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## From the Editorial Team:

Welcome to the sixth issue of the American Public University System (APUS)'s *Saber and Scroll Journal*. This issue resulted from an "open" call for papers and therefore contains an eclectic mix of outstanding feature articles which range from an in-depth analysis of Mithridates I's rise to power in Parthia, a mighty kingdom of the ancient near east to a feature devoted to the history of military war dogs – man's best friends in the service to our country. Regardless of your historical interests, we believe that you will find an article in this mix to intrigue and challenge you in your own pursuit of history. The journal team extends a special thanks to the authors of these articles. We would also like to thank our book reviewers for their fine contributions.

We are also pleased to welcome a number of new *Saber and Scroll* volunteers to the journal team. Our content editor team continues to include Anne Midgley, Ben Sorensen, Kathleen Guler, Melanie Thornton and Kay O'Pry-Reynolds. We had a wonderful response to our recent plea for additional editors. Please join us in welcoming Mike Gottert, William Potter, Chris Schloemer, and Rebecca Simmons to the team! They are joined by our proofreaders, Frank Hoeflinger, Jacqueline Wilson, Chris Booth, and our esteemed President/proofreader Lew Taylor; our copy editor DeAnna Stevens and our webmaster, Danielle Crooks. These individuals have dedicated countless hours to the creation of a rigorously edited quality history journal.

The *Saber and Scroll Journal* has recently become available in a print-on-demand format. We wish to extend a special thanks to the APUS ePress Team for their advice, technical expertise and hard work; however, this new format would not be made available without the exceptional dedication of our copy editor, DeAnna Stevens, who not only reformatted the journal to print-on-demand specifications but also designed the beautiful artwork which graces its cover. We continue to seek additional volunteers to help create a superb student-led history journal; if interested, please contact any member of the current journal team.

Please enjoy this issue of the *Saber and Scroll Journal*!

**Editor-In-Chief:** Anne Midgley

**Content Editors:** Ben Sorensen, Kathleen Guler, Melanie Thornton, Kay O'Pry-Reynolds, Mike Gottert, William Potter, Chris Schloemer, and Rebecca Simmons

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## The Council House Fight Sounded the Death Knell to the Comancheria

Lisa Bjorneby

The Council House Fight was one of the lesser battles between the settlers and the Comanche, but it was significant in its long term impact. The new American settlers and the Comanche came together at the Council House in San Antonio, Texas, on March 19, 1840, to negotiate a peace treaty and settle the boundaries of the Comancheria. However, the meeting went horribly wrong, and neither the Indians nor the settlers were without culpability. Neither was willing to give up land for peace; the settlers wanted the land for farming, and the Comanche wanted their traditional hunting grounds. Expecting a celebration, the Comanche brought their wives and children. The settlers brought the Republic of Texas army because they did not. In the end, the Comanche could not fight the combined efforts of the Texas Rangers, the United States Army, and the diseases that the Europeans and settlers from the east brought with them. The dream of the Comancheria died.

The Council House building no longer exists. Only a marker off Market Street shows where it used to stand.<sup>1</sup> The Council House fight took place long after the Comanche had made themselves known to all of the settlers of Texas. There could never have been a lasting peace between the Comanche and the settlers, in part because the settlers did not understand the culture of the Comanche. The Comanche were made of many different independent divisions, bands and families.<sup>2</sup> In Comanche culture, one did not mention the name of the deceased person; therefore, the name of different Comanche groups evolved in a way that it made it nearly impossible to follow the many different bands of the Comanche history.<sup>3</sup> Peace treaties failed because of the unique nature of the Comanche organization. Each tribal division or band had two chiefs, a peace chief and a war chief. The positions were not hereditary and band members chose who would lead. Leadership positions often passed within the same powerful families, but the chiefs only maintained their authority as long as they had the confidence of the band. Their societal structure allowed individuals to cross not only between bands but between divisions as well. When one band of the Comanche signed a peace treaty, no other band was bound to its promises. The officials—Spanish, Mexican and American— never understood the different cultural practices of the Comanche organization.<sup>4</sup>

The original Spanish Indian policy encouraged peace and stability in the Spanish territories, but they punished raids and killings as well. As the violence continued, the Spanish “encourage[d] warfare

between Indian nations as a means of breaking their power.”<sup>5</sup> The resulting sequence of aggression, interspersed with times of relative peace, directly influenced the growth of the Spanish settlement at San Antonio de Bexar, beginning in 1716. The Spanish crown developed San Antonio north of the other Spanish colonies, and it was intended to serve as a bulwark from Indian and French infringement.<sup>6</sup>

The Comanche were a nomadic people, and as they moved further south, taking horses and European goods, they became a threat. The Spanish sent envoys to the Comanche in the summer of 1785, inviting them to a conference in San Antonio de Bexar. A few chieftains accepted the invitation and signed a treaty with the Eastern Comanche in October 1785. Many promises were made to one another, and that treaty was supposed to end hostilities with all Spanish settlements beyond the Texas borders. The Comanche promised to return all Spanish captives, to continue fighting the Apache Indians, and to not allow foreigners into their villages. By foreigners, it is easy to conclude that the Spanish meant the French and the new Euro-American settlers. Both the Comanches and Spaniards assured each other that the friends and enemies of one party would be the friends and enemies of the other party. The Spanish assured the Comanches that their chiefs would be presented with annual gifts. This peace lasted for the next thirty years. The Comanches loved their annual gifts and eventually they were given muskets, gunpowder and shot.<sup>7</sup> San Antonio de Bexar established itself as the place for appointments with the Indians of Texas, both violent and diplomatic.<sup>8</sup>

In 1818, the Comanche began a series of raids against the settlements of the San Antonio region because the incursion of new people from the United States was impacting the hunting ground of the Comanche. The Comanche felt that the Spanish had failed to adhere to the promises they had made in the treaty of 1785.<sup>9</sup> Juan Antonio Padilla, a Spanish army officer, submitted a report in 1819 where he claimed that the Comanches were “treacherous, revengeful, sly, untrustworthy, ferocious, and cruel, when victorious; cowardly and low, when conquered.”<sup>10</sup> Padilla also claimed that they were “inconsistent in their friendships and break their contracts for any cause.”<sup>11</sup>

As the Comanche continued to trade with the Spanish, the Comanche’s desire to obtain more guns and other goods increased. Eventually, the Spanish traded some guns to the Comanche, but the Comanche turned to illegal American traders when they could not get what they wanted from the Spanish.<sup>12</sup>

The last eight years the Spanish ruled colonial Mexico were rank with disorder that prevented royal officials from sending the Penateka Comanche their gifts, and also prevented Spain from sending troops to the region for control of the frontier. Because of the Spanish failure, tribes from central Texas and the United States, primarily Creeks, Cherokees, and Choctaw, entered Comanche territory. All of these tribes contributed to the decimation of the buffalo herds,

thereby threatening mass starvation of the Comanche Indians. The decrease in buffalo, together with a smallpox epidemic in 1816 that killed an estimated four thousand Comanche, had a catastrophic effect on the Comanche.<sup>13</sup>

After a series of uprisings that grew out of the increasing political disorder both in Spain and Mexico, a treaty was signed granting Mexico independence on August 24, 1821.<sup>14</sup> In order to strengthen their defenses against Indian attacks, the Mexican government allowed Stephen F. Austin to bring three hundred American families to settle in Texas. They hoped that by doing so they would help slow down the American expansion inside Texas and allow the settlers to form a buffer between the Mexicans and the Comanche.<sup>15</sup> An unintended consequence of the three hundred American families settling in Texas was the Americans' refusal to recognize Comanche claims to the land, resulting in increasing tensions and violence with the Indians of the region. The American ideas of individual land ownership with the opportunity to amass wealth along with the appeal of free and open land were in direct conflict with the Comanche concepts of communally owned hunting territories. Although initial contact with the colonists that Austin brought to Texas was peaceful, relationships with the Indians soon deteriorated and the Comanche began to distinguish their American trading allies from the Americans that had settled in Texas.

After Texas won its independence from Mexico, conflicts between the Texans and the Comanche continued. The majority of the settlers in the new Republic of Texas came from Southern states and they had experience dealing with other Indians.<sup>16</sup> Some of the Indians who were now in Texas had been forced there because of Americans pushing the frontier westward. The new Republic of Texas sought ways in which to deal with the Indian problem.

Sam Houston, during his first term as president of the Republic of Texas, looked for more peaceful solutions with the Indians than most of the Texas settlers wished. The Constitution of the Republic provided that the first president should serve two years and the succeeding ones should serve three. Houston was, therefore president for five years. President Lamar served in the interim between Houston's first and second term as chief executive of the Republic of Texas. Houston's attitude toward the Indians was indisputably one looking for friendliness and goodwill.<sup>17</sup>

The administration of Mirabeau B. Lamar followed Houston's first term, and he had a much different attitude toward the Indians. Lamar declared war on the native population. In Lamar's first message to Congress, he said that Texas was to begin "an exterminating war upon their warriors, which will admit no compromise and have no termination except in their total extinction."<sup>18</sup> Lamar had learned hatred for Indians when he served as the private secretary to Georgia Governor George M. Troup. In Georgia, a treaty had been signed at Indian Springs, but the Creek Indians claimed that the treaty was obtained

by fraud. President John Quincy Adams had agreed and vacated the treaty, but the Cherokee were forced to move west. Lamar's first opportunity to initiate his Indian policy began with the Cherokee in East Texas; the Cherokee came to Texas around 1824 and settled on land highly desired by many white settlers coming to the territory.<sup>19</sup>

In 1837, Cherokee tribal leaders and Mexican officials met in Matamoros.<sup>20</sup> Lamar believed that this meeting proved an alliance between the Cherokee and the Mexicans and thought that such "treasonable correspondence" should be rebuked. Accordingly, the Cherokee were told to leave the Republic of Texas.<sup>21</sup> The Cherokee were warned to expedite their exodus from Texas, and commissioners said that "every friendly means" was used but on July 15, they announced that they had failed in convincing the Cherokee to leave.<sup>22</sup> This resulted in a fight between the Texas military and the Cherokee, and on Christmas Day 1838 the Cherokee were forcibly removed to Indian Territory in Oklahoma.<sup>23</sup>

With the removal of the Cherokee, the greatest threat to Texas settlement became the Comanche. The Comanche continued to make raids on the Texas settlers and to take white captives and hold them hostage until they received European goods.<sup>24</sup>

In February 1838, one hundred Penateka Comanche came to San Antonio to invite the Texans to the Hill Country so that they could talk about making a lasting peace between the Texans and the Comanche. A member of the Texas Congress named Moseley Baker returned with the group to their encampment on the Colorado River. There he met with fifteen headmen and noted that the Comanche had made a declaration for a boundary line, defining their territorial limits. According to Moseley, the Comanche claimed the "finest country in Texas... the territory north and west of the Guadalupe Mountains, extending from the Red River to the Rio Grande."<sup>25</sup> Although they sought peace, they "would listen to no terms unless the government secured to them the full and undisturbed possession of the land north of the divide between the Colorado and the Guadalupe rivers west of Bastrop."<sup>26</sup> More terms were discussed and the Comanche agreed that they would return to San Antonio at a later date to finalize the treaty. Houston received notice of these negotiations from Robert A. Irion in March, detailing the report written by Col. Henry Karnes, another attendee. Irion sought further guidance from Houston for the planned future engagement.<sup>27</sup>

Early in 1840, a small group of Comanche approached the officials in San Antonio with a proposal that they set a future date to negotiate a lasting peace between the Comanche and the Texans. The Comanche promised to return with a larger deputation and their American captives to finalize the treaty. When he heard of this pending deputation, Lamar immediately dispatched troops to San Antonio because he believed that it was possible the Comanche would not honor their end of the bargain. Since the Texans did not know the Penateka Comanche were only one band among the several bands of



the Comanche tribe, they could not know that the Penateka Comanche could not return with all of the white captives. They could only bring the white captives under their control. The failure of the Texans to understand the nature of the Comanche is one of the reasons that the Council House Fight was so tragic.<sup>28</sup>

Sixty-five Comanche arrived in San Antonio on March 19, 1840, but they brought only one American captive, Matilda Lockhart. It was clear that the 15-year-old Lockhart had been tortured. She had many bruises, burns, and her nose had been burned to the point where all of fleshy tissue was gone.<sup>29</sup> The Comanche either did not realize the reaction the Texans would have upon seeing the disfigured young girl, or they did not care.

Matilda told the story of her abuse, and told them that there were other captives in the village and that the Comanche planned to sell the captives one at a time.<sup>30</sup> With that news, the troops surrounded the council house. The commissioners asked the Comanche to produce the other prisoners. The main peace chief of the Comanche, Chief Muguara, said that they had brought the only captive that they had, the others were with other bands. After that answer, Muguara asked, "How do you like that answer?" Whereupon Lt. Colonel Fisher replied, "I do not like your answer. I told you not to come here again without bringing in your prisoners. Your women and children may depart in peace, and your braves may go and tell your people to send in the prisoners. When those prisoners are returned, your chiefs here present may likewise go free. Until then we will hold you as hostages."<sup>31</sup> The Comanche interpreter refused to translate the message until Commissioner Cooke insisted. The chiefs were informed that they could send several of their young men back to their camp to retrieve the other captives.<sup>32</sup>

Capt. George T. Howard's company was ordered by Col. Fisher into the council room and into the adjoining room in the back near the courtyard, where the other Comanche warriors were. Once inside, Capt. Howard placed soldiers at the doors and across the room to act as guards. The Texans explained to the Indians that they would not be released until the captives were safely returned to San Antonio. The interpreter translated this ultimatum and bolted from the room.<sup>33</sup>

The Comanche inside the room strung their bows and pulled out their weapons.<sup>34</sup> One of the chiefs ran for the doorway and plunged his knife into the soldier that barred his way. With this, a confused battle began. Chief Muguara stabbed Capt. Howard in the side and then was shot to death. A few chiefs fought their way out of the door and the commotion aroused the rest of the Comanche in the Plaza. The streets, alleys, and backyards for blocks around became a battleground. It was after midnight when the last two Indians were burned out of a backyard kitchen in which they had taken refuge. Casualties from the battle were thirty-five Comanche dead, including three women and two children, and twenty-seven women and children

captured. Seven whites were dead and eight were wounded. The captured Indians were locked up, but one woman was given a horse and provisions and told to take word to the tribe that if they wanted their chiefs back, they must bring in the rest of the white captives.<sup>35</sup> Only after she returned with these hostages would the Indians captured by the Texans be freed. She claimed she could return in four days with the captives, but twelve days was granted to provide her sufficient time. The Texans warned the woman that if she did not return in the given time they would assume the hostages had already been killed by the Comanche in retaliation and the Texans would be forced to kill the Penateka captives. According to Colonel McLeod, the woman was well mounted, given provisions and sent off. Both Colonel McLeod and Colonel Cooke remained in San Antonio to await her return, and when she did not come back in the prearranged twelve days, the Texans assumed the worst.<sup>36</sup>

All of the Texans' Comanche hostages were eventually moved from the city jail to the San Jose Mission.<sup>37</sup> Many of the people of San Antonio went to see them, and, according to Mary Maverick, many felt very bad for their situation. They were treated kindly, and were hired into local homes to live and work. And while some Indians were ransomed and exchanged, the rest managed to escape one way or another.<sup>38</sup>

The Comanche were livid following these events. They considered their ambassadors immune from acts of war, and were outraged that they were attacked and killed or captured.<sup>39</sup> On August 1, one thousand Comanche left the Balcones Escarpment under the leadership of Potsanaquahip (Buffalo Hump) traveled in the direction of the towns and settlements strung out along the rivers and creeks toward the coastal bend of Texas. Traveling with the warriors were their families. As they moved further south they traveled by night.<sup>40</sup> One thousand Comanche passed almost completely unnoticed through territory that contained many homesteads and settlements.<sup>41</sup>

The Comanche stopped at Victoria, Texas, and, on August 6, 1840, were seen on the edge of town. The Comanche attacked and killed a number of people, and the Texans fled to rooftops and opened rifle fire. The Comanche surrounded the town, captured over fifteen hundred horses and mules and generally made mischief, but made no effort to take the town and kill its citizens. The residents of Victoria had time to build barricades and the Comanche were discouraged by the rifle fire. They left the Victoria and headed south. On August 8, they arrived at Linnville, Texas. The Comanche were able to surround the town. They also burned and looted several stores, warehouses, and homes in Linnville, which was an important shipping center; the merchandise was destined for San Antonio and the Mexican trade. The Indians removed all they could carry from the warehouses and then set the warehouses on fire. According to John J. Linn, "the Indians made free with, and went dashing about the blazing village, amid their screeching squaws and 'little Injuns,' like

demons in a drunken saturnalia, with Robinson's [a local merchant ] hats on their heads and Robinson's umbrellas bobbing about on every side like tipsy young balloons."<sup>42</sup> The attack resulted in the virtual destruction of Linnville, Texas.

According to Gary Clayton Anderson, the Comanche had attacked Victoria and Linnville because of the need to avenge the men lost at the Council House Fight. Knowing that they were outgunned and needed weaponry to face the Texans' munitions, the Comanche raided Victoria and Linnville to access the Texan stockpiles.<sup>43</sup> The Comanche escaped from the area with a large number of horses, mules, and a few captives. This huge train, packed with stolen goods and tepees and containing women and children moving slowly across the wide open prairie was not easily missed. Nor was it an opportunity to be squandered. As they approached the Hill Country, awaiting Buffalo Hump and his massive convoy were an assortment of two hundred men who had gathered spontaneously from the towns of Gonzales, Lavaca, Victoria, Cuero and Texana.<sup>44</sup> The Texans spurred forward and crashed into the Comanche, killing fifteen of them. They caused the herd of horses to stampede, which then slammed into the pack horses, many of whom were carrying heavy loads of iron and were bogged down on muddy ground. What ensued was a fight between retreating Comanches and advancing Texans that struggled on over fifteen miles of ground. The Comanche stopped long enough to kill their captives. Ultimately, the Comanche lost most of the loot they had gotten from their raids on Victoria and Linnville, including the horses and mules.

Two months later, Col. John Moore led a squad of volunteers for a punitive expedition against the Comanche. By mid-October, his squad of Texans had gone further west than any Texans had gone before, some three hundred miles west of Austin. There they found a Comanche camp of some sixty lodges. Some accounts say that this was Buffalo Hump's camp.<sup>45</sup> The soldiers camped a few miles away and they attacked at dawn. In this battle, there was no mercy given to women or children. According to Moore, he left "the bodies of men, women and children—wounded, dying and dead on every hand."<sup>46</sup> He claimed to have killed one hundred thirty people in about half an hour. He took thirty-four prisoners and destroyed the village by fire.<sup>47</sup> Moore believed that he had avenged Linnville and Victoria. He may have, but the final war had just begun.

The most famous captive of the era was certainly Cynthia Ann Parker. She was captured by the Comanche at the age of nine, and she was treated as a full family member of the Comanche. Cynthia Ann Parker later became the wife of Peta Nocona and the mother of Quanah Parker. As such, she was helplessly thrown into the middle of a social and cultural disaster of epic proportions.

The Comanche's abilities with bow and arrow were legendary. What they could not battle was the white man's diseases. The Penateka Comanche were hit harder than any other band or tribe on the

plain.<sup>48</sup> No one knows how many thousands of Comanches died in the cholera epidemic of 1849, but what started as a gradual disintegration now looked like dissolution.<sup>49</sup> Ketumseh, a Penateka chief, said: "Over this vast country, where for centuries our ancestors roamed in undisputed possession, free and happy, what have we left? The game, our main dependence, is killed and driven off, and we are forced into the most sterile and barren portions of it to starve. We see nothing but extermination left before us, and we await the result with stolid indifference. Give us a country we can call our own, where we may bury our people in quiet."<sup>50</sup>

It appeared that things were growing worse for the Comanche, but the Comanche would not stop raiding the white settlements. Peta Nocona, along with his son Quanah, performed a series of sweeping, devastating raids into the counties between present-day Fort Worth and Wichita Falls, Texas. His war party swung west of Mesquiteville, and rode hard into the line of settlements, killing everyone they saw. They rode across open country in torrential rain and arrived at a place called Stag Prairie, on the western edge of Parker County.<sup>51</sup> There they attacked the home of Ezra Sherman, raping, scalping, and killing his wife, Martha. Her death was neither senseless nor random. She was as much a victim of colliding political and social forces as she was of the arrows and knives of the raiders. Her death was a consequence of the unprecedented invasion of Comancheria by white settlers that had taken place at the end of the 1850s. She and her husband settled in the long-grass prairie beyond the Cross Timbers in northern Texas. This land was ancient buffalo ground that the Comanches had been fighting for since the early eighteenth century. Martha Sherman and her husband were part of that brazenly aggressive move into Comanche territory.

There was little evidence that anyone in the Office of Indian Affairs in Washington D.C. had the remotest idea of what to do. The only thing that the U.S. government could think to do to solve the Comanche situation was to put four hundred starving Penateka Comanche onto a reservation on the Brazos River in 1855. The Penateka, decimated by waves of diseases, were hunting lands emptied of game and were literally starving to death; the Penatekas who did not go to the reservation were simply being overrun by the new settlers. The reaction of Sanaco, one of the chiefs who came to the reservation, sums up the bitter resignation of the Penatekas: "You come into our country and select a small patch of ground, around which you run a line, and tell us the President will make us a present of this to live on, when everybody knows that the whole of this entire country, from the Red River to the Colorado, is ours, and always had been from time immemorial. I suppose, however, if the President tells us to confine ourselves to these narrow limits, we shall be forced to do so."<sup>52</sup>

In January 1858, Texas staggered from a fresh wave of Comanche attacks in Erath, Brown and Comanche counties. That was when the

Texans had had enough. The Texans would take matters into their own hands, and one hundred men were recruited for six-month terms of service. Rip Ford would command them. Ford and his men were to simply launch themselves north of the Red River, penetrate deep into Comanche territory, and strike an offensive blow. Texas Governor Hardin Runnels told the men, "Follow any and all trails of hostile or suspected hostile Indians you may discover, and if possible, overtake and chastise them, if unfriendly."<sup>53</sup> With these words, Governor Runnel was calling for open war against Indians, in direct defiance of federal policy.

In November of 1860, men from Weatherford went searching for Comanches. They traveled approximately 120 miles when they found a camp with a large number of Indians. When the men attacked, they found that most of the occupants of the camp were women. According to Charles Goodnight, the Rangers spared most, but not all, of the women. The federal troops killed everyone they encountered.<sup>54</sup> In a brief running fight, Lieutenant Sul Ross and Lieutenant Tom Kelliheir pursued the last three Indians on two horses. After a while, they caught up with a single Indian. Ross was about to shoot when the Comanche, who was carrying a small child, either opened her robe to show her breasts or cried, "Americano!" Depending on which version you believe, either one caused Ross not to shoot. Instead, he told Kelleheir to stay with her while Ross took off after the other two riders. He shot one who also turned out to be a woman. The other one turned out to be the chief, and he fired arrows at Ross. Ross shot him. The chief was later identified as Peta Nocona, Cynthia Ann Parker's husband and Quanah Parker's father.<sup>55</sup>

When Ross rode back, he saw that the woman was filthy. He also noted that she had blue eyes. She was then taken back to where Peta Nocona was lying, and she wept and wailed over his body. The soldiers did not let her stay there. They brought her back to the main battlefield and questioned her. She told Ross that she remembered that her father had been killed in a battle long ago and that she and her brother had been captured. That convinced Ross that she might be the long-lost Cynthia Ann Parker. With that, she stopped talking. They took her back to Fort Cooper, and she was delivered to the care of the captain's wife. A Ranger named A.B. Mason stayed with Cynthia Ann for a while, and later wrote a version of what Cynthia Ann told officials at Fort Cooper. His version was published in the February 5, 1861, issue of the *Galveston Civilian*. In this piece, Cynthia Ann said that she remembered as a child living in a house with a picket fence all around. One day some Indians came to the house and when her father went out to talk to them they killed him. She remembered that her mother and her four children were taken captive, but that her mother and two of the children were retaken by a white man. She said she lived with the Indians north of Santa Fe, and she has three children.<sup>56</sup>

Cynthia Ann was returned to her family and back at last in civilization. According to Gwynne, the real tragedy occurred not when Cynthia Ann was first captured by the Comanche, but when she was "rescued" from the Comanche and taken to a culture that she remembered nothing about.<sup>57</sup> To the white people at the time, this was an entirely satisfactory ending to the great epic tale. Cynthia Ann was returned to her family and back at last in civilization.<sup>58</sup>

There were some interesting sequels to the battle as well, with enormous implications to the future of the Comanche tribe. Quanah and his brother survived the battle. After the fight, Goodnight realized that two Indians had left on horseback. The young Ranger and ten scouts tracked them to a Comanche camp in the Panhandle. Although Goodnight never learned the identity of these two riders, they were almost certainly Quanah and his brother.<sup>59</sup>

Quanah Parker was born in 1848. His mother said that he did escape at the same time that she was captured. Quanah later quite forcefully denied that he had ever been there, or that his father had died there. In "the Case for Peta Nocona," Robert H Williams argues that Quanah Parker's later insistence that he and his father were out hunting during the attack was done by Quanah to protect his father's reputation. Quanah did not attempt to set the record straight until 1898, nearly 40 years after the event. He set the record straight when he was giving a speech in Dallas in 1910. He died shortly thereafter.<sup>60</sup>

Quanah was a remarkable man. He said he was born in Elk Creek, in what is now southwestern Oklahoma. But there is a Centennial marker on Cedar Lake south of Seminole, Texas, in Gaines County, that claims that site as Quanah's birth location.<sup>61</sup> For Quanah's first twelve years, he was the son of a powerful man, a war chief with many victories behind him. His father had many horses and was a talented hunter. The warriors and the band followed him as the war chief. According to Quanah, his father was so afraid that his white wife would be taken from him when traders came through the camp he often blackened her face with ashes and made her hide.<sup>62</sup> This might explain why there were very few sightings of Cynthia Ann Parker with the Comanche over the years.

Quanah grew up learning to ride horses, to catch horses, and to rope horses. He also learned to use weaponry young. His father would not have taught him. That was the task of the elderly men in the family, his grandfather or another elderly male. At six, he was given a bow and blunt arrows. As he got older, he began the hunt with real arrows, going out with other boys and shooting birds. The warriors of the Comanche did not know menial labor of any kind. They did not have to help to pack or unpack during moves, and the growing Comanche boys never fetched water or wood. Instead, they played: they wrestled, they swam, they raced their horses, and practiced in play the skills they would need in the future to save their lives.<sup>63</sup>

As he approached puberty, he was expected to strengthen his skills in hunting, particularly in archery, both on horseback and on foot. Comanches were known to be exceptional archers, both on horseback and on foot. He was expected to do no less.<sup>64</sup>

After the battle that killed his father, Quanah became an orphan in a culture that did not easily accommodate orphans. Quanah and his brother had no near relatives to care for them. Then his brother died and Quanah was totally alone. Later he said that he often had to beg for his food and he could scarcely get anyone to make or mend his clothes. "I at last learned that I was more cruelly treated than the other orphans on account of my white blood."<sup>65</sup>

Despite the hardships, Quanah became a full warrior when he was fifteen years old.<sup>66</sup> He was very intelligent and he was by nature aggressive and fearless. He also hated white men. According to his son, Baldwin Parker, "He wished to avenge the wrong. He understood, too, that white people were responsible for his mother's death."<sup>67</sup> Quanah Parker became a war chief at a very young age. His first raid was with the party that rode south through Oklahoma all the way to San Antonio. They stole thirty-eight horses and killed and scalped two white men. When they returned home with their herd of horses and the two scalps, a victory dance was held in their honor.<sup>68</sup>

On October 3, 1871, victorious Union soldiers decided to deal with the Comanche problem once and for all. Six hundred soldiers led by Ranald Slidell Mackenzie, along with their Tonkawa scouts, tracked the Comanche Quahadi tribe to the Llano Estacado. The Comanches were the target because no other tribe had ever caused so much havoc and death. No other tribe was even a close second. The Quahadis Comanches, led by Quanah Parker, had always shunned contact with whites. They never signed a treaty with whites. They were so fierce that even other Comanches feared them. An order was issued to the soldiers to go forward and kill Quahadis Comanches.<sup>69</sup>

For three days and over 40 miles the Union soldiers fought the Comanche. In the end at this time, neither the soldiers nor the Comanches won. But the soldiers had shown that they had the manpower and the weapons, and they were not going to stop. The ruin of the Comanche took four more years. Quanah Parker and Randal Slidell Mackenzie met in 1875, when the Quahadis Comanche finally surrendered and went to the reservation in southwestern Oklahoma.

The Council House Fight took place at the beginning of the westward expansion of the settlers. The fight was the first of many mistakes between the Comanche and the white men. But it was just one of many missteps on the blood-stained path that concluded inevitably some thirty-five years later with Quanah's capitulation to the white man's ways. Quanah embraced cattle ranching, gave speeches throughout the country, and even had dinner with Teddy Roosevelt, but the remainder of the Comanche nation remained in the reservation.<sup>70</sup>

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Paula Allen, "Old Council House saw start of 1840s chaos with Comanches," *San Antonio Express News*, June 10, 2007.

<sup>2</sup> David de La Vere, *The Texas Indians* (College Station: University of Texas A&M Press, 2004), p. 134.

<sup>3</sup> Thomas Kavanagh, *The Comanches: A History, 1706-1875* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), p. 352.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 121-126.

<sup>5</sup> James M. Daniel, "The Spanish Frontier in West Texas and Northern Mexico," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly* 71 (April 1968), 481-95.

<sup>6</sup> De La Vere, *The Texas Indians*, 142; James M. Daniel, "The Spanish Frontier in West Texas and Northern Mexico," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly* 71 (April, 1968), 481-95; Jesus Frank de la Teja, *San Antonio de Bexar: A Community on New Spain's Northern Frontier*, 7, 15.

<sup>7</sup> Donald E. Chipman, *Spanish Texas, 1519-1821* (Austin: The University Of Texas Press, 1992) *Texas*, pp. 198-199.

<sup>8</sup> De la Teja, *San Antonio de Bexar*, pp. 13-14; William E. Dunn, "The Apache Mission on the San Saba: Its Founding and Failure," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly* 17 (April 1914), pp. 379-414.

<sup>9</sup> Joyde Schilz and Thomas F. Schilz. *Buffalo Hump and the Penateka Comanche*. El Paso: Texas Western Press, 1980), 6.

<sup>10</sup> Raul A. Ramos, *Beyond the Alamo: Forging Mexican Ethnicity in San Antonio: 1821 -1861*, (Chapel Hill: University Of North Carolina Press, 2008), p. 144.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> Chipman, *Spanish Texas*, pp. 198-199.

<sup>13</sup> John C. Ewers, "The Influence of Epidemics On the Indian Populations and Cultures of Texas," *Plains Anthropologist* 18 (1973), p. 108.

<sup>14</sup> Arnoldo De León, "Mexican Texas," *Handbook of Texas Online* (<http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/npm01>), accessed August 14, 2013. Published by the Texas State Historical Association.

<sup>15</sup> Schilz, *Buffalo Hump*, p. 7.

<sup>16</sup> Gregg Cantrell, *Stephen F. Austin: Empresario of Texas*, pp.136-137.

<sup>17</sup> Muckleroy, Anna, "The Indian Policy of the Republic of Texas," *The Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, April 1922, Vol. XXV, No. 4, [https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=F25IAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&output=reader&authuser=0&hl=en\\_US&pg=GBS.PA229](https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=F25IAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&output=reader&authuser=0&hl=en_US&pg=GBS.PA229), last accessed October 22, 2012.

<sup>18</sup> Lamar's First Message to Congress, December 21, 1838, *The Papers of Mirabeau B. Lamar*, Eds. , Charles A. Gulick, Jr., Katherine Elliot, and Harriet Smither, 6 vols., (Austin: Von Boeckmann-Jones, 1921-1937), Vol. 2, pp. 346-369.

<sup>19</sup> Lamar, *Papers*, Vol. 3, pp. 159-183.

<sup>20</sup> Donaly Brice, *The Great Comanche Raid: the Boldest Indian Attack of the Texas Republic* (Austin: Eakin Publishers, 1987), p. 13.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 14.

<sup>22</sup> Brice, *The Great Comanche Raid*, p. 18.

<sup>23</sup> J. Love to M.B. Lamar. April 13, 1841, *Lamar Papers*, Vol. 3, pp.507-509.

