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Editorial Welcome

Global Security and Intelligence Studies (GSIS) aims to publish high-quality and original research on contemporary security and intelligence issues. The journal is committed to methodological pluralism, and seeks to bridge the gap between scholars and practitioners engaged in global security and intelligence issues by publishing rigorous research, book reviews, and reflections on the field that are relevant to both communities. We will, on occasion, also seek to publish special issues on timely intelligence and global security topics, and welcome proposals that fit with the scope and aims of the journal. The journal actively encourages both former and current intelligence and global security practitioners to participate in important scholarly and policy debates, and invites them to contribute their research to the journal. As a result, we hope that the journal is a vibrant platform for informed, reasoned, and relevant debates on the most important global security and intelligence issues of our time.

Welcome to the Fall/Winter 2018 issue of GSIS. This final issue of 2018 features original research articles, unique perspectives from global field settings, commentary on policy-relevant issues, and book reviews. The research articles in this issue examine matters of security from differing perspectives. First, Kate Brannum, Michelle Watts, and Joseph Campos II adopt a human security perspective in Choices of Lesser Importance? Conflicting Values Shaping Perceptions of Community Security and Women’s Health Security. The authors offer a comparative study based in two settings – the Maya community in Guatemala, and the Quiverfull community in the United States. Through an unlikely comparison of these two very different cases, the authors provide an enlightening analysis of the interrelations between women’s security and community security. Next, drawing connections between security, law, and public policy, Marvin L. Astrada and Scott B. Astrada critically analyze the effects of securitizing immigration law and policy in Enemy at the Gates: The Consequential Effects of Securitizing Immigration. The authors not only examine the public policy implications of casting immigration as a threat to national security, but also evaluate what this signifies for American identity into the future. Finally, Dmitriy Nurullayev and Leonard Ray focus on state security in Assessing the Effectiveness of Diplomatic Strategies: A Quantitative Analysis of U.S.-Soviet Interactions. The authors evaluate the effectiveness of containment as a strategy compared to high-level negotiations during the Cold War. In analyzing 93 separate crises between the United States and the Soviet Union from the end of World War II through 1978, the authors contribute a quantitative analysis on the extent to which containment in fact produced better outcomes for the United States.

The Voices from the Field section features a report by Elise Carlson-Rainer on the global human rights dialogue that took place at the 38th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC). Reporting from the session in Geneva, Switzerland, Carlson-Rainer offers telling insights into how the Human...
Rights Council process is carried out by focusing on the presentation of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of the Human Rights in Eritrea. This section will be of particular interest to scholars and practitioners drawn to the interactive process of UNHRC sessions and the strengths and weaknesses of the most far-reaching international human rights body in the world.

This issue’s Policy Relevant Essays section features an in-depth analytical commentary by Margaret S. Marangione entitled *Leakers: Truth-teller, Threat, or Fake News?*. In her essay, Marangione explores the complex and multifaceted subject of the leaking of government information in the 21st century, with particular focus on the perspective of millennials. She argues that understanding the motives and perceptions of millennials, including their approach to transparency, loyalty, and information sharing, can provide valuable information for government agencies in establishing whistleblower programs. Marangione concludes by offering policy-relevant recommendations that hold particular relevance for intelligence practitioners but will certainly be of analytical interest to the broader academic community as well.

Finally, two book reviews round out this issue. Paula Wylie provides a review of Lawrence S. Kaplan’s engaging book, *Harold Stassen: Eisenhower, the Cold War, and the Pursuit of Nuclear Disarmament* from the perspective of a diplomatic historian, and Derekh Cornwell reviews *Credible and Actionable Evidence: The Foundation for Rigorous and Influential Evaluations (Second Edition)*, edited by Stewart I. Donaldson, Christina A. Christie, and Melvin M. Mark, providing insights into its utility for professionals involved in policy evaluation work.

In closing, I would like to remind authors that GSIS is currently accepting submissions for its next issue (Spring/Summer 2019). Although GSIS accepts submissions on a rolling basis, the deadline for consideration in the Spring/Summer issue is February 1, 2019. We are currently seeking a diversity of both peer- and editorially-reviewed formats including original empirical research, research notes, action notes from the field addressing contemporary global security and intelligence issues of practice, policy relevant essays, and book reviews. In addition, GSIS provides a forum for small groups of authors to collectively submit several short articles built around a particular topic, similar to a symposium. Potential authors should consult the GSIS website for more details about the various types of contributions that the journal accepts and follow the instructions for authors in preparing their submissions.

Publishing an academic journal is a collaborative process. I would like to extend a sincere thanks to the authors, to our peer reviewers for their feedback and commitment, and to the members of the editorial board for their support and input.

On behalf of the editorial team,

Dr. Melissa Schnyder, *American Public University System*
Global Security and Intelligence Studies (GSIS) busca publicar investigación original y de alta calidad acerca de temas contemporáneos de seguridad e inteligencia. La revista está comprometida con el pluralismo metodológico y busca cerrar la brecha entre los académicos y los profesionales de la seguridad global y la inteligencia al publicar investigación rigurosa, reseñas de libros y reflexiones en acerca del campo que son relevantes para ambas comunidades. También a veces buscaremos publicar ediciones especiales acerca de temas actuales de inteligencia y seguridad global y recibimos propuestas que quepan dentro de la envergadura y propósitos de la revista. La revista fomenta activamente a los profesionales anteriores y del presente a contribuir con su investigación a la revista. Como resultado esperamos que la revista sea una plataforma dinámica para debates informados, razonados y relevantes acerca de los temas más importantes de seguridad e inteligencia de nuestra época.

Doy la bienvenida a la edición de otoño/invierno de 2018 de GSIS. Esta edición final de 2018 incluye artículos originales, perspectivas únicas desde entornos de campo globales, comentario acerca de temas relevantes a la política y reseñas de libros. Los artículos de investigación en esta edición examinan temas de seguridad desde diferentes perspectivas. En primer lugar, Kate Brannum, Michelle Watts y Joseph Campos II adoptan una perspectiva de seguridad humana en ¿Elecciones de menor importancia? Valores en conflicto que dan forma a las percepciones de la seguridad de la comunidad y la seguridad de la salud de la mujer. Los autores ofrecen un estudio comparativo en dos entornos—la comunidad Maya en Guatemala y la comunidad Quiverfull en los Estados Unidos. A pesar de ser una comparación fuera de lo común entre estos dos casos tan diferentes, los autores proporcionan un análisis revelador de las relaciones entre la seguridad de la mujer y la seguridad comunitaria. A continuación, al establecer conexiones entre la seguridad, la ley y la política pública, Marvin L. Astrada y Scott B. Astrada analizan críticamente los efectos de la titulización de la ley y política de inmigración en Enemigo a las puertas: los efectos consiguientes de la titulización de la inmigración. Los autores no solo examinan las implicaciones de declarar a la inmigración como una amenaza para la seguridad nacional, sino que también evalúan lo que esto significa para la identidad estadounidense en el futuro. Finalmente, Dmitriy Nurullahov y Leonard Ray se enfocan en la seguridad del estado en Evaluando la efectividad de las estrategias diplomáticas: un análisis cuantitativo de las interacciones soviéticas de los Estados Unidos. Los autores evalúan la efectividad de la contención como estrategia en comparación con las negociaciones de alto nivel durante la Guerra Fría. Al analizar 93 crisis individuales entre los Estados Unidos y la Unión Soviética desde el final de la Segunda Guerra Mundial hasta 1978, los autores contribuyen con un análisis cuantitativo sobre la medida en que la contención produjo mejores resultados para los Estados Unidos.

La sección Voces del campo presenta un informe de Elise Carlson-Rainer sobre el diálogo mundial sobre derechos humanos que tuvo lugar en la sesión 38 del Consejo de Derechos Humanos de las Naciones Unidas. En su informe de
la sesión en Ginebra, Suiza, Carlson-Rainer ofrece información reveladora sobre cómo se lleva a cabo el proceso del Consejo de Derechos Humanos centrándose en la presentación del Relator Especial sobre la situación de los derechos humanos en Eritrea. Esta sección será de particular interés para los académicos y profesionales interesados en el proceso interactivo de las sesiones del CDH de la ONU y en las fortalezas y debilidades del organismo internacional de derechos humanos de mayor alcance en el mundo.

La sección de ensayos relevantes para la política de este número presenta un comentario analítico en profundidad de Margaret S. Marangione titulado **Filtradores: ¿Verdad, amenaza o noticias falsas?** En su ensayo, Marangione explora el tema complejo y multifacético de la filtración de información del gobierno en el siglo XXI, con especial atención a la perspectiva de los millennials. Ella sostiene que comprender los motivos y las percepciones de los millennials, incluido su actitud hacia la transparencia, la lealtad y el intercambio de información, puede proporcionar información valiosa para que las agencias gubernamentales establezcan programas de denuncias. Marangione concluye ofreciendo recomendaciones relevantes para las políticas que tienen una relevancia particular para los profesionales de la inteligencia, pero que sin duda también serán de interés analítico para la comunidad académica en general.

Por último, dos reseñas de libros finalizan esta edición. Paula Wylie ofrece una reseña del interesante libro de Lawrence S. Kaplan, *Eisenhower, the Cold War, and the Pursuit of Nuclear Disarmament* desde la perspectiva de un historiador diplomático, y Derekh Cornwell reseña *Credible and Actionable Evidence: The Foundation for Rigorous and Influential Evaluations* (segunda edición), editadas por Stewart I. Donaldson, Christina A. Christie y Melvin M. Mark, que proporcionan información sobre su utilidad para los profesionales involucrados en el trabajo de evaluación de políticas.

Para cerrar me gustaría recordar a los autores que GSIS está aceptando actualmente documentos para su próxima edición (primavera/verano 2019). Aunque GSIS acepta documentos de forma continua, la fecha límite para su consideración en la edición de primavera/verano es el 1 de febrero de 2019. Actualmente estamos buscando una diversidad de formatos revisados por pares y en editoriales que incluyen investigación empírica original, notas de investigación, notas de acción desde el campo que aborda los problemas contemporáneos de seguridad e inteligencia global de la práctica, ensayos relevantes para políticas y reseñas de libros. Además, GSIS proporciona un foro para que pequeños grupos de autores envíen colectivamente varios artículos breves sobre un tema en particular, similar a un simposio. Los autores potenciales deben consultar el sitio web de GSIS para obtener más detalles sobre los distintos tipos de contribuciones que acepta la revista y seguir las instrucciones para que los autores prepares sus documentos.

Publicar una revista académica es un proceso colaborativo. Me gustaría agradecer sinceramente a nuestros autores y reseñadores por su retroalimentación.
Editorial Welcome

y compromiso, y a los miembros de la junta editorial por su apoyo y contribucio-

De parte del equipo editorial,

Dra. Melissa Schnyder, American Public University System

全球安全与情报研究》(Global Security and Intelligence Studies, GSIS)致力发布
高质量原创文章，研究当代安全与情报问题。本刊坚持方法论多元主义，
并通过发布严谨学术研究、书评，致力在参与全球安全和情报问题的学者
和从业者之间搭建桥梁。我们有时也会发布有关及时情报和全球安全主题
的特刊，并欢迎适合本刊范围和目标的提议。GSIS积极鼓励所有曾任和现
任情报从业者参与重要的学术辩论和政策辩论，同时GSIS邀请他们为本刊
投稿。最终，我们希望本刊成为相关辩论的活跃平台，用于研究当代最重
要的全球安全和情报问题。

欢迎阅读2018年GSIS秋/冬季期刊。本刊作为2018年的最后一期，聚焦于
原创研究文章、全球领域背景下的独特视角、有关政策议题的评论文章，
以及书评。本期研究文章从不同视角考察了安全问题。首先，作者Kate
Brannum、Michelle Watts 和 Joseph Campos II 在《不太重要的选择?互相
冲突的价值观影响社区安全观念和妇女健康安全观念》一文中采用了人类
安全这一视角。作者基于危地马拉玛雅社区和美国Quiverfull基督徒社区这
两个背景从而提供了比较研究。通过对这两个截然不同的案例进行比较，
作者启发性地分析了女性安全和社区安全之间的关系。接着，通过在安
全、法律和公共政策间建立联系，作者Marvin L. Astrada 和 Scott B. Astrada
在文章《门口的敌人: 安全化移民的后果》中批判地分析了将移民法和政
策进行安全化所产生的作用。作者不仅考察了将移民作为一种国家安全威
胁所产生的公共政策意义，还评价了这对未来美国认同的预示。最后，作
者Dmitriy Nurullayev 和 Leonard Ray在《外交战略有效性评估: 美苏互动的
定量分析》一文中研究了国家安全。作者评价了冷战时期与高层磋商相比
遏制战略所产生的效果。通过分析自二战结束到1978年间美国和苏联发生
的93次危机，作者完成了一项关于遏制政策在何种程度上为美国创造了更
好结果的定量分析。

本期“领域之声”版块的主题是一篇由Elise Carlson-Rainer在联合国人权理
事会第三十八届会议上就全球人权对话所作的报告。此次会议在瑞士日内
瓦举行，Carlson-Rainer通过聚焦于厄立特里亚境内人权情况特别报告，讲
述了人权理事会过程是如何进行的。该版块对那些“对联合国人权理事会
内容和全球国际人权机构优劣点”感兴趣的学者和从业人员具有特别吸引
力。
本期“政策相关文章”版块的主题是一篇由Margaret S. Marangione撰写的深度分析评论，题名为《泄密者：说真话的人，威胁和假新闻?》。在这篇文章中，Marangione探索了21世纪政府信息泄露这一复杂多面主题，她特别聚焦于千禧一代的视角。作者主张，理解千禧一代的动机和观念，包括他们对透明度、忠诚度和信息共享的接触，这些都能为政府机构在建立举报计划时提供宝贵信息。Marangione得出的结论提供了政策相关建议，这些建议与情报从业人员尤为相关，但也值得更广范围的学术圈对其进行分析。

最后，本期内容还包含两篇书评。Paula Wylie以外交历史学的观点评论了Lawrence S. Kaplan的著作《哈罗德·斯塔森：德怀特·艾森豪威尔、冷战和核裁军》；Derekh Cornwell评论了由Stewart I. Donaldson、Christina A. Christie、和 Melvin M. Mark共同编辑的《可信和可执行证据——严格且具有影响力评价的基础》第二版。

我想在文末提醒各位，GSIS目前接受下一期投稿（2019年春/夏季）。尽管GSIS全年都接受投稿，但春/夏季投稿的截止时间为2019年2月1日。我们正在寻找一系列经过同行评审或通过编辑评审的文章，包括原创实证研究、研究纪要、研究当代全球安全和情报问题的相关领域实践记录、政策相关文章和书评。此外，GSIS还为一小批作者提供论坛（类似于研讨会），用于集体发表数篇有关于特定话题的短文章。有兴趣的作者请咨询GSIS网站获取更多关于本刊所接受的投稿类型，并遵循指示进行投稿。

发行学术期刊是一个集体过程。我衷心感谢各位作者和同行评审所给出的反馈和投入，同时感谢编委会成员的支持和付出。

谨代表编辑组，

Melissa Schnyder博士
美国公立大学系统
Choices of Lesser Importance? Conflicting Values Shaping Perceptions of Community Security and Women’s Health Security

Kate Brannum¹, Michelle Watts², and Joseph Campos II³

Abstract

In recent years, a paradigm shift among international organizations, governments, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) from a state security perspective to a human security perspective brought into the mainstream a gendered understanding of what it means to be secure. However, the idea that women’s security should only be understood in terms of community security is still seen in multiple settings across cultures. This article is an exploration of the relationship between women’s security and community security in two communities: the Maya community of Guatemala and the Quiverfull community in the United States. Specifically, this article examines the parallels between challenges faced by indigenous women and girls in the Lake Atitlan region of Guatemala, even with the assistance of NGOs providing sexual education and contraception, and challenges faced by women in a religious movement in the United States that promotes women’s surrender of control over their sexuality and reproduction. While both cultures include cultural and religious arguments against contraceptives and are grounded in male authority, the Quiverfull community provides a much more explicitly political reason for women to follow religious mandates. How women are asked to understand their own security is shaped by the idea that their health needs and control of their reproduction may be a threat to the needs of the community. A gendered human security approach recognizes that the health needs of women are not simply a matter of individual security; they affect security in ways that are ultimately important to the larger community and the nation-state.

Keywords: Human security, gender, nongovernmental organizations, reproduction, Guatemala, Quiverfull.

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¿Elecciones de menor importancia? Valores en conflicto que configuran las percepciones de la seguridad de la comunidad y la seguridad de la salud de la mujer

Resumen

En los últimos años, un cambio de paradigma entre organizaciones internacionales, gobiernos y organizaciones no gubernamentales (ONG) desde una perspectiva de seguridad del estado a una perspectiva de seguridad humana introdujo en la corriente principal una comprensión de género de lo que significa estar seguro. Sin embargo, la idea que la seguridad de las mujeres debería solamente ser comprendida en términos de la seguridad comunitaria todavía se ve en múltiples ámbitos en muchas culturas. Este artículo es una exploración de la relación entre la seguridad de la mujer y la seguridad comunitaria en dos comunidades: la comunidad maya en Guatemala y la comunidad Quiverfull en los Estados Unidos. Específicamente, este artículo examina los paralelismos entre los desafíos que enfrentan las mujeres y las niñas indígenas en la región del lago Atitlán de Guatemala, incluso con la asistencia de ONG que brindan educación sexual y anticonceptivos, y los desafíos que enfrentan las mujeres en un movimiento religioso en los Estados Unidos que promueve la rendición del control de las mujeres sobre su sexualidad y reproducción. Si bien ambas culturas incluyen argumentos culturales y religiosos contra los anticonceptivos y se basan en la autoridad masculina, la comunidad Quiverfull proporciona una razón política mucho más explícita para que las mujeres sigan los mandatos religiosos. La forma en que se les pide a las mujeres que comprendan su propia seguridad se basa en la idea de que sus necesidades de salud y el control de su reproducción pueden ser una amenaza para las necesidades de la comunidad. Un enfoque de seguridad humana de género reconoce que las necesidades de salud de las mujeres no son simplemente una cuestión de seguridad individual; afectan la seguridad en maneras que son al final importantes para la comunidad en general y el estado-nación.

Palabras clave: seguridad humana, género, organizaciones no gubernamentales, reproducción, Guatemala, Quiverfull
不太重要的选择？互相冲突的价值观影响社区安全观念和妇女健康安全观念

摘要

近年来，国际组织、各国政府和非政府组织从国家安全领域转向人类安全领域转变了视角。性别角度对于安全的理解因此纳入主流。然而，妇女的安全只应从社区安全的角度来理解，这种观点在不同文化背景下仍然有所体现。本文探讨了危地马拉玛雅社区和美国Quiverfull基督徒(保守派)社区中妇女安全与社区安全之间的关系。具体而言，本文分析了危地马拉阿蒂特兰湖地区土著妇女和女孩在提供性教育和避孕教育的非政府组织协助下所面临的挑战和为促进妇女放弃对其性行为和生育控制的美国宗教运动中妇女面临的挑战之间的相似之处。虽然这两种文化都包含反对避孕药具的文化和宗教论点，而且都以男性权威为基础，但Quiverfull基督徒社区为妇女履行宗教使命提供了更为明确的政治理由。妇女的健康需要和生育控制可能对社区需要构成威胁，这种观念影响了妇女对于自身安全的理解。基于性别的人类安全攻略提出，妇女的健康需要不仅仅是个人安全的问题；它们以对更大范围社区和整个民族国家至关重要的方式影响安全。

关键词：人类安全，性别，非政府组织，生育，危地马拉，Quiverfull

The view that women’s security should be understood in terms of community security is seen in multiple settings across cultures. What follows is an exploration of the relationship between women’s security and community security in two communities: the Maya community in the Lake Atitlan region of Guatemala and the Quiverfull community in the United States. Specifically, this article examines the parallels between challenges faced by indigenous women and girls in the Lake Atitlan region of Guatemala, even with the assistance of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) providing sexual education and contraception, and challenges faced by women in a religious movement in the United States that promotes women’s surrender of control over their sexuality and reproduction. While both cultures include cultural and religious arguments against contraceptives and are grounded in male authority, the Quiverfull community provides a much more explicitly political reason for women to follow religious mandates. These two cases are illustrative of the common covert and overt pressures that impact women’s health security in two dissimilar communities.
Gender and Security

In recent years, a paradigm shift among international organizations, governments, and NGOs from a state security perspective to a human security perspective has opened the field of international relations to an array of topics not previously integrated into conceptualizations of security, including gender issues. This has brought into the mainstream a gendered view of what it means to be secure.

The literature on gender and security highlights the need to consider the unique and differentiated circumstances of women around the world. This is something that until recently mainstream international relations writings have ignored. Hudson (2005) argues that “A realist national security project enforces conformity to values that are often male-defined. Feminists therefore point out that an understanding of security issues needs to be extended to include the specific security concerns of women” (157). Human security approaches allow scholars to do that. As Hoogensen and Stuvoy (2006) note in their discussion of gendered approaches to human security, “The widening of the security agenda and the focus on the individual allows for the integration of non-state perspectives to inform security theory and security approaches” (207–8). However, a human security approach to looking at gender issues is not without pitfalls. The way that some groups conceptualize community security can minimize the importance of health security, particularly when it comes to women’s health.

Human security was first introduced in the 1994 Human Development Report. While human security primarily focuses on the individual as opposed to the state, it also focuses on community security. Frerks (2008) points out that one of the difficulties of the human security approach is the comprehensive nature of the concept. He asks, “How does one respect the multidimensionality of human security without becoming paralysed in the face of all those challenges that demand simultaneous and integrated action?” (12).

This multidimensionality may also mean that women’s needs take lower precedence. In some situations, the individual woman is only conceptualized as part of a community that takes higher precedence. This paper will discuss how in two communities, women are expected to subordinate individual health needs to what are perceived as community needs and community norms. These community norms form an essential part of how a community sees itself and thus what it needs to do to survive in way that is in keeping with its own self-perception. Often, the discourse surrounding community norms ignores the nondominant groups within the community and the challenges of intersectionality. How women are asked to understand their own security is shaped by the idea that their health needs and control of their own reproduction threaten the culture, the very survival of their communities, and even the nation-state. However, discourse about
the tension between individual and community rights can be a way of privileging the desires of the dominant group. Kuokkanen (2012) has gone so far as to assert in her study of the interconnections between indigenous self-determination and indigenous women’s rights, “the tension between collective and individual indigenous rights is illusory and that those who argue against individual rights do so only when women’s rights are in question” (249).

