the absence of any centralized structure to define key learning objectives in the field, exploring assessment structures provides “ground truth” on what intelligence studies programs are actually trying to accomplish. By researching the experiences of eight programs, this study finds an eclectic mix of structures that appear to be driven more by the priorities of the institution in which they reside as they seek accreditation, versus the subject-matter discipline the program seeks to advance. To the extent that there is agreement on methods of assessment, it largely centers on the use of direct, qualitative approaches.

Keywords: Accreditation, Higher Education, Intelligence Studies, Program Assessment

¿Crear un consenso? Enfoques de Evaluación en Programas de Estudios de Inteligencia

RESUMEN

Si bien la literatura de estudios de inteligencia ha prestado una atención sustancial a los objetivos del programa y pedagogía de aprendizaje, no hay una exploración sustancial de las estructuras de evaluación en estos programas. Esto es significativo, ya que en ausencia de una estructura centralizada para definir objetivos de aprendizaje clave en el campo, explorar las estructuras de evaluación proporciona una “verdad fundamental” sobre lo que los programas de estudios de inteligencia realmente están tratando de lograr. Al investigar las

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experiencias de ocho programas, este estudio encuentra una combinación ecléctica de estructuras que parecen estar impulsadas más por las prioridades de la institución en la que residen cuando buscan la acreditación, que con la disciplina del tema que el programa busca avanzar. En la medida en que hay consenso sobre los métodos de evaluación, se centra en gran medida en el uso de enfoques directos y cualitativos.

Palabras clave: acreditación, educación superior, estudios de inteligencia, evaluación del programa.

制造共识？情报研究项目中的评估方法

摘要

尽管情报研究文献对情报项目的学习目标和教学方法给予了大量关注，但却没有实质性地探索这些项目中的评估结构。这是十分重要的，因为当没有任何可定义情报领域中关键学习目标的中心化结构时，探索评估结构则能就“情报研究项目试图完成的目标”

提供“基本事实”。通过研究八大项目得出的经验，笔者发现，当寻求认证时，比起项目试图提高的主题学科，多种评估结构似乎更多地受所属机构优先事项的驱动影响。鉴于评估方法的统一程度，本文主要聚焦于使用直接定性方法。

关键词：认证，高等教育，情报研究，项目评估

Introduction

If you visit the website for the National Security Studies Institute at the University of Texas at El Paso (UTEP), you will notice a link for student resources. Within that section of the website, you will find that the program at UTEP created a document called “Writing in INSS” (University of Texas at El Paso n.d.). Created in 2014, it provides guidance and additional resources to students on how to craft a variety of paper assignments across all of the courses in the program.

That guide is an illustration of what assessment is supposed to produce. Assessment is a systemic process in higher education that uses empirical data on student learning to refine programs and improve student learning (Allen 2004, 5). In this case, the program at UTEP had a clearly defined standard with regard to writing skills, data on student assignments across several courses that suggested that this standard was not being met, and a desire to do something about it. The program also altered the type and frequency of writing assignments in some courses to give students more opportunities to develop their communication skills (Larry Valero, Telephone interview with author, November 6, 2017). One program director described program assessment with a “dip stick” metaphor—you do not need a dip stick to make a car run, but you use it every now and again to see how everything is running (Background, Telephone interview with author, January 24, 2018).

This essential framework for assessment is widely understood. First, student learning outcomes (SLOs) are clearly articulated for the program or major. Then, data on relevant student activities are collected and evaluated from across the courses in the program. Finally, programmatic change is instituted (if needed) in response to the data in order to address any deficiencies. To be sure, it is important that the process is well articulated. As Rodgers et al. note, “the quality of assessment is important because influential decisions, such as curricular changes, should be informed by quality information” (Rodgers et al. 2013, 384).

However, there are some important questions that underlie this assessment activity. First, who is assessment for? While there is a clear benefit to an individual program, assessment efforts are often driven by the institution that houses the program. Their priorities surely overlap, but to what degree? Related to this question, how much commonality is there between intelligence studies programs in how they assess? If they largely share a common set of program objectives, do they also share a common set of assessment tools? Assessment reflects the “ground truth” of what a program’s objectives truly are. The former U.S. Vice President Joe Biden is famous for saying, “Don't tell me what you value, show me your budget, and I'll tell you what you value” (Goodreads, n.d.). Assessment reflects the true programmatic objectives in a similar fashion. A last question relates to the level of the degree. Many would agree that the SLOs in graduate-level programs in the field should reflect a higher level of competency than undergraduate programs. However, is that difference reflected in the assessment process?

By surveying a group of intelligence studies programs at civilian institutions in the United States, this study addresses these questions. What it finds is that the assessment process is typically driven from the institutional level with varying degrees of input from the program. This naturally leads to an element of diversity of assessment measures that are employed by different intelligence programs. And while it is expected that graduate-level programs are requiring a higher level of

competency than undergraduate programs, there is no substantive distinction in the assessment methods. Both levels in the sample show a preference for direct, qualitative assessment measures of SLOs.

Literature: Assessment as a Neglected Area of the Intelligence Studies Literature

Many observers have noted the substantial growth of the field of intelligence studies, and its associated literature, over the last decade. With regard to programs, the organizational growth and student enrollment have been substantial. In 2006, only 4 of the top 25 universities noted in *U.S. News and World Report* had courses in intelligence; by 2013, that proportion had grown to more than half (Smith 2013, 25). In 2015, Stephen Coulthart and Matthew Crosston identified 17 programs in intelligence studies at U.S. civilian institutions of higher education, with the vast majority of them being established since 2005 (Coulthart and Crosston 2015, 54). Since that time, additional programs have been established and only one of the programs noted in the Coulthart and Crosston study has been disestablished. Landon Murray noted a comparable growth with regard to scholarship. In 2013, he noted that “both qualitatively and quantitatively, the scholarly literature on academic intelligence curricula ... has grown impressively” (Landon-Murray 2013, 769). That sentiment appears to be even more true today.

One concern that arises from this rapid growth is the consistency of the educational experience that is being offered at different programs in this field of study. Some have likened the field of intelligence studies as an academic version of the Wild West with programs reflecting the unique collection of faculty in their programs (Marrin 2011, 5). This is an issue where assessment and accreditation could be of value to intelligence studies. Assessment tools or accrediting bodies that gave meaningful measures of program performance could promote quality educational experiences in the field.

As it stands, the eclectic nature of the intelligence studies environment can be attributed to three primary factors. First, with the substantial student demand, qualified faculty are in short supply. In 2011, Martin Rudner assessed that the demand for new intelligence studies programs had exceeded the supply and that appears to still be true today (Rudner 2009, 121). Second, the background of those faculty are uncommonly diverse for a field of study. Since there is only one doctoral-level degree in intelligence studies in the United States, faculty tend to come from a variety of academic backgrounds and with varying levels of practical experience in the field. This, in and of itself, is no vice as the study of intelligence is inherently interdisciplinary and borrows from several academic fields. Lastly, attempts to define a common vision of the field of intelligence studies are still in their infancy. For instance, the International Association for Intelligence Educa-

tion (IAFIE) articulated a set of educational standards (i.e., learning outcomes) for undergraduate and graduate programs in the field in 2011. However, unless a program is seeking certification of their program from IAFIE, there is no obligation for a program to follow this standard.

Within the literature on intelligence studies, there has been a robust debate regarding the program objectives and pedagogical approaches within the field. Perhaps the broadest debate regarding these academic programs is the question of whether such programs focus on the development of specialists or generalists in the field of intelligence. Stephen Marrin sees the rise in intelligence studies programs as adding a new dimension of academic support to the intelligence community—the development of process-oriented generalists (Marrin 2011). In contrast, former practitioners such as Mark Lowenthal reflect a contrary view that students preparing for careers in the field should primarily focus on area expertise and language skills, and that majoring in intelligence studies may be of limited value (Dujmovic 2017/2018, 60).

Many of the emerging programs would appear to be focusing on the skills related to analytic generalists. For instance, William Spracher's doctoral dissertation featured a "crosswalk" between the core competencies that are identified by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) for nonsupervisory analytic staff with the program objectives of a sample of education programs. He concluded that the objectives of most of the academic programs that he reviewed largely corresponded with the ODNI objectives (Spracher 2009).

Discussions of pedagogy largely reflect a desire for students to develop higher level intellectual skills associated with intelligence analysis. For instance, Kris Wheaton has been a strong advocate for the use of simulations and games as a tool to improve analytic skill sets. Corpora echoes a similar sentiment in his call for the use of open source intelligence exercises in the classroom to promote activities such as evaluating assumptions and exploring different methodological approaches to intelligence questions (Corpora 2007/2008, 12). Michael Collier stressed the importance of education on advanced social science methods and modeling to prepare students for advanced intelligence analysis positions (Collier 2005, 33).

However, one area that the literature has not directly addressed is how these programs are assessed. While the focus on the objectives and activities within programs is useful, whether these programs are producing graduates that attain the programmatic objectives remains unaddressed. For instance, while Spracher's conclusions in 2009 suggest an emerging consensus on program objectives, are the programs he reviewed actually educating students adequately in these areas? Placement as an indirect measure of assessment has been considered by some scholars in the field, but exploration of assessment remains a largely neglected area in the discipline of intelligence studies. This study hopes to begin a more

direct discussion to remedy that. The literature on assessment in the broader area of academia can provide some insight for the emerging discussion with the intelligence studies field.

Assessment in the United States

Assessment of academic programs has been driven by the accreditation movement in U.S. higher education. Starting in the nineteenth century, six regional accrediting agencies emerged to foster course articulation between secondary schools and higher education institutions. These private organizations were charged with the evaluation of the academic coursework of prospective students by colleges and universities (Harclerod and Eaton 2005, 263). In 1918, the American Council of Education was established as an association of higher education institutions that were interested in standardization and the reduction in redundancies in the accreditation process. By the 1930s, accreditation and peer evaluation among higher education institutions had become the norm (ACICS n.d.).

The significance of accreditation grew with the participation of the federal government in funding higher education. In 1952, the reauthorization of the GI Bill for Korean War veterans mandated that eligibility was limited to students enrolled at institutions included on a list of federally recognized accredited institutions published by the U.S. Commissioner of Education (CHEA 1998). Similarly, with the creation of the U.S. Department of Education in 1980, and under the terms of the Higher Education Act of 1965, the department was required to publish a list of nationally recognized accrediting agencies that the Secretary had determined to be reliable authorities on the quality of education provided by the institutions of higher education and the higher education programs they accredit. Thus, these regional and national accrediting agencies, which are accountable to the Department of Education, were empowered with substantial oversight authority for civilian colleges and universities.

Currently, the central nongovernmental organization in this accreditation system is the Council for Higher Education (CHEA). Established in 1996, CHEA is the successor to several earlier national nongovernmental associations formed to coordinate the U.S. accreditation process for higher education. Its mission is to promote academic quality through accreditation, and it has more than 3,000 degree granting institutions of higher education as members in the United States (CHEA 2015). Additionally, there are other nongovernmental organizations that assist in articulating learning standards for education degree levels and programs, such as the Lumina Foundation.

For most schools in the United States, the path to accreditation is driven by the program-level assessment structures that they implement. Accreditation in higher education has been an issue of growing political prominence in the United

States. Starting in the 1970s, there was heightened political and public pressure on higher education institutions to explain what they were trying to do and to provide evidence they were actually doing it (Angelo and Cross 1993). Accreditation has become the standard credential for an institution to demonstrate the expected level of academic quality in their efforts. Yet, how could these accrediting organizations validate the quality of these institutions beyond graduation rates? Additional evidence was needed. Hence, the “culture of assessment” arose as a way to provide empirical evidence in support of institutional claims of student learning to achieve accreditation.

This is not to suggest that colleges and universities were not attempting to assess student learning before the growth of accreditation concerns. The initial attempts to demonstrate student learning at the institutional level in the United States were with standardized tests. The Carnegie Foundation led this movement in the early portion of the twentieth century (Shavelson 2007, 6). Designed to measure overall comprehension, some of these assessments could be quite lengthy. For instance, a study of Pennsylvania students in 1928 used a test that contained 3,200 questions and was over 12 hours long (ibid). However, these tests seemed to demonstrate student learning and so the focus on testing grew. By the late 1970s, there were a variety of test providers in operation. These organizations, like the Educational Testing Service (ETS), provided a cost-effective manner for institutions to evaluate prospective students, as well as to assess the impact of their educational programs on the students who graduated from their institution.

However, there was concern that these assessment tools were limited in scope. While they measured knowledge-level objectives, these assessment tools did not assess other important educational objectives such as communication, critical thinking, and problem solving—things that were viewed as particular strengths in American higher education. By the 1970s, many faculty saw objective testing as too limited. For them, life was not a multiple-choice test (Shavelson 2007, 12). Indeed, this continues to be a concern. In a 2009 study, Cole and De Maio noted that “standardized tests are more efficient in measuring student learning outcomes but lack contextual information” (Cole and De Maio 2009, 294).

This led to a focus on more holistic tests instruments such as the Collegiate Learning Assessment. Developed by the Council for Aid to Education (CAE), this assessment tool is a “test of reasoning and communication skills at the institutional level to determine how the institution as a whole contributes to student development” (National Institute for Learning Outcomes Assessment, n.d.). This more holistic focus also led to more qualitative forms of assessment, such as portfolios, that were harder to objectively assess in the aggregate. That said, the validation from an accrediting authority provided a measure of proof that these assessment tools were effective.

So, the rise of assessment in the United States is driven by the confluence of these factors. Colleges and universities have continued to seek ways to address the complex task of measuring student knowledge levels. Government institutions, responding to political pressures, sought mechanisms to ensure measures of accountability, so that public funds were not being wasted. The rise of accreditation bodies can be seen as a way of mediating these two issues (Shavelson 2010).

Critics of Assessment

The power of these accreditation bodies is not viewed by everyone as a positive development. Some suggest that these accrediting bodies actually inhibit the assessment of student learning. In his 1996 book, *Crisis in the Academy*, Christopher J. Lucas criticized the accreditation system as too expensive, onerously complicated, incestuous in its organization, and not properly tied to quality (Lucas 1996). Similarly, a 2002 report by George C. Leef and Roxana D. Burris of the American Council of Trustees and Alumni (ACTA) argued that the system does not ensure or protect educational quality, while still imposing significant costs (Leef and Burris 2002). Robert Shireman, a senior fellow for the Century Foundation, recently echoed this sentiment. He argued that accrediting agencies often require institutions to reduce SLOs to meaningless blurbs which “prevents rather than leads to the type of quality assurance that has student work at the center” (Shireman 2017).

Some suggest that this pressure leads to poor methodology in the attempt to demonstrate the causal relationship between education and student learning. This is not to suggest that the education does not facilitate student learning, only that the data gathering and analysis structures that are in place are poorly constructed. David Eubanks, a board member for the Association for the Assessment of Learning in Higher Education, criticized the approach to assessment structures, noting “the whole assessment process would fall apart if we had to test it for reliability and validity and carefully model interactions before making conclusions about cause and effect” (Eubanks 2017, 6). He argues that applying common sense to dubious data is akin to a Rorschach test.

Another critique of the current accreditation-driven assessment structure is that it has little impact on educational improvement. As Banta and Blaich noted in a study of assessment reports: “We scoured current literature, consulted experienced colleagues, and reviewed our own experiences, but we could identify only a handful of examples of the use of assessment findings in stimulating improvements” (Banta and Blaich 2011, 22). Indeed, some suggest that the 6 percent of improvements that were found in this study actually overestimate the impact because the assessment reports were not selected randomly (Fulcher et al. 2014).

Indeed, among these scholars, the current model is self-sustaining due to financial incentives. As Upton Sinclair once noted, “it is difficult to get a man to understand something when his salary depends upon his not understanding.”

Erik Gilbert, a professor of History, wrote a notable essay criticizing assessment in higher education. He contended that the rise of learning outcomes assessment coincides with the rise of cost-cutting measures such as the use of adjunct faculty and online education. In that way, universities can justify the lack of investment in traditional faculty since the assessment results demonstrate that the “customers” are learning just as much as before (Gilbert 2015, 1).

Role of Faculty

Given that many assessment activities are often administered or implemented in individual courses, faculty member support for the larger assessment program is important. Yet, much of the assessment literature describes faculty attitudes toward assessment as inherently negative (Cole and De Maio 2009, 294). As Gilbert notes, “if you look at a typical assessment conference program, you will see that there is an astounding amount of time devoted to dealing with reluctant faculty and doubters” (Gilbert 2015, 1).

Faculty typically come to their disciplines because of their interest in and passion for the field. As a result, assessment is often viewed as “an imposition that is time consuming and may detract from teaching rather than contributing to it” (Cohen 2008, 612). According to one study, 43 percent of faculty in business programs had at least some resistance to assessment programs; over half of the faculty in the same study reported being overwhelmed or over-loaded by assessment work (Pringle and Michel 2007, 208).

There are also other reasons for faculty resistance. In his 2005 essay, Linkon identifies several possible motivations for faculty resistance to assessment. First, while assessment programs are largely focused on student learning, the role of faculty in that learning process leads to concerns of heightened scrutiny. Related to this, faculty may resist program assessment since it may represent an abridgement of academic freedom. Lastly, given the additional time required to participate in the assessment program, some wonder if it provides a sufficient return on investment. This raises the point that, depending on the objective and context, some forms of assessment may be more useful than others. An assessment tool that is applied inappropriately is likely to further erode faculty support (Linkon 2005).

Another concern of faculty support for assessment flows from the support of the institution. Historically, support for program assessment can often be episodic—being driven by the timing of visits by the accrediting bodies. With academic institutions requiring periodic reaccreditation by regional and national organizations, the focus on assessment can wane in the off years. By extension, it can also grow in the immediate run-up to an accreditation visit. As Mary Allen confesses in the preface of her book, “in 1997, my campus was preparing for an accreditation visit, and it became clear that we had to make rapid strides in assessment” (Allen 2004, viii). Clearly, this runs counter to the recommendations from

advocates of assessment. Linda Suskie, a higher education consultant, says that “Good assessments are not once-and-done affairs. They are part of an ongoing, organized, and systematized effort to understand and improve teaching and learning” (Suskie 2009, 50).

Beyond the cues from the administration, research has attempted to find ways to develop faculty support for program assessment. In her 1996 book, Cushman notes that assessment works best when there is faculty buy-in and when it is done collaboratively (Cushman 1996, 10). Banta et al. echo this sentiment, noting that assessment programs are most effective when done in an environment that is receptive, supportive and enabling (Banta et al. 1996, 62). However, the question of how to develop the culture of assessment among the faculty is open to debate. One path is to provide compensation and institutional support, such that assessment is truly reflected as a priority and not an add-on function. As Kelly and Klunk note, “increased resources in support of learning assessments are likely to have an impact on the development of learning assessment in departments” (Kelly and Klunk 2003, 453).

Methods and Data Sources

To gain an insight on the role of assessment practices on intelligence studies programs, requests for participation were sent to 16 institutions which reflect the universe of civilian intelligence education programs in the United States. This listing largely comes from the Coulthart and Crosston study (2015), though modifications were made for programs that had both been created since that time (e.g., the Citadel), as well as those that had been disestablished. Of these, eight programs from six different schools agreed to participate on the record. In addition to these, two additional schools agreed to be interviewed under the stipulation that their information not be directly quoted in the study.

The participating programs provided information regarding program objectives, curricula, and assessment plans that allowed for comparison and evaluation. Additionally, program leaders and assessment coordinators were interviewed to get additional insight and context on the programs contained in this study. These interviews were guided by a list of 10 open-response questions that the author constructed. The questionnaire instrument is included in appendix A of this paper.

The programs utilized in this study reflect the diversity of the intelligence studies landscape within the civilian academic community. This is particularly true with regard to the three graduate-level programs in the study. The Masters of Science in Intelligence and National Security Studies at the University of Texas at El Paso is an established and traditional program. A member of the Intelligence Community’s Centers of Academic Excellence program, this degree primarily of-

fers in-residence courses to prepare students for careers in intelligence or further academic study. In contrast, the Citadel's Master of Arts program in Intelligence and Security Studies was created in 2016 and is primarily an online program. Its purpose is to prepare students for intelligence careers in the federal government (Jensen 2015). The Intelligence, Security Studies and Analysis master's program at Angelo State University is also primarily an online program. However, like the program at UTEP, the Angelo State program offers a thesis option to complete the program for students who are preparing for teaching or additional graduate study.

The undergraduate programs have a greater degree of similarity. The programs at Notre Dame College and Coastal Carolina University employ primarily in-residence courses. The programs at Angelo State University and the University of Arizona South are primarily online institutions due to their focus on serving members of the armed forces. The Citadel undergraduate program in Intelligence and Security Studies is a blended program with a balance of in-residence and online courses. That said, all share a focus on the emphasis on objectives related to the liberal arts.

Assessment Programs in Intelligence Studies

The assessment structures of the programs in this study were heavily influenced by the institution that housed them. As Greg Moore of Notre Dame College noted, the assessment structure served two masters: the field of study and the mission of the institution (Gregory Moore, Telephone interview with author, December 20, 2017). None of the programs in this study was solely responsible for the construction of their assessment plan. The actual plans were often constructed as a collaborative venture between the program faculty and the institution's assessment staff. For instance, at the Citadel, the program goals were submitted to the institution which helped the department to identify the appropriate assessment tools (Carl Jensen, Telephone interview with author, December 21, 2017). Institutions provide management software and technical expertise to support the program's assessment effort. As one program director noted, "they have been good at determining what measures are best for our field" (Background, Telephone interview with author, January 24, 2018). This institutional influence ensures that the intelligence studies program at their institution supports the larger effort to maintaining accreditation from the regional accrediting associations (Gregory Moore, Telephone interview with author, December 20, 2017).

But while the institutions heavily influenced the assessment structures, the actual implementation of the assessment measures was conducted within the program. Program directors often handle the assessment requirement, sometimes with the assistance of other faculty. For program directors, this was a part of their administrative responsibilities associated with their job description. For faculty,

this was mostly done as an uncompensated activity, though some were given additional compensation for work during the summer. As a result, several program directors expressed a desire to keep the additional work associated with assessment away from faculty. One program director's philosophy was to keep assessment as "a background process that faculty are not involved with, and perhaps not even aware of." However, one program director expressed a different motivation for keeping faculty away from the assessment process. They did not want faculty to feel a pressure to "teach to the test" (Background, Telephone interview with author, January 24, 2018).

This dynamic, where the faculty are largely disconnected from the implementation process, or uncompensated for the effort, explains the ambivalent perceptions of assessment in the interviews for this study. Some see it as important and want to get more involved, while others see it as taking faculty resources away from teaching (Background, Telephone interview with author, January 24, 2018). Some directors described the process as a burdensome requirement that often did not yield useful information for program improvement. To the extent that the faculty were supportive of the assessment effort, it was due to the institution's persuasion of the faculty that the process could provide information on student learning that could help to improve the quality of the program (Carl Jensen, Telephone interview with author, December 21, 2017).

So, the broader themes of assessment in intelligence studies programs appear to be consistent with academia writ large as seen in the literature. Regional accreditation is an important driver of institutional efforts and that impacts the development of assessment tools within intelligence studies programs. Second, faculty support for assessment in intelligence studies programs is ambivalent, as the implementation of assessment tools can be seen more as burden than benefit. However, this study also seeks to explore the degree of consistency of assessment tools across intelligence studies programs to see if the actual educational experiences of these programs are comparable. The first step to exploring that is to ensure that they are all beginning with similar learning objectives at the outset.

Program Objectives

In the debate over the role of assessment, there is a concern that the measurement of outcomes could subvert the management of curriculums. As Allen notes, "assessment should not be the tail that wags the dog" (Allen 2004, 13). Ideally, a program should be driven by the stated learning outcomes that are articulated in advance. These should then be reflected in the curriculum and student learning activities. Only then should assessment activities evaluate how well the activities performed in meeting the initial program objectives. This "goal—treatment—assessment" structure is a basic and intuitive model for managing a program (academic or otherwise).

With that in mind, it is useful to compare the range of learning outcomes that are identified by the programs in this study. These program objectives should identify the priorities of each academic program. As Coulthart and Crosston note, these objectives identify outcomes that transcend a single course. That is, due to their importance, the program seeks to repeat and reinforce an essential learning or skill objective for as much as 144 weeks instead of a single 12-week period (Coulthart and Crosston 2015, 65). If there is wide variation among the sample programs in their student learning objectives, a wider variety of assessment structures among the sample would be expected.

In their study of course descriptions in U.S. intelligence studies programs, the Coulthart and Crosston study identifies three key areas of focus for program objectives related to student learning. First, they identify procedural areas of knowledge such as communication and analytic tradecraft. These areas focus on the higher level learning objectives in Bloom's Taxonomy, particularly application. The second area that is identified is core knowledge, which focuses on historical issues of the field, as well as current actors, processes, and legal issues that explain contemporary intelligence activities. The last area that Coulthart and Crosston note is domain knowledge which covers the subject matter context in which intelligence activities occur. This would include the study of international relations, domestic criminal justice issues, or the private sector business environment (Coulthart and Crosston 2015, 57).