<sup>24</sup> John H. Wilbarger, *Indian Depredations in Texas* (Austin: Hutchings Printing House, 1889), 22.

<sup>25</sup> Letter from R.A. Irion to Sam Houston, March 14, 1838, Winfrey and Day *The Texas Indian Papers, 1825-1843*, (Texas State Library: Austin, 1959), I: 42-45.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>28</sup> Carol A. Lipscomb, "Comanche Indians," *Handbook of Texas Online* (<http://www.tshaonline.org/articles/bmc72>), last accessed August 30, 2012. Published by Texas State Historical Association.

<sup>29</sup> Alice Gray Upchurch, "LOCKHART, MATILDA," *Handbook of Texas Online* (<http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/flo02>), accessed August 12, 2012. Published by the Texas State Historical Association.

<sup>30</sup> Gregory Michno and Susan Michno, *A Fate Worse Than Death*, location 1643.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*



- <sup>33</sup> Gregory Michno and Susan Michno, *A Fate Worse Than Death*, location 1643.
- <sup>34</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>35</sup> Mary A. Maverick, eds. Rena Maverick Green and Maverick Fairchild Fisher, *The Memoirs Of Mary A. Maverick: A Journal of Early Texas* (San Antonio: Alamo Printing Company, 1921), 38.
- <sup>36</sup> McLeod's Report to on the Council House Fight, March 20, 1840, <https://www.tsl.state.tx.us/exhibits/indian/war/mcleod-mar1840-1.html>; John Holmes Jenkins, ed., *Recollections of Early Texas: The Memoirs of John Holland Jenkins*. Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1958.
- <sup>37</sup> Mildred P Mayhall, *Indian Wars of Texas* (Houston: Texian Press, 1965), 25.
- <sup>38</sup> Maverick. *Memoirs*, 35.
- <sup>39</sup> Gary Clayton Anderson, *The Conquest of Texas: The Ethnic Cleansing in the Promised Land* (Norman: The University of Oklahoma Press, 2005), 183.
- <sup>40</sup> S.C. Gwynne, *Empire of the Summer Moon*, p. 93.
- <sup>41</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>42</sup> Linn, 341-342.
- <sup>43</sup> Gary Clayton Anderson, *The Conquest of Texas: The Ethnic Cleansing In the Promised Land, 120-1875* (Norman: The University of Oklahoma Press, 2005), 185-186.
- <sup>44</sup> John Henry Brown, *Indian Wars and Pioneers of Texas*, p. 81.
- <sup>45</sup> Schilz and Schilz, 24.
- <sup>46</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>47</sup> Ibid, 183-184.
- <sup>48</sup> Ernest Wallace and E. Adamson Hoebel, *The Comanches: Lords of the South Plain (Civilization of the American Indians Series)*. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987), 169-170.
- <sup>49</sup> Rupert N. Richardson, *The Comanche Barrier to the South Plains Settlement* (Glendale: Arthur H Clark Company, 1933), 78.
- <sup>50</sup> Letter: Horace Capron to Robert Howard, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, September 30, 1852, letters received, M234, Roll 858, Texas Agency (cited in Schilz and Schilz, p. 38).
- <sup>51</sup> J. Evetts Haley, *Charles Goodnight: Cowman and Plainsman* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1981), p. 49.
- <sup>52</sup> Randolph Marcy, *The Prairie Traveler: The 1859 Handbook for Westbound Pioneers* (New York: Dover Publications, 2006), p. 218.
- <sup>53</sup> John Salmon Ford, *Rip Ford's Texas*. ed. Stephen B. Oates (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1963), 224.
- <sup>54</sup> Mike Cox, *The Texas Rangers: Wearing the Cinco Peso, 1821-1900* (New York: Forge Books, 2009), 169; Charles Goodnight. *Charles Goodnight's Indian Recollections* (Houston: Russell and Cockrell Printers, 1928), 22.
- <sup>55</sup> Wilbarger, *Indian Depredations*, p. p. 58.
- <sup>56</sup> *The Galveston Civilian*, February 5, 1861.
- <sup>57</sup> S.C. Gwynne, *Empire of the Summer Moon, Quanah Parker And the Rise and Fall of the Comanches, The Most Powerful Indian Tribe In American History* (New York: Scribner, 2010), 181.
- <sup>58</sup> Jo Ella Powell Exley, *Frontier Blood: The Saga of the Parker Family* (Centennial Series of the Association of Former Students, Texas A&M University) (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008), 183-84, citing manuscript of J.A. Dickson.
- <sup>59</sup> Lawrence T, Jones, "Cynthia Ann Parker and Pease Ross, The Forgotten Photographs," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, January 1991, p. 379.
- <sup>60</sup> Robert H. Williams, "The Case for Peta Nocona," *Texans*, Vol. 10, 1972, p. 55.
- <sup>61</sup> Chief Baldwin Parker, *Life of Quanah Parker, Comanche Chief*, through J. Evetts Haley, August 29, 1930, manuscript at Center for American History, University of Texas, Austin.; Brian C. Hosmer, "Parker, Quanah," *Handbook of Texas Online*, (<http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/fpa28>), last accessed October 12, 2012. Published by Texas State historical Association.
- <sup>62</sup> Ibid, p. 186.
- <sup>63</sup> Ernest Wallace and E. Adamson Hoebel, *The Comanches*, p. 81.
- <sup>64</sup> Wallace and Hoebel, p. 178.
- <sup>65</sup> Ibid, p. 183.

<sup>66</sup> "Quanah Parker in Adobe Walls Battle," *Borger News Herald*, date unknown, Panhandle Plains Historical Museum Archives.

<sup>67</sup> Chief Baldwin Parker, *Life of Quanah Parker, Comanche Chief*, through J. Evetts Haley, August 29, 1930, manuscript at Center for American History, University of Texas, Austin.

<sup>68</sup> Exley, *Frontier Blood*, p. 291.

<sup>69</sup> S.C. Gwynne, "The Last Days of the Comanche," *Texas Monthly*, May 2010, <http://www.texasmonthly.com/2010-05-01/feature4-2.php>, last accessed November 4, 2012.

<sup>70</sup> Steve Barnett, "Epoch of Comancheria," *San Antonio Express News*, August 22, 2010.

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## Mining Picks and Baseball Bats: The Unique Sports Culture of Butte, MT

Kevin Edgar

In industrial cities, it is inevitable that the population will be made up of the working class – that is, young single men and women; a group which is known for restless attitudes and competitive behavior. The dangers inherent in the work and the proximity of the residential areas to each other tend to create a stress within the society. To help alleviate stress and to act as a “pressure valve,” groups create formal, organized competition – games. These activities tend to unify social and racial groups and create a group association and competition in a socially healthy way. This “blowing off of steam” substitutes for unhealthy competition and helps avoid damage to the group as a whole. From an economic point of view, the industry associated with the city benefits by encouraging healthy social competition. If stress is relieved in the working group, it helps ensure that productivity, and therefore, profit, are maximized.

Butte, Montana, is an example of such a city that understands the benefit of athletic competition to a society. The history of the mining camp that became one of the most influential cities during the electrical industrial revolution is rich with stories of athletic competition. These athletic competitions and the subsequent rallying of fans behind competing teams helped to create a unique culture in the city.

Sports and games predate modern industrial American cities. Nor are they unique to “civilized people.” European explorers and colonists encountered Native Americans who played games and sports for pure amusement as well as ceremonial reasons. European colonists brought their own gaming tradition and what historians Elliot J. Gorn and Warren J. Goldstein describe as recreational ideologies to the new world. Leisure and sport were seen by the English as rewards for hard work and a job well done. Games and sports were ingrained in the British tradition at all class levels.<sup>1</sup>

Gorn and Goldstein describe seventeenth century English communities competing against each other in exuberant “hurling” matches – a competition to bring a ball to a goal, similar to modern soccer and football that would take place over miles of countryside and involve large numbers of the males of the competing communities. The competition was generally followed by a large feast sponsored by the local nobility. These competitions served a few purposes. First, it acted to provide “cultural glue” in the communities. The inhabitants of the communities could find common ground in rooting for their young men as they competed against the young men of the neighboring

community – serving, in essence, as a substitute for warfare. These competitions, which usually happened around feast and festival days, also helped to secure loyalty to the local lord, who sponsored the games and the feasts.<sup>2</sup>

According to Gorn and Goldstein, the relationship between the aristocracy and the lower classes was strengthened through these events. The rural laborers saw the feasts and celebrations as a form of reward – something they had earned through years of loyal work and service. The males of the community saw the games as a way to define their masculinity. By providing such amusement, the gentleman secured loyalty and devotion from the common man, as well as forestalling any social uprising among the working class.

Contemporary writers advocated such amusements as a form of social control. John Brand wrote in favor of popular recreation: “Popular pastimes not only helped workers accept their lot, but siphoned off discontent that otherwise might lead to political rebellion.”<sup>3</sup>

In the 1820’s only about five percent of Americans lived in cities, within fifty years that number quadrupled. Farm workers, especially those displaced by the Civil War, migrated to the city in search of employment. New York, the first American city to surpass 100,000 inhabitants, grew from 123,000 in 1820 to 942,000 in 1870.<sup>4</sup> According to Stephen Reiss, writing in *City Games*, in New York, during this time, as in other American cities:

Changing demographics, rising wealth, new spatial patterns, improved interurban transportation and communication networks, new voluntary class and ethnic organizations, the rise of modern political institutions, and traditional, transitional, and emerging modern values all interacted with each other and sport to produce a variety of distinctive urban sporting subcultures.<sup>5</sup>

To the individual living in a city in the late nineteenth century, city life was a lonely existence. Alone in a sea of strangers, the urban individual, especially a single young man, could feel disconnected. Sports teams offered a sense of community and a place to belong for the young urbanite. Teams and sport allowed men to create what Reiss calls “sporting fraternities.” These fraternities were an informal brotherhood of men who “sponsored, participated in and attended traditional sporting contests.”<sup>6</sup>

These fraternities transcended class divisions and included the economic elites as well as lower class men; a group Reiss calls “the bachelor subculture.” Made up mostly of the working class, the sporting fraternities provided a refuge against the loneliness of city life and became a substitute family for its members.<sup>7</sup>

Butte, Montana was one of thousands of mining camps that sprung up throughout the west in the late nineteenth century. First



gold, then silver, brought miners to the camp located high on the Continental Divide. But it was copper that made what could have been just another busted mining town into one of the most prosperous cities of the industrial age. By the turn of the twentieth century, Butte boasted a population of over 100,000 and was the most significant city between Minneapolis and Spokane. The copper mined in Butte became the wires that electrified the world.<sup>8</sup>

The citizens of Butte were immigrants from around the world. Miners from Cornwall and Ireland were followed by immigrants from Finland, Italy, China, and the Baltic Peninsula. It has been claimed that there were more than forty languages spoken in Butte around the turn of the century.<sup>9</sup> The immigrants brought with them their home cultures which combined and created a unique Butte culture. The great grandchildren of the original immigrants still live in Dublin Gulch, Finntown, German Gulch and The Cabbage Patch. Butte was a typical mining town. Inhabited primarily by young, single men, it has been said that in its heyday, Butte was a “wide open town.” It was a mecca for drinking, gambling, and prostitution.

And sports. Just as in other communities, workers in Butte found camaraderie and fellowship in sports. Each mine had a sports team and neighborhoods engaged in competitions, pitting not only local, but cultural and international ties against one another. The difficulty of the work and the diversity of the backgrounds of the inhabitants created a unique culture in Butte. The history of sports in the city reflects this uniqueness.

The quintessential American sport is baseball. It swept the nation in the 1880's, according to Ronald Story,<sup>10</sup> with the intensity of what can only be called a cultural movement. Story compares the movement of baseball to other mass cultural movements such as temperance or revivalism. Baseball seemed made for Butte. According to Story, baseball was a “man's sport.” Baseball offered the opportunity for men to play a boy's game. The rules stay the same whether you are playing Little League or Major League Baseball. Baseball ties into the bachelor subculture in ways that other sports don't. Baseball, unlike fishing or hunting, says Story, is aggressively physical. It is simple to learn and featured bursts of exciting play. Baseball is intensely competitive. This competitive nature lent itself easily to the rough and tumble life in Butte, MT. Butte was one of the first western cities to organize baseball. The Butte Mines League was created in 1899 and became part of the Pacific Coast league in 1901.<sup>11</sup> The history of the city's teams and leagues is long and colorful. The 1920's were the heyday of Butte baseball. The mining companies sponsored teams with such names as The Young Muckers, The Berkeley Mines team, The Clark team and the Anaconda Company Team. Today's American Legion teams in Butte harken back to the mining past. The teams are nicknamed the Miners and the Muckers.

Football too, was a perfect fit for Butte. As Don James says in *Butte's Memory Book*, “Contact sports and Butte fans seem to be a

natural combination.” The rough life in the mining city was reflected in the brutal play on the field. Playing on fields of granite, the players were an early example of “Butte tough.”<sup>12</sup> Football began in Butte just before the turn of the century. James’ book features pictures of professional teams from the 1890’s. One professional Butte team proclaimed themselves the “World Champions” of 1895. Football was a device in early Butte that was used as social control to keep the rising gang problem under control. According to James, in 1926, a fierce inter-gang rivalry had arisen among the youths in Butte. The competition for turf and access to athletic equipment had led to property damage and rock fights among the gangs. Several youths were arrested and sent to the state industrial school that year. In response, the Butte government created a youth sports program which soon gained national attention. Thousands of youths were said to have participated. The program offered a variety of sports and activities for both boys and girls.<sup>13</sup>

Butte’s young athletes have made their mark in high school sports as well. Butte has become known as the City of Champions due to the number of state championships its high school teams have racked up over the years. The Montana High School Association began its formal high school state championships in 1900. Butte High School won eleven of the first twenty football state championships and has won the title 26 times since. The Butte High team won their most recent state football championship trophy on November 16th, 2012 in what many have called the greatest football game in the history of Butte.<sup>14</sup> When championships in basketball, track, and softball are added to the count, it becomes very obvious that Butte high school athletes have continued the culture of sports and have continued the long tradition of winning.

Bruce Saylor, long time sports editor at the Montana Standard, points to the ethnic diversity and rough living conditions as factors that create Butte athletes:

Ethnic competitiveness probably bred the Butte athlete and needing one another to survive dire circumstances made the rivalries mostly friendly, forming teams that were forces with which those from other locales were forced to contend.<sup>15</sup>

Saylor says that, “Butte kids play with their hearts and souls as well as their brains, bodies, talent, arms and legs.” Recalling his early days as a sportswriter in Butte, Saylor says:

The first football game and basketball game I covered in Butte, I noticed the difference. Emotions were dialed up a notch above what I thought I had experienced was the top. I could almost feel the vibration of the importance of the moment oozing up through the ground

and floor between my toes. I still experience the feeling and it still is a tingle.<sup>16</sup>

According to James, "It meant something to be a kid in Butte."<sup>17</sup> Sayler echoes that sentiment:

It means he or she will be teased and envied by those from other places. It means he or she will have hallowed ground in a good sports city. It means he or she has earned respect of the community, it means he or she holds membership in a club of legends, greats and solid citizens. It means he or she has been offered a foundation that can be used toward building a productive life and some help in rearing families of their own thanks to life lessons learned.<sup>18</sup>

The rivalries between teams within the city of Butte have resulted in many examples of fierce athletic competition as well as moments that bind the schools together. The two high schools, Butte High School and Butte Central Catholic High School have sustained a long, intense "sibling rivalry." However, sharing their Butte background, the two schools come together when needed. At Butte High games against other schools, a good portion of the crowd will be made up of Butte Central students and vice versa.

Writing in the *Montana Standard* in 2008, Sportswriter Bill Foley described a girls' basketball game in which the two schools came together in a way that transcends sport. One of the Butte High player's fathers had recently died of cancer, and a freshman player was killed earlier that year by a drunk driver. In addition, the daughter of the Butte Central head coach was undergoing treatment for cancer. The two teams turned what should have been the yearly grudge match into a celebration of the human spirit. The two teams wore matching warm-ups and paid tribute throughout the game to their fellow Butte citizens and athletes. "I couldn't help but think that BC-Butte High rivalry is just like a sibling rivalry. Brothers or sisters will fight like hell. But when times are tough, they stick together, "That's Butte to a T: I can beat him up, but you better keep your damn hands off of him," said Foley.<sup>19</sup>

Sports are much more than kicking or throwing a ball. To individuals it can mean personal glory or fortune. For a city, it can be a reflection of, and creation of a unique cultural identity. Throughout history, athletics have helped create communities and bind those communities together.

#### Notes

<sup>1</sup> Elliot J. Gorn and Warren J. Goldstein, *A brief history of American Sports* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Garroux, 2004), 6

<sup>2</sup> Gorn and Goldstein, 8.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, 13.

<sup>4</sup> NYC Department of City Planning

<sup>5</sup> Stephen A. Reiss, *City Games: The evolution of American Urban Society and the rise of sports* (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1989), 14.

<sup>6</sup> Reiss, 15.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, 16.

<sup>8</sup> Ellen Crain and Lee Whitney. *Butte* (Charleston, SC: Arcadia Publishing, 2009), 8.

<sup>9</sup> Janet L. Finn, *Tracing the Veins: Of Copper, Culture and Community from Butte to Chuquicamata* (Berkely, CA: University of California Press, 1998), 76.

<sup>10</sup> Ronald Story, "The Country of the Young, the meaning of Baseball in Early American Culture." In *Sport in America: From wicked amusement to national obsession*, by Kenneth T. Wiggins, 121-128. Champlain, IL: Human Kinetics, 1995.

<sup>11</sup> Bruce Sayler, interview by Kevin Edgar. *Thoughts on unique Butte sports culture* (July 17, 2011).

<sup>12</sup> Don James, *Butte's Memory Book* (Caldwell, ID: Caxton Publishers, 1975), 275.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., 276.

<sup>14</sup> Montana High School Association. Montana High School Association. 2006. MHSa.org (accessed July 2011).

<sup>15</sup> Bruce Sayler, interview by Kevin Edgar. *Thoughts on unique Butte sports culture* (July 17, 2011).

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> James, 276.

<sup>18</sup> Sayler.

<sup>19</sup> Bill Foley, "Tap 'er light." *Montana Standard*, January 14, 2008. [http://mtstandard.com/sports/high-school/tap-er-light-how-the-times-have-changed/article\\_4cf1c08f-6f81-52be-8c60-249a58bd3486.htm](http://mtstandard.com/sports/high-school/tap-er-light-how-the-times-have-changed/article_4cf1c08f-6f81-52be-8c60-249a58bd3486.htm).

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*Immonen in 1994. They have two children, Melanie and Morgan. Kevin received his Bachelor's Degree in Liberal Studies with a focus in Literature and Philosophy from Montana Tech of the University of Montana in 2005. He graduated from American Public University in 2013 with a Masters degree in American History.*

## American Women in the 1950s: The Years Between the War and Liberation

Corinne Fox

When World War II ended with the dramatic explosions of the atomic bombs, the United States emerged as a world super power vowing to fight oppression and spread democracy. In an effort to accomplish this colossal feat, the United States first had to prove to the rest of the world that its people deserved the envy they sought. Civilians, desperate to reestablish a sense of normalcy, took this opportunity to create a citadel of domestic conformity. The shift from cramped city living to spacious suburban life began as early as the 1920s but encountered significant challenges in the 1930s and early 1940s. In 1945, American women were finally able to refocus their efforts and continue their pursuit of the American Dream that their parents had craved during the previous decades. The ingrained desire to create the idealistic family with a male breadwinner, female homemaker, and several children with a piece of land to call their own sprouted during the post World War I economic boom of the 1920s and came to fruition following the Allied victory of World War II.<sup>1</sup>

The history of women in the 1950s became a popular topic for research in the 1980s. Joanne Meyerowitz notes in *Not June Cleaver: Women and Gender in Postwar America, 1945-1960* that prior to the 1980s, historians focused more on working women during World War II and the women who led the Women's Liberation Movement in the 1960s and 1970s than on the years between the two.<sup>2</sup> As the subject of women in the 1950s grew in popularity, many historians claimed that housewives were mostly acquiescent to their domestic plight despite the timeless marital issues that tend to vex couples of any era. While most acknowledge that the iconic picture of the perfect family in a Levittown-like community applied to white middle-class Americans, historian Elaine Tyler May argues in *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era* that this era also showed remarkable conformity among African American and Jewish women as well.<sup>3</sup> Historians also tend to agree that housewives' lack of intellectual stimulation from stifled careers spurred many of them and their daughters in the 1960s and 70s into revolting against the accepted norms of conformity.

Historians May and Laura Miller set the stage for 1950s history by tracing its roots back to the earlier parts of the century. Miller notes in her article, "Family Togetherness and the Suburban Ideal," that the economic prosperity of the 1920s put the first waves of suburbanization into motion.<sup>4</sup> Transportation technologies like the railroad and

automobile made it possible for Americans to move to more remote patches of land and still have transportation access to their jobs in the cities. The number of housing construction projects skyrocketed thanks to the higher wages of prospective homeowners.<sup>5</sup> Miller then acknowledges that during the Great Depression and the subsequent war, nearly all new housing efforts came to an abrupt halt.

Elaine Tyler May especially dedicates a substantial section to identifying how the 1950s were cultivated by the unique environment of the 1930s and 1940s. Marriage rates reached record lows in the 1930s due to the Great Depression. May claims that young men were reluctant to marry if they felt financially unprepared to support a wife and children.<sup>6</sup> Society encouraged women to work and to help boost the overall family income provided they never earned higher wages than their husbands or fathers. This all changed with the Pearl Harbor attack when America plunged into World War II. Marriage rates suddenly spiked in 1942 buoyed by many young couples rushing to marry before the boys soldiered off to war as Emily Yellin points out in *Our Mother's War: American Women at Home and at the Front During World War II*.<sup>7</sup> May and Yellin agree that the Second World War opened a new door for women in the workplace. As men fought in the European and Pacific theaters, women rose to the occasion and helped the war effort in every way from growing vegetables in their own personal victory gardens to joining the Women's Army Corps.<sup>8</sup> After the sudden end of the war, instead of seeing a continued female presence in traditionally male-oriented jobs, men and women were eager to recapture the prosperity of the 1920s and reverted back to previously held standards of gender separation.

A favorite theme of 1980s and 1990s historians is the actual "suburban sprawl" that occurred during the late 1940s and early 1950s. Couples fled the cities in droves searching for their own little piece of suburban heaven. Glenna Matthews acknowledges in *"Just a Housewife": The Rise and Fall of Domesticity in America* the dire need for housing during the immediate postwar years and claims that two and a half million families shared homes in the late 1940s.<sup>9</sup> Miller rightfully attributes the ability of young married couples to purchase new homes to the GI Bill and government mortgage assistance.<sup>10</sup> Between 1948 and 1958, Kristina Zarlengo notes in her article, "Civilian Threat, the Suburban Citadel, and Atomic Age American Women," that 64 percent of population growth occurred in the suburbs, and out of the thirteen million new home construction projects, eleven million were located in the suburbs.<sup>11</sup>

Housing trends also underwent a stylistic transformation. Victorian-style homes with several stories and multiple partitioned rooms gave way to single-story ranchers with a more open layout. The open floor plan eased the housewife's ability to tend to her culinary responsibilities while still keeping a close eye on her young children playing in the adjacent living room.<sup>12</sup> Dolores Hayden, another prominent 1980s historian who authored, *Redesigning the American*

*Dream: The Future of Housing, Work, and Family Life*, wrote that this quintessential home typified the American Dream complete with its white picket fence, television set, and electric washing machine.<sup>13</sup>

Historians across all decades recognize the implications for women in this patriarchal panorama of the American Dream. A new home in a new community came with the expectation that women would surrender their wartime work and pay to returning servicemen. Many women gave up careers altogether for the life of a wife, mother, and fulltime homemaker. May and historian Douglas Hurt, author of *The Great Plains during World War II*, equally purport that women who held wartime industrial jobs traditionally filled by men accepted massive layoffs and returned to the home or to lower wage, lower skilled jobs.<sup>14</sup> Hayden concurs, adding that most wartime employers immediately terminated their day-care programs, and that the one-time riveters who remained in the workforce became supermarket check-out clerks, maids, and cafeteria workers.<sup>15</sup>

Despite this shift in the type of work performed by women during the war's aftermath, historians are careful to acknowledge that the actual number of women in the workforce continued to increase. Meyerowitz notes that the rate of married women in the workforce grew by a staggering 42 percent during the 1950s.<sup>16</sup> Historian Eugenia Kaledin, author of *American Women in the 1950s: Mothers and More*, claims that many women worked to supplement the overall household income and help improve their family's standard of living in connection with the growing consumerist society.<sup>17</sup> Although Kaledin's and May's books vastly differ from each other, May also comments on America's increased spending, primarily on automobiles, recreation, and household appliances, that she attributes to the overall higher median family income.<sup>18</sup> Yet women remained mindful of the fact that their domestic responsibilities trumped any involvement outside the home. Society accepted women workers so long as they never posed a threat to their male breadwinners.

Most historians acknowledge the reversal of women's freedom in the public sector though not all agree on how conscious the women themselves were of the change. Matthews argues that women felt deceived about the rewards of housewifery. She uses the analogy that men who dig ditches are not told that their line of work is glamorous, so they do not hold unrealistic expectations. Housewives, on the other hand, maintained that they were misled into believing falsehoods about the joys of a professional homemaking career, but instead found themselves trapped in a domestic web, disillusioned by their mundane routines.<sup>19</sup> Though Matthews then goes on to discuss the influence of Betty Freidan's *Feminine Mystique*, she is careful to also note Freidan's overall lack of historical analysis and practical implications of female liberation.<sup>20</sup>

Kaledin dedicates a portion of her book to the stifled education of many women who dropped out of college to get married or those who married immediately after college without time to use their



newly earned degrees for a career. These women claimed that they instead married who they wanted to become; if they studied law in college, they married a lawyer. If they studied medicine in college, they married a doctor.<sup>21</sup> Still, despite the fact that women in the 1950s suffered from gender discrimination from both the government and society, Kaledin argues that those same women who donned new hats, starched white gloves, and pushed baby carriages, continued to become more aware of their own potential.<sup>22</sup>

Other historians are more forgiving of 1950s middle-class women who accepted their plight as subordinate housewives to the male head of household. May and authors Eliza K. Pavalko and Glen H. Elder Jr. draw on primary source responses provided by women who participated in longitudinal studies in the 1950s. May references the Kelly Longitudinal Study (KLS) while Pavalko and Elder dissect the Terman Longitudinal Study (TLS) conducted by Stanford University every five years from 1936-1960 in their article, "Women Behind the Men: Variations in Wives' Support of Husbands' Careers."<sup>23</sup> In both studies, high percentages of women who provided written responses to the open-ended questions indicated that they viewed motherhood and being a loyal and obedient wife as their primary life goal. In the KLS, May observed that women who gave up careers for their families claimed that what they had gained through motherhood far outweighed their career aspirations.<sup>24</sup> Interestingly, Pavalko and Elder specifically note one individual in the TLS who chose to have a childless marriage in order to focus on a career in epidemiology but later expressed regret in sacrificing a family.<sup>25</sup> Women who chose married life and motherhood over a paying profession not only believed their sole purpose was to raise babies and put dinner on the table, but that their contribution to the American family helped ward off threats to national security.

Immediately after the Allies won World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union plunged into a Cold War that plagued national security with the imminent threat of nuclear war and the spread of communism. A new wave of conservatism swept over national politics. Landon Y.R. Storrs, in his article, "Attacking the Washington 'Femmocracy': Antifeminism in the Cold War Campaign Against 'Communists in Government,'" claims that these new conservatives attacked women by claiming unhealthy and immoral synergies between feminism and communism.<sup>26</sup> To contain growing Red Scares on the home front, propagandists supporting the civil defense strategists gave women a new challenge. Instead of working outside the home, they encouraged women to prepare their home and family for an atomic attack. May notes how many women described the professionalization of their homemaker career by learning first aid, fire-fighting, and the art of stocking a bomb shelter with supplies, yet not all women found complacency in homemaking and child rearing.<sup>27</sup>

Revisionists revisited this same time period over the last two decades of the century. They narrowed in on the women who defied

the norm, or they limited their focus to a single aspect of 1950s women's history, helping to create a more well-rounded and balanced history. The aforementioned Joanne Meyerowitz offers a history unique from the tale of the white, middle-class American housewife. Meyerowitz acknowledges that most other historians emphasize the influence of domestic conformity, the sexist treatment of women in the workplace, and the overall prejudice against their presence in the public sector.<sup>28</sup> She argues to the contrary, however, suggesting that, "experts and opinion leaders not only recognized and approved of women's increasing employment but also sought to adjust public opinion and public policy to accommodate women's greater participation in the public sphere."<sup>29</sup>

Eugenia Kaledin, like Meyerowitz, also attempts to give a voice to the women who struggled to be defined by more than their legacy as mothers. Kaledin does not attempt to argue against the claims made by the above-mentioned authors, but she instead focuses on the women who defied the norm and are noteworthy exceptions to the stereotypes. In a time when many female historians focused on the suffocating housewife soon to be awakened by Betty Freidan's *Feminine Mystique*, Kaledin wrote about the women already liberating themselves. Kaledin does not refute the high marriage and fertility rates nor the limited employment options and wages available to women during the 1950s. Instead, she recognizes the women who struggled to work as authors, artists, and scholars, and fought not only against gender discrimination but also racial discrimination. She concludes that this work outside of the home helped these women maintain the sense of independence and power they once tasted during the war years.<sup>30</sup>

Modern historians typically conclude their discussions of the 1950s with a foreshadowing of the imminent Women's Liberation Movement. Glenna Matthews mentions a book published in 1941 by Pearl Buck with similar content to that of Betty Freidan's though she attributes the escalating international conflict as an explanation for why the book failed to generate much of a response. By the mid-1950s, however, Freidan's definition of the *Feminine Mystique* as "the problem that has no name" catches the attention of American housewives who can relate on a personal level.<sup>31</sup> May, on the other hand, concludes that the new wave of 1960s feminism is born not from the young mothers of the late 1940s and early 1950s, but instead from their daughters who rejected their mother's domestic confinement.<sup>32</sup> Interestingly, each author presents compelling justifications for both sides, leaving the readers to find their own truths.

From the countless housewives and nameless mothers of the baby boom to renowned figureheads like Eleanor Roosevelt and Rosa Parks, the new voice of 1950s women is one of individualism and diversity. Historians in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s capture the essence of women living in the cities and suburbs during the post World War II years. For most, it was a time of raising children and

coping with common marital and family struggles while others refused to surrender the freedom they discovered while at work during the war. These women left a tremendous legacy for their daughters and granddaughters, and with the diligent work of modern historians, this history with its lessons and values will be preserved for the women of tomorrow.

#### Notes

<sup>1</sup> Laura J. Miller, "Family Togetherness and the Suburban Ideal," *Sociological Forum* 10, no. 3 (September 1995): 401, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/684782> (accessed September 8, 2011).

<sup>2</sup> Joanne Jay Meyerowitz ed., *Not June Cleaver: Women and Gender in Postwar America, 1945-1960* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994), 2.

<sup>3</sup> Elaine Tyler May, *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era* (New York: Basic Books, 2008), 26.

<sup>4</sup> Miller, 401.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, 401.

<sup>6</sup> May, 41.

<sup>7</sup> Emily Yellin, *Our Mother's War: American Women at Home and at the Front during World War II* (New York: Free Press, 2004), 5.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid, 5.

<sup>9</sup> Glenna Matthews, *"Just a housewife": The Rise and Fall of Domesticity in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 203.

<sup>10</sup> Laura Miller, 401.

<sup>11</sup> Kristina Zarlengo, "Civilian Threat, the Suburban Citadel, and Atomic Age American Women," in "Institutions, Regulation, and Social Control," special issue, *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 24, no. 4 (Summer 1999): 936, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3175598> (accessed September 10, 2011).

<sup>12</sup> Laura Miller, 401.

<sup>13</sup> Dolores Hayden, *Redesigning the American Dream: The Future of Housing, Work, and Family Life* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1984), 21.

<sup>14</sup> R. Douglas Hurt, *The Great Plains during World War II* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), 67.

<sup>15</sup> Hayden, 25.

<sup>16</sup> Meyerowitz, 86.

<sup>17</sup> Eugenia Kaledin, *American Women in the 1950s: Mothers and More* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1984), 64.

<sup>18</sup> May, 158.

<sup>19</sup> Glenna Matthews, 195.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid, 217-218.

<sup>21</sup> Kaledin, 43.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid, 214.