As our discussion of the Quiverfull movement will illustrate, the stories that women are told about their security have justified limitations on their pursuit of their own health or in their efforts to advocate for other women in their community. These challenges are particularly fierce when women are cooperating with or at least receiving help from outside of the community. Community suspicion of outsiders often reflects collective memory of actual physical threats to community survival, as in the case of the Maya in Guatemala, or a collective belief that the wider culture is encroaching on religious beliefs, as in the case of the Quiverfull movement in the United States.

A Comparison of Two Communities

For this project, we carried out a comparative case study design focusing on two cases of women’s reproductive security: the Quiverfull in the United States and the Maya in Guatemala. The research was executed through interviews in 2015 with 14 indigenous women who were clients of the NGO Mayan Families, Mayan Families leadership, employees (both local indigenous and foreign), and six Guatemalan school teachers. Interviews were done in person in Panajachel, Guatemala, and the surrounding villages of Tierra Linda, El Barranco, and San Jorge La Laguna. Follow-up interviews with NGO directors and staff occurred by Skype and phone. Additionally, analysis of videos, blogs, and webpages was carried out to assess the messaging used when discussing reproductive health in the Maya and Quiverfull communities.

The Maya Community in Guatemala

The Maya community in the Lake Atitlan region of Guatemala has consistently suffered from higher rates of chronic malnutrition, teen pregnancies, and maternal deaths than the nonindigenous population (USG Guatemala GHI Team 2016). This group has also been highly impacted by the Guatemalan civil war and ensuing mass killings. These historic events heighten a societal need for self-preservation, exacerbating a situation in which focusing on the security of one part of one’s identity, such as women’s reproductive health, impacts the security of another identity. While access to sexual education and birth control are guaranteed in Guatemala under the family planning law, passed in 2005 and enacted in 2009, this law has by no means been fully implemented (Ospina 2015).
The work of Mayan Families, with curriculum and training assistance from another NGO, Wings Guatemala, reveals the tensions created between dominant community norms and organizations that are viewed by some as outside influences. Mayan Families is a community development organization in Panajachel, Solola, Guatemala, that provides a means of student sponsorship by donors and runs preschools, a health clinic, vocational education programs, elder feeding programs, and, more recently, sexual education. Mayan Families demonstrates some of the complexities of leadership that exist in many NGOs that are neither entirely foreign nor entirely local. While it is funded primarily by sources outside of Guatemala and was founded by Australian and American expatriates, it was from the beginning open to and heavily influenced by indigenous voices, with the board of directors including local indigenous members. WINGS Guatemala not only provides training to other NGOs, but also provides reproductive health education and services including cervical cancer screening, birth control, and sex education and counseling. Its main clinic is in Antigua, Guatemala, but they have mobile and stationary clinics in other areas and send employees out to other parts to reach out to the community with information and services. Their education outreach, which includes public service radio announcements along with trainings, is directed at young students as well as adults, both male and female.

Mayan Families does not specialize in reproductive health but added a sexual education program to its existing education programs in 2015. Its website points out the serious need for increased sexual and reproductive health knowledge, access to condoms, and local reproductive health while at the same time acknowledging the cultural challenges of addressing those needs. It notes that “[b]etween 2008 and 2012, more than one in ten Guatemalan women had given birth by the age of 18. Unfortunately, sexual and reproductive education is uncommon in schools and other institutions for indigenous youth, as it is considered a sensitive and often taboo subject from a religious and cultural standpoint” (Mayan Families 2016). The specific sexual education program developed by Mayan Families, with training from Wings, is Ojos Abiertos which incorporates a series of sexual health promotion workshops for middle and high-school students. Wings is an organization that provides information about family planning, conducts cervical cancer clinics, and trains male and youth ambassadors.

There is an increasing awareness in the NGO community that programs will not be successful if local culture is not respected. This awareness has been highlighted in the World Association of Non-Governmental Organizations Code of Ethics and Conduct for NGOs, which states that an NGO “should be sensitive to the moral values, religion, customs, traditions, and culture of the communities they serve” (WANGO 2004, 10). That begs the question of which voices within the community have the power to determine cultural norms, and which voices are heard and which silenced.
Local organizations like Mayan Families work to balance what they see as essential health needs for women with respect for cultural values and the realities of the women they are trying to serve. For instance, one Mayan Families’ director noted when speaking of empowering women, “We try to make that impact but work within cultural norms” (Interview with author, February 2015). For instance, she noted that most activities for women are conducted early in the day so that the women can be home to make their husbands lunch. That way, they are much more likely to be able to attend.

This is a difficult task for Mayan Families since there is strong pushback in the Maya communities of Guatemala against the use of birth control. One of the arguments made to women by community leaders, including some in the Catholic Church, is that birth control is another attempt by outsiders to threaten their culture. For instance, Archbishop Oscar Julio Vian Morales said in a 2011 interview that “the problem is the kind of birth control methods that are used, like forcing families into sterilization. Foreign governments should not insist on less children but on more education” (Suarez 2011). It is interesting to note that this threat of sterilization is the same argument made by those trying to prevent parents in Pakistan from having their children immunized against small pox (Brannum and Campos 2016).

The Archbishop’s statement needs to be understood in the context of a culture that faced the very real threat of being wiped out during the civil war in the 1990s (Santiso and Bertrand 2000). This history and understanding of an outside threat means that indigenous women working for access to healthcare may need to convince other women that they are not part of a foreign sterilization program. The fear expressed by some is not only that woman may have fewer children, but that birth control could lead women to infidelity. Wings specifically addresses in its discussion of myths about birth control, the myth that “contraceptives lead to a woman having uncontrolled sexual desires. Only women interested in extra-marital sex want to use birth control” (Wings Top 10 Myths 2012, n.p.). Cleaning up such misconceptions is an important part of the work that Wings does. These challenges mean that NGOs have to decide how to allocate resources and develop programs in a way that minimizes their cultural footprint while providing opportunities for women and girls to control their own reproduction.

One solution that is discussed in the literature has been providing space for women’s voices to develop rather than imposing outside voices on the women. As Rebecca de Souza notes, “the notion of voice is central to the culture-centered approach because it is through voice that participants gain access to structural and cultural resources” (de Souza 2009, 693). For her, “having voice refers to a condition in which marginalized communities speak for themselves, make their own decisions, and contest claims that do not resonate with a sense of who they are” (de Souza 2009, 693). While providing a space for indigenous women to voice their
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concerns is clearly part of Mayan Families’ efforts, its Ojos Abiertos program goes beyond simply organizing local communities and has required sexual educational programs for scholarship students. Given Mayan Families’ prior commitment to indigenous voices, when the time came to develop Ojos Abiertos, there was a great deal of discussion among board members and staff about whether participation in this program should be a voluntary program that would provide a resource for students to develop their own voices or whether it should be mandatory (Interview by author, Panajachel, Guatemala 2015).

In the end, it was decided that it would be mandatory in order to reach more students; students then have the ability to incorporate what they have learned into their lives or make a more informed choice not to use birth control. However, it is important to note that students who did not participate were not actually removed from the broader program Mayan Families staff members (Interview by author, Panajachel, Guatemala 2015).

Interestingly, Mayan Families’ webpage description indicates a two-pronged approach to the reality of male dominance. On the one hand, they explain that boys are included in the Ojos Abiertos program because “Male-centered decision making persists as the norm in indigenous Guatemalan culture, so it is crucial that boys have a sound understanding of sexual and reproductive health” (Mayan Families 2016). In this way, they are acknowledging the reality and trying to work to an extent within that framework. However, in the next sentence, they note that in addition to helping young men “make relationship decisions that will benefit both themselves and their partners,” the training will help them to be “better equipped to understand and respect women’s rights” (Mayan Families 2016). Workshops with the aim to better equip young men to respect women’s life go beyond working within the current cultural framework. Rather, the goal seems to be to make generational changes to the framework itself. This contributes to a form of cultural adaptation that can lead to new cultural norms that include consideration of women’s health and wellbeing.

According to correspondence with Mayan Family staff, by April 2015, Mayan Families had successfully completed its first workshop series with 546 students participating. In 2016, they opened up the program to 497 nonsponsored children as well. The following year 464 participated including some in local public schools (personal communication February 12, 2018). One reason that Mayan Families has been able to reach so many people is that it had already been providing services to the indigenous in that area for 11 years and has earned a degree of trust. People are less likely to believe that the organization running the preschools and feeding the elderly is involved in a secret sterilization program. Thus, the distinction made by many between local and foreign NGOs may not be the way the local community views outsiders. Our interviews revealed a level of trust in the organization that was not expressed for local government. For the Maya living in
and around the Lake Atitlan region, a *ladino* coming from the city may be as or more distant to them than an Australian NGO director who has been providing services for many years.

Because of its focus on women’s health, Wings did not share the same advantage of having provided other, less-controversial services to the community for years. That is why it is so crucial that their message is delivered by indigenous community members. Interestingly, in many instances, the message that they deliver is not explicitly about independence or personal choice, but is framed in terms of better care for their children. For instance, in one meeting shown in the video *Blessed Fruit of the Womb*, the organizer says to the gathered women, “my poor kids are all dirty, working polishing shoes. Children are working instead of going to school. If I plan my family, I will be able to give them food, love, shelter, health for the mother and children” (Music 2013). Their message to the community is that the focus is on the wellbeing of women and families and not just one of female choice and independence. While the second may come from the first, that idea is frequently ignored.

**The Quiverfull Movement in the United States**

The resistance to women’s efforts to expand their health security and particularly the use of birth control is more extreme in some ways among the Quiverfull movement in the United States. Quiverfull members do not live in any particular area in the United States or share any one denomination; however, they can be considered a community. Exact numbers are hard to determine, but they are believed to number in the thousands, possibly as many as 10,000 (Joyce 2006). As Harrison and Rowley (2011) point out, Benedict Anderson’s idea of imagined communities fits very well with members of the Quiverfull community. Anderson asserts that nations are “imagined because even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (2006, 6). This speaks to the Quiverfull belief that they are a community of true Christians pushing back against an unstable secular society. Their sense of identity is framed by this feeling that they must protect America from feminism and secular culture. As Freiman (2011) notes, it is a “backlash movement; its founders reacted against societal norms that allow for sex education in the schools, choice and birth control.” Freiman (2011) has framed her examination of the Quiverfull movement through the lens of “collective identity and oppositional consciousness” (4), explaining how through oppositional consciousness one’s identity is formed in direct contrast to an identity considered immoral or inferior, drawing a clear line between oneself and one’s group and the “other.”

The name Quiverfull is derived from Psalm 127:3–5 which states:
Behold, children are a heritage from the LORD,  
The fruit of the womb is a reward.  
Like arrows in the hand of a warrior,  
So are the children of one’s youth.  
Happy is the man who has his quiver full of them;

Thus, adherents argue that it is each woman’s duty to produce as many children as God grants, proscribing any interference in the process of becoming pregnant. Even a married woman’s decision to be abstinent is considered interference in God’s plan. The name Quiverfull may be problematic because while it was originally adopted by the community itself, many have stopped using it. After several scandals and a book entitled, *Quiverfull: Inside the Christian Patriarchy Movement*, some started calling themselves “Biblical Families.” However, that name can be confusing because many types of groups, including polygamists, believe they are living out the image of the biblical family.⁴ Thus, regardless of the issues, the name Quiverfull will be used here.

Unlike the Maya in Guatemala, the very survival of Quiverfull as a community has not been threatened by war and mass killings of members. And yet, the perceived threat of violence and need for a spiritual army to combat the state is an underlying principle of their ideology. They argue that they are culturally oppressed by a secular society that tempts their children away from biblical values. They believe the way to fight back against that oppression is to have large numbers of children that are trained up to resist influences such as women’s liberation (Harrison and Rowley 2011). One of the messages given to Quiverfull women (among others) is that Western civilization is at risk of depopulation. This message is communicated through websites, home-school curricula, churches, and multimedia presentations. One of the films that is referred to by members of the Quiverfull movement is *Demographic Winter: The Decline of the Human Family*. Several reviews of the film have pointed out its implicit racism and sexism.⁵ However, it is worthwhile to move beyond that and look at it from a human security perspective. The idea conveyed to women is that if they care about their faith and culture, they will return to patriarchy and prolific child birthing. The basic argument of the film is that there will soon not be enough young people on the planet to support an aging population and maintain a thriving civilization. However, the subtext is clearly that the solution is to breed the “proper type” of people. For instance, one speaker notes, “You could say that certain kinds of human beings are on the way to

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⁴ See, for example: http://www.biblicalfamilies.org/.
extinction, in particular, people who for lack of faith do not go forth and multiply” (McLerran 2008). This aligns with the Quiverfull goal to gain cultural victory by out populating non-Christians.

For women in particular, this means sacrificing their own health to give birth to large numbers of children who will not only stop an imagined demographic winter but will also raise up a “Joshua generation”—that is a generation who “will be victorious warriors, dependent on God’s Spirit for supernatural victory” (Parsons 2016, n.p.). In preparation for their duties as part of the Joshua generation, Quiverfull boys are encouraged to pursue careers as politicians to influence political and societal norms (Seelhoff 2012). Adherents have the goal of “reclaiming sinful cities, such as San Francisco” (Joyce quoted on NPR 2009).

The risk to women’s health is a real one; women are expected to continue to have babies even if they are at risk. There is also pressure to bear children at home, even if they have had caesareans in the past so as to put the birth in God’s hands. The mental and physical toll of repeated childbirth and the resulting large family cannot be understated. When the woman or man encounters fertility problems, they are often suspected by the community of practicing some type of birth control (Freiman 2011). For Quiverfull women, any act to avoid pregnancy, including abstaining from sex on certain days, is considered a form of self-control. That type of self-control is sinful because control over family size should be handed over to God. Even the act of not having sex when a husband wants it is denying God’s will not only because of general strictures on complete submission to the husband but also because of 1 Corinthians 7:5.

There are multiple blogs and sermons on this topic. See, for instance, Tom Challies, a church elder who writes in his blog (2007), “The Bible tells us that spouses are to have sexual relations regularly and are not to deprive each other. ... Abstinence is not to be used as a method of birth control. It seems to be part of God’s plan for sexuality that there is always the possibility that a woman may become pregnant as long as she is physically able to bear children,” or Pastor Keith Krell (2009) who argues that “Therefore, before a couple gets married, the question needs to be asked, ‘Are you willing to be sexually available to your spouse till death do you part?’ If the answer is, ‘Well, I’m not so sure about that,’ I would suggest that the couple postpone their marriage or not get married at all” (16). Thus, the anti-birth control strictures go beyond that of the even the Catholic Church which allows for abstinence and “natural methods.”

The key message for women is that it is selfish to focus on their own individual welfare. In the movie Demographic Winter: The Decline of the Human Family

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6 See, for instance, The Catechism of the Catholic Church (CCC), no. 2370 which states, “Periodic continence, that is, the methods of birth regulation based on self-observation and the use of infertile periods, is in conformity with the objective criteria of morality.” These methods respect the bodies of the spouses, encourage tenderness between them, and favor the education of an authentic freedom.”
McLerran 2008), one speaker bemoans the state of U.S. culture, particularly its focus on the individual: “Affluence doesn't just mean that we buy more stuff, it means that we want to live our lives as individuals as opposed to being in large groups.” In other words, broader U.S. culture focuses on self rather than community values. The narrative goes on to indicate that this is the type of desire that leads to depopulation. Toward the end of the video, Philip Longman, Senior Fellow at the New America Foundation, paints the future in stark contrast declaring, “Either we go by the Swedish model or we return to traditional values, specifically patriarchy, properly understood, which was a value system that persuaded both men and women to have and take care of children” (McLerran 2008). The Swedish model, according to this video, means state policies that among other things support working mothers. The Swedish model is presented in the film as an abysmal failure that has not increased birth rates and is a fundamentally selfish way to live. Thus, it is the woman’s responsibility to ensure community security by submitting her body to the will of God and her husband rather than focusing on individual security. By doing so, she will help to hold back an ever-encroaching state. The movement draws upon articles and blogs that reinforce this message. For instance, it is asserted in the Federalist blog that:

as all good totalitarians know it is mothers—specifically, devoted and self-sacrificing mothers—who gum up the works of statist control in a society. Her crime is forging bonds of love, the self-sacrificing kind that don’t mix with big government schemes. Worse, when she forges these bonds within the context of a marriage covenant with the child’s father, she is exponentially more hazardous to the centralized state. (Morabito 2016)

It is, therefore, not enough to sacrifice her body to bear as many children as possible; a woman must also be self-sacrificing within the bounds of marriage and family in order to fulfill her duty to God and country.

Cheryl Lindsay Seelhoff, a former leader among Quiverfull women, who was publicly excommunicated after deciding to divorce, explains that Quiverfull families are often somewhat isolated, and thus abuse goes unnoticed by the community members. She felt her life was in danger from her husband, and yet the church told her to reconcile with her husband, hand over her bank account to the church, refrain from using the Internet, cease from going out in public alone or speaking in public ever again (CTV 2012; Seelhoff 2012). The perspective she shares is that women are only secure if they follow narrowly prescribed norms set forth by manifested patriarchal constructions. Kristiana Miner, who grew up in the Quiverfull movement, echoes the notion that abuse is tolerated among the Quiverfull; “training videos” by Michael and Debi Pearl encouraging physical discipline of the children were “second only to the bible” in her household (Shelton
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They point out that the very patriarchy that purports to protect women often functions to isolate women and shield abusers, ironically encouraging women to stay in abusive situations that undermine their security and the very idea of patriarchy as a protective umbrella for the family.

While Quiverfull advocates condemn feminist ideas as satanic (Joyce 2006; Seelhoff 2012), Harrison and Rowley (2011) point out that some Quiverfull advocates attempt to co-opt feminist ideas and engage modern culture rather than seek to return to “biblical times,” creating their own competing notion of culture. For instance, Susan Flanders, a member of the movement, notes that feminists advocate “choice” and she wishes that her choice to have as many children as God will give her and to respect her husband would not be considered “crazy” (Al Jazeera interview 2016). This discussion of choice, however, does not acknowledge the extreme pressure put on members to conform or be cast out often without an education or any financial resources. By connecting its movement through modern technology, using the mainstream media to gain credibility by emphasizing common values, and co-opting the rhetoric of feminism, the movement seeks to be perceived as part of modern society while challenging the meaning of cultural norms and concepts like feminism.7

Support from Survival Networks

Unlike the Maya Community in Guatemala whose poverty and need for post-conflict recovery attracts NGO efforts, the Quiverfull community receives little attention from NGOs. This overlooks the reality that many Quiverfull women and girls are trapped in their community and have no economic independence. One of the strategies of the movement is to have young girls completely ensconced in a family unit before they are old enough to leave. In the most extreme cases, young women leave home with no proof of U.S. citizenship.8 This can happen because their home births are not reported and they are not registered in school or even church. Many Quiverfull families only home church because of both perceived hostility to their large families and incompatibility of beliefs (Freiman 2011). This means that girls will have very little evidence that they were born or spent their childhoods in the United States if their parents refuse to cooperate.

Thus, networks of survivors have become a key resource for some of the women who want to leave the Quiverfull community. While there are not many organizations that provide economic, health, or emotional support to the women and young girls who have left or are trying to leave the Quiverfull movement, in

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7 As Hudson (2005) notes, “there is no one feminism” (158); people bring their own associations as well as stereotypes when they discuss feminist ideas.

the last few years, a few survival groups have begun to form. Frequently, the focus of these groups is on ex-home-school students indoctrinated with extremist views or ex-fundamentalists but with a good deal of attention focused on Quiverfull in particular. They are beginning to act to provide financial support to people seeking to leave the Quiverfull movement. Perhaps most importantly, forums such as Home-Schoolers Anonymous and No Longer Quivering seek to provide a new form of community for those seeking to make a new life outside fundamentalist communities (Wagley 2016).

While survivors acknowledge the choice of adult women to conform to their practices as part of religious freedom, they speak out for those they see as trapped by economic constraints or lack of knowledge. One example is Vyckie Garrison who works to help women leave the Quiverfull movement. She was pressured to have four more children after doctors advised against it. She eventually left the community, divorced her husband, and started the website “No Longer Quivering.” In addition to exposing abuses in the Quiverfull movement, this site hosts a support group for women leaving the community. Thus, support groups are often actively countering the beliefs they see as subjugating women and helping women to shift their world view such that they do not believe that receiving medical treatment during childbirth and practicing birth control of any kind are acts against God.

Conclusion

A comparison of indigenous women in Guatemala and Quiverfull women in the United States demonstrates the complexity of women’s health security in the context of communities that perceive a threat from the wider society. A discussion of the two groups brings into focus the propensity for women to be constrained by community, and how efforts to respect community values can sometimes privilege dominant—frequently male—voices. Maya women in Guatemala suffer much greater economic hardship than women living in the United States. However, Quiverfull women are often born into or integrated into the movement at a young age and lack any financial independence. Another commonality is that both groups view outsiders as a potential threat. In the case of the Maya, this means that NGOs have had to navigate cultural issues while trying to improve women’s health. In the case of the Quiverfull, outside groups have kept a distance as women’s health in that community has been seen in the context of religious freedom and family values. Assistance for Quiverfull women has come largely in the form of survival networks.

9 These groups include: Responsible Homeschooling, the Unboxing Project, No Longer Quivering, and Recovering Grace.
While it is crucial for NGOs and scholars to have an extensive understanding of the dominant culture of the community, this does not mean that the individual needs of women need to be subsumed by the needs of the community as if the two are inherently distinct. Moreover, those seeking to work with women in these situations must consider the complexity of women's roles in any culture and seek to recognize and promote the voices of women. Seeking to be advocates for women is a delicate balancing act, but an indispensable one for individuals and organizations working to provide education and alternatives for women. National and transnational actors have made progress in recognizing not only threats to women's health, but the imperative to include women in the solutions. To truly achieve security, these evolving and differentiated circumstances must be taken into account at all levels of policy as well as in theoretical conceptualizations of security. A gendered human security approach recognizes that the health needs of women are not simply a matter of individual security; they affect security in ways that are ultimately important to the larger community and the nation-state. These cases have broad applicability to human security theory and resulting policies as well as notions of collective identity.

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Conflicting Values Shaping Perceptions of Community Security and Women's Health Security


Enemy at the Gates: The Consequential Effects of Securitizing Immigration

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Abstract

Securitization measures were presented as key pillars of Candidate Trump’s campaign, and have informed Executive policymaking since President Trump assumed office. In the wake of the contentious relationship that has been developing between the Executive and the judiciary, the Court’s recent opinion sustaining, in part, the Executive’s immigration policy, and the Court allowing the travel ban to take effect while legal challenges go forward, it is timely to critically examine the nexus between Security, Law, and Policy. In the present context, the Executive has articulated an agenda that explicitly securitizes immigration. The significance of this is that law and policy each cast the immigrant as an existential threat to public safety. The foregoing merits critical examination. We contend that explicitly securitizing immigration law and policy will have substantial political, sociocultural, and legal effects on overall public policy and on the content and character of American identity going forward.

