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Letter from the Editor

Letter from the Editor

Welcome to the edited and revised fourth issue of the American Public University System (APUS) *Saber and Scroll Journal*. As noted in the previous revised issues, authors of articles published in the early issues of the *Saber and Scroll* have expressed interest in purchasing a print-on-demand (POD) version of their work. In response to that request, a small team has tackled editing and revising the first four issues of the journal to improve the content quality and publish each as a print offering.

Sincere thanks are due to APUS faculty member Jennifer Thompson, who, together with the *Saber and Scroll* Editor in Chief, have edited and revised each article and book review published in the fourth *Saber and Scroll* issue. Thanks are also due to Susanne Schenk Watts, who has carefully proofread the issues created for print-on-demand format. Where appropriate, the team has added public domain artwork to feature articles to enhance the aesthetics of each issue.

Thanks are due to the fourth issue authors: Robert Busek, Kenneth Oziah, Kathleen Mitchell Reitmayer, Anne Midgley, Lew Taylor, Chris Booth, and Patrick Baker for their contributions to the *Saber and Scroll Journal*.

As with the previous revised issues, the original letter from the editor has been included. The original letter from the editor stated:

Welcome to the Volume I of the Second Edition of the *Saber and Scroll Journal*!

As the *Saber and Scroll Journal* enters into its second year of publication, we are so pleased to have such a warm response and stable journal team. While the last year has been filled with changes, we have done our best to bring you the best possible journal that we can put together and this edition is no different. It has been only through the support of the *Saber and Scroll* members that we have been able to be successful into a second year. We thank those who have volunteered in the past and our present volunteers as well as the historians who have submitted their work for the journal.

As we normally do with the first journal of the year, this journal was an open topic. Every author in this volume is a member of the American Public University System community. It is the best American Public University System's History and Military History Departments have to offer from undergrads to faculty and from Ancient Greece to the American Civil War.

With that said, we hope you enjoy the Winter Issue of the Saber and Scroll Journal.

Your Journal Team

Anne Midgley, Managing Content Editor

Ben Sorenson, Content Editor

Melanie Thornton, Content Editor

Kathleen Reitmayer, Technical Editor

It is with great pleasure then that the edited and revised version of the fourth Saber and Scroll issue is hereby presented in print-on-demand format.

Anne Midgley
Editor in Chief

Defenders of the Faith: Augustine, Aquinas, and the Evolution of Medieval Just War Theory

Robert Busek

Christianity has always had a difficult relationship with the concept of war. After all, it is impossible to follow Christ's command to "love one's neighbor" on the battlefield. Indeed, "turning the other cheek" in such a situation is very likely to allow one to meet God face to face. Christian pacifism was particularly prevalent in the early years of the Church, when many Christians steadfastly refused to join the Roman army, a move that caused governmental authorities some concern. As the empire began to crumble in the third century, the Christian repudiation of violence eventually led to persecution by the state. Guided by the pacifist theology supported by the early theologians Origen and Tertullian, many Christians went meekly to their deaths, winning the crown of martyrdom.

By the fourth century, however, the relationship between Christianity and the Roman state had radically changed. Under the protection of Constantine the Great, Christianity had not only achieved legitimacy, but had also become an important arm of the state. Later, under Theodosius the Great, Christianity became the official religion of the empire, effectively marginalizing the pagan belief systems that had once tried to destroy it. However, with this political victory came a host of theological problems, including the question of whether or not Christians should wage war. The attempt to reconcile Christ's injunctions against violence with the unfortunate necessity of war resulted in the development of what philosophers now call the "just war theory," the conditions under which war can be waged without sin. It is fitting that the first great philosopher to write about the just war, Augustine of Hippo, lived during the death throes of the Roman Empire, in a world plagued by the strife of nations. Over eight hundred years later, the man who would further develop this theory, Thomas Aquinas, lived in a world where warfare had assumed a truly spiritual function through the concept of the crusade and the blending of monastic and knightly traditions. Faced with this new idea of positive warfare, Aquinas reinterpreted Augustine's theology to fit this context.

When discussing Christianity and war, modern pacifists tend to focus on portions of the New Testament that specifically forbid any type of violence, the most famous of which is Christ's command to "not resist an evil person. If

someone strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also” (Matthew 5:39). Almost as famous is his rebuke to Peter in Gethsemane after the apostle struck a servant with his sword: “Put your sword back in its place,” Jesus said to him, “for all who draw the sword will die by the sword” (Matthew 26:52). These isolated comments would seem to confirm that the Bible absolutely forbids Christians from taking part in any sort of violent action, especially when paired with Christ's meek acceptance of death at the hands of his enemies. Yet curiously, alongside these injunctions are examples of acceptance of soldiers and their violent profession. John the Baptist, for instance, did not denounce the soldiers who came to him as “baby-killers” and demand that they give up their swords, but told them, “Don't extort money and don't accuse people falsely—be content with your pay” (Luke 3:14). Similarly, when the centurion came to Jesus asking him to heal his servant, Jesus told the crowd, “I have not found anyone in Israel with such great faith” (Matthew 8:11). Then there is Jesus' own use of violence in a righteous cause:

When it was almost time for the Jewish Passover, Jesus went up to Jerusalem. In the temple courts he found men selling cattle, sheep and doves, and others sitting at tables exchanging money. So he made a whip out of cords, and drove all from the temple area, both sheep and cattle; he scattered the coins of the money changers and overturned their tables. To those who sold doves he said, “Get these out of here! How dare you turn my Father's house into a market!” (John 2: 13-16).

Indeed, prior to going to Gethsemane, when the disciples told him that they have brought two swords, Jesus did not berate them for bearing weapons, but merely said, “That is enough” (Luke 22:38). So the New Testament is not a paean to non-violence, rather, there is no strict conclusion on these issues and the Christian's approach to questions of the morality of violence seems to depend on the circumstances in which he finds himself.

Though many historians have tried to characterize the early Church as broadly anti-military, a deeper look at the history reveals a far more complicated situation. Some Christians seem to have been serving in the Roman military throughout the second and third centuries while others refused because of their faith. The Church fathers of this period tend to prefer that Christians avoid military service for the good of their souls. In the late second century, Tertullian connected military service with idolatry, in part because it involved the Christian in traditional pagan worship. He relied on Christ's rebuke to Peter in Gethsemane to support his pacifism:

Shall it be held lawful to make an occupation of the sword, when the Lord proclaims that he who uses the sword shall perish by the sword? And shall the son of peace take part in the battle when it does not become him even to sue at law? . . . Shall he carry a flag, too, hostile to Christ? And shall *he* ask a watchword from the emperor who has already received one from God?¹

The third century theologian Origen held similar views on violence and the Christian:

[Christ] nowhere teaches that it is right for His own disciples to offer violence to any one, however wicked. For He did not deem it in keeping with such laws as His, which were derived from a divine source, to allow the killing of any individual whatever.²

Though both these men admitted that Christians were serving in the Roman army during their times, they certainly believed that a true Christian should avoid a way of life so seemingly antithetical to the commands of Christ.

By the late third century, these theological musings must have seemed rather moot. The strains of empire were taking their toll on the Roman state and more and more often, the Christians found themselves as the scapegoats. The empire-wide persecutions of first Decius and then Diocletian followed the general attitude of “don't ask, don't tell” which had prevailed during the Pax Romana. Christians were not even fulfilling the basic requirement of worshiping the divine emperor; how could Rome expect them to serve loyally as soldiers? As the Church fought to survive the persecutions, questions of the morality of military service must have been far from pressing.

All this would change when Constantine came to power in the early fourth century. After his victory over Maxentius at Milvian Bridge, Constantine acted quickly to legalize and support the religion that he believed had given him victory. A year after Milvian Bridge, Constantine issued the Edict of Milan which allowed anyone “who wishe[d] to observe Christian religion [to] do so freely and openly, without molestation.”³ Constantine went great lengths to show his preference for Christianity, granting its bishops land and wealth, making them part of his circle of advisors, and enforcing the decisions of their councils. Scholars continue to debate what exactly he hoped to achieve through this patronage, but what is clear is that Constantine set Christianity on the path to dominance in the Empire, a dominance achieved by the end of the century when Theodosius made Christianity the official religion of the empire. Throughout this process, the empire now considered the once-disenfranchised Christians full citizens and thus expected

them to aid in its defense. After centuries of mere discussion, Christian theology would now have to grapple with the problem of war.

The theologian who would take on this challenge and thus give birth to the concept of the “just war” was Augustine of Hippo. Born in 354 in North Africa to a pagan father and a Christian mother, they raised Augustine in a world where rival religions were struggling for the soul of the empire. This struggle reflected in Augustine's own spiritual journey, he initially rejected the faith of his mother Monica, seeking answers to his questions about human nature in the dualist philosophy of Manichaeism. Eventually, however, he returned to Christianity; Ambrose of Milan instructed and baptized him in 386. Soon after, he returned to North Africa with the intention of building a monastic community in the desert and living there in prayerful seclusion. That was not to be, for the Church “shanghaied” him into becoming the bishop



Figure 1 *St. Augustine in His Study*. Fresco by Botticelli, c. 1480. Located in the Church of Ognissanti, Florence, Italy.

of Hippo, whose Christian community needed his learning to guide them. In the over thirty years that he was bishop, Augustine produced more than one hundred works in Latin that would become the foundation for Western Christian theology.

Indeed, he wrote so much over such a long period of time that he felt it necessary to publish some retractions at the end of his life to “set the record straight.”

Augustine was certainly no stranger to the horrors of war. In his lifetime, the Western Empire began to disintegrate under the weight of multiple invasions by Germanic tribes. In 410, Augustine, like most Romans, was aghast to learn that the Visigoths had sacked Rome, signaling the start of the end of civilization in the West. Naturally, those pagans who remained in the empire blamed these misfortunes on Rome having abandoned its traditional gods. Never one to back down from a challenge, Augustine took up his pen to refute them. His work entitled *Concerning the City of God against the Pagans* is a defense of Christian truth in the face of such disasters. It also serves as a synthesis of Augustine’s thoughts on politics, including the function of war in a Christian world. Although Augustine had addressed the issue of just warfare in some of his earlier works, *The City of God* presented this concept in its finished form.

Augustine viewed the lack of worldly peace as an obvious result of man’s fall from grace. He was the great developer of the Christian concept of “original sin,” which he defined as the human preference for the inferior pleasures of the physical world, such as food, human love, and wealth, as opposed to the higher, spiritual pleasures, such as loving God and living morally. When discussing the peace that God promised Israel in the Old Testament, he wrote, “But if anyone hopes for so great a good as this in the world, and on this earth, his wisdom is but folly.”⁴ According to Augustine, there can never be true earthly peace so long as human beings exist in a state of sin. As such, secular society waged wars merely for the enjoyment of inferior secular pleasures: “Thus, the earthly city desires earthly peace, albeit only for the sake of the lowest kind of goods; and it is that peace which it desires to achieve by waging war.”⁵ The taint of sin makes the ideal of true everlasting peace unattainable; man must transcend his worldly nature in order to achieve it.

However, Augustine was quick to point out that earthly victory in a war and the peace that follows it are “gifts from God” and form the basis for the relationship between secular society and the Church.⁶ The Church needs the stability that secular society provides so that it can perform its function, which is to lead people to God. In accepting this earthly peace, the Church places itself under the direction of secular government in all matters that are unconnected to the faith and “makes no scruple to obey [its] laws,” which would necessarily include the

declaration of war.⁷

In this context, Augustine argued that Christians should not refuse to join the army simply because the role of a soldier entails the use of violence. For him, peace is indeed worth the fight. However, Christians must fight the enemies of the state in the correct frame of mind, remembering that their purpose in fighting is neither the joy of slaughter nor the chance to plunder, but the establishment of peace, however ephemeral it might be. Augustine first addressed this issue in a letter to a friend who was afraid that his vocation as a soldier might lead him to damnation. He assuaged his friend's fears with the following words:

Peace should be the object of your desire; war should only be waged as a necessity, and waged only that God may by it deliver men from the necessity and preserve them in peace...Therefore, even in waging war, cherish the spirit of a peacemaker, that, by conquering those whom you attack, you may lead them back to the advantages of peace.⁸

In *The City of God*, Augustine further developed this theme by describing the attitude of the righteous man towards war:

But the wise man, they say, will wage just wars. Surely, however, if he remembers that he is a human being, he will be much readier to deplore the fact that he is under the necessity of waging even just wars. For if they were not just, he would not have to wage them, and so there would then be no wars at all for a wise man to engage in. For it is the iniquity of the opposing side that imposes upon the wise man the duty of waging wars.⁹

Thus, even the just war is a necessary evil, fought only for the purpose of preventing greater evils. The Christians who engage in such wars must therefore remember to fight according to what Augustine calls the "law of charity," that is, with compassion and without malice.

Thus, the first criterion for a just war is its motivation: the establishment or preservation of earthly peace. To that end, Augustine went on to establish the second criterion: the initiation of war by a legitimate authority. It is this declaration by a higher power that removes the stain of sin from a soldier's violent actions provided, of course, that the soldier is behaving in accordance with the precepts of the first criterion. Augustine specifically stated that "when the soldier, obedient to the power under which he has been lawfully placed, slays a man, he is not guilty of murder."¹⁰ For Augustine, Christ's rebuke to Peter at Gethsemane was not for his violent act, but for perpetrating such an act without Christ's authorization. That authority also need not be merely terrestrial; Augustine addressed divinely sanctioned violence in the Old Testament, such as the wars of the Israelites in the

Promised Land, by stating, “And if this is true when the command is given by a general, how much more is it when it is given by the Creator!”¹¹ Without the endorsement of such a legitimate authority, no war can be truly just.

Augustine’s just war must have both the correct motivation and the appropriate authorization. What then constituted a just war to Augustine? It seems that the only war that Augustine would unequivocally support would be a war of defense against an aggressor. When discussing the early wars of Rome, Augustine claimed that the Romans “were compelled to resist the savage incursions of their enemies; and they were compelled to do this not by greed for human praise, but by the necessity of defending life and liberty.”¹² In the case of offensive wars, *The City of God* is less clear. However, one of Augustine’s earlier works, *Questions on the Heptateuch*, certainly implied that an offensive war is entirely just in the following circumstances, “if some nation or some state which is warred upon has failed either to make reparation for an injurious action committed by its citizens or to return what has been wrongfully appropriated.”¹³ Very few secular wars can uphold these criteria. However, Augustine justified the ancient wars of the Israelites, waged under God’s authority, as just because the Israelites “acted not in cruelty, but in righteous retribution, giving to all what they deserved, and warning those who needed warning.”¹⁴ The justice of these wars depended on their divinely ordained nature; God promised the Holy Land to the Israelites and the Israelites had to conquer it to fulfill God’s plan. Yet even these wars were primarily secular in nature in that they fought them for territorial and political domination.

Augustine never seemed to have considered the concept of religious war as being relevant to his discussion. To him, war was a purely secular activity that, although sometimes necessary, was always regrettable. It is ironic, then, that Augustine’s words became the basis for justifying a war with a distinctly religious character—the First Crusade.

In the seven centuries separating Augustine and the crusading movement, the West had fallen to the Germanic hordes (Augustine himself had died while the Vandals besieged his city) and created a new fusion of Roman and Germanic cultures. The greatest embodiment of this cultural exchange was, of course, the reign of Charlemagne, the first Frankish emperor of the West. According to his biographer Einhard, Charlemagne’s favorite book was Augustine’s *Concerning the City of God*. He took great pains to paint the king of

the Franks not as a mere seeker of loot and glory like earlier Germanic kings, but as a fighter of just wars to keep the earthly peace, especially against non-Christian enemies like the pagan Saxons and the Muslims of Spain. Whether Charlemagne truly embodied Augustine's ideas of warfare is debatable; after all, Einhard himself admits that he has a considerable bias in favor of the king. Still, Charlemagne's example would prove to be vital to maintaining the idea of just warfare into the High Middle Ages.

By the year 900, his successors had shattered the earthly peace achieved by Charlemagne as they divided his empire amongst themselves. New threats, particularly the raids of the Northmen, would create further chaos and inspire a new military ideal—chivalry. Based on the concept of heavy cavalry and wedded to older Germanic traditions, the new warrior elite would revolutionize the fighting of wars. These early knights were not the pious and courteous figures of romantic tales; indeed, most of them engaged in what we would consider most unchivalrous behavior. In response, the Church attempted to rein in the knights by setting definite limits on their behavior. These efforts took many forms. The Church insinuated itself into the knighting ceremony until it became a secular version of the rite of baptism, reminding the knight that his first “liege lord” was God Himself. The Peace of God movement sought to limit the damage that knights could do by threatening to excommunicate any knight who showed violence to the poor, the clergy, or the property of the Church. Similarly, the Truce of God should limit fighting only on specific days of the week (typically sunrise on Monday to sunset on Wednesday). Though these edicts of the Church were largely unenforceable, they did make the Church the ultimate arbiter of which types of wars to fight and under what circumstances. The crusading movement would be the ultimate expression of this theoretical power.