This study has utilized this framework with one modification. Ethical and legal issues are identified as an area of core knowledge in the Coulthart and Crosston study. Certainly, knowledge of legal frameworks falls squarely within this realm. However, ethical dilemmas involve a form of reasoning that is normative in character and beyond the scope of subject matter expertise. Several programs strive for students to "understand" or "apply" ethical reasoning, integrity or moral standards. For instance, the programs at Angelo State specify both "ethical awareness" and "moral reasoning" in their SLOs (Tony Mullis, E-Mail Message to Author, January 25, 2018). So, this study reviewed the sample programs for this fourth knowledge area, as well.

As can be seen in Table 1, what is found among the sample is a high degree of uniformity among the sample programs. Regardless of level or mode of delivery, there was uniformity across the areas of procedural, core, and domain knowledge. There is some variation with regard to the area of ethical reasoning. Two of the six institutions identified this as a student learning objective. But with that exception, there is a high degree of similarity between program objectives.

This similarity in program outcomes is very useful in our exploration of assessment structures in intelligence studies programs. Consistent with the past scholarship (e.g., Spracher 2009), the programs in this study are largely purport to achieve the same objectives. That is, the expected benefits of being in one pro-

gram should largely be the same as being enrolled in another. However, what the intelligence studies literature has not addressed, until now, was whether the actual assessment methods had that same degree of consistency. When the “rubber meets the road,” do intelligence studies programs actually strive for similar outcomes in student learning?

Table 1. Intelligence Studies Program Outcomes

Institution	Degree Level	Procedural Knowledge	Core Knowledge	Domain Knowledge	Ethical Awareness
Angelo State University	Masters	X	X	X	X
The Citadel	Masters	X	X	X	X
University of Texas at El Paso	Masters	X	X	X	—
Angelo State University	Bachelors	X	X	X	X
Coastal Carolina University	Bachelors	X	X	X	—
Notre Dame College	Bachelors	X	X	X	—
The Citadel	Bachelors	X	X	X	X
University of Arizona South	Bachelors	X	X	X	—

Direct Assessment Measures

The most intuitive approach to measuring student performance is via direct means—that is, measuring the program’s progress towards SLOs by allowing students to demonstrate their level of competency. However, how students demonstrate that competency can be done in a variety of ways. The most common categorization of assessment methods in this area is to distinguish between qualitative and quantitative approaches. Both of these approaches have a unique collection of strengths and weaknesses.

Quantitative approaches to assessment are the most efficient way to assess SLOs across a larger population. This is particularly true in programs where the student-to-faculty ratios are very high—such as intelligence studies. Quantitative approaches often include more abstract or indirect measures of student performance such as graduation rates, course grades, and placement data. The ability to monitor these basic criteria can sometime serve as a “tripwire” for programmatic issues (Larry Valero, Telephone interview with author, November 6, 2017).

As an example of a direct, quantitative assessment method, Coastal Carolina University utilizes an internal multiple-choice test as one of its assessment measures of core knowledge competency. This test is administered to students twice: once when they enter the program in the INTEL 200 Introduction to Intelligence and National Security course; and again at the end, during the INTEL 494 Intel-

ligence and National Security Capstone course. The expectation is that student scores on this assessment instrument should improve between the pre and post-test due to their exposure to the curriculum.

While collecting quantitative data to measure these outcomes is the easiest to process, many outcomes do not easily lend themselves to quantitative measurement. Objectives related to critical thinking and communication fall squarely into this realm. Many programs utilize qualitative approaches to assessment, but these come with their own problems. For instance, the program director at Notre Dame College noted the subjectivity associated with trying to assess a complex skill such as communication (Gregory Moore, Telephone interview with author, December 20, 2017). So, how a given objective is defined and operationalized can vary widely. Even with a common standard, is the measure applied without subjectivity? This is where the utilization of rubrics is intended to assist.

The other issue with qualitative assessment practices is the time required in the effort. For instance, while processing multiple-choice tests can be done in minutes, the assessment of terms papers is likely to involve many hours of effort. This issue is compounded by the fact that faculty often have to implement the assessment tool as an extracurricular function to their teaching. Some faculty address this problem by incorporating the assessment tool as a part of a course grade, but this can lead to potential confusion over grades, which are a measure of a student's progress in a given course, and assessment, which is about assessing the effectiveness of the program that the student is in.

Indeed, given that assessment tools can involve substantial time outside of the classroom, some programs do not assess all of their SLOs on an annual basis. Instead, some select a particular outcome for that year and only assess that area. Another option is to assess only a sample of the student work. However, both of these approaches exacerbate concerns about validity in the process since they raise concerns that the particular outcome being studied in a given year or the sample being reviewed may not be representative.

Capstone courses are a common venue for assessment mechanisms since they are scheduled to be one of the last courses in a student's curriculum. For instance, of the 13 undergraduate programs that are listed in the Coulthart and Crosston study, 7 have a capstone requirement listed as a required course. In the Bachelors program at Angelo State University, all of the summative SLOs for the program are assessed within their capstone course, ISSA 4403 Capstone: Case Studies in Intelligence (Tony Mullis, E-Mail Message to Author, January 25, 2018). At the graduate level, thesis projects often serve a comparable function—indeed, in the graduate program at Angelo State University, students can either take the capstone course or complete a thesis. The system uses either venue as the summative assessment for its discipline-specific knowledge and communication learning objectives.

The Citadel's undergraduate and graduate programs rely heavily on the use of portfolios. This mechanism is designed to be a compilation of course assignments that demonstrate a given student's fulfillments of the SLOs for the program. This could include a variety of assignment types such as in-class assignments, group projects, or papers. This compilation of student work that was completed as a part of their course grades is then repurposed as a means of assessing the programs learning objectives. This approach necessitates that courses in the program utilize a common set of rubrics to assess areas such as critical thinking, communications skills, and ethical reasoning. In addition to this collection of graded coursework that the student selects for the portfolio, they must also pass an oral exam before graduation that demonstrates competency in the field of study (Jensen 2015).

While this assessment measure is intended to primarily demonstrate student achievement with regard to the program's learning objectives, it also contains an indirect measure by asking students to write a reflective essay which summarizes their perception of the knowledge, skills, and attitudes related to intelligence and homeland security that they have developed as a result of their educational experience (Jensen 2015).

The programs at the University of Texas at El Paso, the University of Arizona South and Coastal Carolina University identify the use of writing samples as an assessment method. This approach utilizes a sample of student work that is drawn from different courses in the curriculum and then assessed with a common rubric. This allows for an assessment to track the development of writing skills across introductory, intermediate, and advanced level courses. However, as noted earlier, the use of this approach raises concerns over sample bias.

The University of Texas at El Paso utilizes an external reviewer in its program assessment. The reviewer is provided with the SLO, course materials, and examples of student work and asked to provide an evaluation of how well the program achieved the SLO. This approach has the benefit of an unbiased evaluator who has substantive expertise in the field of study. One of the programs that was reviewed in this study was considering using personnel from an advisory board to the program. Another intended to seek program certification from the IAFIE as a substitute for an external reviewer (Background, Telephone interview with author, January 24, 2018).

The use of an external review in the field of intelligence studies does have one potential drawback—the lack of qualified external reviewers. As noted in other studies, the field of intelligence studies is limited by qualified faculty to staff these programs (Smith 2013, 28). The small number of programs in the field leads to a similarly small number of potential reviewers. Beyond the issue of who is qualified to serve, which does not appear to have a clear standard, the use of external reviewers can be further exacerbated if there are additional limitations placed on the selection by the institution, such as the reviewer representing a peer institu-

tion or having no personal connection to the faculty in the program (Larry Valero, Telephone interview with author, November 6, 2017). It may be that subject-matter organizations with certification or accreditation programs (e.g., IAFIE) may resolve these challenges to this assessment method (Table 2).

Table 2. Assessment Types by Program

Institution	Degree Level	Thesis	External Review	Portfolio	Capstone	Writing Samples	Stand. Test	Student Surveys	Reflective Assignment
Angelo State University	Masters	X	—	—	X	—	—	—	—
The Citadel	Masters	—	—	X	—	—	—	X	X
University of Texas at El Paso	Masters	—	X	—	—	X	—	—	—
Angelo State University	Bachelors	—	—	—	X	—	—	—	—
Coastal Carolina University	Bachelors	—	—	—	X	X	X	—	—
Notre Dame College	Bachelors	—	—	—	X	—	—	—	—
The Citadel	Bachelors	—	—	X	—	—	X	X	X
University of Arizona South	Bachelors	—	—	—	X	X	—	X	—

Indirect Assessment Measures

Indirect measures are typically based on opinions. These opinions are most commonly obtained from current students or alumni. While this may seem inherently subjective, that is actually the point. As Allen notes, “Indirect techniques ... make unique contributions to program assessment because they allow us to pursue issues in depth and to solicit advice from important stakeholders” (Allen 2004, 103). Surveys of student perceptions about the state of their knowledge, the impact of the educational experience on their learning, and the extent that the education prepared them for subsequent education or career experiences can provide important cues to a program. As the saying goes, it doesn’t matter what is true, it matters what people believe to be true. And while most of these are in-house surveys, some institutions utilize standardized tests such as the National Survey for Student Engagement (NSSE) in support of this function.

The University of Arizona South employs these indirect assessment measures at both ends of the process. In the National Security Policy course, the gateway class for the Intelligence Studies major there, students take a survey that asks them to assess their content knowledge related to the SLOs for the program. This pre-survey reveals the initial preparedness of students in the program and provides a baseline from which to assess the program objectives at the end of the process. At the end of the curriculum, students take a post-survey which helps to assess the growth in student learning. For instance, the survey asks the students to identify the three most important things that they learned in the program. In addition to student assessment of their learning, this post-survey is also an opportunity to gather student input on the delivery of the curriculum (UAS n.d.).

That said, the utilization of indirect methods of assessment can vary widely. Some programs, such as Coastal Carolina University or Angelo State, appear to not utilize these measures at all. Others, such as the Citadel and Arizona, utilize them in conjunction with direct measures. And while they are not included in this study, some programs are primarily reliant for indirect measures for the data which is utilized in their assessment systems (Background, E-Mail Message to Author, February 23, 2018).

A final comparison for this study relates to the level of the degree program. Michael Collier suggested that variations in intelligence studies programs should be driven more according to the level of education and proficiency (e.g., graduate versus undergraduate levels), rather than focusing on the issue of specialists versus generalists (Collier 2005, 33). A natural extension of that argument could include variations in assessment practices. While there is some variation among specific methods, all programs in the sample tend to focus on direct, qualitative measures of program assessment. It is possible that the criteria for assessing adequate progress could vary by degree level, but there is not a substantial difference in assessment methods.

Conclusions

To be sure, there are cross-pressures in the discussion of program assessment in the development of a new field of study. On the one hand, as the field evolves, questions of identity and larger purpose arise. What does it mean to study “intelligence”? This leads to a desire for there to be common objectives in the instruction that transcend the institution. Discussions of “model curricula” or certification/accreditation by an organization that promotes the subject area expertise are reflective of this position. Even with the understanding that intelligence studies is a multi-disciplinary field with a variety of specializations, such as law enforcement intelligence, competitive intelligence, or national security intelligence, there are fundamental learning objectives that are common throughout the field. For instance, any program that studies intelligence will attempt to advance

a baseline of core expertise about how intelligence is developed and employed in its given area.

On the other hand, while these should be this commonality among intelligence studies programs, each program is housed within a larger academic institution which espouses its own educational mission, which often includes maintaining regional accreditation. A program that has objectives that run counter to the larger mission of their college or university is likely to have problems in sustaining itself. If nothing else, since the assessment process is often driven by the institution's pursuit of academic accreditation, the assessment program from the intelligence studies program would need to support this institutional mission. While it is always possible to pursue a subject-specific accreditation for the program in addition to the institutional effort, the latter will always hold sway.

This leads to a question of purpose for the assessment program—who does it primarily serve? Ideally, the assessment plan would serve both the program-level objectives of department and the institutional-level objectives related to mission and accreditation. However, invariably, the assessment plan will have to prioritize one of these objectives over the other—and that typically means institutional needs prevail. Other academic disciplines have found a way to integrate their assessment of subject-matter expertise and the broader assessment objectives of a college or university—engineering, law, and public administration just to name a few. Perhaps the growth of professional associations in the field of intelligence studies will influence these program-level assessment structures in the years to come.

This research reflects an initial attempt to understand the role of assessment in intelligence studies programs. A prominent limitation of this study is the modest sample size. Even in a field with a limited number of programs, a larger sample would be useful in validating the generalizations that were noted in this paper. Additionally, the inclusion of more online programs would be useful in exploring the challenges related to the mode of delivery for the educational experience. For instance, the graduate program at Angelo State University notes the difficulty in evaluating oral communication skills in an online environment (Mullis 2017, 12). Notre Dame College noted a similar concern with their graduate program (Gregory Moore, Telephone interview with author, December 20, 2017). With the growth of online programs and improved technological tools, whether this will continue to be an inhibiting factor in assessment remains unclear.

Another area for additional exploration would be on other areas of assessment. This study's focus has been on the area of SLOs. A related area of assessment would be graduation measures related to placement. While the pedagogical issue of accurately measuring student development is important, the issue of the practical impact of our field of study is of great significance to the longevity of our field of study. Some scholars such as Michael Landon Murray have begun exploring this important, but methodologically challenging, question (Landon-Murray 2013, 771).

While it should not be “the tail that wags the dog,” assessment of SLOs is an area of substantial importance that is likely to grow over time. While there is a substantial degree of agreement among intelligence studies programs at both the undergraduate and graduate levels on what are the objectives of the program, there is a wide variety of assessment tools that can be incorporated to measure their effectiveness. Overall, most of the programs attempted to address the area of program assessment with a mixture of tools that focus on direct, qualitative measures. It appears that there is little variation between undergraduate and graduate curriculums on assessment, but overall, there are no perfect correlations in this regard. As the field continues to grow, the ability to share experiences between programs may be helpful in developing best practices. With regard to assessment, this study hopes it has made some progress in that effort.

APPENDIX A

Questionnaire—Assessment

Intro statement

This interview has 10 questions and is intended to get some context and insights in to your assessment program. If you would like any comment to be unattributed or excluded from my study, please let me know and I will ensure that is done.

I. Creation of Assessment Program

(1) How was the assessment program created?

Who initiated/drove the process?

Sources of inspiration for the content of the assessment program? (other programs, practitioners, etc.)

(2) To date, has your program's assessment system been revised?

If so, why was the change sought and by who?

II. Conduct

(3) How would you characterize your faculty's view of assessment?

(4) Are there any direct incentives for faculty to participate in the assessment program?

(5) Based on your experience, which assessment tool has been most useful? Why?

Least?

(6) Does your institution provide any additional resources to support your implementation of the assessment plan?

(7) Do you have any program-level assessment measures that are in addition to what is required by your institution?

(8) Do any of your assessment measures require the participation by people outside of your program, such as external reviewer?

III. Utility

(9) Has your program been modified based on the findings of a past assessment report?

(10) How would you characterize the value of your assessment system to your program?

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Power Shifts in the Saudi–Iranian Strategic Competition

Aidan Parkes¹

ABSTRACT

The tensions between The Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) have afflicted the Gulf, and the broader Middle East region pervasively since the 1979 Islamic Revolution of Iran. The most theoretically illuminating feature of this conflict is that rather than isolated and regional, it develops parallel to global shifts in power. This article analyses the ascensions of two Islamic powers, and how their ascensions have aligned, commensurate to trends in global polarity. While religious incongruence underpins an aversion that is predicated on sectarianism, structural implications of polarity remain pervasive, and omnipresent in explaining the way states interact with one another. Polarity theory has been applied to the Middle East in the regional sense. However, the literature pertaining to how global polarity inflects on the Saudi–Iranian contest is understudied. It is this space in scholarship this paper seeks to address.

Keywords: Polarity, Security, Strategic Studies, Iran, Saudi Arabia

Cambios de poder en la competencia estratégica entre Arabia Saudita e Irán

Las tensiones entre la República Islámica de Irán (RII) y el Reino de Arabia Saudita (RAS) han afectado al Golfo, y a la región más amplia de Medio Oriente desde la Revolución Islámica de Irán en 1979. La característica más teóricamente ilustradora de este conflicto es que, en lugar de ser aislado y regional, se desarrolla paralelamente a los cambios globales en el poder. Este artículo analiza el crecimiento de dos poderes islámicos, y cómo estos mismos se han alineado de acuerdo con las tendencias en la polaridad global. Si bien la incongruencia religiosa sustenta una aversión que se basa en el sectarismo, las implicaciones estructurales de la polaridad siguen

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siendo generalizadas y omnipresentes en la explicación de la forma en que los estados interactúan entre sí. La teoría de la polaridad se ha aplicado al Medio Oriente en el sentido regional. Sin embargo, la literatura relacionada con la inflexión de la polaridad global en la competencia entre Arabia Saudita e Irán está poco estudiada. Es este espacio de la investigación al que este trabajo pretende contribuir.

Palabras clave: polaridad, seguridad, estudios estratégicos, Irán, Arabia Saudita

沙特-伊朗战略竞争中的权力转变

摘要

伊朗伊斯兰共和国（IRI）和沙特阿拉伯王国（KSA）之间的紧张关系自1979年伊朗伊斯兰革命发起之后便使波斯湾和大中东地区倍感压力。从理论上讲，这种冲突最明显的特征则是，它和全球权力转变的发展并行，而不是被隔离作为区域事务（看待）。本文分析了两大伊斯兰势力的崛起，以及这种权力提升如何发展并顺应全球格局极化趋势。尽管宗教矛盾加强了宗派主义中所预示的相互反感，但权力极化的结构性意义依旧无处不在，它能解释各国相互影响的方式。本文从区域的角度将极化理论应用于中东。然而，有关全球权力极化如何影响沙特-伊朗之间的竞争的学术文献并不充足。本文试图填补这一研究空缺。

关键词：极化，安全，战略研究，伊朗，沙特阿拉伯

Introduction

This article explores the contributing factors that explain the protracted animosity between the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). The scope of this paper will focus primarily on post-1979 Iran and the foundation of the Saud Dynasty in 1744. The objective of this paper is to understand the modern zeitgeist of an ever-complicating and multiplex relationship. The year 1979 is also widely considered the inception of a modern

“Shiite Crescent,” which will be discussed further.² The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran crystallized modern state Shiism in an irreducibly adversarial position to the Wahhabi-predicated Saudi Regime. Hence, although the modern Saudi–Iranian quandary has deep historical roots, its modern roots, within the scope of this study are traced to the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and Wahhabism’s institutional marriage to the House of Saud in 1744. Within this focus, this article applies geopolitical theories in analyzing the applicability of global polarity to specific cases. Despite the theoretical applicability of polarity theory to the Saudi–Iranian rivalry, most of the literature views the rivalry simply as a subset of the broader Sunni–Shia debate, alliances, and great power patrons.

Polarity theory has been applied to the Middle East in the regional sense (Kausch 2015). However, the literature pertaining to how global polarity inflects on the Saudi–Iranian contest is understudied. It is this space in Middle Eastern scholarship, this paper seeks to harmonize. With regard to a theoretical framework, this paper applies international relations theory to the regional contestation between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Global polarity theory is applied at a regional level to the religious and geopolitical tensions that exist between the IRI and KSA. Empirical data such as rhetorical devices and scriptural analysis indicates a link between state and religious legitimacy. Empirical content analysis is complemented by theoretical application, offering a unique link between global power distribution and regional power shifts across the region. Collectively, this paper combines theoretical pluralism and empiricism to explore how global powers inflect and constrain powers of regional players in the Middle East.

The article begins by contextualizing the religious incongruence that underpins modern hostility. The article then explores the way in which both Iran and Saudi Arabia’s modern state legitimation is founded on reciprocal religious intolerance. The following section explains how nascent multipolarity affects the alliance structures of Saudi Arabia and Iran, and subsequently intensifies their antagonism, thus bifurcating their international relations. The final discussion section explores the competition dynamics between Iran and Saudi Arabia with respect to the Arab Springs.

Contextualizing a Complex Contest

The modern Middle East has been described by some as its own “Cold War”—two regional major powers are pursuing strategic objectives through proxy contestation in the Middle East (Gauze 2014). The Middle East’s circumstance is unique in multiple ways, one of which is the opaque influence of nonstate actors (NSAs). NSAs have vexed how states approach war in the twenty-first cen-

² In describing Iran’s religious political clout, King Abdullah II of Jordan coined the term “Shi’ite Crescent.”

ture due to their versatile ability to fill vacuums, complicate conflict zones, and act as proxies for states. This is particularly so in areas prone to sectarian tensions and the inflection of great power patrons. Both the KSA and IRI have modernized their twenty-first-century war strategies and instrumentalized violent NSAs for geostrategic goals. The confluence of modern tensions between the KSA and IRI can be traced back to Iran's Revolution in 1979 and linked to the Arab Uprisings beginning in late 2010. The KSA had just received F-15 fighter jets from the United States in addition to deeper liaison between Washington and Riyadh regarding Afghanistan's future (Hart 1998). Meanwhile, in Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini led the Revolution that ousted the secularist pro-U.S. Shah of Iran. Here, two key implications can be drawn from the 1979 Revolution: an inherent distrust toward the United States and a mutually irreconcilable distain between the KSA and Khomeini's post-Revolution IRI. Notably, Mabon suggests that after 1979, the contested Gulf security environment "transcended pure hard power competition, becoming a region embroiled in soft power competition" (Mabon 2016, 217). Ultimately, the ideological scope and intensity of Saudi–Iranian rivalry increased as a result of competing regional identities and global strategic alignments following the Iranian Revolution in 1979.

Religious Incongruence

Complex sectarianism drives the modern conflict between the KSA and IRI. Yet religious incongruence invariably predicates the deep-seated animosity. The Sunni–Shia split, which began over discrepancies regarding the mode of leadership succession within early Islam, soon intensified into a multiplex socio-political divergence, a political divergence that has endured centuries. Indeed, as Abdo notes, "Iran has never abandoned Ayatollah Ruhoollah Khomeini's vision of a pan-Islamic Middle East with Iran as its progenitor" (Abdo 2013, 51). The city of Karbala evokes innate reverence from Shia Muslims. This is because the Battle of Karbala and subsequent death of Imam Husayn bin 'Ali are central to modern Shia identity.³ Saud al Kabeer bin Abdul-Aziz bin Muhammad bin Saud added sectarian nuance to the Sunni–Shia divide when he led the Wahhabi sack of Karbala in 1802. Here, the nascent Saudi state led some 12,000 Wahhabi-inspired supporters to Karbala where they sacked the city indiscriminately killing thousands, while looting and destroying the Shrine of Imam Husayn. The Saudi sack of Karbala was economically conducive because the Shrine had an abundance of gold, jewels, and rare minerals (Rousseau 1809). Politically, the attack polarized the region and exacerbated sectarianism. Baghdad became a contested fault line between the Arabian Peninsula and greater Persia. The attack also broadly politicized religious adherence, fusing Wahhabi rhetoric with the House of Saud's legitimacy. Ultimately, modern sectarianism has developed out of religious divergence and its ideologically incongruous influence on state legitimation. While both Iran

3 The day of *ashūra'* commemorates the death of Husayn bin 'Ali on the tenth day of Muharram.

and Saudi Arabia derive domestic legitimacy from religion, the respective interpretations are inherently incompatible. This incompatibility poses an intractable quandary for modern state legitimation.

State Legitimation in Islamic Societies: A Weberian Analysis

Omnipresent in the structure of the state, religion is the central source of legitimation in both the KSA and IRI. German sociologist Max Weber divides the foundations of a state's legitimate authority into three categories: rational-legal, tradition, and charisma (Weber 1978). He also believed religion to be a crucial force in society. Most instructively, Weber's three determinants hinge largely on Islam in the case of both Saudi Arabia and Iran. Indeed, there are other, nonreligious forms of authority in Tehran and Riyadh. However, were religion precluded from either state's ethos, attaining Weberian legitimacy would prove foundationally problematic. What this means is that state authority hinges upon religious determinants (Wolin 1981). Islam's socio-political clout has permeated the judicial institutions, rendering Weber's "legal-rational" authority subordinate. "Tradition" as a mode of authority hinges on customary principles and finds root in patriarchal domination (Gerth and Mills 1958). Again, not uncommon to Islamic societies, customary principles often synergize with cultural Islam. Examples of this include Muslim tribal customs which predate Islam both in Saudi Arabia and Iran, and the way in which customary cultural traditions have synergized with Islam. "Charisma" as a precept of Weberian authority requires "virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities" (Weber 1947, 297). Here, charismatic endearment is inextricably linked to Ayatollah Khomeini's meteoric rise. Emblematic of Ibn Saud's charismatic leadership, he was able to create the *Ikhwan*, a religious military brotherhood that aided Saud in consolidation of the Arabian Peninsula. Indeed, political reliance upon tribes was not uncommon in embryonically centralizing Islamic societies. Additionally, Saud brought Bedouin tribal allegiance under the *Ikhwan*. Thus, it is evident that the precepts of Weberian legitimacy are deeply embedded in Islamic legitimation within the political realm. What this means for the KSA and IRI is that authority hinges upon two interpretations of Islam that are in mutual, vehement rejection of each other. The institutionalization of religion both in Iran and Saudi Arabia solidified political legitimacy, but also mutual animosity.