Keywords: immigration, security, political identity, law, power, politics

Enemigo en las puertas: Los efectos consecuentes de la securitización de la inmigración

Resumen

Las medidas de securitización se presentaron como pilares clave de la campaña del candidato Trump y han informado al Ejecutivo desde el momento en que el presidente Trump asumió el cargo. A raíz

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de la polémica relación que se ha desarrollado entre el Ejecutivo y el poder judicial, la reciente opinión de la Corte respalda, en parte, la política de inmigración del Ejecutivo y la Corte que permite que la prohibición de viajar surta efecto mientras continúan los desafíos legales. Es oportuno examinar críticamente el nexo entre seguridad, ley y política. En el contexto presente, el Ejecutivo ha articulado una agenda que explícitamente securitiza la inmigración. El significado es que tanto la ley como las políticas dictan que los inmigrantes son una amenaza existencial para la seguridad pública. Lo anterior merece un examen crítico. Sostenemos que la securitización explícita de las leyes y políticas de inmigración tendrá efectos políticos, socioculturales y legales sustanciales en la política pública general y en el contenido y el carácter de la identidad estadounidense en el futuro.

Palabras clave: inmigración, seguridad, identidad política, ley, poder, política

门口的敌人：安全化移民的后果

摘要

作为特朗普竞选活动的关键支柱，安全化措施自特朗普总统上任以来，便影响着行政决策的制定。行政和司法之间关系日益冲突，法院的最新意见在一定程度上维持了行政当局的移民政策，法院允许旅行禁令在继续挑战法律的同时生效。介于上述原因，现在需要认真探讨安全、法律和政策之间的关系。目前情况下，行政部门提出了明确移民安全化的议程。这一议程的意义在于，法律和政策都将移民视为对公共安全的生存威胁。上述情况值得认真分析。笔者认为，移民法和移民政策的明确安全化将对整个公共政策以及美国特性发展的内涵与特征产生重大的政治、社会文化和法律影响。

关键词：移民，安全，政治认同，法律，权力，政治
Introduction

Securitization measures, from a public policy perspective, were presented as key pillars of Candidate Trump’s campaign, and have informed Executive policymaking since President Trump assumed office. Under the Administration, immigration law and policy have been emplaced within the ambit of securitization. In the wake of the contentious relationship that has been developing between the Executive and the federal judiciary, the Court’s recent opinion sustaining, in part, the Executive’s immigration policy by upholding a revised version of the travel ban, and the Court allowing the travel ban to take effect while legal challenges go forward (Stohr 2017), it is timely to critically examine the nexus between security, law, and public policy (hereinafter SLPP). This is especially pertinent in the present given the fact that “the modern structure of immigration law actually has enabled the President to exert considerable control over immigration law’s core question: which types of noncitizens, and how many, should be permitted to enter and reside in the United States” (Cox and Rodriguez 2009, 458), and why exactly? In the present political and legal contexts, the Executive has articulated and pursued an agenda that explicitly securitizes immigration law and policy. The significance of securitizing immigration is that law and policy each cast the immigrant as an existential threat to public safety, and each reflects a war-mentality based on perpetual threat. The foregoing merits critical examination, and is the focus of this paper. We contend that explicitly securitizing immigration law and policy will have substantial political, sociocultural, and legal effects on overall public policy and on the content and character of American identity going forward. We thus explore the immigration law and policy within the context of the SLPP to illuminate the consequences that devolve from securitizing immigration.

An analysis of securitized immigration, within the broader context of security, law, and policy, fleshes out the complex nature of Security and how it directly affects public policy. Policy reflects the values and priorities that inform the ways, means, and aims that undergird it. Thus, there are serious consequences that result from basing immigration law and policy on Security. This is the case because the “attempt to control the mobility of people is a paradigmatic feature of the modern sovereign territorial state and states system” (Basham and Vaughan-Williams 2012, 509–27). Law functions as a primary means by which interpretations of Security are conceptualized and implemented. How law interprets and addresses competing values and principles, such as valuing human rights, and preserving civil rights
and liberties, directly impacts and affects the form and substance of public order, authority, and policy. Due to the potential for illimitable application, Security can present serious challenges to democratic societies wherein civil rights, liberties, and assorted political freedoms are deemed foundational ordering principles that inform the character and content of society.

Securitizing immigration, characterizing it as an existential threat to U.S. national security, has profound implications for Executive power and American national identity in the context of a democratic political system. Securitized immigration raises the disconcerting questions of: who exactly are or should constitute the American People, what is the nature of Executive power in defining the character and content of the American People, what role does (or should) Security play in formulating immigration policy, and what values do the American People subscribe to (given the fact that public authority in the United States is legitimized, in theory, by the will of the People)? The present controversy over the Executive’s immigration agenda exemplifies the importance of clearly expounding upon the consequences that securitization has vis-à-vis the SLPP. In the case of immigration, especially after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the “prominence of immigration in the national security debate has been controversial and has legitimized a selective enforcement policy drawn along lines of race, religion, nationality, and citizenship. The vestiges of 9/11 also reveal how immigration laws [have been] borne out of national security concerns” (Wadhia 2017, 672). Examining immigration in the present in light of the SLPP nexus reveals the deep interrelationship between security, law, and policy, the consequences of securitization, and why it is important to explain and understand the magnitude of securitizing immigration on American politics and identity.

**Effectuating Public Safety**

“Security” in the uppercase, throughout this work, refers to an analytic meta-signifier. “Security” as opposed to “security” is indicative of a discursive formation, a set of processes that constitute (and is constituted of) variegated interpretations of the meaning, purpose, and content of power and order (see Chandler 2007). Despite multifarious interpretations, indicated by the lower-case “security,” Security is a notion that applies to all forms of order, society, sociopolitical, and economic organization embodied in formal and informal political units. Thus, Security is potentially hyper-expansive in nature and can lead to a politics of securitization that gives rise to an economy of power that brings about a domain of securitization that Michel Foucault has termed a “Society of Security” (Foucault 2007, 10–11). In such a society, Security becomes the preeminent focus of public policy, and can be expanded to the point where securitized policy may result in “no tiny corner of the realm escap[ing] this general network of the sovereign’s orders and laws” (Foucault 2007, 10–11). For example, “In the context of the
‘war on terror’ unleashed by the US and its allies in the aftermath of the attacks of 11 September 2001, the differential effects of border security practices according to racial and gender characteristics have been particularly visible” (Basham and Vaughan-Williams 2012, 1). Racial, ethnic, and religious markers have become securitized. Privileging Security in the development of policy has the effect of potentially substantially enlarging the scope of securitization (De Genova and Peutz 2010; Parker and Vaughan-Williams 2009, 582–87; Rumford 2006, 155–69). In light of this potential, it is necessary to critically examine policy that is explicitly securitized within democratic society due to its commodious character because “sovereignty is exercised within the borders of a territory, discipline is exercised on the bodies of individuals, and security is exercised over a whole population” (Creegan 2012; Foucault 2007, 10–11). Security can be broadly defined as a state of affairs wherein individuals are emplaced within an overarching Order that exists to ensure the sustainability and wellbeing of the polity, with public safety as a cardinal value legitimizing public authority. Security mechanisms and frameworks are, at the most basic level, designed to establish secure spaces. A secure state of affairs is one in which sovereign authority governs to establish and fix borders, locations, and, above all, make possible and ensure the protection of the People that reside within the geopolitical and physical borders of the State (Foucault 2007, 29). Security, from a State perspective, constitutes an “organic bond uniting hierarchized individuals” (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, xiv) within geo-spatial and political borders.

The State, therefore, provides a space and place wherein it is the ultimate provider of public safety to protect the population through the provision, preservation, and fortification of geopolitical and physical borders. The traditional notion of borders based on geopolitical and physical demarcations have provided the purlieus of sovereign space wherein the Sovereign has effectuated a secure place to govern all within its jurisdiction, to include territory and peoples. To be secure in the world, therefore, involves public authority creating mechanisms of identifying and addressing internal and external “threats” to the integrity, sanctity of borders. Threats to the wellbeing of the State are construed as being a threat to the People. Quelling and managing threats and disturbances to Order, to the peace, are part of a process whereby a State proactively structures, controls, and reifies its sovereign territory. The problem with threat, conceptually, as a means of legitimating Security, broadly conceived, is that it has “the constant tendency to expand” (Foucault 2007, 45). Security is a very broad concept (Opello 2016; Yeatman and Zolkos 2009): Throughout history, political organization—whether primitive, dictatorship, city–state, republic, feudal, monarchical, industrial, mercantilist, capitalist, socialist, or communist—Security has played an incalculable role in the structuration of a polity’s affairs (Astrada 2010, 5–6).

Security, expansively conceived, has grounded existential notions of interests, meaning, purpose, identity, and survival of the People within the State’s bor-
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ders. The State’s monopoly over defining threat, and addressing threat, has played a key role in its capacity to legitimately speak before all others when it comes to articulating Security discourse in the realms of law and public policy. The problem that emerges in securitization, and securitization of immigration in particular, is that borders are not only geopolitical and physical, but are social. That is, a more critical approach reveals that borders can also be viewed as a sociocultural “set of practices” (Basham and Vaughan-Williams 2012, 4). Seeing borders as a sociocultural set of practices broadens and deepens the ability to explain and understand the relationship between Security, immigration, and borders, “which encompasses an array of technologies of governance designed to control the mobility of people, services and goods. In this context, the concept of ‘the border’ is no longer understood narrowly in terms of the sharp lines on Mercator’s map, but a much ‘thicker’ sociological entity” (Basham and Vaughan-Williams 2012, 4).

Security discourse is comprised of interactive material, e.g., police, and intangible, e.g., an ideology that casts the immigrant as miasmic, components that inform, complement, and produce securitization measures. A systematic set of concepts and practices, empirical and intangible, thus function in tandem within an interdependent set of organizational relationships to articulate and implement Security (Basham and Vaughan-Williams 2012, 6–7). Threats to public safety legitimate securitization, which, in turn profoundly impacts the character and content of public policy. Criminal offenses that undermine national security, for instance, are fodder for expansive securitization measures. Order through public safety is at the apex of a State’s raison d’état. “Order is what remains when everything that is prohibited has in fact been prevented” (Foucault 2007, 46). In the process of securitizing immigration, the immigrant becomes an existential threat to U.S. national security virtue of being an immigrant. If a securitized war-response to immigration is pursued in public policy, a result is that the (non-White racial, ethnic, religious) immigrant is reduced to a one-dimensional caricature—a mere threat to good Order and public safety. Thus, the “notion that security needs may be better addressed through more localized, non-violent and social means [can be] readily dismissed as idealistic, as ‘softheaded, wishful, naïve’, even dangerous” (Basham and Vaughn-Williams 2012, 8; Peterson 1998, 581–89; Razack 2004, 129–74; Vaughn-Williams 2007, 107–24).

In tandem with Security, Law, as a meta-signifier, in the form of rules, applies to all forms of order, society, sociopolitical, and economic organization embodied in formal and informal political units. Law assumes an indispensable role in expanding, e.g., the USA Patriot Act, and restricting, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (Prohibition Against Torture), securitization’s limits. Law is a primary medium by which Security finds expression in the realm of public policy (Astrada 2010, 5–6, 57–73). In a system of law “what is undetermined is what is permitted ... the law prohibits ... and the essential function of security ... is to respond to a reality in such a way that this response cancels out the reality to which it responds—nullifies
it, or limits, checks, or regulates it ... this regulation within the element of reality is fundamental in ... security” (Foucault 2007, 47). “Legal practice consists in applying a normative idea to a factual situation. The idea cannot realize itself. Therefore, it requires a decision (for example, a humanitarian intervention) that crosses the distance between the idea (for example, law of war) and the facts (for example, the violent break-up of a state). The guarantee that a decision is made, ultimately irrespective of its substantive content, is the essential characteristic of the legal form” (Huysmans 2004, 168). In democratic political societies premised on the rule of Law, Law has played a particularly important role in both procuring and restricting Security, attempting to reconcile the competing political values, such as liberty v. Order, against the hyper-expansive nature of securitization measures. The federal judiciary has played a key role in checking and balancing Executive and Congressional interpretations of Security. This can be observed in the present struggle by the Executive to securitize immigration versus those on the Bench and in the Congress to push back against securitized immigration. Recently, for instance, President Trump’s Executive Order (The White House 2017b, Enhancing Public Safety) aimed at stripping “sanctuary cities” of federal funding was blocked by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the Executive from unilaterally imposing its view of the primary role that Security should assume in positing and enforcing immigration law and policy (Diamond and McKirdy 2017).

In the present SLPP nexus, the Executive is promoting Security as the goal of public policy regarding immigration. Militarization of local police (Goldman 2017), erecting a massive wall along the U.S.–Mexico border (Jacobs 2017), mass deportation of immigrants within the United States (Aizeki 2017), and the restriction of certain groups of people from immigrating to the United States (BBC News 2017) can be interpreted as the Executive explicitly privileging Security over competing interests and values. Jef Huysmans’ critical examination of the state of exception can be applied to the fallout that results from the securitization of immigration. That is, securitized immigration “tends to politically neutralize the societal as a realm of multifaceted, historically structured political mediations and mobilizations. Or, in other words, deploying the exception as a diagram of the political marginalizes the societal as a political realm. In doing so, it eliminates one of the constituting categories of modern politics, hence producing an impoverished and ultimately illusionary understanding of the processes of political contestation and domination” (Huysmans 2008, 165–83; Neocleous 2006, 191–213).

Casting immigrants and the notion of immigration as an existential threat to U.S. national security creates a justification for hyper-expansive securitization measures in which competing and equally important values and historical facts, such liberty and the U.S. political unit being a product of immigration, drop out. “The political contest of the meaning of and counter-measures to insecurity raises questions about the way in which security responses to violence impact on the
social and political fabric of ... society. More specifically they revive the view that under certain circumstances security policies can become explicitly paradoxical. The paradox arises when security knowledge and technology that is meant to protect liberal democracy against violence [or threat] seriously risks to undermine it. In these situations the technologies and strategies for containing a threat challenge key techniques for restraining arbitrary exercise of political power that define liberal democratic politics” (Huysmans 2004, 321–41). The protective motive that underlies Security and securitization has the effect of undermining the overarching democratic values that inform the political system and political culture. Immigration law and policy reflect an ethos wherein the United States will “not put superficial concerns above public safety”’ (Goldman 2017). To suggest that competing American values and norms, such as diversity and civil rights and liberties, are “superficial” is to articulate a binary paradigm of Security/Insecurity that places Security at the apex of public values. American identity, values, norms, and identity are reduced to one-dimensional signifiers. A binary Security/Insecurity public policy framework simplifies a complex state of affairs into Secure or Insecure state of affairs, and has profound consequences for the polity’s identity, its values, and the foundational bases of the People’s will expressed in public policy. For instance, the existential “threat” that immigrants pose to U.S. national security, as interpreted through the lens of a reductionist Security/Insecurity national security framework, has explicit racial, ethnic, ideological, and religious overtones that, in turn, deeply impact the character and content of public policy.

**Framing and Critically Examining Securitized Immigration**

Control of borders, and of peoples that reside within and without borders, is a basic police function of States premised on public safety. This basic function, however, is readily susceptible to securitization measures based on xenophobia, ideological and religious virtue, and zealotry based on fear and loathing of an immigrant Other, an outsider that threatens to contaminate the polity. The Other, as the literal other, the immigrant, is employed to justify securitization. Identity, as it is inscribed in Western Culture, revolves around resemblance. Resemblance is opposed to “otherness” in the space of the image “of human identity and, indeed, human identity as image—both familiar frames or mirrors of selfhood that speak from deep within Western culture—are inscribed in the sign of resemblance” (Bhabha 1994, 70). This resemblance, or lack of, is the foundation of how otherness is structured for this analysis. The otherness recognized in the immigrant Other, must remain fixed, in so much, from a post-colonial perspective “[a]n important feature of colonial discourse is its dependency on the concept of ‘fixity’ in the ideological construction of otherness” (Bhabha 1994, 94). This fixity is most apparent in the Law, where the “legal definition of whiteness took shape in the context of immigration law, as courts decided who was to have the privilege of living in the United States. As many ordinary citizens did, judges defined the
white race in opposition to blackness or some other form of otherness” (Delgado and Stefancic 2012, 85). The impacts of the Great Recession of 2008, solidified the fear of the Other, among lower middle class voters, who demonized and feared undocumented immigrant workers perceived as draining social safety net resources (Judis 2016, 59). The focus of this analysis is how the other is fixed, and feared, throughout the U.S.’s relation with immigration in the Court, the law, and in the Executive Office.

In the case of immigration, the debate over the desirability and constitutionality of the Executive’s security agenda is reminiscent of arguments premised on the politics of fear and loathing stemming from a securitized interpretation of immigration earlier in U.S. history. Fear and loathing of an outside Other were hallmarks of securitized immigration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, wherein the immigrant Other was viewed as an existential threat to the United States. The following statement, issued on behalf of the People of California regarding Japanese immigrants, is reflective of how a securitized interpretation of immigration—one premised on stringent and comprehensive control of the racial, ethnic, and ideological makeup of the populace—becomes knottily enmeshed in a politics of fear and loathing:

In a memorial to Congress, the California Constitutional Convention in 1879 stated: As became a people devoted to the National Union, and filled with profound reverence for law, we have repeatedly, by petition and memorial, through the action of our Legislature, and by our Senators and Representatives in Congress, sought the appropriate remedies against this great wrong, and patiently awaited with confidence the action of the General Government. Meanwhile this giant evil has grown, and strengthened, and expanded; its baneful effects upon the material interests of the people, upon public morals, and our civilization, becoming more and more apparent, until patience is almost exhausted, and the spirit of discontent pervades the state. It would be disingenuous in us to attempt to conceal our amazement at the long delay of appropriate action by the National Government towards the prohibition of an immigration which is rapidly approaching the character of an Oriental invasion, and which threatens to supplant the Anglo-Saxon civilization on this Coast. (Garis 1927, 316–17)

The foregoing, which characterizes Japanese immigration as an “invasion,” as viral, resonates with the present attempt by the Executive to securitize immigration based on the “invasiveness” of immigrants from the Global South and Middle East, which includes constructing a Great Wall on the U.S.–Mexico border, enhancing procedures to deter entry into the United States, streamlining deportation procedures, funding law enforcement and prosecutorial resources to facilitate the
rapid removal of all illegal immigrants, and including a citizenship status question on the upcoming census (The White House 2017d, Policy Priorities). A consequence that ensues from excessively emphasizing Security within the SLPP is that law and policy grounded in Security reflects a myopic focus on public safety that discards the negative effects of securitized immigration, to include prejudicial and discriminatory racial, ethnic, religious, and ideological effects that such policy has on the character and content of what constitutes an American, the American polity, what is great (or not so great) about America, and categorical demonization of an immigrant Other. “Security knowledge is always knowledge about dangers, about what and how we should fear” (Wæver 1995, 56). Security professionals steeped in the classical political realism and realpolitik do not give due weight to intangible factors such as culture and emotions such as fear in a security calculus—all of which have an impact on the character and content of security and securitization measures (See Vaughan-Williams 2010, 1071–83; Wæver 1995, 46–86). Whether it is combatting the “Evil Empire” of the communists or the generic fanatical Arab terrorist, caricatures of peoples as the basis of security policy is at odds with sundry legal, social, and political developments in the US since the late 1960s onwards at the structural level seeking to make the notion of American and America more inclusive. For example, the Warren Court put forth important constitutional interpretations in line with changes transpiring at the national level, such as: finding formal racial segregation policies in public schools unconstitutional (Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)); finding anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional (Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)); substantially increasing the scope of the doctrine of incorporation against the States (Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)); and holding that the Constitution requires active compliance by the States in the realm of federal protections of criminal defendants (Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)). An emphasis on Security and unmitigated securitization in the SLPP severely minimizes or ablates competing notions of what constitutes the Good in the ordering of a society.

Security in an immigration context becomes tinged with race and ethnicity, and any liberty interests that attach to those enmeshed within suspect racial or ethnic classifications deemed a threat to public safety become attenuated. The sentiment expressed by Senator Sterling in the 1920s toward Japanese immigrants is reminiscent of the ethos that informs the Executive’s present immigration law and policy toward the Global South and Middle East: “If we are going to exclude Japanese immigrants, let us exclude them because it is a wholesome thing, the right thing, the just thing to do for the United States and for the American people” (Garis 1927, 328). Deportation, restriction of or privileging immigration based on a particular religious persuasion, erecting a massive great wall along the U.S.–Mexico border—all of these policies reflect and are in line with a desire to control the racial, ethnic, religious, and ideological character and content of the nation’s pop-
ulation as expressed in Senator Sterling’s statement concerning the Japanese. Presently, the Executive and the lower federal courts have provided somewhat different interpretations of the SLPP vis-à-vis immigration and Security. For instance, when the Trump Administration put forth the initial travel ban, the “states of Washington and Minnesota, along with a series of large corporations, then brought actions stating that these orders violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment and that, as aggrieved parties, they had standing to litigate. The complaints listed a multitude of potential harms to the states and their corporations if the United States government refused to admit individuals from these countries. The potential harms ranged from the economic harm of losing established employees to the disruption to families and communities because of the sudden loss of people who could not enter the United States” (Shmueli and Ahmad 2017, 29).

Public authority, and the interpretation and application of securitization measures based on said authority, permeate Security. With control as the baseline motive for securitization, the State propagates modalities of Security. To be secure therefore involves the generation of mechanisms of control over internal and external “threats” to Order, society, whereby the concepts of individuated and collective selfhood (I and We) are maintained. Securitization that is overtly and explicitly politicized to target enemies of the polity based on unassimilable Otherness—e.g., physical and cultural difference, religious and ideological difference, specific types of alienage and foreignness—that views the Other as miasmic—stokes fear and loathing, which, in turn, foments hate, anger, hostility, and violence (Polakow-Suransky 2017).

Three Executive orders proffered by President Trump pertaining to immigration at the onset of his tenure in office reflect the power-dynamics that inform expansive securitization regarding public safety, threat, and the prejudicial and discriminatory politicizing of racial, ethnic, religious, and ideological identity. On January 27, 2017, the President issued Executive Order 13769, Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States. Citing the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and contending that “numerous foreign-born individuals have been convicted or implicated in terrorism-related crimes” since then, the Executive Order forcefully declared that, the United States “must ensure that those admitted to this country do not bear hostile attitudes toward it and its founding principles” (Executive Order 13769). The Order was further justified because of “[d]eteriorating conditions in certain countries due to war, strife, disaster, and civil unrest increase the likelihood that terrorists will use any means possible to enter the United States. The United States must be vigilant during the visa-issuance process to ensure that those approved for admission do not intend to harm Americans and that they have no ties to terrorism” (Executive Order 13769). In the act of invoking a grave existential threat to the United States, the Executive has put forth a hyper-expansive interpretation of Security that effectively emplaces immigration in a national security framework. In securitizing immigration, we have a phenom-
enon that can be classified as protecting borders from immigrants by “policing without borders” (Côté and Erickson 2009, 52; Derrida 2011, 14).