<sup>23</sup> Eliza K. Pavalko and Glen H. Elder Jr., "Women Behind the Men: Variations in Wives' Support of Husbands' Careers," *Gender and Society* 7, no. 4 (December 1993): 550-551. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/189513> (accessed September 8, 2011).

<sup>24</sup> May, 32.

<sup>25</sup> Pavalko and Elder, 552.

<sup>26</sup> Landon Y.R. Storrs, "Attacking the Washington 'Femmocracy': Antifeminism in the Cold War Campaign Against 'Communists in Government,'" *Feminist Studies* 33, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 125, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20459124> (accessed September 8, 2011).

<sup>27</sup> May, 101.

<sup>28</sup> Meyerowitz, 3.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid, 86.

<sup>30</sup> Kaledin, 212.

<sup>31</sup> Matthews, 199.

<sup>32</sup> May, 197.

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Sisterhood of Courage: African American Women and Their  
Efforts to Aid Union Forces in the Civil War

Lynn Gilland

Few, if any, will argue the significance of the Civil War in America's timeline. The compendium of literature on the topic is vast. At the heart of any war lie people, whether they are generals or privates, military or civilian, male or female. While the military efforts of African American men, both slave and free, have received moderate attention, those of African American women during this era remain relatively unexplored. Being both black *and* female provided them unique opportunities to aid Union forces – some bold and glorious, others meek and humble, all of them worthy of recognition and gratitude. Their lives, their contributions, and their trials, tribulations, and triumphs are an important component of the war years. Without their stories being added to the anthology of Civil War research, the annals are incomplete.

In understanding the efforts of African American women to aid federal forces, it is important to examine the wide network shared by these women. This uncommon sisterhood, shared by African American women in the North and South, grew from the shared bond of a single struggle: to gain and enjoy the freedoms of United States citizens. In this undertaking they often endured persecution, racial hatred, and injustice. In the South, time spent shared among slave women during the labor of their “second shift” tasks of cooking, mending, and tending garden plots provided an opportunity to visit with one another. Saturdays were a common day to gather while doing the family washing. Spinning and weaving the evening quota of cloth for the slaveholder was often done in the company of others. These communal moments were times when close bonds were formed, as well as allowing for the exchange of gossip, stories, and medical advice.<sup>1</sup> In addition to mutual labors, southern slave women engaged in the “domestic slave economy.” This economy provided an exchange network in which goods (typically “liberated” from the slaveholder's larder) were traded, sold, and bartered with other slaves and poor whites.<sup>2</sup> The bonds of “sisterhood” shared among these women and the networks they developed would serve them well during the years of the Civil War. Much needed food, information, aid, and medicine were obtained and passed along the channels of this complex network, often at great risk to themselves.

In the North, churches served as the epicenter of black communities. The efforts of African American women in the support of their churches figured prominently. They often formed women's auxiliary groups, such as the Daughters of Convention of the Second Baptist

Church in New Bedford, Massachusetts.<sup>3</sup> Auxiliary groups provided a number of needed services. Their participation cemented the church as a nexus for information and advice, and provided a tightly woven source of support for the war effort and abolitionist activities as well.<sup>4</sup> Congregations in both northern and southern cities shared both direct and indirect ties to one another, which made for an expansive fabric which both united and served black women in their efforts. In the South, where black churches were often outlawed, extensive familial connections served as a proxy for church communities.<sup>5</sup> Women, bound by family and religious ties, relied upon churches as a place of belonging. As historian Randall Miller writes, "However much race and poverty kept blacks down, their churches lifted them up. Organized religion gave blacks the self-respect slavery had denied them."<sup>6</sup> By having a place of support of their own, they in turn focused their efforts on supporting others.

It is also important to examine and understand the differences in the South between rural and urban slave women. Where one lived affected not only interpersonal connections and opportunities, but attitudes and self-initiative as well. Slave women living in large urban environments led relatively autonomous lives.<sup>7</sup> Daily responsibilities of shopping alone in town for food and other household errands encouraged initiative and independence as well. These tasks not only permitted, but required casual contact between black and white, and free and slave laborers. They also provided opportunity for urban slaves to participate in a rich social life as they gathered to gossip and/or engage in business. Markets, grocery shops, street corners, churches and homes of friends all provided open places of meeting for perhaps clandestine purposes. Owners, particularly after 1861, when inflation skyrocketed along with the cost of goods, permitted urban slaves to work at skilled trades in exchange for a part of their earnings. One such slave woman used her earnings from washing the clothes of Confederate soldiers to buy ingredients to bake bread for Union prisoners of war held in a nearby POW camp. According to the account, "She got in to the prisoners through a hole under the jail-yard fence; knowing all the while she'd be shot if caught at it."<sup>8</sup> Her ability to have personal earnings, as well as the relative freedom to buy goods and move about on her own provided her with the means, opportunity, initiative, and will to risk certain death to provide comfort and aid to Lincoln's soldiers.

Also bolstering black women was their perception of themselves. The Civil War and the Emancipation Proclamation in particular, imbued these women with a new sense of self and provided them with opportunities to assert these new identities.<sup>9</sup> Even black women who remained in slavery began to develop and express new self-images and attitudes. As bondwomen, they began to express in both subtle and direct ways that their owners could no longer take for granted their servile obedience. As one slave woman abruptly responded to her owner's demands, "Answering bells is played out!"<sup>10</sup> Another

account tells of Ellen, a house slave, who was discovered in the master bedroom, admiring herself in the mirror, while sampling her mistress's toiletries. In admiring and anointing her body with perfume, she was laying claim to self-possession and image of herself – a rather soft, feminine perception.<sup>11</sup> Being a lover, wife, mother, matriarch, sister, daughter, and cousin all took on an expanded meaning. Their efforts to aid Union forces were grounded in and buttressed by these self-images and kinship ties. It was a way to demonstrate who they were as women and as independent, *free American citizens*.

Non-church affiliated auxiliary and relief groups provided black women with another opportunity to unite and assist soldiers and the war effort. The forty African American women who comprised the Contraband Relief Society provided food and clothing to those fleeing slavery who arrived at Union army camps. In Savannah, Georgia recently freed slaves received assistance in the form of \$500 from the Colored Ladies' Sanitary Commission of Boston.<sup>12</sup> Both secular and religious relief organizations used their extensive connections to gather needed medicines and supplies that were then distributed to field hospitals. Sewing circles dedicated their time and efforts to assembling uniforms as well as bandages. Other groups, though not exclusively black in membership, supported black women who served as teachers to black soldiers and contrabands in military camps. The American Missionary Association financially supported an unnamed young black woman who taught at Fortress Monroe.<sup>13</sup> Black women were fully engaged in supporting the war effort in a wide-ranging variety of capacities.

Among the most humble, and perhaps overlooked, of those contributing their labor to the Union military were the laundresses and cooks, called "hags", who travelled with regiments around the country. Their experiences as slaves aided them in adjusting to the harshness of camp life. Limited diet, insufficient housing and sanitary conditions helped prepare them for the harsh realities of camp life. There they encountered bug-infested damp blankets, drafty tents, sparse and limited food and supplies, and open cooking fires. While some joined camps as a means of protection against re-enslavement, others viewed their efforts of assisting the military as a pathway to full citizenship, including civil and political rights.<sup>14</sup> These women also occasionally took on the role of nurses, particularly in all-black regiments where white women refused to care for black soldiers. While laundry, cooking, and other domestic chores may not seem as much of a way to support the military, having someone willing to perform these tasks was a blessed relief to many soldiers. In a letter home, a Union soldier in Georgia lamented, "I spend the afternoon in washing, mending and baking. I was very tired at night and wondered how women gets through with as much work as they do. Washing, etc. is the hardest work I have to do."<sup>15</sup> It also offered an economic opportunity as well. Those hired directly by the Union army generally earned between six and ten dollars per month.<sup>16</sup> Those not

hired by the army, but attached themselves to regiments sometimes exchanged their labor for meager food and shelter. Others charged a few cents (generally two or three) per piece of clothing, paid directly by each soldier.<sup>17</sup> These women had a much more difficult time in acquiring regular, steady wages. Susie King Taylor, at the age of 14, joined the 1st South Carolina Volunteers (later renamed the 33rd U.S. Colored Troops). While with the regiment she labored as an unpaid cook, laundress, and eventually nurse. Of her experience she stated, "I was very happy to know my efforts were successful in camp, and also felt grateful for the appreciation of my service. I gave my services willingly for four years and three months without receiving a dollar. I was glad, however, to be allowed to go with the regiment, to care for the sick and afflicted comrades."<sup>18</sup> Despite her tireless work in the support and care of soldiers, Susie Taylor never received a pension from the government after the war. The fact she was never given the "official" designation of "nurse" meant she was ineligible to benefit under a special act of Congress 30 years after the war. Many others like her gave selflessly of themselves for the benefit of the soldiers they traveled with.

Before discounting these women's labors from the military effort, it is important to look at how they viewed themselves. Martha Gray, a former slave who attached herself to the 54th Massachusetts infantry as a laundress and nurse, viewed herself this way: "I consider myself a worn out soldier of the United States. I was all around the South with the regiment administering to the wants of the sick and wounded and did have the name of mother of the regiment."<sup>19</sup> Because laundresses were technically outside the protection of military law, they were unfortunately an attractive target of sexual assault by unscrupulous white officers.<sup>20</sup> But unlike in slavery, where black women were expected not only to submit, but faced punishment for resisting forced sexual demands of white men, female camp workers fought vehemently against such. They were no longer their owner's property, but were free, independent women who belonged to no one but themselves.

Another oft ignored and discounted segment of black women who supported the Union war effort are the nurses and hospital workers who toiled far behind the scenes in often horrific conditions. Because records of African American nurses were poorly maintained, unfortunately the true number of their ranks will never be known. But judging from the journals, letters, and memoirs of the white nurses who supervised them and the soldiers they cared for, their number was quite considerable, comprising as much as fifty percent of staff at some hospitals.<sup>21</sup> According to the United States Army's website, 6,000 women served as nurses and of that number 181 women were black.<sup>22</sup> These numbers seem extremely low, although it does not say if included in this number are the women who worked in field hospitals or if it was just the number of women who worked in military hospitals or if it included contract labor or only those



hired directly by the Army. The Carded Service Records contain information on female workers in over 500 field, general, and post hospitals and perhaps paint a more accurate picture. According to these records, 21,208 women worked as nurses and hospital staff in support of the Union Army during the Civil War. Black women accounted for 2,096 (approximately 10 percent) of those numbers.<sup>23</sup> The total of nurses is listed as 6,284, with 420 (just six percent) of those being black. Matrons number 10,870 with 793 (seven percent) black. Cooks and laundresses are numbered at 1,011 and 2,189 respectively with 363 (36 percent) and 309 (14 percent) being black women. The remaining 854 women are listed as “seamstress”, “dining room girl”, “chambermaid”, or “undesignated”, without distinguishing race.<sup>24</sup> “Contract” nurses, defined as those not hired directly by the Army or a philanthropic society, numbered 778, of which 281 (36 percent) were black.<sup>25</sup> The common practice of hiring black women as nurses while withholding the title of “nurse” further complicates the matter of determining the number of African American women who worked in this capacity. Hospitals treating black soldiers, such as General Hospital No. 3, located in Vicksburg, were more likely to bestow upon black women the designation of “nurse.” However, when white soldiers were being cared for, hospital administrators rarely, if ever, granted them the title of nurse, despite evidence of them carrying out these exact duties.<sup>26</sup>

In hospitals, black workers and nurses composed the backbone, performing the most physically demanding and loathsome tasks that white staff members refused to do. Many free black women nursed in part because they needed the income. With the absence of wage-earning spouses thanks to the war, they faced dire economic situations. Unlike white women, whose soldier-husbands received regular pay they sent back home, black women were left to their own resourcefulness for survival as black soldiers often went unpaid, and when paid received inferior wages. Under Dortha Dix, Superintendent of Women Nurses, white nurses earned 40 cents a day (\$12/mo.) and a ration.<sup>27</sup> Black nurses received up to ten dollars a month.<sup>28</sup> If it was difficult at times for white nurses to receive their wages from the army, it was even more so for black nurses and hospital workers. Former slaves and hospital laundresses Milly Humphries, Rhoda Willis, Anna Irwin, and Laura Irwin, toiled for 14 months without pay in Department of the Cumberland hospitals in ten different locations.<sup>29</sup> Some surgeons intervened on behalf of black workers, in an attempt to insure the wages of these dedicated women. One surgeon wrote to the Surgeon General on the behalf of Sally Salina, “a worthy colored woman who had worked for six months in the convalescent hospital at St. Augustine, Florida and whose name had been omitted from the muster rolls and [was] unable to obtain her hard-earned money.”<sup>30</sup> Despite their best efforts, there is no evidence the Surgeon General ever acted on the requests of these surgeons.

The willingness of hospitals to hire black women varied. Hospitals

in the western theater of the war were more likely to employ black workers than those in the East. One of the first hospitals established in Illinois, Mound City General, hired 193 workers during the war, 48 (25 percent) of which were black. When compared to the more than 885 women who worked in Philadelphia area hospital, of which only three were black, the contrast is stark.<sup>31</sup> The difficulty of the labor and the race of the soldiers being treated determined the willingness to hire African American women. One can only estimate the number of African American women who worked in Confederate hospitals. When Richmond fell in 1865, most of the records were destroyed in fires as the city was razed. But some estimate that 20 percent of female hospital workers were black slaves hired out by their owners.<sup>32</sup>

Civil War Union hospitals, even those ran by philanthropic and abolitionist organizations were hardly bastions of racial equality. As professor Jane Schultz notes, "While many [hospital administrators] embraced the principles of racial equality, at least in theory, and believed that their faith in black potential was well bestowed, they also scorned women who did not adhere to the script of grateful recipient and dismissed black cultural differences that they could not absorb into their own idiom."<sup>33</sup> The failure to perceive black women as distinct individuals and racial stereotyping meant that black women were perceived to be lazy and indolent for refusing to kowtow to the invisible hierarchies of patronage and privilege unknowingly enforced by whites who created them. Black hospital workers were expected to know their place and be grateful for it.

Some African American women chose to assist the Union military by disguising their gender and participating directly as soldiers. Women such as Maria Lewis of Virginia spent 18 months serving in the 8th New York Cavalry. Lizzie Hoffman's, of Alexandria, Virginia, gender was not uncovered until she and the rest of the 45th U.S. Colored Infantry deployed on a steamboat for a prolonged period of time. Mary Dyson of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania is assumed to have fought in a number of battles. And at least one unnamed black woman is known to have fought at the siege of Petersburg, Virginia in the 29th Connecticut Colored Infantry.<sup>34</sup> No records exist to reveal why these women chose to pose as men, taking up arms as soldiers, and place themselves directly in harm's way. For some economic reasons might provide an explanation. As the Union progressed deeper into the South, many former slaves found themselves in dire straits. Black men willing to serve as soldiers received clothing (albeit in the form of a uniform), food, medical care, and, while meager and sporadic, pay. For others, the opportunity to take up arms against those who had held them in bondage may have provided motivation. Whatever the reason, their willingness to take upon their shoulders the risks and burdens of a soldier is deserving of not only recognition, but the gratitude and appreciation of a thankful nation to these sisters-in-arms.

Other African American women did not disguise their gender, but

embraced both their race and their gender to their advantage. Mary Louveste took advantage of her position as a house slave of a Confederate naval engineer to learn of the plans to convert the U.S.S. Merrimac into the ironclad C.S.S. Virginia. Her photographic memory enabled her to pass along to Union Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles detailed information in time for the Union to take up again its work on the development of an ironclad.<sup>35</sup> Harriet Tubman was known to use the disguise of a crippled, elderly slave to pass undetected behind enemy lines during reconnaissance missions. The growing number of contraband men and women crossing over to Union camps made it easier for women spies to blend in and move back and forth in their intelligence gathering.

One of the more interesting accounts is that of Mary Elizabeth Bowser, said to be one of the members of Union sympathizer Elizabeth Van Lew's network of spies.<sup>36</sup> Bowser had been a slave owned by Van Lew's father who was granted her freedom upon his death. For reasons unknown, she was then sent to Philadelphia to be educated at the Quaker Negro College by Elizabeth. Sometime after the beginning of the war, she returned to Richmond as a personal servant in Van Lew's household. In 1863 Van Lew was able to place Bowser in the Confederate White House of Jefferson Davis where she posed as a slow-witted illiterate house slave. Largely ignored and overlooked by the whites around her, she was privy to important conversations regarding Confederate strategy. Her household duties granted her access to vital letters between Davis and his commanders. Possessing an eidetic memory, she then reported her discoveries directly to Van Lew or to a bakery owner turned spy named Thomas McNiven, who made regular deliveries to the Davis residence.<sup>37</sup> In the mid-1990's she was inducted into the Military Intelligence Hall of Fame at Fort Huachuca in Arizona.

Despite the fact women were barred from military and naval service during the Civil, some notable exceptions to this rule do exist. There are a few women who openly served in the army as women, the most famous example of which is probably Harriet Tubman. Born circa 1821 as a slave named Araminta Ross near Cambridge, Maryland to Benjamin Ross and Harriet Green, she would later change her name to her mother's. As was common practice, she worked as a house slave until her teen years when she was sent to work in the fields. When she was approximately 25 years old, she married John Tubman, a freedman. In 1849 she fled slavery, eventually arriving in Philadelphia alone as her husband declined to leave with her.<sup>38</sup> Though accounts vary as to the number of trips made, she made numerous trips back south to lead slaves to freedom along the Underground Railroad, including her parents and siblings. She was so successful in her efforts eventually there was a \$40,000 bounty placed upon her capture.

On March 31, 1862 she reported to General David Hunter at Hilton Head, South Carolina with a letter of recruitment she had received

from Governor John A. Andrew of Massachusetts.<sup>39</sup> For three months, she worked on Sea Island, South Carolina with Major General Quincy A. Gillmore as a scout and gathering intelligence from the contrabands that arrived on the island.<sup>40</sup> She would then relay to military personnel the locations of ammunition storehouses and other Confederate assets. Tubman biographer Sarah H. Bradford noted in her 1869 work *Scenes in the Life of Harriet Tubman*, that Harriet was “instrumental in getting slaves to trust the Union soldiers.”<sup>41</sup> On June 2, 1863 she served as a guide for Colonel James Montgomery’s night raid on rice plantations along the Combahee River. During this operation, 300 black cavalrymen of the 2nd South Carolina Volunteers destroyed millions of dollars worth of cotton and food crops, and secured valuable livestock for Union use.<sup>42</sup> They also rescued 756 slaves. Thanks to Tubman’s incomparable skills as a guide, not a single soldier or slave was lost. With this undertaking, she became the first woman to lead a military expedition. In addition this tireless woman nursed the sick and injured at military hospitals in Florida, and North and South Carolina. While stationed on Sea Island, she also worked as a laundress and cook for the white officers in order to earn money to pay off debts and support her family.<sup>43</sup>

After the war, Tubman continued her charitable efforts to aid freedmen by raising funds and clothing donations, culminating in her ability to open a home for the aged and indigent in 1908 in Auburn, New York. Despite the fact the army enlisted her help and benefited greatly from her knowledge and willingness to put her own life at risk, the United States government refused her request for a pension. Finally in 1899 she was granted a pension of \$20 a month until her death on March 10, 1913. Her tombstone reads in part, “Servant of God, well done.” Well done, indeed.

In addition to the Union army, there are a few women known to have been enlisted in the United States Navy. Ann Stokes served aboard the hospital ship *U.S.S. Red Rover*. The records indicate she enlisted on January 1, 1863 with an enlistment period of “for the war.” She was discharged in October, 1864.<sup>44</sup> While serving on board, she would have witnessed the fall of Vicksburg in July 1863. The *Red Rover* was on hand to care for the injured and sick of the Vicksburg campaign from February 1863 until July of that year. Also on board and recorded as having enlistment dates were Harriet Ruth, Lucinda Jenkins, and Harriet Little.<sup>45</sup> Ann Stokes’ application and approval for a Navy Invalid Pension marks her for exception. She is the only woman currently known to have received a military pension for her own service in the war.<sup>46</sup> While other women, such as Harriet Tubman, did receive a pension, these were not military pensions. Utilizing the Invalid Pension Act approved by Congress on June 27, 1890, she applied on July 25, 1890 for a pension. By this time she was 60 years old and living in Belknap, Illinois. The doctor who examined her described her as “quite large, 5’5” and weighing 145 lbs. Very black with a round smooth face, well mannered and converses intelligently

for her opportunities. She possesses a large frame well covered with flesh. Her hair is not grey, but she fairly represents her age and moves about slowly."<sup>47</sup> He determined her to be pensionable due to heart disease and piles. Beginning in 1890 she would receive a monthly pension of twelve dollars.

Lucy Berington of North Carolina is listed in naval records as being "shipped" (enlisted) with the rank of first-class boy and working at the United States Naval Hospital in New Bern, North Carolina as a laundress.<sup>48</sup> Verdant, young male recruits would have also received the same nautical rating. It is important to note that having this rank erases any doubt as to her status as enlisted. Perhaps not unsurprisingly, it was also the lowest pay scale for naval personnel. Exactly why she was enlisted is a matter of some conjecture. One theory is that it was cheaper to enlist her as a first-class boy who earned only seven to nine dollars a month compared to the fifteen dollars a month paid to a contract laundress. Another suggestion proffers enlistment guaranteed the hospital of having a laundress who could neither negotiate for an increase in pay nor quit for a better paying job at another location.<sup>49</sup> However, one would expect to find a greater number of women enlisted if either of these theories were valid. At this time, the naval records do not bear this out, although the fact of her enlistment advances the idea that other women were mustered in as well.

While the American Civil War was a watershed moment in the history of the United States as a whole, it rings particularly true for that of African Americans. The efforts of African American women during the war helped set the stage for the rearrangement of social conventions during the years of Reconstruction and beyond. Shaped by their antebellum experiences, the war provided an opportunity for them to demonstrate who they were both as women and African Americans. Their unique contributions and tireless efforts proved vital for Union success. Sojourner Truth once asked, "Ain't I a woman?" The only appropriate reply, "Yes ma'am, you most certainly are! You and all your sisters!"

#### Notes

<sup>1</sup> Judith E. Harper. *Women During the Civil War: An Encyclopedia*, (New York: Routledge, 2003), 7.

<sup>2</sup> Harper, 9.

<sup>3</sup> Earl F. Mulderink III, *New Bedford's Civil War*, (New York: Fordham University Press, 2012), 44.

<sup>4</sup> Harper, 6 and Mulderink, 42.

<sup>5</sup> Harper, 7.

<sup>6</sup> Randall M. Miller, Harry S. Stout, and Charles Regan Wilson, eds., *Religion and the American Civil War*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 14.

<sup>7</sup> Harper, 13.

<sup>8</sup> Harper, 16.

<sup>9</sup> Keith P. Wilson, *Campfires of Freedom: The Camp Life of Black Soldiers During the Civil War*, (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2002), 207.

<sup>10</sup> Tera W. Hunter, *To 'Joy My Freedom: Southern Black Women's Lives and Labors After the Civil War*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 4.

- <sup>11</sup> Hunter, 4.
- <sup>12</sup> Glenda Riley. *Inventing the American Woman: An Inclusive History, Volume 1*, (Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, 2001), 232.
- <sup>13</sup> Riley, 233.
- <sup>14</sup> Harper, 4.
- <sup>15</sup> Hunter, 16.
- <sup>16</sup> Jane E. Schultz. *Women at the Front: Hospital Workers in Civil War America*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 40.
- <sup>17</sup> Schultz, 40
- <sup>18</sup> Patricia Romeo, ed. *A Black Woman's Civil War Memoirs*, (Princeton: Marcus Weiner Publishers, 1988) 42, 52.
- <sup>19</sup> Harper, 58.
- <sup>20</sup> Wilson, 207.
- <sup>21</sup> Harper, 286.
- <sup>22</sup> United States Army, *The Army Nurse Corps*, [www.army.mil/women/nurses.html](http://www.army.mil/women/nurses.html), (accessed 12 February 2013).
- <sup>23</sup> Schultz, 21.
- <sup>24</sup> Schultz, 21-22.
- <sup>25</sup> Schultz, 21.
- <sup>26</sup> Jane E. Schultz, "Seldom Thanked, Never Praised, and Scarcely Recognized: Gender and Racism in Civil War Hospitals", *Civil War History* 48, no. 3 (2002).
- <sup>27</sup> Harper, 289.
- <sup>28</sup> Schultz, *Women at the Front*, 39.
- <sup>29</sup> Schultz, "Seldom Thanked, Never Praised."
- <sup>30</sup> Schultz, *Women at the Front*, 41.
- <sup>31</sup> Schultz, *Women at the Front*, 26.
- <sup>32</sup> Jane E. Schultz. "Ten Common Myths About Women in the Civil War and How to Dispel Them," *Foreign Policy Research Institute* 13, no. 15 (2008).
- <sup>33</sup> Shultz, "Seldom Thanked, Never Praised."
- <sup>34</sup> Harper, 266.
- <sup>35</sup> Ella Forbes. *African American Women During the Civil War*, (New York: Garland, 1998), 92.
- <sup>36</sup> Harper, 349.
- <sup>37</sup> Harriette A. Peterson, "Mary Elizabeth Bowser," *Notable Black American Women*, ed. Jessie Carney Smith, (Detroit, MI: Gale Research, 1992)], 100.
- <sup>38</sup> Bonnie Tsui. *She Went to the Field: Women Soldiers of the Civil War*, (Guildford, CT: TwoDot, 2006), 104.
- <sup>39</sup> Lillian Serece Williams. "What's Gender Got to Do With It?: New York in the Age of the Civil War," In *State of the Union: New York and The Civil War*, ed. Harold Holzer, The North's Civil War [New York: Fordham University Press, 2002], 44.
- <sup>40</sup> Harriet Hyman Alonso. *Growing up Abolitionist: The Story of the Garrison Children*, (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2002), 166.
- <sup>41</sup> Tsui, 106-107.
- <sup>42</sup> Robert B. Edgerton. *Hidden Heroism: Black Soldier's in America's Wars*, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2001), 35.
- <sup>43</sup> Alonso, 166.
- <sup>44</sup> Lisa Y. King, "In Search of Women of African Descent Who Served in the Civil War Union Navy," *The Journal of Negro History* 83, no. 4 (1998): 302.
- <sup>45</sup> King, 302.
- <sup>46</sup> King, 302.
- <sup>47</sup> King, 302.
- <sup>48</sup> King, 302.
- <sup>49</sup> King, 302.

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## Manipulating Images of the North: Union Public Diplomacy in Europe

Thomas Rynard

As Union agents moved in European circles during the Civil War, they understood that shaping the opinion of the foreign public could aid diplomacy and further the Union cause. They pursued campaigns to influence that opinion by engaging in forms of public diplomacy directed at keeping Europe from recognizing the Confederacy. It was rudimentary by today's public diplomacy standards but it met all the essential elements of public diplomacy. It presented, in the words of public diplomacy, "a manipulated image of the state," and thereby influenced European policies on the war from within by shaping the impressions, desires and values of the British and French public and establishing a mutuality of goals.<sup>1</sup> It is difficult to measure the impact of public diplomacy, more so in the Civil War era than today. Public diplomacy is seldom decisive in foreign relations. This is the case with the public diplomacy exercised by the Union in the Civil War. Great Britain and France never recognized the Confederate States of America--a feat in part because of the Union's public diplomacy efforts.

Diplomacy practiced during the American Civil War largely dealt with two sides of the same coin—recognition or non-recognition of the independent sovereignty of the Confederate States of America by the European countries.<sup>2</sup> Both sides understood that formal recognition of the Confederacy would greatly benefit their war effort and be the tipping point in gaining independence, much as French recognition of the United States in the American Revolution was seen as the turning point in that conflict. If any of the European countries recognized and supported the Confederacy, this would also mean more supplies and provisions for the ailing Southern effort.

In terms of traditional diplomacy, both the Confederacy and the Union had their shortcomings. The Confederates, to their detriment, relied on King Cotton diplomacy. Foremost among the blunders of King Cotton diplomacy was an embargo on cotton exports designed to starve Europe of the commodity and force it to recognize the South to re-open the trade. On other issues, the South was careful to portray its cause as one against Northern oppression and to paint itself as already having all the attributes of a sovereign nation capable of standing on its own. It also made every effort to sidestep or minimize the issue of slavery and its relation to its bid for independence.<sup>3</sup>

In some respects, the North was no less arrogant than the South in its traditional diplomacy. The Union saw the conflict as an internal

one of rebellion in which Europe had no business. The North was carrying out its right as a sovereign nation to preserve the government which had been established by the Constitution. European interference could only lead to conflict between the United States and those who would formally recognize the Confederacy as a separate nation. Northern diplomacy would also be affected by its position on the issue of slavery. Initially, the Union would be hurt by the refusal of Lincoln to tie the war to the abolition of slavery, a refusal made necessary by the need to mollify border states which remained in the Union.<sup>4</sup>

As to the European view of the diplomatic landscape, Britain predominated. France was willing to recognize the South only if Britain did. Britain declared itself a neutral in the conflict. On recognition, Britain took a middle of the road approach. The South was considered “belligerent,” a status under international law which fell short of recognizing the Confederacy as an independent nation.<sup>5</sup> This position satisfied neither Union nor Confederacy as “[i]t frustrated Confederate supporters, who found themselves in the position of having to pressure the government to alter a policy that could result in direct involvement in the war, and it worried pro-Unionists, who saw neutrality was a possible first step toward recognition of Southern independence.”<sup>6</sup>

While sticking to neutrality, the idea of intervention was not effectively rejected until the middle of 1863.<sup>7</sup> The intervention considered took two basic forms—a forced mediation of disputes by various combinations of European powers or a six month truce. The Union feared either type of intervention. It believed that if it refused to mediate, the European powers would intervene militarily into the war to force the North to accept a peace that would involve Southern independence. The problem with the truce option was only the South would benefit from the halt of hostilities, particularly if free trade with Europe opened during the period of the truce.

Diplomacy between the Union and Britain would also be shaped by flashpoints. The first flashpoint involved encounters at sea between Union ships and British vessels. It would become a major issue in late 1861 when a Union ship stopped the British ship *Trent* and removed two Confederate commissioners bound for Europe. British political and public opinion clamored for a strong response to this insult to British sovereignty. For the North, the *Trent* affair was the first serious foreign relations trial of the war. Had the Lincoln administration not handled this matter correctly, there was a real potential of open warfare between the Union and Britain that would have seen the British allying themselves with the South.

The second potential flashpoint came in 1862. As the bloody battles of 1862 established the ferocity with which the war was being fought, intervention on humanitarian grounds began to be advanced.<sup>8</sup> As one British paper implored, “Let us do something, as we are Christian men. . . . [L]et us do something to stop this carnage.”<sup>9</sup>

Europeans could not comprehend the magnitude of injury the two sides were capable of inflicting on one another and felt that for humanitarian reasons it could not, and should not, be sustained for any period of time.

The third flashpoint was the cotton trade. Significant sectors of the British and French economies were dependent on the importation of cotton from the South. The effects of the war on the textile industries of these two countries was not felt at the war's beginning as bumper crops in 1859 and 1860 had produced a cotton surplus in England. By the summer of 1862, though, the surplus had dissipated. Fears in both countries turned to a "cotton famine."<sup>10</sup> Almost three fourths of the textile mills had ceased operating full-time and large segments of the work force were either out of work altogether or were employed only part-time in Britain.<sup>11</sup> The British government would end up walking a fine line in dealing with the cotton famine and resisting pressure to intervene in the war to re-establish the flow of cotton to the British mills.

