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Welcome to the eleventh issue of the American Public University System (APUS)’s Saber and Scroll Journal, which begins the fourth year of journal production. While it was intended that this issue focus on two key themes, “Winter: The harshest season of the year and its effects on societies, empires, and armies” together with “Religion: Arguably the most powerful influence in history,” not every article in the issue aligns to the themes. The section devoted to “Winter” kicks off with a fine article from Edward Hagerty, PhD, “The Night the Angels Sang: Christmas 1914 at Home and on the Front,” while “Religion” launches with “Tribal Capabilities and Warfare: The Case of Ancient Israel,” contributed by Martin Catino, PhD.

Once again, the journal team is especially grateful for the participation of many APUS faculty members who have shared their outstanding work with us. This issue also features contributions by Nick Ceh, PhD and Robert Smith, PhD. Dr. Smith, affectionately known as “Smitty,” also serves as one of the faculty advisors to the journal team. We are pleased that the APUS historical community continues to respond so enthusiastically to the journal and are proud to bring to you one of our finest issues, featuring articles by APUS students and alumni, in addition to the instructors noted above.

As Saber and Scroll Journal readers are aware, most of the editors are either APUS graduate students or alumni who have finished their MAs with APUS. We would also like to welcome our newest team member, Jack Morato, who recently published a feature article with the journal.

While thanks are due to all our authors and to each member of our journal team, I would especially like to thank our copy editor, DeAnna Stevens, who not only formats our journal, but who also designs the beautiful artwork that graces its cover.

We continue to seek additional volunteers to help create a superb history journal; if interested, please contact any member of the current journal team.

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God heard the embattled nations sing and shout:
‘Gott strafe England’ – ‘God save the King’ –
‘God this’ – ‘God that’ – and “God the other thing.’
‘My God,’ said God, ‘I’ve got my work cut out.’

—J. C. Squire

It may be argued that nowhere in the world does the sacred religious holiday of Christmas have roots and traditions so deep as those of Western Europe, and within that region, many of the most time-honored Christmas customs originated in Germany and Austria. The season’s most well-known and enduring hymn “Silent Night” or “Stille Nacht” was composed by an Austrian priest around 1818, while the Christmas tree itself, typically a fir tree or “Tannenbaum” in German, is said to have originated in Germany in the 16th century. Wartime Britons, perhaps unwilling to credit the source of many of their traditions, noted reluctantly that the tree was “rightly described as the only good thing that ever came out of Germany.” Glass ornaments, however, also trace their origin to Germany in the nineteenth century. The holiday customs spread throughout Christian Europe and Britain, where new elements were added to the Germanic standards and Britons developed their own twists to the holiday. Englishman Charles Dickens’ 1843 novella A Christmas Carol was simultaneously a treatise on social injustice and a captivating tale of redemption that embodied the spirit of the season. His countrymen soon added novelties such as Christmas Crackers, Christmas Pudding, and various other adaptations. By 1914, whether they called it Christmas Eve or Heiliger Abend, Boxing Day or Weihnachtsfeiertag, sang “Silent Night” or “Stille Nacht,” most soldiers on the Western Front shared mutual, deeply instilled holiday memories that for the Christians among them revolved around the birth of the Savior and which, for at least a short time, transcended the will to fight.

Early in December 1914, Pope Benedict XV, elected to the Papacy only three months before, fervently sought a temporary silencing of the guns that had shattered Europe since August. Let “them fall silent at least upon the night the angels sang,” he urged the warring powers. Benedict’s plea fell on deaf ears, but
informally, the spirit of the season managed to exert its power inexorably upon the already battle weary and homesick combatants. Notwithstanding the official government ruling, it would be up to those who bore the greatest burdens to decide whether a break from the fighting was warranted. Even civilians understood the official position, however. After the day had passed, one London correspondent opined that the idea of a Christmas truce had been “quite impracticable” in the face of hard military realities. The fear that such a respite from the fighting could be “utilized for fresh concentration of forces, or for the preparation of new positions, was too serious a matter to be risked.”³ Nonetheless, in the weeks leading up to the holidays, newspapers were filled with conjecture about a truce. Some eventually blamed the Russians for failing to accept the offer, with speculation that the January date for the Orthodox Church’s celebration of the holiday was the key to their rejection. Others blamed German “duplicit[y]” for poisoning the offer, noting, “[I]t would have suited the Germans marvelously well to have accepted the suggestion of a Christmas truce” and to use it in their favor.⁴ A few papers added hope by repeating stories carried in the German press “that Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey assented to the pope’s proposal for a truce."⁵ Many clergymen supported the pope’s proposal. At London’s City Temple, a non-conformist minister referenced the pontiff’s hopes and described the prospect as “a truce of God."⁶ In the end, all efforts failed to sway the nations’ leaders, leaving the outcome in the hands of the combatants on the front lines.