The notion of hospitality articulated by Jacques Derrida (2011, 1–24) is useful in pointing out the deleterious effects that result from a securitized immigration agenda, and how it skews the Law and Policy components of the SLPP. Hospitality can be employed to temper security—hospitality is not absolute but conditional. Thus, it provides an alternative conception of immigration. Security renders immigrants parasitic (illegitimate and thus fodder for securitization). Hospitality provides an alternative framework that allows competing values to emerge in discourse and policy because immigrants are conceived as conditional guests (which allows for rules and processes not tinctured with immediate threat and criminality). The complexity that gives rise to and permeates immigration, e.g., history, economy, culture, sociality, politics, etc., is utterly lost in securitized immigration. Order, safety, and threat reduce the immigrant to a caricature; the immigrant Other is made to conform to the threat that securitized immigration posits as the singular dimension of immigration.

Hospitality (conditional), at base, allows policymakers to take into account the complex factors that inform immigration. For example, immigration from Mexico and Central America to the United States, which is at the forefront of the present Administration’s securitized immigration agenda, was employed by the United States to wage a proxy war against the USSR (McPherson 2016; Pederson 2013). Hospitality may indeed have problems (Leung and Stone 2009, 193–206), but it is multifaceted, thereby allowing the Law and Policy components of the SLPP to retain an independent force. The motives and concerns of host and guest at least have a better chance to manifest than in a securitized immigration framework. With hospitality as an operative factor in the SLPP, it becomes less about threat and combatting invasiveness. Rather, Law and Policy provide alternatives to securitization. Immigration can perhaps be “a question of knowing how to transform and improve the law, and of knowing if this improvement is possible within an historical space which takes place between the Law of an unconditional hospitality, offered a priori to every other, to all newcomers, whoever they may be, and the conditional laws of a right to hospitality” (Derrida 2011, 22–23).

**America First: The Political Question of Who Are “We the People”**

A n essential question that arises when securitizing immigration is, who exactly are or what constitutes the American People that are being put “first” in the Administration’s immigration policy. To address this question, one must examine the context in which the question is asked, and how context frames and constrains the relationship between Security and immigration. In an increasingly globalized world, wherein States are simply unable to function in isolation, the mass movement of peoples across traditional borders seriously challenges the
sanctity and integrity of geopolitical and physical borders. This has the effect, in turn, of rendering immigration an existential threat to the identity of the People as the State defines the term. The People are the repository of a formal identity. The State acts in the name of the People it serves. Thus, securitizing immigration reveals that part of the threat that immigrants pose is one to a stable identity. The present Administration has employed fear and loathing to highlight the “threat” that immigrants pose to American identity, which the Administration equivocates with U.S. identity.

As individuals feel vulnerable and experience existential anxiety, it is not uncommon for them to wish to reaffirm a threatened self-identity. Any collective identity that can provide such security is a potential pole of attraction. It is a war of emotions, where world leaders and other paramount figures are seeking to rally people around simple rather than complex causes. As rallying points, some of these causes seem to have more powerful appeal than others. Nationalism and religion are two such causes or “identity-signifiers” that are more likely than other identity constructions to provide answers to those in need ... nationalism ... [provides] particularly powerful stories and beliefs because of [its] ability to convey a picture of security, stability, and simple answers ... resting on solid ground, as being true. (Kinnvall 2004, 742)

When taken as a self-evident concept or construct, the notion of “the American people” functions as a relatively stable notion that expresses itself through a “general will” (or even multifaceted will). In the realm of representation and public policy, however, “the people” or “a people” are problematic. The concept of the General Will cannot be comprehensibly summarized in the limited space of this paper, but for the purpose of our discussion, it is problematic in the realms of representation and public policy because

there is no people before the act by which a people becomes a people in the first place; and, even afterward, the people are never one or homogenous but many and internally divided. In sum, far from constituting a stable identity derived from a preordained essence that would have been racially, ethnically, linguistically, culturally, or ontologically definable, “people” here serves as a name—one name among others—for the political process that produces its own subject, while reminding us that without an element of subjectivization there can be no politics. (Bosteels 2016, 20)

The question then becomes essentially a political one, and thus, subject to critical analysis on how a polity, or a subsection of it, is conceptualized in the context of Security and immigration.
The question of who exactly are the People is one of the power and privilege to identify what exactly constitutes the criteria of Peoplehood, and the politics of identity. The subsection of the polity that possesses the ability to define—and associate itself as a protector of—the People is one correlated with racial, ethnic, legal, and economic status. For instance, legal citizenship, which only the Sovereign can provide, provides “a sense of belonging to a territorialized political community most often represented by the nation-state. Citizenship, in this respect, offers a bounded [space] that reflects the historical articulation of national communities ... Citizenship serves ... as a mode of inclusion and incorporation in society and as a legal and cultural framework” (Nagel and Staeheli 2004, 5). Policy spaces reflect the politics that attaches to defining the American People. In the case of immigration, the notion of an American People is a product of, in part, the Executive's substantial control over the legal regime governing which type of people (racial, ethnic, class, religious, ideological) qualify to enter and remain in the United States. The notion of an American People is thus not necessarily a representative concept in a democratic sense of the term. Utilizing the term in a securitized immigration discourse reifies the Executive's interpretation of associating its notion of non-American People with threat, and espousing the authenticity of the People via a normative association of its interpretation with an objective referent (Agnew 1999, 499–521). The People in securitized immigration discourse exemplify how the concept is devoid of any objective representativeness. Alain Badiou defines the notion of a People (in his example, the French People) “in reality mean[ing] nothing more than ‘the inert mass of those upon whom the state has conferred the right to call themselves French’” (Bosteels 2016, 23–24).

The process of legitimizing the normative association for a subset of the polity to be or have the power to define the People is, in part, effectuated by the process of identification with a reflection of what type of person or group is the basis of the interests of political leaders. And while the will of the people is an essential aspect of legitimate policy, “[a]s soon as the state in question is formed, regulated, and enrolled in the ‘international community,’ the people it claims as its authority ceases to be a political subject. It becomes a passive mass that the state configures, universally no matter what the form of the state” (Bosteels 2016, 25–26). Here, there is a double process, whereby the polity is fractured into distinct communities and identities, while certain subsets of the whole have the privilege of identifying with the People, simultaneously defining Inside/Outside, People/Other, and in the case of immigration law and policy having an actual People whose interests and safety are protected, despite the fractured nature of the People in actuality. “To recognize oneself as a member of a particular nation—indeed to feel a powerful sense of belonging—and to be recognized by others as such, is a perquisite for the formation of the inside/outside, self/other, us/them boundaries that define the topography of nationalist sentiment and rhetoric” (Bell 2003, 64).
The People function, on the one hand, as a power relationship between the Executive and subsections of the polity, and, on the other, the bedrock of legitimate justification for the State to act on behalf of People. The legitimized expression of the General Will through the electoral system, on all levels of government, still does not reconcile this internal constitutive exclusionary process, in that “it is never really the case that all of the possible people who are represented by ‘the people’ show up to claim they are the people! So ‘we, the people’ always has its constitutive outside, as we know. It is this surely not the fact that the ‘we’ fairly and fully represents all the people; it cannot, even though it can strive for more inclusive aims” (Bosteels 2016, 53). The role of the American People, then, in a democratic society, is not a homogenizing process of distilling a popular will, but rather “a set of debates about who the people are and what they want” (Bosteels 2016, 53). This process is contradictory to a securitization narrative for immigration, in that a securitized Citizen/Other framework in immigration is used to define the polity in a restricted manner, especially considering that immigration policy has an equal, if not greater, effect on domestic labor, economic growth, and federal and municipal interests.

By securitizing immigration, the process of democratic representation is stretched thin when considering that “[t]he people who are the ‘we’ do something other than represent themselves as the people, and this act of self-making or self-constitution is not the same as any form of representation […] This act of self-designating and self-constituting forms as assembly that articulates itself as the ‘people.’ Popular sovereignty is thus a form of self-making that is separate from the very representative regime it legitimates” (Bosteels 2016, 53). Securitization trumps this movement of the people existing outside pure political representation, and instead recasts the polity as a passive, singular-willed body of citizens with homogenous interests. This is opposite of a “we the people” that “does not describe the plurality but seeks to bring about the social plurality that speaks it” (Bosteels 2016, 52). The movement toward securitization is a movement to dispel plurality along a nexus of safety and refuge to prevent any marginal political expression from possibly identifying with the “people’s” will.

A perusal of current headlines exemplifies this process under the current Administration, in the narrative of how it contextualizes the securitization of immigration as an expression of the American polity, its interest, and its constitution (Lind 2018). Security “language implies a specific metaphysics of life. The interpretation does not just explain how a security story requires the definition of threats, a referent object, etc. but also how it defines our relations to nature, to other human beings and to the self” (Huysmans 1998, 231). The corollary of a domestic homogenization narrative is articulated as an immigrant Other. The structuring of an Other that resides outside of the proper purlieus of the People relies on a narrative of a static and homogenous population. The Administration’s wholesale banning of “Muslim countries” because refugees are “Trojan Horses” of
ISIS exemplifies this articulation of the Other as singular population (Krieg 2017). Opposite this spectacle of the Other as one dimensional is Cornel West’s notion of cultural depth, one that resists political tropes: “[l]ike rabbinical or Catholic Christianity, clerical Islam is in no way the essence of Islam—or its only form. [...] All religions are polyvalent—subject to multiple interpretations under changing circumstances. Islam must be understood, by both non-Muslims and Muslims, as a fluid repertoire of ways of being a Muslim, not a dogmatic stipulation of rules that govern one’s life” (West 2004, 135).

An “America First” policy that is effectuated via securitized immigration requires a clear general will that historically has been criticized under various post-colonial lenses (Bhabha 1994, 61–62). In order to securitize immigration against the Other, the polity must be formalized in its expression of will. There is no justification in an appeal to geographic uniformity either because the presence of undocumented workers, TPS recipients, refugees, and DACA recipients, and foreign nationals (among other groups) prohibits defining “American” strictly along geographical location (Miroff 2018). Furthermore, the notion of procuring physical safety by banning the immigrant Other is highly problematic, as citizens and noncitizens alike are less than secure; e.g., the danger that Black People in the U.S. face on a daily basis from police encounters is far more likely than danger posed from an undocumented individual (Swaine and McCarthy 2017).

Securitizing immigration in order to secure the wellbeing of Americans as defined under a nativist America First policy promulgated by the Administration is one that has the effect of bringing about exclusion, conflict. The question of who gets to identify as the American benefitting from securitized immigration “is never the affirmation of a pre-given identity, never a self-fulfilling prophecy—it is always the production of an image of identity and the transformation of the subject assuming the image” (Bhabha 1994, 64). Thus, the Executive relies on a policy justification that transforms the population into a “people” expressing its will. The question of who are “the people” must remain a political one, a plurality expressed as a dialogue. The movement toward vilifying the immigrant Other attenuates the representative nature of American political culture and society in the realm of public policy. Hence, the tension that arises in the SLPP between emphasizing and privileging Security above equally important, competing normative and foundational values that underpin American political culture and society.

In the campaign and subsequent election of Trump, each was based on perceptions and images that were specular in nature, in that fact and fiction became indistinguishable from one another. The spectacle, as an analytic concept, plays a key role in the relationship between image, event, and the exercise of power. What is the essence of the spectacle, and what is its application for the purpose of this examination? Spectacle, generally speaking, is part of “the autocratic reign of the market economy which had acceded to an irresponsible sovereignty, and the
totality of new techniques of government which accompanied this reign ... the spectacle’s unity and articulation as an active force in order to examine the directions in which this force has since been able to travel” (Debord 1988, 2, 4). What this means for the imbrication of Security and immigration is that techniques of government to ensure control over borders, and to retain control over defining the content and character of the People within borders, can be justified under the aegis of public safety, protecting the Homeland, and cast the immigrant Other as deleterious and invasive. Techniques of government relying on spectacle are very effective because the spectacle is a form of information, discourse, knowledge, and ordering principles—in short, the means by which the People come to know the world.

The spectacle is a powerful tool in the appropriation and exercise of power because it is readily amenable to an “absence of logic” (Debord 1988, 30). The absence of logic in the SLPP nexus is profoundly important because it indicates the “loss of the ability immediately to perceive what is significant and what is insignificant or irrelevant; what is incompatible or what could well be complementary; all that a particular consequence implies and at the same time all that it excludes” (Debord 1988, 30). Thus, “contemporary events themselves retreat into a remote and fabulous realm of unverifiable stories, un-checkable statistics, unlikely explanations and untenable reasoning” (Debord 1988, 16). For example, fear, a visceral human emotion, was appropriated in the service of the campaign and subsequent election of Trump. The political consequence of this phenomenon is comprehensive, in that, “the spectacle is at once united and divided. In both, unity is grounded in a split. As it emerges in the spectacle, however, this contradiction is itself contradicted by virtue of a reversal of its meaning: division is presented as unity, and unity as division” (Debord 1995, 16). An example of this that transcends immigration is when the Administration put forth and was able to get individuals appointed to high-level political posts with no background in the agencies/departments that said individuals would oversee. The ostensibly contradictory nature of experts without any training or expertise in relevant fields appointed to run government has been a mainstay of the Administration: for example, a Department of Education Secretary with no background in education theory or administration; a neurosurgeon with no housing policy background to run Housing and Urban Development; a Wall Street banker that made a fortune on foreclosing on homeowners to run the Treasury; a lawyer who publically avowed to destroy the Environmental Protection Agency chosen to run the very same agency; and a surgeon general who owned substantial tobacco stocks are all specular in nature (Johnston 2018, 8–9). Only in the realm of spectacle could these appointments take place.

Trump’s policy positions, despite being problematic due to conflicting and contradictory empirical evidence, were embraced by Trump’s base comprised of the Republican Party’s white working and middle class voters—“precisely the voters who had originally flocked to Wallace and then to Nixon, who had been
attracted to Perot and Buchanan, but who now felt that they had found a champion in Trump. He had become the ‘voice’ of Middle American radicalism and more broadly white Americans that felt left behind by globalization and the shift to a post-industrial economy” (Judis 2016, 75). Hate based on fear, broadly defined, was not only deployed against the elite political class, but was also used to fuel support for Trump’s election and subsequent policy proposals. Spectacle was employed to create a binary between US/Them, American/Un-American, White/Non-White, and nostalgia versus present actuality vis-à-vis the racial, ethnic, religious, and cultural make up of the People, the polity. John Judis observes what exactly made Trump different from his policy predecessors, noting that if Trump “had based his campaign on this moderate Republicanism, Trump probably would have not won a single delegate [... ] But he combined his moderate Republicanism with a set of convictions, most of which went back two decades or more, that were very similar to those of Perot or Buchanan. They challenged the prevailing Democratic and Republican view on foreign policy, trade and investment, and immigration” (Judis 2016, 66). Unfolding alongside this disruption, the campaign implicitly and explicitly relied on race, ethnicity, and ideology to fuel the spectacle of saving America from the “actual” causes of America’s decline. “Ideology is the foundation of the thought of a class society within the conflictual course of history. Ideological entities have never been mere fictions[;] rather, they are a distorted consciousness of reality, and, as such, real factors retroactively producing real distorting effects; which is all the more reason why that materialization of ideology, in the form of the spectacle” (Debord 1995, 61).

Race, Ethnicity, Religion, and Trump

By boldly declaring what the “actual” problems plaguing civil society and its greatness entail—to include immigrants and the immigration process—Trump became the paladin of the “silent majority,” promising to eliminate or severely curtail the policies that made the majority feel like a threatened minority. The “spectacle makes no secret of the fact that certain dangers surround the wonderful order it has established” (Debord 1988, 34). The immigrant Other, who stands outside of and poses a threat to proper Order, is correlated with distinct (undesirable) traits based on racial, ethnic, and/or religious ideology (Triandafyllidou 1998, 593–612). The spectacle thus became “a form of communication ... whereby decisions already taken are presented for passive admiration. For what is communicated are orders; and with perfect harmony, those who give them are also those who tell us what they think of them” (Debord 1995, 6). Specular politics was key to implementing this strategy and to help in procuring the electoral outcome. Within the spectacle, “we are dealing with a form of ideological inoculation. Historically, one of the most effective ways for a system of authority to tout its virtues is not to speak of them directly, but to create a particularly vivid image of their absolute negation—of what it claims life would be like in the total absence of, say ... capital-
ism ... [This] works best when the image is on some level, profoundly appealing” (Graeber 2015, 104). Trump was able to skillfully appropriate perceptions and images of fear and loathing of the Other as the basis for campaign promises, such as promising to end Muslim immigration. Trump has been adept at employing and deploying spectacle to obtain political capital and posit and effectuate select public policy pronouncements, such as severely curtailing immigration, within and from without U.S. borders. Trump has been able to articulate and implement, to some degree, this type of policy because of the ability to use the spectacle as an “enormous positivity, out of reach and beyond dispute [—] ‘Everything that appears is good; whatever is good will appear.’ The attitude that it demands in principle is the same passive acceptance that it has already secured by means of its seeming incontrovertibility, and indeed by its monopolization of the realm of appearances. [Yet, the] spectacle is essentially tautological, for the simple reason that its means and its ends are identical” (Debord 1995, 6).

In the case of race, ethnicity, Muslim religious affiliation, and immigration, the spectacle has taken center stage in the Executive’s articulation of public policy, wherein “images are transformed into real beings—tangible figments which are the efficient motor of articulating a politics of exclusion” (Debord 1995, 7). President Trump’s inflammatory remarks about Mexico, for example, at the very beginning of his campaign, evolved into specular promises that the border wall would be paid for by Mexico (Rodriguez 2018), and that the wall was and remains essential due to the threat to national security that Mexican migrants pose to the United States. Despite critiques of the political brashness of the statements, actual economic analyses of the Great Wall have shown that it will not, empirically, accomplish the goal of border security by substantially reducing or eliminating drug smuggling and creating long-term jobs. In actuality, the wall has been found to be structurally unworkable (Felbab-Brown 2017). Despite mounting criticism, however, President Trump included a request for billions of dollars for the wall in his FY 2019 budget proposal, and continues to tout the wall’s necessity (Holland 2018).

In the case of immigration, the Executive is emplacing immigration law and policy within a specular national security framework. Security thus provides potential limitless justification for measures implemented to ensure the basic Security goal of public order and safety. Order and safety become conflated. National security is presented as the logical or natural goal of public policy regarding immigration divesting competing norms, values, history, and/or practices of a place in the formulation of immigration law and policy (Gonzales 2018). Additionally, the militarization of local police (Goldman 2017), the erecting a massive wall along the U.S.–Mexico border as described above (Jacobs 2017), the mass deportation of immigrants within the United States (Aizeki 2017), and the restriction of certain groups of people from immigrating to the United States (BBC News 2017, “Trump Travel Ban”) are all based, in part, on a specular basis. In positing such a paradigm,
American identity, values, norms, and identity are reduced to one-dimensional signifiers—Security and securitization measures become the singular basis that grounds public policy. “Difference” has thus proven to be a significant concept in structuring and implementing policy. The spectacle has proven to be at the forefront of construing difference to obtain the policy goals of the present Administration, despite the fact that specular politics and policies rely on, at best, distorted notions of Otherness and the processes of “Othering.” The spectacle provides for attachment and commitment to “taken for granted” realities that supposedly ground public policy. The populist surges, after taking root in a history of disillusionment and despair, beg the question: who are the American people? Formalizing the who is essential to understanding what the they want. Explicitly securitizing immigration, conflating immigration with existential threat, is problematic because Security has a capacity to bypass limits, controls, and boundaries in the name of preserving and maintaining order and safety: within Security discourse, “Many things may be unauthorized; everything is permitted” (Debord 1988, 22).

It should also be noted that there are discursive consequences to this securitization in that, in the imposition of “power structures” on otherness (Bhabha 1994, 17), there is an internal consequence to the social fabric of democracy and the ethos of the American polity. As Derrida expounds in international conflict, in the war “[... ] against the enemies of freedom and the assassins of democracy throughout the world, it must restrict within its own country certain so-called democratic freedoms and the exercise of certain rights by, for example, increasing the powers of police investigations and interrogations, without anyone, any democrat, being really able to oppose such measures” (Derrida 2005, 40). Similarly, in the context of securitization and the movement toward a securitized immigration policy, the impact is felt internally within the polity in the mirror of self-perception and how the polity defines itself in the double term of self/other and freedom/law.

Shaping Immigration: Law, the Courts, and Securitization

Executive power to shape and impact the character and content of immigration in a Security context was put forth, in part, by the U.S. Supreme Court in US ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950), wherein the Court found that, “exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty. The right to do so stems not alone from legislative power but is inherent in the executive power to control the foreign affairs of the nation” (Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542). The courts, generally speaking, before and after Shaughnessy, have been deferential to the Executive in the realms of national security and immigration based, in part, on Congressional delegation of its immigration power over to the Executive (see Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 769–70 (9th Cir. 2017)). In Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972), the Court stated that, within the immigration context, the courts should not “look behind the exercise of [Executive] discretion”
when exercised “on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason” (Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770). In interpreting the constitutionality of Executive power and immigration, the court in Sarsour v. Trump, F.Supp.3d, 2017 WL 1113305, No. 117CV00120AJTIDD (E.D. Va. Mar. 24, 2017) at *10 (citations omitted) cited Mandel, noting that

the Supreme Court concluded that where the government has provided a facially legitimate and bona fide reason, “the courts will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing its justification against the First Amendment interests of those who [claim they are injured by the visa denial]” ... a court must extend substantial deference to the government's facially legitimate and non-discriminatory stated purposes.

The courts have found that “Congress has the exclusive constitutional authority to create immigration policies. In exercising that authority, Congress has enacted (and repealed) a wide variety of immigration statutes over the years, with a wide variety of restrictions and authorizations” (Sarsour, F.Supp.3d, 2017 (E.D. Va. Mar. 24, 2017) at *6).