### **Union Public Diplomacy in the Civil War Recognizing the Need**

The Lincoln administration realized the need for an information campaign in Europe. The South had been active in Europe since secession and established its principal organ of persuasion, *The Index*, a newspaper published in London by Henry Hotze but financially backed by the Confederate government. It was dedicated to publishing a pro-Southern and anti-Union message.<sup>12</sup> Secretary of State Seward believed from early in the war that it would be necessary to send prominent Americans abroad to present the Union case in ways which official representatives could not.<sup>13</sup> Thurlow Weed summarized Secretary of State William H. Seward's thinking: "Late in October, 1861, it was deemed important by the Administration that some gentlemen of experience, possessing a good knowledge of all the circumstances which preceded and occasioned the rebellion, should be sent abroad to disabuse the public mind, especially in England and France, where numerous and active agents of Secession and rebellion had long been at work in quarters too ready to accept versions unfavorable to the North."<sup>14</sup>

Henry Sanford advocated for a trusted Republican to be sent abroad to correct European misunderstanding of the situation. Sanford left for Europe on March 26, 1861, as minister to Belgium with instructions to counteract Confederate influence in Europe.<sup>15</sup> William Dayton, minister to France, wrote Seward in May of 1861, "If a gentleman accustomed to the use of the pen, and especially if he had some acquaintance with the leading men connected with the European press, could be sent over here in the possession, nominally, of a *good* Consulate (the duties of which could be performed by clerks) while his attention could be really directed at the press, it might be

of great use in giving a right direction to public sentiment. It is a duty which a public Minister could not *with propriety*, perform if he would."<sup>16</sup> Carl Schurz, who became minister to Spain, spoke to Lincoln along these same lines in September 1861.<sup>17</sup> Even Winfield Scott, on tendering his resignation as commander of the Union army, suggested that he could go to Europe and operate in private circles to counter the actions of Confederate agents.<sup>18</sup>

### **Union Public Diplomacy in the Civil War The Message**

Both Britain and France were fertile fields for public diplomacy. European public interest in the American Civil War was high.<sup>19</sup> Governments in both Britain and France consulted and considered public opinion in setting policy. Britain had a history of public influence on political action, particularly on social reform issues. While Parliament may not have always embraced public opinion, important legislation was impossible in the absence of public support or in the face of stiff opposition.<sup>20</sup> Likewise, in France, Napoleon III gathered and gauged the views of the public before acting.<sup>21</sup>

Thus, there was a public in Europe potentially amenable to public diplomacy. When speaking of the Union's public diplomacy message in the war, there were two messages—one that preceded the announcement of the Emancipation Proclamation and one that followed it. The ineffectiveness of the former message and the success of the latter were tied directly to British public opinion, and well illustrate the truism in public diplomacy that "it is not what one says, but it is what the other hears that ultimately matters most."<sup>22</sup>

Understanding the Union's public diplomacy in the war begins with an understanding of British public opinion and the Union's perception of and reaction to that opinion. The public in Britain was not unitary, nor was its opinion. There was a multiplicity of opinions on the war. Some took an economic and geopolitical view, seeing advantages from a divided United States that would check its economic growth and expansion in the western hemisphere and elsewhere in the world.<sup>23</sup> Those who took this view also tended to see the war as the inevitable product of the inferior American system of republican democracy.<sup>24</sup> Even among the more liberally-minded there was no unity of belief on American democracy. Some saw the United States as having betrayed the democratic ideal, while others perceived the Union as a beacon of hope for democratic government and freedom.<sup>25</sup>

There were, however, two beliefs held in common. Most believed that Southern independence was inevitable. As the London Times noted prior to the first Battle of Bull Run, "Everyone knows and admits that the secession is an accomplished and irrevocable fact."<sup>26</sup> The military progress of the war from 1861 through the battles of Vicksburg and Gettysburg strengthened this belief. Yet, this belief of inevitability of Southern independence did not result in immediate

recognition of the South.

The second common belief was a universal opposition to slavery.<sup>27</sup> However, this disapproval of slavery did not necessarily equate with support for the North or opposition to the South. Some European abolitionists believed that the end of slavery would be achieved quicker if the South seceded and had to deal with the international moral condemnation of its institutions as a matter of foreign policy.<sup>28</sup> Others believed that once the South removed itself from the protective umbrella of the growing Northern economy, it would come to see that the economic costs of slave labor outweighed the economic costs of paid labor.<sup>29</sup> Others simply ignored the issue in their support for the South or sought to rationalize that support by advocating gradual emancipation.<sup>30</sup>

This European opposition to slavery was undercut significantly by the message the Union was conveying in the first year of the war. The North was unable to openly claim that slavery and its abolition had anything to do with its war aims. The British public largely accepted at face value Lincoln's statements that he was fighting to preserve the Union and not to end slavery. Few also looked behind Southern claims that they were fighting to throw off Northern oppression. As a result some were able to sublimate their distaste for slavery to other interests that equated to support for the South. Others were forced to a neutral view, unwilling to support the South because of slavery and unable to support the North because it was not committed to destroying slavery. There remained, however, a core of British abolitionists who viewed slavery as the root of the conflict and who believed that Lincoln was anti-slavery at heart.<sup>31</sup>

The issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation altered the public opinion landscape. Initially, the pro-South British argued the act was born of desperation out of a realization that the war could not be won on the battlefield and contended that it was intended to produce slave insurrections throughout the South.<sup>32</sup> Others saw the Proclamation as hypocrisy by not going far enough, agreeing with the sentiment expressed by the London *Spectator* that "The principle is not that a human being cannot justly own another, but that he cannot own him unless he is loyal to the United States."<sup>33</sup> However, and more decisively, large support for the Union came out of the Emancipation Proclamation, especially among the British working class.<sup>34</sup>

While British public opinion cut across classes and interests, there was one group of British society whose opinion was of great concern to all and which would be paramount in Northern public diplomacy efforts—textile workers. Like with the British public in general, textile worker opinion was not unified. Some placed their economic interests first and favored government action that would restore the cotton trade. Others saw the issue foremost as one of labor and opposed slavery as the ultimate control of labor and contrary to the laboring class' right to acceptable working conditions and wages.<sup>35</sup> The significance of British labor views on slavery came to the

forefront after the announcement of the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation in late 1862 in the wake of the battle of Antietam, an event which coincided with the darkest days of the cotton famine. While some labor support for the South would continue, a substantial portion saw beyond the limited scope of the Emancipation Proclamation and perceived that Union victory would bring an ultimate end to slavery.<sup>36</sup> Accordingly British labor threw its support behind the Union cause. It has been argued that this groundswell of support in the final months of 1862 buried any chances for British intervention in the war after 1862.<sup>37</sup>

Union perception of British and French public opinion was neither entirely accurate nor entirely inaccurate. Seward saw British opinion divided between those who supported the North out of opposition to slavery or a desire that American democracy not fail and those who supported the South out of dislike of republics, personal interest, or a desire to see a potential economic and imperial rival eliminated.<sup>38</sup> Henry Adams complained of British press portrayals of Seward as “an ogre” who was out to insult Britain into declaring war.<sup>39</sup> Charles Adams, the minister, noted as late as December 1862 that “[t]he great body of the aristocracy and the wealthy commercial classes are anxious to see the United States go to pieces.”<sup>40</sup> Lincoln bemoaned that Europeans focused on Union set-backs in the eastern theater of the war and ignored the significant successes the Union produced in the western theater.<sup>41</sup>

At war's beginning, the North was also disappointed in the European failure to understand that the South was making war to preserve and expand slavery.<sup>42</sup> Charles Adams blamed the failure of Britain to fully comprehend the nature of the war “because we do not at once preach emancipation.”<sup>43</sup> Charles Sumner would write to John Bright, the principal Union supporter in Parliament, “It is not necessary that emancipation should be openly on our flag. It is enough that we are fighting against men seeking to found a new government with slavery as its cornerstone, claiming outlying territories for slavery, and sure also, if successful, to pen the slave trade.”<sup>44</sup> Northern perception of British attitudes on the nexus between slavery and war changed dramatically following the Emancipation Proclamation. Henry Adams was able to write to his brother in January of 1863, “Politically things go on swimmingly here. The anti-slavery feeling of the country is coming out stronger than we expected, and all the English politicians have fairly been thrown over by their people.”<sup>45</sup> Charles Adams would also note the effect of the Proclamation in letters to his son and to Secretary Seward.<sup>46</sup>

As to the substance of the message, it was limited at the war's beginning. Unwilling and unable to speak of an end to slavery, the Union had difficulty garnering support for its cause in Europe. Publicly it stuck to the message that it was fighting to preserve the Union and that European beliefs that Southern independence was inevitable were mistaken. The message being conveyed in this respect was that

the North had the resolve and the power to bring the South back into the Union.<sup>47</sup> As to slavery, the Union's efforts were directed at ensuring Europeans saw the connection between the South and slavery. If the North could not claim that it was fighting to abolish the institution, it could at least make note that the South was fighting to preserve it.

This was the message publicly conveyed. There was some indication that privately representations about slavery and its end were being made. As early as January, 1862, Weed would say of his discussions abroad, "In England, too, when I express my surprise that we do not receive the moral support we expected from them, they answer, the North takes no ground on the slavery question. I ask them to watch the progress of events, with which in the end they will be satisfied."<sup>48</sup> If Union agents were constrained to speak of emancipation in the first two years of the war, others were less reticent to make representations about the outcome the war would have on the institution of slavery. For example, as many as forty freed blacks and escaped slaves in England, many of whom made their way to England with Union assistance and encouragement, were speaking on the lecture circuit or wherever their voices could be heard. They spoke out against British intervention in the war but more importantly, they reminded their audiences of how terrible slavery was and of British revulsion to it.<sup>49</sup>

Whether or not he was an official Union agent spreading public diplomacy or a wild card in the mix, George Francis Train conveyed the message that the war was ultimately about slavery and its abolition. In early 1862, a letter from Train appeared in the British press to repudiate claims and accusations that Confederate minister William Yancey had published in the press. The cause of the war, Train said, had been correctly stated by the Confederate Vice-President as "African slavery was the immediate cause of the late rupture and the present revolution."<sup>50</sup> The South, his closing words would state, was fighting for "The bowie knife—the revolver—and eternal slavery of the white man as well as the black—and this is Secession."<sup>51</sup> At an earlier debate which he organized, he was blunter and more colorful in his remarks, presenting the South's position as, "We in Secessia have based our Constitution and reared our Temple of Despotism on one acknowledged cornerstone- NEGRO SLAVERY."<sup>52</sup>

The North's public diplomacy message before the Emancipation Proclamation was perhaps best stated and summarized by President Lincoln himself in responding to petitions addressed to him by the textile workers of Manchester, England.<sup>53</sup> When he first came to office, Lincoln wrote, his paramount duty under the Constitution was to preserve the Union and the integrity of the government and added, "It is not always in the power of governments to enlarge or restrict the scope of moral results which follow the policies that they may deem it necessary for the public safety from time to time to adopt." He acknowledged the hardships the workers were undergoing as a result of the war in America but placed the blame for that wholly

on the Confederacy—"our disloyal citizens"—who were bent on overthrowing a government "which was built upon the foundation of human rights, and to substitute for it one which should rest exclusively on the basis of human slavery[.]"<sup>54</sup> He concluded by praising the textile workers for putting their anti-slavery sentiments before their own economic interests and saw in such a choice "an augury that whatever else may happen, whatever misfortune may befall your country or my own, the peace and friendship which now exists between the two nations will be, as it shall be my desire to make them, perpetual."<sup>55</sup>

Following the announcement of the Preliminary Emancipation Act, the tenor of the Union message changed, as did the means used to deliver it. In the early days of the war, Lincoln had read the dispatches British correspondent William Russell sent home to England as he traveled through the South. From the tenor of those dispatches, Lincoln perceived that the true weak point in the South's efforts to gain European recognition was the issue of slavery.<sup>56</sup> At the time, he also believed that he was not in a position to exploit this weakness.<sup>57</sup> This changed with the Emancipation Proclamation. Pamphlets supporting the contention that slavery was the real issue in the war began circulating in Britain.<sup>58</sup> Similarly, copies of Harriet Beecher Stowe's *Address to the Ladies of England*, an anti-slavery tract, was widely distributed.<sup>59</sup> Fanny Kemble's popular journal of her life as a slave was published but Victorian mothers forbade their daughters from reading it because of its explicit detail of sexual relations between black slaves and white masters.<sup>60</sup> John Bigelow began to openly write and distribute materials that announced the true cause of the war to be slavery and of the South's desire to perpetuate that institution.<sup>61</sup> Seward issued a circular to the diplomatic and consular offices in Europe declaring war aims had changed to "Union and abolition" from "Union and not abolition," which was, in turn, distributed by Bigelow in Europe.<sup>62</sup>

Lecturers supported or encouraged by the North flocked to Europe to speak on the war and emancipation.<sup>63</sup> One of these was William A. Jackson, escaped slave and former coachman to Jefferson Davis. Jackson spoke at meetings and gatherings throughout 1863. He spoke of his life as a slave, of the Confederate leaders he had known and of life in Richmond. What made him particularly popular and effective was his experience and knowledge of Jefferson Davis, along with his resolve to escape slavery even given his comfortable and prominent position for a slave.<sup>64</sup>

Another influential speaker sent by Lincoln across the Atlantic was Henry Ward Beecher, brother of Harriett Beecher Stowe. Beecher was an accomplished orator, abolitionist, and evangelical. He began his lecture tour as news of the Union victories at Vicksburg and Gettysburg arrived. Everywhere he went Beecher spoke to packed houses about anti-slavery and democracy as a religious concept. In his speech before the textile workers of Manchester, he noted the battle



for human rights the Union had been fighting and traced the connection between American and British democracy.<sup>65</sup> A Northern victory could only mean more democracy and more liberty. The South, on the other hand, was fighting out of a fear of losing its political power and, thus, its ability to protect and extend slavery. Slavery had been the reason for the war all along, he concluded.<sup>66</sup>

With the Emancipation Proclamation, the North found a public diplomacy message which resonated with the target audiences in Europe. As the shift in emphasis of message and means of delivering it indicated, Lincoln realized the potential that public diplomacy held when the right message was being delivered. In the language of public diplomacy, the North had a good message to deliver.

### **Union Public Diplomacy in the Civil War The Communications Environment**

There were many means available for delivering this message, particularly in Britain. The communications environment of the time, while not as instantaneous or far-reaching as later means such as the radio, television and the internet, was still capable of reaching large numbers of persons and was open to a significant degree to carrying the Union's message. The principal means of communication included newspapers, broadsides or pamphlets, public rallies, and smaller organized organizational and social gatherings.

Newspapers were plentiful in both Britain and France. They were also not above slanting their content to reflect their opinion. In France, where some censorship prevailed, this was more difficult but in Britain the North could find ready outlets for its informational campaign.<sup>67</sup> The journalistic ethics of the time did not preclude journalists or publishers being paid subsidies in exchange for what news was reported from America and what opinions were expressed in editorial content. It was also normal that stories or editorials in one paper would be copied verbatim and without attribution in another.<sup>68</sup>

The Union took full advantage of the availability of the press in Britain and France. Henry Adams contributed pieces anonymously to various pro-Union newspapers in Britain, at least until he was embarrassed by having his identity as the author revealed by pro-Southern newspapers.<sup>69</sup> When Thurlow Weed traveled to Europe on his special mission in late 1861 and early 1862, he took funds to procure press favors in Europe and likewise wrote for the press in both Britain and France.<sup>70</sup> At the time the Trent affair was breaking, an open letter appearing under the signature of General Winfield Scott, who was in Europe at the time, suggested that the Union captain who removed the commissioners from the *Trent* was acting without authority of the government and predicted the release of the commissioners." This letter was credited with having some effect on the peaceful resolution of the matter.<sup>71</sup> What the Union did not have in terms of resources was its own newspaper in London like the Southern funded

and operated *The Index*. However, London's *American*, established and subsidized by American George Train, helped fill this void. The Lincoln administration disavowed connection with the *American* and George Train. Henry Adams claimed to ignore it because of its openly outrageous writings on the war. Train, though, claimed that at least on one point, Seward secretly sent him funds to keep the paper in circulation.<sup>72</sup>

As part of his duties to oversee informational activities in Europe, John Bigelow cultivated and subsidized members of the French press in order to get the Union message to the French public.<sup>73</sup> Bigelow believed he should not buy the opinion of the French press but that he should engender a willingness in the French press to listen to the Union side before passing judgment on events. In explaining himself to Secretary Seward, he said: "When I give an editor a document I can give him at the same time the light by which it is to be read and interpreted. . . . This too is the only means I have of placing the press under obligation to me and of establishing claims upon their courtesy."<sup>74</sup> Bigelow also wrote anonymous articles for the French press denouncing French suggestions of a truce and providing a biographical sketch of Secretary of State William Seward.<sup>75</sup>

Union agents also distributed fact sheets to the information-starved foreign press. These filtered the information that was coming from America, using Northern news stories, correspondence and official documents that projected the Union in a favorable light. Similarly, Union agents would ensure that Southern newspaper articles, correspondence and official documents which were critical of the South, the war effort, or Southern support for the war were disseminated.<sup>76</sup>

Public diplomacy efforts went beyond the foreign press. It was in these alternate forums that the Union was most successful in getting its message across. The public could be reached through organized public and private meetings, rallies, debates, street corner gatherings, pamphlets and other publications. In Britain, Northern and Southern support organizations and societies, such as the Union and Emancipation Society and Southern Independence Association, began to form in 1862, some with the aid and financial backing of Union or Confederate agents.<sup>77</sup> These organizations had volunteers, paid employees and agents who expended great effort to get out their message. Little of the activities of these organizations were spontaneous and most of it was carefully designed and planned around events, such as Parliamentary debate, to maximize its political impact.<sup>78</sup>

The North had many sources for providing information to these venues. Seward originally believed that dissemination of information should come from consuls who either worked information campaigns as part of their consular duties or were placed in the position of consul as a front to their true function to oversee propaganda. John Bigelow was in the latter situation. He authored a reference book published in France on the United States, *Les Etats-Unis d'Amerique en 1863*, covering all aspects of American society. He likewise arranged

for publication of a French edition of Fanny Kemble's slave narrative, *Journal of a Residence on a Georgia Plantation in 1838-1839*.<sup>79</sup>

Freeman Morse of the London legation and Thomas Dudley, consul in Liverpool, coordinated political activity throughout England and Scotland. They worked closely with the pro-Union societies and their agents, helping to set them up, providing funding for pamphlets and meetings, and assisting in organizing meetings and rallies.<sup>80</sup> Charles Adams met with pro-Union societies and saw that memorials and petitions generated by these groups made their way to Washington and received appropriate response.<sup>81</sup>

Great meetings were held by pro-Union societies which, in the words of one historian, "provided a kind of people-to-people contact that spoke to traditions of independent political activity across national boundaries."<sup>82</sup> Henry Adams wrote to his brother of one of these meetings and detailed the charged atmosphere in support of the Union cause generated by the meeting.<sup>83</sup> American agents were personally involved in organizing and funding some of these meetings.<sup>84</sup> Freeman Morse concluded that the Union's money and his time had been "well spent" and that the results were better than he had hoped.<sup>85</sup>

Seward also sent special missions abroad as a counterweight to "the machinations of the agents of treason against the United States."<sup>86</sup> First of these was the dispatch of a trio of unofficial envoys at the end of 1861, consisting of political advisor and newspaper publisher Thurlow Weed, Catholic Archbishop John Hughes and Episcopalian Bishop Charles McIlvaine. They remained in Europe through the middle of 1862. Weed dealt directly with the press and prominent persons in Britain and France. Archbishop Hughes worked on support from the French, the Irish and the Catholic Church. Bishop McIlvaine was active among the British clergy, but he also had well-placed connections in British government. He spent much of his time speaking to private and semi-private meetings of British clergy, preaching sermons in churches throughout the country, and attending dinners and social gatherings of prominent Britains. McIlvaine explained the Union cause to all the groups he met but he appears to have interspersed this with religious topics and to have given a religious cast to what the Union was seeking to achieve in the war.<sup>87</sup>

Besides Weed, Hughes and McIlvaine, others also went for the express purpose of performing public diplomacy.<sup>88</sup> Among these was Robert James Walker, sent to Britain to whip up support against efforts by the Confederates to raise money through the sale of bonds. Walker's attacks on Jefferson Davis ultimately backfired but his efforts are worth noting for one method of distributing his anti-Davis materials—he dropped his pamphlets from a hot air balloon as it sailed over Britain.<sup>89</sup>

As noted in the discussion of the Union public diplomacy message, public lecturers reached audiences large and small, especially in England. Bishop McIlvaine preached in British churches and spoke

to small religious gatherings. Freed blacks and escaped slaves were said to have “had a profound influence on the direction of British public debate about the Civil War.”<sup>90</sup> These speakers played an important role in the informational campaign as they put a human face on Southern slavery.<sup>91</sup> Other lecturers were well-known and came with a following, such as Henry Ward Beecher, whose connection to abolitionism in its own right as well as his family relationship to Harriett Beecher Stowe was well known. Fanny Kemble also made the lecture circuit, her notoriety and popularity attributable both to her standing as an actress and to the published memoir of her time as a slave with its details of the sexual relationship forced on her by her owner.<sup>92</sup> Others were popular and effective speakers because of who they had known, most notably Jefferson Davis’ former coachman.

In contrast to the South, the North utilized a broad spectrum of the communications environment to deliver its public diplomacy message.

## Conclusion

Without consciously doing it, the Union effectively conducted public diplomacy in the Civil War. It won the information battle that was being waged to “win the hearts and minds” of the European public and, thereby, influence foreign policy. To be sure, the campaign was not always perfect in its implementation or its message. Indeed, it was not until the North could put itself into the position of openly discussing slavery as a cause and anti-slavery as an aim of the war that its efforts would bear fruition. At the same time, public diplomacy is about projecting images of one’s culture and identity. The North may not have been openly talking slavery and emancipation but the message was still being conveyed unofficially and a positive image of the North implanted in the mind of the European publics. Nor can it be said that the Union suffered from a problem of poor delivery of the right message. Its efforts may not have been as organized or direct as those of the South, represented by Henry Hotze’s *The Index*. The Union, though, still reached the European public, especially in Britain, and may have done so through more effective forums than newspapers. Its message was delivered at the level of the public to which it was directed.

Public diplomacy is not the end-all in bringing about foreign policies of foreign nations. It is a tool, a contributor to policy decision-making that works indirectly through the public in the foreign nation. The Union had both the right message and the right means of delivering its message. It might not have been master of the art of public diplomacy but it was, in the end, effective at it.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> Ben D. Mor, “Public Diplomacy in Grand Strategy,” *Foreign Policy Analysis*, vol. 2, no. 2 (April 2006), 157. For a general discussion of public diplomacy, Joseph S. Nye,

Jr., "Public Diplomacy and Soft Power," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 616, no. 1 (March, 2008).

<sup>2</sup> Sources for the general discussion for foreign policy of both North and South in the war are (unless specifically cited): George C. Herring, *From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776* (New York: Oxford University Press 2008); Howard Jones, *Blue and Gray Diplomacy: A History of Union and Confederate Relations* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press 2010); Jay Monaghan, *Abraham Lincoln Deals With Foreign Policy: A Diplomat in Carpet Slippers* (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press 1997); Howard Jones, *Abraham Lincoln and a New Birth of Freedom: The Union and Slavery in the Diplomacy of the Civil War* (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press 1999); R.J.M. Blackett, *Divided Hearts: Britain and the American Civil War* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press 2001); and Charles M. Hubbard, *The Burden of Confederate Diplomacy* (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press 2000).

<sup>3</sup> General sources on Confederate diplomacy on which this paragraph are based are Hubbard, *The Burden of Confederate Diplomacy*; Charles P. Cullop, *Confederate Propaganda in Europe 1861-1865* (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press 1969); and Lonnie A. Burnett, *Henry Hotze, Confederate Propagandist: Selected Writings on Revolution, Recognition and Race* (Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press 2008).

<sup>4</sup> Jones, *Abraham Lincoln and a New Birth of Freedom*, 11-12; Blackett, *Divided Hearts*, 129.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 46.

<sup>6</sup> Blackett, *Divided Hearts*, 123.

<sup>7</sup> Jones, *Abraham Lincoln and a New Birth of Freedom*, 10.

<sup>8</sup> Jones, *Blue and Gray Diplomacy*, 62-63.

<sup>9</sup> Quoted in Jones, *Abraham Lincoln and a New Birth of Freedom*, 100.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 163.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup> The story of Hotze and *The Index* is told in detail in Cullop, *Confederate Propaganda in Europe* and Burnett, *Henry Hotze, Confederate Propagandist*.

<sup>13</sup> Frederick W. Seward, *Seward at Washington as Senator and Secretary of State: A Memoir of His Life, With Selections from His Letters 1861-1872* (New York: Derby and Miller 1891): 17.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> Joseph A. Fry, *Henry S. Sanford: Diplomacy and Business in Nineteenth-Century America* (Reno, NV: University of Nevada Press, 1982), 33; Cullop, *Confederate Propaganda in Europe*, 24-36.

<sup>16</sup> Quoted in Margaret Clapp, *Forgotten First Citizen: John Bigelow* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company 1947), 150-151. John Bigelow filled this position.

<sup>17</sup> Jones, *Abraham Lincoln and a New Birth of Freedom*, 63.

<sup>18</sup> Seward, *Seward at Washington*, 20.

<sup>19</sup> Blackett, *Divided Hearts*, 182.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, *Divided Hearts*, 123. See, also, Jones, *Blue and Gray Diplomacy*, 171-172, for a discussion of Parliamentary consideration of public opinion on issue of intervention.

<sup>21</sup> George M. Blackburn, *French Newspaper Opinion on the American Civil War* (Westport, CN: Greenwood Press 1997), 8.

<sup>22</sup> Ross, "Public Diplomacy Comes of Age," 77.

<sup>23</sup> Blackett, *Divided Hearts*, 17; Jones, *Abraham Lincoln and a New Birth of Freedom*, 3, 16-17.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>25</sup> Blackett, *Divided Hearts*, 17.

<sup>26</sup> Quoted in Jones, *Abraham Lincoln and a New Birth of Freedom*, 43.

<sup>27</sup> Blackett, *Divided Hearts*, 54.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 17, 27.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*; Jones, *Blue and Gray Diplomacy*, 169-170.

<sup>30</sup> Blackett, *Divided Hearts*, 17, 27.

<sup>31</sup> Blackett, *Divided Hearts*, 22, 33; Jones, *Abraham Lincoln and a New Birth of Freedom*, 39; R.J.M. Blackett, "Pressure From Without: African Americans, British Public

Opinion, and Civil War Diplomacy," in *The Union, the Confederacy, and the Atlantic Rim*, Robert E. May, ed. (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press 1995): 72; Jones, *Abraham Lincoln and a New Birth of Freedom*, 57, 63.

<sup>32</sup> Quoted in Jones, *Abraham Lincoln and a New Birth of Freedom*, 116.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., 154-156.

<sup>35</sup> Blackett, *Divided Hearts*, 10, 32-33; Jones, *Blue and Gray Diplomacy*, 208-209.

<sup>36</sup> Blackett, *Divided Hearts*, 32-33; Jones, *Abraham Lincoln and a New Birth of Freedom*, 154-156; Jones, *Blue and Gray Diplomacy*, 227-228.

<sup>37</sup> Jones, *Abraham Lincoln and a New Birth of Freedom*, 154 & 156; Jones, *Diplomacy in Blue and Gray*, 279-280, 301.

<sup>38</sup> Seward, *Seward at Washington*, 625-626.

<sup>39</sup> Henry Adams to Charles Adams, Jr., Dec. 20, 1861, in *A Cycle of Adams Letters 1861-1865*, vol. 1, Worthington Chauncey Ford, ed. (Boston & New York: Houghton Mifflin Co. 1920), 88-89.

<sup>40</sup> Charles F. Adams to Charles Adams, Jr., Dec. 25, 1862, in *A Cycle of Adams Letters*, 220-221.

<sup>41</sup> Jones, *Abraham Lincoln and a New Birth of Freedom*, 4-5.

<sup>42</sup> Jones, *Abraham Lincoln and a New Birth of Freedom*, 43-44; Seward, *Seward at Washington*, 580.

<sup>43</sup> Quoted in Jones, *Abraham Lincoln and a New Birth of Freedom*, 39.

<sup>44</sup> Quoted in Cullop, *Confederate Propaganda in Europe*, 14.

<sup>45</sup> Henry Adams to Charles Adams, Jr., Jan. 30, 1863, in *A Cycle of Adams Letters*, 251.

<sup>46</sup> Charles F. Adams to Charles Adams, Jr., Jan. 23, 1863, in *A Cycle of Adams Letters*, 236; Charles F. Adams to Charles Adams, Jr., Feb. 27, 1863, in Ibid., 254; Charles F. Adams to William F. Seward, quoted in Seward, *Seward at Washington*, 157.

<sup>47</sup> See, for example, Weed to Seward, Apr. 18, 1862, in Seward, *Seward at Washington*, 86.

<sup>48</sup> Seward, *Seward at Washington*, 57.

<sup>49</sup> Blackett, "Pressure from Without;" Blackett, *Divided Hearts*, 187-191.

<sup>50</sup> Quoted in Monaghan, *Abraham Lincoln Deals With Foreign Policy*, 208.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., 195. Official Union diplomats distanced themselves from Train because of his rhetoric and antics, which included publishing the names of British firms believed to be supplying war materiel and supplies to the Confederates and breaking out in song at public meetings. Ibid., 104-106, 164.

<sup>53</sup> The letter and Lincoln's response is most fully discussed in Monaghan, *Abraham Lincoln Deals With Foreign Policy*, 277-279.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., 278-279.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> Cullop, *Confederate Propaganda*, 86, 90.

<sup>57</sup> Jones, *Abraham Lincoln and a New Birth of Freedom*, 63.

<sup>58</sup> Monaghan, *Abraham Lincoln Deals With Foreign Policy*, 260-262.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., 281.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid., 309. Kemble was a renowned international actress of her day in Europe.

<sup>61</sup> Jones, *Abraham Lincoln and a New Birth of Freedom*, 119; Monaghan, *Abraham Lincoln Deals With Foreign Policy*, 285.

<sup>62</sup> Jones, *Abraham Lincoln and a New Birth of Freedom*, 119.

<sup>63</sup> Monaghan, *Abraham Lincoln Deals With Foreign Policy*, 288.

<sup>64</sup> Blackett, "Pressure from Without" 72-73.

<sup>65</sup> Monaghan, *Abraham Lincoln Deals With Foreign Policy*, 336.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., 336.

<sup>67</sup> Clapp, *Forgotten First Citizen*, 151.

<sup>68</sup> Blackburn, *French Newspaper Opinion*, 10.

<sup>69</sup> Cullop, *Confederate Propaganda in Europe*, 26; Monaghan, *Abraham Lincoln Deals With Foreign Policy*, 104; Henry Adams to Charles Adams, Jr., January 10, 1862, in *A Cycle of Adams Letters*, 101, and Henry Adams to Charles Adams, Jr., January 22, 1862, Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> Blackett, *Divided Hearts*, 134.

- <sup>71</sup> Clapp, *Forgotten First Citizen*, 157-159. The letter was ghost-written for Scott by John Bigelow. *Ibid.*, 157.
- <sup>72</sup> Monaghan, *Abraham Lincoln Deals With Foreign Policy*, 104.
- <sup>73</sup> Clapp, *Forgotten First Citizen*, 155-156, 170, 172-173.
- <sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, 160.
- <sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, 181-182, 191.
- <sup>76</sup> Blackett, *Divided Hearts*, 153.
- <sup>77</sup> An extensive discussion of these organizations is in Blackett, *Divided Hearts*.
- <sup>78</sup> Blackett, *Divided Hearts*, 170.
- <sup>79</sup> Clapp, *Forgotten First Citizen*, 184-186, 189.
- <sup>80</sup> Blackett, *Divided Hearts*, 134-135.
- <sup>81</sup> Blackett, *Divided Hearts*, 134; Seward, *Seward at Washington*, 158.
- <sup>82</sup> Blackett, *Divided Hearts*, 157.
- <sup>83</sup> Henry Adams to Charles Adams, Jr., Jan. 27, 1863, in *A Cycle of Adams Letters*, 244-245.
- <sup>84</sup> Jones, *Abraham Lincoln and a New Birth of Freedom*, 119; Monaghan, *Abraham Lincoln Deals With Foreign Policy*, 280.
- <sup>85</sup> Monaghan, *Abraham Lincoln Deals With Foreign Policy*, 280.
- <sup>86</sup> Blackett, *Divided Hearts*, 131.
- <sup>87</sup> Sources for the Weed, Hughes and McIlvaine mission are: August C. Miller, "Lincoln's Good-Will Ambassadors," *Lincoln Herald* 50, no. 2 (June 1948), 17-20; John Herbert Kiger, "Federal Governmental Propaganda in Great Britain During the American Civil War," *Historical Outlook*, 19, no. 5 (May 1928), 204-205; Blackett, *Divided Hearts*, 131-132; Monaghan, *Abraham Lincoln Deals With Foreign Policy*, 156-161; James B. Bell, "Charles P. McIlvaine," in *For the Union: Ohio Leaders in the Civil War*, Kenneth W. Wheeler, ed. (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press 1968), 235-238; and various discussion and letters from Seward, *Seward at Washington 1861-1872*, 17-86.
- <sup>88</sup> Generally, Miller, "Lincoln's Good-Will Ambassadors"; Kiger, "Federal Governmental Propaganda in Great Britain."
- <sup>89</sup> Cullop, *Confederate Propaganda*, 77-78; Monaghan, *Abraham Lincoln Deals With Foreign Policy*, 314.
- <sup>90</sup> Blackett, "Pressure from Without," 73.
- <sup>91</sup> Generally on this topic, see Blackett, "Pressure From Without"; Blackett, *Divided Hearts*, 187-191.
- <sup>92</sup> Monaghan, *Abraham Lincoln Deals With Foreign Policy*, 309.