Prior to the First Crusade, Pope Gregory VII had commissioned the canon lawyer Anselm of Lucca to compile Augustine's texts on just war for use against his adversary, the Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV during the Investiture Controversy. Indeed, Gregory seemed to have wanted to launch an expedition to the East as early as 1074, but his conflict with Henry preempted those plans. In 1096, Gregory's protégé Pope Urban II used Anselm's *Collectio canonum* in his preaching of an armed expedition to Jerusalem. At the Council of Clermont, Urban preached a sermon that launched the crusading movement as an Augustinian just war with both defensive and offensive characteristics. In the first case, Urban

emphasized the need to defend the eastern Christians, “you must help your brothers living in the Orient, who need your aid for which they have already cried out many times.”¹⁵ To justify the offensive nature of the crusade, Urban characterized the Moslems as pagans who have unlawfully seized and defiled the Holy Land, describing them as “despised, degenerate, and enslaved by demons.”¹⁶ To this traditional Augustinian view, however, Urban added an innovation: the idea that the crusade is a positive form of warfare waged not only for the punishment of evildoers, but also for the salvation of the crusaders’ souls:

Remission of sins will be granted for those going thither, if they end a shackled life either on land or in crossing the sea, or in struggling against the heathen . . . Let those . . . who are accustomed to wage private wars wastefully even against Believers, go forth against the Infidels in a battle worthy to be undertaken now and to be finished in victory. Now, let those, who until recently existed as plunderers, be soldiers of Christ; now, let those, who formerly contended against brothers and relations, rightly fight barbarians; now, let those, who recently were hired for a few pieces of silver, win their eternal reward.¹⁷

Urban believed unequivocally that real knights go on crusade. In Urban’s hands, the crusade became a war waged not out of necessity, but Christians can eagerly embrace it as an act of penance and a means of attaining grace.

By the birth of Thomas Aquinas in 1225, the crusading movement had matured into a true religious tradition. Saladin’s re-conquest of Jerusalem had reversed the victory of the First Crusade in 1187. They dispatched the Third, Fourth and Fifth Crusades in an effort to restore Christian rule of the Holy Land to no avail. During Aquinas’s lifetime, they launched two more crusades with no appreciable result. What is more, in 1215, the Church extended the indulgence promising crusaders forgiveness of their sins to those involved in the Albigensian Crusade in southern France against the heretical Cathars. The advent and indeed frequency of religiously motivated warfare naturally necessitated a second look at the concept of just war in this new context. As the greatest theologian of his age, Aquinas restated the concept of just war and applied it to the new circumstances in which Christendom found itself.

Like Augustine, Aquinas was no stranger to the art of war. He was the seventh son of a powerful noble family in southern Italy. His father and his elder brothers were all knights, though his family intended young Thomas for the Church from a very early age. Rejecting his family’s plans to install him as the abbot of Monte Cassino, a position from which he could aid the family’s political fortunes,

Aquinas instead joined the newly formed Order of Preachers, also known as the Dominicans. This order founded expressly for the purpose of combating heresy through disputation and its members soon became the theological “shock-troops” of the Church. As Aquinas continued his education at Paris and Cologne, he devoured the newly re-discovered works of Aristotle and joined in the attempt to reconcile his philosophical approach with the Christian faith. In doing so, historians eventually recognized him as the greatest of the scholastic theologians.




Figure 2 *St. Thomas Aquinas*. Attributed to Botticelli, c. 1481-1482.

Aquinas addressed whether war is always sinful in the *Secunda Secundae Partis* (Second Part of the Second Part) of his

masterpiece, the *Summa Theologica*, which discussed the three theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity. In doing so, he placed the just war squarely in the category of charitable acts, an assertion that Augustine stopped just short of making. How does Aquinas complete the transition from Augustine’s just war of unfortunate necessity to the new crusader ideal of war as a charitable act?

For Aquinas, a just war required three conditions that are rooted in Augustinian theology. The first and third conditions were essentially the same as Augustine presented; a just war requires “the authority of the sovereign by whose command the war is to be waged” and that “the belligerents should have a right intention, so that they intend the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil.”¹⁸ It was in Aquinas’s second condition that a subtle shift in perspective becomes evident: “Secondly, a just cause is required, namely that those who are attacked should be attacked because they deserve it on account of some fault.”¹⁹ Although he

cited the passage above from Augustine's *Questions on the Heptateuch* as justification for this, Aquinas did not fully define "just cause" in his usual exacting manner. On the contrary, he was content to allow this definition to remain somewhat vague, most probably in an effort to create a palatable context for the crusading ideal. By defining a just cause of war in a deliberately vague manner, Aquinas retroactively justified the crusades, incorporating Urban's interpretation of Augustine's theology into the canon. Nowhere in this discussion of just cause (or indeed anywhere in the article) did Aquinas make mention of war as a necessary evil, something that Augustine consistently focused on in his writings. What's more, through this definition of just cause, Aquinas made no distinction between defensive and offensive wars, a distinction that Augustine was very careful to define. Since the Church preached that the crusades were offensive wars with a defensive character, the merging of the two different types of war seems inspired by the advent of the crusading movement.

Another crusade-inspired alteration appeared in Aquinas's description of right intention: "For it may happen that the war is declared by the legitimate authority, and for a just cause, and yet be rendered unlawful through a wicked intention."²⁰ In this statement, one can hear an echo of the great preacher of the Second Crusade, Bernard of Clairvaux, who claimed that the failure of that crusade was not the fault of the cause itself, but of those knights who answered the call. These knights, like the Israelites of Exodus, "were . . . in their hearts returning to Egypt."²¹ In Aquinas's theology, the crusade was a just cause betrayed only by the sins of the crusaders.

As the community of the faithful grew from a minority within the Roman Empire to a dominant force throughout Europe, it became necessary to reconcile Christ's pacifist teachings with the necessity of warfare in the secular world. Augustine established the Christian rules for warfare, creating a theory of just war based on necessity to maintain earthly peace and purity of intention. Aquinas took Augustine's framework and transformed it to meet the requirements of an age that regarded spiritual warfare as an act of charity and the secular world took on a religious identity. In expanding the concept of just war, Aquinas blended the secular and religious needs of Christendom into a theology that justified the Crusades. In doing so, he created the foundation for the modern concept of just war.

Notes

1. Tertullian, *The Chaplet*, trans. S. Thewall, from *Ante-Nicene Fathers*, vol. 3 (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1885), revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight, chap. 11, <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0304.htm>.
2. Origen, *Against Celsus*, trans. Frederick Crombie, from *Ante-Nicene Fathers*, vol. 4 (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1885), revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight, 3.7, <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0416.htm>.
3. "Galerius and Constantine: Edicts of Toleration 311/313," Internet Medieval Sourcebook, <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/edict-milan.asp> (accessed January 1, 2013).
4. Augustine, *The City of God against the Pagans*, ed. and trans. R. W. Dyson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 17, 13.
5. Augustine, *The City of God against the Pagans*, 15, 5.
6. Ibid.
7. Augustine, *The City of God against the Pagans*, 19, 17.
8. Augustine, "Letter 189," quoted in Herbert Andrew Deane, *The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), 159.
9. Augustine, *The City of God against the Pagans*, 19, 8.
10. Augustine, *The City of God against the Pagans*, 1, 26.
11. Ibid.
12. Augustine, *The City of God against the Pagans*, 3, 10.
13. Augustine, *Questions on the Heptateuch.*, 6, 10, quoted in Deane, 312.
14. Augustine, *Contra Faustum*, XXII, 74, quoted in Deane, 161.
15. Fulcher of Chartres, "The Chronicle of Fulcher of Chartres, Book I," trans. Martha E. McGinty, in *The First Crusade: The Chronicle of Fulcher of Chartres and Other Source Materials*, 2nd ed., ed. Edward Peters (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), 52.
16. Fulcher of Chartres, 53.
17. Ibid.
18. Thomas Aquinas, "Summa Theologica: War (Secunda Secundae Partis, Q. 40)," <http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3040.htm> (accessed January 1, 2013).
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Bernard of Clairvaux, "Bernard of Clairvaux: Apology," Internet Medieval Sourcebook, <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/bernard1.asp> (accessed January 1, 2013).

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The Delian League: A Prelude to Empire and War

Ken Oziah

During the classical period of Greece, the rise of the Delian League was a major factor that led to the Peloponnesian War. What changed over time that transformed the league into an empire? In order to repel a possible third invasion by Persia, Greek city-states met on the island of Delos to form a confederation, or league. In their quest to repel invasion, Athens, which was the foremost city-state in the league, grew in prominence and power, eventually turning the Delian League into the Athenian Empire. Thus, the formation of the Delian League was a prelude to empire and war.

The wheels of war were set in motion as far back as 546 BC, when Persian King Cyrus conquered the Lydian kingdom of Greeks on Anatolia.¹ The Persian kings were very interested in gaining territory in Europe. Interestingly, it was the ousted Athenian tyrant, Hippias, who piqued Persian interest in the rest of Greece. Hippias had fled to Sardis, which was a Persian satrapy. The satrap, Artaphrenes, after hearing the complaints of an Athenian delegation against Hippias, decided to support Hippias.² This action led to a Persian attack on Sardis and the Ionian revolt against Persia. Fights and battles occurred all over Anatolia during the years that followed 499 BC.³ The Persians attacked and destroyed Miletus, which further angered the Greeks.⁴ The mainland Greeks had always considered the Ionians as Greeks, as Greek settlers had colonized the region in ancient times. The Greeks considered the subjugation of Ionia as a direct threat to Greece. Fueled by his interest in Greece, as well as the burning of Sardis in 498 BC, Darius set out to conquer Greece.

Darius sent his son, Mardonios, with an army and fleet to cross the Hellespont. He was successful in gaining territory in Thrace and Macedonia, thereby bringing areas of Europe under Persian control.⁵ Many smaller islands gave in to Darius's demands for submission to his kingship. However, his main targets were Athens and then Sparta. A Spartan delegation had previously warned the Persians not to harm any Greeks; however, it was mere rhetoric.⁶ Emboldened, the Persians went forward with their plans.

Hippias, still hoping to regain power in Athens, accompanied the Persian

fleet and possibly suggested Marathon as the landing place for the Persians.⁷ Persians considered Marathon an intriguing landing spot, as it would draw the Athenian army out away from the city. Hippias believed he still had allies in Athens and hoped that once the anti-Persian force left Athens, his allies would assume control of the city. The Athenians were successful in blocking the two exits from the plain of Marathon. Herodotus noted the Persians probably thought the Athenians were crazy as they rushed the Persian line to attack.⁸ However, the Athenians wanted to launch their attack while the Persian cavalry was out of the camp. The ensuing battle was disastrous for the Persian forces. Some seven thousand Persians perished while reports indicated that only 192 Athenians were lost.⁹ After the Battle of Marathon, the Athenians returned home to face the Persian naval forces that had left the area of Marathon in an attempt to gain a victory over Athens.

The Persians planned to conquer the city while the army was fighting at Marathon. The Athenians returned to lower Attica in time to confront the Persians, which resulted in a Persian withdrawal. Hippias would never again rule in Athens. Hippias's dream to reclaim what he believed was his rightful rule of Athens drifted away with the Persian navy.

Darius I died from an illness in 486 BC and his son, Xerxes I succeeded him.¹⁰ Xerxes's intentions should have been clear to the Greeks. He spent the years of 484 BC to 481 BC making numerous preparations to attack Greece. Noted Greek historian Terry Buckley tells of Xerxes's massive construction projects, such as a canal through the isthmus of Mt. Athos, which was the site of a tragedy in 492 BC for a previous Persian fleet. He also built a boat bridge across the Hellespont and arranged food depots, roads, and outposts along the route. Xerxes was keenly interested in paving roads into Greece.¹¹ His forethought, planning, and monumental building projects in preparation for his invasion of Greece belie the frequently held notion of the man as a foolish and headstrong leader prone to rash decisions. Xerxes moved his land and naval forces in conjunction with each other during 480 BC. Moving through Thrace and Macedonia, he made his way through Thessaly virtually unaccosted.¹² Xerxes moved south to Thermopylae.

Here, Xerxes faced approximately seven thousand men from Sparta and Phocis.¹³ The recent Hollywood movie, *300*, immortalized this part of Greek history for a new generation. The Spartan King, Leonidas, defied Xerxes long enough to send away a major portion of the forces under him and gave the other

Greeks time to gather in an effort to defend Greece from a Persian conquest. Once finishing off Leonidas and his Spartans, Xerxes marched to Athens, which its citizens had vacated. Xerxes, perhaps in retribution for the burning of Sardis, sacked Athens and burned the Acropolis.¹⁴ Xerxes moved his fleet in connection with his land forces.

Watching from his throne, Xerxes could see the battle of Salamis in 480 BC. Themistocles had engaged in a subterfuge, which tricked the Persians into attacking the Greek fleet in the straits around Salamis. After the naval defeat, Xerxes placed the blame on his Phoenician captains and executed them; something



Figure 1 *Battle of Salamis (Die Seeschlacht bei Salamis)*. Oil on canvas by Wilhelm von Kaulbach, c. 1868.

it seems he did often. Xerxes went back to his empire in Asia Minor and left a force under the command of Mardonios in Greece. Mardonios died the following year, 479 BC, in the battle of Plataea.¹⁵ That battle concluded Persian aggression in Greece, whether on the islands or the mainland.

Sparta left the Hellenic League in 477 BC, a couple of years after the final defeat of the Persians on the Greek mainland. Before leaving the Hellenic League, the Spartans took over Cyprus and Byzantion.¹⁶ With the loss of Sparta, there was much discussion amongst the remaining members over which city-state should be in charge of the league. The members determined to form a new league,

with new goals and ideals. The new league, composed of as many as one hundred and fifty city-states, met on the island of Delos.¹⁷ Athens was, of course, the primary city-state in the league, which historians later named the Delian League. Each league assessed each polis 460 talents, payable in either specie or ships put towards the league fleet. The member city-states meant the league to be a permanent one. The members swore an oath and sunk lumps of iron into the sea to seal the oath; they intended the league to remain intact until the lumps of iron rose back to the top of the sea.¹⁸

The league's aim was to have vengeance upon Persia and extract compensation for past aggressions; a very attractive goal for the poleis, as Persia was a rich empire. The Greeks were still well aware of the burning of Miletus by the Persians as well as the burning of the Persepolis and the sacking of Athens. Persia would pay for its insolence and insults. The Greeks on the mainland of Anatolia also wanted to remain free from Persian rule. Buckley pointed to one literary source that noted the league had a unicameral legislature, but this is in dispute.¹⁹

The league located its treasury at Delos, which was of some religious significance to the Greeks. Leaders of the league assigned Aristides of Athens to examine the various islands and city-states and assign appropriate contributions from them towards the league.²⁰ Annual contributions of money and ships poured in, which made Athens richer and more powerful as time progressed. The league pushed the Persians out of Europe and back from Ionia. Each victory emboldened the Athenians into presenting themselves as the premier polis in the league.

The league's navy consisted of triremes. The trireme was the most formidable tool of the navy at the time. Approximately nine times longer than wide, the trireme was about 120' by 15' and accommodated 170 oarsmen.²¹ The navy built them for ramming, as could be discerned from the front of all triremes. With these potent ships, the league's navy could enforce the will of the league—and increasingly Athens—on the lesser polis and islands.

Soon, the league, mainly Athens, began forcing other islands to join the alliance. One case in point was the island of Naxos. Naxos had decided to leave the alliance, and as a result, the league's navy responded. They had already forced Carystus, located on the southern part of Euboea, to submit to league demands and join. At Naxos, the league's navy confiscated the Naxians' triremes and demanded future payments to the league be in specie rather than military contributions.²²

Many in the league were becoming distrustful of Athens, as she held sway over the league and its treasury. The culmination of the league's goals came at the Battle of Eurymedon in 467 BC. The league dramatically defeated the Persians at the Eurymedon River. Not only did the league defeat the Persian navy, but also they landed and defeated the army as well.²³ With the decisive defeat of the Persians at Eurymedon, what would follow for the league?

For some, the league had accomplished its purpose, and therefore, it was no longer necessary. As was already pointed out, Athens had begun to bully other city-states and islands into doing what the Athenian leaders wanted. The victory Cimon brought for Athens and the league was a double-edged sword. Victory over Persia ensured there would be no further Persian aggression. It also would bring about the demise of Athenian supremacy, at least in theory. Athens was not willing to lose its control over the league, which, it reminded others, was supposed to be of an indefinite period.

The winds of change were brewing. The previously referred to attack on Carystus was an attack on fellow Greeks—not to drive out Persians—but to ensure submission to Athens. The Euboeans on the southern part of the island were enjoying all the benefits of the league but not contributing towards its expense. More to the point, Carystus was an important port on the corn trade routes, meaning Athens needed to control Carystus to govern the food route.²⁴ Afterwards the island state of Thasos decided to abandon the league.

A major consideration was the silver mines close by, in Thrace. It took Athens two years of fighting to conquer Thasos. Afterwards, Athens also claimed the silver mines and exacted Thasos' payments to the league from the point forward in specie only, rather than in vessels.²⁵ The years that followed saw more revolts and led to political intrigue in Athens. Athens eventually forced out Themistocles, who ended up in Persia, the very nation he had fought so hard to defeat.²⁶

In Athens, through Cimon's fall from grace and through the reforms of Ephialtes, the Athenian Empire, as the league was becoming, still prosecuted fellow Greeks who failed to live up to the conditions of the league charter. Things took a turn for the worse after the assassination of Ephialtes, and Pericles took the reins of government. The fact that Pericles was able to remain the leading figure in Athenian government from approximately 461 BC until his death from the plague in 429 BC shows he was either a master of political intrigue, or extremely loved; or

perhaps it was a little of both. The league began fighting the Peloponnesian League as well as other nations, such as Egypt.