Delegation of power to the Executive has had, generally speaking, the sanction of the courts. In upholding delegation, the courts have found that national security interests do in fact play a role in the exercise of Executive power, and that the courts will, generally speaking, not question the political and strategic calculus that undergirds a law or policy articulated under the aegis of national security—even if it negatively impacts a discrete group of people. The Court, for instance, has declared that, a “law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is not invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of another” (Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976)). This rationale “is particularly applicable in the area of immigration measures related to national security concerns. Relying on Supreme Court precedent, the Fourth Circuit has emphasized that where a particular immigration measure is facially neutral and has a rational national security basis that is ‘facially legitimate and bona fide,’ such a measure will survive an Equal Protection Clause challenge” (Sarsour, F.Supp.3d, (E.D. Va. Mar. 24, 2017) at *12).

While the courts have been, generally speaking, deferential to the Executive, the judicial power has not completely disengaged from shaping the SLPP in the realm of immigration. Indeed, pushback in the present from the lower federal courts against Trump’s immigration agenda has been the case. Although the “Executive has broad discretion over the admission and exclusion of aliens ... that discretion is not boundless. It extends only as far as the statutory authority conferred by Congress and may not transgress constitutional limitations. It is the duty of the
courts, in cases properly before them, to say where those statutory and constitutional boundaries lie” (Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff’d, 484 U.S. 1 (1987)). Furthermore, the courts have also stated that, “Whatever deference we accord to the President’s immigration and national security policy judgments does not preclude us from reviewing the policy at all. We do not abdicate the judicial role, and we affirm our obligation ‘to say what the law is’” (Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 768–69 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal citations omitted)).

Presently, the lower federal courts and the Executive are, to some degree, at odds with one another regarding the constitutionality of the Executive’s efforts to securitize immigration. The tension between the Executive and judiciary reflects fundamental disagreement as to how public authority articulates, justifies, and legitimates securitized immigration. Also, on a broader level of analysis, what constitutes an American, and the American People, are also the subject of disagreement. In securitizing immigration, the Executive’s interpretation of the SLPP is one rooted in managing the character and content of the population, which involves much more than merely exercising sovereign control over territory. Attempts to purge the U.S. population of an influx of an Other deemed a threat to the nation's security (as construed by the Executive)—an Other portrayed as fundamentally incompatible with core American values and norms—reflects a politics of fear and loathing. Fear and loathing of a designated Other underpins and reflects a strategy of governance that, “is basically much more than reigning or ruling, much more than imperium ... [and is] absolutely linked to population” (Foucault 2007, 76) control, management, and the power to define what constitutes an American identity in the “true” and fullest sense of the term.

In the case of immigration, securitization can readily lend itself to Othering; i.e., securitization efforts posit an enemy that is antithetical to the essence of a polity. This is especially the case when the Law applies a rational-basis test or standard of interpretation to securitized immigration. When the Law applies a rational basis test in evaluating law and policy grounded in national Security, the purview of Security is greatly enhanced and expanded. The State’s interest in preserving national security is, according to the Court, “an urgent objective of the highest order” (Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U. S. 1, 28 (2010)). Executive legal and policy pronouncements, when viewed as “rational attempt[s] to enhance national security” (Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 438–39 (2d Cir. 2008)) endow Security with the capacity to minimize competing values in the SLPP that are part and parcel components of Order, and tincture the administration of justice with securitization. Control mechanisms embedded in measures that securitize immigration, such as exclusionary policies that overtly discriminate based on racial, ethnic, and other identity traits, serve to enhance Executive power to determine the form and substance of the populace (Weber 1958, 77–128). The problem with emplacing immigration squarely within Security discourse, allowing Security to provide the framework, structural basis for conceptualizing and adjudging the character and
content of immigration, is that its value, worth to the polity, is ablated by threat. The spectacle, as image devoid of substance yet also as the basis of knowing, leads to the “logical possibility” that government will “use all the advantages they find in the realm of the spectacle” (Debord 1988, 25) to effectuate Order.

Securitization can be conceptualized as flowing from, among other things, the need and desire for control of territory and the populace. Control over population, to include its movement, emplacement in the body politic, and the character and content of its racial, ethnic, ideological, cultural, and religious make up, informs securitization as the Executive interprets the SLPP regarding immigration. In the case of the present SLPP, immigration has been deemed of the utmost importance. Control over borders, culture, and identity, of enabling the United States as a sociocultural, economic, and political unit to maintain what has made it historically “great” informs securitized immigration: the immigrant Other’s threat to the essence of American identity and greatness qualifies immigration for capacious securitization. Within the SLPP nexus Law and Policy become beholden to Security if it is made the singular or preeminent component within the nexus.

**Conclusion**

The potential for Security to subordinate competing interests, values, and principles should elicit critical queries: How is fear engendered, defined? What is to be feared and loathed? What functions does Security serve beyond basic public safety? Who/what benefits from securitization measures? In the case of the present Executive’s securitization agenda apropos immigration, a question of particular importance to ask is, how is threat perceived vis-à-vis the character and composition of the national population? Securitization of immigration encompasses the power to contour the character and content of the population. As David Campbell notes, a threat, danger, “is not an objective condition. It is not a thing that exists independently of those to whom it may” (Campbell 1992, 1) be perceived as a threat. The Executive's attempts to posit new or dismantle existing legal precedents and regimes from a national security interpretation of immigration are potent reminders of the importance of continuously subjecting securitization measures to critical examination. Security, and its discursive manifestation in empirical reality, must be subject to critical interrogation because discourse is not merely the reflection of power relations and agendas. “Discourse—the mere fact of speaking, of employing words, of using the words of others (even if it means returning them), words that the others understand and accept (and, possibly, return from their side)—this fact is in itself a force. Discourse is, with respect to the relation of forces, not merely a surface of inscription, but something that brings about effects” (Foucault 1997, xx). Security discourse, as the anchor for public policy and defining the values of a polity via control of the People, has the potential, due to its limitless application, to facilitate the “dissolution of logic” since it “leaves no room for any reply” (Debord 1988, 27, 29).
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Assessing the Effectiveness of Diplomatic Strategies: A Quantitative Analysis of U.S.–Soviet Interactions

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Abstract

What effect does implementing the strategy of containment, as opposed to one of high-level negotiations and principled diplomacy targeted at finding “win–win” solutions, have on the level of success in dealings with major-power authoritarian regimes? Although much attention has been devoted to the study of the U.S.’ containment policy during the Cold War era, most scholarly work examines how negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union seemed futile. The literature on contemporary U.S.–Russian relations makes a similar point. However, such literature often fails to mention how a hard-line military commitment to issues of strategic importance, and subsequent clear communication of such commitment, tend to lead to better outcomes for the United States—more so than diplomatic negotiations between heads of state. This paper argues that the existence of authoritarian regimes such as the Soviet Union necessitates a powerful enemy, primarily to justify the regime to their domestic populations. These regimes are therefore prone to seek out points of contention with their enemy, yet unlikely to enter unwinnable conflicts as it may damage their reputation before a domestic audience. Given their limited resources and a need to “win,” authoritarian regimes tend to forgo issues of high strategic importance to the United States when the potential costs of contention are clearly communicated. Such communication is best executed through the mechanisms of containment, including hard-line military commitment as well as a clear demonstration of that commitment. Current literature on the topic of outcomes of interactions with authoritarian regimes is substantively comprised of qualitative analysis. In contrast, this paper offers a quantitative analysis of containment and its relative effectiveness vis-a-vis high-level negotiations. To that end,

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this paper analyzes data from crises between the United States and the Soviet Union from the end of World War II through 1978.

**Keywords:** Containment, Diplomatic Strategy, Foreign Policy, U.S.-Soviet Relations

Evaluando la efectividad de las estrategias diplomáticas: un análisis cuantitativo de las interacciones entre EE. UU. y la Unión Soviética

**Resumen**

¿Qué efecto tiene la implementación de la estrategia de contención, en vez de una de negociaciones de alto nivel y diplomacia basada en principios para encontrar soluciones “ganar-ganar”, en el nivel de éxito en los tratos con los regímenes autoritarios de mayor poder? Aunque mucha de la atención hubiera sido dedicada al estudio de la política de contención de los EE. UU. durante la Guerra Fría, la mayoría del trabajo académico examina cómo las negociaciones entre los EE. UU. y la Unión Soviética parecían inútiles. La literatura sobre las relaciones contemporáneas entre Estados Unidos y Rusia hace una observación similar. Sin embargo, dicha literatura a menudo no menciona cómo un compromiso militar de línea dura con temas de importancia estratégica, y la posterior comunicación clara de dicho compromiso, conducen a mejores resultados para los Estados Unidos, más que las negociaciones diplomáticas entre los jefes de estado. Este documento sostiene que la existencia de regímenes autoritarios como la Unión Soviética requiere un enemigo poderoso, principalmente para justificar el régimen ante sus poblaciones domésticas. Por lo tanto, estos regímenes son propensos a buscar puntos de contención con su enemigo, pero es poco probable que entren en conflictos irreparables, ya que pueden dañar su reputación ante una audiencia doméstica. Dados sus limitados recursos y la necesidad de “ganar”, los regímenes autoritarios tienden a renunciar a temas de gran importancia estratégica para los Estados Unidos cuando se comunican claramente los costos potenciales de la disputa. Dicha comunicación se ejecuta mejor a través de los mecanismos de contención, incluido el compromiso militar de línea dura, así como una clara demostración de ese compromiso. La
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literatura actual sobre el tema de los resultados de las interacciones con los regímenes autoritarios se compone de un análisis cualitativo. En contraste, este documento ofrece un análisis cuantitativo de la contención y su efectividad relativa frente a las negociaciones de alto nivel. Con ese fin, este documento analiza los datos de las crisis entre los Estados Unidos y la Unión Soviética desde el final de la Segunda Guerra Mundial hasta 1978.

Palabras Clave: contención, estrategia diplomática, política exterior, relaciones entre EE. UU. y la Unión Soviética

外交战略有效性评估：美苏互动的定量分析

摘要

相比旨在寻找“双赢”解决办法的高级别谈判和原则性外交，实行遏制政策对于与大国权威政权打交道的成功程度有何影响？虽然大多数关注都聚焦于冷战时期美国的遏制政策，但大部分学术著作都表明美国和苏联之间的谈判似乎徒劳无功。关于当代美俄关系的文献也提出了类似的观点。然而，这类文献往往没有提到针对战略重要性问题作出的强硬军事承诺，以及随后该承诺的明确传达为何往往给美国带来更好的结果一比国家元首之间的外交谈判更为有益。本文认为，苏联这样权威政权的存在需要一个强大的敌人，绝大多数上是为其政权向国民辩护。因此，这些政权倾向于发掘与敌人的争论点，但不太可能卷入无法取胜的冲突，因为这可能会在国内民众面前损害他们的声誉。鉴于其有限的资源和“获胜”的需要，当被明确告知潜在的争议成本，权威政权倾向于放弃对美国具有高度战略重要性的问题。这种告知最好通过遏制机制来进行，包括强硬的军事承诺以及这种承诺的明确表达。与专制政权互动主题相关的现有文献实质上由定性分析构成。相比之下，本文对遏制政策及其相对于高层谈判的有效性进行了定量分析。为此，本文分析了第二次世界大战结束至1978年间美国与苏联之间的危机数据。

关键词：遏制政策，外交策略，对外政策，美苏关系
Introduction

Does implementing the strategy of containment (playing hard-ball) in dealings with authoritarian regimes yield favorable outcomes for the United States, as opposed to high-level negotiations targeted at finding “win–win” solutions? Much of the scholarly literature on Cold War relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and on contemporary U.S.–Russian relations, addresses this issue by pointing out the futility of high-level negotiations (Gaddis 2005a; Garthoff 1992; Kennan 1946; Mastanduno 1992). Scholars ranging from George Kennan to Michael McFaul have made the case for containment’s effectiveness by emphasizing the authoritarian states’ inherent need for a major internal or external enemy for the purposes of regime justification (Kennan 1946; Stoner and McFaul 2015; Walt 1989). The notion of an authoritarian regime’s need for external conflict is equally supported by extensive literature expounding the diversionary theory of war (DTW) (Levy 1988; Shulman 1976; Sobek 2007; Weeks 2012). As a strategy, containment reckons this phenomenon in its assessment that the Soviet Union’s inherent need for an adversary cannot, by definition, bring about fruitful negotiations leading to any fundamental resolution of differences, nor lead to an era of a mutually beneficial relationship. Note, importantly, that to study the long-term effects from containment is nearly impossible on the quantitative level, and therefore, this paper focuses on the immediate effects of containment. As a differentiation can be made between general containment and immediate containment, for quantitative analytical reasons, this paper aims to examine the latter.

Most scholarly work on U.S.–Soviet Union relations addresses why negotiations in search of mutually beneficial outcomes between the two world powers were doomed. However, missing in both prior and current literature is a quantitative analysis of whether following the strategy of immediate containment produced better outcomes for the United States. Further, although the theory of extended immediate deterrence (EID) stipulates that decisive action and commitment to follow through does deter the adversary from engaging in conflict (Achen and Snidal 1989; Danilovic 2001; Huth 1988, 1999; Wu 1990), it primarily accounts for defensive deterrence. Put simply, EID theory argues that states which create clear boundaries and show resolve to defend their borders are more likely to deter the aggressor. EID theory does not address the concerns of a major power such as

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3 Containment was first coined as a diplomatic strategy by an American diplomat, George F. Kennan. In his infamous "long telegram" written as a cable from Moscow, Kennan illustrated to the perplexed Washington foreign policy community and academia what he argued to be the underlying cause of Soviet conduct toward the United States. Kennan wrote that the Soviet Union’s psychic has an inherent need for an enemy as a way of justifying its own regime, that the United States was that enemy and that any effort at finding a resolution to the overall conflict was not a realistic possibility. Kennan later argued for containing the Soviet Union through military terms in cases of vital strategic importance to the United States. He called for selective engagement with the Soviets only in cases of no controversy and minimal possibility for conflict.
the United States in its quest to advance specific strategic interests abroad, while simultaneously obtaining concessions from an authoritarian regime such as Russia. Finally, the argument of general deterrence between enduring rivals, advanced by Huth and Russett, does address risks and stipulations of war-making between equal rivals, but fails to explain the effect of specific strategies (such as containment) in pursuit of the national interest of avoiding a direct military confrontation (Huth and Russett 1993; Snyder 2015).

The theoretical framework behind this paper’s argument hinges on authoritarian regimes’ willingness to sacrifice strategic interests and instead focus on cases of contention that can be demonstrated to their internal publics as successes over the enemy. We argue that authoritarian regimes not only require a powerful enemy (Gent 2009; Levy 1988; Levy and Vakili 2014; Miller 1995; Smith 1996), but also require public contention with these enemies. These regimes find points of contention that are more likely to deliver “cheap wins” in order to demonstrate on the domestic front the regime’s ability to thwart enemy complots. Authoritarian regimes such as Russia, however, will acquiesce in cases where costs of contention can balloon and the likelihood of a “win” is low. Hard-line military commitment and communication of such commitment are more effective at extracting concessions from authoritarian regimes because they clearly demonstrate the high potential costs of contention. High-level negotiations, on the other hand, produce noisy information on potential costs of contention and provide the authoritarian regime with both a public forum for nationalist rhetoric and an opportunity to showcase the enemy’s advances—without risking a costly conflict. Following a cost–benefit analysis, the authoritarian regime recognizes that the price of participating in negotiations is relatively low, more than counterbalanced by the opportunity to convey to their domestic public the “outrageous” demands made by the other side.

The policies of containment during the Cold War and neo-containment in more recent years have derived their prominence and appeal primarily through offering a behind-the-mirror view of the Soviet/Russian psychological thought processes. These insights have offered a skeptical perspective on the benefits of engagement and negotiation and have created a sense of normalcy and structure in Washington’s previously perplexed foreign policy agenda (Gaddis 2005a; Kissinger 1994).

This paper rests on the nexus of three theoretical frameworks: immediate containment, DTW, and EID. Although containment has been validated by many scholars, it has been mostly seen as a philosophical framework for understanding the internal psyche of the Soviet Union. By illustrating the irreconcilable road blocks to finding win–win solutions, containment is mostly understood as a strategy that can save time and energy potentially used on already-doomed negotiations. This paper shows immediate containment’s superiority to the strategy of negotiation, in ways beyond simply saving wasted time. It offers a theoretical
framework for the tactical advantages of immediate containment in times of crises and contention. Its analysis and findings make a novel contribution to current literature not only regarding U.S.–Soviet relations, but also in terms of potential interactions between any duo of rivals pitting a democratic and an authoritarian regime. Here, this paper offers a first step into that territory, with the stipulation that further work needs to be done in this sphere, as well as testing the theory on other sets of interactions.

By running regression analysis on 93 separate Cold War crises between the United States and the Soviet Union, this study finds that hard-line approach and military commitment has a greater positive effect on the success of outcomes than does active engagement and high-level negotiation. The introductory section is followed by a section that weaves existing scholarship with a new theoretical argument. The foundation for this theoretical argument rests on prior literature and culminates in a novel contribution and hypothesis. This hypothesis is tested in the methodological section of the paper which is followed by a discussion of the results. The final section of the paper outlines the implications of findings on both policy and further scholarship.

**Literature on Containment and Our Contribution**

When dealing with an authoritarian regime, implementing the strategy of immediate containment yields higher rates of success⁴ for the United States than does the strategy of diplomatic engagement and high-level negotiation. This section explains why elements of containment allow for more concessions from an authoritarian regime like the Soviet Union, as opposed to other diplomatic strategies. First, this section will briefly define and provide a preliminary justification for the definitions chosen for the following concepts: (1) containment, (2) success, and (3) high-level negotiations or diplomatic engagement, followed by a summary of metrics used to measure these concepts. Next, this section will illustrate the theory behind the decision-making processes of authoritarian regimes, as well as their approach to cost–benefit analysis on the domestic and international stages. Finally, this section will explain how decision processes within authoritarian regimes are susceptible to the workings of containment. Consequently, this paper’s argument lies on the nexus of utilitarianism (Mill 1901; Sidgwick 2012) in addition to, on the one hand, the rational choice theory of economics (Simon 1955), and on the other, the neo-realist school of thought within international relations (Walt 2002; Waltz 1959, 2010). It grapples with the clash of rational choice model of decision making within the regime leadership (Harrison 2005, 2006) and the neo-realist argument for the balance of power in the context of rational decision making on a state level (Bull 1966, 2012; Haslam

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⁴ Success is defined as the quality of the outcome of a crisis as measured against the strategic interests of the United States.
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In assessing the effectiveness of containment as a diplomatic strategy, one must consider the theoretical framework underlying its effectiveness and the context of U.S.–Soviet relations. In the context of U.S.–Soviet relations, containment is defined as the middle ground between the policies of detente and rollback (Hansen 1987; Podhoretz 1984), advocating for diplomatic nonengagement and hard-line military approach on issues of vital strategic importance to the United States (Gaddis 1997, 2005a, 2005b, 2006). For the purposes of this paper, immediate containment will be defined as deployment or intention to deploy military tools for protecting U.S. interests on any specific issue, clear communication of such intention coupled with diplomatic nonengagement. Success is defined as the quality of the outcome of a crisis as measured against the strategic interests of the United States. High-level negotiations or diplomatic engagement are defined as diplomatic meetings and formal dealings between high-ranking members of respective executive branches.

Regime perpetuation being an essential task, authoritarian regimes deploy a plethora of tools aimed at securing their survival, a significant number of which can be classified as repressive. Such techniques, directly aimed at protecting the status quo, include the absence of free and fair elections, consolidation of power within the executive branch, and imprisonment of political opponents (De Mesquita 2005; Frantz and Ezrow 2011; Schedler 2009). Although effective, repression comes not without a cost to the regime: its effect on regime survival can be expressed as benefit of repression minus the cost of repression. Over time, repression becomes prohibitively expensive. The relationship between the costs and benefits of repression can be illustrated by the graph shown in Figure 1.

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5 Detente—translated as release from tension in French is a term often used to refer to a period of improved relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

6 Rollback is a term often used to refer to the strategy of actively changing the behavior of another state and/or to curtail the current status of another state.

7 It is important to note that clear communication of intentions and diplomatic nonengagement are not mutually exclusive concepts. Clear communication can be achieved through a variety of means signaling tools such as a military to military hot-line, a concrete statement by a representative of the executive branch, etc. Diplomatic engagement on the other hand implies high-level negotiations at the heads of state or ministerial level targeted to find specific solutions that are acceptable to all sides.
A good extreme typical example of this theory is North Korea. Although the regime uses almost entirely repressive techniques, such repression comes at a very high cost. Almost the entire leadership circle of North Korea are cut off from the rest of the world (Byman and Lind 2010; French 2007). Further, repression is not an unlimited resource and most authoritarian states are limited to the amount of repression that they can exert upon their populations (Linz 1975). Owing to this, authoritarian regimes do not achieve the perpetuation of the status quo through purely repressive techniques. Regimes are rational actors (Friedrich and Brzezinski 1965; Keohane 1986, 1993; Mearsheimer 2001) and being rational, they strive to acquire the good will of their populations and create ideological frameworks for regime justification that can be beneficial to regime survival and can supplement their repressive tools of survival.

Scholars of DTW have long argued that creating a nationalistic ideology to confront a perceived enemy can serve as a helpful mechanism for regime justification (Gent 2009; Levy 1988; Levy and Vakili 2014; Miller 1995; Smith 1996). DTW stipulates that authoritarian regimes will seek out internal and external enemies and launch campaigns to confront such enemies in order to divert the attention of the public away from regime change and toward the perceived “enemy” (Lai and Slater 2006; Weeks 2012). This paper, however, argues that large regimes will seek out different types of enemies than will smaller authoritarian regimes. Smaller regimes will often exaggerate the threat of terrorism and the capability of terrorist or

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8 Most regimes vary on a scale of both authoritarianism and repression. The Soviet Union, for example, for the most part of its history did not match the repressive techniques deployed by the North Korean regime. Further, the modern Russian regime, although authoritarian in nature, exhibits many degrees of freedom that are foreign to most authoritarian regimes around the world.
rebel groups (Wilkinson 2000). They will purport to “sell” stability in exchange for public’s acquiescence to regime’s authoritarian behavior (Wilkinson 2000). If necessary, regimes will even make up a nonexistent terrorist group for the purposes of regime justification (Kendzior 2006). On the other hand, large regimes with big populations face a more unique set of challenges in terms of regime justification. These regimes are often so large that the internal threat from terrorist or rebel groups is not sufficient to generate enough anxiety within the population. The extent of terrorist or rebel groups’ capabilities, made up or real, is not sufficient to unite the nation or to inspire a nationalistic ideology toward the “enemy.” This is the case because both terrorist and rebel groups are often region-specific and do not pose a serious threat to a large state with massive military capabilities; therefore, having an external enemy such as a nation state is better suited for this purpose.