As with many wars, the soldiers who had so eagerly harkened to the sound of the trumpets in the late summer of 1914 did so with the typical misguided notion that they would thrash the foe and be home by Christmas. The unrelenting combat that ensued in the first months of the war and turned Europe’s green farmland into a blood-soaked abattoir soon put the lie to such optimism. Germany’s war plans developed by Chief of the German General Staff Count Alfred von Schlieffen in the latter part of the nineteenth century had gotten off to a good start, though. The Schlieffen Plan presumed an immediate French offensive and thus entailed a German holding action at the border. Meanwhile, the main thrust of a German attack would sweep through Holland and Belgium, along the Channel coast and then eastward through the undefended countryside to Paris, enveloping and trapping the French army. The time required to defeat France was estimated at six to eight weeks. Fortunately for the Allies, Schlieffen’s plan did not survive the manipulations of his more timid successor, Helmuth von Moltke. Nonetheless, for the first month of the war, German forces steadily pushed the Allied armies back toward the Marne River.⁷
The four-day Battle of the Marne that began on September 5 saw nearly 1.4 million German, French, and British soldiers facing one another. When it was over, it was estimated that roughly half a million of those soldiers were wounded or dead. The Schlieffen Plan had likewise suffered a fatal blow, and the Marne proved to be the high water mark of the German advance. There would be no triumphal march into Paris. German dreams of a rapid victory proved to be a chimera. The logistical issues attending the German advance ultimately proved insurmountable. By the eve of the Battle of the Marne the distances between some supply railheads and the front lines of the German juggernaut extended over a hundred miles. At the same time, French and British troops were called upon to stand firm. Joseph Joffre, Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, urged his men to hold at all costs and “die where they stand rather than give way.” Many grasped the urgency of the plea and took those words to heart. One French captain was killed leading his men against a deadly hail of German machine gun fire. His lieutenant then fell as he led the men forward, and a desperate cry arose that “the lieutenant is killed, the lieutenant is killed.” The mortally wounded officer, sensing the panic that was about to ensue, struggled to rise to his knees to shout: “Yes, the lieutenant has been killed, but keep on firm!” Such actions as those helped turn the tide, and the Germans began to fall back across the ravaged French countryside, giving up much of what had been won in the war’s opening weeks. Von Moltke was removed from his post on September 14. By December, the British and French victory had taken on a deeper religious or spiritual significance and had been defined by the term “the miracle on the Marne.”

By the fall of 1914, once the German advance had been halted, the exhausted belligerents all understood that the only way to survive was to entrench. Long lines of deep trenches began to stretch across Western Europe with the British holding an area extending southward from Ypres to the Somme River. Trench systems typically consisted of three lines: the forward line, a support line, and a reserve line. In order to reduce the effect of explosions or of being enfiladed, none of the trenches ran in straight lines. Instead, they were cut in a short traverse pattern with each leg running at right angles to the next. The trenches were soon waterlogged and with no way to keep the men’s feet dry the common ailment known as “trench foot” began to take its toll. Rubber gumboots would not appear quickly enough or in sufficient numbers to prevent the misery that resulted from standing all day in soaked footwear, puttees, and even trousers, which froze solidly.
at night as shivering soldiers huddled low in their muddy holes. Everything was mud-caked and sodden. Lice were rampant. Greatcoats caked with mud and soaked with water doubled in weight. In heavy rains, water sometimes rose to waist level. Periodically the men withdrew from lines so they could recuperate briefly before starting the process again. Such were the shared afflictions of the men who filled the trenches on both sides as the first Christmas of the war drew near. The horrors of poison gas would not appear until the next spring, and despite the desperate fighting, random bombardment, and sniper fire, bitterness had not yet reached the depth where some brief recognition of the humanity of the foe could not be acknowledged.11

While many British soldiers at the front, supported by the fervent hopes of their loved ones at home, would have welcomed a respite from the incessant fighting, news articles discussing the prospect of a truce often appeared side-by-side with articles designed to inspire determination to prevail against the dastardly foe. During the holiday season there was no break in that aspect of the propaganda war that hoped to stir British patriotism, boost enlistments, and engender hatred for the ‘Hun.’ A poem dated December 26 appeared in a London newspaper, marking a distinct turn from the celebration of the birth of the Christ child. Instead, it castigated the German Kaiser and his minions starting with its title “The Baby Killers.” Unfortunately, propaganda and good poetry, at least in this case, were not synonymous.

