Editorial Welcome ................................................................................................ 3
Melissa Schnyder

Articles
A Psychological and Political Analysis of a 20th Century “Doctator”:
Dr. François Duvalier, President-for-Life of Haiti .............................................. 9
Nicole K. Drumhiller and Casey Skvorc

Strategic Warning and Anticipating Surprise: Assessing the Education
and Training of Intelligence Analysts ................................................................. 33
Richard J. Kilroy Jr. and Katie Brooks

Exploring United States Involvement in Post-ISIL Iraq .............................. 59
Stefanie Mitchell

Voices from the Field
On Conducting Research in Challenging Field Settings ......................... 87
Interview with Dr. Katherine Brannum, Professor and Program Director
of International Relations and Middle Eastern Studies, School of Security
and Global Studies, American Public University System

Policy Relevant Essays
U.S. Nuclear Policy Upgraded ................................................................. 93
Dmitry Stefanovich

How Security Decisions Go Wrong ............................................................. 99
Sajad Abedi

Book Reviews
Review of The Chessboard and the Web: Strategies of Connection in
a Networked World ....................................................................................... 103
Julian Westerhout

Review of Nationalism: Theories and Cases ............................................. 107
Elise Carlson-Rainer
Global Security and Intelligence Studies (GSIS) aims to publish high-quality and original research on contemporary security and intelligence issues. The journal is committed to methodological pluralism, and seeks to bridge the gap between scholars and practitioners engaged in global security and intelligence issues by publishing rigorous research, book reviews, and reflections on the field that are relevant to both communities. We will, on occasion, also seek to publish special issues on timely intelligence and global security topics, and welcome proposals that fit with the scope and aims of the journal. The journal actively encourages both former and current intelligence and global security practitioners to participate in important scholarly and policy debates, and invites them to contribute their research to the journal. As a result, we hope that the journal is a vibrant platform for informed, reasoned, and relevant debates on the most important global security and intelligence issues of our time.

Welcome to the Spring/Summer 2018 issue of Global Security and Intelligence Studies. In this issue, research articles, perspectives from the field, and book reviews are featured. In addition, I am excited to introduce a new section devoted to policy-relevant commentaries. Here, our aim is to feature high quality, short essays by academics and practitioners that provide an analytical perspective on current or emerging policy-relevant issues of importance. I acknowledge the valuable assistance and expertise of Dr. Matthew Crosston in developing this section, and thank him for his contributions to the journal.

The research articles in this issue examine a diversity of themes: the rise to political power of unanticipated political leaders, the quality of university-level intelligence studies programs, and political challenges and opportunities in post-ISIL Iraq. In *A Psychological and Political Analysis of a 20th Century “Doctator”: Dr. François Duvalier, President-for-Life of Haiti*, Nicole K. Drumhiller and Casey Skvorc present a psychobiography of François Duvalier, examining key psychological influences and defining moments that shaped his rise to power. The authors’ analysis sheds light on the processes through which a physician was able to transform into a political dictator. Their analysis is situated in the psychological study of political leaders, providing a unique perspective on the rise of “doctators” more generally. In *Strategic Warning and Anticipating Surprise: Assessing the Education and Training of Intelligence Analysts*, Richard J. Kilroy Jr. and Katie Brooks examine the quality of undergraduate degree programs in intelligence studies. Based on a content analysis of course syllabi from a sample of programs, they observe an over-reliance on structured analytical techniques, which, they argue, may not be providing the deep critical thinking skills that future intelligence analysts require to effectively anticipate strategic surprise. Finally, in *Exploring United States Involvement in Post-ISIL Iraq*, Stefanie Mitchell examines critical challenges relating to
long-term U.S. involvement in Iraq. Based on ethnographic fieldwork conducted in Northern Iraq, she applies a conflict resolution perspective to develop policy-based recommendations. An extensive analysis lays the basis for the argument that multi-track diplomacy would open up strategies to engage at the sub-state level.

This issue’s Voices from the Field features an interview with Dr. Katherine Brannum, Professor and Program Director of International Relations and Middle Eastern Studies for the School of Security and Global Studies at American Public University System. She offers insights on anticipating and navigating some of the obstacles involved in conducting research in challenging field settings. In addition, she offers perspectives from her own research experiences and provides helpful advice for emerging scholars. As the study of many current and emerging global security problems necessitates data collection in conflict, post-conflict, authoritarian, and other difficult environments, this section will be of interest to scholars and practitioners who are likely to confront particularly difficult issues in the field.

Two inaugural analytical commentaries are featured in the Policy Relevant Essays section. In *U.S. Nuclear Policy Upgraded*, Dmitry Stefanovich analyzes the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review in light of specific factors related to Russia. He points out that the doctrine can serve as a catalyst for further discussion and (re)consideration of how policymakers view the role of nuclear weapons in contemporary international affairs, and may encourage new approaches to building stability in a turbulent, multipolar world. In *How Security Decisions Go Wrong*, Sajad Abedi explores the role and use of quantitative metrics in making security-related decisions at the individual level. He examines potential threats and shortcomings of such information for security decisions in environments characterized by uncertainty. In their focus on contemporary, real-world issues, these two essays hold relevance for both academics and practitioners alike.

Finally, two book reviews are presented. Julian Westerhout provides a review of Anne-Marie Slaughter’s policy-relevant book, *The Chessboard and the Web: Strategies of Connection in a Networked World*; and Elise Carlson-Rainer reviews *Nationalism: Theories and Cases*, by Erika Harris, which translates complex information into a foundation for the study of nationalism.

In closing, I would like to remind authors that although GSIS accepts submissions year-round, the deadline to submit to the Fall/Winter issue is August 1, 2018. Publishing an academic journal is a collaborative process. I would like to extend a sincere thanks to the authors, to our peer reviewers for their feedback and commitment, and to the members of the editorial board for their support and input.

On behalf of the editorial team,

Dr. Melissa Schnyder
Global Security and Intelligence Studies (GSIS) tiene el objetivo de publicar investigación original y de alta calidad acerca de los temas actuales de seguridad e inteligencia. La revista está comprometida con el pluralismo metodológico y busca cerrar la brecha entre académicos y profesionales de la seguridad global y temas de inteligencia mediante la publicación de investigación a profundidad, reseñas de libros y reflexiones acerca del campo de estudio que son relevantes para ambas comunidades. En ocasiones vamos a buscar publicar ediciones especiales acerca de temas actualmente relevantes de inteligencia y seguridad global, y aceptamos propuestas que quepan dentro de la envergadura y objetivos de la revista. La revista busca activamente incitar a profesionales anteriores y actuales de la inteligencia y la seguridad global a que participen en importantes debates académicos y políticos, y les invita a contribuir con su investigación a la revista. Como resultado, esperamos que la revista sea una plataforma dinámica para debates informados, razonados y relevantes acerca de los temas más importantes de seguridad global e inteligencia de nuestra época.

Bienvenidos a la edición de primavera/verano de 2018 de Global Security and Intelligence Studies. Esta edición incluye artículos de investigación, perspectivas del campo y reseñas de libros. Adicionalmente, me emociona presentar una nueva sección dedicada a comentarios relevantes para las políticas. Aquí nuestro objetivo es presentar ensayos cortos y de alta calidad de académicos y profesionales que proporcionen una perspectiva analítica de los temas de importancia actuales y emergentes. Reconozco la valiosa asistencia del Dr. Matthew Crosston para el desarrollo de esta sección, y le agradezco por sus contribuciones a la revista.

Los artículos de investigación en esta revista examinan una diversidad de temas: el ascenso al poder de líderes políticos no anticipados, la calidad de los estudios de inteligencia a nivel universitario y los desafíos políticos y oportunidades en Irak después del EI. En Un análisis político y psicológico de un “Doctador” del siglo 20: Dr. François Duvalier, presidente de por Vida en Haití, Nicole K. Drumhiller y Casey Skvorc presentan una psicobiografía de François Duvalier, examinando influencias psicológicas clave y definiendo momentos que contribuyeron a su ascenso al poder. El análisis del autor resalta el proceso a través del cual un médico pudo transformarse en un dictador político. Su análisis está situado en el estudio psicológico de los líderes políticos y proporciona una perspectiva única acerca del ascenso al poder de los “doctores” más generalmente. En Advertencia estratégica y anticipando la sorpresa: evaluando la educación y entrenamiento de analistas de inteligencia, Richard J. Kilroy Jr. y Katie Brooks examinan la calidad de los programas de pregrado en estudios de inteligencia. Basándose en un análisis de contenido de syllabus de curso de una muestra de programas, ellos observaron una sobre dependencia en técnicas analíticas estructuradas que, según ellos, podrían no estar proporcionando habilidades de pensamiento crítico que los futuros analistas de inteligencia requieren para anticipar efectivamente la sor-
presa estratégica. Finalmente, en *Explorando la participación de EE. UU. en Irak post EI*, Stephanie Mitchell examina desafíos críticos que están relacionados a la participación a largo plazo en Irak. Basándose en el trabajo de campo etnográfico llevado a cabo en el norte de Irak, ella aplica una perspectiva de resolución de conflicto para desarrollar recomendaciones basadas en la política. Un análisis extenso sienta las bases para el argumento que la diplomacia múltiple abriría el camino a estrategias para participar a nivel subestatal.

En el Voces del Campo de esta edición hay una entrevista con la Dra. Katherine Brannum, profesora y directora del programa de Relaciones Internacionales y Estudios del Medio Oriente de la facultad de Estudios Globales y Seguridad de American Public University System. Ella ofrece información acerca de la anticipación y el paso por algunos de los obstáculos involucrados en llevar a cabo la investigación y desafiar las condiciones del campo. Adicionalmente ella ofrece perspectivas de sus propias experiencias de investigación y proporciona consejos útiles para los nuevos académicos. Ya que el estudio de muchos problemas actuales y nacientes de seguridad global necesita recolección de datos de ambientes en conflicto, en posconflicto, autoritarios y otros ambientes difíciles, esta sección será de interés para los académicos y profesionales que probablemente enfrentarán temas particularmente difíciles en el campo.

Dos comentarios analíticos inaugurales están incluidos en la sección de Ensayos Relevantes a la Política. En *Política nuclear renovada*, Dimitri Stefanovich analiza la Revisión de la Postura Nuclear de 2018 debido a factores específicos relacionados con Rusia. Él aclara que la doctrina puede servir como un catalizador para más discusión y (re)consideración de cómo los creadores de políticas ven el papel que juegan las armas nucleares en los temas internacionales actuales, y podría fomentar la creación de nuevos métodos para construir estabilidad en un mundo turbulento y multipolar. En *Cómo las decisiones de seguridad fallan*, Sajad Abedi explora el papel y uso de la métrica cuantitativa para tomar decisiones relacionadas con la seguridad a nivel individual. Él examina amenazas potenciales y carencias de esta información para las decisiones de seguridad en ambientes caracterizados por la incertidumbre. En su enfoque en temas contemporáneos y de la vida real, estos dos ensayos tienen relevancia tanto para académicos, como para profesionales.

Finalmente, dos reseñas de libros son presentadas. Julian Westerhout proporciona una reseña del libro de Anne Marie Slaughter que es relevante para la política, *El tablero de ajedrez y la red: estrategias para de conexión en un mundo interconectado*; y Elise Carlson-Rainer reseña *Nacionalismo: teorías y casos* de Erica Harris, que adapta información compleja para la fundación del estudio del nacionalismo.

Para cerrar, me gustaría recordar a los autores que a pesar de que GSIS acepte documentos todo el año, la fecha límite para entregar para la edición de
Editorial Welcome

otoño/invierno es el primero de agosto de 2018. Publicar una revista académica es un proceso colaborativo. Me gustaría agradecer sinceramente a los autores, a nuestros reseñadores por su retroalimentación y compromiso, y a los miembros de la junta editorial por su apoyo y contribuciones.

por parte del equipo editorial,
Dr. Melissa Schnyder
American Public University System

全球安全与情报研究》(Global Security and Intelligence Studies, GSIS)致力发布高质量原创文章,研究当代安全与情报问题。本刊坚持方法论多元主义，并通过发布严谨学术研究、书评,致力在参与全球安全和情报问题的学者和从业者之间搭建桥梁。我们有时也会发布有关及时情报和全球安全主题的特刊,并欢迎适合本刊范围和目标的提议。GSIS积极鼓励所有曾任和现任情报从业者参与重要的学术辩论和政策辩论,同时GSIS邀请他们为本刊投稿。最终,我们希望本刊成为相关辩论的活跃平台,用于研究当代最重要的全球安全和情报问题。

欢迎阅读2018年《全球安全与情报研究》春夏季期刊。本期重点是科研文章、情报领域观点和书评。此外,我很兴奋在此介绍本刊新增的评论版块。我们致力将该版块重点放在学者和从业人员撰写的高质量短篇文章,他们对当前和新兴政策重点问题提供分析视角。在此我向Matthew Crosston博士在开发此版块中所提供的宝贵协助表示感谢,同时感谢他为本刊投稿。

本期的科研文章考察了一系列主题,包括意料之外的政治领导者获得执政权、大学情报研究专业的质量、以及ISIL被击败后伊拉克地区的政治挑战和机遇。在《从心理和政治角度分析一位二十世纪的“医生独裁者”：弗朗索瓦·杜瓦利埃医生——海地终身总统》一文中,作者Nicole K. Drumhiller和Casey Skvorc展示了弗朗索瓦·杜瓦利埃的心理传记,同时考察影响其执政的关键心理因素和决定性时刻。作者通过分析,阐述了一名医生转变为政治独裁者所经历的各个阶段。文章致力从心理方面研究政治领导者,并提供独特视角观察“医生独裁者”的执政历程。下一篇文章《战略预警和预判突袭：评估情报分析师的教育和培训》的作者是Richard J. Kilroy Jr.和Katie Brooks,他们检验了本科教育中情报研究专业的质量。基于一项对部分专业课程大纲进行的内容分析,作者发现：这些课程过多地强调了结构化分析技术,而这也可能不会培养学生的深度批判性思维技能,但是未来情报分析师需要这一技能来有效预测战略突袭。最后一篇文章《探索伊斯兰国被击败后美国在伊拉克的干预》中,作者Stefanie Mitchell考察了有关美国在伊拉克长期介入的关键挑战。基于在伊拉克北部进行的民
族志研究，作者将一种解决冲突的视角用于提出政策建议。一项广泛性分析为论点提供了基础，这个论点是：多轨外交会为区域干预打开策略。

本期的“领域之声”版块聚焦于对Katherine Brannum博士的访谈。她既是教授，还是美国公立大学系统安全和全球研究学院国际关系和中东研究专业的负责人。她提出的见解有关于在具有挑战性的领域背景下进行研究时如何预测并应对阻碍。此外，她还从自己的科研经验中提出观点，同时为新兴学者提供有帮助的建议。由于对许多当前和新兴全球安全问题的研究需要收集不同数据（数据包括冲突、后冲突、威权主义和其他困难环境），因此该版块将会引起学者和相关从业人员的兴趣。

本期的“政策相关文章”版块将重点聚集于两篇分析评论。在《美国和政策升级》一文中，作者Dmitry Stefanovich根据和俄罗斯有关的特定因素分析了2018年《核态势评估报告》。他指出，评估报告可以促进未来关于政策制定者如何看待核武器在当代国际事务中的作用的探讨和（再）考量；还可能激励出在动荡多极化的世界中建立稳定性的新措施。另一篇评论《安全决策是如何出错的》中，作者Sajad Abedi探索了定量指标的使用在制定安全相关的个人决策时产生的作用。他考察了以不确定性为特点的环境中这类信息对安全决策的潜在威胁和缺点。这两篇文章聚焦于当代现实世界问题，为学者和从业人员提供了相关性。

本期还包含两篇书评。Julian Westerhout博士评论了Anne-Marie Slaughter所著的《棋盘和网络：互联网世界中的连接策略》；Elise Carlson-Rainer博士评论了Erika Harris所著的《民族主义：理论与案例》，此书将复杂信息转换为一种用于民族主义研究的基础。

最后，我想提醒各位作者的是，尽管GSIS全年都接受投稿，但今年秋冬季期刊的投稿截止日为8月1日。发表学术期刊是一个协作过程。我在此对各位作者表示衷心感谢，同时也感谢同行评审员的反馈和付出，以及编辑委员会成员的支持和投入。

谨代表编辑组，

Melissa Schnyder博士

美国公立大学系统
A Psychological and Political Analysis of a Twentieth Century “Doctator”: Dr. François Duvalier, President-for-Life of Haiti

Nicole K. Drumhiller
American Military University

Casey Skvorc
National Institutes of Health
American Military University

Abstract
As one of the prominent “doctators” (physicians who become political dictators) of the twentieth century, François Duvalier successfully translated the trappings of beneficence associated with his status as a medical doctor to the office of President-for-Life of Haiti. This psychological and political analysis of Duvalier traces his early political development, strongly influenced by the presence of the U.S. military in Haiti, to his post-graduate medical education in Michigan, culminating in his ultimate rise to power and reign of terror against those who challenged his political authority. The psychological influences of mental illness of Duvalier’s mother, and subsequent use of Voodoo imagery and mounting levels of his grandiosity and paranoia, are discussed in the context of his behavior as a political dictator. The circumstances of Dr. François Duvalier’s remarkable rise to political power and terror are of both historic and current interest as unanticipated political leaders continue to emerge in international political landscapes.

Keywords: François Duvalier, doctator, dictator, psychobiography, decision-making, leadership, paranoia, narcissism
Un análisis político y psicológico de un “doctador” del siglo veinte: el Dr. François Duvalier, presidente de por vida de Haití

Resumen

Como uno de los “doctadores” prominentes (médicos que se convierten en dictadores políticos) del siglo veinte, François Duvalier tradujo exitosamente las trampas de la beneficencia asociadas con su estatus como un doctor médico a la posición de presidente de por vida de Haití. Este análisis psicológico y político de Duvalier relata la historia desde su desarrollo político temprano, fuertemente influido por la presencia del ejército de los EE. UU. en Haití, hasta su educación de posgrado en educación médica en Michigan, culminando en su ascenso al poder y reino de terror contra los que estaban en contra de su autoridad política. Las influencias psicológicas de la enfermedad mental de la madre de Duvalier, y el subsecuente uso de imágenes de vudú y niveles ascendientes de su grandiosidad y paranoia se discuten en el contexto de su comportamiento como dictador político. Las circunstancias del asombroso ascenso al poder y terror del Dr. François Duvalier son tanto de interés histórico, como actual, ya que hay líderes políticos no anticipados que continúan apareciendo en los panoramas políticos internacionales.

Palabras clave: François Duvalier, doctador, dictador, psicobiografía, toma de decisiones, liderazgo, paranoia, narcisismo

从心理和政治角度分析一位二十世纪的“医生独裁者”：弗朗索瓦·杜瓦利埃医生——海地终身总统

摘要

作为20世纪最突出的“医生独裁者”（由医生成为政治独裁者，doctator）之一，弗朗索瓦·杜瓦利埃成功地将与其地位
The psychological study of political leaders provides researchers an opportunity to better understand political behavior and elite decision-making. Through leadership assessments and profiles, scholars can better understand how personalities and the environment can impact political decision-making. Early works in this area typically focused more on the political ends as evidenced by Lasswell’s (1930) early work, rather than on the “personological” (Immelman 1993). However, modern research into this area has taken on an increasingly psychological focus as researchers attempt to understand varying psychological components that go into decision-making and how a person’s characteristics impact their decisions. Barber’s (1972) work on Presidential Character, for example, uses psychobiography, a method which looks at a person’s history, to develop a typology of presidential character. Through Barber’s (1965, 1972) influential works, leadership analysts have continued to strive for a more nuanced approach to better understand the decision-making of world leaders, particularly when they are autocratic leaders with a firm grip on power and near total control over domestic and foreign affairs (Hermann 1976).

One subset of world leaders that has captured the attention of political psychologists is the political dictator. Research on dictators has taken many forms, including classic inquiries into their behavior, along with analyses on the relationships they have with their subjects. Within the United States (U.S.), early work profiling dictators can be directly tied to research commissioned by the Office of Strategic Services (the forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency) whose subject of interest was Adolf Hitler (Post 2003; Coolidge, Davis, and Segal 2007). To
be sure, during the 1940s insight into the mind of Hitler and his decision-making was highly sought after to understand and combat how a person could sanction the atrocities committed during the Holocaust.

Research focusing on dictators has lent additional insight into whether leaders are born or made, as well as how individuals can come to commit, and to order, extraordinary acts of violence against others. Authoritarian leaders are excellent subjects to examine how personality impacts politics; their near-total control over all political activity ensures that their directives impact actions taken by the government (Greenstein 1987; Post 2003). For leaders including Hitler (Victor 1998; Coolidge, Davis, and Segal 2007; Coolidge and Segal 2007, 2009; Hyland, Boduszek, and Kilkiewics 2011), Saddam Hussein (Post 2003; Coolidge and Segal 2007, 2009), Kim Jong-Il (Post 2004; Coolidge and Segal 2009), and Stalin (Birt 1993; Stal 2013), it is their extreme—and often dramatic—actions and decision-making, as well as their propensity toward violence, that make them important subjects for dictatorship research (Hermann 1976).

Dictators, and dictatorships, are often looked at with negative connotation as they are associated with images of violent repression, death, punishment, and widespread fear. In fact, the deep-seated fear experienced by the public is largely what helps these tyrants stay in power—something that is certainly a factor in this case study of François Duvalier. Often when assessing leadership behavior through a psychobiography, researchers have focused on a detailed review and assessment of the individual’s upbringing, their first encounter with a position of power, key political mentors, the political environment in which they came to power, how they assembled a powerbase, who they surround themselves with, among other things. Specific to the study of dictators, Moghaddam (2013) argues the importance of taking a holistic approach and examining trait-based explanations for their behavior as well as situational context and group characteristics. To avoid reductionism, leadership personality, to include that of political dictators, must be examined in the context of the cultural environment in which they live and operate (Runyan 1981). For this reason, we carry out a psychobiography, a type of at-a-distance approach, to assess the leadership of François Duvalier and better understand how a physician charged with healing human ails, transforms into a political dictator that does not hesitate to take human life to enhance his own.

A psychobiography, as it sounds, takes a detailed look at a person’s biographical history and applies psychological themes to help assess a person’s life and gain understanding about their leadership behavior (Lasswell 1930; Post 2003; Schultz 2005). Through a content analysis of written and/or recorded material, the information assessed focuses on a leader’s upbringing, and the social and political development into their adult years. Here, the statements of the leaders themselves, in addition to their biographical and sociological information, are assessed to infer their political psychological make-up (Cottam et al. 2004). Through psychobiographies, political psychologists assess personality traits like that of “The Big Five”
including neuroticism, extraversion, agreeableness, openness to experience, and conscientiousness, as well as personality disorders such as sadism, antisocial behavior, schizophrenia, neuroticism, narcissism, and paranoia (Birt 1993; Coolidge, Davis, and Segal 2007; Coolidge and Segal 2007, 2009). To date, many leaders have been assessed using the psychobiographical research method including Woodrow Wilson (George and George 1998; McDermott 2008), Indira Gandhi (Steinberg 2005); Hillary Clinton and Condoleezza Rice (Fitch and Marshall 2008); Ronald Reagan (Glad 1989; Gilbert 2008); John F. Kennedy (McDermott 2008); and Richard Nixon (McDermott 2008) to name a few.