Statehood and Religion in the Arabian Peninsula

Islam is inextricably linked to the inception and predominance of the House of Saud. In 1744, a *bay'ah*, or "oath of loyalty," was established between the Al Saud family and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. This is widely consid-

ered the inception of the first Saudi state (Metz 1992). Modern Saudi Arabia was founded on an alliance between Muhammad ibn Saud and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, an influential theologian from Najd. What became the House of Saud, joined forces with a fundamentalist interpretation of Sunni Islam that became known as Wahhabism. Wahhabism is dogmatic in its interpretation of Islam, and unambiguous in its rejection of Shia Islam. The alliance was mutually beneficial, as Ibn Saud could unify the disparately restive Bedouin tribes through Wahhabism. Indeed, unification under the banner of Islam was often the only point of commonality between disparate tribes, but nonetheless an effective one, particularly against a common enemy. Saud was also able to consolidate his expansion into the Arabian Peninsula with religious justification afforded by al-Wahhab's support. In return, Ibn Saud ensured the propagation of Wahhabism and specific adherence to *Tawhid* in all conquered lands. The *Tawhid* was central to Al-Wahab's conception of Wahhabism and denotes the centrality of monotheism as expressed in the *Shahada*. It specifically pronounced, "There is no god but God and Muhammad is the messenger of God" (Ruthven 2004, 14). Al-Wahhab saw the value in political engagement declaring that, "without the coercive power of the state, religion is in danger, and without the discipline of revealed law, the state becomes a tyrannical organization" (Hopwood 1983, 23–25). The House of Saud did experience two interludes in opposition, briefly against the Ottoman Empire's viceroy of Egypt. However, its Wahhabi infusion endured, which Niblock notes is still "crucial to the nature of the Saudi state" (Niblock 1983, 11). The pervasiveness of Wahhabism served as a cultural conduit for tribal elites to consolidate authority through an application of social and legal Islam which "rests upon a belief in the sanctity of everyday routines" (Gerth and Mills 1958, 297). However, the nexus between Wahhabism and the Saudi state manifested in a way which institutionalized an interpretation of Islam that vehemently rejected Shia Islam as apostasy.

The Iranian Resistance: The Islamic Revolution

The 1979 Islamic Revolution ousted the Pahlavi dynasty of Iran. It had governed for over half a century. The Revolution institutionalized the endearing notion that a "Shiite Crescent" could manifest within the region. Internal factors such as corruption, budget imprudence, and tacit cultural assimilation rendered public perception disparate, but collectively indignant. Ruhollah Khomeini emerged as the first Supreme Leader of the nascent, reactionary Islamic state. Khomeini predicated his ascension on two central precepts: *Wilayat al-Faqih* and a conceptually revisionist approach to the U.S.-led world order. The *Wilayat al-Faqih* translates to the "Guardian of the Islamic Jurist." It signifies central imperative of Twelver Islamic jurisprudence in guiding the IRI's judicial system. Regarding Khomeini's foreign stance, he unambiguously declared, "we have set as our goal the world-wide spread of the influence of Islam and the suppression of the rule of

world conquerors. ... We wish to cause the corrupt roots of Zionism, capitalism and communism to wither throughout the world” (Schirazi 1997, 8). Khomeini drew Weberian legitimation not only through religious “traditional-authority,” but also through endearing “charisma” in his stokes to call on Islamic revolutions around the world. In this regard, Samuel Huntington drew legitimation parallels based on charisma between Khomeini and John Calvin (Huntington 1996, 111). Since the IRI’s inception, Khomeini was an implacable enemy of the Saudi’s Wahhabi regime. Most profoundly, Khomeini crystallized state Shi’ism in Iran and ensured the IRI remained the ideological vanguard of Shiites around the world. This religious clout has manifested around the Middle East and continues to cause angst in Sunni states cautious of an emergent “Shiite Crescent.” Ultimately, the enduring dichotomy between the KSA and the IRI is twofold, and to a certain extent, bridges a religious and sectarian past with the geopolitical present.

Multipolarity and the Power Transition Theory: A Structural Consideration

The emergence of a multipolar world is the most profound structural change to the international system since the fall of the Soviet Union (Buzan 2011). The unequivocal rise of China, Russian resurgence, and the U.S.’ relative decline are all emblematic of a broad redistribution of power. Hence, multipolarity finds structural concordance with A.F.K. Organski’s “Power Transition Theory” (PTT).⁴ The theory proves instructive in explaining how multipolarity manifests in the contest of the Gulf strategic environment. The PTT sees the international system as a hierarchical structure whereby a dominant power establishes a rules-based “international order” (Organski 1958, 173). Here, states are classified in binary terms as either “satisfied” or “dissatisfied” within the international order. Within this paradigm, states are commensurately considered “status quo,” or “revisionist” (see Figure 1).

The coalescence between the PTT and multipolarity finds root in Organski’s nuanced stipulation concerning power. He notes: “power is relative, not absolute. It is not a characteristic of the nation itself but a characteristic of its relationship with other nations” (Organski 1958, 305). However, modernity and its precepts have both complicated and broadened the once military-centric calculus of power politics. Strategic bandwagoning is not anomalous to power politics. The pervasive and often omnipresent economic competition between modern powers commonly implicates multiple economic stakeholders. Consistent with the structural implications of multipolarity, Iran has fostered strategic regional alliances with states

4 There is still exuberant debate over whether a power transition will take place and by what means. See Cox, M. Power shift and the death of the west? Not yet! *European Consortium for Political Research* 10, no. 3 (2011): 416–24; Fenby, J. *Will China dominate the 21st century?* Cambridge: Polity, 2014; Mearsheimer, J. China’s unpeaceful rise. *Current History* 105, no. 690 (April 2006): 160–62.

such as Qatar, Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. Hence, a structural change in polarity has invariable regional implications. For the KSA and IRI, international alliance structures are divergent. While the KSA supports a waning U.S.-led world order, the IRI is forming strategic alliances with great powers like China and Russia. Indeed, ambitious powers are cognizant of this power shift as Geranmayeh and Liik note: “Iran and Russia share an aspiration to create and maintain a ‘multipolar’ world order that would treat both of them as important decision-makers” (Nizameddin 2008, 475–500). Not only does this add dynamism to the ostensibly rigid realist PTT, it coalesces with the nascence of multipolarity. For the KSA and IRI, this denotes a two-pronged quandary whereby the flux international system exacerbates pre-existing sectarian tensions.




Figure 1: Global Power Hierarchy. The dominant power is seen as the pre-eminent international power rather than hegemon. Source: Kugler, J. (2006, December 11). *Power and power hierarchies in the global and regional context*. GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg.

Saudi–Iranian Manifestations: Foreign Fault Lines—United States and Israel

The most intractable feature of modern animosity between the IRI and the KSA is the latter’s longstanding strategic alliance with the United States, and the former’s perpetual disdain for perceived U.S. imperialism. This animosity is broadly exacerbated by the politics of oil, thus evidencing the centrality of economic and strategic clout. Upon the discovery of vast and easily extractable oil reserves in the KSA, the United States began to foster a strategic relationship that would see the KSA integrate within the emergent U.S.-led world order. Indeed, the discovery of oil proved timely and served as a conduit to sway the state

from autochthonous tribalism to a more centralized and governable modern one. Indeed as Haykel explains, “Oil magnified the clientelist power of the Saudi rulers to unprecedented levels at a time when the modern centralizing state was also becoming the dominant institution in society. This then stripped many hitherto active agents in society, such as tribal shaykhs” (Haykel 2015, 128). Thus, while an association with al-Wahhab religiously legitimized the first Saudi State, an association with the United States proved broadly conducive to Saudi Arabia’s strategic interests. As Jones notes, Saudi Arabia’s oil wealth is “passed along in myriad social welfare programs that include free education, free healthcare, sweeping employment support, subsidies for industry and business, and even the provision of copious amounts of water” (Jones 2011, 47).

Contrasting the Saudi experience, the United States has never truly experienced a productive relationship with the IRI. This is largely due to the anti-American and anti-Zionist rhetoric that gave rise to Khomeini’s rise (Nasr 2016, 125). Hence, Weberian legitimacy hinges on such foundational ideals. These include Iran’s deep-seated aversion and suspicion to colonial and imperial overtures. The IRI’s modern divergence with the KSA finds root in its rejection of the U.S.-led world order and Zionism. In a 2015 meeting, Ayatollah Khamenei told Russian President Vladimir Putin that the “long-term plan of the US is against the interests of all nations, particularly our two nations, which can be thwarted by closer cooperation” (Geranmayeh and Liik 2016, 2). What this denotes is a three-pronged dissension between the KSA and IRI, those being: religiously incongruent sources of political legitimacy, conflicting regional objectives, and divergent international alliances. This antipathy is a point of commonality with many disenfranchised Muslims around the world and Arabs in the region which has proved endearing to Iran in uniting Muslims in opposition to the United States and Israel. Rostami-Povey (2010, 6) explains how this contemporary aversion works to mitigate historical and cultural incongruence:

the ordinary people tend to communicate with each other through a mutual perception of the roles of Israel and the USA in the region. Iran is popular simply because it is the only country in the region that supports the Palestinians and the Lebanese while opposing Zionism and the Western—in particular US—policies in the region.

The 2006 Lebanese War crystallized an already prolific history of animosity between the IRI and KSA. Through its support of Hezbollah and Hamas, Iran has been actively, and consistently involved in hostility toward Israel. Its anti-Zionist rhetoric is harmonious with its rejection of the U.S.-led order and reactionary appeal to the Islamic revolution. Thus, while Ibn Saud’s consolidation of modern Arabia was largely contingent upon support from the West, Khomeini’s consoli-

dation of the Islamic Republic was founded on fundamental antipathy toward the West. The IRI's fundamental aversion to the U.S.-led order makes Tehran a generative client to competing great powers such as Russia, thus linking its regional standing to its strategic ambitions and global alignments.

The New Middle East Cold War: The Multiple Hierarchy Model

Multipolarity offers regional opportunity for the KSA and IRI. This is because both states have the capacity to wield influence commensurate of a regional hegemon. As Peter Harris explains, “the same principles that hold at the global level define interactions within regional hierarchies” (Harris 2014, 241–59). Here, great power alliance structures bifurcate the IRI and the KSA. As the fluid KSA maintains its support of the status quo despite the uncertainty of U.S. global leadership or regional arbitration, the IRI has enhanced its geostrategic alignment with likeminded revisionist states internationally in the geostrategic case of Russia, but also through pragmatic economic opportunism with China. From this, regional shifts in power have resulted. Thus, the PTT highlights how structural changes in polarity affect regional dynamics (Organski 1958). Here, the KSA benefit from the status quo rules-based order. In contrast, as a “revisionist state,” the IRI does not benefit from the status quo and consequently seeks to disrupt and ultimately reorder it. The PTT becomes ever more applicable as U.S. leadership in the Middle East becomes more tepid. Tepidity in leadership through Washington’s political maneuver in moving the U.S. Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in December 2017, but also tepidity through the dwindling but once omnipresent force presented by the United States. Now, spheres of regional influence appear more salient, while spheres of broader geopolitical clout have manifested symptomatically of a broader shift in polarity. The precepts of multipolarity denote a refocus on regional spheres of influence, while the PTT observes the way in which the international system shifts commensurate to tectonically structural alternations in polarity and power parity. It is within this context that the KSA and IRI’s ideological incongruence has seen augmented bifurcation as a result of polarity shifts, resulting in protracted modern animosity.

Lemke’s PTT and (Parity) Proxy Wars: The Multiple Hierarchy Model

Douglas Lemke offers nuance to the PTT by postulating that regional sub-systems exist subsidiary to the international system, compromising of the global system (Lemke 1995). It is through Lemke’s adaptation that the PTT best explains Saudi–Iranian competition. Figure 2 observes the interaction between international and regional hierarchies. Lemke notes, “When a dissatisfied

member of a given local hierarchy achieves parity with the local dominant power it has the opportunity to go to war to alter the local status quo” (Lemke 1995, 149). It is difficult to ascribe dominance to a single state in the Middle East due to the complex asymmetry in power between states such as Iran and Israel. Here, Iran is more powerful than Israel on measurements such as population, economic productivity, etc. However, Israel possesses opaque nuclear capabilities and a security guarantee from the United States. However, the manifestation of dissatisfaction plays out through sectarian competition within the region. The way in which states pursue their interests are multifaceted and often include instances of hard and soft power. Given the enlarged role Islam plays in Middle Eastern society, religion manifests as an instrument of clout. Regional influence has become paramount due to declining U.S. presence in the region, and the nascent, systematic restructuring of polarity in the international system. Furthermore, Lemke (1995, 149) notes that “most of the time the local dominant country enjoys preponderance of power over its neighbors in the local hierarchy, and as a result there is peace.” This is problematic for the Middle East region because it implies that an absence of local dominance denotes instability. Here, the PTT highlights the volatile nature of the Middle East, but also illuminates the nature of modern “revisionist” and “status quo” proxy-war competition.




Figure 2. Lemke’s “International Power Cone.” Source: Lemke, D. (1995). Toward a general understanding of parity and war. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 14(2), 145.

Regional Manifestations

The KSA and IRI have not engaged in the war envisioned by Organski's original PTT, nor Lemke's nuanced adaptation. This is symptomatic of an anomalous phenomenon: globalized multipolarity. Here, both the absolute cost of war and the interconnectedness of the Middle East region rationally dissuade Tehran and Riyadh from direct confrontation. Instead, stoking revolutionary uprisings or supporting counterrevolutionary efforts, in addition to the financing of proxy wars, have proven both economically prudent and politically shrewd means of expressing dissatisfaction with the regional status quo. While Iraq highlights Lemke's stipulation regarding great power inflection on regional hierarchies, Yemen typifies the sectarian complexities complicating the strategic rivalry. With regard to polarity theory, the Iraq case highlights Washington's hegemonic unipolar overreach. Conversely, multipolarity denotes an increased emphasis on regionalism, explaining the intensification in proxy warfare, sectarianism, and uprising. Indeed, the empirical majority of Middle Eastern conflicts find predication on religious incongruence. However, polarity theory offers new insights into the constraints and explanations of contemporaneous geopolitical manifestations.

The unprecedented interconnectedness afforded through globalization evidences the broad geostrategic necessity and its salient precedence over the ubiquitously rationalized religious justification. Though religious discordance underpins the rhetoric of such sectarianism, the clouded proliferation of loosely associated, and poorly structured religious-militias negates the need for direct warfare. In its place, however, manifests an opaque consortium of nonstate actor groups of varying degrees of political legitimacy and international recognition. Such groups often engage in fleeting alliances of pragmatic mutual gain, seldom espousing shared religious ideals and rarely shared political objectives. Power parity is the most crucial variable in the PTT; this is because it postulates the probability of war. The opaque and complex asymmetry of the Middle East's hierarchy obfuscates a state's ability to aptly discern power parity in the region. Hence, tacit regional competition manifests in two ways: proxy warfare and in the case of the IRI, encouraging subversive revolutions. In light of increased regionalism, the Arab Springs offered the ideal catalyst for influencing contestation through proxy warfare.

Arab Springs

The complexities and breadth of political outcomes from the Arab Spring vary in such diversity that generalized summation would be simplistically erroneous, though one particular observation may be made from the "springs" that occurred across the Middle East. That is, a geographic uprising of divergent causes and stressors, all symptomatic of a restive region no longer beholden, afraid, or perturbed by the repercussions of great powers outside proximi-

ty of geographic concern. The competition between the KSA and the IRI has been characterized by some as a “New Middle East Cold War” (Gause 2014). Gause (2014) believes this is because socioreligious ideology and political affinity supersede pure military might in such regional competition. Indeed, Ismail (2016) affirms this view by observing a causal relation between Saudi clerics’ pronouncements and their political undertones. However, it is nascent multipolarity which facilitates such inter-regional cold-war strategic overtures. Indeed, modern globalization necessitates and ultimately ensures the implicit “cold” nature of such rivalry. The Arab Springs also created a sectarian Gulf. During the Bahraini Spring of 2011, the Saudi-led intervention proved instrumental in quelling an anti-government uprising and supporting the Sunni minority government. While the KSA looked to support pre-existing (status quo) regimes such as those in Egypt, Tunisia, and Bahrain, the IRI contrastingly perpetuated its Islamic revolutionary zeal. Highlighting the bifurcated alignment within and out status quo status, Mabon notes the Arab Springs served to “isolate Iran and mobilize Sunnis across the region against Iran and the Assad regime in Syria” (Matthiesen 2013, 111).

Although from the outset, some IRI and KSA’s policy toward the Arab Springs were more opaque than ostensibly portrayed. This was done so as to maintain harmony between the states’ endgame objectives, while maintaining strategic ambiguity so as to maintain influential versatility throughout the uncertainty of the uprisings.

Iraq

The U.S. invasion of Iraq and subsequent chaos that ensued is indicative of the concomitant nature of PTT local hierarchies within the broader international hierarchy. This is because the U.S.’s most climacteric act, at its hierarchical dominance precipitated what would become Iran’s regional reassertion and window for revisionism. For this reason, Iraq serves not only as a historic fault line between Shiite Iran and the nascent Wahhabi Saudi state, but also as the catalyst for the modern power vacuum presented subsequent of U.S. withdrawal in the twenty-first century. As Lemke (1995, 149) explains, “Local hierarchies really are local; they comprise proximate states that are able to move enough of their resources into each other’s territory to make warfare possible.” Here, Iraq serves as Iran’s bridging of the religious past with the geopolitical present, serving as a conduit between the regional hierarchy and global order. It is intrinsically linked to the IRI and KSA both geographically and socioethnically. When discussing the relationship between the dominant state and local dominant country, Lemke (1995, 238) notes that “the status quo of the local hierarchy therefore might well be created, defended, or simply affected by more powerful external actors.” This is particularly applicable to Iraq because the U.S.’s intervention weakened its international standing as the world’s sole superpower. For instance, in Figure 2, one might il-

illustrate the U.S.'s intervention in Iraq as *A* reflecting Washington, inflecting an imagined regional hierarchy whereby *E* representing Iraq, affecting the relative power of Iran, representing *C*. Hence, U.S. overreach concurrently reordered the Middle Eastern subsystem by providing a vacuum for Iranian influence following the fall of Ba'athist Iraq. Ultimately, the same sacred fault line which bifurcated political Islam centuries ago remains commensurately relevant to geopolitics. While U.S. overreach is explained by the PTT's assumptions, the regional implications of Washington's overreach indicate a link between global power distribution and the constraints of regional power dynamics.

Yemen

Beginning in 2015, the Yemeni Civil War typifies the opaque nature of opportunism and antagonistic competition between the KSA and IRI. Both the nature and proximity of proxy warfare permit a certain degree of ambiguity through militias. Here, just as ideological clout transcends the geographic parameters of Organski's PTT, ostensibly independent militias with affinities to the ideologies espoused by Riyadh and Tehran obfuscate the groups' true objectives. Neighboring the KSA and occupying the Arabian Peninsula, Yemen is geopolitically central to the KSA's regional standing. However, Yemen's historically established Shia Zaidi sect complicates the modern state's social fabric and offers Tehran the ideological space to seek geopolitical influence within these communities. What began in 2011 as an internal presidential succession row, soon descended into a multidimensional conflict at the heart of the Saudi-Iranian proxy war. In response to the predominantly Shia-led Zaidi "Houthi" rebel movement capturing Yemen's capital Sana'a, the KSA led a military intervention to remove the rebels and reinstall ousted president Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi. Suspicious of the looming yet opaque "Shiite Crescent," the KSA accused the IRI of supporting the Houthis as part of the broader regional competition, an accusation that has been corroborated by the United Nations (UN) (Landry 2015). Despite being the poorest Arab nation, Yemen has seen some of the worst bloodshed in history with some 10,000 civilians killed and 40,000 injured (al-Haj 2017). The impoverished nation is of geostrategic importance to both Tehran and Riyadh as it shares a border with the KSA and is split demographically with close to half its population of the Shia faith. The geostrategic imperative of regional primacy in Yemen is exemplified by the Houthi's assassination of the former president Ali Abdullah Saleh in December 2017. Saleh and his forces had been strategically aligned with the Houthis against exiled President Hadi. However, Saleh's public declaration of willingness to cooperate with Riyadh in the cessation of hostilities and peace negotiations was ultimately incongruent with Tehran's regional grand strategy. For many, Saleh was a symbol of unity in Yemen. His death invariably places Yemen deeper in the midst of a proxy war between two external powers with little hope or intention of resolution imminent.

Conclusions

Religious incongruence underpins historical Saudi–Iranian animosity. This incongruence forms just one piece of a complex puzzle. Modern determinants such as sectarianism, war, and mistrust have predicated its enduring nature. Though state formation, ethnocentrism, and draconian methods of legitimation equally compound the complex aversions espoused in Tehran and Riyadh. Geopolitical theories are useful tools of analysis because they provide a structural foundation to illuminate multifaceted conflicts. Multipolarity and the implications of the PTT are invariably central determinants of conflicts in an age of such complex interdependence in international relations. As explored throughout this article, the complex rivalry between Riyadh and Tehran is best understood within the contemporaneous context of global polarity and these states’ commensurate relations to the great powers discussed.

Ultimately, the findings of this paper indicate that the oscillating nature of the international system continues to protract or pacify the nature of state-to-state relations at a regional level. Dual layered hierarchical measurements, in tandem with empirical contextualization, fill a theoretical gap in the ideological and geopolitical power dynamic between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Within the spatial and longitudinal scope of this paper, the findings affirm Lemke’s stipulation that great power inflection affects regional power structures as illustrated in the “International Power Cone.” Ultimately, the paper finds that shifts in great power distribution affect constraints on regional power dynamics as explored through the enduring strategic rivalry between Saudi Arabia and IRI.

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Legitimacy of Intelligence According to Political Thinkers

Fábio Nogueira de Miranda Filho¹

ABSTRACT

To obtain data protected by the holder, the Intelligence Service (IS) uses specialized actions, which sometimes go against rules of conduct. Thus, society often questions the legitimacy of the IS. Since the IS is a state institution, an approach grounded in political thought can provide parameters to assess its legitimacy. Accordingly, this paper presents a study of the work of 12 classical political thinkers, with focus on the organization of society. It investigates the extent to which the ideas of the authors support or hamper the activity of the IS. The activities of the IS would be in complete harmony with the world views of some authors; other authors have a few reservations regarding its actions, and others reject the actions of the IS. Hence, the authorization of the practices of the IS depend on which thinker is used to assess them, and does not depend on the type of government or the manner in which the state is organized. The moral, social, and ethical values, which are predominant in society and influenced by the teachings of the political thinkers, are explored as the foundations for the legitimacy—or not—of the IS.

Keywords: Intelligence; Policy; Legitimacy; Political Thinkers; Political Theory

La legitimidad de la inteligencia según los pensadores políticos

RESUMEN

Para obtener datos protegidos por la persona a quien le pertenecen, el Servicio de Inteligencia (SI) utiliza acciones especializadas, que a veces van en contra de las reglas de conducta. Así, la sociedad a

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menudo cuestiona la legitimidad del SI. Dado que el SI es una institución estatal, un enfoque basado en el pensamiento político puede proporcionar parámetros para evaluar su legitimidad. En consecuencia, este documento presenta un estudio del trabajo de doce pensadores políticos clásicos, con un enfoque en la organización de la sociedad. Investiga hasta qué punto las ideas de los autores apoyan o dificultan la actividad del SI. Las actividades del SI estarían en completa armonía con las visiones del mundo de algunos autores; otros autores tienen algunas reservas con respecto a sus acciones, y otros rechazan las acciones del SI. Por lo tanto, la autorización de las prácticas del SI depende de qué pensador se utiliza para evaluarlas, y no depende del tipo de gobierno o la forma en que se organiza el estado. Los valores morales, sociales y éticos, que predominan en la sociedad y están influenciados por las enseñanzas de los pensadores políticos, se exploran como los cimientos de la legitimidad, o no, del SI.

Palabras clave: inteligencia; Política; Legitimidad; Pensadores políticos; Teoría política

政治思想家所认为的情报合法性

摘要

为获取数据持有者所保护的数据，情报服务局（IS）使用特殊手段（获取数据），有时这会违反行为准则。因此，社会经常质疑情报服务局的合法性。既然IS是属于国家机构，那么基于政治思考的措施则能提供参数来评估IS合法性。相应地，本文提出一项由12位经典政治思想家共同完成的研究，聚焦于社会组织。本文调查了作者的观点在多大程度上支持或阻碍IS活动。IS活动与部分作者的世界观完全一致；一些作者则对IS活动持保守态度，另一些则完全不接受IS活动。因此，IS实践的批准取决于评估实践的政治思想家是谁，而不取决于政府类型或国家的组织方式。道德价值、社会价值和伦理价值，这三者在社会中占主导地位，同时受政治思想家的影响。本文探索了这三种价值是否是IS合法性的基础。

关键词：情报，政策，合法性，政治思想家，政治理论

Introduction

The decision-making process at the top government levels has increasingly become more complex and challenging, sometimes due to the increasing strength and number of pressure groups, or the increasing amount of information available to be assessed. Several state departments advise the decision maker, and the Intelligence Service (IS) competes as another source of information. Seeking effectiveness, all of the advisory institutions attempt to present the best alternatives for the decision maker. In this sense, the IS seeks to stand out in two ways: presenting a distinct and more accurate interpretation of the facts and information, and/or presenting denied data. In the first case, the IS must improve to develop techniques to achieve this goal. In the second case, it should be clarified that denied data refers to data that is protected by his or her holder, who wants to protect it from unauthorized access. For the IS, it is more natural to stand out in obtaining denied data, since the other advisory institutions do not use this method.