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## The Early Years of Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson and the Impact on His Life

Beth White

One hobby that is pursued by many people today is the family genealogy research. People are interested to learn about family ancestry, if there are any famous relatives and what type of jobs were held by the various family members. However, what often happens is that families learn that past ancestors were not exactly the shining pillars in the local community or possessed great amounts of wealth. Thomas Jonathan Jackson was no different than many people today. The man who would become a feared but beloved military officer, loving husband and father, church deacon and stern professor came from a family that was made up of alcoholics, gamblers and thieves. Just in the first seven years of Jackson’s life, there were more challenges and obstacles that had to be overcome than most people experience in an entire lifetime. What made Jackson a unique individual was not that there were severe obstacles, but instead how the young boy handled each circumstance when handed major challenges.

The first mention of the Jackson family began in Ireland. Great-grandfather John Jackson moved to England with his father and older brothers as a small boy. Soon, the father died and there is no significant mention of John until reaching thirty years of age. Working as an indentured servant for a distant relative, Jackson decided it was time to pursue another line of work and wanted to leave. However before leaving, John also took along 170 British pounds and nine gold lace remnants. Unfortunately for Jackson, the valuables belonged to the relative and the first Jackson ancestor would become a guest of the local jail. In 1749, John Jackson was sentenced to the American colonies for seven years of indentured servitude.<sup>1</sup>

Elizabeth Cummins was a fifteen year old runaway who was also working as an indentured servant for the Holland family. Cummins and another teenage girl who was also working for the Hollands decided to leave the servitude lifestyle, but not before taking nineteen pieces of silver, jewelry and gold lace. The pair of teenage thieves were captured and the accomplice entered into a plea bargain in exchange for testimony against Elizabeth. Mrs. Holland interceded on behalf of Elizabeth and begged for mercy which spared the girl from being sent to the gallows. Cummins was also sentenced to seven years of indentured servitude in America.<sup>2</sup>

As fate would have it, John Jackson and Elizabeth Cummins were both placed aboard the *Litchfield* heading for the colonies to fulfill their obligations. John and Elizabeth met on the ship and fell in love

prior to arriving in Maryland. Both of the young lovers finished the sentences in only six years and married in July 1755. Determined to make a better life together in America than the one they lived in England, the Jacksons purchased farmland in the modern community of Buckhannon, West Virginia. Elizabeth Jackson proved that she was not a traditional housewife of the eighteenth century by purchasing 3,000 acres of land personally. The Jackson family was leaving their mark in the young nation's history.<sup>3</sup>

Many Americans have several generations of family members that served in the military. The Jackson family was like many other families from modern America. When the American Revolution began, John Jackson along with sons George and Edward volunteered to serve with the Continental Army. Again, Elizabeth demonstrated great courage by taking charge of the family farm in what was later called "Fort Jackson". There is also documentation that while defending the family, Elizabeth proved to be a deadly shot with a musket by killing an untold number of Indians that raided the property.<sup>4</sup>

Following the conclusion of the Revolution, the growing Jackson family moved to Clarksburg, Virginia. John died in 1801 at the age of 86 years while Elizabeth survived for another twenty-seven years. She passed away in 1828 at the age of 105 years when great-grandson Thomas was just four years old.

After the patriarch's death, Thomas Jackson's grandfather, Edward moved the family to Weston, Virginia. Purchasing 1500 acres of land, Edward Jackson helped establish the new but rapidly growing town. Jackson built the two story log family home just one hundred yards from the York River. The house measured 20' by 40' and featured a perpendicular wing. By 1808, the Jackson family also had a grist mill as well as a sawmill that provided valuable lumber to the new town for the purposes of building several frame houses along with other businesses.<sup>5</sup>

Edward's son Jonathan did not inherit the strong work ethic that father or grandfather had. Jonathan was not an independent worker. He received a quality education and became a lawyer. Working in a law office for a cousin, Jonathan was named the county's federal revenue collector. After one year, the accounts were more than \$35,000 in debt. Jonathan sold large portions of inherited land in order to cover all of the debts.<sup>6</sup>

Jonathan met and married Julia Neale, the third of eleven children of Irish settlers. Following their marriage, the young couple moved seventy-three miles away to Parkersburg, Virginia and into a three room brick cottage that boasted a semi-attic as well as an inset porch. This was not a three bedroom cottage, but three rooms.<sup>7</sup>

The family grew soon after. The first child, a daughter Elizabeth was born in 1819 followed shortly by brother Warren in 1821. On January 21, 1824, Thomas Jonathan Jackson was born with Julia's brown hair and Jonathan's blue eyes. Despite the young and growing family, Jonathan did not learn or accept responsibility and returned

to a reckless lifestyle of compulsive gambling and drinking. Jackson bet on everything that the family possessed including the furniture and even the family beds.

In March 1826, typhoid fever ran rampant in the Jackson family. Elizabeth died on March 6, 1826 followed by Jonathan just twenty days later. The very next day on March 27, 1826, Julia delivered her last Jackson child, a little girl named Laura. At the end of March 1826, Julia was 28 years old, a widow with two small boys under the age of five and a newborn infant. Jonathan's death left the small family penniless and unable to cover the mountain of debt caused by a reckless lifestyle. The family accepted the charity of the local Masonic group and moved into a one room house that measured only 12' by 20'. The two young Jackson boys who once had plenty of grass to play on now lived in the alley of a back lot. The father's lack of responsibility and the repercussions that it caused was something that Thomas Jackson never forgot.<sup>8</sup>

Blake Woodson was a local attorney who was fifteen years older than Julia Jackson and had eight children that did not live at home. When the young widow and the much older attorney began courting in the late 1820s, neither the Jacksons nor the Neales approved of the relationship. Knowing that there was no other way to provide for three young children, Julia Jackson married Blake Woodson. Following the marriage, the Jackson children found out that the pleasant, graceful and always smiling attorney was anything but pleasant in the privacy of closed doors. Eventually, Woodson blamed continued misfortune and lack of money on the Jackson children. In anger, Woodson began to beat the children and especially young Thomas.<sup>9</sup>

The only course of action that Blake Woodson saw to solve the financial crisis was to send the Jackson children away to live with other relatives. Older brother Warren was sent to live with the Neales in Parkersburg. Thomas and Laura were sent to live with the Jackson family in Jackson's Mill. When Jonathan's brother Cummins came to the Woodson's home in Fayette County to collect the children, young Thomas became terrified at the strange man and ran into the woods. The reaction was certainly understandable for a seven year old boy who had endured so much in such a short time. When the time came to separate, young Tom tried to be brave as the two children were placed on horseback and sent away from their beloved mother. Sobbing hysterically, Julia ran after the children and hugged them for the last time. Later, Jackson's widow Mary Anna Jackson would write in her memoirs that this was a scene that Jackson would never forget and would carry with him for the rest of his life.<sup>10</sup>

Julia Jackson Woodson became ill and sent for the young Jackson children to bid them farewell. She died on December 4, 1831. Blake Woodson could not even afford to purchase a proper gravestone for Julia. The three Jackson children were now orphaned with the oldest, Warren just ten years old. By 1835, Laura Jackson was sent to live with the Neales and brother Warren in Parkersburg as there were no

more Jackson females to raise a young lady. Thomas was just eleven years old and completely alone at Jackson's Mill.<sup>11</sup>

Tragedy would not end with the separation of the brother and sister at Jackson's Mill. In 1836, Tom visited Warren and Laura in Parkersburg. Like many young boys, the Jackson boys developed a brilliant plan that was destined to bring newfound fame and fortune. The plan called for Warren and Thomas to sail down the Ohio River to sell wood to passing steamboats just as uncle Alfred Neale did for a living. After sailing down the river, the Jackson boys found an abandoned cabin and began their business. Soon, the budding entrepreneurs contracted malaria and barely made the trip home to Parkersburg. Warren would never fully cover from the disease and eventually died as a result of tuberculosis.<sup>12</sup>

Before the age of 18 years, Thomas Jonathan Jackson endured many significant tragedies that included the separation from his family as well as the deaths of both parents and two siblings. However, young Thomas Jackson proved to be resilient. Life in Jackson's Mill helped the young orphan grow up into one of the most admired men in the country.

Growing up in Jackson's Mill allowed Jackson the ability to learn and experience many things as a young boy that proved to be invaluable as an adult. Skills such as how to ride a horse, hunt, shoot and survive in the woods became very useful as an army officer.

Throughout Jackson's young life, he learned lessons the hard way by assuming responsibility and the value of hard work. Thomas knew that nothing was going to come easy and used the same kind of determination that great-grandparents John and Elizabeth Jackson had shown. It was this type of determination that served Jackson as a student at West Point where he lay down on the floor near the glowing light of a fire in order to try and understand the day's assignments, or caused him to sweat so profusely at the blackboard even on cold days that fellow cadets expected the room to flood. It was what caused him to stand in the room at West Point and study so vigorously so that he would not fall asleep.<sup>13</sup> Determination is what drove a newly commissioned artillery officer in Mexico when during the battle of Chapultepec he rallied the men and turned the tide of battle. Jackson later stated that telling the troops that there was no danger while running back and forth in front of the cannon was the only lie that he ever told in battle.<sup>14</sup> Determination is what caused Jackson as a VMI professor to stand face to wall and memorize his lessons for class the following day. Any time that a cadet asked a question, Jackson stopped and quoted the lesson again word for word from memory. When the cadet asked the same question again, the stern professor viewed the cadet as being insubordinate and dismissed the curious cadet from class.<sup>15</sup>

The value of ethics was something that Jackson learned and demonstrated just as a young child in Jackson's Mill. Fishing in the nearby York River, Jackson sold the fish to a local businessman for a

specific price. While on the way to the businessman with the day's catch, Jackson was approached by another prospective buyer who offered a higher amount. Jackson declined the offer and sold to the regular customer for a much lower but already agreed upon price.<sup>16</sup> It was a well developed personal code of ethics that caused the West Point cadet to become infuriated when an issued weapon came up missing during a routine inspection and then was "found." However, this dirty weapon was not Jackson's as he had carved his name into the stock and this weapon did not bear any type of identifying mark. Eventually, the correct weapon was found and the guilty cadet was caught. Jackson demanded that the cadet be punished and expelled. Other cadets calmed down an angry Jackson and the cadet would eventually leave West Point.<sup>17</sup> This was also a man who as a professor during a lecture informed a student that he gave the wrong answer to a question. However, when Jackson arrived home later in the day, he poured over various books to find the correct answer. Finding late at night that the student was actually correct, Jackson set out in the pouring rain and walked to VMI. Arriving at the cadet's room, Jackson woke up and informed the startled cadet of the professor's error and the correctness of the cadet. Jackson then turned and walked back home in the rain. That is the type of determination and code of ethics that Thomas Jackson had learned in Jackson's Mill as a young orphan.<sup>18</sup> The same type of determination showed in Jackson's zeal as he sought relief from chronic medical problems that plagued him for many years.

Thomas Jackson had experienced stomach trouble for many years as a teenager. At the age of fifteen, Jackson was told by a doctor that he would not survive to adulthood. Determined to surpass such a gloomy outlook, Jackson began a lifelong determination to conquer every physical, mental and moral weakness of his nature. When the pain became too intense, Jackson applied a hot mustard plaster to his chest and go on long horseback rides with uncle Cummins Jackson to take his mind off of the plaster. However, Jackson became so uncomfortable from the plaster that he fainted and fell off of the horse.<sup>19</sup>

While at West Point, Jackson often took long forced walks to help improve what he considered to be failing health. In his first letters to his sister, he wrote that he had good health. But during his junior year, he had what he thought was consumption or dyspepsia and wrote Laura that "I am gradually recovering." Fellow cadets believed Jackson to be a serious hypochondriac. He often stated that one arm and one leg were heavier than the other and as a result raised his arm straight up to let the blood run back into his body and shift some of the excessive weight. When studying, he stood straight up and not bent over a desk so that the internal organs were not compressed and bring about any disease.

During a time of brief paralysis just prior to entering West Point, Jackson always feared that the condition might return. As a result,

Jackson pumped each arm several times and counted the number of strokes. Severe annoyance resulted if anyone interrupted the count.<sup>20</sup>

Jackson was a frequent visitor to area spas and mineral baths whenever he had the opportunity as he believed that the spas were beneficial and the hydrotherapy was doing wonders for his body. He wrote to his beloved sister Laura and advised her to go to one that was nearby as often as she could.<sup>21</sup>

Laura often received letters from Jackson offering medical advice. Complaining of vision problems, Jackson suggested that she fill a basin with cold water and soak her face under the water with the eyes wide open for as long as breath could be held. The water had to be just as cold as if it had just been drawn from the well or the spring. Jackson stated that he personally soaked his face up to six times per day. It has been written that Jackson's practice would be the modern equivalent of putting cold compresses on eyes when one is suffering with eye infections.<sup>22</sup> Although Jackson had many oddities regarding health and medical practices, perhaps the one characteristic in his life for which the most attention was received was that of his religious beliefs.

One of the first friends that young Tom Jackson had while growing up in Jackson's Mill was Joseph Lightburn. The Lightburn family had an extensive library collection and Jackson made frequent trips to borrow a book. Joseph Lightburn read various books and Jackson was introduced to the Bible. Reading the stories of military campaigns throughout the Old Testament and the love found in the New Testament intrigued Jackson. The Lightburns also began bringing Jackson to the Broad Run Baptist church near Jackson's Mill where the lonely orphan found acceptance and friendship.<sup>23</sup>

Jackson became so intrigued with religion, the stories of love, hope and grace that the young teenager considered becoming a Baptist minister. There were only three reasons why Thomas Jackson grew up to become a Virginian general instead of a pastor. First, Jackson was not a member or affiliated with a local formal church. Secondly, the young Jackson believed that a minister should have a better education than could be found in Jackson's Mill. Finally, there was a dreaded fear of public speaking.<sup>24</sup>

The beginning of interest in religion at Jackson's Mill did not diminish over time. While in Mexico, one of Jackson's commanders was CPT Francis Taylor. CPT Taylor often encouraged the soldiers to develop spiritually and spoke with Jackson about reading a Bible. He began doing so out of a sense of duty. Jackson thought that his mother had been a Methodist while there was an Episcopalian influence with the chaplains at West Point. Entertaining beliefs and practices of religion with an open mind in which to find the one denomination that fit best, Jackson became intrigued with the Catholic Church. One reason for this special curiosity was the close relationship that was shared between the priest and the congregation, something that Jackson had never really experienced after the death of

Julia. After attending mass at a Catholic church, Jackson asked the priest to explain the tenets of the Catholic faith. Esteemed Civil War historian and Jackson expert Dr James Robertson once stated that it was the equivalent of going to the Vatican and asking the Pope to explain what it meant to be Catholic.<sup>25</sup> Preferring a simpler form of worship, Jackson continued to search. Jackson was searching for something and somewhere to find a place to which he finally belonged.

After arriving in Lexington, Virginia to teach at VMI, Jackson began searching for a church home. There were five churches in town from which to choose. Several influential people suggested that Jackson attend Lexington Presbyterian Church, the oldest of the five churches. Jackson began attending and found a place in which the little orphan boy could finally belong. On 22 November 1851, Jackson became one of three new members of the church.<sup>26</sup>

Jackson was the type of individual that when given instructions, it was completed to the best of natural ability. When that happened, there was little that made Jackson change his mind. This is certainly true with the various religious practices and beliefs. Considered a fanatic by many, Jackson did not send a letter late in the week if there was a chance that the mail was still in transit on Sunday. The future church deacon did not discuss political or religious matters on Sunday or even read the newspaper. The entire day was devoted to thoughts only of God and spiritual matters.<sup>27</sup>

In 1855, Jackson started a Sunday school for slaves because as he reasoned, even slaves had souls to save just as much as the white people. The decision was not a popular one or was it legal. Aided by his wife Anna, the class met in the building next to the church and class started promptly at 3:00 pm. Once it was time for class to begin, Jackson stood up and locked the door. Latecomers were not permitted. The class began with the singing of Amazing Grace and then the explanation of a passage of Scripture. The class grew and continued even after Jackson's death.<sup>28</sup>

Even on the battlefield, Jackson the soldier did not stop practicing his religious beliefs. Constantly praying before and after a battle, Jackson placed a white handkerchief on a pole outside of a tent that signified that he was in prayer and was not to be disturbed. As was the case with CPT Taylor during the Mexican War, Jackson was also concerned with the spiritual welfare of the members of the Army of Northern Virginia's II Corps. During a meeting with Episcopalian minister Beverly Lacy, Jackson developed the chaplain corps and church services were held at the commander's request.<sup>29</sup>

Another example of Jackson's concern for the troops' religious training was following the battle of McDowell during the 1862 Shenandoah Valley campaign. General Jackson requested that the II Corps hold chapel services to give thanks to God for the victory over the Union's Army of the Potomac. While visiting the camp of the 44th Virginia Infantry, Jackson came upon a single person that was standing



in the road smoking a pipe. When Jackson came closer and became recognizable, the man who was later identified as CPT Edward Alfriend snapped to attention, saluted and removed his hat. General Jackson returned the salute and asked if a religious service was being held in the camp. CPT Alfriend was unable to confirm the service. The Presbyterian deacon turned Civil War General approached the nervous Captain and asked, "Captain, the next time that I order a divine service to be held, won't you please promise me that you will attend?" CPT Alfriend could not do anything other than answer in the affirmative and go to the service with the General. During the service, Alfriend would closely watch Jackson to see how the great leader would act. As rain started to fall upon the troops, Alfriend took special notice that Jackson continued to stand with his head uncovered, arms folded and head bowed. When discussing the scene before him, CPT Alfriend later stated that it was a sublime exhibition of Jackson's noble religious character.<sup>30</sup>

Although considered by many to be a religious fanatic, Jackson's consistent behavior made an impact upon even the most unlikely of people. Following a pre-battle planning session, General Richard Ewell stated that nothing would be done until Jackson had first prayed about it. An agnostic at best, Ewell often poked fun at the fanatical Jackson who often fell asleep while attending church services. Following another hard fought victory, Ewell went to give Jackson congratulations. When arriving at the General's tent, Ewell began to hear the fervent prayers of the commander giving thanks for an ever kind Providence in the victory. Ewell was so moved by the consistent Christian example of Jackson that the former agnostic proclaimed that "if that was religion, then by God I've got to have it."<sup>31</sup>

Another example of the impact of the faith and consistent religious practice of Jackson upon the life of others exists even to the present day. There is a stained glass window at the Fifth Avenue Presbyterian Church in Roanoke, Virginia. The window was designed in 1906 by Reverend Lilburn Downing whose parents were members of Jackson's slave Sunday school class. The window includes scenes from Chancellorsville, the Virginia countryside and Jackson's final words of crossing over the river and resting under the shade of the trees.<sup>32</sup>

Despite all of the tragedies in his young life, Jackson did not let them hold him down. All of the people that Jackson had tried to love died throughout his brief life. Such intense and frequent tragedies often devastated people. Instead, he used those hard lessons, determination, personal values and a strong ethical code to become a better man, soldier, husband and father.

#### Notes

<sup>1</sup>Dr. James Robertson *Stonewall Jackson: The man, the soldier, the legend*. (New York: MacMillan Publishing, 1997), 2.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

- <sup>4</sup> Ibid., 3
- <sup>5</sup> Mary Anna Jackson *Life and letters of "Stonewall" Jackson by his wife*. (Harrisonburg: Sprinkle Publications, 1995), 5.
- <sup>6</sup> Robertson, 6.
- <sup>7</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>8</sup> Lenoir Chambers. *Stonewall Jackson*. (New York: William Morrow & Co, 1959), 12.
- <sup>9</sup> Ibid., 9.
- <sup>10</sup> Jackson, 16.
- <sup>11</sup> Chambers, 29.
- <sup>12</sup> Ibid., 39.
- <sup>13</sup> Robertson, 35.
- <sup>14</sup> Julia Davis. *Stonewall*. (New York: EP Dutton & Co, 1931), 39.
- <sup>15</sup> Interview, LTC Philip Smith (VMI Alumni), 17 January 2013.
- <sup>16</sup> Robertson, 15.
- <sup>17</sup> Robertson, 39.
- <sup>18</sup> Interview, LTC Smith.
- <sup>19</sup> Robertson, 20.
- <sup>20</sup> Ibid., 44.
- <sup>21</sup> Ibid., 88.
- <sup>22</sup> Ibid., 165.
- <sup>23</sup> Ibid., 18.
- <sup>24</sup> Ibid., 19.
- <sup>25</sup> Interview, Dr. James Robertson Jr. *The faith of Stonewall Jackson* (Documentary clip, *Gods & Generals*, 2003).
- <sup>26</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>27</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>28</sup> Davis, 51.
- <sup>29</sup> Robertson, 683.
- <sup>30</sup> Ibid., 380.
- <sup>31</sup> *The faith of Stonewall Jackson* (Documentary clip, *Gods & Generals*, 2003).
- <sup>32</sup> Kathleen Shelor. *A memorial to Stonewall Jackson*. (Richmond: Richmond Times-Dispatch, 1936).

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*When not working on homework, Beth and Wayne enjoy spending their free time following the many Civil War trails throughout Virginia with a goal of visiting all 519 campaign locations within the Commonwealth. Beth is also working on her first book regarding the battle of Chancellorsville examining the strategies/tactics that were used and a brief history of each regiment that participated in the battle.*

## The United States Army's Use of Military Working Dogs (MWD) in Vietnam

Frank Hoeflinger

The United States Army's use of Military Working Dogs (MWD) in Vietnam provided the Infantry units on the ground with a mobile, accurate and cost-effective detection system (the MWD team) capable of detecting enemy soldiers (both Viet Cong (VC) guerrillas and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) regulars), mines and booby-traps safely. In this regard, the U.S. Army followed in the footsteps of ancient armies, including those of the Egyptians, Greeks and Romans, who benefited from the advantages provided by dogs during war. From the distant past to the present day, military dogs have provided invaluable service to the soldiers they served with and protected.

### Background on the Use of War Dogs throughout History

Since the beginning of recorded history, dogs have been used to support combat operations. They have been used to attack enemy personnel and animals and to destroy a unit's cohesion and formation. It is believed that the Egyptians used war dogs in battle as early as 4000 BC.<sup>1</sup> There are Egyptian murals commemorating the fighting spirit of the Egyptian war dogs. The murals show vicious animals being unleashed by the soldier-handlers and leaping upon the enemy. The Emperor Hammurabi of Babylon equipped his soldiers with huge war dogs, and in ancient Greece, the Corinthians used dogs as shoreline sentries as a defense against an Athenian amphibious assault. According to legend, fifty war dogs leaped, with open jaws, at the Athenians as they crept ashore during a surprise night attack. The legend says the dogs fought ferociously but were all slain, except for one who awoke the Corinthian troops in a nearby town by barking. The Corinthians rallied and defeated the Athenians.<sup>2</sup> A war dog was immortalized in a mural depicting the Battle of Marathon in 490 BC when the Athenians defeated the Persians.

The Romans had veterinarians and war dog handlers. The Romans classified their dogs as watchdogs, sheepdogs, and hunting dogs. The hunting dogs were further classified into attackers, trackers, and chasers.<sup>3</sup> The Romans even employed war dogs to interdict enemy communications.<sup>4</sup> Attila the Hun used packs of large dogs to stand as sentries around his camps to prevent a surprise attack. During the Siege of Rome (AD 537 - 538), the commander Belisarius "continually sent detachments of soldiers...whose duty it was to always pass the night about the moat, and he sent dogs with them in order that no one might approach the fortifications, even at a distance, without

being detected.”<sup>5</sup> During the medieval period, large war dogs, such as mastiffs, were clothed in chain mail and released to attack enemy horses, negating the effect of the mounted men-at-arms.<sup>6</sup> Napoleon used war dogs during his campaigns in the early nineteenth century by deploying fighting dogs in front of his reserves. During World War I, the Germans used 28,000 war dogs, while the French used 20,000 and the Italians used 3,000.<sup>7</sup> The French employed large sheep dogs for sentry duty; the Belgians used dogs to tow machine gun carriages, and the Italians used large numbers of dogs on the Alpine front. Pound for pound, a dog can pull a greater weight than a horse.

When the Imperial German Army implemented the rolling barrage prior to the introduction of “storm trooper tactics” in World War I, one of the problems was communications between the forward observer (moving with the initial assault units) and the artillery batteries far to the rear. One of the solutions implemented was the use of messenger dogs to carry “corrections” (shifting the fire to a new target) back to the artillery command post.<sup>8</sup> In the United States, the first recorded use of war dogs by the U.S. Army was during the Second Seminole War. The Army bought 33 Cuban-bred bloodhounds (at \$151.72 each),<sup>9</sup> and these dogs and their five handlers were used by the Army to track the Seminole Indians and the runaway slaves the Indians were harboring.<sup>10</sup> In the American Civil War “dogs were used as messengers, guards, and unit mascots.”<sup>11</sup> During the Spanish-American War, war dogs were used as scouts, most famously by patrols of Teddy Roosevelt’s “Rough Rider” regiment. The dogs were trained as “point scouts” and patrols accompanied by dogs were almost impossible to ambush.<sup>12</sup> The U.S. armed forces received and trained more than 20,000 dogs for use as scout, tracker, mine detector, attack, and sentry dogs during World War II. The dogs were procured through a “Dogs for Defense” program that accepted family pets donated to the war effort. The majority of the surviving dogs were reunited with their families at the end of the war. It was found, due to terrain, that the dogs were much more effective in the Pacific theater than they were in Europe. In the China-Burma-India Theater, twelve War Dog teams were assigned to Merrill’s Marauders during the last months of the campaign. “On three separate occasions they alerted to a superior enemy force without the enemy’s noticing the patrol. In seven incidents, patrols were unable to locate snipers that picked off men with impunity until scout dogs were brought in. Each sniper was not only located but eliminated with no further loss of American lives.”<sup>13</sup>

The 26th Infantry Platoon (scout dog) was the only scout dog platoon in the Army at the start of the Korean War. Members of the platoon were awarded three Silver Stars, six Bronze Stars for valor, and 35 Bronze Stars for meritorious service.<sup>14</sup> On 27 February 1953, the Department of the Army recognized the accomplishments of the platoon in General Order Number 21. The platoon was so effective that the Army authorized one scout dog platoon for every Infantry

division in Korea. The war ended before those additional platoons could be trained and shipped to the combat zone.

### **Background Information of MWDs in Vietnam**

Overall the U.S. military was to incur approximately twenty percent of its casualties from mines and booby traps in Vietnam.<sup>15</sup> Colonel David Hackworth, who was a battalion commander in the 9th Infantry Division in 1969, paints an even grimmer picture. Col. Hackworth's battalion, the 4th Battalion 39 Infantry, was then stationed and fighting in the Mekong Delta. The Mekong Delta is a large area, comparable with the Florida Everglades. The region is marked by wet, flat terrain and is subject to flooding, with little dry ground and limited avenues of travel by boat or foot marked the region. Col. Hackworth, then a Lieutenant Colonel, wrote in his book, *Steel my Soldier's Hearts*: "Twenty young men from the 4/39th [Infantry Battalion] were killed just before I took over, from November 1968 until 20 January 1969."<sup>16</sup> Then the names of twenty soldiers who died during the timeframe are listed and their causes of death: 4 soldiers from enemy small arms fire, 14 died as a result of enemy booby traps, 1 died of illness, and 1 soldier drowned. That is a seventy percent casualty rate from booby traps.

A solution was needed and the war dog platoon was revived as The Infantry Platoon, Scout Dog. A total of 3,800 MWDs served in Vietnam.<sup>17</sup> The U.S. Army organized 22 scout dog platoons<sup>18</sup> and 22 combat tracker teams (platoon-size elements) for combat operations. The Scout Dog School was established at Fort Benning, Ga., under the auspices of the Infantry School. The Scout Dog School trained both dogs and handlers, which were then rotated to Vietnam as individual replacements. The Army also established a Combat Tracker School at Fort Gordon, Ga., which trained both the tracker dogs and handlers, and the "visual" trackers who complemented the dog's skills on the combat tracker teams. The dogs were used for scouting, tracking (both enemy personnel and lost/wounded U.S. service members), sentry, attack, mine/booby trap, and tunnel detection. This number does not include the U.S. Army MP sentry dog and U.S. Air Force guard dog units."<sup>19</sup>

### **Use of Dog in the Offense**

The offense is the U.S. Army's preferred posture, because only an offensive posture allows an army to dictate the time and place of an engagement. The U.S. Army in Vietnam was still draped in the offensive spirit that had been its driving force across the countries of northwestern Europe during WW II. In Vietnam, the U.S. Army attempted to maintain that offensive posture by conducting patrols and search and destroy missions to prevent the enemy from maintaining freedom of movement, and to gather intelligence. In

November 1967 elements of the 173rd Airborne Brigade were conducting offensive operations in the vicinity of the Dak To mountains with the objective of destroying the 66th Regiment of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA). The 173rd Airborne Brigade made contact with enemy units on the Dak To mountains and initiated an assault against the enemy units dug in on the mountaintop. Alpha Company, 4th Battalion 503rd Infantry was air assaulted into the battle area with the mission of re-establishing contact with the enemy. While maneuvering to assault the enemy, Nikki, a scout dog attached to Alpha Company "alerted" to the presence of enemy soldiers in the vicinity. The invaluable "alert" prevented Alpha Company from making contact with the enemy on the enemy's terms and allowed Alpha Company to retain the initiative and avoid the inevitable ambush and casualties. The results of the battle were the destruction of the NVA 66th Regiment and the reduction of the threat to the vulnerable provinces of the Central Highlands.<sup>20</sup>

### **Use of Dogs in the Defense**

On 11 October 1967 the 1st Battalion 18th Infantry (1/18 Inf.) of the 1st Infantry Division was conducting combat operations in the vicinity of Loc Nihn. The 1/18 Inf. was attempting to make contact with elements of the 271st NVA Regiment, then assigned to the 9th Viet Cong (VC) Division. The battalion was operating in thick jungle where visibility was limited to approximately ten feet.<sup>21</sup> After the battalion left its night defensive position, the scout dog attached to Bravo Company "alerted" to the presence of the enemy. The lead rifle company moved in a patrol formation called a "clover leaf" to provide maximum security, and to ensure that contact was made while the Infantry was in the best posture possible. The company continued to maneuver forward with the scout dog continuously alerting. After traveling approximately 1,800 meters, the lead platoon was ordered to conduct a "reconnaissance by fire." In this technique, fire is placed on likely enemy positions which will trick or force the enemy to reveal its position by returning fire. The Viet Cong returned a heavy fire from positions as close as 30 meters to the lead platoon. Because the lead platoon was alerted to the presence of the enemy, prior to initiating its small arms fire, the platoon was prepared to receive enemy fire, and the VC's fire inflicted no casualties. After making the initial contact, the 1/18 Inf. withdrew into a defensive perimeter to prevent the numerically superior enemy from destroying the battalion piecemeal. "During the three hour engagement the battalion was never decisively engaged."<sup>22</sup> "The combined firepower of tactical fighters, armed helicopters, and artillery, was directed simultaneously on the enemy position, which had been detected from an airborne scent picked up by a scout dog."<sup>23</sup>

## Use of Dogs during Patrols

MSG (R) John C. Burnham served two tours in Vietnam, the second tour as a dog handler in the 44th Infantry Platoon (Scout Dog). The 44th IPSD was assigned to support the 3rd Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division. According to Mr. Burnham,

A handler and his German Shepherd scout dog performed as a team in the mission of leading combat patrols and providing early silent warning of danger. A scout dog team was deployed out front as "point man," which is the most vulnerable and dangerous position of a tactical formation moving through enemy territory. The handler interpreted his scout dog's alerts on enemy movement, noise, airborne and ground scents of booby traps, land mines, base camps, underground tunnel complexes, and underground caches of weapons, food, and medical supplies.<sup>24</sup>

Because the handler was focusing his attention on following the dog and interpreting the dogs "body language" and "attitude," the handler required the supporting unit to provide a security element to protect the handler from any enemy activity.