Oh, William, dear, now did you hear
The news that’s going round?
That in your troops and navy men,
A loving lot you’ve found.
On land their “Kultur” they have shown,
On sea they’ve done the same,
By slaughtering poor innocents
They have earned immortal fame.
And now they drink unto Der Tag,
And proudly wave their dirtied flag,
These brave sons of Attila’s,
But Christians throughout the world,
Know them as “baby killers.”12

Likewise, in many places along the front and elsewhere the spirit of the season did not apply. Nothing but hard fighting and misery marked the days leading to Christmas. In Belgium and northern France, frost and mist on December 25
struggled to produce a Christmas-like scene, but the thunder of artillery along the Yser River early that morning quickly disappointed those who harbored hopes for a truce. Belgian troops crossed the river that day and pushed the Germans back from their trenches. It is likely that some of those Belgians may have enjoyed the Christmas gift from their king, Albert I, who had announced a few days before that he was providing each man a box of twenty-five cigars bearing the inscription “Yser, 1914.” It seems equally likely that there was an abundance of unused cigars after the battle had taken its bloody toll. In all, it was a poor Christmas in Flanders, with one British correspondent there noting on December 24 that the troops were less fortunate than their comrades on other fronts. “The Belgian soldiers, the heroes of Liege and the Yser,” he wrote, “lack all but the bare necessities.”

Christmas Day also saw British naval seaplanes attacking German warships sheltering near their base at Cuxhaven on the North Sea. German Zeppelins and other aircraft quickly responded. British ships standing off the coast drove them away and picked up several downed Royal Navy flyers. A contemporary newspaper account indicates that one pilot was lost and at least six others were rescued, yet the exploit was described in glowing terms in that paper as “a new chapter in naval warfare,” with the repulse of the German airships seeming especially noteworthy. “The fight between our [ships] and the two German Zeppelins reads like a page of fiction from [H.G.] Wells translated into fact” wrote an enthusiastic reporter. Others took a more balanced view, observing that the “episodes are minor details of the war,” but acknowledging at the same time that if they drew the “German fleet, aerial or marine” into battle, “the men that undertook them will have played their part.”

German air raids on Britain were causing equal consternation, but civilians at that time seemed still to be taking it with traditional English aplomb, particularly near the holidays. After being advised to purchase insurance against “war risks,” one concerned citizen expressed amazement at the possibility that the war should reach across the seas to endanger his London home. “Never in my most inspired moments did I imagine that I should have to insure a peaceful retreat in the sylvan heart of old Marylebone forest against the risk of Zeppelin bombs, howitzers, ‘Jack Johnsons,’ and petrol pranks of the Potsdam pests.” London’s 

Globe newspaper even printed light-hearted limericks concerning air raids:
An enemy aerial rover
Thought he’d drop us a missive at Dover,
But the list of the dead
Was but one ca’bage-head
So he needn’t have fagged to come over.\textsuperscript{17}

While some of their kinsmen at the front would celebrate a cautious Christmas with their adversaries, the mood at home was a muted one. “London during these last two or three days seems to have been darker than ever it was before,” wrote one observer.\textsuperscript{18} Closed shops and only sporadically glowing streetlights increased the sense of gloom, yet glimmers of patriotic fervor showed in some places. Others, however, were reminded of the horrid costs of war. A dress rehearsal for a performance at Drury Lane, a West End theater, saw nearly a thousand wounded soldiers clad in red and blue hospital garb topped by khaki great coats crowded into the seats. Many bore the hideous scars of battle, while others were just starting to recover from their wounds. Still, they were mostly cheerful despite their woes. Men with only one arm helped comrades with none, lighting cigarettes and helping them to refreshments. One reporter observing those scenes was moved to write that he now appreciated what the officers meant “when they say so often, ‘the men are splendid.’”\textsuperscript{19} As the soldiers departed the theater to be driven away “by a magnificent fleet of Red Cross motor ambulances,” a large and solicitous crowd “alternately cheered and held its breath, and occasionally sobbed a little.” For their part, the soldiers cheered and sang the familiar music hall classic that defined their war: “It’s a Long, Long Way to Tipperary.”\textsuperscript{20}

Those were the luckiest of the wounded. Many more young Britons, Belgians, and Frenchmen lay immobilized or in agonizing pain in hospitals around the country. In London, layers of straw were laid on streets near hospitals in order to muffle the clopping of horses’ hoofs and the churning of carriage wheels. Londoners were admonished to be mindful of the wounded, and instead of Christmas garland, hospitals were festooned with banners beseeching quiet. Again, those too were the luckiest of men. As Christmas drew near, Britons had to face the awful fact that a third of the original British Expeditionary Force fielded that summer now lay dead. By the end of the first year of war, 90,000 British soldiers were counted among the dead and wounded. That butcher’s bill would be paid for almost another four years.\textsuperscript{21}