To obtain denied data, the IS uses specialized actions to circumvent obstacles posed by the person who holds the data. More explicitly, the IS uses lawful and illicit resources to achieve its goals. These obstacles, in addition to having the purpose of avoiding or delaying access to denied data, are usually provided for in the legal system of the country in which the action is taken to obtain the denied data. That is to say, the IS of country A can take action on its own territory or in country B, and both countries have laws that protect sensitive data. Even while acting in their own countries, there are standards to avoid misuse of the IS by those in power. And in the case of action in another country, besides the internal laws, there are also standards of conduct of the International Public Law that must be followed. To complete the set of obligations, the IS professionals follow a code of ethics,² which, to a greater or lesser degree, if disobeyed can threaten their personal rights.

Thus, faced with the potential injuriousness of the specialized action of the IS, society might question the existence and legitimacy of the IS itself, that is, its justification, validity, and authority. For those who perceive this possible impropriety, the question immediately arises: Why should civil society grant legitimacy to this governmental structure?

A quick answer is that all countries have some type of IS, whether it is for defense against external threats, for public security, or as state policy. In other words, if everyone else has it, you must also have one, to exercise Intelligence actions and to protect against the Intelligence actions of others. To improve this answer, internal controls may be implemented to the IS, such as review boards, as well as external controls, such as legislative powers. However, this may not con-

² Example of a code of ethics: specialized action is the only alternative to obtain the data; reject inappropriate interference; specialized action must be used only until the data is obtained; be discreet; if possible, try to get the data through less damaging actions, etc.

vince people who seek arguments less dependent on the actions of others. Therefore, society needs solid arguments to be able to grant legitimacy to the IS, and to use it in the most effective way.

In this way, in search of a convincing assessment of the legitimacy (or not) of the IS, an approach grounded in political thought is adopted in this article. The IS is ultimately a state institution that is part of the structure of government, and, as such, it would be prudent to assess it. But the very creation of the state and forms of government organization were the fruits of political thinkers who idealized or justified these political structures over the last few centuries. Then, by analogy, the IS must also be assessed by political thinkers.

The term “political thinkers” is used to include people who have written about philosophy, political science, sociology, law, and economics—in short, themes that are related to the institutional structure of the state. Thus, one avoids considering the ideas of only one field of knowledge and perhaps losing the richness of the debate of several lines of thought. This range of subjects mirrors the concept of political philosophy put forward by Bobbio, Matteucci, and Pasquino (1998). This philosophy can be understood as the determination and description of the perfect state; as a search for its foundation and criteria for legitimacy of power; as a determination of the general concept of politics, of what characterizes the political phenomenon and makes it so, distinguishing it and differentiating it from other social phenomena; and as methodology of the political sciences.

Once this subject matter was delimited, the criteria for choosing which political thinkers would be surveyed were established. Although the foundations of political science were laid by authors of antiquity and the Middle Ages, this paper contemplates the ideas from Western modern political thought. This is due to the fact that nation-states emerged in the modern era, and the IS was also consolidated as a state resource for the defense of the sovereigns at the same time.³ The ideas of these authors, reflected in the “classics,” work best as assessment parameters to study the legitimacy of the IS, precisely because these ideas generated the foundations of the political context in which we live in the twenty-first century.

Another consideration for the choice of political thinkers is that their ideas must surpass the contexts in which they were produced. Their works were and still are instruments for understanding political realities and still influence the directions of countries today. Despite the chronological distance, they remain current, and have become references to subsequent generations and other peoples and nations.

Finally, it should be noted that the list of political thinkers is not exhaustive. It is a significant sample of the political thinking developed in recent centuries.

³ There are records of Intelligence activity since biblical times, but without the systematization of modern times.

The addition of other thinkers would pose a risk of becoming a repetitive study or of having marginal effects on the conclusions of the research. It was decided to study a few political thinkers, but in an in-depth and accurate way.

It should also be clarified that the classical authors are all deceased and thus cannot answer the direct question: “Is the existence of the IS legitimate?”. In order to circumvent this problem, the primary avenue would be to consult living political thinkers. However, their ideas have not yet passed the sieve of time and it is impossible to know who will influence future generations. Moreover, because they are susceptible to pressures, these thinkers could be influenced by organizations and people.

In view of the above, the objective of this article is to assess the IS’s legitimacy based on the criticism of political thinkers through the study of their works. This is an important basis on which society may infer legitimacy to the IS, or to reshape it, or even to discard it. In what follows, the IS’s legitimacy is assessed by 12 political thinkers, and at the end, a few words are presented by way of inference and conclusion. However, before this, the concept of the legitimacy of the state is examined, which guides the research on political thinkers.

Legitimacy of the State

According to Mcloughlin (2014), there are two ways of understanding state legitimacy. One is normative and concerns standards that the actor, institution, or political order must obey to be considered legitimate. The standards can center on human rights, justice, consent of the population, or equity. The other way, which is accepted in this study, is the empirical one in which importance is not given to standards but rather to if, how, and why the population accepts or rejects this state. What matters is the belief and the perception of the people, even if the standards are not respected. In short, a state is legitimate when citizens accept that the state governs them (Gilley 2009). Institutional scholars argue that the legitimacy of the state flows automatically from it to its constituent institutions, such as the security apparatus (Lemay-Hébert 2009).

On the other hand, illegitimacy tends to generate conflict and disorder. The importance of legitimacy appears precisely in the lack thereof, which causes the ruin of the state. It is easier for people to rebel if the state is viewed as illegitimate. A state that has little legitimacy is more vulnerable, and this idea extends to more minor incidents in the nation’s political life, for example, strikes in the transport sector. If a state is considered legitimate, it may have some unstable moments and, from time to time, go against what the people want without running the risk of being dismantled. This is due to the fact that people believe that organized power in the form of the legitimate state is adequate and fair, even if it is sometimes against some citizens (Tyler 2006). This finding, that people are more fault tolerant when

the state is legitimate, is especially useful for the IS, given the history of mistakes made in skewed analyses such as the Arab attack on the Israelis in 1973 in the Yom Kippur War (Betts 1978).

All states need a degree of legitimacy to govern effectively. Legitimacy directly affects the viability of the development process. The ability to govern and legitimacy are aspects which are reinforced. Legitimacy can even be forced by the repressive apparatus of the state with a threat of punishment or reward for those who obey the state, but the cost is very high. Thus, legitimacy helps the government to govern, as people tend to be accepting of the state (Englebert 2002). On the contrary, the lack of legitimacy contributes to the bankruptcy of the state, to the extent it makes it difficult to recognize the political identity of the people, avoids the effective functioning of the state, and deprives the state of the support of the people.

There is no one way to gain legitimacy for the state. It may arise from the fact that there is no alternative, or a strong government that prevents chaos, or a state that provides justice and provides for the well-being of all. The key point is to know that tradition, collective identity of the people, norms, principles, and values support citizens' perceptions that the state has the right to govern. However, this perception is not static; it changes from time to time and from society to society (Norad 2010).

Political Thinkers

In this section, the political thinkers are presented chronologically. For each thinker, the main political ideas are presented succinctly, paying particular attention to the usefulness of the arguments that can be used to assess the IS, that is, a focus on the organization of society and the manner of guaranteeing the existence of the state.⁴ I have not included specific facts from the biography of the authors or context in which the work was written, except in cases where these elements are essential for the understanding of the ideas.

For the purpose of this study, it is considered that the IS performs state intelligence. This type of intelligence is of a strategic nature and consists of maintaining the state, protecting society, and seeking opportunities for government, and its performance can be internal or external to the country. There may be tactical subsystems such as internal security and defense. The former is usually carried out by the police and is aimed at public safety, and monitoring of separatist groups and organizations that may cause destabilization to the state. By contrast, the latter has a military character and often concerns war, or at least the power of deterrence. The structure of the IS may be a singular body, or two or more specialized bod-

⁴ It is not a summary of the work of each political thinker, but rather a presentation of parts of their works that enlighten the discussion about the analysis of the existence and legitimacy of ISs.

ies performing state intelligence with some kind of subdivision in the way they function, usually by geographical area, both internal and external to the country. In many countries, however, it is common to structure an intelligence system consisting of both specialized agencies and other bodies that perform a wider variety of functions (for example, the Armed Forces, police, Ministry of Agriculture or Foreign Affairs, etc.).

It should be noted that at the time when the following ideas were conceived by these political thinkers, there was no such structure of intelligence. Thus, this research does not try to verify if the ideas of the political thinkers supported some type of structure of intelligence for that time. Instead, it investigates (i) whether the ideas of the authors, which influence the present world, support how intelligence is practiced today, (ii) whether the actions of the IS can contribute to reinforcing the thinker's ideas, (iii) whether the actions of the IS stand in contrast to the ideas of the thinker, and (iv) if the operation of an IS is rejected by the thinker. The analysis also focuses on how the IS could act today in accordance with the ideas of the various political thinkers. Accordingly, there is no value judgment presented regarding the ideas of each thinker; that is, the analysis does not assess whether they are correct or not, or whether one should agree with them. The following sections present and discuss the ideas of the various political thinkers. Throughout, implications are drawn for how their ideas relate (or not) to the IS.

Machiavelli

Machiavelli (2007) wrote a manual for Lorenzo de Medici, the ruling prince of Florence in the sixteenth century, on how to conquer and maintain states, making them stable. His work has always been based on the pragmatism of the arguments, the absence of moralism, and innovation in relation to the writings on politics of his time. According to him, men are inherently not good, so the Prince would pay a high price for obeying only Christian precepts.

As a book that contains essential notions on the subject of politics, Machiavelli (2007) lists several tips for the Prince to maintain the longevity of his kingdom. His essential advice is: to be more feared than loved; to use cruelty only when necessary, without excess; to practice a set of evils at one time, and to practice goodness gradually and sparingly; to study history, since political situations tend to repeat themselves, in order to be aware of events that could be foreseen, and also to mirror the best examples; to not let any incident, bad or good, vary the behavior of the Prince; to always keep a ready and well-trained army for defense; to study the art of war; to be parsimonious in expenditures; to not appropriate others' things, in order to avoid hatred; to avoid contempt; to know how to simulate and disguise; to keep your word, when convenient; and, finally, to know that if something seems to be good, it is better than being effectively good. In addition to the above advice, Machiavelli (2007) warned the Prince about the whims of the god-

dess fortune. The unexpected and imponderable always roam the palace and can bring ruin or glory. It is up to the Prince to know how to handle the unpredictable.

The region of Italy where Machiavelli lived in the sixteenth century was full of states facing problems of political instability. The manual written by Machiavelli mirrored this situation. In the present day, there is also political instability, even if less intense than at that time in that region. Therefore, in order to prevent this instability, an IS would be useful, particularly for anticipating and avoiding coups. More broadly, the IS could be used to warn governors about the goddess of chance, which continues to haunt the rulers of today. For example, the IS may be useful in showing that the ruler is more feared than loved and to predict events that can alter the course of history unfavorably.

The IS would also be indispensable in attending to the war councils: to maintain an army and to study the art of war. After all, one cannot expect to win wars without the help of spies. Finally, it is worth mentioning the different interpretation of this work given by Jean Jacques Rousseau. For him, Machiavelli pretended to give advice to the Prince in order to undress, in the eyes of the people, the perfidious working structures of the political world. This warning also applies to the IS.

Hobbes

To establish his theory, Hobbes (1985) imagined man, initially, in the state of nature. In this state, each governed oneself, because there was no alienation of the right and power of self-preservation. This predicted fear and uncertainty; hence, the memorable phrase “man is wolf to man.” In this way, man took his inner world as the measure of his actions and acted, in relation to others, without a common power able to keep everyone in fear. To solve the problem, the contract was created, an instrument by which the natural man creates the artificial man, the state, to protect him. Man celebrates the social pact and exchanges the peace and security won through the state for obedience to a sovereign.

Hobbes (1985) conceives of a strong state, since he defended the absolutist monarchy. For him, it is authority and not wisdom that makes laws. It is men and arms, not words and promises, as Aristotle had said, who make the force and power of laws. The law does not emanate from any miracle, from natural reason, or from customs, but rather from authority capable of controlling coercive means.

On the other hand, Hobbes noted that the opposition of the spiritual and secular powers destroys the state. The author lived in the midst of the religious civil war of the Reformation, a translation of the Bible into English, during which each became a judge of good and bad deeds above any civil law. However, according to Hobbes' anthropology, the cognitive limitation of the human species,

in performing the hermeneutics of the New and Old Testament, unleashed the irrationality of religious beliefs, leading man to immeasurable fear. Hence, religion is an effective political instrument of domination. In this way, the monopoly of belief is indispensable to the art of governing the people. Since sovereignty is indivisible, secular and spiritual powers cannot be dissociated. The union of secular and spiritual power, with the prevalence of the former, guarantees the stability and predictability of governments.

For Hobbes, the agent protected the people and, in return, received obedience to the laws. This thought warns of the arbitrary character of power relations between men. In this case, the IS in its domestic realm is intrinsic to state coercion, necessary to the application of the laws. In addition, since the head of state should ensure external peace, he should also rely on an externally oriented IS to help the army maintain protection of citizens. Over time, in both cases, it is the duty of the IS to help the ruler maintain sovereignty, that is, the union of secular and spiritual power under the tutelage of the monarch. Here, there is a clear risk that the IS could be misrepresented and used only to perpetuate the incumbent in power, not to fulfill goals concerning the security of the nation. Using the words of the author himself, the IS could become the wolf to man.

Locke

Locke (1983) conceived the state of nature, prior to the political state, as one in which men were free and equal, that is, there were no impediments to their actions and, furthermore, an absence of links between them. No one man had power over another, and at the same time, all had the power to judge. As each could be a partial judge, they tended to exist in a state of war. To prevent this development, men should respect the laws of the state of nature. The purpose of these laws should not be to abolish or restrict freedom, but rather to preserve and expand it.

According to Locke, the first law of nature is the guarantee of property. Due to human nature and its passions, it was very risky and precarious to have possessions in the state of nature, which could lead to a state of war. Thus, to prevent the destruction of man, civil status would be created for the purpose of preserving property, understood as possessions, life, and liberty.⁵

Central to his work, property allowed Locke to justify the execution of the contract that marks the end of the state of nature and the beginning of the political

5 For Locke, the right of property belongs to the individuals (by comparison, for Hobbes, it is the state that establishes the right to property). To possess something that God has given to mankind, we must work for it. Property brings the benefit of increased productivity, for example, the cultivation of land. On the other hand, there must be limits: no one can own all the land, it cannot be idle, and everyone has to work with what they have. In order to expand the economy, money would be used as the exchange of a perishable good for a nonperishable one, in addition to enabling the employment of others—in other words, work unrelated to property.

state. There would be two contracts: the first of an association pact, between free individuals who come together to use their collective force in the execution of laws, renouncing the right to practice justice alone, and, second, a subjection pact, which would create political society and government.⁶

Furthermore, Locke predicted four forms of corruption of power. The first of these was the conquest defined by external invasion by just or unjust war. Second, the usurpation would be the unjust war from internal origins, for example, the executive legislating. Third would be the tyranny of the legislator creating laws for his own benefit. Finally, the fourth was the dissolution of government, which would be a special form of tyranny in which the legislature would be subjugated by the executive or by foreign power, or the legislature itself would violate natural rights. To avoid the degeneration of power, man had the right of resistance against governments that did not obey the limits of political power. The right of resistance would be another natural right alongside the right of property.

The government, which is tasked with effectively protecting the citizens in the political state and must also respect natural laws, needs a security apparatus to perform this function. In this case, good use of the IS would be useful toward preserving property. Here, similar to what was presented about Hobbes' thinking, it remains to be determined what would be the good use of an IS. At the very least, in this line of thought, the IS should respect the laws of the country and seek to protect the state and society.

As for the right of resistance, there would be an almost unresolved conflict of interests. The IS would be under the orders of the Executive and as such would tend to defend it, even in cases of power degenerations described above. The people, when suffering the maladies of the corruption of power, would invoke the right of resistance. However, the ruler could interpret this uprising of the people as a revolution, which threatens the existence of society, according to Locke's concept. Thus, the IS, and other security structures, would have to choose between the side of the people or the ruler. The decision would not be easy, since reality would likely be misrepresented by both sides. Utopia wanted the security forces to choose the people, for even if they are wrong, they are the holders of supreme power and could start a new society. However, when analyzing history, most often the sovereign, tyrant or not, commands the whole government, including the IS, to the final glory or defeat. It should also be noted that, for Locke, states existed in a state of nature. Thus, by being judges of themselves, they could tend toward a state of war. The IS could be used to avoid this state, and if it could not be avoided, it would be useful to abbreviate it.

⁶ For Locke, the main cause that would lead men to abandon the state of nature and sign the contract was the uncertainty as to the enjoyment of natural rights afforded by their probable violation. Civil society would perfect the state of nature.

Montesquieu

According to Montesquieu (1996), laws allow the citizen to experience political freedom. For this political thinker, freedom is the power of laws, not of people. In other words, freedom is the right to do everything the laws allow. This limitation applies to the people and to the government, since both must obey a Constitution, which points out precise limits to the action of the government and the citizens. One citizen cannot fear another citizen.

Montesquieu's greatest legacy is the prescription on the division, independence, and harmony of three powers that should constitute the state: executive, legislative, and judicial. The first two powers should cooperate with each other and all powers exercised by different people. The executive would be better served by one person than by many, and it would be up to him to perform the ordinary actions, and in particular to promote peace and wage war with other states. The legislature would be responsible for drafting the laws, a task deemed impossible for the people. As Montesquieu studies, in particular, the British political organization, he stipulated that the legislature would be separated in two chambers: of the lords, representing the nobility, and of the commons, representing the town. The judiciary would be exercised by people drawn from the citizenry and would be temporary. Courts would address disputes between individuals, as well as criminal matters. It should be noted that the nobles should be judged by their peers and not by ordinary courts—a kind of privileged forum.

In order for the government to function harmoniously, Montesquieu considered important the balance of social classes and, even more so, of political powers. One power would stop the other. This would ensure that power, even legitimate in its social origin, does not become illegitimate by the way it is used. Power should be experienced as authority, not violence. Montesquieu believed that government corruption generally began by misrepresenting its principles.

In a first assessment, there is no relation between the work of Montesquieu and the presence of IS in government, but from his main contribution—division of powers—one can draw valuable lessons and implications. The IS has the function of assisting the executive in its decisions and as such should not be used illegitimately. Thus, the notion of checks and balances between powers applies to the IS to some extent. The secret nature of their actions should not prevent their supervision and this must occur both by the laws, in an untimely or planned manner, and by the judiciary, in this case from provocations. This oversight brings legitimacy to the IS, since excesses could be curtailed. In countries where there this disposition to supervise the IS exists, one may perceive better use and appropriateness of its activities. Another point that deserves attention in the work of Montesquieu is the emphasis on the maximum obedience of the laws. Since freedom is the right of everything the laws allow, the IS must behave strictly as the body of law applies to its functions.

Rousseau

Rousseau (1978b) conceived man in the state of nature in two stages. In the first moment, man is described as a happy, good savage, living isolated according to his instincts. There is equality and freedom. The ability to perfect oneself and free will distinguish man from other animals in the natural world, and this mutability of human nature caused the change to the second stage. Then, the use of the word and the establishment of property, as well as of society, began. In this progress, social relations were based on differences. Language allowed the proximity between men, and then came the need to limit spaces, which brought unhappiness.

Finally, Rousseau conceives of man as good, but society corrupts him. Social, political, and economic differences are authorized by men and are based on conventions that bring unhappiness. Progress did not bring benefits to human life, but rather accelerated its decay. In this environment, the state did not harmonize men, but rather increased their differences. The development of capabilities happened by chance, without the species being prepared for sociability (Rousseau 1978a).

To solve this problem, we resort again to man's mutability and capacity of adaptation and improvement to reach an ideal society. The social contract began timeless; it was not situated in a timeline of the world. The pact was based on the free will of the parties. The contract presupposed reforms in the institutions and improvement of human beings, educating man to become a citizen. The social pact was the union, forming the whole that is the political body—a public person. With the social contract, man loses the natural and total freedom, but gains civil liberty, limited by the general will and property he possesses. Each may have a particular will contrary to the general will, yet morality is the basis of the general will, expressed by general, impersonal, and inflexible law. In short, the established state has one objective: the common good (Rousseau 1978a).

The social contract gave rise to the figure of the sovereign, and the government arose from the obedience of all to the political body. For Rousseau, there is no correct form of government organization; the ideal is that people be satisfied. Sovereignty is the exercise of the general will that a government needs to carry out. Government is divisible, removable, and limited by the designs of the general will. Sovereignty is inalienable, indivisible, irrevocable, and absolute.

To relate these principles to the IS, it is up to the IS to defend sovereignty and then government. However, since man is corrupted by society, the IS can also be corrupted. To avoid this dysfunction, the IS can pursue the common good, that is, the same legitimate objective of the state. The great difficulty is to establish what the common good is.

Rousseau might analyze some societies today and understand that the pact is in force because the state is driven by the will of the people and the power de-

limited in the Constitution, which emanates from the sovereignty of the people. In this case, it is the duty of the IS to be faithful to the Magna Law and to defend it. On the other hand, Rousseau could characterize the present pacts as false because of the imprecision of the legislator's translation of the popular will. Thus, it would be necessary to invoke once again man's capacity to reinvent himself in order to reshape society and also the IS.

Burke

Burke (1980) was a conservative and valued continuity over rupture. That is why he was a staunch critic of the French revolution. For this political thinker, institutions expressed the superiority of collective reason; in other words, they represented the superiority of practice before theory, or rather, speculation.

This concept of the social institution deserves further discussion. The value of the social institution would be measured by its usefulness regarding criteria such as duration in existence and credibility. Society was viewed as an association of individuals in a group. According to Burke, even the existence of antagonisms between groups, if properly controlled, could generate political benefits such as balance, evolution, improvement, moderation, commitment, and responsibility. This control could be exercised in particular by institutions, custom, and accepted traditions (Freeman 1980).

Burke defended the idea that state institutions could demand obedience, whether by habit, custom, or history. Institutions would also define people's practical freedoms and boundaries, and could be perfected, but with caution, without loss of references and without revolution.

The IS is certainly an institution, and although it is considered atypical in relation to the other departments of public administration due to its secret character, it is maintained by tax revenues and must attend to the public interest. Thus, according to this philosophical approach, the IS would be measured by its usefulness, would act according to accepted customs and traditions, would demand obedience to society, and would be gradually improved. It is also worth mentioning the control of antagonisms in groups within society. Thus, it would not be legitimate for the group in power to use the IS simply to control antagonistic groups.

Kant

For Kant (1980), the existence of freedom, which is the ability of self-determination that human beings possess, is conditioned by morality. Morality is understood as always acting in conformity to a principle of action that can be taken as universal law. Only what is universally valid is moral. Thus, Kant's moral philosophy rejected morality inspired by a concept of the common good, which would be particular to a specific society in a specific period of time.

The concretization of individual freedom also depends on the existence of political institutions, whether domestic or international, that can guarantee the exercise of the autonomy of each person. The principles governing political institutions are also the principles of law, and only the law can establish justice. This circumstance becomes possible if political structures and legal institutions conform to universal moral principles. The individual, as a rational being, who is therefore moral, needs the legal order that guarantees the freedom and full realization of the autonomy and rational potential of all individuals (Kant 1995a).

Regarding the state of nature already described by previous contractual thinkers, for Kant, it was only a logical hypothesis. Kant's goal was universal peace, and it was necessary to overcome the state of nature at all levels: between individuals, between states, and between both of them. For eternal peace, the ideal would be the creation of a world state, but this is not viable because it would entail the ending of sovereignty. The hope is that humanity will realize that war brings harm. Kant (1995b) advocated the formation of a universal confederation of free republics to avoid international conflicts. He preached that peace treaties should always predict peace and take action toward it, such as extinguishing armies and not committing acts that would undermine trust in times of peace.⁷

The central concept in Kant's theory is morality, which serves as the basis for defining freedom and justice. And morality must be universal, not dependent on the common good. Therefore, the existence of the IS is disastrous to Kant's conception of the world. The IS needs the support of the common good to be able to justify its actions. At another point in his work, Kant presents universal peace as the ultimate goal of humanity. To this end, among other things, there should be no armies or actions that would arouse distrust of others, for example, from other states. However, the mere existence of the IS would already be an affront to the confidence of another country. Thus, for Kant, the IS is an outdated idea.