During a patrol in the vicinity of the perimeter of Dau Tieng, the platoon that (then) Sergeant (Sgt.) Burnham was supporting activated a booby trap injuring a soldier. Sgt. Burnham then told the Platoon Leader that he would walk point and have the platoon follow where the dog went. Sgt. Burnham then led the patrol back to the perimeter. While walking, Sgt. Burnham's focus was on his dog, Clipper, and not on the vegetation or terrain around him. Clipper began going left and right, but did not give any alert that he detected anything. After reaching the perimeter, Sgt. Burnham was informed by the platoon leader that every time Clipper went left or right, a soldier would check the area and find a trip wire. Clipper and Sgt. Burnham had successfully led the patrol through a maze of booby traps without the loss of a single American soldier. For volunteering to take the point and leading the platoon successfully through a maze of booby traps, Sgt. Burnham was recommended for the Bronze Star.<sup>25</sup>

## Conclusion

Since the beginning of recorded history, dogs have been used to support combat operations. They have been used to attack enemy personnel and animals and to destroy a unit's cohesion and formation. War dogs have been used by the Egyptians, Babylonians, Greeks, Romans, during the medieval ages, by Napoleon, during the Seminole Wars, the American Civil War, the Spanish-American War and throughout the twentieth century. War dogs have been used for



attack, defense, communication, supply, medical, and reconnaissance missions.

According to Paul S. and Elizabeth Daum, writing in *The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social & Military History*, "Army after-action reports [AARs] reveal 83,740 missions...and credit scout and mine/tunnel dog teams with more than 4,000 Communist troops killed, 1,000 captured, over 1 million pounds of rice and corn recovered, 3,000 mortars located, and at least 2,000 tunnels and bunkers exposed."<sup>26</sup> The United States Army's use of Military Working Dogs (MWD) during the Vietnam War provided the infantry units on the ground a mobile, accurate and cost-effective detection system (the MWD team) capable of detecting enemy soldiers (both Viet Cong guerrillas and North Vietnamese Army regulars) mines and booby-traps safely. The MWD Team could be employed in the same terrain that soldiers were deployed on, and in almost any weather conditions. The MWD team was used as an offense and defensive sensor system as well as a mobile sensor system when used offensively and during foot patrols. The value that the MWD's brought to the infantry fight as has been shown was incalculable.

#### Notes

<sup>1</sup> Lisa Rogak, *The Dogs of War: The Courage, Love, Loyalty of Military Working Dogs* (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2011), 40.

<sup>2</sup> Nigel Allsopp, *Cry Havoc: The History of War Dogs* (Australia: New Holland Publishers, 2011), Kindle Edition, location 659.

<sup>3</sup> Allsopp, *Cry Havoc*, location 230.

<sup>4</sup> Mary Elizabeth Thurston, *The Lost History of the Canine Race: Our 15,000-year Love Affair with Dogs* (New York: Avon Books, 1996), 49.

<sup>5</sup> Henry Bronson Dewing, trans., *Procopius History of the Wars, Books V and VI*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1919), Kindle Edition, location 117.

<sup>6</sup> David Karunanithy, *Dogs of War: Canine Use in Warfare from Ancient Egypt to the 19<sup>th</sup> Century*, (London: Yarak Publishing, 2008), 50.

<sup>7</sup> Toni Gardner, *Walking Where the Dog Walks, An Interspecies Odyssey in Vietnam*, (Baltimore: Minou Press, 2006), Kindle Edition, location 2942.

<sup>8</sup> Bruce I. Gudmundsson, *Stormtrooper Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914-1918*, (Westport: Praeger, 1995) Kindle Edition, 66.

<sup>9</sup> John K. Mahon, *History of the Second Seminole War 1835 - 1842 Revised Edition* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1985), 266.

<sup>10</sup> John Misall and Mary Lou Misall, *The Seminole Wars; America's Longest Indian Conflict* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2004), 171.

<sup>11</sup> ATP 3-39.34 (FM 3-19.17), MILITARY WORKING DOGS, May 2011, Department of the Army, 1-2.

<sup>12</sup> Allsopp, *Cry Havoc*.

<sup>13</sup> Michael G. Lemish, *War Dogs: A History of Loyalty and Heroism* (Dulles: Brassey's, 1996), 105.

<sup>14</sup> Michael G. Lemish, *War Dogs: Canines in Combat* (Dulles: Brassey's, 1996), 157.

<sup>15</sup> John C. McManus, *Grunts: Inside the American Combat Experience from World War II Through Iraq* (New York: New American Library, 2010), 408.

<sup>16</sup> Colonel David H. Hackworth, and Eilhys England, *Steel my soldiers' hearts: the hopeless to hardcore transformation of 4th Battalion 39th Infantry*, United States Army, Vietnam (New York: Rugged 2002), 27.

<sup>17</sup> Maria Goodavage, *Soldier Dogs: The Untold Story of America's Canine Heroes* (New York, Penguin, 2012), Kindle Edition, pg 18.

<sup>18</sup> Mary Kathleen Murray, LCDR, USN, *The Contributions of the American Military Working Dog in Vietnam* (GPO, Fort Leavenworth, 1998), 4.

- <sup>19</sup> SSG Francis Hoeflinger, Reggie Smith, LTC Richard Vargus, "Low Tech Answer to a Persistent and Deadly Threat," *Infantry* 100 no. 4 (Sep – Oct 2011):46-7.
- <sup>20</sup> John Albright, John A. Cash, Allan W. Sandstrum, *Seven Firefights in Vietnam* (Washington D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History U.S. Army, 1970), Kindle Edition.
- <sup>21</sup> LTG John H. Hays, Jr., *Vietnam Studies: Tactical and Material Innovations* (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army, 2002), 42.
- <sup>22</sup> Hays, Jr., *Vietnam Studies: Tactical and Material Innovations*, 43.
- <sup>23</sup> Hays, Jr., *Vietnam Studies: Tactical and Material Innovations*, 45.
- <sup>24</sup> John C. Burnam, *A Soldier's Best Friend: Scout Dogs and Their Handlers in the Vietnam War* (pp. xi-xii). Kindle Edition.
- <sup>25</sup> John C. Burnam, *A Soldier's Best Friend: Scout Dogs and Their Handlers in the Vietnam War* (pp. xi-xii). Kindle Edition, location 99 – 135
- <sup>26</sup> Spencer C. Tucker, ed., *The Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social & Military History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 61.

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## Historiography of Falkirk (1298) as the Predecessor to Infantry Dominance

Scott Manning

For more than a century, historians have identified the Battle of Falkirk (1298) as a turning point in infantry tactics, not only for the Scots but also for warfare in the Western World. In his seminal work on military history, Hans Delbrück (1848-1929) wrote that Falkirk was unique, concluding “nowhere else in the Middle Ages do we find such great masses of foot soldiers who do not immediately break ranks when attacked by knights.”<sup>1</sup> Delbrück was referring to the spearmen organized by Scottish Guardian William Wallace (d. 1305) in a battle that he lost against English King Edward I (r. 1272-1307). Delbrück is not alone in his assertion that Falkirk initiated, or at least preceded some revolutionary method for using foot soldiers, as the claim persists in numerous modern works. Remarkably, there was nothing new about the Scots’ tactics, but Falkirk remains popular in modern memory, predominately due to high profile participants such as Wallace and Edward, the former a national hero, as well as a dense library of contemporary and modern histories. In an attempt to neatly categorize transitions and trends in warfare, historians have erroneously identified Falkirk as the beginning of an era where infantry alone won battles, or at least stood up to cavalry, but in reality such infantry-centric achievements were occurring more than a century prior in the Western World.

### The Battle of Falkirk

Before reviewing the influence of Falkirk in the medieval world along with the last 120 years of interpretation, it is necessary to reconstruct the battle, or at least the formations of the Scottish spearmen “who do not immediately break ranks when attacked by knights.” There are several challenges though. First, there is no archeological evidence for its location. However, historians can be certain it was at or near Falkirk, as all the chronicles and administrative records are unanimous on this point. Second, the chronicles only agree that the battle occurred on July 22, 1298, as it was the religious holiday of Mary Magdalene. After these points the chronicles diverge in tactics, participants, and even the victor. Third, none of the authors of the surviving medieval chronicles was an eyewitness to the battle.

Still, most modern historians rely on the *Chronicle of Walter of Guisborough*, as it was written shortly after the battle. It also provides the most details on tactics employed by both the Scots and the

English, which is enticing to modern-day historians.<sup>2</sup> Although the exact author is unknown, the location—the Yorkshire priory of Guisborough—is well known. The chronicle is invaluable concerning Anglo-Scottish affairs during 1291-1300, as no other chronicle provides as much detail and analysis. Finally, the author likely had access to participants.<sup>3</sup>

Guisborough tells us the Scots had an army comprised of archers, cavalry, and spearmen. The English had cavalry, archers, and slingers. Guisborough describes the English army preparing to leave Scotland after a lengthy campaign without a battle. However, upon learning the location of Wallace and his army, Edward moved quickly to confront the Scots. On a hill, Wallace deployed his troops in a defensive position and awaited the English. Here, Guisborough introduces the *schiltron* formation, circles of spearmen with their spears “held up at an angle” and “their faces were turned to the circumference of the circles.”<sup>4</sup>

Wallace deployed four of these *schiltrons*, which Guisborough describes as “like a thick wood.” Wallace’s “mounted men” were “on the flank, behind” while the archers were in between the *schiltrons*. As for the battlefield, Guisborough describes “a little stream” between the armies, as well as “a muddy loch,” which the English only discovered after they began their attack. When the English cavalry attacked, the Scottish cavalry fled the field “without striking a blow.” The Scottish archers fled, moved into the *schiltrons*, or died. Yet, upon this first cavalry charge, the English “could not enter because of the multitude of lances.” Next, the English archers and slingers moved forward and attacked the spearmen with arrows and rocks. This broke up the *schiltron* formations, after which the English horsemen attacked, “laying waste to everything.”<sup>5</sup>

### The “Infantry Revolution” of Falkirk

Although the Scots lost the battle, Guisborough’s description of how the *schiltrons* repelled the initial cavalry charge has captured the attention of historians. By Falkirk’s mere position on the historical timeline (1298), it appears to be a foreshadowing of new infantry tactics in the Western World. At the Battle of Courtaí (1302), Flemish infantry were able to select their field of battle, set up obstacles, and form a defensive line, which held firm against French cavalry. The next year, Flemish infantry again repelled French cavalry charges at the Battle of Arques (1303). In 1307, Scottish King Robert the Bruce (r. 1306-1329) was able to select his field of battle, set up obstacles, and filter English cavalry into his infantry lines at Loudon Hill. Finally, the battle that historians often mention in the same breath with Falkirk is Bannockburn (1314) where Bruce was able to use his infantry for defense against English cavalry charges and then use the same infantry for offense in a decisive victory.<sup>6</sup>

Yet, even with this seemingly strong evidence for Falkirk as a

foreshadower of new, effective infantry tactics, no historian thoroughly makes the case for an infantry revolution beginning at Falkirk, at least not as strongly as other theses on shifts and trends in warfare. Michael Roberts, Geoffrey Parker and Clifford J. Rogers have all written extensively on military revolutions, changes in military practices that affected societies, debating when and how they began in Medieval and Modern Europe.<sup>7</sup> These “revolutions” have lengthy papers and books arguing over their validity, allowing historians to refer to the concepts by name and author when analyzing them. The infantry “revolution” of Falkirk lacks any such deep analysis or support. Instead, brief statements have crept into military history works for more than 100 years without any direct challenge.

Reviewing these statements on Falkirk chronologically is revealing, as it demonstrates how one historian influenced another in a timeline more than a century old. In 1893, T. F. Tout (1855-1929) described Wallace’s tactics at Falkirk as “novel” and as “a system which within a generation was to revolutionize the art of war.”<sup>8</sup> Although Tout’s book is an older work, it was popular, as it saw reprinting eight times over the next 40 years.<sup>9</sup> In 1895, Hereford B. George (1838-1910) wrote that Wallace’s “most undoubted title to fame, if not his highest glory” was that “he was the first to organise plebeian spearmen afresh, not indeed for victory, but with success as against mailed horsemen only.”<sup>10</sup> George’s work was also popular, seeing reprint five times over the next 15 years.<sup>11</sup> In 1898, A. F. Murison (1847-1934) referred to the *schiltron* tactics as “universally acknowledged” to be “admirable” today and “even original.”<sup>12</sup> Although reprinted less than the previous titles, Murison’s work saw a 2003 reprinting, no doubt to support the continuing popularity of Wallace biographies. In 1907, Delbrück first published his statement on Falkirk in German, “Nowhere else in the Middle Ages do we find such great masses of foot soldiers who do not immediately break ranks when attacked by knights.”<sup>13</sup>

Thus, in the course of less than 15 years, there were at least four different historians espousing the concept that the Scottish foot soldiers at Falkirk used “novel” and “even original” tactics while Wallace “was the first” to organize spearmen and “nowhere else” do we find spearmen standing up to mailed knights. Remarkably, the claims of Wallace’s “infantry revolution” seemingly dissipate from the historiography of Falkirk until the 1980s. Up until then, historians paid closer attention to what appeared to be the first use of the longbow by Edward.

However, the publication of an English translation of Delbrück’s work in 1982 with an affordable paperback version in 1990 appears to have created a watershed of reaffirmation for Falkirk’s influence.<sup>14</sup> For example, Archer Jones stated in 1987 that Falkirk “showed that even elaborately armored elite men, mounted with stirrups on picked horses, could not prevail against densely formed heavy infantry with long pikes.”<sup>15</sup> Two years later (1989), Richard Humble referred to

Wallace as “one of the most intelligent as well as the most inspiring resistance leaders of all time,” crediting him with “evolving the infantry formation known to the Scots as the *schiltron*.”<sup>16</sup> In 1991, nearly 100 years after Hereford B. George penned his history, D. J. Gray cited him in agreement that “Wallace’s *schiltrons* were an important advance in the art of war.”<sup>17</sup> In 1996, Ronald McNair Scott stated that Wallace “shattered for ever the accepted principle that the foot man was always at the mercy of the mounted knight.”<sup>18</sup> In 1998, an article in *The Scotsman* entitled “Glorious Even in Defeat” claimed, “Wallace’s invention of the schiltrom [sic] tactics revolutionised warfare.”<sup>19</sup>

More recently, in his *Warfare in the Medieval World* (2006), Brian Todd Carey identified Falkirk as the “harbinger of battles to come in the fourteenth century, where heavy infantry alone in a defensive posture held its own against the mounted aristocracy and other infantry formations.”<sup>20</sup> In 2007, Michael Prestwich, renowned historian of Edward I, stated, “Wallace’s tactics presaged the infantry successes of the future” and “he made a major innovation by using the formation of the *schiltrons*.”<sup>21</sup> The next year (2008), Paul Cowan claimed the Scots’ use of spears “to ward off the charge was a battlefield innovation ahead of its time.”<sup>22</sup> That same year, Martin J. Dougherty claimed the *schiltron* “was a uniquely Scottish invention.”<sup>23</sup> Finally, in 2012, Matthew J. Strickland stated “Wallace’s innovation” was “in drilling his spearmen to stand fast in effective formations against Edward I’s cavalry.”<sup>24</sup>

In isolation, some of these quotes do not go too far, such as Jones and even Carey. However, it is clear that in the past three decades, historians have gone further than those of the twentieth-century in pushing Falkirk as some sort of revolution. Consolidating these statements, the reader may conclude, “Wallace was one of the most intelligent and inspiring resistance leaders of all time who evolved his innovative *schiltron* formation, which was a major innovation ahead of its time that revolutionized warfare and shattered forever the dominance of cavalry, making Wallace glorious even in defeat.” This theme is worth challenging.

### Predecessors to Falkirk

Unfortunately, these modern-day statements are mere afterthoughts, providing very little analysis. Yet, these afterthoughts appear in some of the most prominent works on medieval warfare. These statements do have indirect refutations though, and the reality is that when the average historian gives analytical thought to the concept of Falkirk as a turning point in infantry tactics, he or she concludes that it was nothing new. In 1996, Peter Reese recognized that Wallace’s tactics at Falkirk were “not only a proven solution for infantry against superior cavalry but also an effective formation for relatively raw soldiers who could take heart from the closeness of

their comrades and the encouragement and commands of their sergeants.”<sup>25</sup> In 1999, John France similarly stated “there was nothing new about the tactics of the Scots. It was almost instinctive for infantry to gather in mass, and very effective.”<sup>26</sup>

Along with these indirect refutations, there are tangible examples from the medieval world preceding 1298. The following examples of infantry withstanding the onslaught of cavalry are provided in descending chronological order, remaining within 200 years of Falkirk. In addition, they focus entirely on battles in the Western World. Finally, it is important to remember that the argument is whether infantry withstood charges from cavalry. In some of these battles, infantry withstood such charges, but did not provide the final push toward victory.

### *Welsh at Maes Moydog (1295)*

Three years prior to Falkirk, at the Battle of Maes Moydog, the Welsh employed *schiltrons*. Although the contemporary description by Nicholas Trivet (c. 1257-1334) does not use the word, he describes the Welsh “planting the butts of their spears on the ground” and turning “the points against charging cavalry so as to defend themselves.”<sup>27</sup> However, like the Scots, the Welsh were vulnerable to projectiles. The English used crossbowmen to break up the formations and then followed up with cavalry charges.<sup>28</sup> This demonstrates that the concept of organizing spearmen against cavalry was not unique to Wallace or Scotland.

In 2012, David H. Caldwell theorized that Wallace might be the same person documented in a 1296 roll who consorted with English military minds. If that were the case, then “he might also have picked up information on the English campaigns in Wales in the preceding few years, particularly how Madog ap Llewelyn with a force of spearmen had been trapped at Maes Moydog in Powys in 1295 and had had his army destroyed by English cavalry in combination with crossbowmen and archers. Wallace would at least have known what to expect.”<sup>29</sup> Regardless, there is always the potential that Wallace heard of the battle through other avenues, but there is no direct evidence.

### *Lithuanians at Karuse (1270)*

*The Livonian Rhymed Chronicle* (c. 1290) provided inspiration for the knights of the Livonian Order, but it also provides another example of infantry standing up to cavalry. On the frozen Baltic Sea, Lithuanians set up a defensive position behind their sleds. Livonian knights charged ahead of their own army. The chronicle reveals that when the knights “came dashing toward them, the heathen went behind the defensive line of their sleds, and the foremost Brothers, the flag-bearers, smashed into it. The heathens rejoiced and stabbed their horses to death. Some of the Brothers were slain, but the others



put up a good fight.”<sup>30</sup> The rest of the Livonian army arrived and a lengthy battle ensued on the ice. However, the Livonian army eventually retreated, “and the heathens rejoiced, for they had held the ice and thus won the victory.”<sup>31</sup> Although a unique battlefield, infantry again stood up to cavalry.

### *Crusaders at Jaffa (1192)*

At the Battle of Jaffa, English King Richard I (r. 1189-1199) found his force outnumbered outside the city’s walls against Egyptian Sultan Saladin (r. 1174-1193) and his Muslim army. Crusader and Muslim chronicles convey similar stories of how Richard’s troops carried kite-shaped shields, which they used to create a shield wall by ramming the points of them into the ground. Those with lances took a knee behind the wall and held their weapons outward. Crossbowmen worked in pairs to load and fire.<sup>32</sup> Saladin’s cavalry charged toward Richard’s position. As the crossbowmen fired, the Muslims would discharge their own flurry of arrows, but turned away before reaching the crusaders’ position. After several attempts, the Muslims refused to charge anymore. Frustrated, Saladin left the field.<sup>33</sup> The battle was over.

Delbrück did not believe that Richard’s defensive position was formidable enough to withstand so much disciplined cavalry and instead “the fighting spirit of the infidels was very dull.”<sup>34</sup> While there were likely morale issues in Saladin’s army, the Crusader formation should not be discredited. Medieval military historian John France makes a direct correlation between the tactics at Jaffa and Falkirk. To him, “the *schiltron* is very like the formation that Richard I formed with spearmen when he was surprised by Saladin outside Jaffa.”<sup>35</sup> France denotes the tactical differences between the two approaches (e.g., the presence of a shield wall at Jaffa), but he makes no mention of the morale factor. Still, regardless of Delbrück’s assessment, there is no doubt that the Muslim cavalry would have pressed their charges against poorly deployed infantry or infantry that broke ranks. That being the case, Richard’s approach at Jaffa was another predecessor to infantry withstanding a cavalry charge.

### *Anglo-Normans at Bourghérolde (1124), Brémule (1119), and Tinchebrai (1106)*

Long before Wallace’s spearmen held firm at Falkirk, the Anglo-Normans demonstrated the capability of infantry to fight against cavalry. In three of their battles, knights opted to dismount and fight on foot against cavalry charges. While it may be easy to argue that one or two instances came about due to favorable circumstances such as terrain, three examples demonstrate a trend. At the Battle of Bourghérolde, cavalry charges could not break infantry lines.<sup>36</sup> At the Battle of Brémule, English King Henry I (r. 1100-1135) dismount-

ed roughly 400 of his knights on a hill. French cavalry attacked the dismounted knights twice, suffering heavy casualties.<sup>37</sup> As one medieval chronicle of the battle states, “He who charges rashly often fails.”<sup>38</sup> Henry dismounted his cavalry at the Battle of Tinchebrai as well, again to victory.<sup>39</sup>

### Falkirk's Influence

Falkirk receives a lot of attention in modern works mainly due to its protagonist, Wallace. There are countless biographies on the Scottish figure. Traditionally, the Welsh leader at Maes Moydog—Madog ap Llewelyn—has had none.<sup>40</sup> However, the focus on Falkirk comes about for other reasons as well. Guisborough's detailed description of the Scottish tactics is thorough and convincing, providing plenty of fodder for the military historian who hopes to extract maxims or demonstrate shifts and trends in warfare. It is clear that the Scots did indeed establish a formidable position. Still, other groups of infantry, even lowly spearmen, had accomplished the same feat elsewhere. The Welsh were just as poorly equipped as the Scots and they used the same formations three years prior.

Still, the robust description of Falkirk by Guisborough is not a sufficient explanation as to why modern-day historians misidentify Falkirk as a harbinger of new infantry tactics. If that were simply the case, then it is plausible that a medieval chronicler providing a more robust description for Maes Moydog would lead historians to identify that battle as the harbinger. This will not do. Although shorter, the medieval description of Maes Moydog explicitly describes spearmen with spear butts in the ground to defend against cavalry charges. Instead, the answer lies in the modern-day imbalanced focus on the Scottish wars and Welsh wars found in English-Anglo-American historiography. Hereford B. George's 1895 book makes no mention of Maes Moydog. However, he incorrectly identified Wallace as “the first to organise plebeian spearmen afresh, not indeed for victory, but with success as against mailed horsemen only.”<sup>41</sup> Brian Todd Carey's 2006 work makes no mention of the Welsh battle or other battles in this paper, but identifies Falkirk as a “harbinger of battles to come.”<sup>42</sup> By excluding Welsh wars, it is easy to misidentify the Scottish tactics as the beginning of some sort of revolution in infantry.

The larger question as to why Wallace receives so much attention is worth examining. He is obviously a national hero in Scotland, but he also became a hero in England in the nineteenth-century. In order to raise funds and maintain support to build the massive Wallace Monument at Stirling in the 1860s (see fig. 1), supporters had to use creative responses to some practical objections. Namely, how can Wallace, a man who clearly wanted anything but unification with the English, earn such a giant monument in an age where Scotland and England were striving toward solidifying their unification? Supporters of the monument argued that Wallace's rebellion put Scotland on

an equal footing with England, setting the stage for a negotiated unification 500 years later. Wallace was not just a supporter of Scottish independence, but also the harbinger of unification.<sup>43</sup> As such, Englishmen such as Hereford B. George could describe Wallace as a



Figure 1: Wallace Monument in 2011. Photo courtesy of Dawn Manning.

“born soldier” in a war where “neither party was entirely in the wrong,” but somehow unification was “inevitable sooner or later.”<sup>44</sup>

Regardless, Falkirk presented nothing new in the realm of infantry tactics. The statements in support of an innovation or revolution of sorts at Falkirk are scattered afterthoughts, as are the implicit refutations. Still, a thread of regurgitated, unsubstantiated statements exists in modern works that carry a tradition more than a century old. Some are explicit, as shown with the direct citation by D. J. Gray of Hereford B. George’s 1895 book. Yet, as shown, armies in the Western World had demonstrated that infantry could withstand cavalry charges for at least the preceding 200 years. Historians often make clean breaks in their narratives. However, these breaks can be subjective and in the case of Falkirk come about due to a detailed contemporary account, an imbalanced focus in modern histories, and the presence of a hero who transcends nationality. As such, historians must challenge these breaks. Falkirk was not the harbinger; it was just another battle reusing infantry tactics.

#### Notes

<sup>1</sup> Hans Delbrück, *Medieval Warfare*, trans. Walter J. Renfro, Jr. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1990), 393.

<sup>2</sup> For example, Michael Prestwich states that Guisborough “provides the fullest account of the battle” in *Edward I* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 481; G. W. S. Barrow goes further, calling it “the fullest account evidently composed by an eyewitness or from information supplied by one” in *Robert Bruce and the Community of the Realm of Scotland* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), 449n65; and Peter

Armstrong states that Guisborough's account "is the most detailed and accurate contemporary one we have" in *Stirling Bridge & Falkirk, 1297-98: William Wallace's Rebellion* (Oxford: Osprey, 2003), 66.

<sup>3</sup> Analysis of Guisborough in Antonia Gransden, *Historical Writing in England, c.550 - c.1307* (London: Routledge, 2000), 440, 472-474.

<sup>4</sup> "Chronicle of Walter of Guisborough," 65. This translation comes from the A. A. M. Duncan (Edinburgh: Scottish Centre for Social Subjects, 1983).

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 65-66.

<sup>6</sup> See Kelly DeVries, *Infantry Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1996), 22, 31, 56-57, 84-85.

<sup>7</sup> The basic theses of Roberts, Parker, and Rogers available in Clifford J. Rogers, "The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years' War," *The Journal of Military History* 57, no. 2 (April 1993): 241-244.

<sup>8</sup> T. F. Tout, *Edward the First* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1893), 207, 208.

<sup>9</sup> Reprinted in 1896, 1903, 1906, 1909, 1913, 1920, 1924, and 1932.

<sup>10</sup> Hereford B. George, *Battles of English History* (London: Methuen, 1895), 45.

<sup>11</sup> Reprinted in 1895, 1896, 1904, 1905, and 1911.

<sup>12</sup> A. F. Murison, *Sir William Wallace* (Edinburgh: Oliphant Anderson & Ferrier, 1898), 155.

<sup>13</sup> "Jo große Massen Fußvoljs, die vor den Ritttern nicht jofort ausein anderstieben, find im Mittelalter jonst nicht zu finden." Hans Delbrück, *Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte* (Berlin: Berlag von Georg Stilke, 1907), 409.

<sup>14</sup> Delbrück, *Medieval Warfare*, 393.

<sup>15</sup> Although Jones does not explicitly state that Falkirk was the first of such battles in the period, he does not provide the same description for any battles prior to Falkirk. Archer Jones, *The Art of War in the Western World* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2001), 158.

<sup>16</sup> Richard Humble, *Warfare in the Middle Ages* (London: Bison Group, 1989), 125.

<sup>17</sup> D. J. Gray, *William Wallace: The King's Enemy* (London: Robert Hale, 1991), 113.

<sup>18</sup> Ronald McNair Scott, *Robert the Bruce: King of Scots* (New York: Carroll & Graf, 2000), 51.

<sup>19</sup> "Glorious Even in Defeat: The Big Date," *The Scotsman* (July 18, 1998): 15.

<sup>20</sup> Brian Todd Carey, *Warfare in the Medieval World* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2006), 154.

<sup>21</sup> Michael Prestwich, "The Battle of Stirling Bridge: An English Perspective," in *The Wallace Book*, edited by Edward J. Cowan, 64-76 (Edinburgh: John Donald, 2007), 69.

<sup>22</sup> Paul Cowan, *Scottish Military Disasters* (Glasgow: Neil Wilson Publishing, 2008), 11.

<sup>23</sup> Martin J. Dougherty, *Weapons & Fighting Techniques of the Medieval Warrior 1000-1500 AD* (New York: Amber Books, 2008), 113.

<sup>24</sup> Matthew J. Strickland, "The Kings of Scots at War, c. 1093-1286." In *A Military History of Scotland*, edited by Edward M. Spiers, Jeremy A. Crang, and Matthew J. Strickland, 94-132 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 114.

<sup>25</sup> Peter Reese, *Wallace: A Biography* (Edinburgh: Canongate, 1996), 76.

<sup>26</sup> John France, *Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades, 1000-1300* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1999), 175.

<sup>27</sup> English translation of the entire battle account by Nicholas Trivet available in John E. Morris, *The Welsh Wars of Edward I* (Conshohocken: Combined Books, 1996), 256.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>29</sup> David Caldwell, "Scottish Spearmen, 1298-1314: An Answer to Cavalry," *War in History* 19, no. 3 (2012): 276, 272-273.

<sup>30</sup> *The Livonian Rhymed Chronicle*, translated by Jerry C. Smith and William L. Urban (Bloomington: Indiana University, 2003), 96-97.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>32</sup> Ambroise, *The History of the Holy War*, 11,378-11,620. This translation comes from the Marianne Ailes translation (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2006).

<sup>33</sup> *Bahā' al-Dīn Ibn Shaddād, The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin*, 229. This translation comes from the D. S. Richards (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002).

<sup>34</sup> Delbrück, *Medieval Warfare*, 411.

<sup>35</sup> France, *Western Warfare*, 175.

<sup>36</sup> Robert Helmerichs, "Bourghérolde, Battle of," in *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Medieval Warfare and Military Technology*, 1:163.

<sup>37</sup> *The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis*, 243. This translation comes from the Marjorie Chibnall translation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978).

<sup>38</sup> *The Hyde Chronicle*, translated in Morillo 1997, 173.

<sup>39</sup> Stephen Morillo, *Warfare Under the Anglo-Norman Kings, 1066-1135* (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1997), 169-170.

<sup>40</sup> That changed in 2008 with the publication of Craig Owen Jones, *Compact History of Welsh Heroes: The Revolt of Madog ap Llywelyn* (Llygad Gwalch, 2008).

<sup>41</sup> George, *Battles of English History*, 45.

<sup>42</sup> Carey, *Warfare in the Medieval World*, 154.

<sup>43</sup> See Colin Kidd, "The English Cult of Wallace and the Blending of Nineteenth-Century Britain," in *The Wallace Book* edited by Edward J. Cowan, 136-150 (Edinburgh: John Donald, 2007), 136-137.

<sup>44</sup> George, *Battles of English History*, 42, 40, 50.

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## Mithridates I: History's Forgotten Conqueror

Cam Rea

Parthia, an empire that started with humble origins eventually grew into a behemoth conquering much of Alexander the Greats' former empire. Parthia stretched from the borders of India to Asia Minor, from Central Asia to Arabia. The Parthian king who accomplished much of this conquest was known by the name of Mithridates.

King Mithridates I of Parthia (r. 171-138 BCE) undoubtedly inherited a kingdom that was solid and sound in both its economic and military apparatus. Mithridates took the foundation established by Arsaces nearly a hundred years previously and turned it into an empire. He marched east gobbling up lands and kingdoms such as Bactria to the east until Parthia's border touched India. He then marched west into Mesopotamia. His achievements consolidated the future of Parthia's power for centuries to come.<sup>1</sup>

Mithridates' rise to fame was due to his character. His brother Phaartes admired him so much that he passed the throne to him. The Roman historian Justin, writing in the 2nd century CE, mentions that the throne was left to Mithridates because he was a "man of extraordinary ability, thinking that more was due to the name of king than to that of father, and that he ought to consult the interests of his country rather than those of his children."<sup>2</sup> Mithridates exhibited qualities that most kings rarely have, experience and maturity. Justin's passage also indicates that Mithridates believed that his subjects came first and not his sons. Mithridates understood that a king could only retain his power so long as the people and nobles were treated fairly. To abuse such power at the expense of his subjects would be devastating. However true Justin's depiction of Mithridates was, is uncertain, what is certain, is that Mithridates was a leader who left a legacy of his conquests starting with Bactria.

### **Invasion of Bactria**

Mithridates' invasion of the Greco-Bactrian Kingdom took place between 171-165 BCE. Justin mentions that the reason for Mithridates' invasion was that the Greco-Bactrians had overextended their borders due to constant warring with their neighbors:

Almost at the same time that Mithridates ascended the throne among the Parthians, Eucratides began to reign among the Bactrians; both of them being great men.