Specific to political dictators, Victor’s (1998) psychobiography of Hitler was carried out to better understand the pathway that led to his evil transformation. Moving this work forward, Coolidge, Davis, and Segal (2007) further investigated Hitler’s psychopathology, and later Hyland, Boduszek, and Kielkiewicz (2011) approached Hitler from a psycho-historical perspective to gain great depth of knowledge on his development and pathology. In an attempt to better assess the personality of dictators, Coolidge and Segal (2007) would compare their findings of Hitler to Saddam Hussein, and later to Kim Jung II (Coolidge and Segal 2009); they found that all shared the six personality disorders including sadistic, paranoid, anti-social, narcissistic, schizoid, and schizotypal in varying degrees. Coolidge and Segal’s (2007) work agrees with Post’s (2004) finding that Hussein was strongly oriented toward paranoia, but the two somewhat disagree on whether Hussein suffered from any psychotic disorders beyond malignant narcissism. Kim Jong II is further described as being emotionally volatile, unpredictable, without empathy, and having a propensity toward malignant narcissism (Post 2004). Stalin, another dictator, has also been assessed as having a paranoid personality disorder which was thought to be a key component in his rise to power (Birt 1993; Stal 2003). As will be seen in the psychobiography below, paranoia also plays a key factor in Duvalier’s behavior.

The current body of knowledge on leadership psychology has substantiated a clear link between personality and political outcomes. Additionally, the literature demonstrates that there are some shared personality components among political dictators. However, one subset of dictators that has been overlooked include those individuals that, in addition to gaining political notoriety, were first known for their medical expertise. These doctor-dictators represent a unique subgroup that have not yet been fully assessed for clues that may explain their pathway to violence. Within this psychobiography, we assess François Duvalier’s rise to power by looking at how this individual transformed himself from a medical doctor, into the President-for-Life of Haiti. Consistent with the psychobiographic method, we examine Duvalier’s rise to power and leadership transformation. We also consider Haiti’s brutal past, its leadership instabilities, and how this may have shaped or influenced Duvalier’s behavior. We also review his development during his early
years, the assembly, consolidation, and maintenance of his powerbase, and the
development of his cult of personality. Additionally, of importance in this study
is the development and cultivation of his medical interests, and manipulation of
this background to further gain a political edge and enhance his political strength.
This case reveals Duvalier’s innate ability to utilize the imagery associated with his
medical profession as a veil to his grim desires to “cure” the political ills of Haiti. In
addition to better understanding the doctor–dictator link, case studies help pro-
vide insight into different diplomatic strategies for engaging with such leaders. For
example, paranoid individuals will be highly suspicious and will largely mistrust
others, so negotiated policies should include a certain degree of confidence-build-
ing measures to help break through this kind of personal defense mechanism.
Likewise, malignant narcissism and sadism will also have an influence on how
individuals interpret and react to events. For these reasons, it is important to con-
tinue delving into the behavior of past leaders to be better prepared for the future.

Doctators: Physicians as Political Dictators

The modern study of conditions that give rise to political dictators has an
assorted range that includes twentieth century psychoanalysts C.G. Jung
(1936) and Sigmund Freud (Stamps 1956) and extends to twenty-first cen-
tury political psychologist Fathali M. Moghaddam (2012, 2013). While numerous
conventional studies of dictators have focused upon the examination of socie-
tal conditions and concurrent psychological traits of dictators as a homogenous
group, there remains a unique subset within the dictator population that have not
been extensively evaluated: political “doctators”—a play on words to represent
physicians who become political dictators. The “doctorship” concept was first
coined by the journalist Simon Sebag Montefiore (1997, 17), who defined “the
process by which a medical doctor, devoted to sacrificing himself to save lives,
becomes a dictator, devoted to sacrificing lives to save himself.”

The power, status, and social position of physicians are distinct and elevated
compared to most professions. Unlike that of career politicians, “physicians are
considered—rightly or not—as persons responsible for the quality of our lives.
They are societal heroes ... By definition, a doctor is a person educated in a pro-
fession that is compassionate to the poor and ill, and because of his education, (in
a prime position) to shape the national health and protection of their country”
(Lass et al. 2012, 642; author translation). Coupled with this elevated social sta-
tus, they are also expected to uphold much higher societal expectations. Sawicki
(2011) explains that these standards hold true for physicians’ personal lives as well

1 “Lekarze są uważani - słusznie lub nie - za osoby odpowiedzialne za jakość naszego życia. Są
bohaterami społecznymi ... Z definicji lekarz to osoba wykształcona w zawodzie współczu-
jącym dla biednych i chorych, a także ze względu na swoją edukację (w doskonałej pozycji),
która kształtuje krajową opiekę zdrowotną i ochronę swojego kraju.”
as for state licensing boards. Licensing boards authorize discipline based on “unprofessional” or “unethical” conduct as it applies not only to their professional lives, but also to their personal lives. In attempting to discern why physicians (and nurses) charged with protecting life and limb are held to a higher standard than others, Sawicki explains that because they work in a profession where the healing and safeguarding of those most vulnerable is part of the profession, “society looks askance at any conduct that calls into question this ethic of care and respect” (Sawicki 2011, 719). Ultimately, society tends to elevate physicians, holding them in high regard for their ability to heal and the perception that doctors personally desire to make the world a better place.

Why do some societies allow physicians to then slip into the role of political dictator? How can widespread human suffering be sanctioned by someone who holds himself to the Hippocratic Oath? These are among some of the interesting questions that arise when considering doctors who assume the role of political dictators. When doctors enter politics, some look upon them differently compared to career politicians, lawyers, or any other profession. Early on, medical doctors were assumed to enter politics for only brief periods of time to impact change within their personal professions, never fully giving up their medical careers (Glasser 1960). Perper and Cina (2010) make the case that doctors are looked upon as father figures, helping their constituents feel safe and secure. It can be argued that society perceives that through their wisdom and healing hands, doctor politicians will know what is best for the country (Perper and Cina 2010). This perception is something that some doctators have come to integrate into their worldviews when they see themselves as the father of the state. However, despite these high standards, doctors are not perfect, omnipotent beings. In fact, some have been downright evil: in the contemporary political domain, Dr. Bashar Assad, President of Syria and a trained ophthalmologist, is said to be responsible for the deaths of more than 250,000 of his countrymen (Naylor 2015). Likewise, Dr. Radovan Karadzic, a psychiatrist, betrayed the values of his profession and was found guilty of genocide, war crimes, and the crimes against humanity which took place in Srebrenica (Post 2004).

**Historical Violent Conflict and Duvalier’s Childhood Development**

To better understand how a society can give way to a ruthless dictator, it is important to assess the political environment in which the individual came to power. However, on occasion digging deeper into a country’s history can also provide insight into how a society may come to be bruised by a particularly brutal past. While many countries have developed through a series of phases often marked by war and political violence, Haiti’s development is particularly brutal and has given way to a series of unstable governments. For this reason, an un-
derstanding of the etiology of circumstances leading to Duvalier’s assumption of power must begin with a brief account of Haitian history.

Under French colonial rule, Haiti was a successful “plantocracy” that was built on the backs of African slaves. Slavery in Haiti was particularly horrific: an estimated one million African slave lives were lost to torture, hard labor, and dire living conditions (Abbott 1988). During French colonial rule, it was considered more economical to replace slaves every 4–7 years rather than keep them alive and nourished as a strong workforce. Torture was a common form of punishment; in addition to regular floggings, slaves were also “burned with boiling cane, chained, branded with hot irons, buried alive, manacled and smeared with molasses so ants would devour them, mutilated and crippled by amputation of arms, legs, and buttocks, raped, starved, and humiliated” (Abbott 1988, 11).

Under the leadership of a Jamaican slave named Boukman, a 13-year revolution ensued, when slaves rose up: “scorching the earth, burning every habitation, and destroying every vestige of the plantations, the rebels slaughtered beast and man, raped women before killing them and their children, tortured prisoners of war with the obscene refinements they had learned as victims” (Abbott 1988, 14). Under this banner of blood, Haiti would earn its freedom from France in 1804. The bloodletting continued under the savage rule of Jean-Jacques Dessalines, who for many would become a national hero. In 1806, Dessalines was assassinated, leaving Haiti divided between blacks in the north and the mulatto-ruled south (BBC News 2012). By the time Duvalier was born in Port-au-Prince in 1907, Haiti unified under the leadership of Pierre Boyer, who later became the first of many presidents forced into exile (Abbott 1988). Between Boyer’s rule and the American occupation, only one president out of 22 would serve his full presidential term. “Three died natural deaths ... three died by violence, and fourteen more, like Boyer, were driven from Haiti by revolts” (Abbott 1988, 25). It is within this tumultuous backdrop that Duvalier’s coming of age and political development must be considered.

Duvalier was born into a lower-middle class family; he was the son of a primary school teacher and a bakery worker (Diederich and Burt 1969). His father, Duval Duvalier, wore many hats as a teacher, as a journalist, and eventually was appointed to Justice of the Peace (Perper and Cina 2010). Duval’s experience as a journalist is of interest, as François, too, would come to captivate a Haitian audience with his nationalistic prose. In his journal Le Courrier du Soir, Duval would rail against the selfish political elite and praise the love of the nation (Nicholls 1996). His mother, Uritia Abraham, was mentally ill and was chronically hospitalized; as a result, Duvalier was raised by his Aunt, Madame Florestal and his father (Abbott 1988). It was reported that he was “deeply resentful and ashamed” of his mother; he was not permitted to mention her name during his youth (Abbott 1988, 51).
During Duvalier’s early years, Haiti would go through a particularly turbulent political period.

When he (Duvalier) he was one-year old Gen. Antoine Simon overthrew Alexis. He was four when a revolution ousted President Simon, and five years old when an explosion reduced the old wooden Palais National and President Cincinnatus Leconte along with it to splinters. Duvalier was six when President Tancrède Auguste was poisoned; his funeral was interrupted when two generals began fighting over his succession .... One Michel Oreste got the job, but he was overthrown the following year by a man named Zamor, who in turn fell a year later to Davilmar Théodore. (Diederich and Burt 1969, 30)

The American occupation of Haiti began when Duvalier was eight years old. During this period, he witnessed American repression and assault on the Haitian religious culture and practice of Voodoo. By the time his mother died in 1921 when he was 14, Duvalier had lived under nine Haitian presidents and experienced an American occupation with violent nationalistic attempts to oust the unwelcomed force. There would be 12 additional Haitian presidents between 1922 and October 1957, eight of whom held the position for less than one year. The swiftness with how quickly political tables can turn is something that Duvalier would come to internalize and later account for during his own presidency. His mistrust of others would force him to consolidate power and surround himself with family and individuals he believed he could control.

Duvalier was reportedly inspired to become a physician around the age of 12, when he watched a Haitian mother treat her child for a tropical bacterial skin infection; following this event, Duvalier decided that he wanted to heal those afflicted by diseases (Abbott 1988). After completing his secondary education, Duvalier came to pursue his interest in medicine and enrolled in the University of Haiti School of Medicine, without being required to take an entrance exam (Diederich and Burt 1969). During his time in medical school, he became politically active and participated in student strikes, initially protesting against education policies, and eventually expanding to an overall protest against the U.S. occupation (Abbott 1988; Johnson 2006). A description of Duvalier during his medical school years mirrors his time in primary school, where the general sentiment was that he was underwhelming and nonthreatening. In her book *Haiti: An Insider’s History of the Rise and Fall of the Duvaliers*, Elizabeth Abbott (1988) describes Duvalier as a “mediocre” medical student who was distracted by his other ethnological interests and who “studied only enough to pass” (8). This description is reinforced in reports that his colleagues referred to him behind his back as “the dummy” or “the dumb one” (Marquis 2007, 106). In addition to his political and academ-
ic behavior while at medical school, additional information regarding Duvalier’s temperament comes to light in a story told by one of his instructors: while living with a roommate at a boarding house, Duvalier “heard from the houseboy that his roommate has spoken unfavorably about him. Without questioning the gossip, Duvalier moved out and never spoke to the roommate” (Diederich and Burt 1969, 37). Later, one of his physician-instructors commented that Duvalier “feels that nobody less educated than he could ever deceive him, so he believes them” (Diederich and Burt 1969, 37). This behavior extended to his political relationships, with Duvalier turning against many of his close associates at the slightest inkling of disloyalty. These behavioral observations were interpreted as an acute sense of paranoia by others, which falls in line, and is further amplified with his behavior later in his political career. In political dictators, paranoia is often coupled with regular waves of power consolidation and the brutal removal of distrusted others.

After graduation from medical school in 1934, Duvalier began an internship at the Hospice Saint François-de-Sales. During this time, he gained the nickname “Papa Doc,” bestowed on him by his patients (Perper and Cina 2010). This would prove to be fitting as he would later come to see himself as the father of Haiti and its people. It is during this time that Duvalier was revered by the Haitian peasantry for his healing work as a doctor—something that he would later come to exploit. Five years after medical school, he married Simone Ovide. They had three daughters and a son; Jean-Claude became his father’s successor (Diederich and Burt 1969). Following Duvalier’s medical internship, while unable to gain employment as an Army medical doctor due to his eyesight, he was appointed as a government consultant for a retirement home just south of Port-au-Prince (Abbott 1988). This position gave him additional exposure to work within the government.

In the 1940s, Duvalier began his participation in a joint U.S.-Haiti effort to control the spread of tropical diseases in Haiti. The leader of this project, Dr. James Dwinelle, made use of Duvalier’s medical and English-speaking skills and used him as an interpreter (Diederich and Burt 1969). In June 1943, Duvalier served as chief of his own clinic. A year later, his dedication to this effort afforded him the opportunity to continue his post-medical education at the University of Michigan, a position he received as a result of the Inter-American Affairs Commission, where he studied from 1944 to 1945 (Diederich and Burt 1969). While Duvalier reportedly failed his courses at the University of Michigan, he returned to Haiti and continued working in the field of tropical medicine (Abbott 1988).

The death of his mother and the U.S. occupation from 1915 to 1928 are considered to be critical events during Duvalier’s transition to young adulthood. Up to this point, nothing suggested that Duvalier would become a predatory and ruthless dictator. There is no evidence indicating that he suffered from the same mental illness as his mother. During this period of his life, Duvalier is commonly described as being sheepish and reserved. “To his school friends, he was a bespectacled bookworm who shunned confrontation, a retiring ‘hole in the corner’ figure
who preferred his own company” (Marquis 2007, 91). Ultimately, there were no indicators up to this point in time that Duvalier would transform from a community doctor into a ruthless dictator.

Les Griots, Voodoo, and Haitian Politics

An integral portion of Duvalier’s development into a politician began before his training as a physician and continued well past his post-graduate medical education. Duvalier attended the state-owned Lycée Alexandre Pétion for his primary and secondary school. At Lycée, Duvalier became close with two teachers who exercised a profound influence on his life: Dumarsais Estimé, a noirist who would become the first black Haitian president since the U.S. occupation, and Dr. Jean Price-Mars, one of Haiti’s leading ethnologists. Noirism was a black pride movement that came to also be known as the negritude movement. Both individuals are important figures and helped shape Duvalier’s worldview and political outlook. Price-Mars’ work would come to captivate Duvalier during his formative years as he would regularly gather with two others, Lorimer Denis and Louis Diaquoi, to discuss Price-Mars’ position on the black middle class and the budding ethnological movement (Smith 2009). Originally held at Denis’s house, “Les Trois D,” as they referred to themselves, formed the “Berceau de L’École Historico-Culturelle des Griots,” where they focused their discussions around cultural issues, including the attack on Haiti’s Voodoo culture (Smith 2009, 24). Later Duvalier drew from his knowledge of Voodoo and its importance in Haiti to manipulate the peasantry and Voodoo leaders into supporting his political pursuits.

As so-called nouveaux Haitians, Duvalier and his associates played a role in shaping Haitian historical and literary culture. It is during this time that Duvalier further solidified his worldview of Haiti in its current state, and Haiti as it should be. Under Les Griots Duvalier further explored his political perspectives and built upon his past literary contributions at Action Nationale, a daily nationalist newspaper, where he wrote “under the pen name Abderrahman, ... eighth emir and first caliph (912–961 A.D.) who founded the medical school of Cordova” (Diederich and Burt 1969, 38). In his writings as Abderrahman, his publications included topics ranging from literature to politics. He severely criticized the American occupation and the elite mulatto ruling class. Duvalier demonstrated a “great bitterness and discouragement about Haiti’s fate ... but he also expresse(d) hope that ‘a man will come’ to correct injustice and set things right” (Diederich and Burt 1969, 39). A chilling self-prophecy predicted his future reign.

In 1933, together with Lorimer Denis and Arthur Bonhomme, Duvalier published Les Tendences d’une Génération, or “Trends of a Generation,” which called for the development of a Haitian literary base (Marquis 2007). The writers presumed that this declaration would help Haiti come out of the shadows of foreign influence and into its own cultural enlightenment. By 1938, Les Griots
transformed into a quarterly journal largely focused on articles that mapped out the uniqueness of Africans and their descendants from people of the west (Smith 2009). Duvalier and Denis wrote articles espousing that Haiti was negatively impacted by “the assimilation of French values which had impaired the proper development of Haitian society” (Smith 2009, 24). The Haitian problem was thought to be the result of the population's inability to break free from the burdens of French colonial values.

When evaluating questions of political stability, these noirists viewed the consistent exploitation by the mulatto elite over the black population to be a critical issue in need of resolution, along with the integration of Voodoo into the greater Haitian culture. The Griots argued that African politics were based on communitarianism, whereby the government was responsible to secure the resources of the people and redistribute them fairly. The current individualism “inherent in Haitian politics was a consequence of the importation of French political systems during colonization” (Smith 2009, 26). Along these lines, Duvalier and Denis asserted that the Haitian government needed to be founded upon the psychological and social realities of the Haitian population and move away from individualism to a refocus around communitarianism and the incorporation of Voodoo into national life. With much of the Haitian population being rural peasants, the Griots argued that the development of Haitian culture should center on these people and their traditions (Smith 2009). Furthermore, as Voodoo was the foundation of their spiritual beliefs, it was something that all of Haiti—including its government—should fully embrace and support.

While there are not yet indicators that Duvalier would become a brutal dictator, during this time he further develops his political ideas and is seen to promote the desire for Haiti to develop a national identity that is free from foreign influence. Through his writings, it appears Duvalier is longing for a drastic change in the culture of Haiti as a whole. This is something that is further reinforced by his embrace and promotion of the Haitian Voodoo culture. However, during the 1940s, Voodoo was about to be persecuted by the Catholic Church which began instigating an “anti-superstition” campaign or purge against Voodoo. Important ceremonial symbols such as drums and gourds were smashed and burned by priests and their parishioners. In response to this religious cleansing, the intellectual movement, including novelist Jacques Roumain, established the Bureau of Ethnology in 1941, to preserve and learn about the religion and its history (Johnson 2006). Duvalier also became active in the Bureau and published *The Gradual Evolution of Voodoo* (Time 2011) in 1944. Duvalier used his position within the Bureau to forward his noirist ideals. His activities in the Bureau allowed him to further establish and rapidly grow his Voodoo network as he “built an arsenal of friendships with vodou priests (houngans) and priestesses (manbos) and reinforced his ideas about Vodou as the heart and soul of the Haitian peasantry” (Johnson 2006, 9). Duvalier’s knowledge of and affinity for Haiti’s Voodoo culture
not only further solidified Duvalier's trust within the Haitian peasantry, but also was interwoven and integrated as the cornerstone of his government.

François Duvalier: Political Engagement and Positioning

In 1946, a Labor Party known as the Mouvement Ouvrier Paysan (Peasant Worker Movement, abbreviated as MOP), emerged on the Haitian political scene. The MOP was formed by students of Daniel Fignolé, a charismatic leader of the urban working class. Fignolé's views mirrored that of many noirist intellectuals including Duvalier and Denis. In 1945, the two began their work on The Problem of Classes Throughout Haiti's History. Officially published in the 1950s, it initially appeared in the Chantiers newspaper “and was dedicated to 'the popular leader Daniel Fignolé, symbol of the aspirations and traditions of all classes of men’” (Smith 2009, 66). This became the first treatise that Duvalier would publish where his political perspectives were revealed (Abbott 1988).

The original intent of the MOP was to support Fignolé's bid for the presidency; however, he was not yet old enough at that time. As a result, leaders within the MOP sought another suitable candidate, deciding Duvalier would be a good fit, especially given his noirist politics. Duvalier had no prior political experience and, at the time, was thought to have little interest in such pursuits (Abbott 1988). Leery of becoming Fignolé's puppet, Duvalier instead accepted a position as the organization's secretary-general. This is a key turning point in his relationship with Fignolé as Duvalier was pitted against him as a potential rival.

Following the overthrow of President Elie Lescot in 1946, Duvalier’s former teacher and mentor, Dumarsais Estimé became President of Haiti. In October 1947, Fignolé attempted to organize a strike to protest Estimé's new law that prohibited strikes by organized labor groups. Estimé's policies proved more popular than initially thought, especially among MOP members and, specifically, Duvalier. The event caused a dispute between Duvalier and Fignolé and resulted in Duvalier permanently leaving the MOP (Abbott 1988). As a former student of Estimé, Duvalier “was appointed Director of Public Health, thereafter Under-Minister of Labor (1948), and finally a member of the Cabinet, as Minister of Public Health and Labor” in 1949 (Johnson 2006, 10). During this time, Duvalier did not promote any particular position and “he aroused few enmities and made few strong impressions on anyone,” continuing his preferred position of remaining in the political shadows (Diederich and Burt 1969, 55).

Under Estimé's leadership, Duvalier found himself content and aligned himself closely with the Haitian president. However, as with other presidents that came before him, Estimé was challenged by the Army, and in 1950, Estimé was overthrown by a military coup. This presidential unseating would have a lasting effect on Duvalier; it taught him that the military strongly influenced a president’s
Global Security and Intelligence Studies

reign. This is something that was further reinforced by Haiti’s checkered past with frequent government overturn and corruption. Refusing to accept the coup, Duvalier temporarily set aside politics in favor of continuing his medical practice (Diederich and Burt 1969; Perper and Cina 2010). The lasting impact the Army had on the political environment in Haiti was not lost on Duvalier and was reflected in the development of the Tonton Macoute, Duvalier’s armed militia which had the power to do Duvalier’s bidding, but not be powerful or organized enough to overthrow him.