Mill

John Stuart Mill (1963) was against the illegitimate interference of society and the state, which he called the tyranny of the majority, on individual freedom. For this political thinker, it was imperative to limit the power of the people over itself. It would not be possible to force a person to do something (or not) on the pretext that it would be better for them, or, in the opinion of others, would be more prudent for them. The necessary condition was that it would not cause injury to any other person and that the person should have perfect mental capacities.

Mill (1964) defended freedom of speech and opinion, with the argument that it is always worth listening to an opinion, whether true or false, at least to

⁷ Kant blamed the balance of power as the facet of international relations responsible for not bringing peace.

confront the truth. For him, the false idea could contain traces of truth, and he warned: it is good that men distrust dominant ideas and listen to minorities. Freedom of expression would be necessary for the development of human faculties.

Another very important item for Mill's work is his defense of representative democracy, however, with the following conditions: the people would be willing to receive it, preserve it, carry out its duties, and perform the functions that would be imposed upon them. The superiority of popular government lies in two principles: self-protection, each one being the only secure guardian of one's own rights and interests; and self-reliance, developing so as not to become dependent on third parties. Mill also described the pathologies of democracy: selfishness, defending immediate interests over long-term ones, and shifting posture upon coming to power, that is, self-interests would take on a larger profile than others or other classes. Mill still warned about professional aristocracies in which the efficient civil servants made the rulers and governors too dependent on them, impeding the development of the general mental capacities of the people, especially their interest in public affairs. As a remedy, he pointed out that representative government should be representative of all (Mill 1964).

When Mill calls attention to the tyranny of the majority over individual liberty, it seems clear that the IS does not fit well into the government structure. If the existence of the IS is unavoidable, this institution cannot co-exist with the ideas of rulers who want to impose their world views on all citizens. As part of the coercive power of the state, the IS assists in compliance with laws, but without invading the privacy of people in an uncontrolled manner. This becomes clearer for the IS when Mill stands for freedom of expression. The IS is often called to clarify facts and so it must actively and purposively listen to minorities, or, more precisely, all parties. Finally, the implication is that the IS should be in favor of representative democracies and practice state intelligence, not government intelligence, lest it risk becoming part of the professional aristocracy.

Marx

Marx's work is very rich and, for this reason, has aroused several interpretations over time, besides being controversial in almost every point. There is the work of Marx and the works by his followers who interpreted it in various ways, so there is no one correct manner of interpretation. Because of this pluralism of ideas, it becomes impossible, in this article, to explore all of his work to find evidence about the legitimacy of the IS. However, two relevant topics regarding the relationship with Intelligence will be addressed: ideology and the will to change the world.

The concept of ideology within Marx's work has two meanings. The first is called structuralism. Structure, as defined by Althusser (1985), is the set of material and social relations of production of human life in a particular social formation.

According to this part of Marxism, ideology is the fruit of these relations of production and represents the dominant ideas derived from social relations. So, there is only one ideology which is dominant. The negative part of this interpretation is that the domination carried out through ideology is created by distortions, that is, it produces a false consciousness. More specifically, false consciousness is produced from the division of labor, and it only takes place from the moment when a division of material and mental labor arises. This logic becomes more perverse when one considers that men are the support, and not the subjects, of this ideology. Man is not a producer of ideology, but rather the one who achieves it, because man is determined by material forces (social structures). In other words, man is crossed by ideology—subject in history, and not of history (Marx 1980).

From another point of view, science, as true consciousness, opposes this false consciousness. This science would be historical materialism, under construction by Marx and Engels. The authors were against classical German philosophy, English political economy, and the utopianism of French socialism. Those who rivaled them were ideological. For example, every bourgeois thinker was an ideologist, bearer of false consciousness (Marx 1982a).

The humanist tradition of Marxism, on the other hand, understands ideology differently. Here, there are several ideologies, not just a dominant one. From the moment consciousness ceases to be only reflection and becomes a transforming agent as well, ideology ceases to be solely the product of the relations of production of existence or a false consciousness, that is, pure negativity. Ideology becomes the fruit of human praxis in its subjective relation to matter, and capable of transforming it. There is no single ideology, reflecting dominant material conditions, but ideologies, fruit of creative praxis and the teleological⁸ capacity of human thought. Man becomes a producer of ideologies through praxis. If ideology is the fruit of human action, it is also the creator of these actions (Marx 1982b).

The second theme of Marx's work that is interesting to the study of Intelligence deals with the will to apply the political theory, which he developed himself, in the real world. For Marx, economic structure is the basis of everything and is what matters most to the citizens. The function of politics is to ensure the maintenance of relations of capitalist production and exploitation of labor. Thus, to implant the new order, communism, Marx and Engels (1982) defended the possibility, and even the need, to break with the existing social, economic, and cultural structures. For Marx, the person who desires a social revolution must wait for the moment when the contradictions between productive forces and existing relations of production reach their limit and then act. In order to corroborate his thought, Marx recalled that the entire history of man, since the dissolution of the communal ownership of land, was marked by class struggle between the exploiter and the exploited, at different stages of social development. This struggle had reached a

8 The study of phenomena from their purpose, not from their causes.

stage where the proletariat could not free itself from the bourgeoisie without also liberating, forever, the whole of society.

Going back to Marxist theory, according to the structuralist line of thought, human conscience is dominated by the dominant ideology. The IS would likely become an echo of this dominant ideology and, together with every apparatus of the state, would be willing not only to preserve it, but to magnify it as well. If the dominant ideology were considered good by society, there would be no problem in the IS defending it. The problem happens when society rises against the dominant ideology. So, the more important question appears: could the IS position itself outside of the dominant ideology?

This question also manifests itself in the humanistic aspects of Marxism in which there are several ideologies disputing the hegemony in society. The IS would align itself with one of them, usually the one in power, and try to defend it. Once again, society should be the judge and promoter of the best ideology. The IS, by reflex, would also be a defender of this ideology.

To illustrate the situation described above, and the will to change the world in practice, we mention the cases of countries that have adhered in practice to Marxist ideas, such as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, Cuba, North Korea, and the Eastern European countries. In these countries, the IS defended/defends the dominant ideology—socialism—regardless of whether it was unique or not. In capitalist countries, such as the United States, Western European countries, Brazil, and others, the IS defends the dominant ideology that is totally contrary to the ideology of that of the previous group. This antagonism generated the Cold War that was fought by the ISs and conventional armies. Thus, Marx does not mention the need to have an IS in the state apparatus, but the IS becomes essential in the practice of revolution inspired by Marx (and, on the other hand, in defending countries from these revolutions). More precisely, according to Marx's theory, the IS must be alert to when the contradictions between productive forces and existing relations of production will reach their limits, to avoid or support the revolution. The ideal would be for the IS to defend the ideology that is better for society, yet dissension characterizes the process of defining which ideology is best for each society.

Weber

Weber devoted his studies to the exercise of power through political sociology. Political power can be desired by itself and men would fight for it to get rich, and to gain social honor and prestige. Politics is understood here as a study of leadership exercised on behalf of the state. Following this, it becomes necessary to understand Weber's thinking to conceptualize what is the state according to his ideas. It is not possible to define the state in terms of its ends, for a political association of leadership embraces all ends. The state holds the monopoly of the legitimate use

of physical force composed of a community of individuals occupying a given territory. In other words, the society is dominated by the state. For Weber, there are three types of internal, and therefore legitimate, justifications for this command and obedience: Traditional, Charismatic, and Legal. These justifications are ideal types, not found in their pure form in reality (see Weber 2002, 2004).

Traditional Domination is exercised by the patriarch, or the patrimonial prince of olden times, and is based on the strength of tradition. The orders are totally decided by the lord and are legitimized by being in accordance with custom. The commanders obey because of personal loyalty to this leader. Charismatic Domination is based on the subjects' recognition and trust of the leadership and exceptional qualities of the lord. He may present himself as a prophet, elected warlord, plebiscite ruler, great demagogue, and/or leader of a political party. Everything in government depends on the judgment of the leader, who exercises the power in an extremely personal way. Domination is unstable, with no legal foundation and tradition; it lasts as long as the facts that caused it remain and as long as the charisma of the leader is maintained. Finally, Legal Domination applies rational, impersonal rules to all members of the associated group. The political leader is elected and alternation of power is assumed. There is a division of the public and private spheres. This domination is common in modern states.

As for the activity of the IS, it is clear to Weber that the state has the monopoly of force, and, naturally, that the IS is part of this apparatus. More specifically, depending on the types of domination and legitimation of state power, the IS would have different roles to play. In the Traditional Domination scenario, the IS would be subject to the caprices of the patriarch, just as the whole administration would be. The patriarch, by virtue of tradition, would use the IS as was the custom of that society. In the case of Charismatic Domination, the IS would be used to maintain the leader in power. The primary function of the IS would be to preserve the myth. Finally, in Legal Domination, the IS must conform, like the whole of society, to the laws that would be conceived and applied in a rational and impersonal way. In any case, Weber declares neither in favor nor against the existence of the IS.

Schmitt

Schmitt was the great jurist of the Third Reich. For him, any conflict can become political. One of his most important concepts is the friend–foe grouping that contains the possibility of war in itself. The politician draws his forces from religious, economic, moral, national (ethnic or cultural), and other oppositions. These conflicts, at different times, cause different connections and separations. The state, as the largest possible grouping, determines who its internal and external enemies are and has the right to dispose of the lives of men in the struggle against these enemies (Schmitt 1992). To corroborate his thinking, he refers to Hobbes—the state protects and the citizen obeys.

This protecting state owes its political unity to sovereignty. Schmitt maintains that it is the sovereign⁹ who decides whether or not there is a state of exception, considered a danger to the existence of the state itself. Thus, sovereignty is exercised more vehemently in the state of exception, which incites war. In opposing the legitimist illusions of state formation, Schmitt believes that the emergence of a sovereign will eliminate the disorder existing in the state of nature, founding the state order.

This sovereign will of the state must be democratic, that is, its decisions must effectively represent the will of the people. However, Parliament and the political parties do not represent the people, they only want to negotiate and distance themselves from the people's wishes. Freedom, a liberal principle which designates no interference by the state, also disrupts the functioning of democracy, since it confuses the exercise of authority.

On the other hand, equality is a valid democratic principle, and people are represented through substantial political homogeneity—equality as an institutional manifestation of a given social organization. Homogeneity may be religious, historical, civic, or nationalistic; in the practical case of Germany during the Weimar Republic, it would be the Aryan race. Whoever is different may be oppressed or expelled, for example, the Jews in the case of the Nazis. In other cases, different peoples can even be absorbed. The result is a homogeneous people, who do not bring controversies, represented in the state according to their degree of identity. Since societies are not homogeneous, what is needed is the popular acclamation of an individual embodying this will (not via electoral methods). Then, to crown his political logic, Schmitt defends the totalitarian state centered on the mythical figure of a leader, who needs to be legitimized by the emotional mobilization of the masses. The leader alone would be able to solve the tensions of the people (Schmitt 1991).

It seems clear that Schmitt incites war to gain hegemony of a people, in addition to allowing the state to exercise sovereignty in its full form. For this, the existence of a dictator becomes ideal. The real and emblematic case of this way of seeing the world occurred in Nazi Germany before and during World War II. In this case, the IS would be indispensable for conducting this war and also for protecting the dictator, who would have many enemies, for example, the oppressed people or those in process of absorption.

On the other hand, with almost disregard, Schmitt affirms that a pacified world, which he thinks could be the final destiny of humanity, would be without distinction between friend and enemy and, consequently, without politics, and also without the IS. As this world without wars would be practically impossible to realize, the countries would continue eternally in the search for hegemony, always supported by the IS.

⁹ The individual characteristic of the concrete manifestation of political power.

Hayek

Hayek was a neoliberal and, among other things, studied how to best pursue a collective project, or, in other words, how society best progresses. His concept of society consists of a system of rules and values gradually created through the interactions of individuals and enhanced by trial and error over generations. Tradition would thus be cumulative and shared knowledge. The regularity of moral principles, through tradition, would result in predictability and social order—necessary conditions for the progress of society. From these basic consensual rules, individuals would find support to establish innumerable experiences that could not be predicted initially (Hayek 1944).

Individual freedom emerges as an unfolding of the dynamic character of tradition. For Hayek, individual freedom leads to social progress because it presents opportunities to accomplish personal goals. Each person could use their knowledge for their purposes, as Adam Smith had already advocated with his invisible hand to guide the economy. To illustrate, Hayek mentioned the example of England from the eighteenth and fourteenth centuries, which, unlike the countries of the continent, restricted the powers of kings, generating a freer and less absolutist society. A defender of individual liberty, Hayek admits that this is not the only legitimate principle of organization of a society, but it is the best one to give objective to our political action (Hayek 1985).

The counterpoint to this spontaneous manner of organizing society would be the rational organization of the Planner State. The state, exercising its monopoly on force, would make interventions in the economy and interferences in private life to achieve greater social welfare. Put another way, the government uses its coercive power to impose its solutions, instead of letting individuals experience, with reason, the best solution for themselves. However, Hayek believes that state planning limits the individual's ability to use social knowledge creatively. No government, no matter how capable, could gather all the knowledge existing in a society and use it more efficiently and creatively than if it were used freely by its citizens (Hayek 1933).

The rational conception considers that the social institutions that contribute to the progress of society are those conceived logically by reason and not those derived purely from tradition. The most ominous consequence of thought involving pure tradition would be the creation of an argument that justifies the performance of government, especially the coercive capacity of the state. Against this reasoning, Hayek argues that since each individual knows so little, it is rarely known which of us knows what is best for everyone. The question is, how will the state choose the best way to go? Does the adopted criteria reflect only the thinking of those in power (or those who are close to power)?

Hayek does not directly attack the fact that the state holds the monopoly of force, but rather how the state, or more precisely the government of the moment,

makes use of that power by imposing its will on its citizens. Therefore, the IS, as part of this apparatus of force, is touched by this critique in a partial way, depending on the manner in which the IS is used. Moreover, the IS must legitimize itself by its rational and efficient use, and not by tradition alone.

It is worth emphasizing that in preaching the supremacy of individual liberty to the detriment of an intervening state, Hayek argues that institutions inspired by liberalism are more efficient in managing social development. The IS then also has the obligation to defend the principle of individual freedom as its ultimate goal. This does not seem to be contradictory, since England, already mentioned as an example of the application of this political thinker's ideas, possessed an IS, and still does. As long as there is control over the activities of the IS, it can advise the government, and at the same time, try not to infringe on the principle of individual freedom.

Final Considerations

Some authors, due to the complexity of their ideas, deserve, perhaps, an article dedicated exclusively to them, as is the case of Karl Marx and his philosophical partner Engels. However, in this paper, the choice was to present, though briefly, the ideas of several authors, diverse in thought and in times. This larger spectrum of political thinkers, however incomplete, is a significant demonstration of what man conceived in the Political Sciences. Other thinkers have been left out of this group, but it should be pointed out that this is not a complete work on the subject; rather, it sparks new discussions about other thinkers. Perhaps the argument that one author could be exchanged for another is valid, yet choices must be made, and other studies like this (or with more depth) can be performed.

From the point of view of the creation and maintenance of the IS, the analysis presented here focused on several questions relating to positive or negative implications for the IS. With regard to the former: whether the ideas of the political thinkers support the performance of Intelligence, and whether the actions of the IS can contribute to the concretization of the thinker's ideas. With regard to the latter, consideration is given to whether the operation of the IS is forbidden, and whether the actions of the IS hamper the concretization of the thinker's ideas. There is also the neutral view, in which it cannot be stated in full that the political thinker is against or in favor of the legitimation of the IS. That is because there is no direct adherence between the subject of the IS and the thinker's reflections. In addition, this paper assessed the extent to which the performance of the IS today would be in accordance with the ideas of political thinkers (see Table 1).

Obviously, it is not a question of whether there are more thinkers for or against the legitimacy of the IS. On the contrary, what is important is that for some thinkers, the performance of the IS would be in perfect harmony with their worl-

Table 1. Assessment of the Ideas of Political Thinkers Regarding the Legitimation of the IS

Political thinker	Direction of the thinker's ideas regarding the legitimization of Intelligence	Action of the IS in accordance with the ideas of the political thinker
Machiavelli	Positive	The IS would be used to protect the ruler from the goddess of chance
Hobbes	Positive	The IS would be used by the agent to protect the people from internal and external enemies (and in return they would be respected)
Locke	Positive	Must respect natural laws and pay attention to conflicts of interest regarding the right of resistance of the people
Montesquieu	Neutral	Using weights and balances among the three powers to monitor and prevent abuse by the IS
Rousseau	Neutral	Must respect the sovereignty of the people; the IS needs to pursue the common good
Burke	Neutral	The IS, as an institution, would be measured by its usefulness, act according to customs and traditions, demand obedience from society, and be gradually improved
Kant	Negative	Contrary to the existence of the IS since it threatens the eternal peace
Mill	Negative	Against illegitimate interference by the state in individual freedom
Marx	Positive	The IS could be used in favor of revolutions of the proletariat, whether to make the revolution or to defend it
Weber	Positive	The IS would be part of the structure that guarantees the monopoly of force by the state
Schmitt	Positive	The IS could be used to maintain the dictator who seeks the hegemony of people through war
Hayek	Neutral	The state must respect the principle of individual freedom

views, for others, there would be exceptions, and for others, it would be rejected. Therefore, the conclusion about legitimacy depends on which thinker the evaluation is based on, and, at the same time, it is perceived that legitimation does not depend on the regime of government, from democracy to totalitarianism, or on the form of state organization, from monarchy to parliamentary or presidential.

The most straightforward way to legitimate the IS would be to admit that the state is legitimate, after all the people accept that the state governs them. It follows

that the legitimacy of the state extends to its institutions, like the IS. However, as is the case with other issues, members of society assess the best decision to be made, or, in this case, whether an institution should exist, and base this decision on the founding ideas of the values of the group. Ultimately, the moral, social, and ethical values that prevail in a society derive from the culture, tradition, and education of this group of people. And these values, also influenced by the teachings of political thinkers, become guides, sometimes invisible, of their decisions. For example, in a society with values susceptible to Machiavelli's ideas, such as Florence, Italy, the presence of the IS would be natural. On the other hand, if there were a country that adhered to Kant's thinking, the IS would be something unnatural that would not fit into this kind of government.

Thus, in countries where the legitimacy and the existence of the IS are aligned,¹⁰ it is said that society agrees on this subject. And, in cases in which it exists and is legitimate, the performance of the IS can be more harmonious and understood by society, in addition to being more efficient. On the contrary, in societies characterized by a conflict between the legitimation and the existence of the IS,¹¹ some action is needed, either to create the IS, amend it, or disassemble it, according to the values that prevail in society (lest the efficiency of the state is impaired). Therefore, the plurality of ideas exposed in the article demonstrate how serious and complex the discussion about the legitimacy (or not) of the IS is.

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10 That is, the IS is legitimate and exists, or it is illegitimate and does not exist.

11 That is, the IS exists but is illegitimate, or does not exist but is legitimate.

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Exploring the Digital Divide: Information Technology Governance and Native Nations

Michelle Watts and Mark Colwell¹

ABSTRACT

This research note presents the results of a research project carried out over two years, in which the principal investigator and research assistant surveyed Native Nations across the United States and conducted interviews to determine information technology (IT) needs, uses, and their perceptions of what the Digital Divide means to them. Thus, this project sought factual data as well as perceptions about IT and the way its presence and absence affects the lives of the indigenous people in the United States today. The survey responses were not sufficient to provide a comprehensive data picture of IT and the indigenous in the United States. Nonetheless, the study does provide fertile ground for future research into how IT is employed among Native Nations, as well as how gaps in infrastructure are a disadvantage for many Native Nations in the United States. In this research note, the term IT Governance is applied to describe government priorities and strategy for developing IT, especially broadband Internet access. It demonstrates the need for a more comprehensive IT governance policy, as well as the need for more thorough and systematic research addressing the gaps in access for isolated communities within the United States.

Key words: Information Technology, Indigenous, Native Nations, Digital Divide, Broadband, Internet Access, Information Technology Governance

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Exploración de la brecha digital: Gobernanza de la tecnología de la información y naciones nativas

RESUMEN

Esta nota investigativa presenta los resultados de un proyecto de investigación llevado a cabo durante dos años, en el que el investigador principal y el asistente de investigación encuestaron a las naciones nativas de los Estados Unidos y realizaron entrevistas para determinar las necesidades, los usos y la percepción de lo que la brecha digital significa para ellos. Por lo tanto, este proyecto buscó datos verídicos, así como percepciones sobre la tecnología de la información y la forma en que su presencia y ausencia afecta la vida de los indígenas en los Estados Unidos hoy en día. Las respuestas de la encuesta no fueron suficientes para proporcionar una imagen de datos integrales de la tecnología de la información y los indígenas en los Estados Unidos. No obstante, el estudio proporciona un terreno fértil para futuras investigaciones sobre cómo se emplea la tecnología de la información entre las naciones nativas, así como también que las brechas en infraestructura son una desventaja para muchas naciones nativas en los Estados Unidos. En esta nota investigativa, el término “gobernanza de la tecnología de la información” se aplica para describir las prioridades del gobierno y la estrategia para desarrollar la tecnología de la información, especialmente el acceso a Internet de banda ancha. Se demuestra la necesidad de una política de gobierno de la tecnología de la información más integral, así como la necesidad de una investigación más exhaustiva y sistemática que aborde las brechas en el acceso de las comunidades aisladas dentro de los Estados Unidos.

Palabras clave: Tecnología de la información, Indígenas, Naciones nativas, División digital, Banda ancha, Acceso a Internet, Gobernanza de la tecnología de la información

探索数字鸿沟：信息技术治理和原住民族

摘要

这篇研究报告呈现了一项历时两年的研究计划所得结果，这项计划中，主要调查者和研究助理对美国原住民族进行了调查，并通过面谈确定信息技术需求、使用，以及原住民族对数字鸿沟的感知。因此，这项计划就“有关信息技术和信息技术的存在和缺失如何影响当前美国原住民生活”寻求事实数据和感知。调查结果并不足以提供有关信息技术和美国原住民的全面数据。尽管如此，本文为今后研究“信息技术如何在原住民族间得以使用，以及基础设施空缺如何成为美国原住民的不利因素”打下了坚实基础。本文将“信息技术治理”这一术语用于描述政府用于发展信息技术，尤其是宽带网络获取的优先事项和策略。本文证明，需要更加全面的信息技术治理政策，和更彻底系统的研究，以应对美国被孤立社区所面临的网络获取空缺。

关键词：信息技术，本土，原住民，数字鸿沟，宽带，网络接入，信息技术治理

Introduction

Information technology (hereafter IT), defined broadly as the devices and infrastructure that facilitate content exchange and the collection of information (Duarte 2017), has become an increasingly important part of everyday life in the United States as well as internationally. In 2011, the United Nations declared that access to the Internet is a “basic human right,” noting that the Internet allows people to “exercise their right to freedom of opinion and expression,” among other rights, and “to promote the progress of society as a whole” (Human Rights Council 2011, 1). Access to IT was an objective of the Millennium Development Goals and is part of the Sustainable Development Goals; Goal 9 focuses on “Industry Innovation and Infrastructure” and strives to narrow the digital divide (UNDP 2017). To put Internet access and use in international perspective, there were approximately 318 million people using the Internet in the Americas in 2005; in 2017, that number had more than doubled, to 662 million (International Telecommunication Union 2017). Approximately 33% of households had Internet access in 2005 in all of the Americas (including Canada, Central America, and Latin America); in 2017, the number was 65% (International Telecommunication Union 2017).

Access to high-speed Internet, deemed by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) as a download speed of 25 and 3 Mbps for uploads (2015), is not considered a luxury in the United States, but a necessity. This is evidenced by the priority given to Internet access by the U.S. government. Part of the FCC's mission, laid out in the 1996 Telecommunications Act, is to ensure that "advanced telecommunications capability" is made available to all citizens of the United States (FCC Factsheet 2016). The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act designated \$7.2 billion to a Broadband Technology Opportunity Program. Motivated by the lofty aspirations expressed by the former FCC commissioner Michael J. Copps: "Broadband can be the great enabler that restores America's economic well-being and opens doors of opportunity for all Americans to pass through no matter who they are, where they live, or the particular circumstances of their individual lives" (quoted in Gross 2009, para 4). Even with this emphasis, the deployment of broadband has actually slowed down between 2015 and 2017, and there was speculation that the FCC standards of 25/3 might be reduced in 2018. Despite this speculation, FCC chairman, Ajit Pai, released a statement in 2018 indicating that the current standard would be maintained, and reinforced the FCC commitment to more widespread access to broadband. Ajit Pai asserted that "Far too many Americans still lack access to high-speed Internet, and that's why the FCC's top priority under my leadership remains bridging the digital divide and bringing digital opportunity to all Americans" (FCC 2018, 1). Despite this commitment, the FCC attempted to implement a regulation cutting back on a subsidy to low-income people in the United States through Lifeline program, which could result in a loss of service for as many as seven million people (Barwick 2018). Many in tribal areas argued that this would impact them directly, and the Washington, DC, court of appeals put the attempt on hold in August 2018 (Fingas 2018). However, this temporary hold is unlikely to put an end to the tension between government attempts to cut funds while carrying out the mission to increase broadband access.