But the fortune of the Parthians, being the more successful, raised them, under this prince, to the highest degree of power; while the Bactrians, harassed with various wars, lost not only their dominions, but their liberty; for having suffered from contentions with the Sogdians, the Arachosians, the Drancae, the Arei and the Indians, they were at last overcome, as if exhausted, by the weaker Parthians.<sup>3</sup>

Justin's passage also mentions that the Parthians were the weaker of the two. However, looks can be deceiving. Parthia was in fact weaker but Greco-Bactria appeared weaker due to over extending its military operations towards the south and east. To make matters worse, the Greco-Bactrian kingdom became much weaker when a coup d'état orchestrated by Eucratides successfully overthrew the Euthydemids dynasty in Bactria. Eucratides' takeover politically divided Greco-Bactria considerably from being a major power. Justin mentions, "the Sogdians, the Arachosians, the Drancae, the Arei" all revolted due to Eucratides' power grab. The Greco-Bactrians were strong but the division caused by Eucratides invited Mithridates in.

Eucratides weakened his state, for Justin also mentions that Eucratides had a number of wars going on even before he fell from power:

Eucratides, however, carried on several wars with great spirit, and though much reduced by his losses in them, yet, when he was besieged by Demetrius king of the Indians, with a garrison of only three hundred soldiers, he repulsed, by continual sallies, a force of sixty thousand enemies. Having accordingly escaped, after a five months' siege, he reduced India under his power.<sup>4</sup>

Eucratides' warring with others to fill his coffers occurred through several or more distinct wars. But these several wars were over a long period of time during his reign. Eucratides was focused on securing not only his domain but expanding his borders towards the south and east. However, Eucratides forgot to secure his western borders.

Mithridates took advantage of Eucratides' blind spot by using spies to gather intelligence on Bactria before he launched an attack. However, Mithridates had another stroke of luck; revolt. Mithridates likely welcomed the rebellion taking place around Bactria when "the Sogdians, the Arachosians, the Drancae, the Arei" revolted.<sup>5</sup> This rebellion placed maximum pressure on Bactrian rule; it was Mithridates' wild card, and it paid off. Eucratides' folly was Mithridates' gain, allowing him to strike Bactria quickly while Bactria was weak and on the offensive. Mithridates had to strike quickly in what almost seems to be a semi-defenseless Bactria due to all the previous wars before



and presently at hand, not to forget that much of the Bactrian military under Eucratides command were most likely engaged in military operations elsewhere. Mithridates gamble paid off. Strabo states that the “satrapy Turiva and that of Aspionus were taken away from Eucratides by the Parthians.”<sup>6</sup>

According to Justin, the capture of Turiva and Aspionus greatly affected Eucratides. He declared that “... the Bactrians, harassed with various war, lost not only their dominions, but their liberty.”<sup>7</sup> Bactria had lost a great amount of territory. However, it seems that the Bactrians lost something greater, Mithridates may have subdued Bactria itself according to the Greek historian and geographer Strabo. He stated, “they also took a part of Bactriana, having forced the Scythians, and still earlier Eucratides and his followers, to yield to them.”<sup>8</sup> Both Justin and Strabo are not saying that Mithridates conquered Bactria, but that he vassalized Bactria, for Eucratides continued to hold his throne after his submission. Mithridates was smart enough to know when to stop, for to continue any further would draw much attention to his activity but more importantly, it was best not to hold complete dominion or annex the territory, for to do so could have resulted in a full-scale revolt due to a quick change in authority. Mithridates understood that it was best to keep still, for he now had a vassal to call upon.

Another interesting aspect in Strabo’s statement is that Mithridates forced the Scythians to submit to his rule. To say that the Scythians yielded to his rule is vague, for Scythians inhabited not every province. What Strabo is indicating is that Mithridates’ rule was vast, expanding beyond Bactria to the north and south. Once Bactria fell into chaos due to dynastic instability, places like Heart, Seistan, and Gedrosia, among many others, broke from Greek rule in favor of their own. Justin supports Strabo as he mentions examples such as Sogdians, Arachosians, Drancae, and Arei, each of which rebelled and replaced Greek with native rule. Mithridates seems to have conquered or vassalized the areas mentioned that neighbored or were a part of Greco-Bactria and may have gradually advanced toward India. However, it seems unlikely that Mithridates pushed far into India since none of the ancient sources mention it. But there is no doubt that Mithridates did subjugate and vassalize many of named provinces mentioned.<sup>9</sup>

In summary, Eucratides underestimated his enemy through ignorance, believing that they were militarily weak and posed no threat. However, the Parthians launched a surprise attack and were successful in their endeavor by gaining assistance from those who revolted against Eucratides. With Greco-Bactria bloodied, wounded, and vassalized, Mithridates could thus turn his attentions towards the west.

### **Mithridates Invasion of Media**

With the Greco-Bactrian kingdom under his control, he could now

turn west towards the province of Media, and finish what his brother Phaartes had started. One would think that Mithridates would have invaded Media first rather than Bactria. It is not clear why he choose Bactria over Media, but the reason could be due to a man named Timarchus. Seleucid King Antiochus IV appointed Timarchus over Media because he was not only a friend but capable of being an effective satrap in the defense of the Seleucid East. The year Timarchus took over the satrapy of Media is unknown. The reason for his appointment may have been the result of Phaartes' successful invasion of Media around 171 BCE. Timarchus was a capable leader and evidently strong enough to declare and defend his independence from the Seleucids after the death of Antiochus IV in 162 BCE, which the first century CE Greek historian Diodorus mentions:

Emboldened by this decree, he raised an army of considerable size in Media; he also entered into an alliance against Demetrius I with Artaxias, the king of Armenia. Having, moreover, intimidated the neighboring peoples by an impressive display of force, and brought many them under his sway.<sup>10</sup>

Timarchus' break from the Seleucids was due to the succession of Antiochus V Eupator, a nine-year old boy, following the death of Antiochus IV. Antiochus was not the heir, but rather Timarchus may have seen opportunity but it was a mistake, for declaring independence created a two front war.<sup>11</sup> Mithridates still walked the sideline and waited for the right opportunity to conduct a full-scale invasion. Mithridates' reasoning for waiting for such an opportunity could have been due to his brother Phaartes. It is possible that Timarchus defeated and killed Phaartes soon after his appointment to govern Media. This may be why Mithridates decided to look east rather than continue on where his brother left off. Mithridates was not about to challenge a man who was evidently able to field a rather large army. Instead, Mithridates would wait to see what the Seleucid response would be.

News reached Rome that Antiochus V was the new successor, however, Demetrius, brother of Antiochus IV, was actually the successor according to Rome. However Rome liked the idea of a boy king ruling over the Seleucid lands rather than a full-grown man. Before we move on, understand that after the Roman Syrian War which pitted the Roman Republic against the Seleucid Empire resulting in a Roman victory, the Treaty of Apamea in 188 BCE was signed. This treaty ultimately hamstrung Antiochus III and his descendants economically; forcing Antiochus to abandon his European holdings and real estate in Asia west of the Taurus Mountains. Moreover, Antiochus III had to hand over his war elephants and keep only twelve warships for use, but much worse was that for twelve years, the Seleucids sent Rome a massive amount of wealth.<sup>12</sup> The treaty ultimate-

ly bled the Seleucid coffers dry, thus giving Rome hegemony over Seleucid territory and control of the throne.

Demetrius at the time of his brother's death was held hostage in Rome. When he heard the news of Antiochus IV death, he came before the Roman Senate, asking for permission to return home and to claim the throne. The Roman Senate denied his request to return. Demetrius secretly escaped Rome and returned to his home country. Once back in Seleucid territory, he gathered military support and killed the boy king Antiochus V. Once on the throne, Demetrius set out to reclaim and reunite his empire by first going to Media. Once there, Demetrius killed Timarchus, thus bringing back what was left of Media into the Seleucid realm around 160 BCE. Demetrius was granted the title *Soter* "Savior," from the Babylonians for freeing them from Timarchus' rule.<sup>13</sup> Demetrius may have gotten rid of Timarchus, but on the other hand, he inherited Mithridates.

Demetrius' recovery of Media was the moment Mithridates had been waiting for. With the forces of Timarchus defeated and those of Demetrius weakened by war, Mithridates made the push into Media after 160 BCE. Mithridates spent much of his time and attention on conquering Media. According to Justin:

During the course of these proceedings among the Bactrians, a war arose between the Parthians and Medes, and after fortune on each side had been some time fluctuating, victory at length fell to the Parthians; when Mithridates, enforced with this addition to his power, appointed Bacasis over Media, while he himself marched into Hyrcania.<sup>14</sup>

Justin mentions a few interesting aspects in this passage. He indicates that it was a war between "Parthians and the Medes" and not a war between Parthia and the Seleucid Empire. Justin maybe focused on the region where the conflict occurred by using the Seleucid province of Media rather than mentioning the Seleucids. On the other hand, it is possible that Justin's mention of Medes is just that, in which the region of Media is once again independent of Seleucid rule, possibly fragmented, or that the Seleucids only controlled half if not less of the region. Demetrius did recover Media but may have lost it rather quickly due to conflicts back west involving the military and political affairs of the Jews, the region of Cappadocia, and soon an imposter's claim to be the heir of the Seleucid throne. All of this took place between 160 and the time of Demetrius I death in 151 BCE.<sup>15</sup>

Justin further mentions that the conflict between Parthia and Media was a fluctuating war resulting in loss and victory for a short time.<sup>16</sup> If we consider the possibility that Media was divided by the native and Seleucid factions, it seems likely that the native held areas were conquered first and soon after the Seleucid portion; for example, a portion of Media was still under the control of a Seleucid

satrap named Cleomenes, who is last mentioned as late as 148 BCE.<sup>17</sup> Another alternative to consider is that Media was under Seleucid control until 148 BCE, but the Medes just mentioned were those in the region of Media Atropatene. It seems without a doubt that Mithridates overran the territory during his western push.<sup>18</sup> Once Media was secured, he “appointed Bacasis over Media, while he himself marched into Hyrcania.”<sup>19</sup> The Babylonian *Astronomical Diaries* mention a Bagayasa who was believed to be the King’s (Mithridates) brother and was governor of Media and evidently in charge of Babylonia.<sup>20</sup>

Mithridates conquest of Media opened up the possibility of further western expansion. The impact he had on the Seleucid Empire was tremendous: the loss of key territory included the rich trade routes—the Silk Road and the Persian Royal Road—that ran through the eastern provinces were lost, as was the manpower and resources the Seleucids used for military and financial purposes.

### **Mithridates Invasion of Babylonia**

After conquering the Median region, Mithridates marched back to Hyrcania where he resided for four years. It was during that time -- around 145 BCE -- that the Elamite King Kammaskiri left Elam to conduct a campaign in Seleucid Mesopotamia. The Seleucid general Ardaya, stationed in Babylonia, mustered his forces and pushed out of Babylon to counter the Elamite forces. During that time, Kammaskiri was freely plundering the cities of Babylonia with no real resistance and appears to have left before Ardaya arrived. Soon after these events had taken place, Mithridates reappeared on the scene, in approximately 144 BCE, making his way towards Seleucid Mesopotamia. Once he entered Seleucid Mesopotamia, he marched straight for the Seleucia, the former Seleucid capital and captured it.<sup>21</sup>

[Against him] (*the Seleucid king Demetrius Nicator*) Arsaces the king (*Mithridates I*) [went] to Seleucia. [The city of. . . , of] the land of Assur, which before the face of Arsaces the king [had bowed down], . . . [Into Seleucia], the royal city, he entered; that month, on the 28th day, [he sat on the throne]. Year 171 (*Seleucid era*), Arsaces the king, on the 30th of the month Du’uzu (9 July).<sup>22</sup>

To secure his precious new possession, he set up a military camp on the other side of the Tigris River called Ctesiphon.<sup>23</sup> After the capture of Seleucia, Mithridates advanced toward Babylon and captured it in the summer of 141 BCE.<sup>24</sup> With Mithridates in control of the Babylonian province, immense pressure was placed upon the Seleucids, for they now had the enemy in their backyard. If Mithridates intended to expand further west, he was temporarily on hiatus, for the Elamites were on their way toward Babylonia.

Around 140 BCE, the Elamites' raids caused alarm in Parthian held Mesopotamia. Mithridates was once again in Hyrcania; when news reached him, he made his way back to Babylonia. The Elamites attacked Apamea-on-the-Silhu. The citizens of Apamea found refuge at Bit-Karkudi on the Tigris. Once the Elamites pillaged what they could at Apamea, they burnt the city down and marched towards Bit-Karkudi. The Parthian general Antiochus left Seleucia and was on his way with citizen troops in hopes of slowing down the Elamite offensive. The Elamites eventually made their way to Babylon and began to tear down, "the brickwork of the Marduk Gate." General Antiochus was able to negotiate with the Elamites (some suggest that he betrayed Mithridates) for which the citizens of Seleucia placed "a curse on Antiochus, the general who is above the 4 generals, because he made common cause with the Elamite." When Mithridates got word of the action, he gave the order for Antiochus to be killed. The Elamite forces would continue to raid Parthian controlled Mesopotamia in search of food, but it was during this period that the Seleucid King Demetrius II would attempt to recover lost lands from the Parthians in his anabasis.<sup>25</sup>

### **A Clash of Kings**

In 138 BCE, Demetrius II launched a campaign of recovery. Justin mentions this endeavor and stated:

As the cities, in consequence, began every where to revolt from his government, he resolved, in order to wipe off the stain of effeminacy from his character, to make war upon the Parthians. The people of the east beheld his approach with pleasure, both on account of the cruelty of Arsacides, king of the Parthians, and because having been accustomed to the old government of the Macedonians, they viewed the pride of the new race with indignation. Being assisted, accordingly, by auxiliary troops from the Persians, Elymaeans, and Bactrians, he routed the Persians in several pitched battles. At length, however, being deceived by a pretended offer of peace, he was made prisoner, and being led from city to city, was shown as a spectacle to the people that had revolted, in mockery of the favour that they had shown him. Being afterwards sent into Hyrcania, he was treated kindly, and suitably to the dignity of his former condition.<sup>26</sup>

The first century CE Romano-Jewish historian Josephus also mentions Demetrius' reason for campaign, which is similar to Justin's passage:

Demetrius passed over [Euphrates], and came into Mesopotamia, as desirous to retain that country still, as well as Babylon; and when he should have obtained the dominion of the upper provinces, to lay a foundation for recovering his entire kingdom; for those Greeks and Macedonians who dwelt there frequently sent ambassadors to him, and promised, that if he would come to them, they would deliver themselves up to him, and assist him in fighting against Arsaces, the king of the Parthians.

According to Justin and Josephus, Demetrius was enticed by the lucrative deal offered by the Greeks and Macedonians living in Mesopotamia, particularly Babylon. Demetrius saw this as an opportunity to gain wealth and to swell his military ranks. If his campaign was successful against the Parthians, he would be able to make war against King Tryphon in an attempt to regain control of Coele-Syria where Tryphon was popular among the Jews. Demetrius was not the most popular fellow in his kingdom, whether Jew or Greco-Macedonian. Diodorus mentioned this and stated:

Many Antiochenes, in fear and hatred of Demetrius, fled the city and wandered all about Syria, biding their time to attack the king. Demetrius, now their avowed enemy, never ceased to murder, banish, and rob, and even outdid his father in harshness and thirst for blood.<sup>27</sup>

Demetrius set off to redeem himself among his people but most likely needed to get away. His eastward push, according to Justin, seems to have brought great joy to the people under the harsh rule of the Parthians. Then again, this may have been mere propaganda. Demetrius, known for his harsh rule, needed news from the front showing how joyous the people were as they waited to be freed. This was likely a public relations stunt. In a sense, it was Demetrius' way of saying to his subjects that "if you think my rule was harsh, look how happy these people are to be under my rule."

Justin also mentioned that "auxiliary troops from the Persians, Elymaeans, and Bactrians" aided Demetrius. A number of issues come into play when reading Justin's passage. The first of which is the auxiliary units that participated in the campaign, particularly the Elamites and Bactrians. It is possible that the Elamites' raids in Parthian controlled Mesopotamia were in fact to aid Demetrius. The mentioning of the Bactrians is interesting, for historian W.W. Tarn provides a provocative theory that Demetrius and Heliocles of Bactria joined forces and created a two front war; but if we count the Elamite raids, one could say it was a three front war against the Parthians. If true, the Arsacid king would have had to turn some of his

forces east to deal with his Bactrian neighbors.<sup>28</sup> Tarn's theory is interesting but there is no proof of a Bactrian uprising to recover former lands under Parthian rule.

Demetrius' push into Parthia did not reach far. Justin mentioned that Demetrius won several battles. If Demetrius won several battles, it had to be in Mesopotamia. According to the Babylonian diaries, Demetrius was in Babylonia, for the diaries mention that Media is secured by Mithridates' brother, Bagayasa. The diaries mention "this king Arsaces went from the cities of Media to Babylon." Arsaces (possibly Mithridates' son Phraates II) marched out of Media and into Babylonia to battle Demetrius. The Parthian king pretended to offer peace to Demetrius and the ruse paid off, he was taken prisoner. As for the army that marched with Demetrius, their fate is uncertain, Justin mentioned that Demetrius "lost his army," they were either slaughtered or forced to join the king's army.<sup>29</sup>

The Parthians paraded Demetrius before those who revolted, mocking the Greco-Macedonian residents who despised Parthian rule, by displaying the Seleucid Empire (Demetrius) in chains. It must have been a powerful image for those witnessing or hearing of the news back west. In many ways Demetrius represented the legacy of Alexander the Great, a legacy led away in chains by those Alexander had once defeated. After the parade had ended, Demetrius resided at the king's court in Hyrcania. Justin mentioned that the king, "not only paid him, with royal magnanimity, the respect due to a prince, but gave him his daughter also in marriage."<sup>30</sup>

With Demetrius out of the picture, the Elamites were still persistent in their raiding. Scholars have often placed the date of the Parthian conquest of Elam around 140 BCE or 139/8 BCE. However, the Babylonian diaries speak of a different story. Instead of conquest, the diaries speak of raids and the Parthians repelling the raids, but with little intervention into Elamite lands by the Parthians. Therefore, the conquest of Elam never occurred during the reign of Mithridates I.<sup>31</sup>

### **Questioning the Final Years of Mithridates Rule**

Did Mithridates I defeat Demetrius II, or did he not? This may sound silly to many who read Parthian history. However, it may very well be possible that Mithridates did not defeat and imprison Demetrius; rather the honor might go to either Mithridates' son, Phraates II or to Mithridates' brother, Artabanus. The Babylonian diaries do not expressly mention Mithridates by name. Rather the diaries say Arsaces. The name Arsaces was on a throne taken by Parthian kings in honor of their founder Arsaces. Neither Justin nor Josephus mention the Parthian king's name that held Demetrius captive.<sup>32</sup> Second century CE historian Appian mentioned that Demetrius "was taken prisoner by them and lived in the palace of king Phraates, who gave him his sister, Rhodogyne, in marriage."<sup>33</sup>

The reason for the assumption that Mithridates defeated and held Demetrius captive at his court is due to coins. There are coins with Mithridates image with the Seleucid Era 174 (139/8 BCE) inscribed on them. Phaartes II, son of Mithridates I, issued coins with the inscription that he was king but with no date. It seems plausible that Mithridates never left Hyrcania during the anabasis of Demetrius II, since Justin mentioned that Mithridates' last campaign was against Elam.<sup>34</sup> It is possible that Phaartes was the one to counter, defeat, and capture Demetrius. But there is an issue. His mother Ri-'nu, acted as regent according to the diary. Therefore, it seems plausible that Artabanus was in charge of the army in which Phraates may have tagged along.

The coins in question indicate that Mithridates was still alive for a date on the coin is visible, whereas Phaartes had no date due to his father being alive, but the coins issued were a likely indication that Phraates was next in line and minted in order to avoid possible rebellion by providing coins bearing his image beforehand.<sup>35</sup>

## Conclusion

In summary, Mithridates built upon the foundation laid before him by his ancestors. From the foundation he constructed an empire quickly, conquering and subjugating Greco-Bactria, and invading and conquering both Media and Atropatene. From Media, he turned south to conquer Babylonia and repulsed the Elamites. However, Parthian rule in Mesopotamia and portions of southwestern Iran was fragile before and at the time of his death. Overall, it is without doubt that Mithridates turned Parthia into a juggernaut, a behemoth.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Kaveh Farrokh, *Shadows in the Desert* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2007), 122.

<sup>2</sup> Justin, 41. 5.

<sup>3</sup> Justin, 41.6.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Strabo, 11.11.2.

<sup>7</sup> Justin, 41.6.

<sup>8</sup> Strabo, 11.9.2.

<sup>9</sup> Richard N. Frye, *The History of Ancient Iran* (München: C.H. Beck, 1984), 188-189.

<sup>10</sup> Diod, 31.27a.

<sup>11</sup> Appian, *Roman History, Syrian Wars* 8.46.

<sup>12</sup> Polybius, *Histories*, 21.42; Appian, *Syrian Wars*, 7.39.

<sup>13</sup> Appian, 8.46-47.

<sup>14</sup> Justin, 41.6.

<sup>15</sup> Peter Green, *Alexander to Actium: The Historical Evolution of the Hellenistic Age* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), 444-445.

<sup>16</sup> Justin 41.6.

<sup>17</sup> Susan M. Sherwin-White and Amélie Kuhrt, *From Samarkhand to Sardis: A New Approach to the Seleucid Empire*, 223, (see Plates 27 and 28).

<sup>18</sup> Touraj Daryaee, *The Oxford Handbook of Iranian History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 169.

<sup>19</sup> Justin, 41.6.



- <sup>20</sup> M. Rahim Shayegan, *Arsacids and Sasanians: Political Ideology in Post-Hellenistic and Late Antique Persia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 72-74.
- <sup>21</sup> Frye, *The Heritage of Persia*, p. 212
- <sup>22</sup> Franz Xaver Kugler, *Sternkunde und Sterndienst in Babel*, vol 2 (Münster in Westfalen: Aschendorff, 1935) 442.
- <sup>23</sup> Daniel T. Potts, *A Companion to the Archaeology of the Ancient Near East* (Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 1004.
- <sup>24</sup> Jacob Neusner, *A History of the Jews in Babylonia: The Parthian Period* (Chico: California: Scholars Press, 1984), 20-21.
- <sup>25</sup> Shayegan, 65-66.
- <sup>26</sup> Justin, 36.1.
- <sup>27</sup> Diodorus, 33 4, 3-4.
- <sup>28</sup> William W. Tarn, *The Greeks in Bactria and India* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1966), 273.
- <sup>29</sup> Justin, 36.1; 38.9.
- <sup>30</sup> Ibid., 38.9.
- <sup>31</sup> Shayegan, 79-81, 96-97.
- <sup>32</sup> Justin 36.1; Josephus, *Jewish Antiquities*, 13.5.186.
- <sup>33</sup> Appian, *Syr.* 11.67.
- <sup>34</sup> Justin, 41.6.
- <sup>35</sup> R.j. Van der Spek, "New Evidence from the Babylonian Astronomical Diaries concerning Seleucid and Arsacid history," *Archiv für Orientforschung* 44/45, (1997/98): 167-175.

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Even if the World Had Paid Attention, Nothing Would Have Changed:  
If the Armenian Genocide Had Not Been Forgotten

Jack Sigman

The Armenian Genocide is referred to as both “The Forgotten Genocide,”<sup>1</sup> and “The Forgotten Holocaust”<sup>2</sup> in part due to the almost overwhelming attention paid to the Jewish Holocaust (hereafter referred to as the Holocaust) and what appears to be overwhelming ignorance of the Armenian Genocide. Adolf Hitler remarked “Who still talks nowadays of the extermination of the Armenians” implying that he could commit genocide with impunity.<sup>3</sup> It has been postulated that had proper attention been paid, the same as has been paid to the Holocaust for almost seventy years, the lessons learned from the Armenian Genocide would have prevented the occurrence of the Holocaust. Indeed, speaking at an event to commemorate the anniversary of the Armenian Genocide in 2011, United States (U.S.) Senator Chuck Schumer stated that if intervention had occurred to halt the Armenian Genocide, “the Holocaust may not have occurred.”<sup>4</sup> U.S. Congressman Joseph Knollenberg stated, “If the international community had spoken out against this merciless slaughtering of the Armenian people instead of ignoring it, the horrors of the Holocaust might never have taken place.”<sup>5</sup> Commenting on the beginning of the Nazi campaign against the Jews, Herbert Hirsch, a noted genocide scholar at Virginia Commonwealth University, opined that just eighteen years earlier, the Armenian Genocide occurred and had little attention drawn to it.<sup>6</sup> Finally, Cenap Cakmak, head of the department of international relations at Eskişehir Osmangazi University, reluctantly stated that elementary legal texts indicate that “the failure of the international community to deal with it (the Armenian Genocide) resulted in commission of similar subsequent campaigns.”<sup>7</sup>

The above statements are a fair representation of the general feeling that had the world paid more attention to the Armenian Genocide, the Holocaust might not have happened. However, there are several reasons why the Holocaust would have occurred no matter how well and how heavily the Armenian Genocide was publicized and politicized. The most important reason is that the Armenian Genocide, as well as the murderous events starting in 1876 which led up to the genocide, were well publicized, politicized, and discussed. This fact is clear, based on the known reactions of the Great Powers and their respective citizens as the events unfolded. The reactions, both public and private, to the massive amount of newspaper press and public discourse during more than four decades between the Bulgarian Massacre of 1876 and the Armenian Genocide, were significant, even though the action generated by them was not.<sup>8</sup> Noteworthy

secondary reasons include: at least thirty-five episodes of politicide and genocide since the Holocaust<sup>9</sup> occurred with little international interference, the inherent difficulties in formulating any type of humanitarian intervention policy, that humane treatment is not the norm between the state and its citizens, and that, too often, national interest is politically more important than national values.

### **Acts of Genocide since the Holocaust**

Barbara Harff, Professor of Political Science Emerita at the U.S. Naval Academy, detailed approximately thirty-five state-sanctioned acts of violence that occurred from 1955 through 1997 and which should be considered acts of genocide or politicide, a term that describes the destruction of a group of people who share a common political belief.<sup>10</sup> These episodes were examined to determine the probability that a series of events, based on the existing characteristics of the state, might lead to such acts. Determining such probability, based on events, will assist in the generation of a watch list with the intent of alleviating or minimizing the risk factors prior to triggering a genocide or politicide.

The relevance of this study to the question at hand is that given the overwhelming attention paid to the Holocaust, and the publicity geared toward educating all about the Holocaust, these acts of genocide and politicide still occurred. Some episodes of genocide, such as those that occurred in Burundi and Rwanda, were repeated periodically over several years with little international notice or involvement.<sup>11</sup> Indeed, Harff's conclusion stresses the opinion that organizations such as the UN and governments that care about what happens in those states should promote human rights and inclusiveness in their relations with those states.<sup>12</sup> However, this lesson is sixty-eight years too late and still not truly heeded. Dr. Paul Bartrop, director of the Genocide Studies Center at Florida Gulf Coast University, indicates that the well-publicized guarantee that the world's revulsion of the events that occurred in the Holocaust would ensure its non-repetition has fallen by the wayside.<sup>13</sup> Therefore, that *Kristallnacht*, "The Night of Broken Glass," the 1938 forerunner of the Holocaust to come, occurred less than twenty years after the end of the Armenian Genocide is quite plausible, based on the number of genocidal episodes within the nearly seventy years since the end of the Holocaust, despite the publicity and memorialization of that event.

### **Humanitarian Intervention**

Humanitarian intervention is one of the most controversial subjects within the realm of international relations. Given that the concept of inviolate sovereignty has been in the forefront of international relations since the Peace of Westphalia (1648), it would seem hard to prove that sovereignty can and should be violated in order to stop

certain activities occurring within that state's borders.

The likely father of the concept of humanitarian intervention, Hugo Grotius, is also the father of the scholars criticizing the concept. Proposed in 1625, Grotius' "just war" concept included rendering assistance to those outside the state who were battling oppression emanating from their own sovereign.<sup>14</sup> However, in almost the same breath, he opined that this principle would more than likely be exploited by those who sought the resources of that state, thus utilizing the circumstances to justify a war for conquest.<sup>15</sup> Since that time, debate has continued. In 1999, former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan summarized the two sides of the debate: Is it legitimate for an organization to intervene without a UN mandate, or without such, is it legitimate to allow genocide to occur?<sup>16</sup>

Sixty-eight years ago, the French delegation attempted to amend the charter of the UN to allow states to intervene without UN authorization.<sup>17</sup> Unfortunately, the concept proved too vague to override the UN charter's proscription of non-violence. As David Mednicoff, director of the Master's in Public Policy and Middle Eastern Studies programs at the University of Massachusetts, relates, "international law in general and the post-World War II UN-based legal order in particular were established to deter the resort to war by powerful states."<sup>18</sup>

The events of the 1990s, particularly the ethnic violence in the Balkans and the genocide in Rwanda, have reopened the line of examination as to the justification of "unilateral humanitarian intervention" (UHI) when the UN finds itself unable to act. In this regard, it seems that the UN's shift from inviolate sovereignty to "right to protect" tends to be such a policy examination. Indeed, the UN investigation over NATO's UHI in Kosovo led the UN to endorse the "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) policy.<sup>19</sup> However, there is still debate as to whether or not R2P fundamentally alters the age-old concept of sovereignty. Regardless, as it took fifty years for the concept, R2P, to emerge after the end of the Holocaust, it is unlikely that this concept would have been given thought or traction less than twenty years after the end of the Armenian Genocide, no matter how well publicized it was.

Still, for many, the concept of intervention lies with a moral high ground. Dr. Os Guinness, Senior Fellow at the Trinity Center, wrestles with the idea that countries of Western Civilization, particularly the U.S. and Britain, have committed their own heinous acts and escaped punishment for such.<sup>20</sup> In fact, the U.S. has refused to ratify the treaty establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) thus exempting U.S. citizens from its jurisdiction.<sup>21</sup> On another note, many African Union member states have refused to heed the ICC's indictment and arrest warrant for the president of Sudan for the commission of genocidal crimes.<sup>22</sup>

## **The Bulgarian Massacre**

A precursor to the Armenian Massacre of 1894-96 was the Bulgarian Massacre of 1876. In 1876, a Bulgarian insurrection against the Ottoman Empire resulted in a brutal suppression of the uprising.<sup>23</sup> Due to the recent liberalization of the press as well as the recent introduction of telegraph service in Europe, allowing far faster transmission of current events than previously achievable, news of the massacre quickly spread all over Great Britain. However, British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli responding to Queen Victoria, who wanted some type of intervention in Bulgaria, indicated that there was nothing that should be done in "that there is not much to choose between the sides."<sup>24</sup> Although his comments made clear his political stance that there were atrocities committed by both sides of the conflict and that they were equally guilty, he knew that in reality tens of thousands of Bulgarians were murdered by Ottoman troops.<sup>25</sup>

Eventually, public opinion became so antagonistic toward Disraeli about this matter that his government almost fell. Regardless, the newspapers split between supporters of the Ottoman Empire and supporters of Bulgaria. Additionally, the Church of England was silent on the matter due to its support of the Disraeli government and its disdain for Orthodox Christianity.<sup>26</sup> Eventually, Disraeli convinced Queen Victoria that the actual fault for the massacres belonged to the Russians who had "instigated" the Bulgarian rebellion, which in turn caused the Ottoman Empire to suppress the Bulgarians so violently. Additionally, Britain's foreign policy was committed to support of the Ottoman Empire as a prophylactic response to Russian expansionism.<sup>27</sup> Finally, British political infighting (similar in nature to today's deadlocked U.S. Congress) prevented any succor for the Bulgarians. Therefore, despite the massive amount of publicity, as well as public support for such, no British government action occurred to directly aid the Bulgarians.