While working with the Service Coopératif Inter-Américain de la Santé Publique (Co-operative Inter-American Service, abbreviated as SCISP) as part of the U.S. Health Commission in Haiti, Duvalier began formulating his political plans. In the SCISP offices, he engaged with other Estimists to establish himself as heir to the presidency (Smith 2009). During this time of political plotting, the military persecuted Duvalier for his opposition. He went into hiding in the countryside among his trusted peasantry base, where he continued to practice medicine and further develop his network among the rural Haitian people (Diederich and Burt 1969; Perper and Cina 2010). Abbott (1988) describes Duvalier’s time in hiding as a key turning point. He “shed his past as a dedicated country doctor and engaged scholar to become a politician obsessed with greatness, history, and power” (Abbott 1988, 61). His friends claimed he focused his interests on Machiavelli’s The Prince and took on a “total lack of loyalty, universal mistrust of individuals, an ability to lie and break promises with stone-faced regularity, and a penetrating ability to identify an individual’s Achilles’ heel” (Abbott 1988, 61). This account echoes descriptions of Duvalier and his lack of trust for others during his earlier years. However, compounded by his political desires to become president, his paranoia would further increase as he recognized his own current persecution, and the past faced by other Haitian political leaders. As his troubles with the Army worsened, Duvalier’s paranoia became more pronounced, and he began to hide firearms on his person, under beds and pillows, and in desks. During this time of increased personal stress, Duvalier turned toward spirituality. Katherine Dunham, an acquaintance of Duvalier, “felt he plunged into (spirituality) with an intensity that bordered and perhaps trespassed on the pathological” (Abbott 1988, 61). This spiritual immersion would later serve Duvalier well as he would come to take on a cult of personality and make himself feared in the image of Baron Samedi, Voodoo god of the dead.

Papa Doc: President-For-Life and Genesis of the Reign of Terror

In September 1956, Duvalier announced his candidacy for president. He campaigned under the banner of Populism, seeking to improve the condition of the masses. “He regarded his campaign as a ‘crusade’ inspired by ‘a dynamic ideology’ ... He emphasized the importance of ‘leadership’ and referred to the in-
fluence which Kemal Ataturk [had] upon his thinking” (Nicholls 1996, 210). Interestingly, Duvalier toned down his noirist views within his campaign speeches, instead further positioning himself as Estimé’s heir.

In 1957, with the support of the Army and a strong support base in the countryside, Duvalier was elected to a 6-year presidential term (Perper and Cina 2010). As president, he promised to “fulfill his populist vision to end domination of the mulatto elite and bring political and economic power to the black Haitian majority” (Perper and Cina 2010, 129). He quickly reestablished the Voodoo traditions and further strengthened his powerbase in the rural countryside. Houngans and mambos (Voodoo priests and priestesses, respectively) who opposed him were immediately eliminated, beginning his ruthless power consolidation that came in the forms of imprisonment, interrogations, beatings, and shootings. Shortly after the election, there were reports of truckloads of still-living people including men, women, children, and officers being dumped into mass graves and smoothed over with cement (Abbott 1988). In another example of terror involving a newswoman from the opposition, a group of Duvalier’s men broke into her home. After her children were beaten and thrown into the street, the victim was driven to a field where she was beaten and gang-raped in the presence of Duvalier (Abbott 1988). Within seven months of his taking office, the majority of Duvalier’s opposition were killed or driven underground and out of the country (Diederich and Burt 1969). This serves as a clear indicator that Duvalier was preparing for lengthy career in his new political position. The elimination of opposition serves to ensure that he can remain in power until he is able to build up a force that will help to further defend his seat of power.

Duvalier experienced the first of several assassination and coup attempts during his first year as president. All of them further enhanced his acute paranoia. On April 30, 1958 after a bomb plot was uncovered, Duvalier was granted emergency powers, and he imposed a curfew in the city. Duvalierists began roaming the streets, armed with machine guns, checking everyone on the streets. It was during this time that the public began calling the Duvalierists the Tonton Macoutes or “Uncle Gunnysack.” Haitian folklore told of a diabolical man who would kidnap children roaming the streets at night, taking them away in his bag. The Tontons Macoutes were largely volunteers from the Haitian peasantry, extracting their living through looting and extorting their victims. Under Duvalier’s command, they helped him to consolidate control by terrorizing any who opposed him (Diederich and Burt 1969). Later, on May 18, Duvalier would request a U.S. Marine survey team to thwart his opposition and show his people that his government had U.S. support.

Duvalier was left traumatized after repeated overthrow attempts. He accelerated his weakening of the Army and enhanced his efforts to increase the numbers in his personal militia. He fired 18 top military officials and created a new
Presidential Guard, trained by the U.S. Marines, that were housed on the grounds of the Presidential Palace. This is something that further demonstrates how Duvalier had recognized past mistakes made by Haitian leadership and can further be explained as a result of his keen distrust of others. He was described as becoming “physically altered” and rather than a “quiet, humble country doctor ... he was shown snarling out at the world from under a large American army helmet” (Diederich and Burt 1969, 122). As further evidence to his paranoia and distrust of others, he took to wearing a gun on each hip to protect himself from future assassination attempts. These are key indicators of Duvalier’s transition from a government official to someone with a pathological determination to defend his political power.

In May 1959, he contracted a serious case of influenza and suffered a heart attack later that month. Duvalier’s personal physician, Dr. Jacques Fourcand, asserted that Duvalier lapsed into a coma, lasting nine hours (Abbott 1988). Some Duvalier associates assumed that irreversible neurological damage had occurred because of oxygen deprivation after an incorrect dose of medication was administered (Abbott 1988). Some of Duvalier’s palace intimates noted behaviors consistent with lapses into insanity (Abbott 1988). During his incapacitation, presidential powers shifted to Clement Barbot, head of the Tontons Marcoutes (Perper and Cina 2010). After his recovery, Duvalier imprisoned Barbot, accusing him of treason.

In April 1963, after being released from prison, Barbot planned a coup and orchestrated a failed kidnapping attempt of Duvalier’s children. “Hundreds, some say thousands, were to die in the horrific aftermath of this event. Duvalier’s immediate response was to order a neighborhood sweep. Then he instigated a witch hunt among those considered suspect” (Marquis 2007, 209). When a group of Tonton Macoute believed they had cornered Barbot in a room where he was reportedly hiding, they kicked down the door and found instead a lone black dog. Subsequently, an urban legend began that Barbot transformed himself into a black dog, who ultimately escaped. According to lore, in response Papa Doc ordered the extermination of every black dog on the island of Haiti (Abbott 1988; Perper and Cina 2010). After the kidnapping attempt, more of Duvalier’s grandiosity surfaced as he declared himself Haiti’s ‘‘predestined’ leader with a ‘historic mission to fulfill’’ (Diederich and Burt 1969, 217). During this timeframe, it was rumored that Duvalier began personally directing the torture of his opponents (Time 2011).

After his heart attack, Duvalier was described as being “Hitler-like,” who would “rant and rave and foam at the mouth like a true lunatic” (Abbott 1988, 98). This further indicates the depth of his paranoia and distrust in others. Duvalier began to withdraw from those close to him and to surround himself with his fervent supporters, the Tonton Macoutes. In a post-heart attack speech to people in the countryside made up of at least half houngans and mambos, Duvalier is quoted as
commanding, “never forget that I am the supreme authority of the State ... Henceforth, I, I alone, I am your only master” (Abbott 1988, 102–103).

By 1964, Duvalier had lost interest in the facade of presidential elections, declaring himself “President for Life.” During this time, his ruthlessness surged to new heights. On September 6, 1964, Duvalier’s men stormed a Catholic Church service in progress, having received information that a so-called black mass was taking place with the goal of causing harm to Duvalier (Diedrich and Burt 1969). After locking the church doors behind them, they severely beat the parishioners and priests. Duvalier’s paranoia caused him to perceive both the church and communism as significant threats to his rule. As a result, he limited freedom of movement through the imposition of curfews, he closed the university in fear of a student uprising, and he censored the media, including the Catholic newspaper (Marquis 2007).

Under Duvalier’s rule, Haiti sank further and further into disarray as he misappropriated millions of dollars in foreign aid.

The GNP slumped in an average year by 2.3 percent, while the cost of living shot up. Soil erosion and natural disasters caused a 13 percent drop in agricultural production, and that in a nation primarily agricultural. Haitian also had a life expectancy of forty years, the highest infant mortality rate in the Western world, the lowest literacy, the lowest percentage of children in school, and the lowest intake of calories and protein. The country’s foreign debt skyrocketed from a modest $4 million under Estime, to $52 million under Duvalier. (Abbott 1988, 139)

Image building was key for Duvalier to promote the illusion of a prospering nation. He forbade businesses from filing for bankruptcy and required them to stay open. To demonstrate a thriving night life to the tourism industry, he ordered people in government to go out in the evenings.

As Duvalier attempted to portray an important world leader, his people were flocking in droves to neighboring states including the Dominican Republic and the Bahamas. The sudden increase in illegal immigrants became a serious cause for concern to the Bahamian government, which forcibly deported fleeing Haitians by the hundreds (Abbott 1988). Duvalier found himself in the midst of a serious brain-drain as the educated classes of doctors, lawyers, and intellectuals left the country in hopes of a more stable life.

An International Commission of Jurists publicly denounced the quality of life in Haiti under Duvalier’s Presidency:

The systematic violation of every single article and paragraph of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights seems to be the only policy
which is respected and assiduously pursued in the Caribbean republic. The rule of law was long ago displaced by a reign of terror and the personal will of its dictator, who was awarded the title of Life President of the republic, and appears to be more concerned with the suppression of real or imaginary attempts against his life than with governing the country. He is leading his nation not in the direction of prosperity but towards the final disaster that can be seen in its political, social, and economic collapse (Abbott 1988, 143).

The Cult of Personality: Duvalier, Dieu, and Dessalines (DDD)

As Duvalier aged, he became increasingly cognizant of Voodoo’s significance in the belief structure of the Haitian people, and was able to manipulate that to serve his power-hungry ambitions. With his knowledge of the Haitian Voodoo culture, Duvalier purposefully mirrored himself after Voodoo priests replicating behaviors that included a staring, penetrative gaze, whispered speech, and hyper-slow physical movements (Time 2011). Duvalier portrayed himself as being possessed by the spirit of Jean-Jacques Dessalines, the famed historical figure who led Haiti to independence (Johnson 2006). Outwardly, he fashioned his appearance after the Voodoo Gede spirit, Baron Samedi, dressing in funeral attire (Johnson 2006; Perper and Cina 2010). “In the panther of loas, Baron Samedi is a god of the dead often portrayed as wearing a white top hat, black tuxedo, dark glasses, and cotton plugs in his nostrils” (Perper and Cina 2010, 130). Papa Doc used this imagery to strike fear in the hearts of his adversaries and to keep the masses at bay and mystified. Using the power of zin, a Creole term for spreading gossip, Duvalier was able to keep the people of Haiti living in fear as rumors spread rapidly that he was followed by spirits who lived with him at the Palace and made sure that no human could overthrow him (Abbott 1988; Johnson 2006). He summoned truckloads of citizens to his Palace to sing and dance for his entertainment. He even went so far as to have the Lord’s Prayer changed to further his cult of self-worship:

Our Doc, who art in the National Palace for life, hallowed be Thy name by present and future generations. Thy will be done in Port-au-Prince as it is in the provinces. Give us this day our new Haiti and forgive not the trespasses of those anti-patriots who daily spit upon our country. (Perper and Cina 2010, 130)

As a dictator, Duvalier created a cult of personality by having his portrait hung across the country. In some of the imagery, he “conveyed the message that he was chosen by Jesus Christ to lead Haiti. In one such portrait, Papa Doc stood next to an image of Jesus Christ with his hand on Papa Doc’s shoulder, along with a caption that read, ‘I have chosen him’” (Ezrow and Frantz 2013, 232). He used
“DDD” signage to position himself with God (Dieu), and Dessalines. Duvalier viewed himself as being one with the state, and an attack on him was a direct attack against the state of Haiti.

Duvalier perpetuated his reign of terror by having his enemies’ decapitated heads brought to him, so he could confer with the dead regarding their plans. He allegedly sought counsel from spirits and studied goat entrails (Johnson 2006). “For the fourteen years he was in power, the people of Haiti were never certain he had a soul, that he was a moral man” (Marquis 2007, 144). This use of the Voodoo religion allowed Duvalier to conflate religious power with political power. For a highly spiritual population, the people of Haiti had little choice but to accept Duvalier’s leadership.

Conclusion: “A Nation’s Ills Demand a Doctor”

Duvalier retained his presidential status and power for 14 years. His education and access to the rural population during his medical practice placed him in a unique position to build a strong powerbase with the rural peasantry. His study of Haitian history helped him to recognize and understand the mistakes of his predecessors, especially regarding the role of the Army. By deflating the influence of the Army, he surrounded himself with eager hand-picked followers, who were rewarded by steady pay and the position of power. For those followers who practiced Voodoo, Duvalier was revered as a Voodoo god and one who could neither be crossed nor killed. Individuals who opposed Duvalier were faced with fleeing to neighboring countries, seeking asylum in foreign embassies, or experiencing extreme punishment or death.

Duvalier masterfully exploited the importance of his iconic image as a physician with the power Voodoo-related beliefs held over the vast majority of his constituency; he positioned himself to initially command high status and respect, and then subsequently fear and terror. Two quotes from Papa Doc reflect this conscious awareness of political strength, both domestically as a despotic ruler, and internationally, when during his rule his status as a physician/dictator was unique and admired among world leader peers: “A nation’s ills demand a doctor,” and “A doctor must sometimes take a life to save it” (Montefiore 1997). Dr. François Duvalier perceived himself and his power as an integral part of a radical political cure, by way of terror and bloodshed, whose cost was justified in taking the lives of 30,000 Haitians during his Presidency (Metz 2001).

Papa Doc’s evolution from physician to despotic dictator is a remarkable, but not unique, international political phenomenon. The current Syrian President, Bashar Assad, an ophthalmologist, has created a “cult of personality” (Burke 2015), culminating in a devastating civil war with 465,000 Syrians dead or missing (Moore 2017). Radovan Karadzic, former President of Republika Srpska and a psychiatrist, was convicted of...
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity by a United Nations tribunal ... for leading a campaign of terror against civilians in the deadliest conflict in Europe since World War II. ... In 1992, the height of the ethnic cleansing campaign, close to 45,000 people were killed or missing, almost half of the 100,000 who died in the Bosnian war. ... Men and boys were held in concentration camps, where thousands were tortured, were killed, or died of starvation, and women were said to have been raped and used as sex slaves. (Simons 2016)

Papa Doc Duvalier, along with his Doctator-contemporaries Bashar Assad and Radovan Karadzic, each skillfully manipulated their status as a physician into authoritarian dictators who imposed a harsh citizen domination coupled with extreme loss of life. There are further examples of international physician politicians who were instrumental in transforming their nation's political landscape, all of which provide further insight into this subset of political dictators, including Dr. Hastings Banda, President of Malawi, Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, founder of the Republic of China, Dr. Che Guevara, Latin American revolutionary leader, Dr. Agostino Neto, former President of Angola, Dr. Salvador Allende, former President of Chile, and Dr. George Habash, founder of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Lass et al. 2012). All of these cases are deserving further exploration to better determine how this subset of individuals may be unique.

In an unanticipated turn of political events, Haiti once again has a political leader who is a physician. Dr. Jack Guy Lafontant, a gastroenterologist and member of the American College of Physicians, was appointed Prime Minister of Haiti on March 20, 2017. Prime Minister Lafontant had no known political experience or knowledge of the political administration prior to his appointment (Charles 2017a). Upon the new government’s swearing in, Prime Minister Lafontant noted the following: “The hour is grave, and the legacy is heavy” (Charles 2017b, n.p.). Although these remarks were delivered in the context of current political and economic challenges, they also serve as recognition of the potential political power and influence a physician Prime Minister can exercise.

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Strategic Warning and Anticipating Surprise: Assessing the Education and Training of Intelligence Analysts

Richard J. Kilroy Jr.
Coastal Carolina University

Katie Brooks
Coastal Carolina University

Abstract

Education of intelligence analysts is important in how the nation responds to emerging threats. In the last 15 years, a number of colleges and universities have developed undergraduate intelligence studies programs, with the intent that many of their graduates would pursue careers in the intelligence community. The purpose of this article is to examine the extent to which these undergraduate degree programs are providing students the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities to become intelligence analysts. The methodology employed consists of conducting content analysis of syllabi from schools offering courses in intelligence analysis to compare and contrast student learning outcomes, pedagogy, assessment, use of analytic tools and processes (such as structured analytical techniques, simulations, and exercises), and other instructional methodologies. It also includes interviewing faculty teaching in these programs, as well as interviewing intelligence analysts currently working in the intelligence community and instructors at the professional schools which train intelligence analysts. This article argues that while undergraduate education in intelligence analysis does a good job in exposing students to the unique challenges intelligence analysts face in assessing threats and providing strategic warning, an overemphasis on using structured analytical techniques in some of these courses may not be providing students with the critical thinking skills necessary to become intelligence analysts who are able to anticipate strategic surprise.

Key Terms: Intelligence analysis, structured analytical techniques, intelligence community, education, training, strategic surprise, critical thinking

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La advertencia estratégica y anticipando la sorpresa: evaluando la educación y el entrenamiento de los analistas de inteligencia

Resumen

La educación de analistas de inteligencia es importante para la forma en que la nación responde a las amenazas emergentes. En los últimos 15 años, muchas universidades y otras instituciones han creado programas de pregrado de estudios de inteligencia, con la intención de que muchos de sus alumnos elijan carreras en la comunidad de la inteligencia. El propósito de este artículo es examinar el punto hasta el que estos programas de pregrado están proporcionando a los estudiantes el conocimiento, habilidades y aptitudes para convertirse en analistas de inteligencia. La metodología empleada consiste en conducir análisis de contenido de los syllabus de instituciones educativas que ofrecen cursos de análisis de inteligencia para comparar y contrastar los resultados de aprendizaje de los estudiantes, la pedagogía, la evaluación y el uso de herramientas analíticas y procesos (como las técnicas analíticas estructurales, los simulacros y los ejercicios) y otras metodologías de instrucción. También incluye entrevistar a los profesores que enseñan estos programas, así como entrevistar analistas de inteligencia que trabajan actualmente en la comunidad de la inteligencia y a los instructores en academias profesionales que entrenan analistas de inteligencia. Este artículo argumenta que mientras que la educación de pregrado en análisis de inteligencia es buena para que los estudiantes estén expuestos a desafíos particulares que los analistas de inteligencia enfrentan al evaluar amenazas y proporcionar una advertencia estratégica, un sobre énfasis en la utilización de técnicas de análisis estructuradas en algunos de estos cursos podría no estar proporcionando a los estudiantes las habilidades de pensamiento crítico para ser analistas de inteligencia capaces de anticipar la sorpresa estratégica.

Palabras clave: analistas de inteligencia, técnicas estructuradas de análisis, comunidad de inteligencia, educación, entrenamiento, sorpresa estratégica, pensamiento crítico
战略预警和预判突袭：
评估情报分析师的教育和培训

摘要

情报分析师的教育从国家如何回应新兴威胁这方面看是很重要的。过去15年里，许多学院和大学都在本科阶段开设了情报研究专业，目的是希望许多毕业生能在情报社区发展事业。本文目的是检验这些专业在多大程度上为学生提供了成为情报分析师所需的必要知识、技能和能力。本文使用的方法论包括对提供情报分析课程的学校的教学大纲进行内容分析，用以比较和对比学生的学习成果、教学法、评估、分析工具和分析过程的使用（例如结构化分析技术、模拟和练习）、以及其他教学法。本文使用的方法论还包括对情报专业的教师进行访谈，也包括对正在情报社区工作的分析师和在校学校培训情报分析师的授课人员进行采访。本文认为，尽管本科教育中的情报分析在某方面完成的不错，即成功让学生面对在评估威胁和提供战略预警时情报分析师所遭遇的独特挑战，但一些情报分析课程过多地强调了结构化分析技术的使用——这可能不会培养出学生的批判性思维，而批判性思维则是成为能够预测战略突袭的情报分析师所必备的。

关键词：情报分析，结构化分析技术，情报社区，教育，培训，战略突袭，批判性思维

Introduction

In 1995, the Intelligence Community (IC) produced a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE-95-15) assessing the threat of nuclear missile technology, concluding that there was not a significant threat in the next 15 years. In 1998, India and Pakistan conducted successful nuclear weapons tests, catching the IC by surprise, causing the U.S. Congress to conduct a series of hearings on how they failed to anticipate the proliferation of nuclear weapons (Rumsfeld 1998). Similarly, as a result of the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other intelligence agencies undertook a number of studies to determine
how to improve intelligence analysis and, by inference, prevent strategic surprise. As Jack Davis of the CIA’s Sherman Kent School, which trains intelligence analysts, stated in 2003, “The central mission of intelligence analysis is to warn US officials about dangers to national security interests and to alert them to perceived openings to advance US policy objectives. Thus, the bulk of analysts’ written and oral deliverables points directly or indirectly to the existence, characteristics, and implications of threats to and opportunities for US national security” (2003, 3). Davis (and others) argue that in strategic warning, surprise is inevitable (Honig 2008; Betts 2010). However, education and training of intelligence analysts plays an important role in preparing the intelligence community, which can influence how the nation responds to new threats as they emerge.

In the last 15 years, there have been a number of colleges and universities which have developed undergraduate intelligence studies programs, with the intent that many of their graduates would pursue careers in the intelligence community. Yet, there is a wide divergence in the structure and design of these programs, to include traditional security studies in a single discipline liberal arts department (political science, etc.); multidiscipline programs which include liberal arts, sciences and technology; and more practitioner-based approaches in professional schools (Campbell 2011; Coulthart and Crosston 2015). Most of these programs include courses in intelligence analysis, but tailored to their particular program requirements.

The purpose of this article is to examine the extent to which these undergraduate degree programs are providing students the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities to become intelligence analysts who may eventually be involved in producing strategic warning assessments. The methodology consists of conducting content analysis of syllabi from schools offering courses in intelligence analysis to compare and contrast student learning outcomes, pedagogy, assessment, use of analytic tools and processes (such as structured analytical techniques, simulations, and exercises), and other instructional methodologies. It also includes assessing the results of interviewing faculty teaching in these programs, as well as interviewing intelligence analysts currently working in the intelligence community and instructors at the professional schools which train intelligence analysts within the IC. This article assesses the extent to which undergraduate education in intelligence analysis does or does not provide the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities for analysts working in the IC, in order to be better equipped to do strategic warning and anticipate strategic surprise. As a result of the research conducted, this article argues that while undergraduate education in intelligence analysis does a good job in exposing students to the unique challenges intelligence analysts face in assessing threats and providing strategic warning, an overemphasis on using structured analytical techniques in some of these courses may not be providing students with the critical thinking skills necessary to become intelligence analysts who are able to anticipate strategic surprise.
Background to the Problem

There has been an ongoing debate within the IC for many years on whether intelligence analysis is tradecraft (art) or science (Marrin 2009; Lahneman and Arcos 2014; Bruce and George 2015; Landon-Murray and Coulthart 2016). Much of the controversy lies in how one views intelligence analysis; is it similar to academic research, where students can learn the basic skills necessary to conduct academic inquiry, applying analytical tools or techniques through qualitative or quantitative scientific methods, or is it more of an art, or the process of tradecraft learned over time and practice, based on experience, direct observation, and “gut instincts” that can only be acquired through lifelong work in the IC? In other words, the debate can be framed in the context of a hypothetical: can a 22-year veteran intelligence analyst in the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) who has served in the US military during the Cold War and studied the Russian military his or her entire career be replaced by a 22 year-old college graduate, who has majored in Intelligence Studies and taken courses in intelligence analysis? While the literal answer may be yes, the larger question to be answered is whether through education and training, new intelligence analysts can possess the capacity to learn the job quickly and be technically proficient in order to be able to produce strategic intelligence assessments which anticipate surprise and provide strategic warning. If so, then what are the knowledge, skills, and abilities students need to learn in coursework which focuses specifically on intelligence analysis during their college years?