The United States has made progress, but it is not progressing as fast as other developed countries, perhaps due to the challenges of connecting such a wide geographical range. Moreover, it is not just access that matters, but also the quality of the connection. According to the FCC, the United States is ranked 16 out of 34 developed countries in terms of advanced communications infrastructure. The FCC benchmark of 25 Mbps for downloads and 3 Mbps for uploads was raised from just 4 Mbps for downloads and 1 Mbps for uploads in 2016. An estimated 34 million people in the United States do not have Internet access that meets this standard; while over half of all Americans in rural areas lack access that meets this standard. Of this number, a disproportionate amount reside in Indian country; 41% of tribal lands lack access that meets FCC standards, leaving approximately 68% of those living in Indian Country without access that meets U.S. standards (FCC 2016). This gap is the central concern of this article, which seeks to examine *information technology governance* in a new way, applying this concept to political rather than business governance.

This project seeks to assess IT needs among Native Nations in the United States and explore indigenous perspectives of the digital divide. It gives a broad overview of IT use and needs among Native Nations in the lower 48 states and Alaska, in addition to providing a more detailed look at the situation of Native Nations in Arizona and Alaska. The reasons for exploring these specific areas are discussed in the following section. This research note details the methods used in the project to collect data from Native Nations, and proceeds to discuss our findings, incorporating information from government reports, and ends with concluding thoughts. It applies the term *information technology governance*, commonly used in organizations, to the broader strategies and policies in the United States. IT and the indigenous is a topic that has thus far not been deeply explored. This research note, while a very small contribution, seeks to establish a foundation for future research on this topic.

Methodology

To explore IT as it relates to the indigenous in the United States, the researchers used a mixture of archival documents such as GAO reports, together with surveys and interviews. Surveys and interview questions were formulated to assess Internet access; and means of communication used, such as cell phones, landlines, and social media. They also addressed the main purposes for which respondents use the Internet; the availability of service and reliability of connectivity in the area; what improvements they would like to see to their Broadband access as well as respondents' interpretation of the meaning of the Digital Divide. The geographic areas of Arizona and Alaska were selected as examples of areas with dispersed population, significant numbers of indigenous peoples, and challenging terrain. Arizona is home to 21 Native Nations, including the Navajo nation, the "largest sovereign nation" in the lower 48 states (Taylor et al. 2012, 17). The remoteness of Alaska makes it interesting from an IT perspective. Moreover, Alaska is home to 224 of the 567 recognized tribes in the United States. Alaska and Arizona both have low population densities and high poverty rates, making them less attractive to Internet providers (Brescia and Daily 2007; GAO 2016; Tveten 2016).

The Survey Process

Surveys were emailed to all Native Nations that listed an email address using the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) data for the lower 48 states, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs Directory for leaders in Alaska, due to the absence of HUD data for Alaska. In addition, the research assistants called Native Nations that did not list an email address in order to determine a person knowledgeable about tribal IT; when a person could be identified, the survey was sent to that person. Participants were encouraged to pass a link to the survey on to

others; thus, a specific completion percentage is not possible. The survey was sent to hundreds of people that were either tribal leaders or people working in the IT field who are either indigenous or work with indigenous areas; the number of responses was low, with 31 responses, 19 of which were complete. This result, while disappointing, is not unusual for surveys directed primarily toward Native Americans (Jarding 2004; Corntassel and Witmer 2008). Surveys were supplemented by interviews, allowing for a greater depth of information.

Interviews

Thirteen interviews were conducted for this project, 12 in-person and one by phone. The majority of the interviews were conducted jointly by the principal investigator and a graduate student assistant. Field research began on the Metlakatla Indian Community, Alaska in June 2017, where the researchers were able to interview six respondents in this small community of approximately 1,200 people. Metlakatla is an interesting place for two reasons. First, it is the only indigenous reserve in Alaska. Second, a project in 2015 sought to put a more robust Internet system in place, giving the island community a foundation to enhance connectivity.

Field research by both investigators was also conducted in Window Rock, Arizona. Investigators attended the Navajo Nation Council meetings in April 2018. One researcher was able to attend a Navajo Nation IT session, while the other conducted an additional interview with the Lieutenant Governor of the Acoma Pueblo in New Mexico.

The results are not generalizable but rather seek to provide a window into the diverse IT needs of indigenous peoples in the lower 48 and Alaska, contributing direct testimony from tribal leaders and IT experts about their needs and goals. The results were geographically dispersed; responses were received from not only Arizona and Alaska but also Nevada, Utah, Montana, Michigan, South Dakota. Interviews were conducted in Alaska, Arizona, and by phone.

Findings

It is important to emphasize that our results are not generalizable. What they can do is provide insight into IT governance within Native Nations, and how indigenous individuals in the United States perceive their IT requirements. We hope these findings serve to help provide a foundation for future research. The section below discusses our findings in conjunction with data and research from other sources. It explains the obstacles Native Nations face because of unreliable access to broadband Internet access, how IT is used in some Native Nations, and perceptions of the digital divide. It also provides thoughts on the relationship between IT and culture, and finally, respondents' aspirations for the future.

According to a 2016 report by the General Accounting Office (GAO), “the lack of service in rural and tribal lands present impediments to efforts of tribal nations to build their internal structures for self-governance, economic opportunity, education, public safety and cultural preservation” (GAO 2016, 1). Our survey results reveal that 5% of respondents (in various locations) reported no Internet access, while others rely on dial up. A few respondents reported needing to travel between 30 and 45 minutes to be able access the Internet, one reported more than one hour, another more than two. Ten percent reported not knowing where a reliable Internet connection could be found. In the case of Metlakatla, Alaska’s only reservation, residents have worked hard, and had some assistance, in overcoming these obstacles.

Metlakatla is located on Annette Island, its water-bounded location making Internet technology more challenging. While the Internet access is subpar when compared to many areas in the lower 48 states, residents of Metlakatla do not find this to be an insurmountable barrier. In addition to being Alaska’s only reservation, it is an interesting case because it has been involved in projects to enhance Internet access and become a “Digital Village” (Odasz 2015). The main beneficiary of this project seems to have been the local school, which has its own satellite, and by all accounts, the best Internet connectivity on the island, with a speed of 40 Mbps (Odasz 2015). The island has an initiative underway to develop a “Digital Montessori Preschool” with Tsimshian language immersion and video conferencing with a sister language immersion school in British Columbia (Odasz 2015). The next best connection can be found at the island’s clinic. The Chief Information Officer at the clinic reported that while the clinic had fairly good access, the costs are high and there is no redundancy, so there is no back up when outages occur. The clinic has been able to use telemedicine, a time and cost-saving option for the island (personal communication June 12, 2017).

In Arizona, the Navajo Nation represents a fascinating case because of its size and organization. The Nation has proposed its own Information Technology Governance Law, laid out in a roadmap aimed at becoming “the Digital Navajo Nation” (Skow 2007, 2). Part of this plan included a Navajo Nation Architecture Plan that recognizes the need for careful planning and compatibility of systems when changes are made. A grant from the Gates foundation allowed for the installation of new computers. Unfortunately, those computers are now obsolete, and the IT staff of the Navajo Nation reports that the Digital Navajo Nation strategy failed. Nonetheless, the Navajo Nation has a Telecommunications Regulatory Commission that has been working on an in-depth assessment of digital capabilities on Navajo territory (Interview with M. Theresa Hopkins April 17, 2018). The Navajo Nation is also working with the FCC to “close the digital divide,” which it defines as the divide “between those with access to modern information and communication technologies and those without” (The Navajo

Nation 2017, para 1). Of central concern is the reliable coverage and the ability to accurately assess coverage throughout the large, geographically diverse Navajo territory—the Navajo Nation encompasses over 27,000 square miles, or roughly the same size as West Virginia. The challenging terrain makes it difficult to have sufficient interconnectivity between cell towers. Delegates for the Navajo Nation have discovered how complex the communications system is (Interview with Delegate Kee Allen Begay November 16, 2017).

Reliable coverage is very important to the Navajo Nation in order for FirstNet, a public safety system created by Congress in 2012, to be used effectively. The Navajo Nation has long advocated that Arizona opt in to this system; Arizona and New Mexico both did in August 2017 (Office of the Speaker 2017). While progress has been made, large areas of the Navajo Nation still lack access. For example, according to Delegate Begay, one chapter house in a community he represents lacks even a landline, while another has a landline but no cellular service (2017). The President of the Navajo Nation, Russell Begaye, notes that the Nation is still “on the wrong side of the digital divide” (Native News 2017, para. 2). Current efforts to increase coverage are hampered by a lack of technical expertise and trained personnel to implement Internet infrastructure, as well as the bidding process for services and federal funds that gives an advantage to areas where it is easier and cheaper to provide coverage (Native News 2017).

How IT Is Used

The survey respondents indicated that Internet is used heavily for communicating with other tribal members (90%), with government officials (90%), and with Native Nations both domestically (95%) and internationally (15%). It is also used to apply for funds and mobilize support for issues affecting Native Nations (45%) and apply for grants. Furthermore, respondents reported using it to conduct research (75%) and other educational pursuits (45%), such as doing homework. One respondent noted that it is used in language revitalization. While some respondents expressed skepticism about the ability to learn culture of language through electronic means, the use of such platforms seems to be growing, as evidenced by the existence of a program for the Navajo language in Rosetta Stone, references by interviewees to developing language apps, and the aforementioned example of Tshimian language (Parkhurst et al. 2015). Several respondents (20%) reported using it to seek medical advice. The results demonstrate a diverse use of IT that has become important in almost all aspects of life, and is indispensable for individual and inter-tribal communication, education, as well as political and economic pursuits.

IT has become an important means to contact and consult with government officials, as well as serve as a platform for debate. One interviewee noted that social media has been both constructive and destructive in debating political issues, noting that tensions can escalate in ways that are different than

face-to-face communication. Another interviewee recounted how the tribal government was forced to adopt policies about the use of social media during work hours and cyberbullying due to issues in their community. The Navajo Nation has explicitly embraced the use of IT and governance, partly due to its vast span of territory. Facilitating information sharing through technology can result in saving considerable resources currently spent on travel in both time and money. In 1992, the Navajo Nation passed a law to expedite the flow of information using IT in governance, forming conduits between Navajo government entities through an “Integrated Criminal Justice System” (Skow 2007, 8). The Nation’s 2007 report observed that “E-government is driving changes in Navajo Nation wide operations forward by providing access to government information and services. The Internet allows citizens to interact directly with government; bypassing frustrating bureaucracy, much red tape and many delays” (Skow 2007, 8). Further, the Navajo Nation advances the idea of prioritizing IT: “Our leaders should treat IT as a resource just like oil, timber, and coal. IT should be included as a necessary infrastructure in community and economic planning” (Skow 2007, 8). It could be said the U.S. policy of implementing increasingly higher standards for broadband recognizes that the Internet is indeed a basic resource, at least in terms of U.S. Internet governance. Not all agree on the importance of IT or the nature of what is called a digital divide, as will be examined below.

The Digital Divide: Definitions and Perceptions

While definitions of the “digital divide” vary in the literature, as discussed in Appendix A, our research found a wide range of thought when asking survey and interview respondents for their perspectives. Their answers ranged from the more commonly heard notions to nuanced interpretations, and some who professed that they had not heard the term or did not know what it means. This article takes the position that there is no “correct” answer to what the digital divide is, but rather that the layers of meaning attributed to the term reveal attitudes toward IT based on the experiences of those interviewed. As IT grows as a field of academic study, users help to give terms such as digital divide and IT governance meaning.

The digital divide is perceived by some in economic terms. One respondent noted that overages, which are charges for exceeding data threshold, create a divide—in other words, even among people with access, their ability to take full advantage of the Internet is limited because data charges prohibit full usage (Anonymous Interview 2017). While this certainly applies to leisure activities like gaming, respondents also gave examples of online education, which can have a direct impact on improving one’s future career opportunities and salaries. The costs of education rise because of the increased need to download materials from the Internet. Anthony Peterman and M. Theresa Hopkins, IT specialists for the Navajo Nation, explained that many people cannot afford Internet and thus must seek

alternative locations to access the Internet, such as McDonald's, the workplaces of friends and relatives, and public libraries. Lieutenant Governor Concho of the Acoma Pueblo, told of how one can often see people parked outside the public library to use Wi-Fi after the library is closed (Interview April 18, 2018). He explained the community's goal to emplace a more robust Broadband system that would help facilitate additional educational opportunities as well as a connection to domestic and international markets to sell crafts.

One survey respondent identified the gap as simply the split between the haves and have nots, explaining in thoughtful detail:

On one side are the Haves: There are some people here who have the technological prowess to find signals and harness or boost them for personal use. There are a few others who have Internet access at their place of work; they and their families enjoy the luxury of that access. On the other side of the divide are all the others; they merely have cell phones which may or may not get enough signal for a data stream. They are the ones who don't even check (or have) email. (Anonymous survey respondent 2017)

Another respondent explained the multiple levels of a digital divide (Anonymous survey respondent 2017). First, it can be seen as the gap between expectations and the actual capabilities available. Second, the people are divided by their ability to use the available technology, which is influenced to some extent by age and exposure to IT. People who grew up with technology in school are more likely to be comfortable with it and be able to use it as an adult. Finally, the versatility of technology means that there are endless possibilities for use, which presents both opportunities and challenges in disseminating information and providing training. Looking at the divide from a different angle, one answer referred to old versus new technology: "Some people are still stuck in Fax, snail mail, landline stages, compared to digital status with all the new tech stuff" (Anonymous survey respondent 2017). This comment may encompass several issues, including gaps in infrastructure, the price of technology, and the ability of people to take advantage of it.

Several interview respondents also expressed the idea that the divide does not refer to the absence of Internet but rather to discrepancies in its quality. One mentioned that it is the "line that separates good connectivity from poor to no connectivity" (Anonymous Interview 2018). In an interview in April 2018 in Window Rock, Mr. Peterman noted that the divide is the quality of service, the ability to have high-speed service and redundancy. Delegate Amber Kanazbah Crotty of the Navajo Nation Council explained that a lack of reliable broadband means that she has few options to meet virtually; she spends many hours on the road to visit her dispersed constituents.

Some responses spoke of the increasing reliance of society on digital information. A respondent asserted that the divide is the “lack of access to a[n] increasingly critical communication pools and information.” Another commented that those without adequate connectivity cannot do what they need to do (Anonymous Interview 2018). Lieutenant Governor Concho noted that in today’s economy, state-of-the-art technology is used for business, putting those without it at a disadvantage. In his community, there is the potential to sell ceramics globally, but they cannot without high-speed Internet (Interview April 18, 2018).

Other comments spoke to the negative aspects of IT. One person identified the digital divide as “communication with devices versus communication verbally” which may speak to the impersonal nature of IT and how it can present an obstacle to personal communications (Anonymous survey respondent 2017). Three respondents identified the divide as a generational gap. One pointed out that increased access is not necessarily an advantage: “[the] younger generation is more fluent and dependent on mobile devices and social media; [it] loses some element of human communication” (Anonymous survey respondent 2017). Others considered their geographic space; one referred to the size of their community, describing the digital divide as the “difference between our digital service and what larger communities are getting” (Anonymous survey respondent 2017). Similarly, another respondent defined it as the “lack of accessibility and local of broadband to meet out population needs” (Anonymous survey respondent 2017). These comments are indicative of the isolation that many community members feel as well as the sense that urban areas are better served than rural areas.

Culture

Survey respondents had mixed opinions about how IT has affected tribal culture, with 40% of respondents choosing the answer “It has both enhanced and diminished tribal culture in different ways.” Respondents noted that an over-reliance on texting reduces face-to-face communication. One interviewee asserted that language and culture cannot be taught online. Moreover, some felt that communicating through IT degrades social skills, describing it as a “blessing and a curse” (Anonymous Interview 2017). Nonetheless, others noted that dissemination of information about the tribe online is a boon for learning about “tribal events, protocols, and history” (Anonymous survey respondent 2017) and that it has increased knowledge among members and nonmembers.

Interview respondents from several Native Nations gave examples of how IT is being used to help revitalize culture in several different ways. First, some are digitizing their historical documents (Interview with Lieutenant Governor Concho April 18, 2018). Second, many are using technology to conduct language classes virtually, compile electronic dictionaries, and to create language apps to encourage learning and practicing Native languages (interviews with President Peterson February 23rd 2018; Lt. Gov Concho April 18th, 2018).

Most respondents did not feel that IT infringed on sacred sites, though some, 15%, were concerned about its impact on tribal lands. Concerns included the pile up of old equipment that cannot be easily re-used and cell phone towers in wilderness areas. One respondent pointed out that proposed towers will disrupt pristine areas and views, while the services offered will be more expensive than other locales and marketed to a community with a high poverty index. Many respondents felt that there was not adequate consultation with Native Nations about changes in IT infrastructure and the needs of the tribe. An example where consultation was lacking can be found with the “Twilight Towers” (Begaye 2017), which refers to some 4,000 towers erected between 2001 and 2005 without tribal consultation, required by Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA); the location of many of these towers is still unknown (Interview with Delegate Kee Allen Begay November 16, 2017).

Aspirations for the Future

Study participants identified many aspirations for improvements in access to IT; central among them were education in IT and infrastructure. The majority of our respondents identified a lack of training as a barrier to using the Internet and the services available online. These findings are not surprising, but our research also identified less obvious areas where improvements could be made in quality of life such as improved communication with emergency services.

Improved Internet technology infrastructure is needed in areas where indigenous live; the need is especially acute in rural and geographically dispersed areas. Interviewees expressed a desire for enhanced infrastructure, including fiberoptic cable and server farms. A Navajo Nation leader commented on the importance of not just constructing cell towers, but ensuring the interconnection of communication technology infrastructure and the maintenance of equipment. Moreover, respondents pointed to the need for competition among Internet providers on tribal lands in order to lower pricing. One survey respondent, noting that “Knowledge is power” identified several ways that better Internet access could improve the quality of life, such as being able to buy organic food online and take online courses, as well as the ability to research health issues and travel options. Another identified better Internet as a way to enhance tribal communication; as the tribe is increasingly able to disseminate information online, its members need Internet access in order to benefit from this information.

Conclusions

Our study highlights the challenges of IT on tribal lands as well as the opportunities. Themes that emerged are the costs of the Internet in remote areas, a lack of adequate infrastructure, a gap in capacity, differing percep-

tions of the digital divide, as well as the need for Native Nations to strengthen or develop their own information governance strategy as part of the government to government relationships Native Nations have with the federal government. This section recaps these themes and offers thoughts on future research.

There is broad consensus that remote lands and difficult terrain make it harder to obtain the infrastructure needed, and more costly for both the Internet provider and consumer. These difficulties translate into prohibitive costs for broadband Internet access which means that it cannot be fully leveraged by those who may need it most, such as those in remote areas that require long drives, boat rides, or are only accessible by plane. For those living in these areas with low incomes, this lack of access leads to much higher opportunity costs compared to the “connected” population. Those in areas with limited connectivity experience a significant difference in quality of life as they have less access not only to professional and educational opportunities, but also to emergency and medical services. IT is useful in enhancing security through emergency response systems in areas where reliable connectivity exists; where it does not exist, residents are at a significant disadvantage when seeking emergency assistance. Moreover, IT has proven to be important in the preservation and revitalization of culture. It is used in schools to connect with and learn from other schools—bonds are formed through the use of technology that then extend beyond the limits of cyberspace with in-person cultural gatherings. It is currently being used in a language revitalization project in Alaska that is open to all ages, not just to those of traditional school age. Those who are not physically present can connect through Google hangouts and can see new resources daily on Instagram (Laughlin 2017). Despite limitless possibilities, the reality is that millions of people on reservations and in remote rural areas have no broadband Internet access.

While definitions of “digital divide” abound in the literature, this study was interested in learning about the nonacademic perspectives, from those who are members of indigenous groups or work in IT on tribal lands, in addition to surveying the literature for the meaning of this term. There is no consensus on what a digital divide is; nonetheless, the topic opened up a path for communicating what people see is lacking in their online environment, whether it be access, training, or the skills to leverage the overwhelming amount of resources online. A recurring theme is not just the gap between the haves and have nots of Information Communications Technology, but also a knowledge gap. While this gap is often assumed to be between old and young (Hargittai 2010), in reality the biggest gap appears to be one of education and training that does not necessarily correspond to age. Those who feel they lack full access to the Internet often feel marginalized, left at the fringes of a society that increasingly assumes Internet access.

Given the importance of the Internet in society today, extensive research is warranted in several areas. In-depth research is needed on access to the

Internet, as well as the way disparate access affects individuals and groups. This type of research may be best conducted by agencies like the GAO in conjunction with the Navajo Nation, following the example of the studies conducted by the Navajo Nation in recent years. A thorough study requires considerable time, human resources, and financing to evaluate needs and propose viable solutions. Research by scholars could focus on how improvements in Internet access affect communities in terms of economic development and educational opportunities. In the realm of policy, scholars should examine how IT Governance, such as the FCC efforts to enhance Broadband access as well specific policies such as lifting net neutrality affects isolated and underserved areas of the United States. This topic is particularly relevant now, as the FCC is actively discouraging municipalities from seeking their own solutions to gaps in Internet coverage, seeking to block local authorities from being involved in the provision of Internet services in order to allow private companies to carry out that function (Kaufman 2018). Moreover, future research could focus on the impact of net neutrality and how the lifting of net neutrality affects the performance and price of broadband access in rural and other underserved areas.

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APPENDIX A

A LOOK AT THE LITERATURE

IT Governance

The term “Information Technology Governance” (IT Governance) is generally used in business settings and lays out the responsibility for setting and implementing policy (Van Grembergen and De Haes 2008). Van Grembergen and De Haes (2008) give three definitions of IT governance. First, it is “the responsibility of executives an[d] the board of directors, and consists of the leadership, organizational structures and processes that ensure that the enterprise’s IT sustains and extends the organizations’ strategy and objectives (ITGI, 2005).” Second, “specifying the decision rights and accountability framework to encourage desirable behavior in the use of IT”; and third, the “organizational capacity exercised by the board, executive management and IT management to control the formulation and implementation of IT strategy and in this way ensure the fusion of business and IT” (Van Grembergen and De Haes 2008, 11). Broadly speaking, IT governance is meant to ensure the best use of IT to fulfill an organization’s goals (Gartner IT Glossary 2017). This author adapts this concept such that information governance refers to the way a government, at whatever level, implements and executes IT to benefit its constituents.

The literature on IT is dispersed over different subject areas, with very few focusing on the indigenous and IT. This brief review seeks to highlight an array of articles that are relevant to the current study, looking at information governance, cultural considerations, geospatial information systems, obstacles to access, and the digital divide. While it does not focus on indigenous perspectives, Mayer-Schönberger and Lazer (2007)’s work has implications for the relationship between the indigenous and government on all levels. They explain the role of IT in governance, focusing on the United States, Singapore, and Switzerland, examining “the implications of different information flows for efficiency, political mobilization, and democratic accountability” (2007 n.p.). The authors in Mayer-Schönberger and Lazer’s volume present different views of the concept of “electronic government,” also referred to as e-government. One definition of electronic government concerns public services that are facilitated through IT; at its highest stage, electronic government would allow for 24 hour services to citizens on demand. Some existing examples of e-government are the ability to set up companies online or obtain work permits. Another view of electronic government is more concerned with efficiency within a government, from a public management perspective. Still others view the potential of electronic government for increasing citizen involvement in government, such as providing input into policies. The editors propose that “information government” (2007, 5) is way of looking at how the incorporation of technology affects the relationship

between citizen and government. The relevance of this concept is reinforced in a 2017 UNDP Human Development report, which discusses how IT is affecting civil society. For example, online voting has been found to increase participation in Brazil. In Estonia, residents can even assist in formulating law online. Other governments use IT as a way to collect feedback from citizens and several countries accept online petitions, including the United States. These mechanisms have the potential to strengthen civil society and increase trust (UNDP 2017), although the opposite effects must also be considered if abuse of IT occurs.

In an edited volume, Dyson, Hendriks, and Grant (2007) compiled an assortment of case studies on indigenous groups in Australia, New Zealand, Africa, and South America that address diverse issues such as the use of geographic information system and cultural assimilation. Some of the authors address technology in very remote areas, such as the Amazon, and question the appropriateness of IT for indigenous cultures. Others evaluate how IT has not only been adapted to indigenous cultures, but used to promote preservation of culture and the dissemination of cultural knowledge, such as through the teaching of indigenous languages online, both live and using apps. *Tribal GIS: Supporting Native American Decision Making* (2012) provides an overview of the experiences of Native Nations using geo-spatial information (GIS) technology from the perspective of the tribal leaders in the United States, demonstrating how it has been used for cultural, political, security, and economic ends. For example, the Navajo Nation employs GIS to attain a more accurate road inventory of their roads—the Road Information Field Data System (RIFDS). Using this system, the number roads mapped on the Navajo reservation increased from the 9,800 miles reported in 2006 to almost 18,000 miles; of this, 8,000 miles were identified as tribal and thus eligible for special funding (Taylor et al. 2012). This is an important contribution in that it shows the diverse ways IT is used, including for cultural preservation. For instance, the Seminole Indians of Florida use GIS to identify and protect archaeological sites (Taylor et al. 2012).