Now that it has been discussed that authoritarian regimes of large size need an enemy to rally support of their populations, the next logical conclusion is that the enemy needs to be roughly of the same size in terms of power as the authoritarian regime. The Soviet Union could not have used Finland as a credible threat to unify the national ideology against the enemy. For the Soviet Union, such an enemy was the United States. At the same time, authoritarian regimes do not have an interest in appearing weak to their internal publics. They need to show that the regime, entrusted with public support, can in fact handle the confrontation with the enemy and is well equipped to protect both the borders and the nationalistic identity from the foreign threat. To do so, these regimes are in the business of not only seeking out confrontation, but also winning or at least not losing the confrontations they take on. Confronting the enemy and winning can supplement repression to ensure regime survival. Of course, winning, just like repression, comes at some cost. For example, confrontation and consistent deployment of forces is costly. In addition, the enemy in concert with its allies can impose some additional costs through various tools such as economic sanctions. The following equation (where W = wins and c = cost) illustrates how adding confrontation and wins to repression can raise the probability of regime survival.

\[
\text{Regime Survival} = (Rb - Rc) + (Wb - Wc)
\]

Regimes cannot win all confrontations, especially against an equally powerful enemy. To redress this, authoritarian regimes will disentangle themselves from conflicts that they are not likely to win and instead focus attention on cases where the likelihood of losing is low or zero. Negotiations create an expectation that all sides can walk away with some gain. Therefore, even in cases of vital strategic im-

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9 Additionally, populations can sympathize with internal rebel groups or organizations that the state labels as terrorist. External enemies often have no control of the flow of information within the regime and are easier targets for nationalistic rhetoric.
importance to the United States, negotiations can signal that a win/win solution is possible when such a solution does not exist. Negotiations also often call for public attention to the specific crisis or contention and once entangled in negotiations, an authoritarian regime cannot back down due to high expectations it has placed on itself in the eyes of its population. Finally, authoritarian regimes need to be given room for some contention and some wins, especially if those wins are not detrimental to the national interests of the United States.¹⁰ Challenging these regimes on all issues across the board indiscriminately will push authoritarian regimes to pick cases of contention at random and by doing so take away the effectiveness of the strategy on the cases of significant importance. Three important take-away points are: (1) authoritarian regimes are selective in types of cases they contend and their selection can be influenced by strategically placing resources in a way that signals high stakes and a very low possibility of a win or even a stalemate for the authoritarian regime in certain cases, (2) negotiations create noise and distort the signaling of possibility of a win for the authoritarian regime and by doing so make it more attractive for the regime to entangle itself, and (3) authoritarian regimes need not be confronted on all fronts.

Now that the behavioral traits of authoritarian regimes have been illustrated, it becomes clear why the elements of containment allow for more concessions from an authoritarian regime, such as the Soviet Union, as opposed to other diplomatic strategies. As discussed above, containment consists of military commitment to issues of high strategic importance to the nation implementing containment, for example, the United States (Gaddis 2005a). The strategy of containment also calls for clear and straightforward communication of such commitment to the adversary. Finally, containment, when implemented as originally designed, calls for restraint in the process of case selection (Gaddis 2005a). In other words, the policy of containment advocates for selective confrontation and careful discrimination. Only cases of high strategic importance should receive the “treatment” of containment. All of these “elements and characteristics” of the policy of containment are parallel with the behavioral traits of authoritarian regimes.

The leadership of the U.S. foreign policy and military community had to come up with a strategy to deal with the Soviet Union. Given the behavioral patterns of authoritarian states described above, resolution of crises through diplomatic negotiation was impossible. Soviet behavior appeared sporadic and without a clear trajectory when viewed from Washington. The policy community in Washington was completely bewildered by the Soviet behavior immediately after World War II. The discussed characteristics of authoritarian regimes created a need for a grand strategy that is neither veiled in a naiveté of idealism nor in a trigger-happy militaristic approach aimed at total victory. This is when the concept of contain-

¹⁰ Presumably, wins for the authoritarian regimes can also include cases of strategic importance to the United States. However, for the sake of this argument, such cases are highly unlikely as these would result in a stalemate rather than a “win” for the authoritarian regime.
ment as a strategy was introduced by the then little known, mid-level diplomat, George Kennan. A prominent scholar of the Cold War, John Lewis Gaddis, in his book Strategies of Containment. A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War noted the following about George Kennan's long telegram that had paved the way for containment: “What Kennan opened up, on that bleak day in Moscow in 1946, was a way out: a grand strategy that rejected both the appeasement and the isolationism that had led to World War II, on the one hand, and on the other the alternative of a third world war, the devastation from which, in a nuclear age, could be unimaginable” (2005a, n.p.). Containment offered a way forward and conceptualized a framework of military and foreign policy tools aimed at dealing with the Soviet Union—tools that aimed to strike at the heart of the Soviet Union’s need for an external enemy and the desire to dwell on constant conflicts without publicly losing such conflicts.

The logical conclusion that follows is that in lieu of diplomatic engagement, authoritarian regimes are better dealt with by hard-line military commitment to issues of strategic importance as long as this approach does not choke off all venues for potential contention. The ingredients of immediate containment are best suited for the execution of such an approach. As opposed to negotiation, containment is an immediate call for a hard-line military approach to issues of vital strategic importance and clear communication of such military commitment. Faced with this information and diplomatic nonengagement, authoritarian regimes will forgo issues of vital importance to the United States and instead focus on issues that are more likely to yield contention and higher probability of “wins” for the authoritarian regime. This gives rise to the following hypothesis:

**H1:** While dealing with an authoritarian regime, implementing the strategy of immediate containment has an effect of yielding higher rates of success for the United States than does the strategy of diplomatic engagement and high-level negotiation.

**Testing Containment versus Alternative Strategies**

The hypothesis of this paper links the effect of immediate containment (the independent variable) on the success of the United States in dealing with authoritarian regimes such as the Soviet Union (the dependent variable). Data on international crises during the Cold War was taken from U.S. and USSR Crises Data: United States, 1946–1976; USSR, 1946–1975 (ICPSR study number: 7702). This study attempted to quantify crisis behavior by both superpowers during the height of the Cold War.11

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11 The dataset was produced by the consulting firm Consolidated Analysis Center, Incorporated (CACI). This firm was founded in 1962 by two RAND corporation alums, programmer Herb Karr and Nobel prize winning economist Harry Markowitz.
This dataset was one of a series of datasets on U.S., Soviet, and Chinese crisis management commissioned in the 1970s by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). These datasets were compiled from open (nonclassified) sources, primarily media accounts. Data on U.S. crisis behavior was derived from western media sources, while the dataset on Soviet behavior was coded from Soviet news outlets. Only the U.S. datasets were used for this analysis, as we argue that containment was an American policy doctrine.

The U.S. crisis data spans two datasets, one with detailed data on 93 international crises, and one with summary data on a larger set of 307 crises. The detailed dataset contains variables for a wide range of U.S. actions, strategies, and problems for each of these events. Using the variables for U.S. actions, we are able to identify the use of containment, diplomatic, or rollback approaches for each of these crises.

Diplomatic actions were those which use nonmilitary tools of statecraft such as “modify treaty,” “lodge protest,” or simply “employ diplomacy.” Some combination of diplomatic actions was taken in 85 of the 93 cases in the detailed data file. The total number of diplomatic actions taken ranged from zero to five, and this number is used as our variable “Diplomacy.” The set of actions coded as diplomatic actions is presented in Appendix A. Rollback actions were aggressive uses of military force and five possible actions were coded as “Rollback.” Some combination of these was used in 24 crises. Immediate containment actions are those which involve deployment of military assets or the threat of military actions.Containment actions were grouped into three broad categories, and weighted according to category. The 15 actions which involve sending military or logistical support, for example, “provide supplies from US depots,” were given a weight of 1. The eight actions involving the deployment of U.S. military assets such as “military blockade or quarantine” were given a weight of 2. Finally, the three actions which threaten nuclear retaliation such as “change alert status of nuclear forces as a deterrent” were given a weight of 3. Some combination of containment actions appears in 84 of the 93 crises. For each crisis, the number of containment actions used by the United States was summed to arrive at a score for the variable. The detailed list of actions included in each category is included in Appendix A.

The summary data on 307 Cold War crises includes an indicator of the outcome of the crisis. Given the complexity of these crisis outcomes, the researchers who compiled the dataset were wary of providing a false precision “on the order of ‘U.S. Eagles 24; Soviet Bears 21’” (E2). Their original design coded crisis outcomes on a seven-point scale, but intercoder reliability was improved by condensing outcomes onto a three-point scale (see 3-21). In this dataset, crisis outcomes are coded as “Positive (U.S. objectives and interests advanced)”; “No Change”; and “Negative (U.S. objectives and interests damaged).” Ninety-three of these crises are also included in the first U.S. file of 307 crises. Carrying the outcome variable over to the second dataset allows for an analysis of the association between U.S. actions
and crisis outcomes. The distribution of the outcome variable across three possible values is illustrated in Table 1.

**Table 1. Distribution of the Outcome Variable across Values**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Negative Outcome (1)</th>
<th>41</th>
<th>48 %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Change (2)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive Outcome (3)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It would be reasonable to suspect that crises differ in their importance to U.S. policymakers, and that a general increase in U.S. effort across all policy tools would be expected for crises which are particularly salient to the United States. Overall, the data do not support this. The use of containment does not correlate highly with the use of other policy tools. The correlation coefficients reported in Table 2 suggest that the use of containment is not a reflection of overall policy engagement with a crisis, as the use of these policy tools correlates quite weakly, and even negatively in the case of containment and rollback.\(^\text{12}\)

**Table 2. Correlations of Level of Containment, Diplomacy, and Rollback**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Diplomacy</th>
<th>Rollback</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rollback</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Containment</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>.204*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^\text{12}\) However, rollback is correlated with diplomacy. This is likely the case due to the nature of high-profile cases where the military is actively involved in pushing the adversary out of their present position. These instances are likely to involve both active military maneuvers and conversations at the highest levels to prevent the conflict from escalating. Omitting rollback or diplomacy out of the model and running logit by comparing containment to each strategy separately does not yield a significant difference on the results.

**Results and Discussion**

To test the effectiveness of each of these strategies on crisis outcomes, the measure of outcomes was regressed on the three indicators of containment, rollback, and diplomatic effort. The dependent variable is categorical with possible values of Failure, Neutral, and Success. The clear order to these categories...
renders ordered logit as the appropriate statistical technique. The results of this logit model are presented in Table 3. Only containment has a significant effect on crisis outcomes. The effect is positive, indicating that higher levels of containment are associated with higher probability of success. The coefficients for rollback and for diplomacy both failed to meet the 0.05 level of statistical significance.

The strength of the effect of containment is most easily seen when the predicted probabilities for each outcome are considered. As Figure 2 indicates, at the lowest level of containment, the probability of failure is 0.6 and the probability of success is only about 0.24. Once the containment level reaches 6, success is as likely as failure. At the highest level of containment, success has a probability of 0.75 and failure a probability of 0.2. These results show a very substantial and substantive change in the probability of success and failure as a result of level of containment.

Robustness checks for variations on the weighting scheme were conducted, and the results reported here are quite stable across variations in the weighting of types of containment. Omitting the weights entirely also does not lead to a material change in the results. Only rollback and diplomacy correlate with each other at a significant level. No strategy is significantly correlated with containment. Omitting rollback or diplomacy out of the model and running logit by comparing containment to each strategy separately does not yield a significant difference on the results.

Implications and Further Research

The effectiveness of various diplomatic strategies has been debated in both academic literature and in the policymaking community. This study sought to examine the effectiveness of one such strategy: the immediate containment strategy. Specifically, the hypothesis of this paper stated that elements of immediate containment strategy, namely: (1) military commitment to issues of high strategic importance, (2) clear communication of such commitment, (3) diplomatic nonengagement on the specific issue, and (4) selective engagement on other issues of lesser strategic importance, will yield higher rates of success for the democratic regime (the implementer of containment) vis-a-vis an authoritarian regime (the implementee of containment) as opposed to high-level negotiations.

The theoretical reasoning behind this hypothesis is as follows. Authoritarian regimes have a basic need to self-perpetuate (De Mesquita 2005; Walt 1989; Waltz 1959, 2010); regime perpetuation being an essential task, authoritarian regimes will deploy a plethora of tools at securing their survival (De Mesquita 2005; Frantz and Ezrow 2011; Schedler 2009). Authoritarian regimes do not achieve the perpetuation of the status quo through purely repressive techniques. Regimes supplement repression by striving to acquire the good will of their populations by creating an ideological framework of a common enemy (Gent 2009; Levy 1988;
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Figure 2. Predicted Probabilities in Ordered Logit\(^{13}\)

![Graph showing predicted probabilities in ordered logit model]

Table 3. Ordered Logit Model Estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Beta Coefficients</th>
<th>Standard Errors</th>
<th>t Statistic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Containment [+ ]</td>
<td>.1320***</td>
<td>.0486</td>
<td>2.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rollback [+ ]</td>
<td>.1036</td>
<td>.3372</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diplomatic Action [- ]</td>
<td>-.0011</td>
<td>.1641</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>93</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability &gt; chi-Squared</td>
<td>0.0434</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-Squared</td>
<td>0.0428</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

\(a.\) Symbols in brackets represent the expected direction of the coefficient.

\(b.\) ** indicates \(p < .01\) \(*\) indicates \(p < .05\)

\(c.\) For robustness purposes, a separate model was estimated using unweighted values for independent variables. For the sake of brevity, the results of that model are not provided but are consistent with the findings in this model.

Levy and Vakili 2014; Miller 1995; Smith 1996). Moreover, authoritarian regimes cannot win all confrontations, especially against an equally powerful enemy. To redress this, authoritarian regimes will disentangle themselves from conflicts that they are not likely to win and instead focus attention on cases where the likelihood of losing is low or zero. In addition, negotiations create noise and distort the sig-

\(^{13}\) The model holds other variables at their means.
naling of possibility of a win for the authoritarian regime and by doing so make it more attractive for the regime to entangle itself in conflict. Finally, authoritarian regimes are better dealt with through hard-line military commitment to issues of strategic importance as long as this approach does not choke off all venues for potential contention and the ingredients of containment are best suited for the execution of such an approach. Taking the above theory into account and by running regression analysis on 93 crises between the United States and the Soviet Union, this paper found that implementing the strategy of immediate containment has a positive effect on the rate of success of crises outcomes.

The findings have implications for both the discipline of political science and the real world of international relations. For the discipline of political science, these findings suggest that authoritarian regimes are driven by domestic regime justification in their interactions with the outside world. Further, these findings suggest that in search for “cheap wins” in international conflicts, authoritarian regimes are capable of foregoing issues of real strategic importance when specific diplomatic strategies are enacted by rival democratic regimes. Specifically, this study illustrates the effectiveness of immediate containment as potentially one such strategy. For the real world of international relations, these findings would prove to be a helpful guide for a wide range of foreign policy practitioners, including top-level diplomats, military establishment leaders, and legislators when dealing with authoritarian regimes at times of crisis and contention. Further exploration to expound upon this hypothesis is required. For example, future research could apply this framework to other regimes and potentially distinguish the effectiveness of containment as applied to various types of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes.
The measure of the use of diplomatic, containment, and rollback strategies was constructed from ICPSR dataset 7702, “U.S. AND U.S.S.R. CRISES DATA” compiled by CACI, Inc.-Federal. The measure of containment is an additive index summing the total number of containment strategies used. Strategies were weighted with a 1, 2, or 3 depending on the intensity of the containment strategy.

Measure of Containment Strategies

**Containment strategies weighted 1:**
- Commit support services (land)
- Commit support services (sea)
- Commit support services (air)
- Redeploy peacekeeping forces
- Military forces used in search and rescue operation
- Military maneuvers or training exercises
- Improve, maintain force readiness
- Airlift personnel and/or supplies and equipment
- Provide military advisory assistance
- Provide military training for combat troops
- Provide other military training
- Drawdown military equipment from U.S. units
- Provide supplies from U.S. depots
- Provide military maintenance assistance
- Provide other military logistics assistance

**Containment strategies weighted 2:**
- Reposition land forces
- Reposition sea forces
- Reposition air forces
- Threaten nonnuclear forces as a deterrent
- Redeploy nonnuclear forces as a deterrent
- Change alert status of nonnuclear forces
- Show of military force
- Military blockade or quarantine
**Containment strategies weighted 3:**
Threaten nuclear forces as a deterrent
Redeploy nuclear forces as a deterrent
Change alert status of nuclear forces as a deterrent

For example, when the East Germans precipitated a crisis by closing the Berlin border in 1961, the United States responded by containment strategy “Improve, maintain force readiness” (weighted 1) and strategies “Reposition land forces,” “Redeploy nonnuclear forces as a deterrent,” and “Show of military force” (weighted 2) for a total containment score of $1 + 2 + 2 + 2 = 7$.

**Measure of Diplomatic Strategies**

**All weighted equally:**
Reaffirm existing political/military commitment
Lodge protest(s)
Make pol/eco commitment implying new mil mission
Advocate/support peacekeeping efforts
Modify an existing defense treaty
Modify an existing base rights treaty
Modify an existing status of forces agreement
Seek assistance in decision making
Take no military action
Employ diplomacy
Mediate a dispute

**Measure of Rollback Strategies**

**Rollback strategies weighted 1:**
Covert military operation
Military intervention between combatants

**Rollback strategies weighted 2:**
Commit land forces to combat
Commit sea forces to combat
Commit air forces to combat
References


Assessing the Effectiveness of Diplomatic Strategies: A Quantitative Analysis of U.S.–Soviet Interactions


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Abstract

The United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) is a multilateral institution uniquely mandated to address human rights abuses globally. During the 38th session of the UNHRC, which took place from June 18 to July 6, 2018, many broad global human rights challenges, as well as country-specific acute human rights abuses, were raised. This essay provides a recent voice from the field in focusing on how the Human Rights Council process is carried out, specifically highlighting the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of the Human Rights in Eritrea. By focusing on the interactive process of this one presentation, based on the author’s primary source observation of the UN session, this essay provides analysis on the strengths, weaknesses, and a first-hand account of the most far-reaching international human rights body in the world.

Keywords: Human Rights, United Nations, Special Rapporteur, Eritrea, Nongovernmental Organizations

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El Relator Especial sobre la situación de los derechos humanos en Eritrea: Informe sobre el Diálogo Mundial de los Derechos Humanos en el Consejo de Derechos Humanos de las Naciones Unidas

Resumen

El Consejo de Derechos Humanos de las Naciones Unidas (CDH) es una institución multilateral con un mandato único para abordar los abusos de los derechos humanos en todo el mundo. Durante el período 38 de sesiones del Consejo de Derechos Humanos de las Naciones Unidas, que tuvo lugar del 18 de junio al 6 de julio de 2018, se plantearon numerosos desafíos globales de derechos humanos, así como abusos agudos de derechos humanos específicos de cada país. Este ensayo proporciona una voz reciente desde el campo al enfocarse en cómo se lleva a cabo el proceso del Consejo de Derechos Humanos, destacando específicamente el Relator Especial sobre la Situación de los Derechos Humanos en Eritrea. Al centrarse en el proceso interactivo de esta presentación, basado en la observación de la fuente principal del autor de la sesión de la ONU, este ensayo proporciona un análisis de las fortalezas, debilidades y un relato de primera mano del organismo internacional de derechos humanos de mayor alcance en el mundo.

Palabras clave: Derechos humanos, Naciones Unidas, Relator Especial, Eritrea, organizaciones no gubernamentales

厄立特里亚境内人权情况特别报告员：联合国人权理事会关于全球人权对话的报告

摘要

联合国人权理事会(UNHRC)是唯一授权在全球范围内解决人权侵犯问题的多边机构。联合国人权理事会第三十八届会议于2018年6月18日至7月6日举行，该会议提出了诸多广泛的全球人权挑战以及具体国家遭受的严重人权侵犯问题。本文
The Special Rapporteur on the Situation of the Human Rights in Eritrea

为最新现场报告发声，集中讨论了人权理事会进程是如何展开的，特别强调了特别报告员对于厄立特里亚人权情况的报告。本文基于笔者对联合国会议的主要来源观察，通过集中讨论这一专题介绍的互动过程，分析了这一世界上最具影响力的国际人权机构的优点，缺点和第一手资料。

关键词：人权，联合国，特别报告员，厄立特里亚，非政府组织

Introduction

During the 38th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), which took place from 18 June to July 6, 2018, many broad global human rights challenges, as well as country-specific acute human rights abuses, were raised. The ground breaking news in the beginning of the session was the announcement that the United States would remove its membership from the Council—a Council that American diplomats helped found in the post-World War II era. While grappling with the loss of the United States, business in the Council continued during this session. Specifically, the long-standing work of many international leaders on country-specific human rights abuses continued.

The UN Human Rights Council is a unique arena for many reasons. First, it is one of the few places in the world where the abused can meet violators. Second, it is a unique space for small, less influential countries to participate in the global human rights dialogue. Third, it is an important arena for the world to spotlight acute human rights abuses by brutal regimes that would otherwise go unnoticed. One of these cases is the human rights situation of Eritrea.

Throughout the week, there were numerous special sessions on acute human rights situations in Syria, Eritrea, Burundi, Myanmar, and more. The Council establishes short-term mandates to address the human rights situation in these countries specifically outside of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process. The Commission of Inquiry brings particular attention to a specific case. This essay will focus on one such presentation: the Special Rapporteur gave her report on the human rights situation of Eritrea. While just one of many special committees that focus on one particular country, the process and discussion of this presentation of the Special Rapporteur is indicative of the power of the Human Rights Council,

as well as its weaknesses. Beyond public reports available from the UN website, this article utilizes primary participant observation of the author, Dr. Elise Carlson-Rainer, who provides a first-hand account from the field while observing this process from within the UN Human Rights Council.

**Special Rapporteur Presentation and Process**

On June 26, 2018, the Special Rapporteur, Ms. Sheila Keetharuth (citizen of Mauritius), gave her report on the human rights situation of Eritrea. As a contextual note, Special Rapporteurs are chosen carefully by the Council; the citizenship of this representative and any personal or political conflicts of interest are always taken into account to ensure the most neutral process possible.

Special Rapporteur Keetharuth began by summarizing the key human rights abuses in Eritrea. She raised numerous times that she and her team repeatedly requested access to the country, but were denied entry by the government of Eritrea. Therefore, she was required to produce the report and document the abuses from outside the country. This fact was repeatedly raised as a criticism of the report. It is an irony of nontransparent countries that they often do not allow transparent, international observation of domestic practices, then criticize international observers for highlighting abuses from outside of the country, as a criticism of the methodology of these international human rights documentations.