We must also define what we mean by “strategic surprise.” Jack Davis argues that strategic surprise is really the lack of strategic warning, which is the “inability of the intelligence community to focus on long-term developments that, when brought to the attention of policy-makers, will allow officials to redirect resources, formulate contingency plans, establish new programs, form new relationships, and otherwise meaningfully prepare for new conditions and trends” (Haddick 2012). Colin Gray (2005) argues that the issue is not “surprise” but rather “effect” of a strategic event and how the geopolitical context often dictates the outcome of the “strategic surprise.” He also states that throughout history, strategic surprise has not dictated the outcomes of war or conflict, and military strategy or transformation should not overreact to such events when they occur. Thus, strategic surprise, by itself, may not be the problem, but rather how institutions and policy-makers (intelligence, defense, Presidents, Congress, etc.) respond when such events like 9/11 occur. Kettl (2013) calls them “policy lighting” events since they often produce major policy changes and bureaucratic responses, such as the Homeland Security Act (2002), Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act Reform (2004), and the subsequent standup of the Department of Homeland Security, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, etc. These in and of themselves have not necessarily improved intelligence analysis, or the ability to anticipate strategic
surprise. Rather, the goal of strategic warning within the intelligence community is not to prevent surprise, but anticipate it and provide policy-makers with timely enough information to shape policy choices (Davis 2003). Although strategic warning is a discrete subset of the broader analytical field of intelligence analysis, the analysts’ training and education do play a key role in enabling them to think critically about future threats, or “global trends” which will impact policy formulation and decision-making (DNI 2017).

**Literature on Intelligence Analysis**

Much has been written about the need for professionalization of intelligence, to include intelligence analysis (Marrin 2012; Bruce and George 2015). The arguments offered are that through a more rigorous professional development program which includes education, training, certification, credentialing and a continual reevaluation and reassessment of one’s own competencies, biases, or prejudices, the intelligence community will produce better intelligence programs, processes, and products, to include strategic warning. As a result, intelligence professionals will be less likely to politicize intelligence, or succumb to their own cognitive biases in producing analytic products. Yet, as Hastedt (2013) notes, intelligence is based on the need for the intelligence community to respond to consumer demands and thus has been and will always be politicized. To this end, a key factor in teaching intelligence analysis is understanding the relationship between the intelligence professional and policy-makers. This is particularly important for those analysts who do produce strategic assessments, offering long-term forecasts of future trends and threats the nation faces.

As a result of the intelligence failures surrounding the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the reorganization of the intelligence community mandated in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004, the newly formed Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) became the chief advocate for further reforms in the intelligence community. As Bruce and George (2015) note, the ODNI, as a result of the IRTPA legislation, mandated certain analytical tradecraft become standardized across the IC, to include the use of Structured Analytical Techniques (SAT). These were codified in the CIA’s *Tradecraft Primer* (2009) and expanded on by Heuer and Pherson (2014). Yet, SATs are not as methodologically rigorous as their proponents argue (Artner, Girven, and Bruce 2016). And, as Coulthart (2017) notes, the jury is still out on the effectiveness of SATs as an analytical tool in producing intelligence products which have provided accurate threat assessments, much less anticipated strategic surprise.

There is a growing amount of literature concerning the best ways to teach and use intelligence analysis; however; most of it tends to fall into two camps based on the previous views of whether intelligence analysis is an art or a science. Those who advocate it is an art fall within the analytical tradecraft literature which
emphasizes critical thinking skills and mastering core competencies or knowledge. Those who argue it is a science and recognize the challenge for analysts to avoid cognitive bias advocate for the use of more social scientific research methods (quantitative or qualitative). The use of SATs is viewed by their proponents as falling into the second category, although there is much disagreement on whether SATs can be considered “scientific” (Artner, Girven, and Bruce 2016; Coulthart 2017).

The use of SATs for intelligence analysis is paramount in the works of authors such as Clark (2016); Beebe and Pherson (2014); and Heuer and Pherson (2014) in order to teach students multiple ways in which information can be analyzed using these techniques. SATs require that analysts use their current information and categorize it or expand on it to come up with a valid prediction or analysis. As developed by Heuer and Pherson (2014), SATs fall within a series of categories, such as Decomposition and Visualization; Idea Generation; Scenarios and Indicators; and Decision Support. Based on the problem to be analyzed or puzzle to be solved, certain SATs under each of these categories will be more appropriate than others. By using SATs, analysts can provide evidence for how they reached their conclusion. They can also share their data with other analysts who have also been trained on the use of SATs within the IC and figuratively speak a common language (e.g., crowd-sourcing and use of Intellipedia). Beebe and Pherson (2014) further provide case studies in the use of SATs demonstrating how different SATs can be utilized from different categories to analyze an actual historical event. The primary goal of the use of SATs proposed by these authors is for a student to be able to analyze a topic or issue and avoid biases (e.g., use of Brainstorming and Red Teaming).

While the development of the term SATs is fairly new, the concepts employed are not. Some of the techniques included as SATs have been around for decades, often employed in the business world. One example would be SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats) analysis, which is used extensively outside the intelligence community for leadership development and decision-making. Some of these techniques can be considered more qualitative rather than quantitative methodologies since they lack the scientific rigor associated with much of social science research or even basic statistical analysis (Bayesian probability, criticality, standard deviations, etc.).

Although the literature does suggest a division between the two camps of those advocating intelligence analysis as an art, with an emphasis on critical thinking skills, and those proposing the use of Structured Analytical Techniques, there is some agreement that one actually precedes the other. For instance, Pherson and Pherson (2016) also focus on the use of Structured Analytical Techniques in their writing and are strong advocates for the use of SATs; however, they do argue in their text that critical thinking is still the main skill that all intelligence analysts
need to possess. They cannot use SATs if they do not first develop critical thinking skills, which leads to another discussion on whether or not students can grasp the substantive knowledge necessary to be critical thinkers within the scope of a typical four-year education. Pherson (2017) also concedes that earlier work on producing SATs for analyst education and training did not specifically address the area of strategic foresight.

**Intelligence Studies Programs**

There are still relatively few colleges or universities in the United States which offer undergraduate degrees in intelligence studies, but the numbers are growing. Examples include: Point Park University (PA); Mercyhurst University (PA); Notre Dame College (OH); Coastal Carolina University (SC), Fayetteville State University (NC), James Madison University (VA); Norwich University (VT); and American Public University (online). The degrees offered at these schools fall within traditional liberal arts departments (Politics or History), multidisciplinary programs (Science and Technology, etc.), or professional schools (Criminal Justice and Homeland Security). Other colleges offer undergraduate minors in Intelligence Studies, or an area of concentration in Intelligence Analysis under a different degree program. Almost all of these programs include coursework related to intelligence analysis. The following are a sampling of schools and programs.

Mercyhurst University in Erie, PA was one of the first colleges to offer an undergraduate intelligence degree program. Mercyhurst is partnered with agencies such as the Department of Defense, European Parliament, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of State. Students have had internships and learning opportunities with these institutions through Mercyhurst’s program. The Intelligence Studies program is a multidisciplinary program with a liberal arts focus that aims to produce entry-level analysts. Students are educated on collecting data and analyzing it for a specified consumer so that after graduation, Mercyhurst alumni can apply these skills in the workplace, to include the private sector, as well as in intelligence career fields.

Notre Dame College in South Euclid, OH offers a Bachelor of Arts degree in Intelligence Studies from the History and Political Science Department. Students in this program are held to academic standards within a traditional liberal arts curriculum and are prepared for a future in the intelligence community. Projected program outcomes include students possessing extensive knowledge and understanding of the working sectors of the intelligence cycle and recognizing agencies both mainstream and those less publicized in the intelligence community. Students graduating from this program are expected to be fluent in the current and plausible domestic, regional, and global security threats. Students are expected be able to write professionally and present reports in accordance with the expec-
tations of the intelligence community. The Intelligence Studies program at Notre Dame encourages students to become fluent in a foreign language and also knowledgeable of other non-Western cultures to have a better understanding of the world around them.

James Madison University (JMU) in Harrisonburg, VA, offers an undergraduate Bachelor of Science in Intelligence Analysis (IA) degree program. It is administered as part of the multidisciplinary Department of Integrated Science and Technology (ISAT). The JMU Intelligence Analysis program is undergraduate-only, with about 250 students in the major. There are two primary concentrations: national security and competitive intelligence, with law enforcement possible if the students minor in Criminal Justice. JMU’s technical specialties include cyber intelligence—linked to computer science, and geospatial intelligence—linked to geographic sciences. It may be best to think of JMU’s program more as an “analysis” major which sets its graduates up well for a wide variety of different kinds of jobs to include—but not limited to—intelligence analysis. JMU’s faculty also reflect a diverse interdisciplinary knowledge base, with few having actually worked in the intelligence career field.

Coastal Carolina University (CCU) in Conway, SC, teaches intelligence analysis courses in support of CCU’s Bachelor of Arts in Intelligence and National Security Studies (INTEL) degree program. The undergraduate intelligence degree program is administered within the Department of Politics at CCU, and as such, follows a traditional liberal arts curriculum. INTEL Majors at CCU complete the University core curriculum, which includes: foreign language; sciences; arts; politics; history; English; and math courses. Since students elect to be an INTEL major upon enrollment, they take courses during their core curriculum required for the major, to include: Anthropology; Communications; Geography; Philosophy; and Statistics. Examples of foundational Intelligence courses required for the major include: Introduction to Intelligence Studies; Intelligence Communications, Analysis, and Operations; Intelligence Research and Writing; and either Homeland Security or National Security. Students complete the program with a Capstone Course, which involves a major research paper. Students in other disciplines can also pursue a Minor in Intelligence and National Security Studies.

American Public University in Charles Town, WV offers an online Bachelor of Arts degree in Intelligence Studies. The American Public University System is also home to American Military University. The program’s purpose is to enable students to research, analyze, and transform raw data into comprehensible intelligence. The program offers concentrations in fields such as counterintelligence, cyber, and Latin America area studies just to name a few. There are five main objectives of the Intelligence Studies program at American Public University. The first objective is for students to be able to outline the various elements of the changing intelligence community and its functions. Second, students will also be capable of
detailing all the working components of the intelligence community and its consumers while also learning, in depth, the intelligence cycle and how each sector works in harmony with another. Third, students will be able to differentiate the different modes of collection and also detail the laws and restrictions associated with the intelligence community. Fourth, students at American Public University will conduct their own research and form their own academic writings suitable for the intelligence community’s consumers. And fifth, students will be able to differentiate among the functions of collection sources such as: Human Intelligence (HUMINT); Open Source Intelligence (OSINT); Measurement and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT); Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT); and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT).

The University of Texas, El Paso (UTEP) offers a Master of Science in Intelligence and National Security and an Undergraduate Minor in Intelligence and National Security. UTEP’s graduate program is certified by the International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE). UTEP also offers an open source certificate, the first in the country that offers curriculum not found in many civilian institutions, such as social media intelligence; commercial imagery; and geospatial intelligence. At the undergraduate level, UTEP offers an online BA in Security Studies, which is an Intelligence Community Center for Academic Excellence and is partnered with the Center for Intelligence and Security Research. Through this partnership, students’ education is progressed through help from faculty and their own student research. Students in the Center for Intelligence and Security Research receive advanced education and training on the intelligence community’s commission to foresee and evaluate the many afflicting national security issues.

Eastern Kentucky University (EKU) in Richmond, KY offers a Bachelor of Science degree in Homeland Security. It also includes an Intelligence Studies Program as part of the Homeland Security degree offered through the College of Justice and Safety. The Intelligence Studies Program started with a required intelligence process course for Homeland Security majors and then expanded to an interdisciplinary undergraduate Certificate in Intelligence Studies, requiring four courses to include: intelligence history; intelligence process; counterintelligence; and intelligence analysis. It is paired with students completing four courses in a concentration, including: intelligence collection and analysis; threat specialization; regional analysis (plus two language courses); security operations, and science and technology. EKU also offers a graduate Certificate in Intelligence and National Security with four courses in: foundations of homeland security; terrorism and intelligence; intelligence analysis; and international relations. The undergraduate and graduate certificates are standalone in which a student can obtain the certificate without having to enroll or complete a formal degree. In the fall of 2017, EKU added a Minor in Cybersecurity and Intelligence pairing three intelligence courses in intelligence process, counterintelligence, and intelligence analysis with four forensic computing courses.
Tulane University in New Orleans, LA offers a Bachelor of Arts degree in Homeland Security. This program is part of the professional advancement Emergency and Security Studies Department. Tulane partners with the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Homeland Defense and Security providing recent graduates an opportunity to further their professional education. Tulane is also a member of the University and Agency Partner Initiative that establishes an environment for sharing curriculum related to the homeland security field. The Homeland Security program at Tulane calls attention to leadership and hands-on training. Students are also taught critical thinking and decision-making skills. The program includes courses related to security and border protections as well as counter terrorism. Students are also taught skills used in emergency management. The program caters to students furthering their education who are already in the profession and those just starting their education in Homeland Security Studies.

Virginia Tech in Blacksburg, VA offers a Bachelor of Arts degree in National Security and Foreign Affairs. This program is taught through the College of Liberal Arts and Human Sciences. Virginia Tech is partnered with the Department of State’s Diplomacy Lab Program in which students conduct research through the Department of State. Students in the National Security and Foreign Affairs program at Virginia Tech are encouraged to study foreign languages. The program also teaches students to analyze the role of intelligence analysis in shaping US strategy for diplomacy and foreign policy, as well as adding a new focus on cyber security. Students will relate their teachings to actual scenarios, providing them with a hands-on approach to analyzing threats and challenges.

In offering courses on intelligence analysis, each school has certain requirements for students (e.g., prerequisite coursework and majors only.), which limits the availability of these courses to students outside of the major field of study. For example, at UTEP, only Intelligence Studies majors can take intelligence analysis courses. For Introduction to Intelligence Analysis and Intelligence Collection and Analysis, UTEP students need to take a seminar, Introduction to Intelligence and National Security course. This course provides a very broad overview of the field, to include the basic context of the Intelligence Community, the intelligence cycle, etc. Graduate-level courses are reading intensive, so students are expected to be familiar with most of the significant literature in the field of intelligence studies.

Teaching Intelligence Analysis

Although coursework in intelligence analysis comprises most intelligence studies programs—whether these are standalone degree programs, minors, or areas of concentration—there is a wide berth of pedagogies, methodologies, and course content involved. The following discussion includes insights offered by course instructors at some of the colleges listed above, as well as a comparison of course content from actual syllabi available on intelligence anal-
ysis coursework. These comments were offered in a Roundtable Discussion on Teaching Intelligence Analysis at the International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE) Conference in Charles Town, WV in May 2017 (see Kilroy 2017).

Stephen Coulthart, an Assistant Professor at UTEP, stated that with undergraduates in his Intelligence Collection and Analysis course, he curates a classroom environment that is as interactive as possible. This is done to help keep students engaged. For example, he uses an exercise on HUMINT collection from Lahneman and Arcos (2014). In terms of content, he focuses on learning about intelligence analysis for 75% of the course (e.g., theory and substantive knowledge of intelligence agencies) and 25% on analytical skills (e.g., Bottom Line Up Front briefing and writing). In terms of intelligence analysis content, Coulthart expects that students walk away from the course being able to discuss and define intelligence analysis and how it fits into U.S. national security as well as identify the key issues and debates in intelligence analysis. To test for this knowledge, he uses mostly multiple choice along with some short answer questions split between assessments done in and out of class. Coulthart’s approach toward graduate intelligence analysis education is quite different from undergraduate intelligence analysis education. It is informed by Schon (1990) which stresses the importance of providing aspiring professionals with environments where they can fail, adopt, and succeed repeatedly. In developing his syllabus for the course, he drew inspiration from art studios where students are given difficult tasks and allowed to “fumble” through them. Coulthart sees his role in this course less as an instructor imparting knowledge and more as a coach/resource person helping students make sense of each task. In terms of learning outcomes, he expects that students will possess a basic understanding of the context of intelligence analysis (e.g., historical and organizational) and basic intelligence analysis proficiencies (searching, validating, organizing, analyzing, and communicating).

Brian Simpkins, who teaches at EKU, explains that each of the courses which cover intelligence analysis employs different pedagogies determined by the expected learning outcomes. For example, HLS 321W Critical Process, on-campus, utilizes a lecture and laboratory format; each week has a lecture on the assigned topic and students then are provided exercises or team simulations where they must use the material covered in the lecture as they work on a major research project. The online version of HLS 321W is a self-study course where the students do the same simulations and exercises as on-campus students and also develop a major research project. The course utilizes Elder and Paul’s (2016) framework. The last 4–5 weeks of HLS 401 Intelligence Process, which focuses on intelligence analysis, employs a Team-Based Learning format on-campus and online a self-study format. HLS 403 Intelligence Analysis employs a seminar format with extensive case-study work done individually and in teams. The online course is more self-study, but still employs student team projects. HLS 825 Intelligence Analysis is only taught online and is done in a self-study format with significant case-study
work done by individual students and an individual student threat analysis project. Intelligence analysis courses utilize a number of Heuer and Pherson’s (2014) Structured Analytical Techniques, to include: Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH); What If Analysis; Red Teaming; and Indicators Analysis. The course also uses Clark (2016) based on formal modeling and case studies.

Stephen Marrin, Associate Professor in JMU’s Integrated Science and Technology program, noted that the faculty members in the program employ a variety of pedagogical styles in teaching different courses. For his knowledge-based courses, he recognizes the challenge in teaching undergraduates that they do not often read the assigned materials. Therefore, he assigns papers that have as a requirement: answer a question by referencing key content from each of the assigned readings into a holistic, synthetic evaluation of the course content, which provides a platform for the students to develop their evaluative and argumentative skills (the core skills of the strategic intelligence analyst). Marrin also has students prepare strategic intelligence assessments in a capstone course. Students in this course can choose a client for whom they will present their paper as the consumer of the product, or they can produce it as a self-initiated product. Since this is a two-semester course process, students must pick a topic, choose a research question, identify methods to employ, and then implement the research design by learning in a trial and error way, where they continually revise their research design and ultimate product. Marrin stated that his goals, as a political scientist teaching social context in an intelligence analysis program, are to one, give students knowledge about aspects of intelligence, intelligence analysis, and national security decision-making; two, be diagnostic and give the students a chance to decide if national security intelligence analysis (or intelligence, or analysis, or national security) is the right path for them; and three, be preparatory, as Rob Johnson (2005) referred to it, a kind of “sociological acculturation” ... a preparation for what it takes to do analysis well. Marrin notes that JMU’s Intelligence Analysis Program is very much like the new pre-med degree programs, which go beyond science education to now include a multidisciplinary approach which includes a social context, e.g., including courses in philosophy, psychology, and sociology, with the goal being a solid knowledge foundation for those who choose to go to medical school after graduation (Marrin 2009).

At CCU, multiple faculty teach INTEL 310 Intelligence Analysis and each brings in their own pedagogy to enhance learning. In the introductory course, INTEL 200, however, where students are first exposed to Intelligence Analysis, all faculty use Jensen, McElreath, and Graves (2012) Introduction to Security Studies. In his INTEL 310 classes, Kilroy begins by discussing critical thinking using literature, such as Heuer (1999), Moore (2007), and Facione (2015). The course then focuses on teaching Structured Analytical Techniques, using Heuer and Pherson’s (2014) text, along with Beebe and Pherson’s (2014), Cases in Intelligence Analysis: Structured Analytic Techniques in Action. Students work in teams assigned to spe-
cific case studies, which then must “teach” the other students in the class about the case study, guide them through the use of the appropriate SAT, and then demonstrate an understanding of the SAT by explaining their outcome. As a culmination of the course, students also work in teams to analyze a contemporary security situation by developing four scenarios for the possibility of a Third Intifada in the Middle East, using adversarial collaboration and structured debate to argue their most likely outcome. In addition to the written papers, the assessment instruments for the course include a midterm which is more objective (multiple choice, true/false, short answer) assessing Bloom’s lower cognitive skills and a final exam (all essay questions) assessing Bloom’s higher cognitive skills (Bloom 1956).

In looking at course syllabi from the programs described above and others, there are a number of interesting observations regarding similarities and differences regarding course content. The following chart summarizes a sampling of undergraduate coursework on intelligence analysis assessing courses regarding their instruction in critical thinking skills, research methods, course objectives, assigned readings, and means of assessment. In this chart, the percentages listed indicate how much of the course is dedicated to the corresponding headings. For example, critical thinking emphasized in the course on intelligence analysis would include the use of assignments, exercises, scenarios, case studies, etc. where students would apply structured analytical techniques or critical thinking skills to solve intelligence-related problems. The research methods emphasized in the course would include conducting literature reviews, writing more traditional research papers, or producing intelligence estimates or other simulated intelligence products. The sources were syllabi either available online, or provided by faculty members at those schools. There were a couple of schools with intelligence programs that offer coursework in intelligence analysis, which preferred not to provide copies of their syllabi.