Continuity and change are inherent to technology (Martin 2003). The way technology evolves is shaped by culture and society; technology also leads to social change (Martin 2003). Martin cites Breslan's (1998) concept of "social technology" in the transformation of indigenous societies. The social impact of technology is a fundamental aspect of how it is used as a tool for both governance and social protest. Vaughan (2011) studies the sustainability of IT of Native Nations in two remote areas of Australia, asserting that communities themselves must define the capabilities they want in order for IT for development (ICT4D) to be successful. She describes a change in the way IT needs are defined:

This move away from normative definitions of capabilities or capability types to a definition that reflects the Indigenous culture, history, circumstances, and well-being aspirations for each community is

intended to give a voice to the people and at the same time provide a deeper informational base—through narrative—for policy and program design than has previously been available. (Vaughn 2011, 131)

Vaughn notes that a “socially inclusive” (2011, 131) approach has the potential to integrate more communities that have been left behind. A 2017 report by the UNDP concurs that the Internet has the potential to bring more people into the fold of political participation, but that “potential will only be reached if universal Internet access, freedom of expression and information are ensured, and if digital participation mechanisms are institutionalized by governments at the local, national and international levels” (Cazabat 2017, para. 10). Such mechanisms are still very much in development throughout the world, but authors agree that education is a fundamental and on-going step for people to effectively use IT.

Brescia and Daily (2007) discuss the need for training and education in IT on one particular reservation. They do not name the reservation, but given the dearth of IT on tribal lands, it is reasonable to extrapolate the need for such education to reservations in remote areas in the United States and internationally, especially those in hard to access locations. Mancini et al. (2013) and Mancini and O’Reilly (2013) discuss how technology can be used in preventing conflict, while acknowledging the limitations of technology in actually forestalling conflict. Musila (2013) discusses Kenya’s progressive use of IT for security. The Kenyan government established a National Conflict Early Warning and Early Response System, employing Geospatial Intelligence and crowdsourcing. The public reports threats both through texts and social media and GIS mapping is used to send security personnel if needed (Musila 2013). The system, while innovative, is limited by several factors included biased or inaccurate reporting, lack of sufficient staff to respond to messages, and adequate training to use the system. Significantly, many authors in this edited volume point to the issue of trust as a limitation in reporting instances—both trust between communities and trust between authorities and civilians (Mancini et al. 2013). A similar dynamic of fear is certainly in other countries, as demonstrated by surveys conducted in Canada in 2016 (Hamilton 2016).

Government agencies such as the FCC and the GAO provide baseline data about the extent of IT available to Native Americans and Alaska Natives. NCAI (n.d.) contributes policy papers on infrastructure, IT, and Native Americans. The GAO carried out a study of high-speed Internet, published in 2016, consulting with 21 Native Nations and 6 Internet service providers to assess access to high-speed Internet. Researchers found that the cost of connecting to “middle-mile infrastructure” (2016 summary) or Internet hubs, inhibited greater connectivity as well as a lack of tribal member technical expertise. Donnellan (2017) makes the point that while Internet prices are likely higher on reservations, especially in rural areas, currently there is no reliable tracking of such prices.

Brescia and Daily (2007) note that while the Telecommunications Act of 1996 may help to accelerate access to IT and that most households in the United States had telephones in the 1960s, there are some reservations which still lack this seemingly fundamental element of communications. Isolation, a lack of infrastructure, and a lack of educational and economic opportunities make the adoption of technology more challenging. Based on an intensive study, Brescia and Daily (2007) used the Delphi approach, which employs questionnaires and follow-ups, to conduct an intensive study of an unnamed reservation. The authors conclude that there is a need for IT education and training on reservations (Brescia and Daily 2007). Parkhurst et al. (2015) examine the discrepancies between the Internet access and Internet use by Native Americans and Alaska Natives. They point to concepts of digital inclusion and digital citizenship; digital inclusion means the capacity of people to use the Internet, through training and technology. Digital citizenship, as Mossberger, Tolbert, and McNeal is not just “the ability to participate in society online” but “represent[s] capacity, belonging, and the potential for political and economic engagement in society in the information age” (Mossberger, Tolbert, and McNeal 2008, 1–2). Thus, citizens need to have effective access to the Internet in order to participate in an increasingly digitized civil society.

The Digital Divide

The concept of a “digital divide” is defined in many different ways. Definitions include those that encompass an international digital divide, as well as within-state divides, driven by economic and social factors. A 2016 Policy Studies Organization (PSO) panel provides a useful discussion of the meaning of a digital divide as well as its implications:

Differences in information and communications technologies (ICT) access and usage within social systems and among nation-states. The knowledge divide specifies the differences in the access and use of related knowledge in global, national and regional contexts. Like other forms of power, access to education, skills, and ICT capabilities and opportunities are variably distributed throughout political, social and cultural system, with important consequences not just for the wellbeing of individuals and groups, but also for the stability and prosperity of nation-states (International Policy Studies Organization Panel: “Stem and Diplomacy: Bridging the Digital and Knowledge Divides” 2016)

This description acknowledges the far ranging implications of the digital divide, which extends from the individual to the national and international levels.

Compaine (2001) downplays the divide, which he defines as “the perceived gap between those who have access to the latest information technologies and those who do not” (2001, xi). He presents a compilation of essays demonstrating the irrelevance of the digital divide, arguing that as the cost of technology falls and ease of use increases, it becomes universally accessible. In the preface, Lloyd Morrisett asserts that the real divide is between those who are skilled at reading and those who are not, asserting that “Rather than being a ‘digital divide,’ the Internet can be a road to information freedom” (2001, x). While many researchers (Hargittai 2010; Mossberger, Tolbert, and McNeal 2008; Brescia and Daily 2007; Donnellan 2017) find that the gap is real and significant, Compaine and company make an important point that those inequalities and imbalances that exist outside of IT often carry over into the realm of IT as well.

Hargittai supports the notion that inequalities will persist, challenging the belief in IT as an equalizer, “that once people go online issues of inequality are no longer a concern” (Hargittai 2010, 93). Her study of college undergraduates demonstrates that even among the relatively privileged (those attending college) significant differences exist in students’ ability to leverage IT to their advantage. Hargittai’s study of college students, while limited in scope, found differences in mastering and using the Internet in ways that provided potential benefits in the long-term versus recreational use, finding that privilege transfers to the realm of IT. Mossberger, Tolbert, and McNeal explain that “the term digital divide has been used to describe systematic disparities in access to computer and the Internet, affecting American who are low income, less educated, older, African American and Latino” (2008, 8); they discuss how segregation contributes to the divide and exacerbate inequalities. Interestingly, Native Nations are not mentioned in their edited volume “Digital Citizenship: The Internet, Society and Participation.”

The digital divide undoubtedly has implications at the international level. The United Nations Human Rights Council and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) express a concern for developing countries of the world, although their comments could also apply to developed countries. In discussing the use of technology and governance, the UNDP asserts that “without universal access, digital participation tools may increase inequalities rather than reduce them, over-representing existing elites in on-line democratic processes” (Cazabat 2017, para. 7). The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) points to capacity as a key element of the ability to take advantage of existing IT. The OECD defines digital divide as the gap in access between the ICT haves and have-nots; these gaps can be present at many different levels, including individual, group, or state level. The OECD asserts that “Education and learning lie at the heart of these issues and their solutions. The gaps that define the ‘learning digital divide’ are thus as important as the more obvious gaps in access to the technology itself” (OECD 2017, para 1). Thus, the issues of a digital divide go

far beyond simply having advanced technology or not. For many, the divide is created by a lack of access to training and education that is not remedied by simply providing access to the technology. The United Nations Human Rights Council adds that the term “digital divide” refers to “the gap between people with effective access to digital and information technologies, in particular the Internet, and those with very limited or no access at all” (2011, 17). They note that this division is not just between countries, but within countries, as access is limited by income and divides “exists along wealth, gender, geographical and social lines within States” (2011, 17).

Brescia and Daily describe the digital divide as the gap between the “information rich” and the “information poor” (2007, 23). In keeping with Hargittai’s (2010) findings, they assert that “within the context of American culture, this divide holds a specific relevance, as it also revolves around issues of race and its inherent interrelations to social class in our economy” (2007, 23). They, along with Hargittai (2010), discuss the gap that social class and economic divisions carry from society to IT. Donnellan (2017) expresses the stark situation for Native Americans; she notes that the digital divide “reflects the socioeconomic situation of users and nonusers, or the ‘information rich’ versus the ‘information poor’” (2017, 347). For those with limited or no access, their ability to use legal processes and public services is decreasing as forms and information related to these services have moved online. Bissell describes the situation as a “digital divide dilemma” (2004, 129).

APPENDIX B

RECOMMENDATIONS

Solutions for bridging this divide must include consultation, enhanced technology, and training. Duarte (2017) finds that a community needs assessment is a necessary first step, followed by a pilot project. Donnellan (2017) suggests that rural areas can gain more economical access through the use of ultra-wideband (UWB) technology; this technology uses the same space as radio, making it easier to establish than other methods. Currently, the FCC limits the use of UWB technology (Donnellan 2017); such limits would have to be modified to make this an effective proposal. However, issues surrounding UWB are complex; many objections to broader use of UWB persist due to concerns that it could interfere with communication systems already in place² (Duarte 2017). Another option is working with the private sector to obtain new, infrastructure-free systems, such as Internet balloons. SpaceX is currently endeavoring to provide increased access through Internet satellites. However, as Rogers notes:

In areas where broadband access is limited or nonexistent, this could provide a new option for getting online. But at the end of the day, no technology can top fiber to the premises internet. While ambitious projects to build constellations of small satellites to cover the globe in high-speed connection will certainly help close the digital divide, we can't lean on these as an excuse to stop investing in long-lasting, gold-standard infrastructure. (Rogers 2018, para. 6)

In other words, even if these ambitious programs are fully executed eventually, they might not provide the answer to the problems posed by the digital divide.

To take advantage of new and existing technologies, education and training are essential. Brescia and Daily (2007) suggest that tribal leaders take the initiative in establishing and facilitating training on tribal lands. Training should be centered in tribal colleges and universities (TCUS)—these serve as information centers for community internet access and IT training. They also stress the importance of tribal leaders encouraging IT education and providing it through tribal universities to lower the obstacles and provide a sense of community for Native American students (Brescia and Daily 2007). Indigenous groups, as demonstrated by the Navajo Nation and other Native Nations who have embraced IT, play a key role in defining their own IT Governance. While the U.S. federal government should

² UWB uses a significant amount of bandwidth, thus raising concerns about interference with other communications. They are allowed between 3.1 and 10.6 GHz, -41dBm/MHz power (Website Radio-electronics n.d.).

provide resources to facilitate the provision and upgrading of service on tribal lands, it must ensure that those efforts are in partnership with the Native Nations. Working together is the only way for the Native Nations to fulfill their own IT governance goals in a way that benefits the indigenous groups and ensures that their lands and culture are treated with respect.

IT governance inevitably brings up questions of equality and justice. As Hargittai asserts “... the more privileged stand to benefit from it more than those in less advantageous positions, raising concerns about possibly increased rather than decreased inequality resulting from the spread of Internet use across the population” (2010, 110). Arbitrarily cutting programs such as Lifeline, which serve those with low incomes will inevitably worsen the gap in areas that already have poor access. Moreover, as government services are moved online, those without broadband Internet access become disproportionately disadvantaged. Donnellan avows that “Without the internet, there is no way to have equitable access to services and justice” (2017, 348). Thus, IT Governance that aims to keep the U.S. competitive with other nations needs to be institutionalized at all levels of government. It must focus not just on the issue of infrastructure and speed, but also the training and education needed to use IT to one’s advantage. It should facilitate the individual seeking employment or education, businesses seeking to expand their reach, educational institutions seeking to enrich their learning environments, or governments seeking early warning signs of conflict in a community. IT governance should seek to narrow the digital divide in its many forms; the gap will never close, but good governance can extend the opportunities IT offers while minimizing the drawbacks. Moreover, gaps must be defined in cooperation with the indigenous tribes themselves. Tribal needs may or may not match FCC stipulations; the best fit can only be determined by dialogue and an inclusive IT Governance policy, based on not just consent but true partnership.

Considering Context as a Factor in HUMINT Collection and Analysis: A Voice from the Field

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Introduction

Consideration of the role context plays in human communication has relevance for HUMINT in both collection and analysis. Variables having to do with context frame our behaviors, the understanding of our behaviors, and future intentions with regard to our behaviors. The analysis presented in this report focuses on the U.S.–China dynamics, but it highlights phenomena that exist with any cross-cultural context involving two or more countries.

I am presently engaged in fieldwork, in relation to my Fulbright Scholar project in Myanmar, and the role of context has again shown itself to be key with my understanding of situational variables here. This report will primarily address my HUMINT experience in China but will close with a focus on my work in Myanmar as an additional illustration. Again, the awareness of context has relevance in any cross-cultural context.

Considering Context in a HUMINT Encounter

Late one evening in the summer of 2000, I was standing in my room at the Jianguo Hotel in Beijing, China when the phone rang. I answered and a warm voice conveyed, “Sir, would you like your evening massage service?” I was startled by the question and paused. She followed up by saying “It is complimentary for our valued guests.” I was still startled. I had been to Beijing numerous times and this had never happened. I guessed it to be a prostitute and, in a mildly disdainful voice, responded “No, I will not be needing the massage service tonight or any night. Please remove my name from your call list,” and hung up abruptly.

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I was in Beijing, in my role as an Assistant Air Force Attaché at the U.S. Embassy, to assist with Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Cohen's visit to China. Secretary Cohen had departed Beijing and I had been at a "wheels up" social gathering at Colonel Kevin Lanzit's apartment earlier that evening. He was my supervisor and hosted a dinner and drinks event to celebrate our performance of duties in support of the SECDEF visit. The beer flowed freely. The Jianguo Hotel was located across Changan Boulevard from his apartment, so I drank an extra beer knowing it was a short walk to my room.

Upon return to the Jianguo Hotel, which was only a few blocks from the U.S. Embassy, I showered and was preparing for bed when my phone call from the "massage service" rang in. I had just stepped out of the shower and was looking for my towel. It occurred to me that I might have been targeted for such a call by the Chinese HUMINT (human source collection) agency, but I could not know for sure. I assumed Colonel Lanzit's apartment was bugged with listening devices and that my evening of alcohol consumption was duly noted. I also observed that the room I occupied appeared to be the same room where I had stayed on an earlier visit or at least in the same area of the building on the same floor. It seemed easy to speculate about the aforementioned, but it was too vague of an occurrence to come to any firm conclusion regarding intent.

I sat down at my desk and flossed my teeth. My eyes drifted to some materials on my desk and the nightstand that were provided by the hotel. One free standing card, which appeared to be commercially produced, conveyed a message about the massage service that is offered by the hotel. That was about my 12th visit to China and I had never experienced such a thing. It struck me as odd. I went to bed, slept soundly, and did not think much more about it.

The next morning I went down to the restaurant for a lengthy breakfast and did some reading while I was eating. I thought about the massage offer incident and decided to report it at the embassy. When I returned to my room, I reached for the aforementioned massage offer card, so I could take it to work as part of the reporting process, and it was gone. I could not find it anywhere.

About five years earlier, while doing a duty tour as an Air Force Attaché in Washington, DC, I had met Nicholas Eftimiades. He worked for the Defense Intelligence Agency as an expert on China intelligence practices and had authored a book titled *Chinese Intelligence Operations*. I had taken a look at his book and remembered it addressed the aforementioned type of scenario. I did a closer read of his book and observed his specific mention of the Jianguo Hotel as a location that has surveillance equipment installed to snoop on inhabitants (Eftimiades 1994, 45). It also specifically lists the Jianguo Hotel as a location that houses intelligence facilities and runs intelligence operations (Eftimiades 1994, 2).

I concluded that it was a pretty safe bet that I had been targeted by the Chinese intelligence apparatus. Living and working in China as a U.S. government

employee put me in other types of related situations that seemed to indicate paralleled conclusions, but such phenomena were difficult to prove for sure in that the evidence was sketchy at best.

A Theoretical Framework for Understanding the Role of Context in Cross-Cultural Interactions

An exchange of meaning in China, that involves an American, poses unique challenges for both the U.S. and Chinese perspectives. It requires not only understanding the particular phenomenon being addressed but also the cultural context within which the topic exists. In *Chinese Perspectives in Rhetoric and Communication*, Ray Heisey (2000, xix) stresses how the interaction of Eastern and Western communication perspectives should emphasize an understanding of the cultures within which these communicative practices exist. Such a stress can initially consider the relevance of language.

Devito (2016, 148) states that language is “a social institution designed, modified, and extended (some purists might even say distorted) to meet the ever changing needs of the culture or subculture.” The element of context is important in this understanding. “As we grow up in the world, our experience is formed by the language in which it is presented and talked about, and this language becomes so much a part of the mind as to seem a part of nature” (White 1984, 276). Ochs emphasizes this degree of context more strongly in saying that “language is the major vehicle for accomplishing communication, language functions both *in* context and *as* context, simultaneously constructing and being constructed by the social occasion” (1979, 206).

Chinese people, and the Chinese language that reflects the culture, are less likely to communicate ideas in a direct manner in comparison to people in the United States. “Within Chinese conversational style is a tendency to respond in terms of expectations, goals, even models rather than mundane facts” (Murray 1983, 13). The important role of context cannot be overstated when the aforementioned is paralleled with the system of government in China. “China’s governance involves both the overt system of public institutions with whose members we interact rather easily and the more shadowy system of political and security organs whose work is not open ...” (Murray 1983, 10). This process is defined as high-context communication.

Hall (1984) states that high-context cultures must provide a context and setting and let the point evolve. Low-context cultures are much more direct and to the point. Andersen (1987, 23) explains that “languages are some of the most explicit communication systems but the Chinese language is an implicit high context system.” He goes on to explain that “explicit forms of communication such as verbal codes are more prevalent in low context cultures such as the United States and Northern Europe” (24).

So, in consideration of the aforementioned, it should be clear that the Chinese tend to operate using a high-context perspective for conveying and receiving meaning. Conversely, it should be clear that Americans tend to operate using a low-context perspective for conveying and receiving meaning. As such, a foundation exists for significant confusion and conflict, not just for advancing differing objectives, but for even achieving a common understanding of what the issues are.

The reader should observe I indicated that the Chinese and Americans “tend” to operate in such ways. It should be understood that there are exceptions. That is, this is not a pure science. There are some Americans who lean toward high-context approaches and there are some Chinese who lean toward low-context approaches. The point is that, for the most part, the Chinese (and the Chinese government) will practice high-context approaches and Americans (and the U.S. government) will practice low-context approaches.

Understanding Context as a Variable between U.S. and Chinese HUMINT Operations

U.S. and Chinese HUMINT operations have significant differences, and these differences are reflective of the contextual themes that are stressed in each culture. That is, China is a high-context culture that focuses more on nuance and indirect meanings and the United States is a low-context culture that focuses more on direct and explicitly stated meanings. Thus, Chinese HUMINT operations are less direct and rely heavily on generalized contextual meanings and U.S. HUMINT operations are far more explicit and goal directed. Ultimately, what HUMINT is understood to be differs in each culture and what it means to be human is ultimately called into question.

Students of the intelligence community will see frequent reference to an illustration that exemplifies a primary unique aspect of Chinese intelligence operations in contrast with other countries such as the United States and Russia. It focuses on intelligence gathering in relation to a sandy beach. According to this explanation, Russian forces would arrive in the dead of night via a submarine loaded with a small highly armed contingent of Special Forces soldiers who would make their way ashore, promptly fill five buckets with sand from the beach and retreat into the darkness from whence they came.

The United States would send a Navy Seal unit in, commensurate with the aforementioned Russian approach, and the extraction would be accomplished. The backup would be accomplished via a Marine commando team landing from the air via helicopters and accomplishing a similar type of sand extraction. Planning and execution of this strategy would be enhanced with National Security Agency satellites providing real-time visuals of the beach area.

The Chinese would use a vastly different approach. They would enlist the support of 10,000 beachgoers (families with children, etc.) with instructions to go to the beach on a given sunny afternoon, engage in standard beach recreation activities, and then return to their place of lodging. These Chinese “collectors” would then shake off the sand that had accumulated to their towels, sandals, clothing, and body into a small pile and these many piles would be collected into one single pile that would be larger and more diverse than the total of what was collected by the Russian and U.S. efforts (Hoffman 2008, 7; Stober and Hoffman 2001, 133; Wise 2011, 11). The point is that the Chinese would use a much more broadly conceived approach that is subtle and far less intrusive. This approach would be vague in conception and practically undetectable in execution. It would draw heavily from the general contextual orientation that is common for such a beachfront. The Cox Committee (U.S. House Select Committee, 1999) develops this type of scope of operations more fully in their report about Chinese intelligence operations.

I find that the aforementioned lessons learned while working in China have relevance with my work in the field that I am presently doing in Myanmar. All cultures can be located on the high-context–low-context continuum. My work in Myanmar has highlighted the need for me to be ever mindful of messaging that is more implicit than what I am accustomed to in the United States. This, in turn, impacts my habits regarding the need to be less explicit with messages I convey. I advise colleagues working in varied field settings to consider their contextual emphasis as well.

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What Social Psychology Tells Us about International Tolerance of Gross Human Rights Abuses

Morgan Randolph Rust¹

States have a basic political obligation to stop genocide and crimes against humanity due not only to established moral standards and international law as codified in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Responsibility to Protect, but also because of the threat they place on the international system and regional stability. Yet, if international laws call for the prevention or intercession of crisis situations that violate human rights norms, why does the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), as the primary enforcement institution pertaining to any threat to international peace, fail to enforce the law in some cases? The suggestion here is that decisions are often reduced to a process of rationalization resulting in state prioritization of geopolitical national interests before threats posed by human rights violations committed in another state. The primary reason for the absence of human rights compliance is often attributed to a lack of political will of governing bodies to enforce current laws, even when those bodies possess the adequate knowledge and sufficient power to prevent them (Genser 2018; Hehir 2011, 2015; Power 2013; Sikkink 2017).

Social psychological theories have shown utility in the study of human rights violations and a recurrent theme of theoretical literature reveals that many scholars investigate why nations commit mass atrocities and what motivates countries to comply with international law. Nevertheless, there exists a gap in the literature to explain what selectively motivates a country to force international law compliance on other countries that have violated established norms (Moore 2003). That gap might be filled by broadening the application of these theories to analyze the general lack of political will.

Cognitive Dissonance Theory

Case in point is cognitive dissonance theory, which posits that individuals and groups violate established personally held values and make decisions counter to those values by looking for ways to justify the dissonance or inconsistency involved with the action. Developed by Leon Festinger in 1957, cognitive dissonance suggests that when people are faced with two conflicting beliefs,

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they experience tension or an aversive state of mind producing physiologically measurable stress after realizing that their attitudes, ideas, and beliefs are inconsistent with what they identify as the prevailing norms of the group (Meyer 2005; Sturman 2012; Tsang 2002).

Those conflicted persons will then take steps to resolve this contradiction by altering their attitudes and perceptions, engaging in moral reasoning, and justifying immoral behavior as being moral or at least irrelevant to morality. Festinger's theory is based on the assumption that human beings constantly strive for consistency and that any knowledge, opinion, or belief about the environment, about oneself, or about one's behavior that encompasses a person's identity, needs to balance with preconceived moral values, otherwise the person will seek to identify why there is no balance (Reinold and Zürn 2014). Several field experiments in social psychology have demonstrated that groups, regardless of whether they are ad hoc or institutionalized, are able to shift individual cognitions, feelings, and behavior (Meyer 2005). As it pertains to human rights, crimes committed in a certain situation, such as the Bosnian or Rwandan Genocides, were committed by people who otherwise never would have committed the crime because it conflicted with their internal standards, yet manage to convince themselves to do so anyway.

Jo-Ann Tsang argues four possible motivations for a person to rationalize away morality: (1) a focus on consequences versus intentions, (2) another higher prioritized goal or an ultimate goal in itself, (3) the difference between "ought" or a "want," and (4) the direction of the moral motivation (Tsang 2002). One example is that of the average soldier, a person likely raised to believe that murder is the gravest of immoralities; however, the soldier will rationalize that killing another individual is acceptable by dehumanizing the enemy and convincing him/herself that the action is acceptable because the enemy does not maintain the same moral code as they do.