Athens was so concerned with maintaining control over the league, now their empire, that Athenian leaders were willing to fight anyone at any time. The ensuing years brought about battles with the Peloponnesian League, headed by Sparta. One of the sparks that ignited the hostilities between the two leagues occurred in Megara, which had decided to leave the Peloponnesian League and join Athens. This pitted her against Corinth, who was very afraid of Athenian expansionism. The battle proved disastrous for Sparta and her league because it drew Athens into the politics of the Boeotia region and by 456 BC, the Athenians controlled the region, minus Thebes.²⁷

In 454 BC, the Delian League faced a bitter defeat in Egypt, which caused even more rifts and strife in the league.²⁸ They had to crush more revolts, and Athens tightened its grip on the league members. Historians have questioned the scope of the impact outlined by Thucydides' account of the period; however, Pomeroy states the fighting against Artaxerxes in Egypt was indeed disastrous for Greece.²⁹ That defeat was not the only calamitous occurrence in 454 BC. The Athenians also moved the league treasury from Delos to Athens, claiming that Delos was now vulnerable to pirates and Persians alike.

At this point, the Delian League essentially ceased to exist and became a de facto empire, the Athenian Empire. This empire became embroiled in battles termed the Peloponnesian Wars. Though not a world war as defined by modern day historians, the Peloponnesian Wars were a great regional conflict that caused the death of thousands of people. The misnamed Thirty Years' Peace interrupted the wars, with Athens signing peace treaties with one state after another.³⁰ That peace would not last thirty years, but rather approximately fifteen years.

Pericles and the Athenians were once again at war with Sparta and the Peloponnesian League; a conflict termed the Archidamian War. This war would end the rule of Pericles as in 429 BC, with Spartan soldiers laying siege to Athens, a plague spread through the city, killing Pericles and many of the citizens and soldiers of Athens.³¹ The war would soon conclude and with its end, Athens's power base disappeared.

The Greeks formed the Delian League as a way to counter any further Persian aggression into Greece. Persian kings had twice entered Greece, sacked, and burned Athens and the Acropolis, and caused great suffering and death to the

people of Greece. While the league began with noble intentions, Athens later used it as a tool of aggression— not only towards Persia, but also towards fellow Greeks who failed to comply with Athenian demands. The Delian League was indeed a prelude to wars that would devastate the mainland of Greece almost as much as the Persian wars.

Notes

1. Sarah B. Pomeroy, *Ancient Greece: A Political, Social and Cultural History*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 202.
2. Robert Morkot, *Historical Atlas of Ancient Greece* (New York: Penguin Books, 1996), 66.
3. Victor Ehrenberg, *From Solon to Socrates: Greek History and Civilization during the 6th and 5th Centuries BC* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 99.
4. Pomeroy, *Ancient Greece*, 207
5. Morkot, *Historical Atlas*, 66; Pomeroy, *Ancient Greece*, 207.
6. P. J. Rhodes, *A History of the Classical Greek World: 478-323 BC*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 121.
7. Morkot, 66-67. Map on p. 75 shows the first campaign of Darius.
8. A. D. Godley, *Herodotus*, with an English translation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920), Hdt. 6.112.2
9. Morkot, *Historical Atlas*, 74.
10. Pomeroy, 215, 216.
11. Terry Buckley, *Aspects of Greek History: 750-323 BC: a source-based approach* (New York: Routledge, 1996), 122.
12. Morkot, *Historical Atlas*, 77. This map shows the route Xerxes forces took to enter Greece.
13. Pomeroy, *Ancient Greece*, 219
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., 220.
16. Ehrenberg, *From Solon to Socrates*, 155.
17. Pomeroy, *Ancient Greece*, 229.
18. Buckley, *Aspects of Greek History*, 142.
19. Ibid., 143, 144.

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Futuo: Fifty Shades of the Roman Empire

Kathleen Mitchell Reitmayer

Ancient Rome is known for many things: the reflections of the ancient Roman Empire include advancements in art, architecture, government, law, infrastructure, and so many other important elements that would ultimately be the basis and point of comparison to advanced society even through today. On the darker side of the ancient Roman Empire are the sexual practices and social norms of the time. Excess and decadence are an important aspect of ancient Roman culture. There was little by way of modern standards outside the realm of acceptance for sexual acts in Rome with an exception to the ideas of social class. Rome openly practiced sexual acts that are considered taboo in modern times including orgies, homosexuality, incest, prostitution, and bestiality.¹ In the modern era, the idea of some of the sexual practices of ancient Roman culture is beyond acceptance. What were the rules for these sexual practices and why did the acceptance of the sexual practices of ancient Rome change so dramatically?

In the millennium and a half since the fall of Rome, social norms changed due in part to the practice of Christianity. The Christian faith took sexual practices very seriously and created rules and boundaries, supposedly from the mouth of God himself, to enforce the use of the sexual rules of the Christian faith. Many of the practices forbidden by God himself in the Christian faith were incredibly common practices in ancient Rome. By comparing and contrasting what is known about the sexual practices in the Roman Empire to what was forbidden in the Bible, conclusions can be drawn that the elements of Christianity pertaining to sexual practices was a direct affront to the sexual practices in use in ancient Rome. Christianity created the rules in regards to sexual practices that were to be acceptable and unacceptable to oppose the Roman rule of the time during the writing of the New Testament of the Bible.

The three very specific areas in which the Christian faith and the sexual practices of the Roman Empire differ are in the concepts of homosexuality, prostitution, and the issues of abstinence and sex within and outside of the rite of marriage. These key elements of difference between the Bible and the sexual practices of the Roman Empire are an important differentiation between the two sets

of beliefs. Each of these elements will be examined at length to first explain the practices in the Roman Empire and then in relation to specific verses of the Bible.

Homosexuality

Men widely practiced homosexuality in ancient Rome. Religion and culture did not forbid homosexuality. Homosexuals followed established rules and traditions to gain society's approval.² Romans did not look at homosexuality as sexual perversion but considered it a normal and natural act between two men and a sign of dominance by the victors after acts of war.³ Homosexuality, a sign of increased male sexual desire in ancient Rome, began at a young age. However, the Christian faith reviles this practice.

Ancient Rome followed simple rules for homosexuality. One who practiced homosexual sexual acts had to stay within the boundaries set mainly by ancient Greek tradition.⁴ Rules pertained to age, class standing, and role in the sexual act. They clearly defined the more masculine act as the one penetrating the other sexual partner with his penis.⁵ The man who penetrated the other partner needed to be of a higher class than the man being penetrated, either orally or anally.⁶ The age of the male being penetrated also helped decide whether or not the sexual act would be condoned. Generally, they penetrated young males, with the exception of prostitutes.⁷ Deviation from the traditions and the practices of homosexual relationships in ancient Rome did bring some consequences. Society shunned a male or considered him "less of a man," if he allowed someone of a lower class or age to penetrate him.⁸ As long as one followed the boundaries set forth for the acceptance of homosexual acts, there were no moral or legal qualms about allowing the practice of homosexual sexual acts to occur within the Roman Empire.

Within the Christian faith, the practice of homosexual sexual acts was, and on many levels is today, considered an act against God himself according to the Bible. While some of the rules against homosexuality did come from the Old Testament of the Bible, such as Leviticus 18, which is a composition of laws regarding impure acts, has a verse that reads "Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind: it is abomination,"⁹ there were still more regulations against homosexuality in the New Testament. These references would include 1 Corinthians 6 which reads: "neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor adulterers, nor

effeminate, nor abusers of themselves with men, nor thieves, nor covetous, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor extortioners, shall inherit the kingdom of God.”¹⁰ There are further references to the issues Christians found with homosexuality in the New Testament such as Romans, Matthew, and Ephesians.

Historians can draw several conclusions when comparing the Roman view and the Christian view of homosexual sexual acts. While homosexual acts were expressly prohibited in the Old Testament, the New Testament uses wording that excludes being both effeminate, a rule for certain men in Rome, but also regards homosexual acts as self-abuse. The wording of the Bible provides a little insight as to whether or not the rules for Christians directly related to the Romans. The separation of effeminate and sexual acts with men shows a conciseness of the general rule of Rome in ancient times regarding homosexuality and indicates they wrote these verses to oppose the general Roman society as a whole.

Prostitution

Prostitution had a major role early in the Roman Empire. Prostitution was neither illegal nor was the practice generally reviled for the first part of the Roman Empire. In fact, the practice became so important generating income that Rome itself would begin registering and taxing prostitutes for profit.¹¹ Fornication is again an issue within the Christian faith. Prostitution, although not expressly decried was and still is something the Christian faith frowns upon due to reasons of purity and marriage.

Early in the Roman Empire, the practice of prostitution was something that was simply a part of daily life. There were both male and female prostitutes available to those who wished to utilize their service.¹² Prostitution occurred in the open with no fear. The best remaining example of the openness and availability of prostitution in the Roman Empire today is the preserved city of Pompeii. Mount Vesuvius destroyed Pompeii before any laws regarding the control of prostitution, beyond taxation, could occur.¹³ Preservation of ancient brothels and the associated artwork in volcanic ash reveals a great deal about the actual practice of prostitution in early Rome. Prostitution was available all over the city. In some cases, they carved phallic symbols into the street pavement to indicate where prostitution services were available.¹⁴

In 40 AD, the Emperor Caligula imposed a tax upon prostitution

throughout Rome.¹⁵ Taxation had less to do with actually controlling prostitution, but instead with the tax revenue that could be collected from the practice of prostitution. They implemented further laws that would control the prostitutes themselves from entering into Roman society. They forced prostitutes to register with the state, and prostitutes could not wear the clothing of a noble woman.¹⁶ Additional laws, making adultery punishable by law, actually increased prostitution.¹⁷ These laws forbade women from committing adultery; however, men could still have sex with prostitutes in lieu of having an affair with a married woman.¹⁸ These laws did add a bit of shame to the practice, particularly to the prostitutes themselves; the practice of prostitution was still not a moral issue for the whole of Roman society. Prostitution was a fact of life in the Roman Empire that they have preserved in artwork and literature.

The Christian faith took issue with prostitution on a moral level. The Bible repeatedly mentioned the concept of fornication, defined as sexual intercourse between two unmarried partners. First Corinthians 6 expressly forbade the concept of fornication and separates fornicators from adulterers in verse 9 and then moves on to harlots reading, “Know ye not that your bodies are members of Christ? Shall I then take away the members of Christ, and make them members of a harlot? God forbid. Or know ye not that he that is joined to a harlot is one body? For, the twain, saith he, shall become one flesh.”¹⁹ Other versions of the Bible use the term ‘harlot’ to refer to a prostitute. The Bible does have many notable celebrated prostitutes while denouncing the practice. The conclusions about the relation of the rules against prostitution in the Bible are that it is very likely that the catalyst for the expressly forbidden practice of prostitution aimed at the Roman Empire. Again, when the language is studied, it is clear that there are separations. While prostitution would and should fall under the express terms about fornication, the Bible continued with the separation of adultery and fornication and lying with harlots. This could most certainly be because the Roman Empire separated these terms themselves. One could commit adultery, as it were, with a prostitute under Roman law. The use of the same and repeating terms that did not necessarily require repetition, i.e. fornicating with a prostitute is redundant. The Bible is a strong indication that the Christians were simply attacking the common practice of the Roman Empire.

Sex outside the confines of marriage

It should be clear at this point that Romans thought little was sexually inappropriate. Sex was something encouraged and celebrated within the Roman Empire as it demonstrated virility and encouraged the growth of the Empire. There was no shame for most to display sexual desire and to act on these desires within the confines allowed for their class. Sexual intercourse was something allowed for both inside and outside of marriage for men; with some rules pertaining to class and with whom the man was having intercourse. Women could not commit adultery; however, this did not apply when the husband was involved, which would generally be during orgies.²⁰ Next to homosexual acts and acts with prostitutes, the Roman orgy was a condonable and legal means to sexual gratification. The orgy was mainly something for the upper classes with Emperors Tiberius, Caligula, Nero, and Elagabalus very well known for their orgies.²¹ In the Christian world, they considered having any type of sexual intercourse outside of marriage immoral.

The Roman orgies consisted of men and women who were in some cases related and occasionally, particularly on the part of Tiberius, included children and by some accounts even infants in sexual acts.²² The orgies were generally without rules, such as those that pertained to homosexuality and prostitution. Society did not consider orgies anything out of the ordinary and allowed them for sexual gratification of anyone of the right class who attended.

The concept of orgies was and still is outside the confines of the Christian faith. Numerous passages in the Bible pertain to fornication, adultery, or any other type of sexual act outside of the confines of marriage. The books of Matthew and John expressly disapprove of fornication; First Corinthians goes into more detail about the sin of fornication and adultery. Mark 7 uses language that is a little stronger regarding adultery and fornication, which reads: "That which proceedeth out of the man, that defileth the man. For from within, out of the heart of men, evil thoughts proceed, fornications, thefts, murders, adulteries, covetings, wickednesses, deceit, lasciviousness, an evil eye, railing, pride, foolishness: all these evil things proceed from within, and defile the man."²³ While the passage goes on to speak about the Greeks, the sentiment is important in relation to the Romans. The passage did not simply frown upon orgies and sex outside of the marriage; it referred to them as born of pure evil. Again, it is clear that these rules and perceptions of evil were in reference to sexual practices of certainly the Greeks and the Romans.

Conclusion

The Roman practices of homosexuality, prostitution, and orgies are some of the major elements of the abundant sexuality known about the Roman Empire. Each of these practices had their own rules, which had little to do with the shame of the act itself and everything to do with class and social standing. The rules were in place to protect the class system and not to place judgment on the morality of the acts themselves. It is important to realize that sex in Rome had everything to do with pleasure and very little to do with morality or marriage.

The change in the perception of sexual acts for pleasure rather than simply multiplication of the species came to fruition as the Christians slowly enveloped the Roman Empire. By specifically using language that condemned the practices of prostitution, homosexuality, and polyamorous sexual relations as they were termed in Ancient Rome, the writers of the New Testament appear to have targeted the Romans and intentionally call into question the morality of the Roman way of life. The New Testament looked specifically at acts that were common practice in ancient Rome and denounced them as sinful. The creation of firmer language in the New Testament as opposed to the Old Testament regarding some of these sexual practices indicates that not only was Christianity the cause of the changes in perceptions of the acceptable sexual acts of the Roman Empire, but they wrote intentionally to denounce the sexual practices in Rome.

Notes

1. *The History of Sex*, film (New York: The History Channel, 1999).
2. Craig A. Williams, *Roman homosexuality: ideologies of masculinity in classical antiquity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 17.
3. *Ibid.*, 105.
4. *Ibid.*, 15.
5. *Ibid.*, 160.
6. *Ibid.*, 17.
7. *Sex in the ancient world: prostitution in Pompeii*, film, directed by Kurt Sayenga (New York: The History Channel, 2009).
8. Craig A. Williams, *Roman homosexuality: ideologies of masculinity in classical antiquity*

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 125.

9. Leviticus 18:22 (American Standard Version).

10. 1 Corinthians 6:9-10 (American Standard Version).

11. *Sex in the ancient world: prostitution in Pompeii*, film, directed by Kurt Sayenga, (New York: The History Channel, 2009).

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Thomas A. J. McGinn, *The economy of prostitution in the Roman world a study of social history & the brothel* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004), 147.

16. *Sex in the ancient world: prostitution in Pompeii*, film, directed by Kurt Sayenga (New York: The History Channel, 2009).

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. 1 Corinthians 6:15-16 (American Standard Version).

20. *Sex in the ancient world: prostitution in Pompeii*, film, directed by Kurt Sayenga (New York: The History Channel, 2009).

21. Nigel Cawthorne, *Sordid sex lives: shocking stories of perversion from Nero to Nilsen* (London: Quercus, 2010).

22. Ibid., 14.

23. Mark 7:20-23 (American Standard Version).

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Ninety Six: Strategic Backcountry Outpost and Microcosm of the American Revolutionary War

Anne Midgley

[Ninety Six] must be kept at all events & I think no reasonable expense should be spared—besides Georgia depends entirely upon it.

—General Charles Lord Cornwallis to Colonel Nisbet Balfour

You know the importance of Ninety Six, let that place be your constant care.