Professional Schools and Intelligence Analyst Training

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ince one of the goals of most of the undergraduate intelligence degree programs is to prepare students for future careers in the intelligence community, to include Intelligence Research Specialist (GS-0132) positions as intelligence analysts, comparing coursework at these schools to what is being offered at the professional schools for intelligence analyst training provides important insight. In other words, does the coursework at colleges and universities provide students the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities necessary to be successful intelligence analysts who may be involved in doing strategic warning? It is necessary, however, to point out that education and training are not the same thing: this has been an ongoing debate in academia for years (Hale 2006; Rugg 2014). The professional schools for intelligence training (e.g., CIA’s Sherman Kent School, DHS Intelligence Training Academy, DIA’s National Intelligence University, and Military
Strategic Warning and Anticipating Surprise: Assessing the Education and Training of Intelligence Analysts

In intelligence Schools), tailor their training programs to the specific needs of their respective services and agencies. For example, the US Army Intelligence Center and School at Ft. Huachuca, AZ provides training for both officers and enlisted personnel in military intelligence (35 series) career fields, which focus primarily on tactical intelligence operations, collection, and analysis. Also, the professional intelligence schools, with the exception of the National Intelligence University, are not accredited, degree-granting institutions. Some colleges do, however, give course credit to prior military service members for intelligence training courses,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>University</th>
<th>Critical Thinking</th>
<th>Research Methods</th>
<th>Course Objectives</th>
<th>Books</th>
<th>Course Assignments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coastal Carolina University: Intelligence Analysis</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>Comprehend analysis work and identify analytical methods</td>
<td>Heuer and Pherson (2014) Beebe and Pherson (2014)</td>
<td>Two papers (40%) Case Study (20%) Briefs (10%) Exams (20%) Participation (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Public University: Intelligence Analysis</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>Learn types of analysis associated with intelligence, Structured Analytical Techniques and the intelligence research process</td>
<td>Gray, Williamson, Karp, and Dalphin (2007)</td>
<td>Progress assignments (75%) Forum Discussions (25%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Kentucky University: Intelligence Analysis</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>Understand Structured Analytical Techniques, and employ them in writing, determine information sources, evaluate policies</td>
<td>Beebe and Pherson (2014) Pherson and Pherson (2016)</td>
<td>Class Prep Guides (19%) Participation (15%) Team Project (15%) Individual paper (8%) Individual Project (43%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Madison University: Issues in Intelligence Analysis</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>Learn various aspects of intelligence analysis while exploring improvement for future analysis</td>
<td>Marrin (2009) George and Bruce (2014)</td>
<td>Exams (60%) Research Paper (30%) Participation (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercyhurst University: Improving Intelligence Analysis</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>Learn issues related to intelligence analysis, and other comparative objectives</td>
<td>George and Bruce (2008) Russell (2007)</td>
<td>Weekly Papers (90%) Participation (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Tennessee State University: Intelligence Analysis</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>Learn all aspects of the intelligence cycle</td>
<td>Phythian (2013)</td>
<td>Weekly Assignments (20%) Exams (40%) Poster (20%) Presentation of Poster (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Texas at El Paso: Intelligence Collection and Analysis</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>Introduce key components of intelligence analysis and the evolution of changes associated</td>
<td>Clark (2013) George and Bruce (2014)</td>
<td>Quizzes (20%) Application Briefings (20%) Exams (50%) Participation (10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notre Dame College: Advanced Research and Analysis</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>Enhance research, source evaluation, and analytical skills, cover Structured Analytical Techniques</td>
<td>Heuer and Pherson (2014) Pherson and Pherson (2016) Heuer (1999)</td>
<td>One paper, graded on each submitted portion. Background (15%) Midterm (20%) Presentation 1 (20%) Final Paper (20%) Final Presentation (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulane University: Intelligence Research</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>Understand the basics of intelligence analysis, cultivate writing skills</td>
<td>Clark (2016) Heuer (1999)</td>
<td>Position Papers (15%) Oral Presentation (10%) Midterm Exam (25%) Final Exam (30%) Participation (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia Tech: Intelligence Analysis Workshop</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>Create reports, evaluate techniques, analyze for assessments</td>
<td>Clark (2016) Heuer and Pherson (2014)</td>
<td>Intelligence Reports (50%) Class Performance (50%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Global Security and Intelligence Studies

based on course equivalencies in their degree programs.\(^1\) The National Intelligence University does offer a Bachelor of Science in Intelligence (BSI) degree as a full-time fourth year program of study (17 courses) for students who have already completed three years of college course work at other academic institutions. Even though NIU comes under the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), students who participate in the BSI, as well as other intelligence training courses provided by the University, come from throughout the intelligence community. They are required to have a Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS/SCI) security clearance to participate in NIU educational programs (NIU 2017).

The CIA's Sherman Kent School offers the Career Analyst Program (CAP). It is the CIA's basic intelligence training program for new analysts. It introduces intelligence analysts in the Agency to "basic thinking, writing, and briefing skills" (CIA 2015). The CAP runs 16 weeks with segments of instruction including "analytic tools, counterintelligence issues, denial and deception analysis, and warning skills" (CIA 2015). The goal of the CAP training program is to produce critical thinkers who can state their analysis clearly and succinctly (BLUF—bottom line up front), use probabilistic thinking in producing intelligence products which reflect ICD 203 language (DNI 2015),\(^2\) and demonstrate the effective use of Structured Analytic Techniques in their methodologies. Or, as one instructor noted, "they must be able to show their work" on how they reached their conclusions, using tools such as a pre-analysis worksheet (PAW).\(^3\)

Structured Analytical Techniques, such as Analysis of Competing Hypotheses (ACH), were developed by Richards Heuer and later codified by the CIA in its Tradecraft Primer (2009). Along with another former CIA analyst, Randy Pherson, Heuer published a textbook on the use of SATs as another means by which to reduce cognitive bias (Heuer and Pherson 2010). They argued that the use of SATs also provided a common language by which analysts could work collaboratively and "show their work" when queried on how they came up with their conclusions. The danger of this argument, however, is what Betts (2010) noted as the "speed of response" that could be considered one of the pathologies when it comes to strategic warning failures.

The use of SATs in teaching intelligence analysis is not just used by the CIA. Other intelligence training schools have also included instruction in SATs in their basic curriculum. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Intelligence Training Academy (ITA) requires intelligence analysts working in DHS organi-

\(^1\) For example, Cochise College, in Sierra Vista, Arizona near Ft. Huachuca, gives credit for certain military intelligence training course to be applied toward an Associate of Applied Science Degree in Intelligence Operations Studies (Cochise 2017).

\(^2\) ICD 203 is an Intelligence Community Directive which provides a standard for analytical products which reflect the levels of confidence in the assessment being made (e.g., use of the term "highly probable" reflects an 85–90% confidence level on the part of the analyst in their assessment).

\(^3\) Personal discussions with students and instructors at the Kent School.
izations to attend their Basic Intelligence and Threat Analysis Course (BITAC). This 4-week course provides DHS intelligence analysts the basic knowledge and skills necessary to work in Homeland Security-related assignments within DHS. The course provides training in intelligence writing and briefing; preparing intelligence estimates; delivering intelligence briefings; and analytic tradecraft. The BITAC also includes instruction in SATs as a means to improve critical thinking skills and reduce cognitive bias. Like the Kent School, the ITA’s use of SATs is meant to provide students a methodology using “quasi-quantitative” means to support their arguments. For DHS agencies, the use of SATs also helps develop both individual and group analytical work, particularly given DHS’s role in supporting federal law enforcement training across state, local, tribal, and territorial government agencies. The ITA, along with the Kent School, also offers a number of short-duration (2–3 day) courses focused on intermediate- and advanced-level training for both analysts and managers on analytic methodologies, substantive issues, and leadership skills. The ITA also has a mobile training team which will take its courses on the road to a number of Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC) throughout the country.

In discussions with military intelligence analysts who attended their specific intelligence training centers and schools (such as the US Army Intelligence Center and School at Ft. Huachuca, Arizona), the use of SATs was not consistently included in their curriculum. In fact, one former Army intelligence analyst who is now serving in a civilian GS-132 series position in a federal agency mentioned that he had never heard of SATs until he actually attended his Basic Non-Commissioned Officer Course (BNOC), not his intelligence courses. He intimated that the use of SATs in BNOC was not so much based on intelligence analysis, but rather as a tool for decision-making (e.g., SWOT analysis). However, military intelligence analysts working in the Joint Staff J2 and at the Navy’s Office of Naval Intelligence stated that they did use SATs in producing their intelligence products.

Content Analysis

Courses and programs compared in this paper all had at least one similar instructional goal: for students to learn the skills required to be knowledgeable in the work of intelligence analysts in general (not specifically strategic warning and assessment). One trend is class participation, where students are required to engage in group work. In the majority of these courses, students
are assigned to work together and contribute ideas in class. Another aspect that stood out is the number of oral presentations or briefings required. Almost all of these courses have a presentation element where students have to orally demonstrate their understanding of research concepts and write a paper that works off of the presentation or vice versa. Both of these requirements are consistent with the professional schools, which also focus on group work and briefings to improve communication skills. Cognitive psychology literature also supports the value of group dynamics over individual performance in analytical outcomes using SAT methodologies, such as brainstorming (Lamm and Tromsdorff 1973).

Another observation is that there were either one or two large projects for the course, or there were many, mostly weekly, assignments for students to complete. This shows what the instructors prioritize from the student learning outcomes, whether it is research and presentation for one or two large assignments or mainly writing skills which are portrayed in the smaller multiple assignments.

The college courses analyzed also demonstrated that they were teaching students similar knowledge, skills, and abilities to what the professional intelligence training schools were offering their students. Providing college students methodological tools, such as Structured Analytical Techniques as well as knowledge of the ICD 203 Analytical Standards in their college programs of study, does give students the means by which to “learn the language” of analytical tradecraft and better prepare them for the types of jobs they will encounter throughout the intelligence community agencies. Practicing rhetoric and effective communication through oral presentations and classroom exercises also provides college students more confidence as public speakers and briefers, who at some point in their professional intelligence career will be required to present their analytical products to senior leaders in their organizations.7

The similarity in course texts and intelligence literature further demonstrates that most college intelligence analysis coursework is providing students with the most recent scholarship by both practitioners and academics in intelligence studies. While there was some variation in the amount of time spent in each subject area, the courses provide a similar amount of emphasis on using texts which focused on critical thinking skills (Jones 1998; Heuer 1999; Moore 2007; Fingar 2011; Kahneman 2015; Elder and Paul 2016; Pherson and Pherson 2016); use of SATs and other instructional methodologies (Heuer and Pherson 2014; Lahneman and Arcos 2014); and general knowledge of analytic tradecraft and culture (Johnson 2005; George and Bruce 2014; Clark 2016).

One finding in the research, however, which was insightful, was the means by which the professional schools used case study methodology as a means of supporting their instructional objectives versus the college courses. Both the Kent

7 The Sherman Kent School recognizes the achievements of their most outstanding CAP graduates in four areas: research, writing, briefing, and leadership.
School and the ITA use real world case studies from the Harvard University Kennedy School of Government, which provide students a scenario, with a problem to be analyzed, along with the actual results, so that students can learn what they missed. The instructors do not provide students a specific SAT or methodology but allow the students to come up with their own means to solve the problem. As one instructor noted, “this allows us to focus on process in determining outcomes.” Some of the college courses chose to use a text (Beebe and Pherson 2014), which provides case studies, but with specific SATs to be applied, and often they are open-ended cases without resolution. The goal of these case studies is for college students to learn the SAT and the methodology over process and outcome. Also, the Kent School curriculum only focuses on the use of SATs in approximately 40% of their instruction material, leaving the majority of the time to other instructional methodologies (scenarios, exercises, etc.), despite the CIA being the main developer and proponent of SATs. Furthermore, the use of SATs is limited to about 13 total (primarily those in the CIA Tradecraft Primer) versus the 48 developed by Heuer and Pherson in their 2nd edition text (2014). Some college curriculum in intelligence analysis placed much more emphasis on teaching SATs, arguing that these are used extensively throughout the IC. The evidence, however, to support that argument is lacking.

With regard to the ability of intelligence analysts to do strategic warning and better anticipate surprise, there was little information in the literature, as well as in the curriculum offered in college courses or the professional intelligence schools, which addressed the particularly vexing problem of teaching strategic foresight (as Randy Pherson calls it), or strategic forecasting. Taking the longer term perspective on the types of threats that intelligence community must be able to anticipate in the future is not necessarily a skill that can be developed in a college course or an introductory analyst training program. An example of an analytical product which does strategic forecasting is that which is produced by the DNI’s National Intelligence Council every 5 years, which had previously been called Global Trends: Alternative Worlds 2030. The most recent version, released in January 2017, is now titled Global Trends: Paradox of Progress (DNI 2017). The unclassified report looks out 5 years and 20 years, analyzing trends and indicators of what the future may portend. To support the analytical effort involved in thinking strategically, private companies, such as Randy Pherson’s Globalytica, and Philip Tetlock’s Good Judgment Project (Tetlock and Gardner 2016), provide training programs and courses, contracted to the intelligence community, as well as academic institutions, to bridge the gap in education and training currently available.

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8 Personal discussions with ITA and Kent School instructors.
9 Ibid.
10 Comments offered during the Globalytica Workshop (Pherson 2017).
In addition to promoting the need for intelligence analysts to develop effective communication skills (written and oral) in their education and training, a new area of emphasis appears to be for students to develop the skills necessary to use analytical software. Programs, such as IBM i2 Analyst Notebook, ArcGIS, Palantir Gotham, as well as others which enable social network analysis are coming more into use in the IC, given its interest in big data, data analytics, and other information technology to manage the large amount of information available in open source media. Students who combine intelligence studies with technical coursework in computer science, information management, or geospatial information systems are particularly in high demand in today's competitive intelligence job market.

In researching the literature and coursework related to intelligence analysis, it was evident that most college intelligence programs do emphasize that students in an introductory intelligence analysis course should be taught critical thinking skills as well as methods laid out in SATs. The two go hand-in-hand in teaching the basics of analyzing information and creating a product. Students’ active participation and engagement, often in teams, is also a very important component for students to learn intelligence analysis skills required today in the IC, since analysts today often work in centers or on analytical teams.11 Being accountable for one's analytical products, as well as actively collaborating as a participating partner with other IC analysts in other agencies is also now standard practice in the IC and vital for someone working as an intelligence professional. Based on comments offered by instructors in the professional schools, college students studying intelligence analysis would also benefit from the availability of advanced analysis courses that go more in depth than introductory courses, to include providing some knowledge of strategic forecasting and longer-term analytical products. They also commented that if a student plans on going into an intelligence analysis career field, it would be helpful for them to be familiar with the types of analytical software available to support intelligence analysis. While such familiarity may be viewed as training and not education, it does provide a potential skill that will make them more competitive in a very tight labor market.

It is also important for students to be able to research and present their findings. Being able to put together an intelligence document (like a National Intelligence Estimate—NIE) with predetermined information is only one part of analysis. Students should be able to do all parts: research, compile and analyze, and present. Part of being an intelligence analyst is being able to provide information to consumers, whether those are policy-makers or senior officials making decisions based on intelligence products. This is particularly crucial when producing longer-term assessments and providing strategic warning.

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11 For example, former CIA Director Mike Pompeo noted that he stood up a Korean Mission Center at the Agency, in order to share information and analysis on the rising threats in Northeast Asia (Gertz 2017).
Conclusion

Intelligence studies, as an academic discipline, continues to evolve as more colleges and universities develop programs of study, particularly at the undergraduate level of higher education. Within the curriculum these programs offer, intelligence analysis remains an important topic of study, given the unique challenges intelligence analysts face within the IC. Being able to hire new employees with the requisite knowledge, skills, and abilities to fill critical analytical needs within the various intelligence agencies is of paramount importance to the nation’s national security interests, particularly those requiring strategic warning analysis.

Instruction in the use of methodologies which support analytical rigor is an important part of the educational process for future intelligence analysts. Learning Structured Analytical Techniques used by the various intelligence agencies provides students the knowledge of how to use these tools to help solve intelligence problems. They also enable students to “speak a common language” and foster the shared use of methodologies commonly known throughout the IC in presenting their analytical products.

Yet, given the complexities of today’s changing threat environment and the “wicked problems” that intelligence agencies and policy makers face now and in the future, the ability to anticipate surprise is needed now more than ever. While the knowledge and use of SATs will help analysts to be better able to “show their work” and provide some methodological rigor to hopefully avoid cognitive bias, the basis for their analysis remains a firm grounding in critical thinking skills and mental agility which will enable them to ask the right questions and seek the right answers to these complex problems. A college education alone cannot replace the depth of knowledge and (hopefully) understanding which comes from a lifelong career in the intelligence services. However, it can provide new knowledge and comprehension using critical thinking skills and also demonstrate the higher cognitive abilities of synthesis, evaluation, and explanation. College coursework can also expose students to more scientific methodologies using quantitative analysis useful for intelligence analysis, helping to bridge the tradecraft/art and science divide. The intelligence community needs analysts who will be looked upon to provide the nation strategic warning and better anticipate surprise from new threats which are yet unknown.

References


Exploring United States Involvement in Post-ISIL Iraq

Stefanie Mitchell

American Military University

Abstract

In the winter of 2016, the United States (US) escalated its involvement in Iraq in order to assist in the retaking of the city of Mosul from the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The blend of nations and opposing agendas converging during this critical intervention created concerns about the impact this offensive will have on the region. Given ambiguity surrounding US involvement after the offensive, ethnographic field research was conducted in the Kurdistan region of Northern Iraq from November 2016 to March 2017, using a Glaserian grounded theory analytical method to annotate critical challenges and develop recommendations from a conflict resolution lens. The research observations were limited to the five-month period and focused on regional changes throughout that period directly tied to counter-ISIL operations and the Mosul Offensive in Iraq. This paper adds to current research by using levels of analysis to outline critical challenges and local sentiment, narrowing down the spheres and developing targets of opportunity in which policy may be able to operate within a vast, complex web of issues. It argues that using multi-track diplomacy, the US should maintain involvement in the form of supporting political and security stability, encouraging conflict transformation and the transformation of pervasive negative perceptions of US activities. Utilizing the multi-track diplomacy method will open up strategies for sub-state interventions and bottom-up approaches.

Keywords: Iraq, Kurdistan, sectarian conflict, Middle East conflict resolution, US intervention in Iraq, ISIL, ISIS, Mosul offensive
Explorando la participación de los EE. UU. en Irak después del EI

Resumen

En el invierno de 2016, los Estados Unidos (EE. UU.) aumentó su participación en Irak para poder ayudar a retomar la ciudad de Mosul del Estado Islámico de Irak y el Levante (EI). La mezcla de naciones con agendas opuestas que coinciden durante esta intervención crítica creó preocupaciones acerca del impacto que tendrá esta ofensiva en la región. Dada la ambigüedad que rodea la participación de los EE. UU. después de la ofensiva, se llevó a cabo una investigación etnográfica de campo en Kurdistán y el norte de Irak de noviembre de 2016 a Marzo de 2017, utilizando el muestreo teórico glasereriano para comentar acerca de los desafíos críticos y desarrollar recomendaciones desde una perspectiva de resolución de conflictos. Las observaciones de la investigación estaban limitadas a un periodo de cinco meses y se enfocaron en los cambios regionales durante el periodo que está directamente vinculado a las operaciones para contrarrestar al EI y la Ofensiva de Mosul en Irak. Este documento añade a la investigación actual porque utiliza niveles de análisis para esquematizar desafíos críticos y opiniones locales, definiendo mejor las esferas y desarrollando objetivos de oportunidad en los que las políticas podrían operar dentro de una red vasta y compleja de problemas. Argumenta que, al utilizar diplomacia múltiple, los EE. UU. deberían mantener su participación en forma del apoyo a la estabilidad política y de seguridad, fomentando la transformación del conflicto y la transformación de las percepciones negativas prevalentes de los EE. UU. Utilizar el método de la diplomacia múltiple abrirá el camino a estrategias para las intervenciones de sub-estados y acercamientos de abajo hacia arriba.

Palabras clave: Irak, Kurdistán, conflicto sectario, resolución de conflictos en el Medio Oriente, intervención de los EE. UU. en Irak, EI, EIIL, ofensiva de Mosul
Introduction

Throughout the winter of 2016, the United States (US) increased its involvement in the Middle East, to support the recapture and defense of critical territories occupied by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and ease violent tensions in the region. Of particular importance is the US involvement in the joint urban offensive in Mosul, Iraq which was initiated in October 2016, and at the time of this writing was currently entering what may be its most critical and violent phase to finally remove ISIL from this last Iraqi stronghold. The US is supporting the Iraqi Army and Kurdish Peshmerga forces, in the vicinity of Iranian-influenced Hashd al-Shaabi Shia militia, as well as Turkish forces near
the Syrian/Iraqi border. This joint activity has created sharp tensions between key stakeholders, who now consider the rights to govern these lands disputed. The blend of forces, nations, and opposing political agendas converging during this critical intervention has created ongoing concerns in the international community about the longer-term impact this offensive will have on the region. Currently, there are several key points of crisis: widespread internal displacement on a massive scale which is causing humanitarian disaster, strain on local economy and infrastructure, sectarian violence, intracommunity violence, sectarian political conflict regarding control of areas retaken, political upheaval at a regional level, and the mutation and decentralization of ISIL activity.

The international community consistently gathered to determine what its long-term role in the crisis should be. At a United Nations Security Council update on 4 February 2017, Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General (SRSG) for Iraq, Mr. Ján Kubiš stated, "In the post-Daesh\(^1\) period, Iraq will need continuous, substantial and sustainable support and assistance from the international community, including its regional partners. Any abrupt scaling-down of engagement or support would mean repeating mistakes of the past—mistakes that have had grave consequences for stability and security, well beyond the borders of Iraq" (UNAMI 2017). What is unclear during most of these key international engagements is what the US role will be and should be. A critical point of confusion is the change of the US government administration in the midst of this extreme crisis.

Confusions and tensions regarding the current and future policy changes of the new US administration are creating new challenges and turbulence in an already complex operating environment. As this situation unfolds, the future of US Iraq intervention policy is unknown and there are no concrete statements regarding what US involvement will be or should be after the Mosul offensive. Furthermore, current research lacks strategy toward sub-state level mechanisms, and current recommended policies are broad, state-centric, and fail to annotate the diverse tools available to the state in resolving policy puzzles. This paper seeks to explore and analyze these gaps and asks the question: What are the current critical challenges in the post-ISIL Iraq environment, and given these challenges, what involvement should the US maintain in the post-ISIL reconstruction of this environment? This paper finds that Multi-Track Diplomacy would best address the complex conditions found in post-ISIL Iraq. It argues that using Multi-Track Diplomacy, the US should maintain involvement in the form of supporting political and security stability, encouraging conflict transformation and the transformation of pervasive negative perceptions of US activities. Additionally, if US policy is moving toward a federalized view of Iraq, the US must support a more federalized policy approach by utilizing the Multi-Track Diplomacy method, which will open up strategies for

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\(^1\) Arabic acronym alternative for ISIL.
sub-state interventions and bottom-up approaches. Failure to include sub-state and bottom-up activities will likely lead to lost opportunities for strategic gain.

The Historical Approach of the US and the Current State of Policy

Current White House and US Policy

In the midst of this major crisis, the new US administration has adopted a foreign policy called “Peace Through Strength” (US Government 2017). The Trump administration has largely verbalized an “America First” policy, with amendments to increase military prowess, counter-ISIL operations and improve relations with some regional partners. However, the vast amount of local and international feedback on this policy is that it lacks structure, coherency, and a plan of execution. Conversely, the newly instated travel ban targeting Iraq, Syria, and refugees from these locations has created a firestorm of negative reaction and left doubts about what US support will look like during this humanitarian disaster.

The visit of Secretary of Defense James Mattis to Baghdad in late February displayed a backpedaling of previous Trump comments about the US taking Iraqi oil, yet a commitment to continued military assistance (Rudaw 2017a). It is unclear and unspecified what this military assistance will look like, for what duration and how that will be executed in coordination with the heavy international influences on the ground, including Iran, which the new US administration has developed increasingly tense interactions with. The visit of Mattis and Vice President Mike Pence to the annual Munich Security Conference also revealed little specific strategy and added to the conflicting policy perceptions (Erlanger 2017). The 2017 Munich Security Report described the Trump administration's policies as unpredictable, incoherent, and devoted an entire page to the administration's “mixed messages” (MSC 2017, 15). The outcome of this confused administrative strategy is expected to be “tremendous” (MSC 2017, 14). “Vacuums will be filled by other actors. Key institutions will be weakened, spoilers will be emboldened. And some U.S. allies may see no alternative than to start hedging by seeking out new partners” (MSC 2017, 14).

Critical research published by the Middle East Research Institute (MERI), located in Erbil, Iraq, mirrored these sentiments, describing the Trump administration's Middle East policy as “unpredictable;” “abstract foreign policy sentiments and preferences at times appear to be irreconcilable” (Ala’ Aldeen 2016, 2). The report points out Trump’s now infamous entanglements with Russia, and his general support for unpopular authoritarian political regimes (Ala’ Aldeen 2016).