Special Rapporteur Keetharuth reiterated her most important findings and recommendations of her report. She highlighted the continued issues of forced conscription, lack of freedom of expression and assembly, forced disappearance, gender violence and discrimination, and more. Her comprehensive report and areas for improvement can be found in her published report.³

**Eritrean Representative in Response to Special Rapporteur Ms. Sheila Keetharuth’s Final Report**

After Special Rapporteur Keetharuth’s speech, the standard practice of the UN Human Rights Council is to allow the country in question to respond. In this response, the Eritrean representative called it a politically motivated report. His delegation found Special Rapporteur Keetharuth’s work an unfair and counter-productive experience. He highlighted the double standards of UNHRC member states in their hypocrisy for singling out Eritrea when many other nations have grave human rights abuses. He called on the Council to objectively consider the whole human rights situation in the entire horn of Africa and dismissed this “unwarranted” report.

While his concerns were specific to his country, his criticisms of the process were not unique. The government of Eritrea never allowed the Special Rapporteur

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³ See [https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/CountriesMandates/ER/Pages/SREritrea.aspx](https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/CountriesMandates/ER/Pages/SREritrea.aspx).
into the country to conduct primary source documentation. Although the Special Rapporteur stressed her repeated attempt to gain formal access into the country, as required by the formal process of the Council, she was denied access. Ironically, the representative emphatically criticized the Special Rapporteur for not coming into the country, and documenting abuses by proxy, while speaking to people outside of the country. While not recognizing the formal denial of the Special Rapporteur’s entry, the Eritrean government official criticized her methodology of collecting data from outside of the borders. This circuitous reasoning is common on the floors of the UNHRC. Many representatives responding to a country-specific report in the UNHRC raise similar criticisms of the process, namely, being unfair, unwarranted, or questioning the neutrality of the findings.

Questions from the Floor

After the Eritrean representative was finished, the floor was open to discussion from all member states in the Council. The European Union (EU) representative was first to speak (they were first to speak in most general plenary session discussions during the 38th session). The EU representative expressed concern about arbitrary arrest, freedom of religion, asylum seekers, respect for foreign property rights, and compulsory military service. Furthermore, the EU representative emphasized respect for UN mechanisms, including implementation of the UPR recommendations. The EU representative ended by asking to hear the Special Rapporteur’s assessment on women’s rights in the country.

Next, a host of countries commented positively on the Special Rapporteur’s report and process. Most of these were European nations, namely, Norway, Belgium, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Spain, Greece, and the United Kingdom. These countries mainly focused on similar talking points as the EU representative, with small variations of specific subject matter. Most expressed regret that the government of Eritrea did not allow the Special Rapporteur into the country.

Countries with an Ulterior Agenda

A few countries from other regions of the world commented, such as Algeria, Cuba, and Belarus. Belarus made a strong intervention, while having no explicit geopolitical interest in Eritrea. Belarus criticized the Special Rapporteur’s mandate, claiming that it singled out any one country outside of the UPR process. The representative criticized the report’s methodology, stating that the report, prepared from afar and not in country, cannot stand up to criticism. Essentially, Belarus maligned the whole report and the Special Rapporteur process. Cuba and Russia echoed this sentiment, calling the process of singling out any one country as too politicized and unfair. This was a common refrain from countries critical of the Special Rapporteur’s work. It is a common because their comments were based more upon the geopolitical relationship between their specific country and the
country in question of the Special Rapporteur. Notably, many countries did not comment on the content of the report. They had few remarks specific to Eritrea, and utilized their allotted time to bring attention to the asymmetric treatment they feel their own countries have faced in the Council. The criticism was more about the process of the UN Human Rights Council and utilizing a Special Rapporteur to target problems within one country, than actual human rights concerns in the country of focus. More long term, many nations seek to undermine the documentation and methodological process of a Special Rapporteur. The motivation for undermining this work is that if, and when, their country is the focus of a future Special Rapporteur, they will have worked to undermine the process, and thereby denigrate the findings of any high-level report of human rights abuses in their own country.

**NGOs and the UN Human Rights Council as a Unique Venue for the Abused to Address Their Abuser**

The UNHRC has a psychologist on site. The need for a psychologist became clear when the representatives from Eritrea and international NGOs spoke. It was during the presentation of NGOs that one felt the most poignant moments, and power of the entire venue of the Human Rights Council. It is a rare opportunity for the abused to meet the abusers face to face, and for the world to hear of the internal human rights abuses in a place such as Eritrea. These are rarely brought to the attention of the international community.

NGO representatives spoke passionately about gruesome, specific, persistent, and acute human rights violations. Some raised specific cases of disappeared, tortured, raped, and killed Eritreans. Human Rights Watch, Christian Solidarity Worldwide, Center for Global Non-Killing, World Alliance for Citizen Participation, and Fellowship of Reconciliation were a few organizations that provided expert witness and testimony. The World Alliance for Citizen Participation, for example, named specific cases, names, and dates of persons who had been tortured by the Eritrean authorities. They called for specific people who have been targeted for arrest and detention to be released. In a joint statement from NGOs, some of these organizations raised the abuses of crimes against humanity and arbitrary arrest, and highlighted other egregious human rights abuses. They condemned Eritrea for not making enough reforms, and called for victims’ voices to be heard and improved legal recourse for victims. They commended the Special Rapporteur for her work, and for giving international attention to their plight. As Eritrea lacks freedom of expression and speech, the ability of NGO representatives to speak to authorities, and hold them accountable for specific crimes, is a critical aspect of justice and addressing human rights abuses.

Not all NGOs are the same, and some came with opposing points of view. One such NGO came in support of the government of Eritrea, called the “Associ-
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ation Mauritanienne pour la promotion du droit.” Their representative criticized serious problems with the methodology of the Special Rapporteur’s report, especially writing it from outside of the country, as mentioned above. She also claimed that it was a form of “fake news” and was going to do harm to her country, stating that the report would greatly further human rights abuses to the people of the country. As a note, at this point in the public gallery, there was a public rustle and a number of observers were visibly upset from the statement of this NGO. NGOs such as this one are often not actually NGOs; often, they receive funding and political support from their government.

After the statements from NGOs, the Special Rapporteur had the opportunity to respond to the questions and comments from the country representatives and NGOs. She echoed many representatives’ calls to end arbitrary arrest and detention, spoke of deplorable prison conditions, and highlighted her specific recommendations in her report for implementing changes in the country. She ended her speech, and multi-year mandate, by addressing the Eritrean people and saying, “Thank you to the Eritrean people for entrusting me with their stories, dreams, and hopes. I thank them for trusting me, for bringing their words here with care, with respect to their inherent dignity and to bring it to the attention to the international community.”

Broader Analysis of the UN Human Rights Council Process and Conclusion

This essay has focused upon one Special Rapporteur during the 38th session of the UN Human Rights Council—the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of the Human Rights in Eritrea. However, the process of this Special Rapporteur is not unique to Eritrea; rather it highlights a similar process that many other countries experience when Council members decide to assign a Special Rapporteur to a particular issue or country case. Similar reports and commissions were convened in regard to Myanmar, Syria, and Burundi during the same session. Providing a description of the process, and analysis of the strengths and weakness of the Council, illustrates not only how it works to laymen, but also shows the specific purpose of Special Rapporteurs and the broader purpose of the UN Human Rights Council.

Many countries in the world do not have or enforce the right of freedom of expression. Eritrea is one such country. If any one person, leader, or civil society group had made half of the comments of Special Rapporteur Keetharuth, they would have been thrown in jail. The UN Human Rights Council provides political will and cover for third-party individuals to make comments on human rights concerns. Listening to these comments, albeit sanitized through parliamentary procedure, is a powerful process. It is one of the few places in the world where
there is an interactive dialogue between government representatives, NGOs and civilians, and third-party international leaders.

Beyond providing a venue for accountability, the UNHRC ensures the world pays attention to nonstrategic places. It takes multilateral efforts in financial and human resources to carry out this work. The governments of Ireland, Austria, and Mexico, for example, do not have the time and resources to pay attention to Eritrea and raise it to the level of this Special Rapporteur. They do not have the resources nor the political interest to devise a bilateral inquiry of the human rights situation in remote parts of the world. The Council thus provides that important venue. Some broader themes and analysis arise out of highlighting this specific example of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights situation of Eritrea. First and foremost, it allows for the world to put a spotlight on a human rights situation that otherwise would likely fall below the priority level for large and small countries alike. However, with collective efforts by the Council, shared resources, and combined political influence, small countries can pool together to call global attention to human rights abuses in other parts of the world.

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Leakers: Truth-teller, Threat, or Fake News?

By Margaret S. Marangione

Snowden, Manning, Winner, and Comey. These names have captured the headlines of news media and, ironically, they have used news and social media to amp their fame through releasing, leaking, espionage, whistleblowing, or, depending who you ask, being wrongly accused. Additionally, President Donald Trump has conflated the issue with his war on reporters and news media. He either incorrectly accuses people of leaking or uses the term to underscore accurate reporting. For example, he stated, “leaks are a massive over exaggeration put out by the Fake News Media in order to make us look as bad as possible” (@realDonaldTrump, May 14, 2018). He also inaccurately called James Comey a leaker of classified information (Washington Post May 1, 2018). The word choice of “leaker” and its meaning has been used haphazardly. What it connotes and denotes has contributed to the muddling of leaking in understanding and managing both insider threats and Millennials in the workplace.

The sharing or leaking of government information is a multifaceted subject. Certainly, there is a history of leaking to media outlets and many can remember the Pentagon Papers blasting a new road to leaking in the early 1970s. Besides historic precedent, there are numerous variables that affect leaking in the twenty-first century, which include Millennials’ and the general public’s attitudes toward information sharing and validity, punishment of leakers, intent, and over-classification of information. Many feel that the increased amount of information being classified in the post-9/11 era has contributed to the prevalence of leaking. Additional factors include that information is purposefully leaked. There is politics in leaking, and people can be accused of leaking to fit an agenda of a politician or political party. Also, there seems to be a disparity in how leakers are punished and the use of the Espionage Act to punish them. For example, author John Kiriakou argues that the antiquated Espionage Act should be written to deal with issues of intent, motive, as well as applicability (Kiriakou 2014). He feels it should also be enforced without disparity citing Leon Panetta’s leaking information about waterboarding to screenwriter Mark Boal. “Besides,” he states, “it has never been applied uniformly and is woefully antiquated.” For example, the Espionage Act is so outdated that it refers to national defense information rather than classified information because the classification system had not yet been invented.

For Millennials, intent and motive of leakers is paramount. In the 2016 Rand Report, The Millennial Generation, 22 percent of Millennials polled felt Snowden

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was a patriot and 15 percent said they would have released the information if they had been in his position (Weinbaum, Girven, and Oberholtzer 2016, 14). Clearly, with Millennials making up 59.7 percent of all military branches, and 30 percent of the Federal workforce, their attitudes, especially about information and transparency, are crucial for classified information management (U.S. Office of personnel Management 2017).

Another issue in examining these cases is the short-sighted examination with the lens of the psychology of espionage and insider threat model. In doing so, there may be a risk in utilizing an outdated psychological model of espionage pathologies and psychological traits and applying it to individuals in the digital age. Even the term “insider threat” seems old school when viewed through the lens of the millennial generation and the recent cases. For example, 58 percent of college students scored higher on a narcissism scale in 2009 than in 1982 (Roller 2013, para. 1). This is a major red flag for insider threat management, as narcissism is a characteristic of people susceptible as insider threats (Wilder 2017). Therefore, understanding what drives Millennials and how they feel about transparency, loyalty, information sharing, as well as their opinions of these prominent leaking cases can be a way forward for the government and its contractors in mitigating any possible Snowden effect.

While looking at Millennials with a microscope might provide clarity, some of the challenges are more large scale, which include the current whistleblowing reporting structure and lack of support for a whistleblower. The decision to prosecute whistleblowers under the Espionage Act is viewed by some, to include the perpetrators, as a gross war on “truth tellers” by ignoring the legal definition of whistleblower—any person who brings to light evidence of waste, fraud, abuse, or illegality. This brings us to another issue in this complicated problem, that whistleblowing, which many see as quality assurance, should be supported by the federal government and its agencies; new legislation must be written that would protect whistleblowers while allowing the government to prosecute traitors and spies.

Mr. Ellsberg, the leaker of the Pentagon Papers, who is 86, feels the Nixon administration’s attempt to halt the publication of those documents was a “mockery of democracy.” Mr. Ellsberg explains, “Can you have democracy in a real sense with the government having the final voice and the total voice as to what citizens shall know about what they’re doing and whether they are telling the truth and whether they are obeying the law? I should say no” (R.M. 2010, n.p.). Ellsberg echoes many of the current attitudes about leaking, information transparency, and news media. Justice Hugo Black, in his ruling on the Pentagon Papers, sounds eerily modern in light of Snowden, Winner, and Manning’s professed motives and intent. Justice Black stated, “The guarding of military and diplomatic secrets at the expense of informed representative government, provides no real security for our Republic...the Framers of the First Amendment, fully aware of both the need
to defend a new nation and the abuses of the English and Colonial governments, sought to give this new society strength and security by providing that freedom of speech, press, religion, and assembly should not be abridged” (Priest 2016, para. 7). Under the Trump administration, in addition to the blurred lines between leaker and traitor as well as the continued discrediting of journalism, whistleblower protection, and the First Amendment have also come into question.

Recent developments in the offices and cases handling whistleblowers are not encouraging for individuals with grievances and have increased the likelihood that leaking will continue when only 5 percent of reported cases are investigated (OSC 2016a, 2016b). The OSC report, published in September 2017, acknowledges that “whistleblowers play an important role in safeguarding the federal government against waste, abuse and fraud. However, [they] also risk reprisal such as demotion and firing” (OSC 2016a, n.p.).

Corresponding with these issues are the Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General (DODIG) investigations into employee whistleblower reprisal for 2013–2015, which did not meet statutory or timeliness goals for 83 percent of the cases (U.S. GAO 2017, para. 1). For example, DODIG’s timeliness goals were 240 days, but the average length of investigations was closer to 608 days (para. 1). This office also found that whistleblowers risk reprisal such as demotion, reassignment, and firing, as was found in the OSC report.

**Twenty-first Century Leaks**

The recent leaking cases underscore the disparity of feelings between leaker versus traitor and transparency versus treason. For example, in 2013, U.S. Army Intelligence Analyst Chelsea Manning delivered classified documents that she found troubling to WikiLeaks, after attempting to contact the New York Times and Washington Post, and was sentenced to 35 years in prison for espionage and theft (Tate 2013). The judge in Manning’s case stated that, “Providing classified information for mass distribution is a sort of treason if the government can prove the defendant knew he was giving information to the enemy by indirect means” (Liptak 2013, para. 4). Aiding the enemy is based on military law, and is not applicable to leakers in nonmilitary employment or media.

Intent seems to be a slippery slope of proof and is difficult to determine or prove a person’s or a publication’s intent. What applies to these cases is they expose the tension between government transparency, which is essential to a democratic society and weighed as paramount for Millennials, with the equally pressing factor of protecting national security from disclosure of information that could be used by people or groups to harm U.S.’ interests.

The American Civil Liberties Union referred to Manning’s ruling as a “... sad day for all Americans who depend on brave whistleblowers and a free press for a
fully informed public debate” (Tate 2013, para. 5). Manning states that the reasons for leaking classified information were her questioning of the morality and ethics of U.S. policy. Regarding serving time, she stated, “You have to pay a heavy price to live in a free country” (para. 11). Perhaps no one knows this better than Edward Snowden who was granted asylum in Russia after his information dump.

In 2013, Edward J. Snowden leaked classified details of a top-secret National Security Administration (NSA) electronic surveillance program to the Washington Post and the Guardian. The information revealed that the NSA and the FBI were collecting data, including email, chats, videos, photos, and social networking information from ordinary Internet users in the United States and abroad. Though some denounced Snowden as a traitor, many others, and especially Millennials, supported his actions, calling him a whistleblower.

Federal prosecutors charged Snowden under the Espionage Act; Snowden felt that mass surveillance by the government was going unchecked and that the classification rules were preventing public debate about this subject. Regarding the avalanche of issues that resulted from his information leak and exile, he stated, “… the mission’s already accomplished. I had already won. As soon as the journalists were able to work, everything that I had been trying to do was validated … I wanted to give society a chance to determine if it should change itself … All I wanted was for the public to be able to have a say in how they are governed” (Gellman 2013, para. 7).

Snowden may have been right according to U.S. District Judge Leon who described NSA’s surveillance capabilities as “Orwellian” and “probably unconstitutional” (Gellman 2013, under “Going in Blind”). For the NSA, an agency accustomed to watching but not being watched, they had the eye of public scrutiny to suddenly endure as a result of Snowden’s actions. Snowden’s supporters argued that his actions opened up a much-needed debate on security, privacy, and transparency within the federal government. Cyber Security Professor and Baby Boomer Greg Austin stated, “When Edward Snowden went public with his leaks in 2013, in our organization in New York, we did a survey and found that [Millennials] thought he had done the right thing and people of my generation thought he had done the wrong thing” (Haynes 2017, under “Does he have a point?”). The former Director of the CIA Michael Hayden concurs: “I don’t mean to judge them all, but this group of Millennials … simply have different understanding of the words loyalty and secrecy and transparency than certainly my generation did” (n.p.). Director of Australian Centre of Cyber Security, Jill Slay agrees: “My generation feel bound by [the] Official Secrets Act … This generation values individuality” (under “New research shows Millennials have different views on cyber security”).

Snowden does not feel he broke an oath of secrecy though he signed standard form 312, the classified information nondisclosure agreement, because it is, according to Snowden, a civil contract. “The oath of allegiance is not an oath of
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secrecy. That is an oath to the constitution. That is the oath I kept that Keith Alexander and James Clapper did not” (Gellman 2013, under “They elected me”). Snowden also said that the law that Reality Winner was charged under when she exposed Russian hacking of elections “must be resisted” (Zaid 2017, para. 2). This sense of the importance of their own individuality and the power of their own ideas makes Millennials less tied to institutions and employers. According to the Pew Research Center study, Millennials have entered adulthood with low levels of trust and detachment to traditional institutions like employers, government, and even marriage (Pew Research Center 2014). Being less tied to employer ethics and values than the Baby Boomer generation should cause the Intelligence Community some concern, which has been fueled by another detrimental leak of classified information in the June 2017 case of Reality Winner.

On social media, people called Reality Winner a hero and a whistleblower and began raising money for her defense and family as soon as she was apprehended. Winner was accused under the 1917 Espionage Act of providing classified information about Russian hacking of U.S. elections to the news website the Intercept. “I felt really hopeless,” states Winner as to why she leaked the information. “... I was not trying ... to be a Snowden or anything” (Choi 2017, para. 5). The leak, published on the Intercept in June 2017, revealed an attempted hack by Russia’s military intelligence unit during the contentious 2016 U.S. presidential election (para. 6).

Whistleblower? Leaker? Spy?

The classified document that Reality Winner disseminated to the world through the Internet was obviously newsworthy, concerning, and ground-breaking in an election that was divisive, contentious, and murky. But, nothing in the document that she leaked exposed any type of fraud, waste, abuse, or unlawful conduct by the U.S. government. Legally, anyone who leaks classified information to the media instead of appropriate governmental channels is not a whistleblower entitled to legal protection. Because she signed, under her own volition, a secrecy agreement, she was bound by law, oath, ethical, and morals to her government to protect material she was handling and exposed to from unlawful disclosure, which included news outlets.

For an employee in the Intelligence Community, wanting to do the right thing in the face of a difficult and challenging ethical and moral issue can still be daunting despite all the whistleblowing avenues for reporting. For example, the clear-cut definition of whistleblower is Army SPC. Joseph Darby, who blew the whistle on prisoner abuse in Abu Ghraib and provided his superiors with a CD showing prisoner tortures; three months later, the abuse aired on “60 Minutes.” While not arrested, Darby has been ostracized by members of the military who labeled him a traitor (McLaughlin 2017a, 2017b).
There are other challenges besides being ostracized that face a whistleblower. Melvin Goodman, formerly with the CIA and State Department, feels intelligence employees have grounds to worry that their anonymity may not be protected, Congress may not follow up, and workplace culture will not support them. For example, with the Pentagon Papers, Daniel Ellsberg gave copies to Congress more than a year and a half before he released them to the *New York Times*. He released the Pentagon Papers to the *New York Times* because he received no input, action, or even concern (para. 11). So, going to the press may be the only successful avenue for government employees who want a problem to receive attention. “This is what whistleblowing is all about—going to the public arena to talk about wrongdoing,” said Goodman. “There aren’t a lot of avenues other than the media. The so-called guardrails of democracy are broken” (para. 13). Besides, echoes Attorney Edward McMahon, who represented a CIA officer who leaked information in 2015, “Not every government secret is national defense information,” and, therefore, not punishable under the Espionage Act (n.p.).

Many Millennials, having grown up in an era of transparency, believe that information was meant to be shared. They feel that the government not supporting transparency and freedom of information violates the First Amendment. What is paramount for this generation is that the government must validate that the disclosure of truthful information is necessary and important to the public debate. This idea about truth, transparency, and information sharing is critical to understanding the Millennial generation, how it shapes their relationships and their worldview, and the larger scale issue of insider threat management.

**The Millennial Connection: Snowflakes or Truth Tellers?**

Every generation has looked at the generation preceding it as somewhat of an anomaly. Aristotle, in 320 BC, stated, “The young people of today think of nothing but themselves ... they have no reverence ... they are impatient of all restraint ...” Aristotle's young people did not have smartphones or have most of their friends on Facebook (Pew Research Center 2014). This technology revolution has isolated the current generation in their global virtual village and made information immediate, shareable, and downloadable. This globalization and privilege is empowering and sometimes frightening, especially when the information that can be shared via social media and the Internet can run the gamut from a detrimental picture on Facebook to destroying national security.

Both the Pew Research Center and the Rand Corporation have produced similar findings about the Millennial generation’s value of sharing and transparency, with the common denominator being their exposure to and use of the Internet, and social media and its assisted technology from an early age. This sentiment is echoed by Shane Lambert, who has over 20 years of experience in Insider Threat Program Management. Lambert feels that Millennials do not comprehend why
we need state secrets because they share everything, and they have different ideas about privacy. “They are a generation of free information” (Marangione and Crosby 2017, n.p.).

Besides their views on information sharing, Millennials have a jaded and skeptical view of the federal government. According to one Millennial, “We don’t blindly trust these institutions; we understand their limitations and know their greed and corruption are inevitable …” (Weinbaum et al. 2018, n.p.). Almost 80 percent of Millennials do not trust the federal government (“Survey of Young Americans’ Attitudes Toward Politics and Public Service” 2014, 17). Sixty percent of Millennials feel that the guiding morality in any situation is that they will just be able to feel what is right (Stein 2013). Many call these divided loyalties. According to Lambert, “They might be Americans but their allegiance is to their own beliefs and ideologies and definitely not their government” (Marangione and Lambert, pers. comm., 2017).