—General Charles Lord Cornwallis to Lieutenant Colonel Francis Lord Rawdon

Though scarcely known today, in the mid-eighteenth century, Ninety Six, South Carolina was a thriving community, built close to the convergence of the Cherokee Path, a key route from the Cherokee lands to Charleston, and the Island Ford Road, which led to the Saluda River and points further southeast. The strategic location of Ninety Six made it a crucial stopover for traders and travelers—it was a location known widely throughout the South during the late colonial period. Today, only a National Park Service Visitor Center and outbuildings occupy the site, and yet, had it developed apace with Charlotte, North Carolina, a site of similar size and situation in the 1760s, Ninety Six, too, could have become a power-house of the New South. The critical strategic nature of Ninety Six led to its destruction by the British in early July 1781, though Loyalist troops had successfully defended the town against the longest field siege of the Revolutionary War less than a month beforehand.¹

Despite its significance to the British during the Southern Campaign of the Revolutionary War and the larger-than-life role that it played in the South Carolina backcountry during the late colonial period prior to the war, historians rarely focus on Ninety Six. Cowpens, a remote pasture in the backwoods used for fattening cattle on the way to market, is much better known today because of a battle fought there on a cold day in January 1781 than is Ninety Six. However, fear for the safety of Ninety Six caused General Charles Lord Cornwallis to send Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton racing after Continental Army Brigadier

General Daniel Morgan, which directly led to the British debacle at Cowpens.²

This paper establishes the strategic significance of Ninety Six to the British effort to retake the Carolina backcountry, traces its rise to become both a trading center and a center of justice for the backwoods settlers, and examines



Figure 1 *A New and accurate map of the province of South Carolina in North America.* Published by John Hinton, c. 1779.

why Ninety Six and its surrounding area was a Loyalist stronghold. It also studies both the strengths and shortcomings of General Nathanael Greene and his military engineer, Count Thaddeus Kosciuszko's approach to the Patriot siege of Ninety

Six. It analyzes why the commander of Ninety Six, British Provincial Army Lieutenant Colonel John Harris Cruger, was much more successful than either Continental Army Major General Benjamin Lincoln at Charleston or Cornwallis at Yorktown in defeating the siege tactics thrown against him.³

The site of Ninety Six, South Carolina, is today an area of rich archaeological interest. Archeologists have found evidence to place human activity at the site as early as 9000 BC with the discovery of a Clovis point there in 2005. The Native American peoples of most interest to students of the Colonial and the Revolutionary War periods in South Carolina are the Cherokee, who are mentioned as inhabitants of the Savannah River headwaters region as early as 1674. Ninety Six is located between the Long Canes Creek, a feeder of the Savannah River, and the Saluda River. The Cherokee figure prominently in the story of Ninety Six, as the site grew up at the junction of Cherokee trading routes, including the Cherokee Path, which ran from the Cherokee Hill Towns to Charleston, and an intersecting trading route, which ran to the Savannah River. Ninety Six's very name likely came from the distance in miles between its location and the Cherokee town of Keowee, in present-day South Carolina.⁴

Trade drove the initial relations between the British colonists and the Cherokee; the colonists exchanged firearms, blankets, farming tools, and other items for animal pelts and slaves. The Cherokee sold as slaves many of the unfortunate people that they captured during their various raids and skirmishes with neighboring native peoples. As more settlers migrated to the South Carolina backcountry, merchants established formal trading outposts to facilitate the exchange of goods. Drawn by its well-situated location and pleasing environment, in 1738 Thomas Brown chose Ninety Six as the site of his trading outpost.⁵ During the middle of the eighteenth century, the government of South Carolina encouraged immigration to the backcountry—partially to provide a human shield between the native peoples to the west and the eastern edge of the colony—which included the Low Country plantations and the town of Charleston.⁶ As more settlers flocked to the South Carolina backcountry, population pressures, as well as misunderstandings between the various Cherokee peoples and colonists, caused ruptures in the cordial trading relationships that had existed between the two groups. For as the colonists attracted to the backcountry were of diverse population groups, including Scots, Scots-Irish, Germans, Swiss, Irish Quakers and French Huguenots, as well as English, Welsh, and a small group of Sephardic Jews—the Cherokees had their own

distinct town and regional affiliations and loyalties.⁷ The colonists did not broadly appreciate the distinctions among the Cherokees at the time, and trading relationships, in some cases, favored the natives of one region over another—leading to unfortunate consequences for the relationships between the Cherokee and the colonists.⁸

Robert Gouedy, a successful trader, migrated to the Ninety Six region in 1751 and established a new trading post a short distance from Brown's location. Gouedy's store became the nucleus of a growing community, and as relations with the Cherokee deteriorated during the Anglo-Cherokee War of 1760-1761, they built a stockade around Gouedy's barn. The fortified barn became the original Fort Ninety Six, and within its sturdy walls, the local militia fought off several Cherokee attacks during 1760. The colonists quickly recognized the strategic significance of the fort's location at the junction of the Cherokee trading paths and the colonial government designated the small fort as an official provincial military outpost.⁹

The end of the wars with the Cherokee peoples and the cessation of the French and Indian War brought an uneasy peace to the backcountry. A new wave of immigration surged forth from colonies to the north, particularly Pennsylvania and Virginia, and from Europe to further populate the region. However, the previous hostilities had attracted a new element to the backcountry; lawless men displaced by the wars sought to prey on both the Native American tribes and the backcountry settlers. Exacerbated by the increasing levels of violence and retribution that burst out during the wars, and fueled by a level of savagery unknown in other parts of the American colonies, the backcountry colonists adapted their own defense tactics. The means of reprisal became more brutal. The provincial government of South Carolina, its focus on Charleston and the coastal areas, virtually ignored the plight of the new settlers. The backcountry pioneers lacked access to courts and suffered from the depredations of general lawlessness. Eventually, the backcountry settlers formed vigilante groups to protect their interests. The Regulator movement, which initially attempted to bring order to the backcountry, spawned its own increase to the level of backcountry ferocity. After much political wrangling, and on-going violence, the South Carolina Provincial Assembly recognized the need to provide law enforcement and court access to the back county. King George III gave his approval of the measure on November 25, 1769. Ninety Six again benefited from its strategic location, and the South

Carolina Assembly directed that a substantial brick courthouse and jail be built in the town.¹⁰

While the backcountry settlers of Ninety Six and its surrounding region were concerned with the constant threat of violence, the more established coastal regions became caught up in the general colonial ferment against British policies enacted following the Seven Years' War and Britain's attempts at raising revenue through taxation directed at the colonists. South Carolina's influential and wealthy planter class split between political radicals and moderates; however, the rebel radical Whig leaders successfully seized control of the state government and established a Provincial Congress and Council of Safety to control the colony.¹¹

The radical Whigs moved quickly to consolidate their power and bring the majority of South Carolina's colonial citizens to their side of the dispute with the British government. They established a Provincial Association, which called upon citizens to sign a statement siding with the rebel cause. Determined to bring their viewpoints to the backcountry and rally the populace to the rebellion, William Henry Drayton and Reverend William Tennant led a delegation to the outlying regions during the summer of 1775. They encountered a mixed reception; while recent settlers from Europe tended to support the Crown, most in the backcountry were apathetic to the political nature of the conflict and supported neither side. Drayton and his Charleston delegation encountered outright hostility at some stops in their journey, particularly when they met Robert Cunningham, Thomas Brown, and Colonel Thomas Fletchall, the leader of the Fair Forest District militia. These men were confirmed Loyalists and strong leaders of like-minded men. To counter the influence of the Loyalist leaders, Drayton called out the local rebel militia, led by Colonel Richard Richardson and Major Andrew Williamson. These men marched against the militia of Fletchall, and both sides camped near Ninety Six. To head off armed conflict, Fletchall proposed a peace conference, which resulted in the Treaty of Ninety Six on September 16, 1775. Cunningham and Brown, who had refused to participate in the meeting, opposed the treaty. Drayton, however, subsequently upheld the terms of the treaty and used it to ostracize the Loyalist leaders.¹²

The resultant conflict between the rebels and the Loyalists led to the first bloodshed of the War for America in South Carolina. Following the Treaty of Ninety Six, the rebels held firm control over the area. The rebels arrested Robert Cunningham, who continued his strong support for the Crown, and accused him of

sedition in early October, 1775. They subsequently jailed Cunningham in Charleston. In response, his brother, Patrick Cunningham, sought a means to whip up Loyalist resistance, and learned of a supply of arms meant for delivery to the Cherokee tribesmen from the rebels. The rebels desired to placate the Indians, provide for their autumn hunting needs, and prevent them from siding with the Loyalists in the British cause. Patrick Cunningham successfully raised fears of renewed Cherokee conflict throughout the backcountry, raised a Loyalist contingent in response to the threat, and seized the weapons and powder en route to the Cherokees. The rebel militia leader, Williamson, reacted by once again raising his troops, this time erecting a fortification at Ninety Six. Cunningham and his supporters—now armed with the stolen weaponry and ammunition—descended upon Ninety Six, captured the courthouse, and attacked the stockade. The combatants sporadically fought the first Battle of Ninety Six off and on over a three-day period, from November 19 to November 21, 1775. It resulted in one rebel death and minimal rebel casualties; however, the Loyalists suffered far greater. They lost fifty-two men killed and one wounded, but they did achieve nominal success. Following the rebels' defeat at Ninety Six, South Carolina's Patriot leaders ordered Whig Colonel Richard Richardson to find and arrest the principal Loyalist leaders. Richardson's force swelled in numbers as he approached Ninety Six, eventually growing to almost five thousand men. As Richardson's force grew, Loyalist resistance withered away in the South Carolina backcountry. The rebels captured and imprisoned some of the principal Loyalists leaders in Charleston; other Loyalists fled the district. The rebel Whigs regained control of the region.¹³

The focus of the war remained to the North. However, after years of fighting in the Northern and Middle colonies, the British and American forces reached a stalemate, and because of the British loss at Saratoga on October 16, 1778, the Americans formed an alliance with France, which significantly shaped the remainder of the war. Faced with what then became a global conflict as the Bourbon ally of France, the still powerful Spain, and the Dutch entered the war against Britain, the British reassessed their options and shifted their military strategies to fit the new, increasingly complex, demands on their economic and military resources.¹⁴ Struggling to find a way to end the war and retain at least some of their American mainland colonies, the British seized upon their Southern Strategy. This strategy built upon the precarious assumption that a significant population of Loyalists existed in the Southern colonies, and only waited upon the military support of Great

Britain to rise and take back control of their colonies.¹⁵ Initial successes followed Britain's shift to the Southern theatre, as Savannah, Georgia, fell quickly to the British on December 29, 1778. The rebels barely attempted to defend the city. The British followed their victory at Savannah with the conquest of Charleston, South Carolina, on May 12, 1780, which fell following a shattering siege. The loss of Charleston devastated the rebel cause in the South, as the American commander, Major General Benjamin Lincoln, surrendered virtually the entire Southern Continental Army, together with a large number of militia, supplies, and weapons to the British. Only a small force of Continental soldiers still operated in the South, as a contingent under Colonel Abraham Buford was en route to provide additional support for the besieged city of Charleston. In one of the most villainous skirmishes of the Southern campaign, Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton and his British Legion annihilated Buford's small command of Continentals at the Waxhaws, South Carolina, on May 29, 1780.¹⁶

Anxious to seal their victories, the British fanned out forces to pacify the backcountry, establishing strong posts as key strategic towns, including Ninety Six in June, 1780. The British chose Ninety Six not only for its strategic location but also because they believed that large numbers of Loyalists lived in the surrounding area, and stood ready to support the Crown. The newly appointed Inspector of Militia, Major Patrick Ferguson, accompanied the British commander, Colonel Nisbet Balfour, and his troops as they journeyed to Ninety Six, which they took with little effort on June 19, 1780. Cornwallis then chose Lieutenant Colonel John Harris Cruger, a New York Loyalist, to lead at Ninety Six, and Balfour returned to Charleston to take command of the city. Ferguson remained in the backcountry and was initially successful with his campaign to attract and train Loyalist troops near Ninety Six. However, his early triumphs came to a swift and final defeat at the Battle of Kings Mountain on October 7, 1780, where a mixed group of rebel militia gathered from a number of regions decimated the Loyalist troops and killed Ferguson.¹⁷

Cornwallis, reacting to Ferguson's defeat at Kings Mountain and other rebel victories gained by the small bands of partisan fighters operating in South Carolina, wrote to Balfour on November 1, 1780, to apprise him of the strategic importance of Ninety Six. Cornwallis stated that Ninety Six "must be kept at all events & I think no reasonable expense should be spared—besides Georgia depends entirely upon it."¹⁸

It was Cornwallis's concern for the safety of his strategic outpost at Ninety Six that caused him to send Tarleton and his troops westward to guard against the possibility that Brigadier General Daniel Morgan and his "flying army" might target Ninety Six when they split from Major General Nathanael Greene's main Southern Continental Army in January 1781, to launch Greene's strategy to re-establish rebel control of the South. Following Tarleton's defeat at Cowpens by Morgan and his motley assortment of Continentals, state troops, and militia on January 17, 1781, Cornwallis continued to express concern for the safety of his key backcountry forts. He cautioned Lieutenant Colonel Francis Lord Rawdon, one of Britain's most capable Southern field commanders, on February 4, 1781, "You know the importance of Ninety Six, let that place be your constant care."¹⁹

Events in the South quickly began to unravel for Cornwallis and the British cause. Enraged by Tarleton's defeat at Cowpens, Cornwallis threw all his resources into overtaking Morgan and re-capturing the British prisoners that Morgan was rapidly escorting northward, away from the British strongpoints in South Carolina. The British and American forces set a



Figure 2 *Nathanael Greene*. Original portrait painted from life by Charles Wilson Peale, c. 1783.

grueling pace in the "Race to the Dan River" as Greene and Morgan directed their forces toward safety. While retreating, they laid a nightmarish path for Cornwallis and his forces through a territory strongly sympathetic to the rebel cause and

picked clean of food and forage. The resultant Battle at Guilford Court House on March 15, 1781, nominally a British victory, exhausted and decimated the British force. Incapable of further offensive actions, Cornwallis turned north, toward Virginia and destiny, while Greene turned south in April 1781 to take advantage of his renewed position of strength and begin a campaign to retake British southern strongholds, including the post at Ninety Six.²⁰

Meanwhile, the British and Loyalist forces at Ninety Six were not idle. Cruger had significantly improved the fortifications at Ninety Six. Beginning in September 1780, he had worked ceaselessly to secure Ninety Six, building two redoubts and a block house, improving the existing palisade surrounding the village with a deep ditch, which he further enhanced with an *abates*, felled trees intertwined and set into the ground, with sharpened ends facing the direction of potential attack. Lieutenant Henry Haldane, a military engineer that Cornwallis sent to the post to support Cruger, designed one of the redoubts as a Star Fort, an eight-pointed structure that allowed defenders to fire muskets and cannons in all directions. A ditch and an *abatis* further protected the Star Fort from attack. Ninety Six's "Achilles heel" was its water supply, which a small stream to the west of the village provided to the outpost. Cruger positioned his second redoubt—Holmes' Fort—to protect the water supply. Trenches and covered walkways connected all the fortifications of the post.²¹

The rebels began their war of posts at some of the less important sites, including Fort Watson. The combined forces of Continental Army Colonel Henry "Light Horse Harry" Lee and the partisans of Colonel Francis Marion attacked the fort, which a small group of Loyalists and British regulars held. The rebels introduced a significant innovation during the siege of Fort Watson, when Colonel Hezekiah Maham, accompanying Lee and Marion, designed and led the construction of what came to be known as a Maham tower. Maham designed the tower to rise above the fortifications of the outpost, which allowed the attackers to fire effectively at the defenders. The rebels successfully campaigned against the scattered British outposts, with the Battle of Hobrick's Hill leading to the evacuation of Camden, long a strategic location for the British. Only two significant outposts remained in British hands: Augusta, Georgia, and Ninety Six. The success of the Maham tower at Fort Watson set the stage for its use at the rebel sieges of Augusta and of Ninety Six.²²

Greene led his Army to Ninety Six. Accompanied by the Polish Colonel

Thaddeus Kosciuszko, a military engineer, Greene reviewed the state of Ninety Six's fortifications and was dismayed by their strength. Cruger, a Loyalist from a prominent New York family, and his Loyalist defenders were well prepared for Greene.²³ Nevertheless, Greene and Kosciuszko elected to besiege the fortifications. While educated in military engineering and held in high regard by Greene as well as Commander-in-Chief General George Washington, it is questionable whether Kosciuszko was familiar with the siege tactics developed by the French engineer, Sébastien le Prestre de Vauban, who had perfected siege tactics in the seventeenth century.²⁴ Kosciuszko and the rebel sappers dug their initial siege trenches only seventy yards from the Star Fort, which Cruger aggressively protected. Cruger and the fort's defenders fired on the American sappers with the fort's small cannons, and wiped them out with a sortie from the fort led by Loyalist Lieutenant John Roney. Their lesson quickly learned, the Americans began their next round of parallel siege trenches "at a more respectful distance [400 yards]."²⁵