US Military Engagement in the Middle East

A meaningful and well-developed historical analysis of US military engagement in the Middle East was conducted by Jeffrey and Eisenstadt (2016). The key findings
Jeffery and Eisenstadt pinpointed an opportunity for transformational diplomacy. They noted that US military missions and policy were directed at maintaining “status quo,” by “maintaining or restoring peace and deterrence, or to respond to threats to regional security and stability and to larger universal principles” (Jeffrey and Eisenstadt 2016, 20). Jeffrey and Eisenstadt noted several outcomes of these historical policies:

* U.S. engagement since 1945 has failed in “winning” the region effectively as an ever more peaceful, prosperous, and politically liberal element. The ultimate rationale for U.S. foreign policy in the last century has been to combat these underlying human catastrophes for moral reasons and because such catastrophes breed violence and chaos. (Jeffrey and Eisenstadt 2016, 35)

* America’s military interventions in the greater Middle East over the past two decades have often failed to effectively counter threats to U.S. interests emanating from the region or to advance American interests there. In fact, U.S. policies have frequently reinforced the region’s pathologies and exacerbated some of its most intractable conflicts. Many of these missteps were the result of failures to understand the politics of the Middle East, and to craft effective strategies due to flawed policy assumptions or ideological preconceptions. (Jeffrey and Eisenstadt 2016, 50)

Jeffrey and Eisenstadt (2016) state that US military and US policy were often out of step and influenced these failures. They suggest these realities should instigate revision and reassessment of US military engagement strategy in the Middle East. They make two predictions of possible outcomes of poor strategy, which have proved to be quite accurate—that US mistakes would empower radicalism or cause the fading of US influence and the increased dominance of Russian-Iranian regional alliance (Jeffrey and Eisenstadt 2016, 37). Their excellent and timely analysis is useful for casing poor military strategy and needs to be combined with overall regional policy goals.

**Stagnant State of the Future of Iraq Project Goals**

Publicly released and declassified documents from the US-driven Future of Iraq Project from 2002 to 2006 outline the major US objectives in Iraq for the Post-Saddam environment. These documents provide a detailed view of US policy priorities from that time; policies which were created in coordination with Iraqi local leadership for the future structure and civil function. The planned policies spanned the broad spectrum of politics, economy, justice, security, and civil engagement.
Documents released by the US government, which were drafted by the Democratic Principles Working Group, stated the US should be involved in democratic transition and urged the US to avoid favoring specific political groups. They advised the support for free, fair elections, and included positive discussion of federalism (DoS 2002a). A dominant priority for Iraq was fostering democracy, rule of law, and civil society (DoS 2002c). The expected US role was immediate intervention, and was viewed as required by all stakeholders, in order for the policies to succeed. The US was seen as the only state which could support forward movement, and this assistance was requested by Iraqis (DoS 2002b, 5).

There are some valuable insights to be gained from the previous Future of Iraq Project; goals which were largely unattained which still hold value and dynamic relevance in the region a decade later. Iraq’s progress, seemingly thwarted by terrorism and sectarian conflict, may be suspended in a similar state as it was in the immediate Post-Saddam era. The pursuit and support for democratic systems and values, as well as support for federalism, are sustained needs in the region.

**Current Broad Middle East Policy Recommendations**

Recent research conducted by MERI recommends support for federalization in Iraq, and the deliberate addressing of the Sunni population marginalization. Support for federalization will enhance rights for all parties, encourage power-sharing and minimize one group becoming dominant (O’Driscoll 2016a, 9). Elections should be prioritized, as well as negotiations—facilitated by the US—for the disputed lands (Ibid., 9). MERI research also recommends US focus on economic reconstruction support, because the military intervention is insufficient (Costantini 2016, 2).

In the aftermath of dwindling ISIL territory, reconciliation efforts will be needed as part of transitional justice processes, conducted by an official court system, with an international judiciary supervisor (O’Driscoll 2016c). The US is seen as an important player in the transitional process, regardless of some local criticism about poor planning for the post-Saddam period (O’Driscoll 2016c). The US is seen as having the power and influence, to shape and steer post-ISIL reconstruction in a variety of sectors (O’Driscoll 2016c).

Additional research conducted by the Unites States Institute for Peace pinpointed the need for justice and security policies that would ensure safety and rehabilitation of the local population, in particular internally displaced persons (IDP) who represent a large population under crisis, and will remain or return to areas previously ISIL-controlled. Better measures across all sectors in relation to post-ISIL territory are needed, if long-term stability is to be gained (Alkhaykanee 2016). It is unclear and unstated exactly how the US can participate in the stated recommendations, and even less known is what assistance the current administration is willing to offer outside of military support.
The 2017 Munich Security Report asserted the possible reality of a “Post-Western Middle East,” with the US and Western states losing their influence in the region due to unclear goals and direction in the current political atmosphere (MSC 2017, 30). Successive US foreign policy shifts have caused ineffectiveness in shaping the course of direction in Middle East policy. Each US administration has pursued a different approach which, as of the Obama administration, shifted toward less involvement and making room for foreign influences (Ala’Aldeen 2016).

CATO recommended the US shift its focus from prioritizing strategic relationships with Israel and Saudi Arabia to a more comprehensive approach, which would include minimizing its military presence, and minimizing its role in the polarizing negotiations between Israel and Palestine (CATO 2009). Additional policy recommendations encourage an increase of US involvement in the political sphere, including positive and constructive engagement with the Sunni population and Sunni states toward an agreement on political movements in the larger ME (NSI Team 2017).

Micallef (2017) projects seven “macro issues” will be at the heart of US policy: “the Iranian/Shia challenge, economic instability from low oil prices, the political stability of Egypt and its role in the larger Middle East, especially in North Africa, Russia’s current role in the region, the emergence of Turkey as a rogue actor, the civil/proxy wars in Syria, Libya and Yemen and, finally, the ongoing battle against jihadism in general and the Islamic State (IS) in particular” (Micallef 2017, n.p.).

**Gaps and Critique of Literature and Policy**

The aforementioned critical policy recommendations make scholarly, historical, and practical contributions to the field of Middle East and Iraq-focused policy. From the field level, these recommendations are useful, reasonable, and rooted in clear understanding of complex issues. The noticeable gap in the aforementioned published literature is the lack of strategy toward sub-state level mechanisms. The recommended policies are broad, state-centric, and fail to annotate the diverse tools available to the state in resolving policy puzzles. Additionally, they fail to strategize countering of negative sentiment, and they do not provide a security policy option to counter a possible drawdown of troops or military support—an action largely unsupported by local Middle East government leaders. Intense participation in state-level political processes and supporting democracy is necessary, but will not create a stable security environment, nor impact the urgent humanitarian crisis in the near term.

Many of the aforementioned recommendations have surfaced on the new US administration’s priority list; however, no projected outlook on the policy stance can be determined from these reports or from the US administration. This paper will add to the current research by suggesting possible targets of opportuni-
ty, narrowing down the actors and spheres in which policy may be able to operate within this vast, complex web of issues.

**Theoretical Framework**

The Glaserian grounded theory approach (Glaser and Strauss 1967) was used to induce theory from the data, rather than approach the data from a preconceived theoretical standpoint. Using this method, data collection is accomplished prior to the literature review, hypothesis, and theory construction. This method was chosen for its ability to allow the data to evolve, and to develop fresh perspectives of dynamic data which may be already saturated by study, bias, and assumption. In this case, the Glaserian method was used to compare the data with existing conflict resolution theories, in order to pinpoint developing theories which may contribute policy resolutions to the current crisis phenomena.

The field of Conflict Resolution recognizes several dominant processes, the most relevant to this context is conflict transformation, “... the process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses and, if necessary, the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict” (Miall 2004, 3). These processes engage sub-system actors and attempt to move conflict participants away from zero-sum positions toward positive outcomes, often with the help of external mediation. Coleman, Deutsch, and Marcus (2014), who carried out peacebuilding activities in Northern Iraq in the early 2000s, annotate several approaches and paradigms these methods can utilize; however, a critical node of difference in the current context is the presence of a designated terrorist group as one of the main combatant groups and conflict actors. This brings a new form of complexity, considering much traditional conflict resolution and diplomatic activity is centered on negotiations and bargaining. Iraq can be characterized as a protracted regional conflict; however, it is uniquely complex due to the added divisiveness and gruesome stripping of humanity, resources, and rule of law caused by a designated terrorist organization at the crux of this conflict. ISIL has exploited unstable conditions, bringing new types of impact and new strains of grievances. An additional complicating factor for the future of US involvement in the traditional conflict resolution process is the role of the US as a participating combatant in this conflict, its history of military engagement, and the deeply divided perceptions of the shared history in the region. A state-to-state-driven process with the US in the lead is theoretically unable to address this complex environment:

It is evident that to date, the state-centered system has failed to pursue appropriate conflict resolution policies compatible with the needs of the current conflict arena, the state is rarely the only actor in the conflict arena, and conflict resolution is no longer a matter of
managing state-to-state relations. The fact is the rationalist discourse is unable to address dilemmas associated with the decline of human security and the root causes of modern protracted social conflict. (Rupesinghe 1995)

The evolution away from bi-polarity, and state-to-state level conflict has opened up opportunities for multi-level strategies. Some of the historical, traditional methodologies to promote peace and stability in post-conflict environments are war tribunals, dialogues, truth and reconciliation commissions, integration and sovereignty strategies, and third-party peace brokering (Bercovitch and Jackson 2009; Cottam et al., 2016). These have had success in other similar cases of internal, ethno-political conflicts such as Somalia, Liberia, and Bosnia, and have been used in the Philippines, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mozambique, and South Africa (Rupesinghe 1995; Cuthbert 2005).

Moving away from state-centric approaches, and using some of the above traditional methods, Multi-Track Diplomacy emerges as an option to address complex systems and recognizes nine categories of actors: (1) official governmental actions, (2) unofficial government-related actions and conflict resolution professionals, (3) business, (4) private citizens, (5) research, training, and education (6) peace and activism (7) religion and (8) philanthropy, and (9) media (Notter and Diamond 1996; McDonald 2014). No track is more important than the other, and no track is independent from the others; they operate together as a system. Each track has its own resources, values, and approach, but since they are all linked, they can operate more powerfully when they are coordinated (Notter and Diamond 1996). An important empirical study on the use of Multi-Track Diplomacy found that the characteristics of the mediating actor were significant; combined track mediating efforts were more effective, in part, because they potentially create layers of obligations and agreements which reinforce compliance and encourage successful outcomes (Böhmelt 2010). This study also found that state-centric models can cause competitiveness and unfair focus on the official interests of the stronger party; they are also less flexible due to state affiliations (Böhmelt 2010). Evidence shows that a “linear approach” to conflict does not lead to sustainable peace (Bercovitch 1982; Rupesinghe 1995). The multi-track approach may maximize the efforts of all concerned parties, and create new strategies to address catastrophic environments, such as the post-ISIL environment which has impacted basic stability and functioning at both the human and governance level.

Data and Research Methodology

The data was collected during field work conducted in Kurdistan, Iraq from November 2016 to March 2017. A qualitative, semi-ethnographic approach rooted in the Glaserian method of grounded theory was used to annotate
regional developments and changes in the Iraq and Iraq borders region—as a result of the Mosul offensive. This research annotated the various effects of the ISIL occupation and the joint Mosul Offensive which were observed or encountered during the time period. Observations and interview results were recorded prior to conducting any literature review. The literature review was conducted after initial interviews and observations, to assist in addressing known policy goals and capture current scholarly sentiment.

Using the ethnographic approach, all local persons, events, and actions were considered participants relevant in the study, and as having an impact on the overall findings. In Northern Iraq during the research period, the location offered a dynamic flood of individuals and activities not indigenous to the region, yet all having a grave impact on the current and future conditions. The research collection used semi-structured interviews, informal conversations with locally based personnel, as well as observations to record the diverse local sentiments regarding the status of the offensive and opinions regarding US government involvement. The interviews and conversations were conducted with a broad spectrum of individuals derived from all ethnic backgrounds, from the local host community, IDP and Syrian refugee populations and were selected due to their organic occurrence in the field work location. This method strove to collect data which was naturally occurring in the most natural situations, and purposely did not create contrived collection scenarios, or narrow the criteria for participation. The intent was to include all of the dynamic phenomena taking place and capture as much of the diverse sentiment and activity as it was happening. The population interviewed represented various political, military, and civil affiliations from across many cities, as well as village areas in Northern Iraq and the Mosul Corridor region. Interviews were confidential, identifying data was not collected, and translators were used when necessary. The results were compiled into an aggregate descriptive format according to themes. Publicly available secondary data found in government and non-government organizational databases, local news, and online reporting was used to augment observations, provide insight into current events and political changes, and track humanitarian data.

The grounded theory analytical approach was used in order to minimize bias in the data collection, and promote the development of unique policy strategies, with an open, axial, and selective coding process for the analysis. A conflict resolution lens was used in the final analysis. Final coding used a levels-of-analysis approach to categorize major themes and developments, as well as major targets of opportunity for peace and resolution of historical grievances, and describe the theoretical methodology to best address those opportunities.

The research observations were limited to the five-month period and focused on regional changes throughout that period which were directly tied to counter-ISIL operations and the Mosul Offensive in Iraq. The situation is fluid
and dynamic, and as such, events after the research collection period may have
dramatic changes on the proposed findings. Furthermore, the vast scope of the
crisis required recommendations to be limited to an exploratory study of targets
of opportunity that may support both US interests and stability.

Findings

Initial Codes of Interviews and Observations

Using grounded theory with a levels-of-analysis approach, the findings were pro-
duced in three phases. Initial, axial, and selective coding results were used to build
recommendations for future policy. The initial phase of coding used aggregated
data from interviews, observations, and secondary data from the collection peri-
od. Two groupings of observations developed during this phase which were cate-
gorized as the current Critical Challenges, and dominant Local Sentiment regarding
future US involvement in the region (See Tables 1-2 in Appendix a). Below are
the current Critical Challenges:

a) Ethnic sectarianism: Sharp divides between Arabs, Kurds, Syrians, and mi-
nority groups are present within Iraq, Kurdistan, and the surrounding bor-
der regions. This includes deep divides along Sunni, Shia, Christian, and re-
ligious minorities. Interactions are intensely colored by an ethnic-oriented
perspective, which tends to have a tense, negative orientation. These divides
are enabled in all spheres of life, and are evidenced in urban planning, in-
ternally displaced persons, and refugee camps which are often segregated
along ethnic and religious lines.

b) Political sectarianism: The political situation in Iraq, Kurdistan, and bor-
der regions is heavily divided, even within the same political groups. Iraqi
and Kurdish politics is rife within in-fighting among splinter groups. Kurd-
ish political parties continue moving along multiple diverging paths, with
interrupted aggressive behavior. There are 30–50 political groups that are
fighting each other. Kurdish political groups have conflicting alliances with
regional partners such as Turkey and Iran, which create tensions within
the Kurdish region. Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) pursuit for inde-
pendence is met with strong opposition from some Iraqi political parties,
such as the Shiite National Alliance—parties which are also splintered into
diverging groups and goals spilt along religious party lines.

c) Sectarian violence: Violence between Sunni, Shia, Arabs, and Kurds by
state-sponsored groups was evident throughout the Mosul campaign,
during military operations, and during military-supported humanitarian
operations. Sunnis experience an existential threat. Splinter groups within
parties engaged in violent clashes in disputed areas and border areas. Com-
plaints of torture, unjustified killings, physical abuse, and disappearances occurred in all regions participating in counter-ISIL operations, including Southern Iraq, and the border areas of Turkey and Syria. Mass casualty and kidnapping events in Baghdad and Kirkuk areas, allegedly by state-sponsored militias, were reported. Rojava Peshmerga engaged in skirmishes with Yazidi Shingal forces in Nineveh Province, and accusations of signs of genocide are noted. There was a rumor of the creation of secret sectarian extermination groups. Branches of Shiite organizations are opening around Mosul, and alongside an increase in Shiite graffiti in Mosul. Children held in an Erbil detention center complained of torture from Peshmerga guards. A Hashd al Shaabi commander publicly claimed “The Americans have dirty games, plans, and secret aims—because we believe the terrorist project of ISIS is an integral part of American projects in the region, and therefore these forces are not welcome, not wanted at all” (Rudaw 2017b).

d) **Increasing Iranian influence**: The state of Iran has increasingly displayed influence in Iraqi political structure, military operations, economy, and civil society. Iran is escalating influence in Kurdistan through sub-state actors and building positive relations on multiple levels. Iran has become the leading state-level player within Iraqi territory, and a major influence in Syria, particularly via government liaison and use of the Hashd al Shaabi militia. Official operational offices are opening in Iraqi territories. This increased influence matches Iranian long-term geopolitical objectives in the region and has shifted balance for the US and coalition partners.

e) **Intracommunity violence stemming from revenge culture**: Revenge was openly used as leverage and motivation for violence in hot-bed areas such as Baghdad, IDP camps, and disputed territories, including among state-sponsored military forces.

f) **Humanitarian crisis**: Nearly 30,000 persons have reportedly fled west Mosul since 25 February (UNOCHA 2017). Water, electricity, and medical care is scarce in Mosul areas, with some humanitarian assistance in the cleared zones. Approximately 750,000 civilians were trapped in Western Mosul, as of early March 2017, with sporadic ability to flee with friendly forces. Medical capacity to deal with wounded and casualties is overstretched. There is the threat of refugees resorting to high protection risk survival tactics including child marriage, survival sex, and prostitution. Refugees and IDPs are suffering from lack of educational capacity and resources, experiencing low school enrollment. Alternatives are scarce and are elevating vulnerability and risk levels.

g) **Widespread regional displacement of persons**: A critical variable of the humanitarian crisis is the issue of displaced personnel from all ISIL-con-
trolled areas, including Syria. Nearly 200,000 persons have been internally displaced from Mosul and surrounding areas since military operations to retake the city resumed in October 2016. Three million IDPs have been displaced from broader regions centralizing into northern Iraq. The displacement is causing its own unique problem-sets due to the emptying and flooding of areas by personnel, unstable pressures on infrastructure, and tensions developing between local and displaced populations. Government’s ability to track and provide support to displaced persons is restricted with many going without any basic government services. Displacement is also causing vacuums, being filled by state-sponsored military and political groups—activity which is causing dispute, violence, and shifts in historical power and influence in these areas.

h) Arab versus Kurd tensions manifesting in political and security protocols: Increased tensions became institutionalized during the campaign. Iraqi and Kurdish power plays within politics and security were evident in security checkpoints, road closures, funneling, and barring of ethnic groups in and out of areas, hazing and bullying of the opposing groups at security points, barring visas, and barring of employment opportunities.

i) Ethnic intolerance: Internalized racism and disdain was evident between ethnic groups at the individual level in a wide range of regions and situations. This disdain was driven by historical grievances but was exacerbated by tensions derived from sharing dwindling resources between local host community, refugee, and IDP communities. Open disdain between groups was present in civil society.

j) Strain on local economy and infrastructure: Regionally, the Middle East is suffering from lack of capacity to support the host community and the influx of refugees and IDPs. This can be seen in Jordan and broader Iraq. Lack of funds and capacity to increase infrastructure is creating economic tensions from the state level, down to the individual level where employment has become a critical issue both for local individuals and transient personnel alike. Lack of cash, lack of employment, and lack of entrepreneurial support are evident. Rates on most items, such as homes, apartments, and goods have decreased during the crisis. Electricity, power, and water supplies are stretched or minimally available in some areas and are relying on humanitarian NGO provision.

k) Lack of democracy: Some authoritarian practices were evident throughout broader Iraq, to include Kurdistan. Restricted freedom of speech, restricted freedom of movement, random arrests, and harassment and brutality toward journalists and civilian protesters were evident. Kurdish political activity supported power structures, without providing appropriate public
voting mechanisms. Tribal levels were reportedly disenfranchised, and political groups displayed priority over public sentiment. NGO activity was highly regulated, and in some cases their activity was controlled and prevented for political gain.

l) **Political incoherence**: KRG promoted calls for independence, with broad interest in a federalized Iraq. Iraqi political groups have diverging agendas and varied opinions on Kurdish independence. Islamic parties have diverging goals with National Settlement proposals. Kurdish and Iraqi relations with Turkey, US, Iran, and Syrian opposition groups run opposing interests, and shifting interests which create counter-productive goals. Turkey conducts bombings into cross-border civilian Kurdish towns. Western coalition partners’ political leaders intermittently surface at the state level, creating political movement in unclear directions.

m) **Lack of strategy for reconstruction**: Although the United Nations and multiple foreign countries such as Saudi Arabia, Germany, and Japan have donated sizable funds toward counter-ISIL campaign reconstruction, the local government effort to support returnees has been minimal to none. Many locations still have little to no electricity, water, or basic necessities. Health care for IDPs is minimal outside of camp environments. No government emergency funding or physical assistance is provided to families to rebuild homes. Strategies proposed by the Iraqi government have not yet been implemented, and no clear sign of direction can be found. Refugees and IDPs in camps are likely to remain there for protracted amounts of time, with no viable solutions for alternatives.

n) **Remnants of colonial relations and the impact of colonialism**: Iraq’s use of support from outside states such as the US, Britain, France, and Iran has enabled an environment which lacks self-sufficiency and cohesion. At the individual level, this reliance is perceived as a direct result of colonialism and fosters negative sentiment about foreign relations. Doubt about Iraqi competency, and suspicion regarding foreign motivations is hamstringsing sub-state positive engagement. International NGOs, and foreign business, at times, exacerbate this post-colonial activity by not encouraging local development and utilizing practices which encourage local corruption and local drain, for foreign gain.

o) **Increase in civil society action**: Heavy increases of civil society activity and participation were observed. As frustration with state-level politics increases, more activity at the sub-state level is seen, to include individual grass-roots activism to promote democracy and human rights. An increase in grass-roots activism is spreading. Civil society is organizing increasing numbers of partnerships to mobilize action, information, and education—
to include campaigns, protests, and conferences. Protests against the Baghdad government, the Trump administration, the Trump-imposed travel ban, and the treatment of journalists in KRG were seen.

p) *Mutation and decentralization of the ISIL organization:* A critical impact of the military offensive is the increased decentralization of ISIL networks, and continued change in violent tactics. Currently, East Mosul areas that have been cleared and held by Iraqi Army areas are now experiencing an upswing in modified ISIL attacks, using new forms of weaponry including mustard gas and militarized drones. ISIL leaders have fled the areas, and an increase of ISIL-related arrests and attacks have been seen near the edges of Erbil—a previously safe zone.

Aggregate *Local Sentiment* derived from interviews and observations produced the following combined themes on recommendations for US actions and involvement in the post-ISIL environment:

a) The US needs to act in support of democratic ideals; not just talk about them. US must take responsibility for proxy actions, which energized Al Qaeda and resulted in current jihad population. US must not abandon plans and regions before a solution is resolved. US relationship with Saudi is unhelpful.

b) The current US administration, and the resulting incoherence and tension within the US is spreading doubt in democratic values. The US is seen as a source of all hope for civil society, good government and institutions. The US must maintain status quo and lead the way in democracy and security. All impoverished people and developing regions feel hope when they know the US is supportive.

c) UN has lost importance. The people are disillusioned with the UN and prefer the US act individually in support of local issues.

d) The US needs to support democratic change; needs to shut down Maliki and other Islamic parties. Other democratic parties are waiting for US support. Without it, Maliki will thrive, and also Iran will thrive.