Russia was just as immobilized. Nevertheless, news of the Bulgarian massacre spread throughout Russia. The Russian Orthodox Church publically supported the Bulgarians. The Tsar's wife actively supported relief efforts.<sup>28</sup> The Russian foreign minister sent the other Great Powers official reports of the massacre, appealing for action. To forestall action by Russia, which would force the British to militarily defend the Ottoman Empire, Disraeli convinced the Ottoman Empire to accept a six-month armistice.<sup>29</sup> While the eventual war between the Russian and Ottoman Empires was successfully postponed, the delaying action came about because of Britain's desire to foil Russian expansion, not to save the Bulgarians.<sup>30</sup>

## **The Armenian Massacres**

Less than twenty years after the Bulgarian Massacres, another series of massacres involving Ottoman Empire troops occurred. This

time it was the Armenian's turn to suffer for the apparent sin of not being Turkish Muslims. Ostentatiously punished for insurrection, the truth of the matter is that the Armenians were protesting against unfair taxation and the failure of the Ottoman Empire to institute agreed upon reforms. Indeed, all indications reveal that the rationale had merely become "a pretext for killing Armenians."<sup>31</sup> It appears that the previous attention paid to the minorities of the Ottoman Empire by the Great Powers proved to be a particularly painful thorn in the Ottoman side that could only be exorcized through periodic massacres.<sup>32</sup> Additionally, there is indication that the massacres continued as a not so subtle diplomatic message to Western powers to mind their own business as well as a warning to the surviving Armenians that the results of appealing to the nations for rescue would only result in disaster for them.<sup>33</sup> Perhaps this was one lesson learned by the Jewish elites of Germany who sought to cancel a mass rally held in New York City protesting Nazi treatment of Jews, for fear of reprisals against the German Jewish population by the Nazis.<sup>34</sup>

Again, the major newspapers carried reports of the massacres. The people of Europe and America as well as their respective governments, were horrified at the events because the massacre was the first known instance of the Ottoman Empire organizing a mass murder of a specific ethnicity in a time of peace.<sup>35</sup> The U.S. Congress proposed resolutions calling for military intervention and the creation of an independent Armenia.<sup>36</sup> However, in the end, Congress merely resolved to support a presidential call to the European powers to uphold treaty obligations as they pertained to the Armenian people. Unfortunately, even that resolution was not acted upon by the Cleveland administration for fear that the Turkish Sultan would forbid American Red Cross aid to the Armenians.

The next notable massacre of Armenians occurred in 1909 at Adana. This massacre ended Armenian existence in Adana, which was a major Armenian economic center.<sup>37</sup> Despite diplomatic and missionary requests for intervention, and even though the warships of several states were anchored just off the coast, no state intervened.

## **The Armenian Genocide**

World War One (WWI) became the backdrop for the final chapter of Armenian existence in Ottoman Turkey. Henry Morgenthau, the U.S. ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, had a ringside seat to the genocide.<sup>38</sup> Continuous reports flowed into the State Department on the progress of the genocide, along with Morgenthau's requests that the U.S. government intervene. However, the U.S. government did nothing. Not even a letter of protest was sent to the Ottoman government.<sup>39</sup>

Germany, as an ally of the Ottoman Empire, refused to condemn the atrocities. Instead, they justified the violence as a normal and expected response to Armenian treason.<sup>40</sup> The French and British presses

publicized the atrocities, but their respective governments, already at war with the Ottoman Empire, believed that the quickest way to end the oppression was to win the war; the same excuse made by the Allied Forces thirty years later when asked why repeated requests to bomb Auschwitz were denied.<sup>41</sup>

The American press, like the European press, was not silent. Over twenty years of pro-Armenian and anti-Ottoman journalism permeated the American psyche.<sup>42</sup> Dr. Simon Payaslian, an Armenian historian at Boston University, citing Thomas C. Leonard in Winter's "America and the Armenian Genocide of 1915," indicates that the U.S. press provided extensive coverage of the Armenian Genocide because of the intense interest of the American people in the region.<sup>43</sup> This interest stemmed from the overwhelming religious familiarity with the "Bible Lands," in addition to the well-publicized practices of the "intolerable Turk," since the 1890s. However, despite pressure from former president Theodore Roosevelt,<sup>44</sup> an American public clamoring for intervention, and the existence of what might be termed the "Armenian Lobby,"<sup>45</sup> President Wilson chose to maintain the U.S.'s neutrality and did not even join France and Britain's denunciation of the "crimes against humanity and civilization."<sup>46</sup>

## Conclusion

There are questions regarding the relationship between the Armenian Genocide and the *Shoah*, the Jewish Holocaust. That there is a relationship is undeniable. However, the insistence that the world paying attention to the Armenian Genocide would have prevented the Holocaust is very questionable. Aside from the difficulties of states engaging in humanitarian intervention and the reality that numerous episodes of genocide have occurred since the end of the *Shoah*, the fact of the matter is that the Armenian Genocide, as well as the forty years of Ottoman genocidal massacres leading up to the Armenian Genocide, were well publicized and politicized, almost to the same degree as that which was seen during a similar time frame during and after the *Shoah*.

It is inconceivable that the pre-WWII leaders and leading politicians, as well as the political elites and the intelligentsia of the states that encompass Western Civilization were ignorant of the Armenian Genocide or the history leading up to that genocide. Leo Kuper, a noted South African sociologist and genocide scholar, contends that the genocide was immediately known outside of Turkey.<sup>47</sup> However, there is a *bon mot* attributed to Marcel Proust that might apply: "Everything has already been said but, since no one pays attention, it has to be repeated each morning."<sup>48</sup>

There is a sickness in the world. It is called propensity for genocide. This sickness transcends almost all nationalities and religions, and while we claim that it takes us by surprise, it always comes with ample warning. In some states, it is through government-manufac-



tured fear that a certain minority is acting as an enemy of the state. This scenario occurred in Turkey and Germany. In other countries, genocide is the response to years of downtrodden existence of the majority which blames, and then kills, a supposedly better-off minority. The pogroms in Poland and Russia in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are examples of such. Another scenario plays out when a long term animosity suddenly breaks into violence following a national crisis. All of these scenarios occurred in Rwanda. However, no matter what the cause, it always seems to come as a shock that no one saw the signs and warned the victims. A greater shock is that no outside government intervenes, at least not until the death toll is massive, and at times not even then. The worst shock is that we cannot believe it occurred, and we claim that we cannot understand why it happens. However, Woody Allen says it best through one of his film alter egos, "The question is not why. The question is, given what we are, why not more often?"<sup>49</sup>

Based on the information provided, it is clear that the Jewish Holocaust would have occurred regardless, as it happened in spite of the massive amounts of publicity about the Armenian Genocide that saturated the U.S. and Western European presses.

#### Notes

<sup>1</sup> Leo Kuper, *Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981), 105.

<sup>2</sup> Robert Fisk, "The Forgotten Holocaust," *The Independent*, (August 28, 2007). <http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/fisk/robert-fisk-the-forgotten-holocaust-463306.html>, (accessed July 1, 2013).

<sup>3</sup> Deborah Dwork and Robert Jan van Pelt, *Holocaust: A History* (New York: Horton and Company, 2002), 41.

<sup>4</sup> Taleen Babayon, "Thousands Gather in Times Square to Commemorate 96th Anniversary of Genocide," *The Armenian Weekly*, (May 2, 2011), <http://www.armenianweekly.com/2011/05/02/thousands-gather-in-times-square-to-commemorate-96th-anniversary-of-genocide/>, (accessed February 12, 2013).

<sup>5</sup> Congressional Record, "Commemoration of the Armenian Genocide," *House of Representatives*, (1998), <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-1998-04-22-pt1-PgH2213.pdf#page=1>, (accessed February 26, 2013).

<sup>6</sup> Herbert Hirsch, *Anti-Genocide: Building an American Movement to Prevent Genocide* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 119.

<sup>7</sup> Cenap Cakmak, "ICJ and Armenian Genocide dispute," *Zaman Amerika*, (March 3, 2008), [http://us.zaman.com.tr/us-tr/newsDetail\\_getNewsById.action?newsId=19991](http://us.zaman.com.tr/us-tr/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=19991), (accessed February 11, 2013).

<sup>8</sup> Peter Balakian, *The Burning Tigris* (New York: HarperCollins, 2003), xiii.

<sup>9</sup> Barbara Harff, "No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder Since 1955," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1, (February 2003): 57, Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed July 9, 2013).

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid*, 57-73.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid*, 71.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid*, 72.

<sup>13</sup> Paul Bartrop, *A Biographical Encyclopedia of Contemporary Genocide: Portraits of Evil and Good* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2012), xvii.

<sup>14</sup> L. C. Green, "Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law," *Journal of Conflict and Security Law*, 8, no. 1, (2003): 104.

<sup>15</sup> Ryan Goodman, "Humanitarian Intervention and the Pretext for War," *The American Journal of International Law*, 100, no. 1 (2006): 107.

<sup>16</sup> John J. Merriam, "Kosovo and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention," *Case*

*Western Reserve Journal of International Law* 33, no. 1 (Winter 2001): 113, Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed July 9, 2013).

<sup>17</sup> Thomas Franck, "Legal Interpretation and Change," In *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas*, ed. J. I. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 206.

<sup>18</sup> David Mednicoff, "Humane Wars? International Law, Just War Theory and Contemporary Armed Humanitarian Intervention," *Law, Culture and the Humanities*, no. 2 (2006), 375.

<sup>19</sup> Karen A. Mingst and Margaret P. Karns, *The United Nations in the 21st Century*, 3rd ed., (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2007), 112.

<sup>20</sup> Os Guinness, *Unspeakable* (New York: HarperCollins, 2005), 218-20.

<sup>21</sup> Michael Elliott, "Bush Is Right to Refuse World Court," *Time.com* (July 9, 2002), <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,319117,00.html>, (accessed March 2, 2013).

<sup>22</sup> ICC-ASP, "President of the Assembly Regrets Visit of Sudanese President to Chad," *International Criminal Court*, (February 20, 2013), [http://www.icc-cpi.int/en\\_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/pr874.aspx](http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/pr874.aspx), (accessed February 23, 2013).

<sup>23</sup> Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History* (New York: New York University Press, 1996), 133.

<sup>24</sup> Gary J. Bass, *Freedom's Battle* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008), 262.

<sup>25</sup> Mark Rathbone, "Gladstone, Disraeli and the Bulgarian Horrors," *History Review*, no. 50: 3-7, (2004), 3, Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost, (accessed February 13, 2013).

<sup>26</sup> Gary J. Bass, *Freedom's Battle*, 276.

<sup>27</sup> Mark Rathbone, "Gladstone, Disraeli and the Bulgarian Horrors," 4.

<sup>28</sup> Gary J. Bass, *Freedom's Battle*, 282.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 285.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 290.

<sup>31</sup> Peter Balakian, *The Burning Tigris*, 56-7.

<sup>32</sup> Donald Bloxham, "Rethinking the Armenian Genocide." *History Today*, 55, no.6, (June 2005), 28.

<sup>33</sup> Leo Kuper, *Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981), 115-6.

<sup>34</sup> Yehuda Bauer, *History of the Holocaust*, (Danbury, CT: Franklin Watts, 1982), 99.

<sup>35</sup> Peter Balakian, *The Burning Tigris*, 56.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 71.

<sup>37</sup> Bedross Der Matossian, "From Bloodless Revolution to Bloody Counterrevolution: The Adana Massacres of 1909," *Genocide Studies and Prevention* 6 no.2 (2011): 164.

<sup>38</sup> Gary J. Bass, *Freedom's Battle*, 322.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, 325

<sup>40</sup> Samantha Power, *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide* (New York: HarperCollins, 2002), 4-5.

<sup>41</sup> David S. Wyman, *The Abandonment of the Jews*, (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 291.

<sup>42</sup> Gary J. Bass, *Freedom's Battle*, 316.

<sup>43</sup> Simon Payaslian, "The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and America's Response/America and the Armenian Genocide of 1915/'Starving Armenians': America and the Armenian Genocide, 1915-1930 and After." *The Middle East Journal* 59 no.1 (2005): 135, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/218536496?accountid=8289>, (accessed February 23, 2013).

<sup>44</sup> Peter Balakian, *The Burning Tigris*, 293-5.

<sup>45</sup> Norman Stone, "A Bungled Case for the Prosecution," *The Spectator*, (Apr 24, 2004): 43-44, <http://search.proquest.com/docview/201152502?accountid=8289>, (accessed February 23, 2013).

<sup>46</sup> Samantha Power, *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*, 5.

<sup>47</sup> Leo Kuper, *Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century*, 107.

<sup>48</sup> Arthur Plotnik, *The Elements of Expression*, 2nd ed. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2012), 191.

<sup>49</sup> Woody Allen, *Hannah and Her Sisters* (United States: Orion Pictures Corporation, 1986).

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COLIN G. CALLOWAY. *The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of America*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Treaty of Paris was signed in 1763, ending the war between Great Britain, France, and Spain, which was known in North America as the French and Indian War, and in Europe as the Seven Years' War. This treaty was responsible for the transfer of enormous amounts of territories. The British received Canada and Louisiana – in other words, all of the French held territory east of the Mississippi River from Canada all the way to the Gulf of Mexico, which included East and West Florida. As Francis Parkman, a noted nineteenth century American historian said: “half a continent changed hands at the scratch of a pen,” and Colin Calloway used this phrase as the title of this concise book which was the winner of the Society of Colonial Wars Book Award in 2006.

Divided into seven chapters, plus an epilog, this book, which is part of the “Pivotal Moments in American History” series published by Oxford University Press, is not about diplomacy, war, or even land. It is about the year 1763, and the power politics of Europe at that time. As Calloway says, it is “less concerned with changing colors on the map....than with the effects of changing circumstances on the various people living there.” This is a unique approach to the study of early America, because most historians writing on that period have focused their studies on the Anglo-American society and culture of the people that lived in a narrow strip of land along the East coast of North America. While Calloway also discusses this group, he goes further by including others who were also part of the story of the colonization of America. These groups included the Native Americans, Canadians, French, and Spanish, as well as those British colonists who lived in the back country and whose lives were very different than those living along the Atlantic coast. Calloway describes the many cultures that made up the British Empire of the 1700s with statements such as “slaves from West Africa labored in fields in West Florida wearing textiles from West Yorkshire.”

Each chapter of this book deals with a different subject. Chapters 1 and 2 give an overview of life in America in 1763 and the contested land areas. Chapters 3 and 4 are devoted to Pontiac's War, the Settler's War, the Red Coat's War and the setting of the new boundaries, while Chapter 5 deals with the endurance of the French in North America. The last two chapters are both rather short and discuss the “Louisiana Transfer and Mississippi Frontier” as well as “Exiles and Expulsions.”

Calloway writes that the Seven Years War actually lasted nine years in America, and it ended the fifty year struggle between France and Great Britain for control of Canada and the Ohio River Valley – the lands between the Appalachian Mountains and the Mississippi

River. He also shows that the Treaty of Paris set in motion a series of unexpected consequences. Indians and Europeans, as well as settlers and frontiersmen, all had to struggle to adapt to the new boundaries, alignments, and relationships. Great Britain was now in possession of a vast empire in North America. Settlers were now free to move into the western territories, and the clashes with Native tribes became more frequent and violent as the Indians tried to defend what they believed was their territories as well as their cultures. In the Northwest Territory, Pontiac's War - which Calloway describes as the first World War - "brought racial conflict to its bitterest level so far." The year 1763 saw the migration of whole ethnic groups - sometimes from one end of the continent to the other, as the Acadians did when they left Canada, migrated to Louisiana, eventually becoming known as Cajuns.

Calloway tells his story with great narrative skill. Not only does he include the regular cast of characters such as George Washington, Thomas Gage, and Jeffrey Amherst, he also includes many other lesser known people such as William Johnson, the Irishman who was able to move from Indian camps to British forts. Also included are the great Ottawa chief, Pontiac; Alejandro O'Reilly, the Spanish governor of Louisiana who outlawed the taking of Indians to be slaves, and James Murray, the first British governor of Quebec, who was diligent in his fight for the rights of his French Catholic subjects.

While most Americans are aware of the significance of the Declaration of Independence and the Emancipation Proclamation, they are, for the most part, unaware of the significance of the Treaty of Paris of 1763, even though this treaty shaped our history just as decisively as those documents signed in 1776 or 1862. This small book by Colin Calloway explains why this is true and he provides a wealth of well-documented information in his book - a book that should be read by anyone who has an interest in the relationships between the French, the British, the Spanish, and the Native Americans prior to the American Revolution.

As stated earlier - this book is not a book about the French and Indian War, but rather about the consequences of that war and its effect on the people - of all nations - living in America in 1763. This reviewer believes that had Calloway increased the size of the book by adding one or more chapters, especially one that further explained how the various Native American groups were treated by the major powers, as well as some comparisons of the treatment of the other various groups, it would have given an even better view of what it was really like to live in North America in 1763 and given more depth to the effects of the war on the people living there.

LEW TAYLOR

#### Notes

<sup>1</sup> Colin Calloway, *The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North America*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 15.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 16.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 24.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., ix-x.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., Inside Front Cover.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., 24.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., 27.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., 119

WYMAN H. HERENDEEN. *William Camden: A Life in Context*. Woodbridge, UK: The Boydell Press, 2007. Xiii+536 pp.

Wyman Herendeen's book on the famed English Renaissance intellectual William Camden (1551-1623) is described as an analytical biography. Indeed, the account goes far beyond a straightforward narrative of Camden's life. Represented as a minor yet important figure operating from the fringes of the Elizabethan and Jacobean courts, Camden is studied from birth to death through the various institutions and people with which he was involved, how they influenced him, and how he in turn influenced them, his own time and that which followed.

Herendeen, Professor and Chair of the Department of English at the University of Houston, Texas, divided the book into three phases, taking the reader through Camden's early years and schooling; his period as an educator, headmaster, writer, historian, and antiquary during Elizabeth I's reign; and his waning years as a herald in the Jacobean period. Relying on primary sources by contemporary figures such as John Stow, Philip Sidney, Ben Jonson, and William Cecil, Camden's own works and prodigious correspondence, as well as recent scholarship, Herendeen examines each period in minute detail to understand what drove Camden's interests, career moves and attitudes. While the author has created an exhaustive study, his profiles of the figures and institutions with which Camden interacted are so extensive that the reader may forget who the book is actually about. Yet the upside of this scrutiny results in a thoroughly comprehensive understanding of the Elizabethan and Jacobean periods from intellectual, religious, political and cultural points of view, as well as of London's atmosphere and the schools that played key roles in Camden's education, including St. Paul's, Westminster and Oxford.

Camden was indeed an intriguing figure of the English Renaissance. He took on many "careers," ranging from teacher, poet, and scholar to herald, historian, antiquary, the first biographer of Elizabeth I and author of several works, the most important being the *Britannia*. Herendeen makes the astute summation that Camden, in spite of never narrowing his focus onto any one of his many pursuits, was "greater than the sum" of all those pursuits put together. Yet in spite of his prolific correspondence and well known gift for lifelong friendships, Camden appears to have been intensely private. Herendeen writes almost nothing of the intellectual's family other than a few words about his parents. A wife—unnamed, yet who apparently nursed Camden through a prolonged illness—is noted only once. No children are mentioned at all.

Camden seemingly walked a very fine tightrope between the religious factions of the day, staying in line with Elizabethan Protestantism while remaining neutral on Catholic and Puritan issues. He also is thought to have trod softly around political matters, giving the appearance of aloofness when in truth political volatility had to have encircled him. Herendeen interweaves these two aspects with the intellectual and cultural elements very well. One thread that he missed, however, was how antiquarianism, probably one of Camden's most satisfying interests, stemmed from the growing sense of nationalism that England was experiencing at the time, a cultural element that grew out of the aftermath of the Hundred Years' War that ended in 1453. John Leland, a predecessor in English antiquarianism whose interest in Britain's past was certainly sparked by this sense, had deeply influenced Camden's own interest. Here, Herendeen's study neglects the importance of the late medieval period's lingering influence on the English Renaissance.

Further, Herendeen paints a glowing view of Camden, finding deep admiration and virtually no faults. Indeed, portraits of the man show eyes full of kindness, and true, only one critic exists in the sources, that of the ranting, jealous Ralph Brooke who despised Camden. Brooke felt that Camden's elevation to Clarenceaux King of Arms (officer of arms at the College of Arms in London) was out of line and undeserved. However, numerous other sources portray a rush of friends and colleagues who defended Camden against anything Brooke said or wrote. When an account such as this biography appears so one-sided, questions arise as to the author's potential bias. To be fair, though Herendeen may have ignored Camden's faults, he may also have lacked any sources to explore them. Perhaps Camden was as successful in hiding faults as he was in treading the tightwires between factions and in protecting his private life.

Overall, Herendeen achieves his goal of placing Camden within the context of his lifetime. However, several issues mar this book besides those already cited. If the volume were ever revised, a good hard edit would be a foremost task. Elimination of a tremendous amount of redundancy could reduce the text by at least a third and produce a much clearer study. Proper copyediting would eliminate myriad punctuation errors and missing and misspelled words. In the section about Roger Brooke's animosity towards Camden, the author over-used quotes from Brooke's works, each time stating what Brooke said, then quoting directly, going on page after page. Further, numerous quotes in Latin were not translated or presented within the context so that a non-speaker of Latin can understand the gist of the author's statements. No bibliography was provided, a serious omission for a scholarly monograph. Instead, notes with some references were placed at the end of each section. The most glaring mistake, however, was the author's anachronism of referring to Mary, Queen of Scots as the sister of Elizabeth I instead of her cousin.

While perhaps Camden's need for privacy created an absence of



details for Herendeen to employ, and though a wealth of knowledge about sixteenth century England is imparted in this volume, unfortunately, the reader comes away with the sense that too much attention has been paid to the peripheral information at the expense of focusing on Camden himself.

KATHLEEN GULER

JENNIFER D. KEENE. *Doughboys, the Great War, and the Remaking of America*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001.

American academic military history has undergone a significant metamorphosis since the mid-twentieth century. It has become an increasingly complex and multi-faceted field, although in the eyes of the reading public it remains one that is often confused with popular military history, a form written for general audiences and lacking academic rigor. In a recent discussion of the field launched by "Mind and Matter - Cultural Analysis in American Military History: A Look at the State of the Field," military historian Wayne E. Lee distinguishes between the traditional academic military history approach that studies the "nature of weapons and activities of armies within political, economic and technological contexts," and the newer form of military history, "war and society" studies that focus on the social and cultural impacts of war by analyzing the effect of the war experience on those who served in the military and upon society in general in the midst and aftermath of war.<sup>1</sup> Military historian Edward Hagerman's *The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare: Ideas, Organization, and Field Command* is an excellent example of the traditional military history "material and operational" approach. Conversely, Jennifer D. Keene's *Doughboys, the Great War, and the Remaking of America* exemplifies the "new military history" with a ground-breaking study of America's Great War "doughboys," the men who formed the largely conscripted, mass army that the United States sent to win the "war to end all wars."<sup>2</sup> In her masterful work, Keene develops the thesis that the Great War experience not only shaped the doughboys into a highly politicized generation, but that it did so in ways which eventually led to the creation of the GI Bill, the "most sweeping piece of social welfare legislation in American history."<sup>3</sup>

In a manner strikingly similar to Fred Anderson's award-winning *A People's Army: Massachusetts Soldiers and Society in the Seven Years' War* and Kyle Zelter's *Rabble in Arms: Massachusetts Towns and Militiamen During King Philip's War*, Keene sets out to research the social character of men-in-arms, the society from which the men were drawn, who they were, why they served, and the effects of their service on their future lives. She begins her study by examining how the citizen-soldiers of 1917 came to find themselves bearing arms. Like their predecessors from the Massachusetts Bay Colony in the first of colonial America's great wars, King Philip's War (1675-1678),

most of the men who served in the First World War were conscripted. Also, many of the decisions about who went to war were made at the local level.<sup>4</sup> Keene, however, benefited from the sheer enormity of archival material available to her. Compared to King Philip's War, the Great War was relatively recent and the materials available for researchers include documents such as the draft registration records of 24 million men in addition to volumes of correspondence, surveys, letters and diaries, military records, and reports from both American and foreign newspaper correspondents. Keene's extensive back-matter, comprised of endnotes and a review of primary and secondary source material, provides insight into the depth of her research and the vast amount and diversity of the materials used in her work.<sup>5</sup>

Keene comprehensively builds her case that the Great War experience of America's doughboys had a significant and lasting impact on the men and upon American society. In its struggle to raise and field a mass army, where over 70 percent of the men served involuntarily rather than by volunteering, the U.S. Army found itself faced with unique and unexpected tests. The Army's challenge began with its need to absorb, train and discipline men from an increasingly diverse nation; regional and racial conflicts came to the Army together with its new conscripts. The Army faced the need to accommodate language and literacy barriers; "approximately 100,000 of the half-million foreign-born troops serving in the military could not speak English" and illiteracy rates ranged from 14.2 percent for the men from Minnesota to 49.5 percent for those of South Carolina.<sup>6</sup> Overall, black troops suffered the highest from educational neglect with an overall illiteracy rate exceeding 50 percent.<sup>7</sup> The Army encountered additional challenges brought on by the need to support front-line combatants across the Atlantic. For the first time, the majority of the men in service played support and technical roles rather than serving as combat soldiers. The Army had little time to train combat troops. Those serving in support roles received minimal if any training before assuming their duties.<sup>8</sup>

Keene establishes that the conscripted soldiers viewed a social contract existing between themselves and the nation they served, a contract that implicitly set boundaries upon the severity of Army discipline and that included impacts to the federal government. In the eyes of the doughboys, they fulfilled their duties. They believed that the federal government assumed a reciprocal responsibility to provide them with adjusted compensation to reimburse for the "diminished social and economic prospects" the veterans faced upon re-entry into American society.<sup>9</sup> The "social contract" theme flows throughout *Doughboys* and finds its culmination in Keene's analysis of the veterans' Bonus March during the height of the Great Depression, when Great War veterans found themselves suffering from a substantially higher unemployment rate than the country in general. The unemployment rate among veterans was almost 50 percent

higher than that of non-veteran peers in their age-group.<sup>10</sup> Keene persuasively argues that the Great War veterans played a critical role in enacting the GI Bill, providing a legacy to their veteran sons and daughters that would significantly improve the quality of their lives following time in service to their country. The GI Bill paved the way for WWII veterans to “enter the middle class” by providing “education, home ownership, and medical benefits at the right historical moment in the life of both individuals and the nation.”<sup>11</sup>

If a flaw can be found in Keene’s work, it is the lack of an introduction to the Great War itself, a war which resulted from rivalries among Europe’s great nations and that “constitutes the seminal event of the twentieth century, since it paved the way for so many of the century’s later events: the Russian Revolution, the Second World War, the Holocaust, decolonization, and the Cold War.”<sup>12</sup> Within the larger perspective of the Great War’s impact on subsequent peoples and generations over the globe, Keene’s focus is narrowly Americanized and could benefit from an additional chapter that places the war within its overall context. That said, Keene’s *Doughboys* is an impressive work and one that displays the social history genre of the “new military history” at its finest.

ANNE MIDGLEY

#### Notes

<sup>1</sup> Wayne E. Lee, “Mind and Matter--Cultural Analysis in American Military History: A Look at the State of the Field,” *Journal of American History* 93, no. 4 (March 2007): 1116-1142, Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost <http://ezproxy.apus.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com.ezproxy1.apus.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=24562558&site=ehost-live>, (accessed February 2, 2013).

<sup>2</sup> Jennifer D. Keene, *Doughboys, the Great War, and the Remaking of America* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, x.

<sup>4</sup> Keene, *Doughboys*, 10-11, 18-25; Kyle Zelner, *A Rabble in Arms: Massachusetts Towns and Militiamen during King Philip’s War* (New York: New York University Press, 2009), 7-8.

<sup>5</sup> Keene, *Doughboys*, 11, 215-285.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 20, 28.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 28.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 39.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 163.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 181.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 212.

<sup>12</sup> Samuel R. Williamson Jr. and Russel Van Wyk, *July 1914: Soldiers, Statesmen, and the Coming of the Great War, a Brief Documentary History* (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2003), 1.

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PAULINE MAIER. *Ratification: The People Debate the Constitution, 1787-1788*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010. Xvi + 590 pp.

Shortly following the writing of this book review, historian Pauline Maier passed away from a short illness on August 12, 2013 at the age of 75. *Ratification*, the 2011 George Washington Book Prize winner was her final book in her distinguished career as a historian and educator. With the current political rhetoric continually referring to the creation of the United States and the government under the Constitution, attention needs to be paid to the ratification process. Since Constitutional originalists insist on purity in their concept of what the Constitution means, it is only right to study how the Constitution was created. To that end, the ratification process is just as important to that issue as the Constitutional Convention itself. The Convention was only one phase of the process of changing the government of the United States. Getting the Constitution ratified was the second part and as the documents of the past show us, far more difficult than the creation was.

Pauline Maier, the William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor of American History at MIT has written what is the most exhaustive examination of the ratification process to date. Utilizing records from the conventions and state legislatures, private letters from delegates, and newspaper accounts, she has reconstructed what took place at the conventions and more importantly, why events occurred as they did. The result is a very detail oriented book that explores what the men who attended the conventions were thinking as well as the factions in the states that were for and against ratification. She makes it perfectly clear that ratification was not a slam dunk affair, but instead a very iffy proposition that came very close to failing.

We know today that eleven of the thirteen states ratified the Constitution and commenced operating under it in March of 1789. What most people do not know is that this almost did not occur. Quite possibly a very different national history could have transpired, potentially one that created multiple nations instead of the America we know today. The Constitutional Convention was not employed to create a totally new government, and Congress could easily have decided not to send the proposed Constitution to the states for their legislatures to decide upon calling for a ratification convention or not. However, Congress did decide to send it on as they deemed it was legal to do so under the Articles of Confederation. Had they thought it was not legal, they certainly would not have done so.

Once the states received the Constitution with its proposed national government, the legislatures had to decide whether they should call for a ratification convention or not. One state, Rhode Island, decided not to do so and its legislature voted against ratification. The rest of the states did call for conventions and set forth

voting parameters and delegate qualifications. Maier covers this as the process was important and resulted in delegates being elected on the basis of being for or against ratification while in some states a great many were elected because they had not made up their minds and wanted to do so at the convention based on what they learned. Maier also reminds us repeatedly that this was the late 18th century where communications were only as fast as a horse could carry a rider. She also points out how unusual it is to modern readers that delegates in that era were elected to make up their minds later when they went through the information instead of staking out a position one way or the other in many cases. The contrast between that idea and today's election process stands out.

Maier covers each convention in the order they happened. While some conventions were smaller and a large majority predisposed for ratification, important questions were asked. Maier points out the basic arguments which were brought up in each convention as well as the defenses which countered them. She also addresses where deviations from the discussion took place and why. She does not invent an interpretation, but rather relies on solid work with primary source documents to construct her interpretation of the process. While some states had sparse records of their conventions for political reasons, Maier dug up additional sources which show there was a solid core of opposition in most states. She delves into the background of the prominent delegates who took part in the process, but she also brings many of the minor delegates to the forefront, men who could be considered as minor Founders. These delegates played a role albeit secondary to the main figures, but still important as in a few states the voting came down to several men who either switched their votes from their original positions or made up their minds on the last day.

Maier's book contends that while the Federalist Papers were written during this period, their impact on the various conventions was slight. She refers to it in explaining what James Madison, John Jay, or Alexander Hamilton thought of the Constitution, but does not use it as a means of explaining what everyone thought. In fact, she goes to great lengths to show that there were many different opinions on both sides of the argument and that even the men who signed the Constitution at the Convention had differing opinions on most of the articles in it. This is important because the concept of originalism is dependent upon the idea that the Founders were in agreement on what they were doing. The complete opposite is true. Often they agreed that something needed to be done in a certain way, but they disagreed on why it should be done.

All in all, this is an outstanding book for any student of the Constitution to read. Readers will finish it with the realization that ratification almost failed. They will also emerge knowing that unlike today's politicians who continually fight and work to impede the progress of legislation that has already been made law, the men of the ratification conventions worked to create a national government

regardless of how they voted at the conventions. They worked together once the votes were finished in order to create a more perfect union. They disagreed on many issues, but once the voting ended they abided by the results and worked to make things better. Maier shows this result as well as how each person's individual beliefs and personalities influenced each other. Many historians of this period remark on this as well.

This book is highly recommended for students of this era as it is quite informative in explaining how the Constitution became the frame for the new national government and why certain events occurred as they did. Quite often the personalities of the people played important roles in those events. The example of James Madison barely being elected to the first House of Representatives is a good example of how personalities clashed over ratification. Also, the fact that George Washington favored ratification and the fact that practically every delegate assumed that Washington would serve as the nation's first president is brought up in several chapters. In the end, that could have been one of the factors that changed a few delegate's minds about ratifying the Constitution. As stated earlier, Maier's depiction of the events brings them to life and makes the participants human. That in turn makes this book a great read and a worthwhile addition to any history scholar's library.

JIM DICK

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