The American entrenchments, now proceeding at a much safer distance from the Star Fort, proceeded at a furious pace, as Kosciuszko's sappers worked continuously. As the rebels dug closer to the fort, the defenders' accurate fire had a lethal effect. Greene ordered that a Maham tower be erected while Cruger countered the latest threat by raising the walls of the Star Fort with sandbags, allowing his riflemen to continue their deadly work. Cruger also attempted to bring down the Maham tower by firing at it with heated cannonballs, but the rebels had constructed the tower of green wood and it did not set ablaze. Greene resorted to firing flaming arrows into the fort; Cruger simply removed the roofs from the interior structures. Lee and his force joined Greene at Ninety Six on June 8, 1781, after successfully seizing the British fort at Augusta. Greene ordered Lee to take the second redoubt, Holmes Fort, and cut off the supply of water to Cruger. Lee's success controlling the water supply led Cruger to employ naked African American slaves who dared rebel fire to deliver water at night to the fort by way of the trenches that connected the Star Fort to the remainder of the fortifications. Clearly concerned for Ninety Six, Rawdon set out to relieve the town. As Rawdon approached, Greene grew more desperate. He began the construction of a mine to tunnel close to the Star Fort and blast through its walls. Greene sought to delay Rawdon, but Rawdon's route took him away from the troops of Colonel Andrew Pickens and Lieutenant Colonel William Washington,

who Greene had ordered to slow and divert Rawdon. Balfour was able to get word to Cruger that help was on the way; a farmer leisurely approached the fort, and when close, spurred his horse to a gallop under a hail of rebel bullets. He safely entered the fort and provided his welcome news to Cruger. Both sides were now aware that Rawdon was closing in, and Greene sought to end the siege by an outright assault. The Americans recruited volunteers and sent a small group, the “Forlorn Hope,” to bring down the walls of the Star Fort with grappling hooks. Under heavy covering fire, Cruger’s men attacked the “Forlorn Hope” with two sally parties from the fort, which resulted in heavy losses on the American side. Greene considered his losses, his lack of prospect for success, and the imminent arrival of Rawdon; he judiciously ended the siege. As he had done in previous engagements during the Southern Campaign, Greene lost the battle, but “won the war.”²⁶

Compared to the major sieges of the Southern campaign, the sieges of Savannah, Georgia, Charleston, South Carolina, and Yorktown, Virginia, the siege of Ninety Six was a relatively small affair, yet it had moments of intense brutality involving small groups of men, like the “Forlorn Hope’s” final, hopeless assault. The British capture of Savannah undertaken by Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Campbell with a force of about 3,000 British regulars and Loyalist troops on December 29, 1778, predated the main British Southern offensive. Confusion among the American rebel defenders’ command allowed Campbell’s forces to take Savannah so quickly that the town itself suffered no damage. A combined American and French force in September 1779 gathered to re-take Savannah. It united approximately 3,500 troops under French Admiral Charles D’Estaing with a force of about 1,500 Continentals and militia led by Major General Benjamin Lincoln. Outnumbered, the British forces fought fiercely. Campbell’s defensive force included Cruger, who likely learned the value of an active and aggressive resistance during this siege. The British, in an intense and bloody defense of Savannah, convinced the Franco-American besiegers that a continued, prolonged siege of Savannah would be far too costly to their forces. The allies lost a significant part of their attack force, including the formidable Colonel Casimir Pulaski, the “Father of American Cavalry,” who fell mortally wounded leading a cavalry charge. All told, the allied losses were over 750 dead and wounded, while the British lost approximately 150 men to death, desertion or battle wounds. The unsuccessful siege of Savannah was the bloodiest engagement since the Battle of

Bunker and Breeds Hills and bequeathed to Cruger, the future defender of Ninety Six, the lessons that the besieged can prevail.²⁷

Unlike the sieges of both Ninety Six and Savannah, the sieges of Charleston and Yorktown resulted in success for the besiegers and were significant turning points in the war. The British siege of Charleston took intensive preparation, the commitment of a large joint British Army and Royal Navy force, the naval transport of almost 10,000 British troops, and the flawless execution of the British Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Henry Clinton. Launched with an attack led by Major General Charles Lord Cornwallis, on March 29, 1780, Charleston fell to the British on May 11, 1780, following a combined land siege and sea bombardment of the city, which cost the American cause thousands of Continental troops and approximately twelve hundred militia. The loss of Charleston virtually wiped out the American Continental force in the South and paved the way for the perilous, and ultimately tragically flawed, British Southern campaign. Lincoln was not successful in protecting the American interests, especially the valuable Continental forces, due in large part to interference from the civilian leaders in Charleston; a factor that did not come into play at Ninety Six.²⁸

The siege of Yorktown turned the tables on the British with a virtual mirror image of the earlier siege of Charleston. This time, the combined Franco-American forces, led by American Commander-in-Chief General George Washington and French Lieutenant General Jean Baptiste de Donatien de Vimeur, the Comte de Rochambeau, aligned against Cornwallis, who had boxed himself and his troops into a trap at Yorktown. French Rear Admiral Francois Joseph Paul, the Comte de Grasse, provided French naval support to the American-led siege of Yorktown, and sealed Cornwallis' fate. Unlike Cruger's extensive preparations and aggressive actions, Cornwallis exhibited a surprising malaise, rather than his characteristically forceful and active reactions to his situation, and on October 19, 1781, he surrendered. The British effort to retain its American colonies was shattered.²⁹

In the end, the strategic significance of Ninety Six doomed its future. Ninety Six ended in a blaze of fire and smoke as Rawdon ordered Cruger, late the savior of Ninety Six, to torch the town and shepherd its Loyalist inhabitants to Charleston. With the fall of Ninety Six, the British indeed lost the war in the backcountry.³⁰ No Southern Phoenix rose from the ashes of Ninety Six. The site

of the town, the courthouse, and jail is today marked off with stakes and twine. Together with National Park Service field maps, little but the outline of Ninety Six is left to tell its tale. The earthen area by the remains of the Star Fort traces the siege trenches. The rebels' attempt to mine the Star Fort is simply now a mound of earth, awaiting future excavation. The Cherokee Path remains, however, a silent, haunted trail through the Southern forest; a testament to the peoples who lived, traded, fought and died at one of the most strategic sites to the British Southern Campaign of the American War of Independence.

Notes

1. Robert D. Bass, *Ninety Six: The Struggle for the South Carolina Back Country* (Lexington, SC: The Sandlapper Store, Inc., 1978), 13-39; John S. Pancake, *This Destructive War: The British Campaign in the Carolinas, 1780-1782* (1985; repr., Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 1992), 209-214. The term "Loyalist" refers to American supporters of the British and the author has used it in place of the disparaging term "Tory." The author's thesis, "Charles Hulett, Continental Army Drummer: A Revolutionary Life Reexamined," explored the experiences of Charles Hulett, who entered the war as a sixteen-year-old New Jersey militiaman. It examined the political, social, and military milieu of colonial and revolutionary New Jersey, including the province's demographics and religious denomination affiliations, which influenced the choices made by the residents to either support the British Crown or the Whig rebellion. The study traced Hulett's career through the war as he experienced life as a militiaman in colonial New Jersey, a member of revolutionary New Jersey's state troops, a conscripted drummer in the American Continental Army, and a British provincial soldier in the New Jersey Volunteers. It highlighted that an individual's choice between the Whig concept of liberty and loyalty to the British Crown often turned on pragmatic concerns and emotional ties, rather than upon lofty ideals. For Hulett, the choice to enlist with the Loyalist New Jersey Volunteers in 1780 followed compulsory service with the Continental Army as a nine-month draftee. His actions illustrated that in some cases, Americans made decisions based on the will to survive a long and brutal civil war, not on the resolution to pursue ideological goals. The author's research of Hulett's experience in the Provincial Light Infantry concluded that it was very likely that Hulett was among the troops who marched under British Colonel Francis Lord Rawdon to the relief of the Loyalist troops defending Ninety Six. Hulett is the author's fifth great-grandfather.

2. Lawrence E. Babits, *A Devil of a Whipping: The Battle of Cowpens* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 8; Stanley D. M. Carpenter, "British Strategic Failure in the Southern Campaign, 1778-1781," *Naval War College Paper*, 2008, 39.

3. Pancake, *This Destructive War*, 209-216. For in-depth studies of Loyalist soldiers and the British Provincial Army in America, see Paul H. Smith, "The American Loyalists: Notes on their Organization and Numerical Strength," *William and Mary Quarterly* 15 (1968): 259-277 as well as Stuart Salmon, "The Loyalist Regiments of the American Revolutionary War 1775-1783 (PhD diss., University of Stirling, 2009). Salmon identifies Smith as the most accurate source for numbers of Loyalist soldiers serving in Provincial units—over 19,000—but quarrels with some of Smith's categorizations.

4. Bass, *Ninety Six*, 13; Robert M. Dunkerly and Eric K. Williams, *Old Ninety Six: A History and Guide* (Charleston, SC: The History Press, 2006), 11-12; Guy Prentice, "Ninety Six National

Historic Site Cultural Overview,” National Park Service, (2003). <http://www.nps.gov/seac/SoutheastChronicles/NISI/NISI-Cultural-Overview.htm> (accessed February 4, 2012).

5. Bass, *Ninety Six*, 20; Prentice, “Ninety Six National Historic Site.”

6. John Buchanan, *The Road to Guilford Courthouse: The American Revolution in the Carolinas* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1997), 20; Robert Stansbury Lambert, *South Carolina Loyalists in the American Revolution*, 2nd ed. Clemson: Clemson University Digital Press, 2010. <http://www.clemson.edu/caah/cedp/cudp/pubs/lambert/lambert.pdf> (accessed December 18, 2011).

7. Tyler Boulware, “The Effect of the Seven Years’ War on the Cherokee Nation,” *Early American Studies* 5, no. 2 (Fall 2007): 396-399. <http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy1.apus.edu/docview/195872376?accountid=8289> (accessed February 11, 2012); Buchanan, *The Road to Guilford Courthouse*, 19-22; Lambert, *South Carolina Loyalists*, 2.

8. Boulware, “The Effect of the Seven Years’ War,” 404-408.

9. Bass, *Ninety Six*, 28, 45-46; Boulware, “The Effect of the Seven Years’ War,” 410-415.

10. Bass, *Ninety Six*, 55-67; Boulware, “The Effect of the Seven Years’ War,” 410-415; Buchanan, *Guilford Courthouse*, 20; Merrill Jensen, *The Founding of a Nation: A History of the American Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 28-29; Robert Middlekauff, *The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763-1789* (Revised ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 182-183; South Carolina Assembly, Acts 1769-1777 quoted in Stanley South, “Historical Perspective at Ninety Six with a Summary of Exploratory Excavation at Holmes’ Fort and the Town Blockhouse,” Chapter 7 “The Town of Ninety Six-The Courthouse and Jail,” http://scholarcommons.sc.edu/archanth_books/1/ (accessed April 19, 2015).

11. Lambert, *South Carolina Loyalists*, 7.

12. Buchanan, *Guilford Courthouse*, 91-99; Pancake, *This Destructive War*, 73-75.

13. Buchanan, *Guilford Courthouse*, 101; Marvin L. Cann, “Prelude to War: The First Battle of Ninety Six: November 19-21, 1775,” *The South Carolina Historical Magazine* 76, no. 4 (October, 1975), 197-214; Lambert, *South Carolina Loyalists*, 31; Pancake, *This Destructive War*, 76.

14. Carpenter, “British Strategic Failure,” 73; Middlekauff, *The Glorious Cause*, 391; Pancake, *This Destructive War*, 1-4.

15. Pancake, *This Destructive War*, 9-13.

16. Pancake, *This Destructive War*, 32, 63-67, 70-71.

17. Pancake, *This Destructive War*, 116-120; Buchanan, *Guilford Courthouse*, 80; Cann, “War in the Backcounty,” 1.

18. Cann, “War in the Backcounty,” 2; Pancake, *This Destructive War*, 104-106.

19. Cann, “War in the Backcounty,” 2; Pancake, *This Destructive War*, 131-138.

20. Cann, “War in the Backcounty,” 4; Pancake, *This Destructive War*, 159-186.

21. Lawrence E. Babits, “Patterning in Earthen Fortifications,” in *Historical archaeology of military sites: method and topic*, edited by Clarence R. Geier, Lawrence E. Babits, Douglas D. Scott, and

David G. Orr (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2010), 115; Cann, "War in the Backcounty," 4.

22. Pancake, *This Destructive War*, 200-201; Paul K. Walker, *Engineers of Independence: A Documentary History of the Army Engineers in the American Revolution, 1775-1783* (Honolulu, Hawaii: University Press of the Pacific, 2002), 281.

23. Cann, "War in the Backcounty," 6; Pancake, *This Destructive War*, 209-210.

24. Jamel M. Ostwald, *Vauban's Siege Legacy in The War of the Spanish Succession, 1702-1712*, PhD diss., The Ohio State University, 2002. <http://etd.ohiolink.edu/send-pdf.cgi/Ostwald%20Jamel%20M.pdf?osu1039049324> (accessed February 12, 2012).

25. Walker, *Engineers of Independence*, 285.

26. Cann, "War in the Backcounty," 7.

27. Pancake, *This Destructive War*, 32-35.

28. Pancake, *This Destructive War*, 62-66.

29. Carpenter, "British Strategic Failure," 60, 66-72; Pancake, *This Destructive War*, 222-230.

30. Bass, *Ninety Six*, 416-423.

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A Change in Tactics: Hard War in the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia, the Valley Campaign of 1864

Lewis A. Taylor II

When the American Civil War began in 1861, a military tradition inherited from the eighteenth century dominated the way that the combatants waged war. It was a tradition that showed moderation in conducting war, especially in regards to civilians; however, those principles of war would soon change. Following the excessive violence of the sixteenth century Wars of Religion, European leaders consciously made a distinction between the State and civilians. They pursued wars for political or dynastic reasons and fought with relatively small, professional armies. Military commanders generally regarded civilians as innocent bystanders who happened to get involved in the arguments that took place between nations—or, as in the case of the American Civil War—between sectional governments. Government and military leaders typically considered non-combatants, especially women, children, conscientious objectors, and the elderly as eligible for special protection.

Even though some reversal of this separation of armies and civilians occurred by the end of the eighteenth-century and the beginning of the nineteenth, a policy of conciliation remained in place and continued throughout the first three years of the American Civil War. When the war began, President Lincoln and other politicians in the North did not believe that all Southerners were in favor of secession and the slave owners controlled the entire secessionist movement. President Lincoln also did not acknowledge the South's secession from the Union; as a result, the United States should continue to treat Southern citizens as civilians and protect their constitutional rights. As early as 1862, General Henry W. Halleck, the general in chief of the Union Army, worked with Francis Lieber on many issues, including "how to handle guerrillas and how to treat prisoners of war."¹ Lieber, who was working at Columbia College in New York City, was a German-native who lived and taught in South Carolina for two decades where he was a former slave owner.² An avid critic of secession, Lieber published *Guerrilla Parties Considered with Reference to the Laws and Usages of War* (1862) and *A Code for the Government of Armies* (1863); the latter which the Federal War Department revised and issued.

In his articles, Lieber said armies needed to practice restraint while in the field. He said that officers needed to be held accountable for the actions of those under them, even when they were following orders and that “armies should be prohibited from the ‘wanton destruction’ of non-military resources.”³ He did insist, however, that there may be times when military necessity would dictate a different course of action—allowing for the “destruction of property, and obstruction of the ways and channels of traffic, travel, or communication, and of all withholding of sustenance or means of life from the enemy.”⁴ This explanation of “military necessity” was the blueprint for what was to follow.

By 1864, President Lincoln, frustrated by Union defeats and the inability of the vastly superior Union war machine to defeat the Confederate forces and crush the rebellion, began looking for a general who could take command of the Union forces, crush the rebellion, and end the war.

President Lincoln found the general he was looking for in Ulysses S. Grant. General Grant received the nickname “Unconditional Surrender” Grant in 1862 at the Battle of Fort Donelson when Brigadier General Simon Bolivar Buckner, the fort’s commanding officer, requested terms of surrender and Grant had replied that the only terms available were an unconditional and immediate surrender of the fort. Grant’s insistence on surrender without terms fit very well with what Lincoln was looking for in a general, and Grant’s attitude was to do whatever needed to win. General Grant and his lieutenants, Phil Sheridan and David Hunter, would bring “hard war” to the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia—the breadbasket of the Confederacy—in an effort to deprive the Confederate army of needed supplies but to also convince the citizens of the Shenandoah Valley that the Union forces would no longer tolerate their support of the Confederate army. As General Grant stated in his orders to his lieutenants: “eat out Virginia clear and clean . . . so that crows flying over it for the balance of the season will have to carry their provender [food] with them.”⁵ With support from President Lincoln, who had changed his attitude on how to fight the war, Grant initiated a campaign within a campaign in the spring and summer of 1864. Grant determined first to destroy the Confederate army of General Jubal Early in the Shenandoah Valley and then to bring the war to the residents of the Valley by destroying their ability to supply the Confederate forces elsewhere in Virginia and to convince them that continuing the conflict was an exercise in futility. To accomplish this, he turned to two of his senior lieutenants: Generals David Hunter and Philip Sheridan. Many

people are familiar with General William Tecumseh Sherman’s “March to the Sea.” Few are familiar with the destruction General David Hunter caused in the upper part of the Shenandoah Valley, especially in the town of Lexington where his forces burned and gutted both Virginia Military Institute and Washington College, or the “hard war” General Philip Sheridan waged in the central portion of the Valley, specifically Rockingham and Page counties. Hunter started the ball rolling in the spring of 1864, but Sheridan finally brought the Confederate army in the Shenandoah Valley, and along with it, the Valley civilians, to its knees.