**Millennials and the Psychology of Espionage and Insider Threats**

Democratic, liberal views on political and social issues, maintaining a distance from what have been the core institutions of marriage, religious affiliation, and employers, the Millennial generation has taken the ideas of Emerson’s self-reliance to new levels. According to a Pew Research Center study, Millennials are considerably more liberal than other generations: about four-in-ten Millennials are mostly (28 percent) or consistently (13 percent) liberal in their views, compared with 15% who are mostly (12 percent) or consistently (3 percent) conservative (44 percent are ideologically mixed) (Pew Research Center 2014, n.p.).

While their independence can be exciting, their attitudes have been causing alarm within the Intelligence Community. For example, how do you mitigate an insider threat if they are all insider threats? One of the key variables in mitigating insider threats is being on the lookout for narcissistic personalities in the workplace, as narcissistic personality disorder is nearly three times as high with Millennials than people 65 or older. Importantly, narcissism can also be connected to feelings of entitlement (Stein 2013).

“I have done nothing wrong .... I no longer work for the government but the people,” tweeted Snowden, which can be interpreted as the benchmark of Millennial attitudes regardless of its tone of grandiosity and entitlement (The Guardian 2013, n.p.). This generational affectation, coupled with research that supports that constant interacting with a screen all day supplies a hit of dopamine when someone responds to a tweet or post, can reduce empathy (Stein 2013). Millennials may not see the far-reaching implications of their behaviors or how their ethical choices might implicate national security. According to Joel Stein, “Not only do Millennials lack the kind of empathy that allows them to feel concerned for oth-
ers, but they also have trouble intellectually understanding others’ point of view” (para. 9). This might explain how Snowden, Manning, and Winner disseminated classified information without awareness for the causal chain that might follow for themselves or the country. “They do not understand the long-term damage of leaks and how it compromises the United States” says Lambert (Marangione and Lambert, pers. comm., 2017). Fran Moore, former CIA Assistant Director, echoes, “Individuals like Snowden, Manning and Winner do not care about ramifications” (Marangione and Moore, pers. comm., September 19, 2017). Moore goes on to state, “One of the challenges of an organization that must be made clear is it is never O.K. to spill secrets. The real question is: how do you recognize if you have a Snowden [Winner or Manning] working for you?” This can be doubly troubling for the Intelligence Community if the Millennial generation has had such a profound shift in attitude that makes the insider threat as outlined by the National Cybersecurity and Communications Center’s (UCEERT) and psychology of espionage model outdated.

The model for espionage as outlined by CIA’s psychologist Ursula Wilder includes life crises, pathologies, and ease of opportunity, as well as financial gain. Wilder describes espionage as spying for the purpose of working against your own country. Leakers are defined as not involved with long-term dissemination and are not paid (Wilder 2017). Millennials do not fit into a clear diagnostic model of profiles for espionage. Wilder feels that the personality traits of narcissism, immaturity, and entitlement as well as the variable that long-term Internet usage “un-balances people,” are criteria that must be monitored for leakers. Well, welcome to the Millennial age.

Therefore, are these variables useful for mitigating insider threats? Perhaps the paradigms of working with Millennials, who have been molded and shaped by the information age and believe in transparency and their own ethical model, must be seen as normative. Perhaps it is the Intelligence Community’s approach to managing insider threats that has to change just like the Intelligence Community had to change, reactively, after 9/11.

Recommendations

The partnership of Millennials and the Intelligence Community has to flourish. Millennials and the rising generation’s need for information sharing has to be acknowledged. The paramount necessity of a whistleblower program must be valued as serious by all parties involved. Without this, the Intelligence Community runs the risk of increased intelligence leaks, especially in this divisive political climate where Millennials feel that the government and leadership are at odds with their own morals and ethics. If the Intelligence Community does not channel dissent into constructivism, leaks may grow worse.
The culture of all agencies and contractors handling classified information must strengthen ethical and law-abiding practices and this must be clearly embraced in a company’s mission and values and honored by the management. Employees must feel that management encourages and, more importantly, requires employees to discuss any issues and challenges they perceive as incongruous in the workplace; whistleblowers must be seen as improving the work environment, increasing accountability, and employers must honor transparency.

Often, the Intelligence Community has approached change from a reactionary position as exemplified by its overhaul post-9/11 despite a morphing international terror threat at the end of the twentieth century. Mitigating the Snowden Effect does not come from a 1950s insider threat model, a punitive approach to employee management, or a close scrutiny and monitoring of individuals. It comes from reshaping the workplace for inclusion and transparency, modifying the Espionage Act and providing a whistleblower protection framework so that an employee has no reason to leak information. Whistleblowers must not be ignored or punished. Otherwise, WikiLeaks and the Media will continue to be the whistleblower’s only course of action.

Efforts must be given to a basic shift in values that have direct implications on daily operations and employees must know from a tactical, strategic, and logistical perspective that they will be encouraged to bear witness honorably through appropriate channels. The culture of all intelligence agencies must highlight ethical, law-abiding behavior and employees must feel that management does not just encourage but expects employees to hold themselves, each other, and the organizations that they work for to standards of accountability.

Research supports that Millennials have a new attitude toward work and their faithfulness is to their own ethics; the government may be headed down a slippery slope for classified information management and leaking. This might be exasperated by the recent administration’s divisiveness, challenges to the legitimacy of information, and the dismantling rather than strengthening of current offices for reporting and protecting whistleblowers. Changing the paradigm must be paramount for every organization, otherwise Snowden, Manning, and Winner are just the canary in the coalmine.

References


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Review of *Harold Stassen: Eisenhower, the Cold War, and the Pursuit of Nuclear Disarmament*


Lawrence S. Kaplan’s book, *Harold Stassen: Eisenhower, the Cold War, and the Pursuit of Nuclear Disarmament,* begins with a series of unflattering adjectives about its subject, former Governor Harold Stassen: “sense of entitlement” (1), “over-weening self-confidence” (3), and an “insatiable appetite for high political office” (7). Yet, as Kaplan argues in this highly engaging text, Stassen’s ideas about foreign policy show remarkable insight in a lifetime that spanned much of the twentieth century. Born in 1907, he died at age 93 in 2001. Stassen is known for the many years of public service and campaigning that began at an early age.

Just out of law school in 1929 from the University of Minnesota, Stassen established a law practice then quickly gave it up to run for district attorney in Dakota County, Minnesota. By 1935, Stassen was president of the Minnesota County District Attorney Association. A lifelong Republican, Stassen became a delegate to the Republican National Convention in 1936 at age 29. He became governor of Minnesota just two years later. At the beginning of World War II, in 1940, Stassen was re-elected governor and again in 1942. The campaign in 1942 was the last time he won political office, although he ran in 13 other races throughout his career, including nine times as a U.S. presidential primary candidate from 1944 to 1992. Stassen’s failures as a political candidate have been lampooned in the media, including a 2006 episode in the hit cartoon series, *The Simpsons.*

Stassen’s national political career began in 1943 when, as a second-term governor in Minnesota, he joined the Navy and served as an aide to Admiral William F. Halsey. While it might seem incongruous that a state political figure would interrupt his career to join the U.S. military to advance his national political career, Kaplan explains Stassen’s unrelenting pursuit: “Lieutenant Commander Stassen took advantage of every opportunity in a variety of venues to advocate his conception of America’s role in the postwar world” (20). By 1944, Stassen entered the Republican presidential primary against isolationism and for economic aid to post-war Europe. That year, President Franklin D. Roosevelt easily won re-election on a similar platform.

Kaplan explains that Stassen’s foreign policy positions were unique in the Republican party and drew FDR’s attention. While serving as Commander under Admiral Halsey, Stassen received notice from the President that he had been selected as a U.S. delegate to the first United Nations Conference in San Francisco. At the Conference in 1945, he showed qualities of leadership but also “bullheadedness” (27) and “arrogance” (28). At the end of the UN Conference in summer 1945,
Stassen returned to the Navy where he was promoted to Captain and witnessed the surrender of Japan with Admiral Halsey in August 1945. He was 38 years old.

Throughout his political career, Stassen’s sense of timing and his age proved to be an advantage. After failing to achieve the Republican nomination for president in 1944 and again in 1948, Stassen initiated another primary campaign in 1952 to help General Dwight Eisenhower’s chances for the nomination. His complex idea was to split the Republican party to give Eisenhower the best chance to win based on popularity rather than policy. Among a list of five losing candidates, which included Senator Taft of Ohio, Governor Earl Warren (the future chief justice), and General Douglas MacArthur, at age 45, Stassen was at least 15 years younger than each of them. Kaplan’s account is a candid description of Stassen through the eyes of his peers. When Eisenhower brought Stassen aboard in 1953 as the director of the Mutual Security Agency, Stassen came armed with 10 years of national political experience and a reputation that made him, as New York Times critic Orville Prescott commented, “a sitting duck for all his rivals to shoot at” (51).

Stassen’s argumentative and idealistic approach drew sharp criticism and rivalry in the Eisenhower Administration—in the State Department, especially—which prompted a colleague to speculate that Secretary John Foster Dulles wanted Stassen “to step over the line he has drawn so that he can lower the boom” (177). By the time he left the Eisenhower Administration in February 1958, sure of his convictions in nuclear disarmament policy, sure of his destiny as a presidential hopeful, but out of a job after being fired, he was 50 years old.

After 1945 but prior to his time in the Eisenhower Administration, Stassen set out on a plan to address “control of the atom bomb [as] his special interest” (37). Eisenhower found Stassen’s way of thinking about nuclear disarmament appealing, even more so than some of his closest advisors. Stassen’s obsession with nuclear disarmament and specifically, diplomacy with the Soviet leadership, revealed both an intriguing aspect of his personality but also a distasteful one. When Stassen single-handedly set up an interview with Joseph Stalin in Moscow during a nine-week tour of 18 countries in Western Europe and the USSR, although he “held no official office and was on no official mission,” (47) Stassen’s “ploy” (46) provided the unhappy combination of intrigue and consternation among his peers. James Reston, the New York Times Washington correspondent, admired Stassen’s “upstart quality” (52).

While serving as Eisenhower’s Special Assistant for Disarmament from 1955 to 1957, Stassen advocated a method toward verification through a program called “Open Skies,” which meant the United States and the USSR would agree to monitor each other’s commitments to disarmament through aerial surveillance. It is at this point in Kaplan’s account that the author misses an opportunity to show President Eisenhower’s personal role in disarmament policy. Dino Brugioni’s Eyes in the Sky: Eisenhower, the CIA, and Cold War Aerial Espionage (2011, Naval Institute Press) detailed the Open Skies policy and its origination within the admin-
istration. Brugioni argued that since 1918, President Eisenhower understood the importance of aerial surveillance. Eisenhower had used aerial photographs as a staff officer just after World War I to monitor supplies and movement of equipment. From 1918 through World War II, Eisenhower innovated ever-increasing technical advancements in aerial surveillance.

When the Atomic Energy Commission released a comprehensive report in February 1955, Eisenhower created the post he offered Stassen one month later, special assistant to the president for disarmament. Eisenhower had an operational vision to enact nuclear disarmament and wanted to focus the Administration's attention on an overall lack of preparedness. On June 15–17, 1955, knowing that a surprise nuclear attack would be devastating, Eisenhower ran a three-day exercise with 6,000 U.S. government personnel in Washington, including those from the CIA, the Departments of Defense and State, as well as the Atomic Energy Commission and other departments of the government to expose vulnerabilities in dealing with such an attack. Brugioni, a former CIA officer taking part in the exercises, reflected that Eisenhower's exercise was effective in pinpointing critical problems, especially in inter-agency communications. Brugioni's 2011 account or the exercise are not mentioned in Kaplan's Harold Stassen.

Kaplan's account of Stassen in national politics during the twentieth century is one the diplomatic historian will devour. Although Stassen's life story focuses on his political failures, Kaplan brilliantly shows the persistence and resilience that were unyielding in his subject's character. It is somewhat disappointing that the title of the book is not the central focus. The text is 192 pages, yet almost one-half is a recounting of Stassen's career to the point of joining the Eisenhower Administration in 1953.

Diplomatic historians are intrigued by studies in character and decision making, searching for new insights about historical figures through unpublished archival evidence. Most letters, memos, and diary entries in Kaplan's text are drawn from secondary sources or edited volumes like the Foreign Relations of the United States. Especially in the chapters on Stassen's role in the Eisenhower Administration, the book would benefit from additional unpublished materials from the Stassen Papers, the Eisenhower Library, and the John Foster Dulles Papers. These archival sources are cited to a very limited extent. Robert Divine's 1978 work Blowing in the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954–1960 remains a valuable text on the topic, as does H. W. Brand, Jr.'s Cold Warriors: Eisenhower's Generation and American Foreign Policy (1988).

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The origins of Credible and Actionable Evidence (Credible) can be traced to a Claremont Graduate University Stauffer Symposium convened over a decade ago to address the key and contentious question of what actually constitutes “credible and actionable” evidence in the context of professional evaluation research. An important motivation for this book is articulated in the preface as the editors explain that tensions from an earlier quantitative–qualitative paradigm war in evaluation research appear to have resurfaced within the last decade or so and have re-exposed longstanding epistemological divisions among practitioners. Among the catalysts implicated in reigniting these controversies was the 2003 U.S. Department of Education’s Institute of Education Sciences (IES) “wholesale commitment to privileging experimental and some quasi-experimental designs over other methods in applied research and evaluation funding competitions” (12). References to this explicit preference for experimental or “gold standard” designs among federal funders of evaluation research pervade the early chapters of Credible and help to simultaneously contextualize the controversies, on the one hand, and make some of the motivating examples feel a bit dated, on the other. Nevertheless, despite the 15-year time lapse between the publication of this worthy second edition and many of the cited examples, this book offers a broad overview of many of the ongoing epistemological debates in the field of evaluation research and should serve as a useful supplemental text for advanced undergraduates or early graduate school training in research design and causal inference.

The organization of the book is designed to help readers navigate the material in a roughly “top down” fashion by first introducing broad concepts followed later by in-depth discussions of more specific debates and issues. Accordingly, Credible is divided into four parts, with the first three consisting of three chapters each and the last consisting of four.

The chapters in Part I together provide an overview of the basics of contemporary evaluation research practice and its roots in the broader philosophy of science paradigms of the twentieth century. Chapter 1 by Stewart Donaldson provides a wide-ranging review of contemporary evaluation practice and delves into details that help establish the motivation and need for the book. The second chapter by Christina Christie and Dreolin Fleischer serves as a general refresher
on the philosophical underpinnings of the major scientific paradigms that inform contemporary debates about the appropriate role of experimental versus nonexperimental designs and qualitative approaches in generating credible and actionable evaluation evidence. Perhaps the strongest chapter in this section is the third, written by Robin Lin Miller. Reviewing the evidence to date from the cognitive and information sciences, Miller focuses on the ways in which consumers of information actually make judgments about what is credible and what is not. Perhaps most helpful to the applied evaluator is Miller's observation of the need to structure into our research the mechanisms necessary to prevent undue reliance on heuristics, which can, at times, lead consumers to false judgments about credibility. The importance of factoring these considerations early into the research design and planned communication and dissemination plans is sage advice.

Not surprisingly, the most contentious section of Credible is Part II, which focuses on the role of randomized experiments in building credible evidence. Central to this debate is the underlying idea that randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are the “gold standard” for establishing causality and thus should be the preferred design when the cost of incorrectly inferring causality is high. In this regard, Chapter 4 by Gary Henry serves as a defense of the decision by IES and other funders to prioritize RCTs when causal inference is the goal. Henry's argument, however, seeks to root the preference for and legitimation of RCTs within a broader theory of policy decision making within a democracy, arguing that the causal inferences afforded by RCTs are the most straightforward mechanism available to connect public actions and social consequences. This somewhat idealized vision for the role of RCTs in a democratic polity helps to establish the more in-depth discussion that comes next in Chapter 5 by Leonard Birkman and Stephanie Reich. In this chapter, the authors examine the theory behind RCTs. In doing this, the authors focus on a litany of considerations that can threaten both the internal and external validity of RCTs. Among the several listed threats to internal validity are experimenter effects (in which the behavior or expectations of the experimenter can affect the study in various ways) and participant attrition. For applied practitioners, these potential threats are well known and they are often dealt with by blinding, in the case of experimenter effects, and by establishing intensive follow-up and engagement protocols to minimize attrition. Arguably, a more common criticism of RCTs is the limited external validity they provide. And while one could argue that establishing internal validity is the ultimate purpose of causal research, how applicable research findings are to other settings, times, and contexts is also highly important to those the research may seek to influence. On this point, Birkman and Reich argue for the use of RCTs in settings that are as close as possible to the likely “real world” setting in which the intervention of interest will be applied. Ultimately, the authors conclude that while potential threats to internal and external validity abound, the RCT is still one of the most credible designs available to evaluators.
Chapter 6 in Part II by Michael Scriven is the most contrarian in this regard and openly challenges the notion that RCTs deserve a privileged place atop the research design hierarchy. Specifically, Scriven notes that RCTs are rarely if ever used in other scientific disciplines, such as the astrological or physical sciences, that have no difficulty making sound causal claims. Moreover, Scriven makes a more general argument that the general elimination methodology or algorithm, which systematically excludes alternative explanations, is the logical underpinning of all causal designs including the RCT. Scriven’s argument then moves on to explain that quasi-experimental designs (QEDs) can meet these standards as readily, and usually less expensively, than RCTs. Scriven’s argument is provocative and receives a special response from Melvin Mark in Appendix I. In reviewing the arguments made by Scriven, Mark hits on an important point that, in my experience, is often overlooked when discussing the limitations of RCTs. In particular, many, if not most, of the recognized threats to validity that are discussed by Scriven, and by Birkman and Reich in the previous chapter, also apply to QEDs and other non-RCT designs. When assessing the relative merits of designs for causal inference, evaluators should be careful to avoid the assumption that a theoretical threat to validity for an RCT does not apply to a proposed alternative. A clear accounting for the threats to validity across design choices, and clearly articulated strategies for minimizing them, is critical.

Part III of Credible is devoted to a variety of topics that loosely correspond to the appropriate use of qualitative methods and synthesis of research evidence. Chapter 7 by Sharon Rallis, for example, discusses the application of qualitative research methods in the evaluation context with a strong focus on relationship-building with stakeholders. In her discussion, Rallis very helpfully walks through her own experience building trust and respect among the stakeholders and practitioners in her own work and ends by reiterating the importance of matching methods to purpose with a question-driven study. For evaluation practitioners, however, Chapter 9 by Eleanor Chelimsky is perhaps the most engaging and inspirational for those who work directly with (and for) policymaker agencies. In this chapter, Chelimsky discusses her career at the Government Accountability Office in which she worked to synthesize research evidence in response to direct questions from policymakers and elected representatives. Through a series of concrete policy examples, including chemical warfare and the effectiveness of the Women’s, Infants’, and Children’s Program (WIC), Chelimsky discusses the steps followed to design a systematic synthesis methodology that was flexible enough to pivot to diverse policy areas. Her recounting of the challenges and payoffs involved with producing synthesis reports on the pressing policy issues of the time should be read by researchers who are beginning their careers. Additionally, Chelimsky’s chapter is the only one to address the issue of research synthesis and touch on issues of meta-analysis and publication bias in evaluation research. Given the methodological advances in meta-analysis techniques and the heightened awareness of the role
publication bias can play in shaping the evidence we collect and disseminate, these topics deserve more space.

Part IV consists of four chapters designed to provide more general perspectives on earning credibility (Chapter 10); contextual influences on method choice (Chapter 11); considerations of necessary and sufficient conditions for credible evidence of effectiveness (Chapter 12); and a framework for building future practice and research (Chapter 13). While each of these chapters makes a worthy contribution to the central purpose of the book, Chapter 13 may be the most useful for practitioners. In this chapter, Melvin Mark attempts to build a framework that both synthesizes the previous sections and moves the field forward. Mark begins by listing the characteristics of evidence that together create a threshold for action. The four main components of evidence are credibility, probative force, relevance, and comprehensiveness. Credibility is defined broadly here as whether something can be taken to be true or false. Probative force can be regarded as evidence that essentially “clenches” the argument. Relevance refers to the extent to which the evidence from an evaluation addresses the specific question at hand, presumably from a decision-making standpoint. Finally, comprehensiveness captures the extent to which the evidence covers the full range of questions that may be of interest. As Mark explains, and practitioners are well aware, real-world evaluations involve tradeoffs among these four components, as, for example, relevance and comprehensiveness may move in opposite directions given resource constraints. Mark does put these pieces together to show how they may impact actionability. Later in the chapter, Mark also includes contextual components and other processes to build a more global framework to help practitioners place method and design choices in the appropriate perspective. In this sense, *Credible* ends with a useful jumping off point for researchers to push the field of evaluation forward in a constructive and inclusive manner.

My hope is that a future edition of this book will begin where this last chapter ends and continue to push the field and the discussion forward. In my assessment, this can be accomplished by updating the current edition to address emerging trends in applied evaluation work. These trends include the growing interest in rapid cycle evaluation that emphasizes the use of rigorous experimental or QEDs to assess short-term outcomes often using existing data. As the name implies, the focus of these types of evaluations is on quick identification of the impact of policy or procedural changes on readily measurable outcomes with a goal of both assessing causation while also informing program improvement. Related to this trend is the growing use of “big data” in evaluation research and what the practical, ethical, and inferential implications are for research design choice going forward. A final theme that touches on the previous point and relates back to Michael Scriven’s chapter is the use of rigorous nonexperimental designs. The ability to systematically eliminate alternative explanations for the observation of an outcome after an intervention has been implemented is indeed an underpinning of all causal
designs including RCTs. In expectation, the random assignment mechanism of RCTs is what provides this inferential power, assuming other threats to validity are controlled for. However, it is conceivable that with advances in data analytics, the proliferation of sophisticated statistical algorithms, and wider data availability, other rigorous non-RCT designs may be viewed as more cost-effective and able to closely mirror the inferential power that RCTs can provide. Examples of these rigorous non-RCT designs include various flavors of propensity score matching, regression discontinuity, and interrupted time series designs, among others. While these designs are not new, the ability to execute them more efficiently via advances in statistical computing, and to account for potential threats to validity through cross-validation with other data sources, has increased significantly over the past decade. More discussion and considered guidance around these themes would be a welcomed addition to an updated version of this very useful book.

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* The views expressed in this review are solely my own and do not necessarily reflect those of Mathematica or any of its clients.