**Axial Coding**

The axial phase of coding compared and categorized both groupings of codes on the multiple axes of state, sub-state, and individual levels, in order to develop the Multi-Track view of the current situation (See Tables 1-2 Appendix a). The tables depict a state-heavy presence in the observed activity. This may be interpreted
in several ways: (a) the state is driving these factors, (b) the state is ineffectively structured to minimize the factors, or (c) the state is reacting to the absorption of the main impact of the counter-ISIL campaign. Furthermore, the tables depict a broadbase of sub-state Multi-Track activity, a base which provides a wide range of opportunities for positive engagement. The individual level brought forth the dominant themes of Colonial Impact and Ethnic Tensions, which had a narrower range. This narrow range may provide opportunity for more focused, targeted positive engagement.

The next round of coding observed axial relations between the Critical Challenges and Local Sentiment themes, levels, and diplomatic tracks (See Tables 3 and 4 Appendix a). The Critical Challenges were dominantly present at the state and sub-state levels with an equal number presenting at both levels. Sectarian Violence, Intracommunity Violence, Ethnic Intolerance, Increase in Civil Action, Support for US Maintaining Status Quo and Support for US Individual Actions displayed the highest degree of opportunity across the levels and tracks for interventions and conflict resolution activity. This is an interesting finding, as sentiment for Support for US Maintaining Status Quo and US Individual Action seemed in direct opposition to three major diverting, intervening variables which emerged over the course of the collection period. These emerging sentiments were dominant at the individual and sub-state levels, and have critical impact on the overall assessment: (a) residual and persistent negative perception of past US intentions, (b) internalization of anti-US propaganda, and (c) lack of trust for current US intentions and policies.

Selective Phase Assessment and Final Recommendations

The following final assessments and recommendations were derived from the last phase of the coding process:

1) State Level/Track One: 15 out of 16 Critical Challenges, and all 4 Local Sentiment themes are able to be influenced by Track One—state-level initiatives. Multiple opportunities for conflict resolution and conflict management are present, provided they are not counter-productive to the activities at lower levels.

2) Sub-State Level/Tracks 2-9: Sectarian Violence, Intracommunity Violence, Ethnic Intolerance, Increase in Civil Action, Support for US Maintaining Status Quo and Support for US Individual Actions displayed the highest opportunity for conflict management interventions and conflict transformations activity, across the levels and tracks. These critical issues can be engaged by the Multi-Track diplomatic process in a dynamic way, even if at the US state-level constructive policies are not achieved. This finding may also validate policy recommendations supporting a federal structure in Iraq.
3) *Individual Level/ Tracks 3-8:* The spread of these variables creates a positive gap between the sub-state and individual levels, which suggests that conflict transformation interventions at the individual level may be possible, which could enhance underlying positive Support for US Maintaining Status Quo and Support for US Individual Actions at the state and sub-state levels, from the bottom-up. The negative sentiment which emerged at the individual level may also be successfully addressed as only 8 of the Critical Challenges are found at the individual level. This could suggest a lack of meaningful interaction between the state and the individual, which presents an opportunity for diplomatic engagement to consider broader civil engagement strategies to fill this gap.

4) Fifty percent of the Critical Challenges span across all three levels. This means that the majority of challenges can be affected by a broad spectrum of initiatives and conflict resolution strategies, and not one method or approach will be effective. The needs are so complex and pervasive, and even possibly interdependent that a Multi-Track approach will be necessary.

Looking at Iraq from this vantage point, it appears that current US policy is working in direct opposition to expressed regional needs and demonstrated challenges. It also shows a weakness in current policy to address the negative weight at the individual level, and, in fact, recent policies have likely served to exacerbate it. Failure to adapt policies which will incorporate sub-state actors and positively engage the individual level shows disregard for the increase in movement and synergy in the civil sphere, and will also be a lost opportunity for partnership and fostering support for democratic processes—one of the foremost unrealized objectives of post-Saddam policy. The conflicting perceptions and hopes toward the US as a state model, as a democratic culture, and as a strategic partner need to be addressed below the state level to bring any enduring resolutions and stability.

**Conclusion**

Rather than focusing solely on countering ISIL and Iranian influence from the state level with Track One diplomacy, the evidence and the conflict transformational model suggests the US needs to create meaningful strategies across tracks to improve and deepen the US-Iraqi relationship, resolve negative memories and perceptions, and maximize underlying positive sentiment regarding democracy and US status quo. Accomplishing change to those phenomena alone would likely improve relations dramatically and close the gap that terror groups and Iranian influence have exploited. The demonstrated needs in the current environment include fostering of political and security stability, encouraging conflict transformation, and promoting democracy in the region. These will be effective priorities for US policy to address the current regional reconstruction
needs. Given the splintered political climate, the US will need multilateral positive engagement across political spheres which will enhance positive functioning of a federal Iraq in the long-term; failure to include sub-state and bottom-up activities will likely lead to lost opportunities for strategic gain. This current crisis, and the Post-ISIL environment, provides a dynamic opportunity to display the vast array of tools available with the conflict resolution framework, toward constructive US policymaking and relationship-building with Middle East partners.

Future research should address in detail the specific challenges and sectors as they relate to the continued evolution of the US administration and Middle East counterterrorism. A detailed look at the specific tracks and strategies for implementing initiatives among various actors needs to be fully developed. It is critical to continue to meaningfully address the history of US involvement in Iraqi conflict; the impact, memories, and perceptions which have developed regionally; and the expectation that the US will continue to engage in positive resolutions due to this complicated shared history.
Table 1: Critical Challenges Found Across State Levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Critical Challenges Variables</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Sub-State</th>
<th>Individual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Ethnic sectarianism</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Political sectarianism</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Sectarian violence</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Increasing Iranian influence</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Intracommunity violence stemming from revenge culture</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Humanitarian crisis</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Widespread regional displacement of persons</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Arab versus Kurd tension manifesting in political and security protocols</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i. Ethnic intolerance</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j. Strain on infrastructure and economy</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>k. Lack of democracy</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>l. Political incoherence</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>m. Lack of strategy for reconstruction</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n. Remnants of colonialism and colonial impact</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o. Increase in civil society action</td>
<td></td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p. Mutation and decentralization of the ISIL organization</td>
<td></td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: “Y” represents “yes”; displaying that the activity and/or sentiment was observed within the corresponding level.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Sentiment Variables</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Sub-State</th>
<th>Individual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. US needs to act in support of democratic ideals; not just talk about them. US must</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>take responsibility for proxy actions which energized Al Qaeda and resulted in current</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>jihad population. US must not abandon plans and regions before solution is resolved.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Current US administration, and the resulting incoherence and tension within the US</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>is spreading doubt in democratic values. The US is seen as a source of all hope for civil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>society, good government and institutions. The US must maintain status quo and lead the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>way in democracy and security. All impoverished people and developing regions feel hope</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>when they know the US is supportive.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. UN has lost importance. The people are disillusioned with the UN and prefer the US</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>act individually in support of local issues.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. US needs to support democratic change. Shut down Maliki and other Islamic parties.</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other democratic parties are waiting for US support. Without this support Maliki will</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>thrive, and also Iran will thrive.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: “Y” represents “yes”; displaying that the activity and/or sentiment was observed within the corresponding level.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Critical Challenges Variables</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Sub-State</th>
<th>Individual</th>
<th>Track</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
a. Ethnic sectarianism        | Y     | Y         | Y          | 1, 2, 5, 6, 9 |
b. Political sectarianism     | Y     | Y         |            | 1, 2, 5, 6, 9 |
c. Sectarian violence         | Y     | Y         |            | 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 9 |
d. Increasing Iranian influence| Y     | Y         |            | 1, 2, 3, 9 |
e. Intracommunity violence stemming from revenge culture | Y | Y | Y | 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 |
f. Humanitarian crisis        | Y | Y | Y | 1, 3, 5, 8 |
g. Widespread regional displacement of persons | Y | Y | Y | 1, 4, 8 |
h. Arab versus Kurd tension manifesting in political and security protocols | Y | Y | Y | 1, 2, 5, 6, 9 |
i. Ethnic intolerance         | Y | Y | Y | 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 9 |
j. Strain on infrastructure and economy | Y | Y | Y | 1, 3, 8 |
k. Lack of democracy          | Y | Y |            | 1, 4, 5, 6, 9 |
l. Political incoherence      | Y | Y |            | 1 |
m. Lack of strategy for reconstruction | Y | | | 1, 3, 5, 8 |
n. Remnants of colonialism and colonial impact | Y | Y | Y | 1, 5, 9 |
o. Increase in civil society action | Y | | Y | 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 |
p. Mutation and decentralization of the ISIL organization | Y | | | 1, 2, 5, 7, 8 |

Note: “Y” represents “yes”; displaying that the activity and/or sentiment was observed within the corresponding level. Tracks are: (1) official governmental actions, (2) unofficial government-related actions and conflict resolution professionals, (3) business, (4) private citizens, (5) research, training, and education (6) peace and activism (7) religion and (8) philanthropy, and (9) media.
Table 4: Local Sentiment and Corresponding Track Sectors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local Sentiment Variable</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Sub-State</th>
<th>Individual</th>
<th>Track</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. US needs to act in support of democratic ideals; not just talk about them. US must take responsibility for proxy actions which energized Al Qaeda and resulted in current jihad population. US must not abandon plans and regions before solution is resolved.</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Current US administration, and the resulting incoherence and tension within the US are spreading doubt in democratic values. The US is seen as a source of all hope for civil society, good government and institutions. The US must maintain status quo and lead the way in democracy and security. All impoverished people and developing regions feel hope when they know the US is supportive.</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1, 2,4,5,6,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. UN has lost importance. The people are disillusioned with the UN and prefer the US act individually in support of local issues.</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>All 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. US needs to support democratic change. Shut down Maliki and other Islamic parties. Other democratic parties are waiting for US support. Without this support, Maliki will thrive, and also Iran will thrive.</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,5,6,7,8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: “Y” represents “yes”; displaying that the activity and/or sentiment was observed within the corresponding level. Tracks are: (1) official governmental actions, (2) unofficial government-related actions and conflict resolution professionals, (3) business, (4) private citizens, (5) research, training, and education (6) peace and activism (7) religion and (8) philanthropy, and (9) media.
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Miall, Hugh, Oliver Ramsbotham, and Tom Woodhouse. 1999. *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformations of Deadly*


Fieldwork is often an essential element of the research process. Sometimes fieldwork must be conducted in dangerous or violent places, or even with dangerous or violent actors. This interview with Dr. Katherine Brannum is intended to draw attention to possible security concerns, ethical challenges, and potential risks and benefits related to fieldwork in challenging settings to the larger community of researchers.

1. Please describe the nature of your research in Guatemala.

My research has focused on compliance with international norms most recently with a case study of indigenous rights to self-governance in Panama. However, my interest started shifting on my last few trips to Central America to the role of NGOs in strengthening human security, particularly in Guatemala. Right now I am focused on women’s health security and exploring how conflicting values can affect women’s and girls’ options in pursuing reproductive health and can affect NGOs’ efforts to navigate the provision of assistance to women and girls. On my last research trip, I did interviews with indigenous mothers and teachers along with staff members of the Mayan Families organization about their views on girls’ education and Mayan Families’ newly developed sexual education program.

2. Can you describe the field setting and the NGO(s) involved in the fieldwork?

(I also did some research on another organization they work with called ALAs/Wings Guatemala—but primarily Mayan Families). Mayan Families is an organization that provides school sponsorships, health initiatives, vocational training and microfinancing. One of the reasons I find this particular NGO so interesting is that it demonstrates some of the complexities of leadership that exist in many NGOs that are neither entirely foreign nor entirely local. While it is funded primarily by sources outside of Guatemala and was founded by Australian and American expatriates, it was from the beginning open to and heavily influenced by indigenous voices, with the board of directors including local indigenous members. I
also wanted to avoid those organizations, such as religious organizations, that are blatant in their attempts to impose their world views. I find the efforts of organizations that are trying to work, at least to an extent, within community norms more interesting.

The setting in which I did my research in Guatemala included the small city of Panajachel, Solola, Guatemala and the surrounding villages. It wasn’t remote like some of the research I had done in Panama where we were deep into comarcas. I always find it interesting what some people consider remote. I read a few travel blogs that called one of the Guatemalan villages I was in, Tierra Linda, remote and noted that the Mayans there weren’t used to seeing people of European descent. That seemed downright ridiculous to me because while the village is not a tourist location, it is only 30 minutes out of a major town and has NGO folks from all over the world in and out regularly. It was quite different from some truly remote areas in Panama where there are major logistical challenges in terms of getting safe transport, access to electricity, and housing.

3. Fieldwork in developing countries can be quite different from conducting fieldwork in developed countries. What were some of your most notable observations in that regard? What did you find most challenging?

A lot of advice graduate students get on where to conduct interviews and how to manage the interview space is just not going to work when doing interviews in an area where you just don’t have the facilities or the control. For example, trying to set up the interview in a quiet space, where the respondent is comfortable can be quite challenging when you are out in the field. Many times, travelling to the person's home is not appropriate and not useful because often extended families are present in one or two-room structures. You must be very flexible. In a developing area depending on the research, you might want to conduct an interview with a single individual, but they may want their entire family or village there to participate in the event. One of my research partners, Michelle Watts, and I were once surprised to be met by a formal community gathering when we were expecting to do individual interviews. We just rolled with it and then tried to interview people after the group had finished their formal presentation to us. With those things in mind, I tell my doctoral students that they may have to find a quiet corner of a field or even the back of a pickup truck. As long as we are following institutional review protocols and making sure not to interview in ear shot of others, we improvise and just do the best you can. And speaking of IRB
protocols, one of the challenges I take very seriously is making sure that consent is fully informed and that what I am communicating is being understood by study participants. When dealing with vulnerable populations and particularly with people who cannot read and write, it is very crucial to go beyond the basic consent speech and really work to make sure the participants understand. We want to make sure that they view us as being authority figures and know that it’s ok to say no if they don’t have time, are afraid, or are just disinterested. That may require a great deal of discussion with the indigenous translator to ensure that she fully understands the meaning of what she needs to convey. So, that means setting aside adequate time for interviews. In the United States, you might have people who want you in and out in 30 minutes; in less developed areas, you would want to allot extra time for travel, discussing the consent form, and the interview.

Another issue that comes up, and I have written about it in the past, is the issue of traveling in areas perceived as dangerous. Women scholars, in particular, get a lot of advice about not traveling alone and I always push back against this. Yes, we need to be careful. For instance, Michelle Watts and I once had to postpone fieldwork in Panama during violent clashes between indigenous protesters and police on the Ngabe-Bugle comarca. We were worried about the police preventing access and about causing problems for our indigenous connections. However, in general I find the limitations that some think women scholars should put on themselves when traveling is misplaced and destructive. As a female scholar I don’t want to be constrained in where, how, and when to travel, work, and do research. That narrative reinforces the idea that women, whether they be researchers, volunteers, or simply travelers should not freely roam.

4. Which skills or training were most important in preparing you to conduct your fieldwork?

Language and rapport-building. Learning to speak foreign languages may seem like an obvious skill for researchers. However, it surprises me how often a young scholar says they want to focus on a particular region but doesn’t work to learn the major language or languages of the area. While it’s appropriate to use translators in many circumstances especially when study participants speak a variety of indigenous languages, Spanish skills are still crucial for me in my work. It’s much easier and more appropriate for me to find a Spanish to
Global Security and Intelligence Studies

Kaqchikel translator than an English to Kaqchikel translator. On my last trip if I did not speak Spanish, I would very likely have ended up needing to use two translators—one for English to Spanish and one for Spanish to Kaquchikel. That would have invited translation difficulties. Of course, knowing how to create interview questions is also crucial. Maybe the most important skill though is how to make people comfortable and being able to develop rapport. Interviews may put some people far out of their comfort zone. A good interviewer needs to be able to relate to people in a friendly, courteous, relaxed way. I tell my students that developing rapport is a skill that can be developed. For instance, if you are interviewing parents and don’t stop to admire and be playful with their children, you are missing an opportunity to put the parents at ease.

5. Do you have any advice or recommendations for young academics who may be considering conducting this type of research (in a non-Western country)?

I guess I answered this above. Learn the required language but still use a translator when necessary. Even a competent speaker can miss important nuances. Also, make sure to be familiar and comfortable with the area before you do your first research there. It’s so important that at least one member of the team has already made the necessary connections, and is familiar with the culture, and understands what the challenges are. I’d really emphasize the importance of them going out of their way to learn the social norms of the area before they hit the field. Making a good impression can go a long way to opening doors, and an accidental offense to a key community leader can cause the rest of the community to shun you and ruin your research chances. Having a driver or guide who knows the local area can also be invaluable. However, that can also cause issues if local guides or contacts want to hover. They may be doing this from a protective instinct particularly in conflict-ridden areas, but it is not a good idea particularly considering they may have their own agendas. Also, when in the field, young scholars should definitely know where they want to go and with whom they wish to speak. They need to be careful about letting community leaders set their agenda for them.

6. In general, what are your thoughts on how researchers can use fieldwork to help bridge the gap between academics and practitioners?

I think it is important to be right there with these organizations because their reality is often more complex than the literature demonstrates. For instance, those who work for NGOs don’t always see
that the academic writing on NGOs addresses the realities they face on the ground. For instance, academic writers may talk of NGOs respecting local culture and not imposing outside values. However, a researcher who has been in the field is better able to understand the complex reality on the ground that informs how the practitioner views academics. When one spends times with the NGO, one sees how they are faced with questions like, “Who defines what the local culture is?” “What if there are many women who don’t want to see culture defined by dominant male voices?” “What if a cultural practice prevents young girls from living long enough to find their voices?” If academic studies are going to be useful to NGOs, they must address those realities in a way that goes beyond philosophy and can inform the work in the field. Collaboration and communication between researchers and practitioners is essential in preventing an idealized or simplified view of either the population or culture being studied or the work that NGOs do. Both academics and practitioners need feedback to work to strengthen the bridge between them.
U.S. Nuclear Policy Upgraded

Dmitry Stefanovich

Experts and politicians are familiar with several variants of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The Huffington Post published a draft in mid-January. On February 2, in the run-up to the February 5 deadline to meet the central limits of the US–Russia New START treaty, the NPR was officially presented in the Pentagon by representatives of the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the Department of Energy. The full text of the document was then briefly deleted from the Pentagon website.

On February 6, Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis personally presented the NPR to the House Armed Services Committee. Witnesses point out that this version differed slightly from the previous one. One of the main changes had to do with the appearance of a chart showing how the US is lagging behind Russia, China and North Korea in upgrading its nuclear arsenal (see Fig.1). In the first draft, the entire Korean Peninsula was shown in the colours of the North Korean flag; in the next version, the chart represented Taiwan as a Chinese territory; in the following one, Russia “lost” the Kuril Islands in their entirety. The latest variant of the chart appears to be true to life, but this minor incident may indicate a certain degree of inattention to detail on the part of those who compiled the document. It is worth mentioning that the NPR summary has also been published in Russian, Chinese, Korean, Japanese and French: this suggests that Washington believes it extremely important to inform its allies and adversaries about the US approach to nuclear arms.

The Russian Factor

The Trump administration’s nuclear doctrine specifically emphasizes the degradation of the system of international politico-military relations in the second decade of the 21st century, a process characterized by the quantitative and qualitative increase of challenges and threats to US interests. This situation resulted from the international activity of “revisionist powers”: Russia, China, North Korea and Iran. The document repeatedly mentions this “revisionism”, so it is worth listing the nuclear-related accusations Washington is levelling against Russia.

The NPR accuses Russia of three main “sins”:

1 First published in RIAC, and then on Modern Diplomacy: http://moderndiplomacy.eu/2018/02/17/us-nuclear-policy-upgraded/
breaching the INF Treaty by testing and deploying a long-range ground-based cruise missile;

pursuing a “escalate-to-deescalate” strategy. This strategy implies delivering a limited tactical nuclear strike should the threat of losing a conventional conflict become imminent, in order to subsequently impose the terms of conflict settlement on the adversary. This concept belonged exclusively to the realm of journalism until recently, even though renowned experts did discuss it actively and aggressively, albeit somewhat skeptically;

upgrading its nuclear arsenals, including via the development of various exotic delivery platforms. Everyone seems already accustomed to fantasies about hypersonic glide vehicles, but the mention, in this context, of a strategic intercontinental torpedo with a megaton-class warhead (known as Status-6) is puzzling and unexpected.

The Russian Foreign Ministry’s reaction to the publication of the new US nuclear doctrine came in the form of a prompt and fairly apposite comment: “Russia’s Military Doctrine clearly limits the possibility of using nuclear weapons to two hypothetical defensive scenarios: first, in response to an aggression [... ] involving the use of nuclear or any other weapons of mass destruction, and second, in response to a non-nuclear aggression, but only if Russia’s survival is endangered. The 2014 Military Doctrine introduced a new term, the ‘system of non-nuclear deterrence’, which implies preventing aggression primarily through reliance on conventional (non-nuclear) forces.” The comment continues: “We are deeply concerned about Washington’s no-limits approach, under which it might use nuclear weapons in ‘extreme circumstances’, which are not limited to military scenarios in the new US doctrine. [... ] If this is not the doctrinal enhancement of the role of nuclear weapons, what then does Washington imply when it uses the term with regard to Russia?”

One may mock the lexical peculiarities of the Russian comment, but it does contain a commendably succinct and exhaustive description of the country’s nuclear doctrine. It should be stressed that the Foreign Ministry was merely reacting. Had it been proactive in explaining the country’s stance on nuclear weapons and their qualitative and quantitative parameters to partners, opponents and society, all questions regarding Russia’s conceptions and arms may have been resolved before making their way into the NPR and similar documents.

Such positive promotion of Russia’s strategic non-nuclear deterrence concept merits in-depth analysis. In his speech at an open session of the Defence Ministry’s Board in late 2017, General Valery Gerasimov, Russian Chief of the General Staff, provided an exhaustive description of the “non-nuclear deterrence components” being formed in Russia as applied to the weapons systems currently employed. These include the S-400 SAM system, the Bastion coastal anti-ship
missile system, submarines and sea-surface ships armed with Kalibr missiles and also, with certain reservations, the Iskander-M theatre missile system (“operation-al-tactical”). It is worth mentioning that all the aforementioned systems are, to varying degrees, dual-capable, i.e. they can be tipped with nuclear warheads. The problem of dual-capable nuclear/conventional arms is growing ever more acute. In particular, one of last year’s publications by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, under the editorship of James M. Acton, is devoted to this topic.

The US Response

Washington is planning to employ a combination of the following elements in order to deter Russia:

- the US nuclear triad (intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear submarines armed with ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers);

- non-strategic nuclear forces from the USA and other countries in Europe, i.e. B611 aerial bombs and the nuclear sharing concept, which Russia has been criticizing for many years;

- the nuclear forces of British and French allies.

This approach appears to be a serious obstacle to the future of bilateral strategic offensive arms reduction. At the same time, it may also prove instrumental in overcoming the seeming deadlock. Washington, in effect, is introducing its allies’ nuclear arsenals into the Russia–US strategic stability equation, meaning that Russia now has every reason to take these arsenals into account in future talks. Moscow will certainly have to introduce into the equation some of the Russian nuclear components that have until now remained outside the scope of limitation and reduction agreements, and were even excluded from the transparency principle. However, certain progress is possible here, provided that third nuclear countries (ideally China as well) are involved in the process.