The Shenandoah Valley

When one mentions the Shenandoah Valley, people think of its scenic beauty, history, and the song “Shenandoah.” A great number of people, who



Figure 1 *Bellevue, The Lewis Homestead, Salem, Virginia*. Oil on canvas by Edward Beyer, c. 1855.

populated the southern regions of the United States in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, passed through the Valley on their way to North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Texas. In 1861 to 1865, however, the Shenandoah Valley and its rich farmlands were anything but serene. It was the

scene of more than three hundred military actions according to the National Park Service. They classify fifteen of these actions as major battles, and four of these battles took place between September 19 and October 19 of 1864.⁶

The Shenandoah Valley is the northern portion of the more extensive Great Valley of Virginia, which is a small portion of the Great Appalachian Valley that runs for over twelve hundred miles from Quebec, Canada, to the state of Alabama. The borders of the Shenandoah Valley are the Blue Ridge Mountains on the east and the first ranges of the Allegheny Mountains on the west. The Shenandoah Valley runs for approximately 125 miles in a northeasterly direction from the northern part of Rockbridge County in the south to the Potomac River in the north. While varying in width, the valley, at its widest, is only twenty-five miles wide.⁷ The valley is composed of nine counties—Shenandoah, Page, Rockingham, and Augusta in the Lower Valley; Frederick, Warren and Clark in the upper Valley; as well as Berkley and Jefferson counties in West Virginia. The Shenandoah River flows northward through the Valley in two forks that come together at Front Royal and then flowing, as one stream, northward to Harper’s Ferry, West Virginia where it joins the Potomac River. Because of this northerly flow of the Shenandoah River, a person traveling north in the Valley is said to be going “down the Valley”—a distinction that causes confusion to the Valley’s many visitors.

The traditional explanation of the discovery of the Shenandoah Valley by Europeans was the expedition launched by Governor Alexander Spotswood and his “Knights of the Golden Horseshoe,” who viewed the Shenandoah Valley from the crest of the Blue Ridge Mountains in 1716 from a point just east of what is now the town of Elkton in Rockingham County. Other sources state that Colonel Abraham Wood and Captain Henry Batte explored the Shenandoah Valley, which John Wayland disputed in his book about the German element in the Shenandoah Valley.⁸ Wayland does report that a German immigrant by the name of Johann Lederer led a group of explorers from east of the Blue Ridge Mountains into the Valley in 1670.⁹

While many English settlers moved to the Valley from the Tidewater area of Virginia as well as its Eastern shore, the majority of the Valley settlers came down an old Native American trail known as the “Great Wagon Road.” This road, now Interstate 81, ran from Pennsylvania through Virginia and into North Carolina and was the main roadway settlers of German and Scots-Irish ancestry used as they migrated south from Pennsylvania.¹⁰ Many of the German immigrants, especially

the Mennonites, entered the Valley through Page County and then began moving into Rockingham County in the central part of the Valley. The Quakers came from the east entering the Valley from Frederick County, Maryland, and Loudoun County, Virginia. There were also French Huguenots who settled in the Rockingham-Augusta county areas and the Scots-Irish who settled primarily in the upper and lower parts of the Valley.

By the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861, the Shenandoah Valley was a melting pot of immigrants, primarily farmers who were raising wheat, had few slaves, and were not part of the slave-owning aristocracy of eastern Virginia. There were many people supportive of the Union who did not favor secession, as well as a significant group of pacifists who wanted nothing to do with politics in the Valley. This was the civilian population to whom the Union was bringing the war, a population that supported both the Union and the Confederacy and that just wanted to be left alone. Unfortunately, the new commander of the Union armies had a different plan for the inhabitants of the Shenandoah Valley. From Lexington in the south, to Harrisonburg in the center, and northward another forty miles to Woodstock, in two separate campaigns, Hunter and Sheridan would wage hard war on the Shenandoah Valley, a war that the Confederacy could not stop.

The Beginning of Hard War: General David Hunter, June – July 1864

The movement towards “hard war” did not suddenly emerge in 1864, but under the new leadership of Ulysses S. Grant; the focus was an overwhelming drive to defeat the Confederate forces under Robert E. Lee in Virginia, opening the door to ending the war. Grant believed that after a defeat there should not be a retreat or even a long break to regroup, but rather the Union armies needed to be constantly advancing, overwhelming the enemy and wear it down by attrition if nothing else worked. Grant also brought with him William Tecumseh Sherman who had already shown a willingness to use whatever force necessary to devastate the countryside so that the enemy army could not draw any sustenance from it.¹¹ Grant determined to keep pressure on the Confederates on all fronts, in early May of 1864, assigned General Franz Sigel to clear the Shenandoah Valley. To say that he was unsuccessful would be an understatement. Sigel’s orders included destroying the Confederate supply base in Staunton, moving eastward to tear up the tracks of the Virginia Central Railroad, and then continuing on to

Charlottesville to destroy that supply base as well. Sigel, not considered the most competent general in the Union Army, received his position in an attempt to keep the German population of the North happy. He moved his army at a very slow pace allowing Confederate General John C. Breckenridge to pull together enough forces to defeat him soundly at the Battle of New Market on May 15. Following this defeat, Grant relieved Sigel and replaced him with General David Hunter, giving him virtually the same orders as had been given to Sigel.

Hunter was a much more aggressive general, and under his leadership, the Union forces penetrated further into the Shenandoah Valley than any other previous attempt. Grant expected this from a general “who had earlier sought permission to ravage the homes of Southern slaveholders. . . . [and] believed in hard war.”¹² Hunter’s campaign of fire and vandalism soon became notorious.

Upon entering the Valley, Hunter defeated the Confederates under General W. E. Jones at the Battle of Piedmont on June 5. He then moved on to Staunton where part of his army destroyed the warehouses and supplies stored there, along with the “steam mill, foundry, and carriage and woolens factories,”¹³ while others began destroying the



Figure 2 *Officer David Hunter, full-length portrait in full military dress.* Photographic print on carte de visite mount: albumen. By E. &H.T. Anthony, NY. Library of Congress.

railroad tracks leading east towards Charlottesville. When Hunter saw that the Confederates had strengthened their position on the mountain pass between Waynesboro and Charlottesville, Hunter decided to move his forces southward to Lynchburg. Lynchburg, while not as large as Charlottesville, was also a major supply center that had not only railroads, but also canals which connected it with the eastern part of Virginia.

On his way to Lynchburg, Hunter stopped in Lexington and burned the Virginia Military Institute (in retaliation for the services of the VMI cadets at the Battle of New Market) along with the home of a former Virginia governor, John Letcher. Lt. John Rogers Meigs, Hunter's engineer, "availed himself of the opportunity, helping himself to a fine set of mathematical instruments before the institute's buildings were set ablaze."¹⁴ The person responsible for the burning was Hunter's chief of staff, Colonel David H. Strother, who said that VMI was "a most dangerous institution, where treason was systematically taught."¹⁵ In a report dated August 8, 1864, Hunter stated that "[o]n the 12 (June) I also burned the Virginia Military Institute and all the buildings connected with it. I found here a violent and inflammatory proclamation from John Letcher, lately Governor of Virginia, inciting the population of the country to rise and wage guerrilla warfare on my troops."¹⁶

For two days, Hunter and his men burned and looted the town of Lexington, a delay that allowed Robert E. Lee to anticipate that Hunter's next target was Lynchburg. This action was applauded by one Union soldier who wrote home, "Father, Hunter is just the man for the job of putting down this rebellion he is a fierce and savage looking man he has no mercy on the rebels."¹⁷ Colonel Strother, when assessing the results of the campaign said in his report that "[a]bout fifty miles of the Virginia Central Railroad had been effectually destroyed; the Virginia and Tennessee road had been destroyed to some extent for the same distance; an incredible amount of public property had been burned, including canal-boats, and railroad trains loaded with ordinance and commissary stores, numerous extensive iron works, manufactories of saltpeter, musket-stocks, shoes, saddles and artillery-harness, woolen cloths, and grain mills."¹⁸

While Hunter pushed Breckinridge further up the Valley, he still managed to cause Hunter problems. Believing that Breckenridge's force was too small to cause any major problems, Hunter relaxed and delayed moving on Lynchburg, a delay that allowed Lee to move General Jubal Early and the Second Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia into the Valley. The combined forces of Breckenridge

and Early were able to drive Hunter across the Valley and into the mountains of West Virginia, effectively clearing the Shenandoah Valley of Union forces, a move that left Washington, D.C. and Pennsylvania vulnerable to the Confederate forces under Early and Breckenridge.

Emboldened by his success against Hunter, and with the blessings of Lee, Early moved his forces northward to the outskirts of Washington, D.C., where he met the Union forces at Fort Stevens. Lee needed to have some relief at Petersburg, and believed that should Early put pressure on Washington, Grant would have no choice but to pull Union troops away from Petersburg and bring them back for the defense of the capital. While Early's movement to Washington was not a tactical success, it nevertheless showed the vulnerability of the city, and for a short time, Lincoln came under enemy fire at Fort Stevens. Standing on the parapet, others warned Lincoln that his position was vulnerable to sharpshooters, and it was only after a Union officer "was shot down within three feet of him, when he reluctantly stepped below."¹⁹

Realizing the Confederates could continue to use the Valley to threaten Washington, D.C., Grant sent a communication to the army Chief of Staff, General Henry Halleck, on July 14 saying he needed to assemble a force that could "eat out Virginia clear and clean." The next day he told Halleck that "Hunter . . . should make all of the Valley south of the B&O [rail]road a desert as high as possible. I do not mean that houses should be burned, but all provisions and stock should be removed, and the people notified to move out."²⁰ After a roundabout trip, Hunter finally ended up back in the Valley, coming back through Harper's Ferry. After getting his command back in shape and receiving reinforcements, he began his search for Early and his army. After a futile search, he began to terrorize the Valley, more out of frustration and his need for vengeance after rough treatment earlier in the year than from any rational plan of attack. Hunter ordered the burning of many homes in the Lower Valley, even that of one of his distant cousins Henrietta Lee. One of the victims of Hunter's terrorism wrote the following to the general after her house was destroyed: "Your office is not to lead like a brave man and soldier, your men to fight in the ranks of war, but your work has been to separate yourself from all danger, and with your incendiary band steal unawares upon helpless women and children, to insult and destroy."²¹ Even Hunter's artillery chief, Henry Dupont wrote that Hunter was "dominated by prejudices and antipathies so intense and so violent as to render him at times quite incapable of

taking a fair and unbiased view of many military and political situations.”²² Grant realized it was time for a change in command in the Valley and he accepted Hunter’s resignation, appointing General George Crook as his replacement.

During July and August of 1864, Jubal Early and his army had helped relieve some of the pressure Grant was exerting on Lee’s army at Petersburg by heading north into Pennsylvania. There he burned the town of Chambersburg in an eye-for-an-eye policy. The burning of Chambersburg “sealed the fate of the Valley and its people and opened the door to some of the most desperate acts of war ever targeted against civilians.”²³ Following Early’s foray into Pennsylvania, Sheridan defeated him at the Battles of Third Winchester on September 19, 1864, and then at Fisher’s Hill on September 21, forcing Early to retreat up the Valley to try to regroup and resupply.

What happened during October in the Shenandoah Valley would cause a Union soldier from Vermont, Private William Fisk, to write, “They have tasted the bitter fruit of secession, and have had enough of it. . . . They see the grim determination of the North and they begin to feel that to hold out longer is to fight against inevitable destiny.”²⁴ That same private also wrote in his diaries that many of the citizens of Harrisonburg “are heartily praying for peace, let it come in what way it will. . . . They find that it [war] does not satisfy, that it was a poor remedy for their imaginary grievances.”²⁵ It is doubtful that Private Fisk was speaking (at that point) for the bulk of the civilian population of the area, but the firestorm that was coming would soon cause even the most steadfast supporter of the Confederacy to stop and think about their commitment to the Confederate cause. This was because the population of Rockingham County more than doubled when more than 28,000 men under the command of Philip Sheridan set up camp around Harrisonburg, the county seat. While Sheridan was aware that he had severely hurt Early’s forces, he was aware that Early was not ready to give up control of the “breadbasket of the Confederacy.”

Hard War Intensifies: General Philip Sheridan, August – October, 1864

Philip H. Sheridan was a captain in the Thirteenth United States Infantry, serving as the quartermaster and commissary officer for the regiment when the war began. Within a short time, Major General Henry Halleck, commander of the

Department of the Missouri, appointed him as his quartermaster, a position he held during the campaign for Corinth, Mississippi.

While Sheridan was efficient in this position, he was “remembered as not being very pleasant.”²⁶ Sheridan had a confrontation with Brigadier General Samuel R. Curtis, who commanded in Southwest Missouri, over some horses that thieves had stolen from local farmers and were now trying to sell to the army to replace lost cavalry mounts. The issue arose when Sheridan refused a direct order from General Curtis to pay for the horses, and “responded with some hastily chosen words.”²⁷ Curtis had Sheridan placed under arrest for his refusal to obey a direct



Figure 3 *Major General P. H. Sheridan*. Photographic print on card mount, albumen, photographed between 1861 and 1865. Library of Congress.

order, but Halleck stepped in and transferred Sheridan to Tennessee before a court martial could take place.

Sheridan was happy with the transfer no longer assigned to rear echelon duties, but in command of the Second Michigan Cavalry. By the end of 1863, Sheridan had attained the rank of major general and had, in that capacity,

commanded XX Corps of infantry at the battles of Chattanooga and Chickamauga.²⁸ Sheridan was a confident leader and that trait, along with his aggressive leadership, caused him to stand out from the other Union commanders in the Western Theater. When Grant rose to lieutenant general and took command of all Union military forces, he brought Sheridan east to be in charge of the cavalry corps of the Army of the Potomac—one of only three general officers who were battle tested selected to accompany Grant to the Eastern Theater. One of those waiting to meet with General Sheridan when he arrived in Harpers Ferry, West Virginia, in August of 1864, was a young lieutenant named John Meigs. Lt. Meigs was an engineer who had served with the Union army west of the Blue Ridge Mountains for most of the past year, and of all the engineers available, Meigs knew the territory best. Little did Lt. Meigs know that in two months he would be the center of a controversy caused a large amount of destruction in the small town of Dayton, Virginia.

Two days after meeting Sheridan and impressing him with his knowledge of the Shenandoah Valley, Meigs received assignment as chief engineer with General Crook's army in the Department of West Virginia. In two weeks, Sheridan decided how he would proceed in his campaign; he brought Meigs from General Crook's army and assigned him as his aide-de-camp, becoming, at age twenty-two, the chief engineer of all forces under the command of General Philip Sheridan. Sheridan later wrote, "I found that, with the aid of Meigs, who was most intelligent in his profession, the region in which I was to operate would soon be well fixed in my mind. Meigs was familiar with every important road and stream and with all points worthy of note west of the Blue Ridge, and was particularly well equipped with knowledge regarding the Shenandoah Valley."²⁹

Sheridan was, more than anything, a clear-thinking planner. He was also an opportunistic combatant who shared Grant's belief that the defeats suffered by the Union forces during the first three years of the war necessitated a change in the basic rules of warfare. It was not enough to engage the enemy in battle. The Union needed to end the war before the civilian population lost heart and demanded peace on any terms. To do this, they had to destroy the institutions that supported the Confederate army and allowed it to live, move, and fight.

During the month of August 1864, not only did Sheridan skirmish with parts of Jubal Early's army on almost a daily basis, he also had to put up with constant raids on his camps, supply lines, and lines of communications by roving

band of guerrillas. The problem was that many of these so-called guerrillas were not guerrillas at all, but part of the Confederate army—but because they lacked proper uniforms, they were mistaken as partisan rangers or guerrillas. Partisans and guerrillas were not part of the army, and because of that, did not receive the same considerations if captured. One particular incident is still talked about in the town of Dayton—the execution of Davy Getz.

Near the town of Woodstock, troopers from General George Custer's Michigan brigade captured a civilian with a rifle in the woods near their camp. The troopers labeled him a bushwacker, but in reality, Davy was a thirty-nine-year-old with the mind of a child, who happened to be out hunting squirrels. There was no time to settle this affair until late September, following the Union victories at Third Winchester and Fisher's Hill, and after the Union forces had moved south to Harrisonburg to set up camp between that city and the town of Dayton.

They brought Getz, left with the Michigan brigade's supply wagons, before a court in Dayton, convened by Custer, and sentenced him to death by firing squad. They took Getz out to a field, made him dig his own grave, and then executed him.³⁰ Citizens of Dayton and Rockingham County found the execution of Getz as well as the occupation of the area by Northern soldiers extremely aggravating. While they remembered the members of the 116th Ohio Infantry, who had been in charge of the town, as gentlemen; they remembered the cavalry in a different light altogether. Even though orders forbid looting, they were not enforced, and it was not just the enlisted men doing the looting—officers also looted things. Captain John Deforest of the 12th Connecticut Infantry remembered his time in Rockingham County by writing it was “a time for devastating crops and devouring cattle.”³¹

Following the Union victory at Fisher's Hill and the final battle of Sheridan's campaign in October, a separate campaign took place in the central part of the Valley. Historians said little about this other campaign because it intentionally took the war to the civilian population. They had jumped from the battle at Fisher's Hill to the cavalry battle at Tom's Brook several weeks later without mentioning what Sheridan and his army had done during the missing weeks. It was not until recently, when Stephen Starr, in his *Union Cavalry in the Civil War* wrote, “[t]he deliberate planned devastation of the Shenandoah Valley has deservedly ranked as one of the grimmest episodes of a sufficiently grim war.