A second example is seen during World War II with many Europeans failing to protest the Nazis' treatment of Jews, a decision dissonant with the belief of the group that the Nazis' policy was wrong, however, balanced next to the personal safety of each person and their family, many chose to remain safe and avoided publicly protesting against the Nazis (Tsang 2002). They ignored the moral choice in favor of personal safety, neither openly supporting the Nazis nor protesting the treatment of the Jews. Moral disengagement is a type of cognitive dissonance to include subcategories such as *diffusion of responsibility*—typically exhibited by individuals claiming part of the responsibility for a violation of international law—or *displacement of responsibility*—where an individual claims innocence by way of just following orders from an authoritative figure. Rather than envisioning the moral ramification of actions, the individual focuses on the duty to obey and interprets the situation in terms of how well he or she is following orders (Tsang 2002). This was the argument that Adolf Eichmann unsuccessfully used to explain his role as one of the chief architects of the Holocaust.

Cognitive dissonance demonstrates that people can change their ideas and beliefs relatively quickly and easily in response to a changed external environment (Huntington 1997). National interests include material concerns such as security, natural resources, economic development, as well as moral concerns such as human rights and climate change. From a materialistic or realist point of view, if it is in a state's interest to violate an international commitment to upholding a moral concern to achieve a material concern, it is not uncommon for states to do so (Huntington 1997; Kelley 2007; Sturman 2012). This causes issues in a society where both the state and citizens traditionally believe in the rule of law and prize adherence to commitments and international responsibilities. It is here where states try to morally justify why they stood by while atrocities were committed.

Applying the theory of cognitive dissonance to the question of why the UNSC might lack the political will to prevent mass atrocities involves asking whether or not a cognitive decision is being weighed that ultimately has the questioning state or groups of states choosing not to force compliance in support of international law, in exchange for some other positive equity, assuming it to be in support of national interests. Already mentioned is the slow nature of the UNSC to label humanitarian disasters as a violation of international norms, including painstaking negotiations dragged on by bureaucratic processes that go back and forth clarifying the definition of key terminology or parsing hairs to categorize atrocities as a result of a sovereign civil war or the actions of the state selectively targeting certain portions of the population. Several reports from the UN Secretariat as well as research demonstrate that states steadfastly avoid the use of the word genocide because when uttered it denotes a legal and moral obligation to take action (Power 2013).

In both the Rwanda and Kosovo genocides, the UNSC convinced itself that reports were exaggerated and that the situation was contained to small civil war, thus clearing the moral conflict of not asking and claiming that they did not know after the tragic ending (Power 2013). This theory expects that some states and the UNSC know that crimes are being committed, but morally rationalize national interests as more important than intervention and likely do so for different reasons. Russia and China fear not only the deterioration of their sovereign authority to make decisions affecting issues within their borders, but they also fear international reaction to crimes that they themselves are accused of and that voting in favor of human rights measures invites intervention mechanisms within their own borders (Rodman 2008). The former U.S. Ambassador to the UN Susan Powers argues that the United States believes that genocide is wrong, but it is not prepared to invest the military, financial, diplomatic, or domestic political capital needed to stop it, citing examples in both Rwanda and Bosnia (Power 2013).

Social Exchange Theory

Social exchange theory is similar to cognitive dissonance and can be used to determine how states conduct international relations based on terms of the profit maximization of human rights laws, where decision makers are concerned about what they can gain out of a specific relationship (Brown 2000). The choices being rationalized are at times influenced by immediate situational factors, weighed more strategically for long-term benefit or both (Reike 2014). For example, repressive governments view respecting human rights as forcing immediate cost-restraints on government power and therefore violating human rights provides the immediate benefits of unrestrained action, while only risking the possibility of punishment by international condemnation or economic sanctions. Complying with human rights laws thus demonstrates a willingness to restrain the use of power for long-term benefits in some countries, while violating human rights in other countries preserves the full range of government power in the present at the expense of future gains (Moore 2003).

Equally, if a repressive government is aware that it offers an explicit benefit to powerful nations within the UNSC, such as natural resources or geopolitical influence, it is not incentivized to comply with international norms as the expectation is that it will not be forced to comply. For example, Syria has consistently ranked low in human rights and in June 2018, the UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria found that the government had committed war crimes and crimes against humanity, yet Russia has continually blocked resolutions aimed at Syria, to include the usage of 12 vetoes, due to its strategic partnership, and Syria has shown little regard for potential compliance on behalf of the UNSC. Nations that lack unique benefits and prominence, by contrast, have a greater need to assure potential partners that they will cooperate (Moore 2003).

The presumption here is that at the international level, human rights are enforced unequally depending on the value of the offending nation. Critics argue that rational choice theory has not provided a comprehensive explanation of why a nation would find it in its self-interest to conform to human rights norms when it is not compelled to do so by either domestic influences or other states (Moore 2003; Reike 2014). Yet, the rationalist assumption that people have an interest in taking actions that they believe will produce the best outcome can provide a basis for determining why states choose to ignore violations in weaker states (Curley 2009). Social exchange theory can be used to research the lack of political will within the UNSC because competition over resources has often been identified as a rationale to national policymaking. According to the former UN Ambassador Susan Power, referencing the Kosovo genocide, there were concrete choices made by the United States after unspoken and explicit weighing of costs and benefits, but in the end, the United States wanted to avoid engagement in conflicts that posed little threat to American interests (Power 2013).

The European Union (EU)'s differential treatment of Chinese and Myanmar human rights transgressions provides another example. The EU has imposed a variety of sanctions on Myanmar for its human rights abuses over the last few years, while simultaneously turning a blind eye and pursuing increasing trade with China as it committed its own abuses. The discrepant choice between enforcing human rights norms indicates that the economic gains offered by China create incentives to ignore their transgressions, while Myanmar offers little in benefits to EU interests, so it seeks retribution for those affected (Moore 2003). Similarly, the United States has on multiple occasions given money or cheap military equipment to countries, such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, considered important allies in the war on terrorism despite weak human rights records, even postponing the release of its annual report on religious freedom when some of those countries whose cooperation was needed were criticized in the report (Moore 2003).

There are many potential case study opportunities to explain how states use the social exchange equity of ignoring human rights abuses in exchange for economic benefits. Using the Darfur incident, it took over a year of UNSC resolutions before UNSC Resolution 1591 sanctioned anything attached to the Sudanese government, and still, those sanctions did not include its oil industry for fear of a Chinese veto, as it received 90% of the government's export earnings (Rodman 2008). Five more years of negotiations passed before official UNSC acknowledgment and ICC charges were brought against the Sudanese government for genocide. The UNSC cognitively avoided the usage of the term genocide and classified the incident as a civil war. Dragging out the process of acknowledging that crimes have been committed or developing significant international laws to enforce has long been a tactic of bureaucracy within the UNSC.

Following diplomatic negotiations between 150 heads of state, only two paragraphs from the original 100-page document were adopted of what would become the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, despite the former UN Secretariat General Kofi Annan declaring that the international community shared responsibility for not stopping the Rwandan Genocide. In an opportunity for states to show support for universal human rights by adopting a strong policy, the document was modified extensively until only nonbinding language remained to constitute little more than the current international policy of highly encouraging support for human rights and absolutely no enforcement mechanism (McCormick 2011).

What seemingly gets overlooked in the social exchange cost-benefit analysis of states to ignore human rights abuses in another state is the cascading effect that genocide has on the global market. McCormick discusses the spillover effect of atrocity crimes: genocide in country X can cause problems for neighboring country Y because of refugees pouring over the border, while country Z halfway around the world is affected by the disruption of natural resources being imported from country X (McCormick 2011). Yet, this effect has shown little weight in the majority of decision-making instances more supportive of some type of intervention.

Studies have shown that those who commit mass atrocities clearly determined that their interests are best served if they resort to extreme violence and are rarely committed on a whim or accidentally (Hehir 2015). Likewise, it could be inferred that power projection through the use of a proxy-state violating international law is more useful in a cost–benefit analysis to stronger states, than the enforcement of human rights standards.

Looking Ahead

Social psychology studies of the populace show that human nature often condemns checkerboard laws (Reinold and Zürn 2014), which applied to this problem refers to UNSC members pursuing prosecution for some human rights violations, while ignoring others. The UNSC gets around these laws by developing a reason in support of why two similar yet separate violations are treated differently. If the cost–benefit analysis from social exchange theory indicates that the costs of taking the moral high ground versus the benefits are too high, then cognitive dissonance may pave the way for moral principles to be downgraded, and the state engages in the moral rationalization of a potentially immoral act, or views inaction as being moral or at least irrelevant to morality (Tsang 2002).

The recent rise of nationalist leaders continues to play a role in the weakening of the influence of international human rights institutions. Despite a declaration from human rights groups, the UN Human Rights Council, and the U.S. House of Representatives of genocide having been committed in Myanmar and Syria, international enforcement of human rights law violations has continued to decline simultaneously with a rise in UNSC vetoes protecting culpable nations. Additionally, the last year saw the election to the Human Rights Council of several states with a history of gross human rights violations and abuses, which questions the credibility of the Council as it moves forward.

The outlook for the Council is uncertain, with the United States withdrawing its membership and China taking a larger role as it introduces resolutions emphasizing the importance of national sovereignty that advocate for states to work out internal matters themselves unless they request aid from the UN. In conjunction with Russia, China also continues to block resolutions against action in Syria and Myanmar despite compelling evidence of crimes against humanity and genocide. With this erosion of human rights laws, there is a need for an increase in social psychology research into the actions of the UNSC to learn why there is a failure of compliance with human rights laws and to develop mechanisms to reverse the decline in human rights interests.

The challenges of implementing the Responsibility to Protect doctrine are repeatedly initiated and halted at the hands of the permanent five members of the UNSC, which choose to wield their veto powers according to material na-

tional interests or power projection, rather than moral national interests, resulting in the unequal application of the law. Those permanent members repeatedly express outrage at the inaction of the Council, yet are united in avoiding any limits placed on their veto powers in order to stop these types of atrocities (Reinold and Zürn 2014). Cognitive dissonance and other social psychology theories may be useful in determining how and why these states choose to downgrade their obligations.

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Review of *Due Diligence in International Law*

Joanna Kulesza (2016). *Due Diligence in International Law*. Nijhoff: Brill.
ISBN: 9879004283107. 315 pages. \$173.00.

With a rise in nationalism and to a degree, state isolationism, there are questions regarding states' obligations to international law. Recently passed United States' domestic laws like the controversial Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act that enables victims of state-sponsored terrorism to hold those states liable for those acts bring up additional questions. So, to what extent is a nation-state required under international law to demonstrate due diligence in preventing domestic activity that might cause harm beyond its borders and to protect those foreign nationals under its *de facto* control?

While due diligence is a well-recognized principle of legal theory in most civilized nations' *conscience juridique*, it is still being developed as a fundamental "norm" in international law. Assistant Professor of International Law and Internet Governance at the University of Lodz, Joanna Kulesza, in her 2016 book *Due Diligence in International Law*, provides a definition of due diligence that requires states "[to take] vigorous action to identify all events within state territory which might endanger the security of other parties" (61). Kulesza "argues for the recognition of a state duty to show due diligence in performing its international obligations" and goes as far as to claim that this standard is the "missing link between state responsibility and international liability" (2–3, back cover). These seem like high standards in a time of tense international relations, but just because diplomatic and economic interactions might feel strained, the movement of people, information, and goods across borders will not cease.

Kulesza bases much of her reasoning on reports drafted by the United Nations International Law Commission (ILC) that explore the relationship between state responsibility and due diligence at length. Kulesza uses past opinions of ILC chairman Roberto Ago and the judges from the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), Max Huber and John Bassett Moore, to support her claims. Moore was U.S. Assistant Secretary of State and the first American judge to serve at the PCIJ. Much of Kulesza's work focuses on the responsibility a nation has to prevent harm to foreigners within its borders and to prevent activity within its borders that may cause harm beyond its borders (1). Drawing on historical cases like *The Steamer Apure case* (1885) and the repercussions of that case, the author develops her notion of "state responsibility" (240–60).

In the above-mentioned case, a steamer was carrying the President of Venezuela, General Juan Bautista Garcia, and a small security team. The steamer was attacked by rebels and two crew members were killed and one injured, all of whom

were Americans (242). The wives of the deceased crew members filed suit for damages in amounts of \$50,000 (\$1,297,484 today) and \$30,000 (\$778,490 today) and the injured crew member filed suit for \$15,000 (\$389,245 today) (Ibid). The rebels who attacked the steamer were attempting to assassinate the General who was on board. The General had been warned of the threat, yet had ordered the crew to move forward with making port at Apurito, located within a region officially under his jurisdiction. Following the attack, there was little or no effort by the government to punish the rebel group and thus the question was raised as to whether the General, and ultimately the government, could be held responsible for the death of the foreigners (258).

The four criteria needed for establishing a nation responsible for denying justice to any foreign victims within its borders after a crime has occurred, as dictated by the ILC and identified by Kulesza, are: (1) authorities must have had knowledge of the activity in advance and failed to act; (2) there was the opportunity to act and the authorities chose not to; (3) the authorities demonstrated ignorance in discovering the illegal conduct to such a degree to have acted in “bad faith”; and (4) after having been informed of the illegal activity, took no action to deter future infractions (79). Kulesza argues that the opinions expressed by the Commissioners on state responsibility, with regard to exercising due diligence, in this case and in subsequent legal literature, “to a large extent [remain] accurate today” (ibid).

Professor Kulesza sees a direct line through the *Steamer Apure Case* to other cases such as the *Corfu Channel Case* that dealt with the responsibility of the Albanian military to notify British ships of possible mines in the channel and the *Tadić* case that dealt with the responsibility of the state to prevent harm caused by its personnel. This line leads directly to environmental cases like *Smelter* which is often cited in and applicable to terrorism and cyber cases. The *Smelter Case* was a 15-year-long dispute between the United States and Canada which eventually set a new standard for preventing harm beyond a nation’s borders (91). A zinc smelter in the Canadian town of Trail was polluting the waterways of surrounding areas. The degree of pollution was great enough that crop yields had significantly decreased, affecting property values. A large section of the affected area was across the U.S. border in the State of Washington. The Court eventually rendered a decision in favor of the United States issuing the opinion stating:

... no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties of persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.

Regarding terrorism, Kulesza cedes that “[C]ourts have taken altering approaches to the concept of state supervision over the acts of individuals” (106). Indeed, she notes that the UN itself has held fifteen conventions on the issue of terrorism. However, to illustrate her position on the relationship between due diligence and terrorism, she relies on another important historical case, *The Carolina Case*, one of the original “leading cases for due diligence in preventing foreign harm” (59). This 1837 case took place when the Canadians were rising up against the British. During this quasi-revolt, the United States “tolerated” the ship *Caroline* to smuggle weapons to Canadian insurgents while flying an American Flag at port at Fort Schlosser within U.S. borders. The British attacked and destroyed the ship while it was in U.S. territory, but during the attack a Brit was captured and detained. The British then appealed to the United States that their man ought to be released because they had been acting in self-defense.

This case is one of the first instances when preemptive self-defense was cited as reason for extraterritorially attacking entities that could potentially cause harm to a foreign sovereign. While the United States strongly opposed the British argument that harm was imminent, the case drew attention to due diligence as a requirement of the United States to ensure it was not facilitating activities of a “terrorist nature” (59). The obscure notion of “act of facilitation” takes different forms with regard to the principle of due diligence. This case begs the question: What degree of legal fault lies with a party that tolerates *patientia* or gives refuge *receptus* to terrorist activity under its jurisdiction? Kulesza argues that “[t]he most important element in this ongoing discussion is the question of state responsibility for *omissions*, which may be attributed by showing lack of due diligence by a state in preventing a given harmful act” (136).

Regarding cyber security, Kulesza contends that the criterion of “good government” ought to be “perceived objectively, with reference to the best international practice and best available technology” (114). The author explains that cybercrime, like terrorism, is an activity nations can be held responsible for allowing to be perpetrated within their jurisdiction (290). To illustrate this connection, just think that on May 12, 2017, the hospital databases in almost a 100 countries were compromised and held for ransom. There are four “elements of notice” with regard to exercising a functioning cybercrime network: “(1) a prompt notification of any such risk for all potentially affected states, (2) sharing all available information relevant to responding to a given disruption, (3) prompt engagement in multilateral consultations aimed at identifying and applying mutual acceptable measures of response to threats already arisen as well as provide (4) mutual assistance ‘as appropriate’” (295).

In conclusion, Kulesza identifies the moment when the duty of due diligence arises in the following excerpt: “The obligation to prevent violations and the corresponding duty to take active measures to prevent it arise at the moment

when state authorities become aware of or should have, under normal circumstances, learnt about a serious risk of crime being committed” (112). Throughout this review I have tried to give Kulesza’s thorough examination of, and call for, greater due diligence its due credit. Although, as we watch the world grow smaller through advances in means of travel and communication, it cannot be denied that nationalist movements and isolationist agendas may place constraints on these trends, limiting the potential for embracing Kulesza’s ambitious call for greater cooperation and communication. Perhaps the field of international law can act as a platform separate from politics and continue to improve its global integration.

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Review of *Reasoning for Intelligence Analysts: A Multidimensional Approach of Traits, Techniques and Targets*

Noel Hendrickson (2018). *Reasoning for Intelligence Analysts: A Multidimensional Approach of Traits, Techniques and Targets*. Lanham, Maryland: The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group Inc. LCCN 201048900 (print), ISBN 9781442272309 (cloth : alk.paper). 335 pages. \$98.00

Are Intelligence Analysts born or made? Is Intelligence Analysis (IA) a trade craft or profession? Will academic rigor and coursework improve critical thinking? Can the foundations of logic, methodology, and reasoning allow analysts to reach proper and transparent conclusions? Dr. Noel Hendrickson, in his textbook *Reasoning for Intelligence Analysts: A Multidimensional Approach of Traits, Techniques and Targets* proposes that the twenty-first century, which ushered in the information age, has created significant challenges for Intelligence Analysts. Most notably, the navigation of the vast amounts of open resources and the speed of transmission of information. Furthermore, because Intelligence Analysts ultimately serve as advisors to policymakers and decision makers, their critical thinking skills and methodology are applied to conclusions that must be replicable and clear as crystal. Dr. Hendrickson's work is intended to improve intelligence analysis in the twenty-first century by combining evidence, theory, and analytical reasoning techniques. He places significant value on balancing theory with real world application. Thus, he supports that intelligence analysis can be vigorous when analysts use consistent techniques, and that these techniques must be able to be mastered by an analyst in a short time frame. Ideally, by analysts utilizing objectivity and gaining mindfulness about pitfalls, they will not only understand the fallibility inherent with being Intelligence Analysts, but will also be prime examples for critical thinking and analysis.

Dr. Hendrickson's foundational argument is that intelligence analysis is a profession that must be supported by academic theory and analytical methodologies—specifically, the abductive approach, which is better suited to the challenges of analysis in the information age. He classifies the information age as beginning in the 1990s with the digitization of information, the control of knowledge, and that an individual is defined by their ability to access and use the supporting information technology. Of course, one of the greatest challenges is processing open source resources in the information age, and making sense of it in a way that is valid and replicable, or that can stand up to assessment. Because abduction deals with guesswork or speculative hypothesis, and can be defined as inference with best explanation, it combines both deductive and inductive argumentation. Deduction

tends to be rooted in rationalism (working with what is logically necessary given the data), inductive reasoning tends to be rooted in empirical observation and measurement (working with what is likely given the data), and abduction is rooted in both (using inductive and deductive reasoning to reason by analogy, to formulate hypotheses). This approach is better suited to the navigation of information in the twenty-first century. Hendrickson points out that the information age is still in its infancy, and therefore is marked by speculation, but the endpoint of the information age may be the universal accessibility to all the world's information.

Dr. Hendrickson spends the first few chapters of his 31-chapter textbook on the challenges of general reasoning. Many are familiar with basic reasoning challenges like personal traits, which can cause errors such as ethical dilemmas. The second is social media, blogs, etc. where anyone can publish their ideas, theories, and opinions and create a following and validation. Print publishing had a stop gate for people, called editors and peer review, which prevented individuals blogging from the basement to gain credibility. In the information age, everyone has a voice, Internet credibility, and can deliberately spread misinformation and fake news authority.

Additionally, there are constant and twenty-first century variables that muddy the waters for reasoning and contribute to analytical pitfalls. These include mindsets (beliefs about the world) and fallacies (poor reasoning). Also, the clustering of people based on their political beliefs or other ideological factors, via technology, has dramatically affected rational resolution of issues in the information age. Significantly, there is an increasing amount of unreliable data and misleading data. With all of these challenges, the analyst also has to contend with increasing speed of information that requires timely and rapid decisions. Often this occurs before all outcomes can be possibly weighed, which is another determining factor for utilizing the abductive approach.

While both inductive and deductive reasoning should be utilized by both experienced analysts and academically oriented analysts, to mitigate, navigate, and refine these techniques with twenty-first century challenges, Dr. Hendrickson discusses the use of the abductive reasoning approach, which marries theory and practice. In his chapter one, he explains that abductive, deductive, and inductive inferences are strategies for developing knowledge and wisdom, while also pointing out their use, success, and inherent pitfalls. According to Dr. Hendrickson, while inductive and deductive reasoning have been utilized historically and successfully in the IA community, it is abductive reasoning that "... has the potential advantage of creating an integrated approach to both 'theory' and 'practice' that will balance both academic rigor and practical relevance ..." (3). In abductive reasoning, the conclusion is an explanation of the available information. This is a critical point because of the inherent challenges that he outlines in the information age.

While the author begins his book with a general overview and methods of reasoning, the majority of the textbook is a detailed and comprehensive breakdown of analytical methodologies. This is supported by clear and well intentioned graphs and diagrams that highlight main ideas, as well as provide compare and contrast to applicable methodologies and theories. A thoughtful chapter that supports one of the book's themes that analytical reasoning is personal, and which is not often approached in academic textbooks, is chapter 9, "How to Know your Personal Characteristics as an Analyst." This chapter examines how the personal traits of an analyst influence the quality of their reasoning. Inherently, the title of analyst often embodies analytical prowess, which might make the analyst unaware of their own abilities and flaws. This chapter provides advice and a starting point for an analyst to be mindful about their personal thinking processes.

Reasoning for Intelligence Analysts is a timely tool for the analyst's toolbox in a complex world as it builds and expands upon what could be considered the limited use of behavioral and social science approaches and analytical techniques. Historically, the pioneering work of Richard Heuer's structured analytical techniques and its competing hypothesis theories, has been utilized in coursework, but has been found to be limited. One of the strongpoints of Dr. Hendrickson's text is that he does not criticize previously utilized analytic techniques, but rather builds on their strengths and directs readers toward what they are useful for. The information that supports the explanation of various analytical techniques is intended to offer a clear, straightforward, and detailed overview. This delivers ease of understanding and allows for debate.

The limitations of the textbook are almost nonexistent. The author points out the one drawback to his book is the lack of space available to address detailed case studies that illustrate the methodology being explained. However, there is the use of historically important analytical examples (post WWII) that he feels an analyst should be familiar with. Also, the textbook is intended for students and working analysts, who have a foundational understanding of argumentative reasoning. Recently, I queried a Defense Contractor, who hires approximately 300 Intelligence Analysts a year for civilian positions within the government and military. The top four degrees of new hires were Criminal Justice, History, Cyber-Security, and Homeland Security. The contractor, interested in building in-house coursework to measure and assess these new hires' critical thinking based on the competencies of ICD 203, 206, and 208, said that it might be a challenge to utilize Dr. Hendrickson's book as a building block for that coursework. This book's audience may be better suited to students in higher level (300+) Intelligence Analysis coursework for which Dr. Hendrickson is intimately familiar, as he is an Associate Professor of Intelligence Studies at James Madison University (JMU).

Since 2005, Dr. Hendrickson has focused his research on reasoning approaches for Intelligence Analysts. In addition to teaching at JMU, he is the found-

ing member of the JMU's Intelligence Analysis Program. His background is in philosophy and he earned a Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Wisconsin in 2002. He is a frequent speaker at related education and training conferences as well as author of *Counterfactual Reasoning: A Basic Guide for Analysts, Strategists and Decision Makers* (2008) and a coauthor of the *Rowman and Littlefield Handbook of Critical Thinking* (2008). Significantly, his approach to Intelligence Analysis has been utilized since 2007 in a four-semester analytical methodology course that supports the JMU Bachelor of Science Degree in Intelligence Analysis. He has refined and evolved his methodological approach through interaction with students, intelligence analysts, and colleagues in academia and the intelligence community.

Intelligence Analysis has moved beyond a craft to a noble profession supported by academia, and competitive intelligence academic programs provide the groundwork for critical thinking in the information age. At the core of intelligence analysis is the reduction of ambiguity for decision makers by providing understanding into complex twenty-first century military challenges. Yet, it is not fake news that, at times, the intelligence community has had difficulties converting knowledge into wisdom by forecasting and understanding armed conflicts and intelligence issues. While there has been historical preference for inductive and deductive reasoning and a reliance on heuristics, a proactive, timely, and contemporary approach may be to make use of a comprehensive intelligence analysis methodology that has been developed in *Reasoning for Intelligence Analysts*. Dr. Hendrickson's modern approach to a modern age specifically takes into account twenty-first century challenges, all with the goal of turning out the next era analyst.

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