Let us now discuss the materiel portion of the NPR: the assessment of America’s needs for nuclear delivery platforms.

The Trump administration believes that America is nowhere near being “great again” when it comes to nuclear weapons. This opinion is not entirely true. Nevertheless, the NPR calls for creation and deployment of new systems in addition to the new B-21 Raider bomber, LRSO air-launched cruise missile, GBSD intercontinental ballistic missile, new Columbia-class submarine (all effectively launched under the Obama administration), and the modernization/service life extension programmes for existing nuclear warheads, which are nearing completion. The document identifies the need for nuclear-tipped sea-launched cruise missiles and lower-yield warheads for Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
The NPR also sets the rather vague objective of developing advanced nuclear delivery platforms and “alternative basing modes”, which may imply mobile ground-based (or airborne!) launchers. Sea-launched cruise missiles are meant to fill the gap caused by the INF-Treaty-related limitations, both in response to Russia’s “transgressions” and in other theatres saturated with missiles of nations not bound by the treaty. Notionally, low-yield warheads for submarine-launched ballistic missiles are meant as a deterrent against attempted use of tactical nuclear weapons in conventional conflict.

The NPR authors believe the US president will thus be able to deliver a nuclear strike that would not result in a full-scale nuclear war. It remains unclear how Washington’s adversary is supposed to distinguish an incoming low-yield munition from a full-blown first-strike weapon. The single-missile argument does not hold water, because a single launch from a submarine with subsequent air burst is considered a classic tactic for blinding enemy early warning and missile defense radars, to be followed by the multiple-launch application of the entire arsenal. Curiously, the UK had such sub-strategic submarine-launched ballistic missiles in its armoury more than 20 years ago. Discussions continue as to whether these munitions are effective. It would appear that the preservation of the “nuclear taboo” proves the usefulness of such munitions. On the other hand, the existence of “serious” strategic weapons in the arsenals of several lead-
U.S. Nuclear Policy Upgraded

...ing world powers seems no less convincing a reason why nuclear arms have not been used in anger to date.

Apart from the aforementioned aspects of nuclear arms development, the NPR pays special attention to less publicly known components of the US nuclear arsenal: the nuclear command, control and communications (NC3) system and nuclear warheads.

The US NC3 system has long been in need of modernization because it consists largely of slightly modified Cold-War-era technology. At the same time, the NPR emphasizes the increase in, and qualitative changes to, the threats in outer space and cyberspace, the two key command-and-control arenas that apply not only to nuclear arms. To bring the NC3 system up to date and make it reliably stable, the NPR calls for massive reforms, the deployment of new subsystems, and the introduction of protection against all types of threats. It is in this context that the document contains the extremely controversial thesis stating that nuclear weapons may be used in response to a conventional attack on critical infrastructure, even a cyberattack against NC3 systems. The connection between nuclear arms and cyberthreats is becoming a particularly hot topic. It appears that within the debates involving the NPR, the sides would do well to at least reach a mutual understanding of the problem, if not work out common rules of the game.

The NPR contains detailed and tightly deadlined targets for the National Nuclear Security Administration (which formally reports to the Department of Energy but operates independently) to prolong the service life of existing warhead types until 2030 (this may require upgrades, as illustrated by the example of the W-76 warhead for the Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile). Also by 2030, the USA must produce up to 80 plutonium pits, which are critical to the manufacture of nuclear charges. In fact, these targets were generally described back in 2007–2008, and their importance was reiterated following the signature of New START in 2010–2011. The USA is not planning to conduct any nuclear tests (with the exception of those required to ensure the safety and efficiency of the nuclear arsenal). On the other hand, Washington does not intend to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty either.

The new NPR pays somewhat less attention to non-proliferation, nuclear terrorism and arms control than the previous versions, and mainly focuses on the rivalry between the superpowers.

According to official estimates made public in late 2017, full implementation of the US nuclear modernization programme will require up to $1.2 trillion through the year 2046. Coupled with massive spending on missile defense (incidentally, the Department of Defense will shortly release a Missile Defense Review, whose title conspicuously omits the word “ballistic”), and the growing needs of all conventional military branches, the planned expenses might be streamlined...
by postponing the implementation of some projects and completely abandoning others, which is not unknown in the history of the US defense industry.

**The Doctrine as the Catalyst of Discussion**

The modernization of nuclear weapons is inevitable and even advisable for all nuclear powers. Russia, for one, continues to deploy and develop advanced nuclear systems. Universal nuclear disarmament remains a thing of the distant future; shiny new missiles appear to be safer to handle than rusty old ones, and they are better at deterring potential adversaries.

A number of provisions contained in the NPR make one reconsider the existing attitude towards the role of nuclear arms in the contemporary system of international politico-military relations and start devising new conceptual approaches. It would be an utter mistake to return to “escalation dominance”, the “missile gap,” and other antiquated Cold War theses, which are hardly applicable to the contemporary polycentric nuclear world.

Nuclear weapons as an aspect of great power competition were too quick to disappear from the international agenda (together with the very notions of competition and great power), with the focus shifting towards various global problems associated with sustainable development. The new US NPR clearly indicates the fallibility of this approach. At the same time the discussion spurred by the publication of this document gives one hope for the emergence of a new approach to building a stable multipolar world.
How Security Decisions Go Wrong

Sajad Abedi

Information warfare is primarily a construct of a ‘war mindset’. However, the development of information operations from it has meant that the concepts have been transferred from military to civilian affairs. The contemporary involvement between the media, the military, and the media in the contemporary world of the ‘War on Terrorism’ has meant the distinction between war and peace is difficult to make. However, below the application of deception in the military context is described but it must be added that the dividing line is blurred.

The correct control of security often depends on decisions under uncertainty. Using quantified information about risk, one may hope to achieve more precise control by making better decisions.

Security is both a normative and descriptive problem. We would like to normatively know how to make correct decisions about security, but also descriptively understand where security decisions may go wrong. According to Schneider, security risk is both a subjective feeling and an objective reality, and sometimes those two views are different so that we fail to act correctly. Assuming that people act on perceived rather than actual risks, we will sometimes do things we should avoid, and sometimes fail to act like we should. In security, people may both feel secure when they are not, and feel insecure when they are actually secure. With the recent attempts in security that aim to quantify security properties, also known as security metrics, I am interested in how to achieve correct metrics that can help a decision-maker control security. But would successful quantification be the end of the story?

The aim of this note is to explore the potential difference between correct and actual security decisions when people are supposed to decide and act based on quantified information about risky options. If there is a gap between correct and actual decisions, how can we begin to model and characterize it? How large is it, and where can someone maybe exploit it? What can be done to fix and close it? As a specific example, this note considers the impact of using risk as a security metric for decision-making in security. The motivation to use risk is two-fold. First, risk is a well-established concept that has been applied in numerous ways to understand

1 First published by Modern Diplomacy: http://moderndiplomacy.eu/2018/02/18/security-decisions-go-wrong/
2 Sajad Abedi is a Resident Research Fellow at the National Security and Defense Think Tank. He obtained his Ph.D. degree in National Security from the National Defense University under a group of leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran. His research interests pertain to Arab-Israeli studies, cyber security studies and national security.
information security and often assumed as a good metric. Second, I believe that it is currently the only well-developed reasonable candidate that aims to involve two necessary aspects when it comes to the control of operational security: asset value and threat uncertainty. Good information security is often seen as risk management, which will depend on methods to assess those risks correctly. However, this work examines potential threats and shortcomings concerning the usability of correctly quantified risk for security decisions.

I consider a system that a decision-maker needs to protect in an environment with uncertain threats. Furthermore, I also assume that the decision-maker wants to maximize some kind of security utility (the utility of security controls available) when making decisions regarding different security controls. These different parts of the model vary greatly between different scenarios and little can be done to model detailed security decisions in general. Still, I think that this is an appropriate framework to understand the need of security metrics. One way, maybe often the standard way, to view security as a decision problem is that threats arise in the system and environment, and that the decision-maker needs to take care of those threats with available information, using some appropriate cost-benefit tradeoff. However, this common view overlooks threats with faults that are made by the decision-maker. I believe that many security failures should be seen in the light of limits (or potential faults) of the decision-maker when she, with best intentions, attempts to achieve security goals (maximizing security utility) by deciding between different security options. I loosely think of correct decisions as maximization of utility, in a way to be specified later.

Information security is increasingly seen as not only fulfillment of Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability, but also as protecting against a number of threats by doing correct economic tradeoffs. A growing research area into the economics of information security during the last decade aims to understand security problems in terms of economic factors and incentives among agents making decisions about security, typically assumed to aim at maximizing their utility. Such analysis is made by treating economic factors as equally important in explaining security problems as properties inherent in the systems that are to be protected. It is thus natural to view the control of security as a sequence of decisions that have to be made as new information appears about an uncertain threat environment. Seen in this light and that obtaining security information usually is costly, I think that any usage of security metrics must be related to allowing more rational decisions with respect to security. It is in this way I consider security metrics and decisions in the following.

The basic way to understand any decision-making situation is to consider which kind of information the decision-maker will have available to form the basis of judgments. For people, both the available information, but also potentially the way in which it is framed (presented), may affect how well decisions will be made.
to ensure goals. One of the common requirements on security metrics is that they should be able to guide decisions and actions to reach security goals. However, it is an open question how to make a security metric usable and ensuring such usage will be correct (with respect to achieving goals) comes with challenges. The idea to use quantified risk as a metric for decisions can be split up into two steps. First, do objective risk analysis using both assessment of system vulnerabilities and available threats in order to measure security risk. Second, present these results in a usable way so that the decision-maker can make correct and rational decisions.

While both of these steps present considerable challenges to using good security metrics, I consider why decisions using quantified security risk as a metric may go wrong in the second step. Lacking information about security properties of a system clearly limits the security decisions, but I fear that introducing metrics do not necessarily improve them; this may be due to 1) that information is incorrect or imprecise, or 2) that usage will be incorrect. This work takes the second view and I argue that even with perfect risk assessment, it may not be obvious that security decisions will always improve. I am thus seeking properties in risky decision problems that actually predict the overall goal – maximizing utility – to be, or not to be, fulfilled. More specifically, we need to find properties in quantifications that may put decision-making at risk of going wrong.

The way to understand where security decisions go wrong is by using how people are predicted to act on perceived rather than actual risk. I thus need to use both normative and descriptive models of decision-making under risk. For normative decisions, I use the well-established economic principle of maximizing expected utility. But for the descriptive part, I note that decision faults on risky decisions not only happen in various situations, but have remarkably been shown to happen systematically, described by models from behavioral economics.

I have considered when quantified risk is being used by people making security decisions. An exploration of the parameter space in two simple problems showed that results from behavioral economics may have impact on the usability of quantitative risk methods. The results visualized do not lend themselves to easy and intuitive explanations, but I view my results as a first systematic step towards understanding security problems with quantitative information.

There have been many proposals to quantify risk for information security, mostly in order to allow better security decisions. But a blind belief in quantification itself seems unwise, even if it is made correctly. Behavioral economics shows systematic deviations of weighting when people act on explicit risk. This is likely to threaten security and its goals, as security is increasingly seen as the management of economical trade-offs. I think that these findings can be used partially to predict or understand wrong security decisions depending on risk information. Furthermore, this motivates the study of how strategic agents may manipulate, or attack, the perception of a risky decision.
Even though any descriptive model of human decision-making is approximate at best, I still believe this work gives a well-articulated argument regarding threats with using explicit risk as a security metric. My approach may also be understood in terms of standard system specification and threat models: economic rationality in this case is the specification, and the threat depends on bias for risk information. I also studied a way of correcting the problem with reframing for two simple security decision scenarios, but only got partial predictive support for fixing problems this way. Furthermore, I have not found such numerical examinations in behavioral economics to date.

Further work on this topic needs to empirically confirm or reject these predictions and study to which degree they occur (even though previous work clearly makes the hypothesis clearly plausible at least to some degree) in a security context. Furthermore, I think that similar issues may also arise with several forms of quantified information for security decisions.

Another topic is using different utility functions, and where it may be normative to be economically risk-averse rather than risk-neutral. With respect to the problems outlined, rational decision-making is a natural way to understand and motivate the control of security and requirements on security metrics. But when selecting the format of information, a problem is also partially about usability. Usability faults often turn into security problems, which is also likely for quantified risk. In the end the challenge is to provide users with usable security information, and even more broadly investigate what kind of support is required for decisions. This is clearly a topic for further research since introducing quantified risk is not without problems. Using knowledge from economics and psychology seems necessary.
Review of The Chessboard and the Web: Strategies of Connection in a Networked World


In The Chessboard and the Web, Anne-Marie Slaughter makes a strong argument for the need for a new way to understand international relations and approach policy analysis and decision-making in the twenty-first century. She proposes that we need to depart from the traditional state-centric view of realist international relations theory, but that we not abandon it for an alternative based wholly on a view of the world that views political borders as lines on maps that in reality are so porous as to be practically ineffective. Instead of picking one view from this binary pairing, Slaughter suggests that we need to incorporate both, melding and drawing from each in various ways depending on the characteristics of policy issues and the type of actors involved.

The metaphor of international relations as a chessboard featuring state actors as competitors on a global chessboard whose rules are dominated by states’ power attributes has dominated the Westphalian system, but its usefulness has been challenged and diminished by the threats to state sovereignty presented by the proliferation of supra, sub, and non-state actors in the late twentieth century, a phenomenon that is gaining strength in the twenty-first century. One reaction to the diminishing dominance of state actors in the international system was to change the metaphor of international interaction to favor a model that viewed international relations as an ever-increasing web of complex interdependence. As Slaughter points out, the introduction of the paradigm of complex interdependence was promulgated by Keohane and Nye in the 1970s, and in the decades since academics and policy makers have both debated the primacy of these two models as well as created new models that blended both, like Moravcsik, or placed networks at the analytical center, such as Kahler.

Slaughter provides a comprehensive overview of the different approaches and schools of thought regarding the roles played by networks, network theory, and different actors in policy analysis as well as policy making. She concludes that the proper way to look at the chessboard and the web is not as an either/or proposition, but as both/and, a position that she argues requires an adjustment of our ontological understanding to be able to “see power and interdependence, states and people, structure and agency, stasis and dynamism, all at the same time” (Slaughter, 66). By this she means that we need to recognize that both state power and broader networks are important, that both operate simultaneously, and that
policy makers need to operate in both arenas, utilizing an adaptive toolset that focuses on both the nature of the issue and actors in order to best address the problem.

She divides the problems facing the international community into three types: resilience, execution, and scale, and outlines the different types of networks and responses that address each type. Resilience networks focus on capacity to respond to disasters, attacks and other threats, and different network types are suited to different types of problems; for example, defense issues might be best addressed using a centerless mesh network, while recovery networks can incorporate both decentralized hub and spoke as well as mesh structures, taking the form of a “diverse and layered civic web” (Slaughter, 103). Execution or task networks, in contrast, are always versions of a hub and spoke, as the nature of addressing a specific task requires more focused direction. The third type of network Slaughter addresses are scale networks, which can take different forms depending on their function—replication, gathering in, or parceling out. Her goal is not to provide an exhaustive typology of network types, but to provide a toolbox and framework of understanding how to consider a mix of network types that are right-sized to best address the issues and goals at hand.

Power and its role in network design and efficacy are also critical, and Slaughter describes the connection between network types and particular forms of power, from the efficiency and speed of flat networks (such as social media), to the structural adaptability of some NGO and crime networks whose network forms change in reaction to pressures and tactics of other actors, to the need for networks to balance the ability to scale quickly, which often utilizes loose structures, with the need for staying power, which requires some degree of hierarchy. These different types of power of networks are connected to, but distinct from, the forms of power in networks—the amount of agency and agenda setting control a network actor has, which is related both to their organizational and resource characteristics and to the structure of the networks in which they operate. The power that actors get as a result of being part of a network is a third element of power, which Slaughter describes as “the power of many to do together what no one can do alone” (Slaughter, 173). She argues that the gains from joint power that is the result of the actors being part of a network increase as the network structure moves along a trajectory toward openness, becoming more enticing to would-be participants.

In order for the international order, conceived as simultaneously chessboard and web, to be optimal, a view of leadership as being one of clarifying goals, not of dictating processes or outcomes, is necessary. To accomplish that, she proposes a grand strategy of open order building built on the three pillars of open society, open government, and an open international system (Slaughter, 203). By open, she means that systems need to be participatory, transparent, and autonomous—a world of networks based on a set of principles as opposed to rules. In
the international system of the twenty-first century, there is still a need for states in many cases to be principal and central actors, but in many cases their role will not be central. There is an evolving balance between states and other actors, and this requires a flexible analytical perspective that takes into account context and allows for issue and circumstance-specific approaches to solving the collective action dilemma.

Slaughter provides a robust overview of several of the most influential strains of international relations theory of the past 40–50 years and makes a strong argument for a new approach for policy analysis and policy making that incorporates the role of states as well as recognizing the continuing strength of non-state actors and the increasing diversity of arenas of interaction in which global issues are contested and addressed. This volume does not provide a detailed template or instructions on how, exactly, this new system will function, but does provide a worthwhile toolkit that can be used to build a series of templates and models that will allow for better understanding of how to address problems in an ever more complex world.

Julian Westerhout

Associate Instructional Professor
Department of Politics and Government
Illinois State University

jwester@ilstu.edu
Review of *Nationalism: Theories and Cases*


Policy makers and scholars alike are struggling to explain the current rise of nationalism sweeping across liberal democracies. Harris’ work is a timely, concise book that helps illuminate this current complex political phenomenon. As an expert on nationalism in post-communist communities, Harris spent decades analyzing the rise of nationalism in nations such as Slovakia, Ukraine, and the Czech Republic. One of her unique aims in this book is to uncover how nationalism impacts the everyday lives of people: How does it influence where children go to school, the language they speak at home, or with whom people socialize? Harris offers a distinct approach to the common broad, sweeping political categorizations of nationalism.

The organization of the book is conducive to readability and easily digesting her material. She begins with a discussion of nationalism from a historical perspective. While a somewhat stale and vague historical introduction, Harris’ definition of the aim of nationalism is noteworthy. Rather than focusing on preserving language, culture, or a shared identity, as other scholars have, Harris focuses the concept of nationalism as defined by people’s political choice for their collective destiny (Harris, 4). It is a goal, she explains, for people to achieve self-governance and thereby their nation’s survival. By focusing on governance, Harris offers a definition of nationalism that leads to the end goal of self-determination.

Harris divides the book into three main sections. She structures her analysis by giving an overview of the relevant schools of thought, most prominent scholars in the field, and then provides case studies to illustrate these theories. Her central argument in part one is that while nationalism concerns states, it is not necessarily contained within them; the state centricity of traditional nationalist theories has hindered our understanding of this cultural and social phenomenon (Harris, 9). She provides a lengthy discussion of the two rival schools of thought in the field: primordialist and modernist. The former, as exemplified by scholars such as Anthony Smith, holds that nations are not modern. Rather, they are a continuation of earlier forms of cultural identity (Harris, 48). By contrast, modernist scholars, best represented by Ernest Gellner, contend that nations have been invented as a construction of modernity; there is no self-evident reason for people of the same nationality to desire the same political unit. As most states are not homogeneous and thereby have no real connection as one historical unit, nationalism as a principle of political legitimacy is a modern concept (Harris, 53).
Part two of the books delves into contemporary debates about nationalism and cultural identities. Her investigation of the rights of minorities addresses the critical question of how to reconcile culturally diverse communities within one political entity. Who constitutes a member of “the nation” and the relationship between state and nation is central to her discussion. Harris asserts that these concepts are foundationally about the status between minorities and majority groups. She recognizes the trend of international law has been to focus less on state sovereignty than on the human rights on individual citizens, i.e., upholding rights for minorities (Harris, 76). Thus, she briefly addresses this rising tension between international law potentially overriding aspects of state sovereignty when enforcing the rights of individuals or minorities. As one of the timeliest discussions of the book, Harris could have spent more time discussing this tension.

Part three concludes the book with assessing theories of nationalism in international relations, and transcending the nation in the global world. She recognizes that the nation state remains the political unit that holds legitimacy in places such as the UN and international affairs; not individuals or sub-national groups, for example. She offers a candid discussion that while the legitimate unit, it is arbitrary which groups can seem to achieve state status by the international community. Examples she puts forth are the acceptance of Kosovo. This point is important when examining how other groups have experienced a different reception from the international community such as the Kurds or Bidoon to name a few examples.

The most useful discussion in this book is Harris’ analysis of the nexus and sometimes conflict between democracy and nationalism. She engages with the scholarly debate on whether the two are congruent or inherently mutually exclusive. As nationalism often holds ties to one ethnic group, language, or religion, minorities are inherently excluded. Therefore, in a liberal democracy, nationalist ideology fundamentally rejects the rule of law and equal rights and legal status for all. We see these currently being challenged across liberal democracies. The rapidity with which nationalism has swept across Western Europe recently confounds international relations scholars. Why are some of the most liberal, democratic societies in the world now exhibiting political trends of xenophobia, intolerance, and nationalism? Previously, Northern European nations set the global standard for gender equality, civic involvement, and equal political participation.1 Countries across the European Union have some of the strongest mechanisms for upholding rule of law. However, recent elections in Germany, France, Sweden and more have seen an erosion of those ideals. Harris poses the following paradox: in a world of increased democratic ambitions, when we should be expecting less nationalism and more democracy, the opposite appears to be true. She brings to light the duplicitous claims of nationalist leaders; that while they may make democratic claims

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based on the right for self-determination, their platform is inherently exclusionary and thus undemocratic.

Harris poignantly demonstrates the critical link between nationalism and security. She argues that most conflicts today in some way have a nationalist component. Conflicts center on a “struggle for independence, greater autonomy, or a more just distribution of resources, more recognition, readjustment or revenge for historical wrongs, protection of resources, security and protection of territory” (Harris, 33). Extreme nationalism poses an enormous threat to the peace and security of a nation. It can lead to exclusion, the lack of social cohesion, ethnic and religious conflict, among other societal ills. Referencing prominent scholars such as Amartya Sen, identity can be understood as an illusion of the uniqueness and destiny of one particular group; this perceived uniqueness can justify violence as a means to achieve a group’s desired destiny (Harris, 128, as quoted by Amartya Sen Identity and Violence). Harris’ analysis reminds scholars of security studies and international relations to closely follow the rise of nationalism, as it is often the precursor of conflict.

Many governments now recognize that international peace and stability are critical to a society’s security and economic development, yet are struggling to address nationalism. This research provides insightful original work for policy makers and theorists who are currently struggling to explain how previously tolerant, liberal democratic societies are becoming increasingly intolerant, nationalistic, and exclusionary of ethnic and religious minorities.

Dr. Elise Carlson-Rainer

Dr. Carlson-Rainer serves as Assistant Professor of International Relations in the School of Security and Global Studies at the American Public University. She is a former U.S. diplomat with the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. She earned her Ph.D. from the University of Washington in the field of human rights and foreign policy. She researches and teaches courses related to Nationalism and Identity at APU.