Unlike the haphazard destruction caused by (Gen. William T.) Sherman's bummers in Georgia, it was committed systematically, and by order."³²

When Sheridan first entered Rockingham County, he became aware of the abundance of crops (Rockingham County was one of the nation's top ten




Figure 4 *Map of the Shenandoah Valley Campaign, 1864*. Map, pen-and-ink and watercolor. Contributed by Robert Knox Sneden. Created 1864-1865. Library of Congress.

agricultural counties at that time³³) and after establishing his headquarters in a private home in Harrisonburg, he began to send requests to Grant, asking him to “change the direction of his campaign.”³⁴ Sheridan had already destroyed many

barns in Augusta County prior to moving to Harrisonburg, and he now argued that if they did not completely “destroy the Valley’s harvest and everything that supported it, they would have to deal in the future with other Confederate armies using the Valley to threaten the North.”³⁵

What Grant was not aware of was that Sheridan had already begun the destruction. For thirteen days, from September 26 to October 8, there was continuous burning of property and the confiscating of livestock in the Valley’s four central counties: Augusta, Rockingham, Shenandoah, and Page. Augusta and Rockingham counties were the two largest producers of wheat in Virginia—and because of this known as the “breadbasket of the Confederacy.” Grant utilized over five thousand cavalymen and a brigade of infantry in the actual destruction of property, “while thousands of other soldiers in blue were called upon to drive off or kill livestock.”³⁶

The worst moments for Dayton and Rockingham County came in early October. On October 3, Lt. Meigs, Sheridan’s engineer, was out with two orderlies making the rounds of the different camps so they could note the location of each brigade should Sheridan decide to move his forces. They had finished their duties and were heading back into Harrisonburg when three riders approached wearing oilcloths for protection against the light rain that had started falling. The riders turned away from Meigs, but he followed them, ordering them to stop. They refused his orders and kept moving. Meigs and his men kept following the riders until finally they wheeled their horses around to prepare for a confrontation. When Meigs came up on the riders, who were actually scouts from Wickham’s brigade, the scouts ordered him to surrender. He refused, pulled his weapon, and shot one of the Confederates. One of them then shot Meigs through the head and killed him. One of his orderlies was able to escape and get back into the Union lines where he said guerrillas operating in the area attacked them.

When Sheridan heard of Meig’s death, he flew into a rage. Guerrillas and bushwackers had consistently irritated him since his arrival in the Valley, and now they had killed one of his favorite officers. The orderly reported civilians had fired on them and shot down Meigs in cold blood while trying to surrender. What he probably heard was the Confederate telling Meigs to surrender, and he was not aware that they were soldiers because their oilskins covered their uniforms. Even so, Sheridan regarded Meig’s death as murder, not an act of war. The next morning he sent Major George A. Forsyth, one of his aides, to find Meigs’ body.

Forsyth speculated, and no one questioned his reasoning (or why a group of bushwackers would operate that close to a Union camp), that members of Mosby's or White's gang had murdered Meigs.³⁷

Because of this act of murder, "Sheridan ordered that the entire town of Dayton and all surrounding houses in a five mile radius be burned to the ground. The task of burning the area fell to General Custer's Fifth New York cavalry and the men of the 116th Ohio Infantry. The people of Dayton and Harrisonburg saw homes beyond the towns totally engulfed in flames as Custer and his men began their assignment. The Union soldiers visited every town between Dayton and Bridgewater, running off slaves, killing farm animals, and burning buildings."³⁸ They did not spare the farm of one of President Lincoln's cousins. At the farm of Joseph and Abigail Coffman, (Abigail's father and Lincoln's grandfather were brothers) the soldiers killed all of the hogs, burned the barn, new smokehouse, and granary, and destroyed almost all of the fencing. The house was spared, but only because it was used as a head-quarters by Custer.³⁹

While this devastation was taking place in the county, the people of the town of Dayton were watching and waiting to see what would happen to their homes. Finally, Colonel Wildes of the 116th Ohio sent a messenger to Sheridan and told him the citizens of the town had treated him and his men well and asked that he rescind his order to burn the town. William T. Patterson, a soldier in Wilde's regiment, writing in his diary reflected the anguish that the common soldier felt about this duty: "This will include the city of Harrisonburg, the towns of Bridgewater and Dayton. . . . This evening the citizens are removing their goods. . . . The work of destruction is commencing in the suburbs of the town."⁴⁰ Sheridan, while unhappy over the death of his lieutenant, held Wildes in high regard and agreed to spare the town. The order to burn the outlying homes and farms still stood.

When the 116th Ohio heard Sheridan rescinded the order to burn the town, "there was louder cheering than there ever was when we made a bayonet charge." Colonel Wildes observed "a great deal of clapping of hands and shouts of gladness of the little children over the good news," and that this was "too much for even the grim and sturdy old soldiers. The sleeve of many a blouse was wet with their tears."⁴¹ The depredations endured by the residents of Dayton, Harrisonburg, and other parts of Rockingham County were over by the end of the first week of October. Sheridan had decided to move his army down the Valley

toward Strasburg and Front Royal. His move determined that the final battles of the Valley campaign would be fought at Cedar Creek, instead of near Harrisonburg.

Jubal Early had re-entered the Valley in Augusta County and prepared to move northward himself. The destruction left little in the area to support an army, even a force as small as the one Early led. Often the men had to spread one day's rations over two or three days, although they were able to grind some grain in a mill that somehow Custer had missed while burning the area. As one Confederate soldier remembered, "Our hearts ached at the horrible sight, our beautiful Valley almost a barren waste and we with an army so inferior in numbers as to render success almost hopeless. Yet the sight carried with it unseen power and determination to avenge this dastardly warfare, making us doubly equal to such an enemy."⁴²

Sheridan confirmed this destruction in his report of October 7 in the *Official Records*:

In moving back to this point, the whole country from the Blue Ridge to the North Mountains has been made untenable for a rebel army. I have destroyed over 2,000 barns filled with wheat, hay, and farming implements; over seventy mills filled with flour and wheat; have driven in front of the army over 4,000 head of stock, and have killed and have issued to the troops not less than 3,000 sheep. This destruction embraces the Luray Valley and little Fort Valley, as well as the main Valley. . . . Lieutenant John R. Meigs, my engineer officer, was murdered beyond Harrisonburg, near Dayton. For this atrocious act all the houses within an area of five miles were burned.⁴³

It is interesting to note that Sheridan still regarded the death of Meigs as a murder, even though it was determined that those involved were not partisan guerrillas, but army scouts, making Meigs' death a combat death, not murder. Another report says that cavalry troops under Wesley Merritt "destroyed 630 barns; 47 flouring mills; 4 sawmills; 1 woolen mill 3,982 tons of hay, straw and fodder; more than 400,000 bushels of wheat; 3 furnaces; 515 acres of corn; 750 bushels of oats; more than 3,000 head of livestock; 560 barrels of flour; 2 tanneries; 1 railroad depot, 1 locomotive engine; and 3 boxcars."⁴⁴

After the Union forces had left Rockingham County, the officers of the court, located in Harrisonburg, appointed a committee to assess the destruction inflicted within their jurisdiction. This jurisdiction included the city of Harrisonburg and Rockingham County only. On November 11, 1864, the

committee published its report in the *Rockingham Register and Advertiser*. The committee found that in Rockingham County alone the Union Army destroyed over 100,000 bushels of wheat along with 50,000 bushels of corn. The Union forces also burned 30 dwelling houses and 450 barns.⁴⁵

Sheridan was convinced that the devastation he caused in Rockingham, Augusta, and Page counties was sufficient. He believed that even if a Confederate force could follow him, its soldiers would be in no condition to fight. However, as the Union Army moved northward, shadowy riders began to appear on the horizon—riders wearing the grey of the Confederate cavalry. These riders were the advance scouts for General Jubal Early, who followed Sheridan northward until, at Cedar Creek, battle between the two forces decided the fate of the Shenandoah Valley.

Conclusion: The End of the Destruction

The “burning” was over. The Union forces had moved north to try to crush Jubal Early and his army. Now it was time for the residents of Augusta, Page, and especially Rockingham counties to start putting their lives back together.

While some produce managed to survive the destruction caused by Generals Hunter and Sheridan, most of the Valley residents suffered from shortages that winter. Solomon Wenger of Rockingham County “remembered that his father’s horses nearly starved.”⁴⁶ Just north of Harrisonburg, near Fisher’s Hill, one of Fisher’s grandchildren was able to crawl into the bottom of their mill and scrape up close to a bushel of old flour dust. In later years, Mr. Fisher recalled that “[w]e sifted the worms out of it and mother baked it into bread.”⁴⁷

Ironically, the very government that sanctioned Sheridan’s campaign of destruction provided emergency rations, and sent them to the Valley on the Baltimore & Ohio and the Manassas Gap railroads. Problematically, however, the government sent the rations to Winchester and for those people living in Rockingham County, the trip to obtain rations was close to seventy miles—a trip not easily made in 1864.

The justice who presided over Rockingham County wrote, “many of his constituents were without a pound of meat, bread, or anything to live on, to say nothing of fire-wood. It will require the daily and hourly exertions of the poor and those who have been burnt out to procure a scanty subsistence to sustain life during

the winter.”⁴⁸ The editor of the *Richmond Examiner* was quite blunt in his description of the suffering in the Valley when he wrote, “The horror and crime of this devastation was remarkable even in Yankee warfare. They impoverished a whole population; they reduced women and children to beggary and starvation.”⁴⁹

The use of fire as a weapon in the 1860s was frightening to everyone concerned. Robby Martin, who was a small child in 1864, described this scene later in his life: “I have always carried . . . a vivid picture of the mighty roaring, varicolored flames that licked up the flour mill. The flames leaped upward in great pointed spirals. . . . The vivid red that predominated had for contrast all shades of green and other colors . . . possibly partly consumed gases from wheat and flour and meal mingled with the real flames.”⁵⁰

The orders that Ulysses S. Grant gave to Generals Hunter and Sheridan were very succinct. There were two aspects to these orders: rid the Shenandoah Valley of all Confederate forces and make the Valley so desolate that it cannot supply any Confederate armies. Hunter failed in his mission, Sheridan succeeded. Sheridan’s success prompted John Mead Gould of the 29th Maine to write in his journal following the Union victory at Cedar Creek: “History must give General Sheridan credit for doing what only such Generals as Napoleon and his kind have been able to.”⁵¹

What did all of this destruction mean to the Confederacy? It was the primary cause of the losses suffered by the Confederacy at Tom’s Brook and Cedar Creek—defeats caused in part by the “famished condition of his [Early’s] army.”⁵² The loss of the autumn harvest in the Valley meant that supplies to Lee’s army in Petersburg would dramatically decrease, and probably more than anything, Sheridan’s successes helped reelect Abraham Lincoln to another term.

The Shenandoah Valley would return to normal eventually because of the industriousness of the residents, helped by friends and family living in other areas, and by Northerners who were willing to invest in the rebuilding of the Valley. By 1870, farms had returned to levels that existed before the war and railroads that had been destroyed, were rebuilt. In time, even those who should have been the most unforgiving realized that the destruction had a purpose. When asked about “the burning,” an ex-Confederate cavalry officer replied: “What is the worst in war, to burn a barn or kill a fellow man?”

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General William T. Sherman: Total Warrior

Chris Booth

On those all too rare occasions that the world has the opportunity to witness pure genius or someone of an outstanding nature work in his respective craft, the blessing often goes unheralded. However, in the case of William Tecumseh Sherman, humanity immediately understood and recognized the remarkable talent that he unveiled throughout the Civil War. Of the generals, only a few were more noteworthy and ingenious throughout the entire conflict, which prompted historian Richard McMurry to say that Sherman was “probably the most creative and intuitively brilliant of all the high-ranking Civil War generals.”¹ Few generals were more groundbreaking than Sherman was, as he proceeded to utilize the practice of total warfare during his signature “March to the Sea” campaign. No general had previously used total warfare during the Civil War, and Sherman’s employment of the technique brought both a resounding victory for the Union and lasting hatred from Southerners for the man who authorized its usage. Nevertheless, despite criticisms against his methods, Sherman most certainly epitomized the characteristics of a brilliant tactician, and because of his implementation of total warfare, the Civil War ended much sooner than it would have had Sherman decided to stay with conventional military techniques in his “March to the Sea” operation.

However, three preliminaries bear mentioning before examining Sherman and his use of total warfare. First, one must consider the important literature compiled on Sherman. Next, the author will provide an introduction to Sherman and his background, as both are important in understanding the psyche and mentality of the man who would become an innovator on the method of total warfare and the pioneer of the technique during the American Civil War. Finally, the author will include a summary of total warfare and its origins to help the reader understand how new to the time and revolutionary it was for Sherman to employ such methods. These three aspects will help the reader understand not only Sherman, but also why he would employ total warfare and the importance of his actions.

On the subject of Sherman, much literature exists simply because of his importance as a general during the Civil War, and while less goes into depth on his usage of total warfare, many of the works are still quite useful and deserve mention. Liddell Hart's *Sherman: Soldier, Realist, American* is a critical piece of literature on the general that has received lavish reviews, such as the *Saturday Review* stating it was "[t]he best analysis of General Sherman that has appeared." Hart explores Sherman's many campaigns and goes into depth on "The March to the Sea," detailing its destruction and importance vividly. *Southern Storm: Sherman's March to the Sea* by Noah Trudeau is an exceptional piece that describes the damage caused by Sherman's capstone operation in Georgia through the diaries and journals of Union soldiers and Confederate civilians. Finally, Sherman himself illuminates the reader with his collection, *Memoirs of General W.T. Sherman*, a remarkably well written and engrossing compilation of his life, which is incredibly helpful in creating a picture of the man and his genius. Although historians have written countless other works on Sherman, these three are noteworthy and deserve to be mentioned, as they are pivotal in understanding his decision to utilize total warfare.

Like so many of his contemporaries, Sherman found himself having to fight for everything that he had at a young age. Forced to deal with the loss of his father at the age of nine, Sherman moved to live with his adoptive parents. Sherman said in his memoirs that his father's death "left the family very poor, but friends rose up with proffers of generous care and assistance."² Although he received a high quality education because of his foster parents, his life was not destined to become easy with his appointment to West Point. Hart describes the harshness of life at the academy as one that stunted creativity and individualism, characteristics that Sherman demonstrated throughout his life. Likening West Point to a prison and Sherman as to a wild animal from the wilderness of Ohio, Hart says "when he [Sherman] entered the gates of West Point the "animal" must have felt that, in truth, he was entering a cage, and its bars of customs and discipline were to be a sore restraint on body and spirit alike."³ Although Sherman disliked the academy about as much as one could, he still managed to graduate high in his class, saying "My average demerits, per annum, were about one hundred and fifty, which reduced my class standing from number four to six."⁴ Sherman mentioned two other important notes about his character that he discovered while at West Point. The first dealt with his drawbacks, which he recalled by stating that he was "not

considered a good soldier” as he did not possess any important virtues related to the military at that time, principal among them “neatness in dress and form, with a strict conformity to the rules.”⁵ Sherman realized at an early age that what was expected and deemed normal for military members was not necessarily the best and or right thing. Sherman then mentioned that he “always held a respectable reputation with the professors” and noted his skills in certain areas by saying that he “generally ranked among the best, especially in drawing, chemistry, mathematics, and natural philosophy.”⁶ Sherman recognized his attributes and was not afraid to let more trivial matters like uniforms and appearance detract from his ability to perform well as an officer. Later, Sherman fought for increased military and officer corps professionalization, more rigorous officer performance evaluation, and curbing political partisanship—progressive arguments ahead of his time, considering the amateurish nature of the officer corps.⁷ These points from Sherman’s youth illustrate factors that led to his becoming a fearless general—one who made controversial decisions impacting the lives of hundreds of thousands.

What exactly is total warfare? The short answer from *dictionary.com* describes total warfare as “a war in which every available weapon is used and the nation’s full financial resources are devoted.” The idea originated in the nineteenth century, when French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars mobilized mass populations and targeted many civilians who died during battle. Total war also broke out during the Taiping Rebellion, as belligerents on both sides waged war on civilians as well as used them in support roles during the conflict. However, the first deliberate appearance occurred during the American Civil War, as Sherman directed a total war campaign in his epic “March to the Sea.” Many historians credit Carl von Clausewitz for writing on the subject of total war. Clausewitz posited that the growth of nationalistic armies in Europe raised the stakes in war to new heights (which proved out during World War I and World War II with trench warfare and the atomic bomb respectively). Clausewitz stated, “If one considers war as an act of mutual destruction, we must of necessity imagine both parties as making some progress.”⁸ Certainly this would not do as a strategy, so therefore the implementation of total warfare, a tactic that would ruin an opponent’s ability to make war and encourage the enemy population to withdraw emotionally from the conflict, would be the next logical step.

Did Sherman immediately use this strategy at the outset of the Civil War in 1861? The answer to that is surprisingly no, as is the next statement: Sherman

actually suffered several setbacks early in his military career. After serving well at the First Battle of Bull Run (receiving minor wounds, the first of many injuries during the war), Sherman seemed to be heading in the right direction with his promotion to brigadier general of volunteers.⁹ However, as Sherman took over operations in Kentucky, he began to suffer from severe pessimism and nervousness, leading to a breakdown. Major General Henry W. Halleck ordered he take a leave of absence. Sherman experienced further defeats and losses throughout the course of the Civil War, as he was a great—but not perfect—general. Sherman suffered a loss at the Battle of Chickasaw Bayou, which prompted historian John Winters to say of Sherman “if he muffed his Vicksburg assignment, which had begun unfavorably, he would rise no higher.”¹⁰

However, these setbacks were only temporary, and after the period of leave in 1861, Sherman came back to help Brigadier General Ulysses S.




Figure 1 *William T. Sherman*. Negative, glass, wet collodion, c. 1860–1870. Library of Congress.

Grant capture Fort Donelson, a move that would endear him to the future president and unite them for the entirety of the war. This relationship would grow stronger after the Battle of Shiloh, a massive battle that left thousands dead on both sides. Sherman’s command received a major part of the Confederate attack, and despite giving ground, never retreated and due to Sherman’s calm, helped the Union forces

from falling into a devastating retreat. During the next day's fighting, the Union forces under Grant, Sherman, and other generals pushed the Confederates back in a battle that made sure the South "not only lost irreplaceable men but also failed to restore the balance of power in the middle and east Tennessee sub theater."¹¹ The excellent defensive measures Sherman displayed the first day and the well-executed counterattack the following day at Shiloh impressed Grant. While not total war tactics, they display Sherman's great generalship and provide an important stepping stone in building the relationship that would eventually allow Sherman to convince Grant and Lincoln that he should embark on his "March to the Sea" campaign.

After the first few years of the war had passed, Grant rewarded Sherman by naming him the overall commander in the Western theater, and tasking him with "bringing Bragg's army, now under the command of General Joseph E. Johnston, to battle."¹² Sherman did this by participating in the Battle of Chattanooga, and afterwards received command of all Union troops in the Western theater. Sherman then began to press Grant for permission to take the fight to Bragg and the heartland of the Confederacy by abandoning his supply line and living off the land in what would become his infamous "March to the Sea" campaign. This was of course a bold and almost reckless plan but also one that Grant understood was necessary, as coupled with General Sheridan's operations in the Shenandoah Valley it would aid in destroying the Confederacy's will to fight so that when Lee eventually surrendered in Virginia there would be no likelihood of a continued guerrilla war.¹³ In the spring of 1864, Sherman received letters from Grant detailing that his plan would be approved, causing Sherman to say in a letter to his superior "That we are now all to act on a common plan, converging on a common centre, looks like enlightened war."¹⁴

The 'March to the Sea' could not happen until Sherman had captured Atlanta, however, which he accomplished after much maneuvering on September 2, 1864. The battle itself caused minimal damage to the city, but Sherman (in a move seen as a precursor to how he would treat the rest of the state and the future city of Columbus, South Carolina especially) ordered military and government buildings to be burned after giving civilians the opportunity to leave. Sherman knew a strategy like this was controversial, when he stated, "If the people raise a howl against my barbarity and cruelty, I will answer that war is war, and not popularity-seeking. If they want peace, they and their relatives must stop the

war.”¹⁵ To complicate matters, many buildings not targeted by Sherman for destruction after he captured Atlanta burned due to the fires at the military buildings. While Sherman’s actions in the destruction of Atlanta might be considered brutal and heartless, it was not necessarily a total war tactic, because



Figure 2 *Sherman’s march to the sea*. Lithograph print by Felix Octavius Carr Darley, c 1883. Library of Congress.

he gave civilians the opportunity to leave and only targeted military buildings to be destroyed (even if many shops and homes burned accidentally).

Sherman’s famous quote of “I will make Georgia howl” left no doubt that he intended to cause as much damage as he could and that his strategy was one of total war during his next campaign of marching through the state and living off the land. Sherman’s ultimate desire was to destroy the ability of the Confederacy to make war, either by crushing their farms, which fed the soldiers and funded the war, ruining the infrastructure in the Deep South, or by wiping out all morale and by bringing support for the war down to the point that average soldiers would desert. Rarely in history has an operation succeeded in achieving

all of its goals, yet Sherman's "March to the Sea" did just that. To make matters worse for the Confederacy, the trek through Georgia from Atlanta to Savannah was a relatively easy one that only took Sherman and his army a month and a half, forcing them to suffer a negligible amount of casualties. Confederate cavalry left in Georgia under the command of Major General Joseph Wheeler did what they could to harass Sherman and his troops. They failed to inflict much damage; Sherman's cavalry was "more than sufficient to keep Wheeler's horsemen" at bay.¹⁶ These few defenses were not enough to stop Sherman's torching of certain cities and towns during the trek through the state, as they completely destroyed the city of Millen due to the Confederate prisons that housed Union forces in inhospitable conditions.¹⁷

The path that Sherman and his troops cut through Georgia along what is now I-16 paled in comparison to the destruction visited on the state of South Carolina, most particularly the capital city of Columbia. Perceived by many as the state that initiated the Civil War, Sherman and his troops seemed to take extra care to lay waste to the areas that they traveled through, with the most damage done to Columbia, as they burned it to the ground on February 17, 1865. The troops under Sherman did have to fight their way through Confederate forces in South Carolina more so than in Georgia, as a division of 1,200 Confederate soldiers attempted to thwart Sherman's advance at the crossing of the Salkehatchie Swamp. Sherman's sweeping aside of this enemy forced Confederate General Joseph Johnston to say that "there had been no such army since the days of Julius Caesar."¹⁸ Sherman had to persuade Grant to approve this campaign yet again (as Grant pushed for Sherman and his troops to board ships and travel north to rendezvous with his army to fight Lee). Sherman's army crossing into North Carolina where they met Union troops, finally culminated a four-month long trek from Atlanta to Goldsborough, North Carolina, that helped bring the end of the war that much closer for the Union. A resounding success, what began with the "March to the Sea" ended with two key Deep South states completely destroyed and useless to the Confederacy. More importantly to the annals of history, the operation placed Sherman in rare air as someone who perfected a strategy that would be implemented forever more destructive results in the twentieth century.

Not as damaging as the instances of total war in the twentieth century (such as the firebombing in Germany and the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan during WWII), Sherman managed to inflict

incredible amounts of damage to the Confederacy in his final campaign. Doing the opposite of what Grant was doing in Virginia (Grant's strategy focused on bleeding Lee's army to the point where he would no longer fight), Sherman's operations in Georgia and South Carolina resulted in relatively few Confederate soldiers killed since it aimed at destroying the infrastructure in the South that allowed them to stay in the fight. In Columbia alone, military buildings along with "the old state house, the Institution of the Sisters of Charity, a hotel, several churches and possibly 1,300 dwellings were burned."¹⁹ Debate still rages over whether Sherman intended for the mass burning to take place or whether it was accidental or set by a few rogues, but regardless of the debate, the damage inflicted to the noncombatant structures occurred and the city was summarily out of the war for all intent and purposes. Sherman summed up the scene by uttering the phrase that his soldiers had "utterly ruined Columbia."²⁰

Even if one were to take away the burning of Atlanta and Columbia, the destruction visited to the Confederacy was evident in two other pivotal areas already mentioned but deserve deeper investigation as they are prime results of the impact of total war: supplies and morale. The amount of weapons, foodstuffs, and all other various and sundry materiel Union troops took from warehouses, farms, and towns along the campaign made it impossible for the Confederacy to replace due to limited factories and broken infrastructure. They maimed so many railroads in the campaign, nicknamed "Sherman's neckties," which speaks magnitudes to the poor state of infrastructure in the Confederacy at the time. In the town of Cheraw, South Carolina alone, Harry Hansen writes that the Federals found "24 guns, 2,000 muskets, 3,600 barrels of gunpowder...and eight wagonloads of fine wines."²¹ This type of taking from the poor (the Confederacy) and giving to the rich (the Union) effectively helped bring the war to an end even sooner, as it deprived the Confederacy of the necessary implements to make war and had the added effect of helping the enemy in the process. Even as the Confederacy was on its last legs, Sherman's forces ensured that even more damage would be inflicted as they destroyed the printing press in Columbia while using the Confederate money to spend and gamble "in the most lavish manner."²²

All of these factors listed above, combined with the burning of the cities and the homeland of so many soldiers who were away fighting in other states served to ruin the morale of the Confederacy, which had already almost bottomed out by this point of the war. Sherman's march and his usage of total warfare

destroyed the Southern will to fight more effectively than fighting many large-scale battles against the Confederate armies, because it forced the Southern men that were away fighting to worry about their families and homes even more than normal since they knew that Union forces were present in the area. According to Allan Millett and Peter Maslowski, Sherman “perceived that these raids also had a psychological impact, undermining the South’s morale by demonstrating its incapacity for effective defense.”²³ This statement could not have been more accurate, as it points out that Sherman knew what effects his operation would have on the Confederacy’s morale, which is why he fought so hard to convince Grant and Lincoln to attempt it as opposed to a conventional style of war featuring large battles.

Only rarely do military leaders use the perfect strategy designed for the perfect general, as William Tecumseh Sherman exploited total war during the American Civil War. Raised through troubling times and maturing in the harsh walls of West Point, Sherman was a rugged man who was willing to do whatever it took to achieve victory for the Union. Throughout the war, his brilliance showed in key battles, and although he suffered some setbacks along the way, he was in prime position to take the war to the Confederacy in ways unimagined in 1864-1865. His infamous “March to the Sea” campaign destroyed Southern infrastructure, ruined their morale, and robbed them of any further chance and ability to continue the war. Nevertheless, Sherman knew that by implementing a strategy of total war that he would receive much disdain, but this did not affect him. Built for the type of conflict, his strong words to the Confederacy of “you cannot qualify war in harsher terms than I will,” were not full of just suggestions or bluster, but were words that he stuck to as he visited destruction to the Confederacy by perfecting the strategy of total war.²⁴

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Anne Midgley

Washington's Crossing is a striking book; a complex work that explores a pivotal moment in the American Revolutionary War as Continental Army Commander-in-chief General George Washington made his desperate gamble to strike the British and Hessian forces when least expected, on Christmas evening 1776. The American cause teetered on the brink of extinction—yet after Washington's successful attack on the Hessian outpost at Trenton, New Jersey—the sputtering flame of the Revolutionary War burned bright again. David Hackett Fischer's tome traced the events that led up to the Battle of Trenton and the subsequent Battle of Princeton, which brought a tide of enlistments to the undermanned Continental Army and shifted the momentum of the war to Washington's forces. Fischer also provided a treasure trove of related information for the student and general reader, alike. Fischer's extensive resource material comprised virtually one-third of the volume, and included appendices, source material, and most notably, a lengthy section on the historiography of the American Revolutionary War.

Fischer's study included an examination of the various armies of the American rebels, as well as those of the British and the Hessians, treating each with scholarship and objectivity. Fischer explored the rebel "Army of Liberty" in its almost infinite variety: from the troops fielded by the New England colonies, to the riflemen of Virginia's backcountry, to the radical Democrats of Pennsylvania's Associators, to the "silk-stocking" regiments of Maryland, each with its own customs and traditions. He described the British "Army of Order" in detail, from the composition of its regulars and officers to British recruiting and training processes. Along the way, Fischer demolished stereotypes; although historians have commonly referred to the barbaric British custom of flogging, Fischer noted that not all British units used discipline in the same manner. The Fifth Foot preferred reward to punishment and was one of the first British units to use medals of merit rather than punishment to direct and control behavior (p. 45). Fischer portrayed the Hessian forces in detail and noted that about thirty thousand German soldiers served in the war. He described the Hessians as the "Army of Honor and Profit"; an army

bound together by a common belief in “hierarchy, order, and discipline” (p. 59). Fischer’s treatment of the Hessians included a detailed study of Colonel Johann Gottlieb Rall, the commander of the Hessian troops at Trenton. Fischer portrayed Rall in a much more positive light than many historians have done in the past. He described Rall as a leader highly regarded by his men, for he treated them with dignity; he “merited the highest respect” (p. 57).

While *Washington’s Crossing* is a complex, multifaceted work, at its heart it is a study of George Washington and his growth as a leader while in the midst of almost insurmountable odds and frequent chaos. Fischer provided a telling example of Washington’s courage during an memorable incident—the rebel forces from disparate regions that came together for the first time broke out in a riot—essentially rebel Americans were fighting rebel Americans in a knock-down brawl. Washington galloped into the center of the melee, leapt from his horse, and grabbed the two closest combatants, literally lifting them off their feet while he shook some sense into them. As Fischer related the incident, the “rioters stopped fighting, turned in amazement to watch Washington in action, then fled . . . in all directions” (p. 25). Based on Fischer’s extraordinary account of the events leading up to the Battle of Trenton, it is easy to understand the memorable reflection on Washington provided by General Henry “Light Horse Harry” Lee at Washington’s death; Washington truly was “first in war, first in peace and first in the hearts of his countrymen” for a very good reason. George Washington was the indispensable man of the American Revolutionary War.

Wilson, Harold C. *Gosnold's Hope: The Story of Bartholomew Gosnold*. Greensboro, NC: Tudor Publishing, 2000.

Lew Taylor

In the introduction to this short biography of Bartholomew Gosnold, Harold Wilson states that he wishes to “rescue Bartholomew Gosnold from historical obscurity,” (p.10) and that he believes Gosnold “was one of the great, unsung heroes of American history” but that “today, many Americans have never heard of him” (p. 9). Wilson’s statement regarding Gosnold’s relative obscurity is unclear as there are over one hundred primary and secondary sources in his selected bibliography. Perhaps the reason that few people have heard of Gosnold has less to do with his importance and more with the way American schools teach history today.

Wilson declares, “The story of Bartholomew Gosnold begins in about the year 1001 A.D. when Leif Erikson and his men sailed southwesterly from their home in Greenland” (p.11). Wilson then devotes the remainder of his first chapter to a brief history of the voyages of the Vikings and the early English adventurers Sir Humphrey Gilbert and Captain Edward Hayes. The rumor spreading around England at that time was that Giovanni da Verrazzano, an Italian sailing for the French, had visited a “beautiful country on the North American coast” (p.13). The land became known as Norumbega and England thought it was a utopia – gold, crystals, fertile soil – everything that England was looking for to help them replenish their treasury that had been severely depleted due to recent wars with France and Spain. Both enemies of England claimed that this area belonged to them. English geographer and writer, Richard Hakluyt contended that England’s claim was more legitimate because John Cabot discovered North America, where this bountiful land was located, in 1497 while sailing for England (p.14).

Wilson dedicates several chapters to Gosnold’s early life including his schooling and his acquaintance with people of station in Elizabethan England. Gosnold’s father was a successful lawyer and his mother was a relative of Sir Francis Bacon. Gosnold’s upbringing brought him into contact with the best families of England. He received his BA in Law from Cambridge University in 1590 and entered “New Inn, one of the Inns of Chancery, a “farm team” of the Middle Temple, the famous Inn of Court” (p.20). While an attorney, his true love

was the sea and exploration, due to exposure to the lectures of Richard Hakluyt (p.21).

Wilson traces Gosnold's voyage to America and his exploration of the coast of what is now Cape Cod, Martha's Vineyard, and the Elizabeth Islands. He gives Gosnold credit for the naming of Cape Cod (for the abundance of cod that his sailors were able to catch), Martha's Vineyard (named after his daughter who died as an infant), and the Elizabeth Islands (named for his sister). Wilson includes a lengthy description of the rough seas that Gosnold's ship encountered by a breach thereafter named "Tucker's Terror." Wilson states, "[If] Gosnold had not escaped the fury of Tucker's Terror . . . the founding of Jamestown may not have occurred and what is now the United States would not be an English-speaking nation" (p.48). The author gives Gosnold far more credit for the settlement of Jamestown than is warranted.

Wilson dedicated his final chapters to Gosnold's voyage to America that resulted in the settling of Jamestown, Virginia, the first permanent English settlement in the New World. After the death of Queen Elizabeth and the ascension of James I to the throne, peace with Spain put a hold on England's colonization projects. However, on July 15, 1605, a treaty ratified by King Philip III of Spain stated, "Spain would treat English colonies as legal ventures," (p.93) opening the door for Gosnold and other adventurers to organize a new voyage with the intent of establishing a permanent English settlement in North America. Two years later on April 26, 1607, Gosnold's expedition sailed up the Chesapeake Bay and began the task of establishing a colony in the New World. When they sailed, the adventurers did not know whom England designated to be their leaders until they opened a strongbox after their arrival. Gosnold's name was first on the list followed by John Smith, Edward Wingate, John Ratcliffe, and others. These men were to be the Governing Council of the new settlement. The leaders finally selected a point approximately eighty miles up the James River for the location of their settlement. Gosnold disagreed with this location because of its low marshy ground and its infestation with insects. Gosnold lost this argument, and they established Jamestown. After months of discontent, shortages of food, attacks by natives, and damp weather, the settlers' morale was low and a sickness, probably dysentery, began to take its toll. Gosnold was stricken with a fever in August of 1607, and after suffering for two weeks died on August 22, barely four months after his arrival in Virginia (p.105).

While Wilson did an admirable job in his attempt to “rescue Bartholomew Gosnold,” the book was a bit amateurish for a volume marketed to adult readers and appeared geared more towards a middle school audience. Wilson provides extensive primary and secondary sources but does not cite his references in the book, an unfortunate gap. Wilson devoted much of his book to Gosnold’s adventures around Cape Cod and the Islands rather than to the settlement of Jamestown, despite his claim that the settlement of Jamestown was due, in large part, to the abilities and efforts of Bartholomew Gosnold. It is not clear that Wilson adds any new information to that already available on the subject.