Support for the wounded and for their families became an important concern. Many charitable organizations and relief societies received funding
directly from average Britons who purchased postcards sold at the behest of the Prince of Wales to generate income for a National Relief Fund. Hugely successful through the war’s opening months, by November 1914 it was announced that a new fund-raising effort would be unveiled for the Christmas holiday: a National Christmas Card. The *Yorkshire Evening Post* reported on November 14 that the King had received the first copy of the new card.²² It was khaki colored and the front cover was illustrated with soldiers, ships, and aircraft in a picture entitled “Defenders of the Empire.” Inside was a depiction of a dreadnought battleship saluting Lord Nelson’s ship, *HMS Victory*, and an inscription from the King himself: “Once again the sure shield of Britain and her Empire.” A Shakespeare quote from *Antony and Cleopatra*, though somewhat out of context, capped off the text of the card with a further inspirational message: “What’s brave, what’s noble, let’s do it.” Such efforts raised thousands of pounds and did much to support those at home as well as the troops in the field.²³

Some British units produced their own Christmas cards or postcards to send home, which the men sometimes referred to as “field service cards.” One private wrote to his cousin in Newcastle that he should not think of the card as “a lazy way of getting out of letter writing, for it is not always possible to write a long letter.”²⁴ Though not common, the postcards saw wide use in the British IV Corps. Their Corps commander, Lieutenant General Sir Henry Rawlinson, drew the artwork for some of the cards, and they were distributed to the men for their use in writing Christmas greetings to loved ones at home.²⁵

The Christmas holiday was traditionally marked on both sides by the exchange of gifts, or in some cases simply the giving of gifts. British soldiers at the front were to receive from their grateful nation a small brass gift box. Reputedly the idea of young Princess Mary, who lent her name to a public fund for the purpose, British and colonial troops of the Empire eventually received more than 426,000 of the brass tins embossed with her likeness. The words “Christmas 1914” appeared below her portrait and “Imperium Britannicum” above. Around the edges of the top were the names of the allied nations situated between depictions of weaponry, ships, and flags. The gift boxes were filled with a variety of items depending on whether the intended recipient was a smoker, a non-smoker, a nurse, or an Indian Sikh or Hindu. Men could receive a pipe, tobacco, cigarettes, candies, or writing materials. Some boxes included a unique sterling silver bullet pencil encased in a .303 caliber brass cartridge. Nurses were favored with chocolates. All the boxes contained a
Christmas card and a picture of the seventeen-year-old daughter of King George
and Queen Mary. A surviving specimen housed in the collection of Australia’s
Museum Victoria measures roughly 3¼ x 5 inches. The boxes were so well
received that many men thoughtfully re-wrapped them and sent them home to
loved ones to be preserved as remembrances of the war. One corporal wrote home
in January that he had “cards from the King and Queen and a present from
Princess Mary; all these I shall treasure.”26 Another sent home the Christmas card
he received from the King, “and I want you to keep it for me until I come home,
which I hope to have the luck to do.”27 The pleasure that such a small gesture
brought to the troops was inestimable. “During the afternoon we had our greatest
pleasure of all,” wrote a sergeant. “This was a lovely card from their Majesties the
King and Queen wishing us a happy Christmas and a safe return. These, of course,
we shall always treasure.”28 Another soldier who received “Princess Mary’s Box”
on December 26 pronounced it simply, “very nice.”29 A field artilleryman noted
that he too received the Princess’ gift, but it failed to accomplish its purpose. He
complained that he “had a miserable time of it at Christmas,” and other than the
box, “the only way we knew it was Christmas was we got a piece of pudding.”30

The sentiments expressed in a later wartime poem entitled “The
Christmas Box” accurately captured Princess Mary’s recognition of the anguish of
that first Christmas in the field and her wish to ease the burden on her countrymen
far from home:

Oh, we have shipped his Christmas box with ribbons red ‘tis tied,
And he shall find the things he likes from them he loves inside,
But he must miss the kisses true and all the laughter gay
And he must miss the smiles of home upon his Christmas Day.31

Though her gift was undoubtedly much appreciated, her kindness did not stop the
cheeky editor of the Liverpool Daily Post from printing her photograph on
October 30 with the caption: “Princess Mary, Christmas Fairy.”32

The Crown Prince of Germany likewise wished his soldiers “God’s
richest blessing” and provided his “faithful comrades in arms” with a useful gift of
a smoking pipe that bore his image.33 One British soldier who later took part in the
fraternization during the informal Christmas Truce saw one of his Saxon foes
standing quietly and smoking a large meerschaum pipe that “bore the face and
high-peaked cap of ‘Little Willie’ painted on it.” Seeing the Tommy looking at his
pipe, the Saxon took it from his mouth and “said with quiet satisfaction:
‘Kronprinz! Prächtiger Kerl!’ before putting back the mouthpiece carefully between his teeth.” Someone later told him that Prächtiger Kerl translated roughly as “Good Chap.”

Among the soldiers themselves, the gift-giving spirit surfaced with the sudden cessation of firing in some areas along the front, and men scrambled to find small tokens to exchange with their new acquaintances from the opposing trenches. A corporal from the 2nd Northampton regiment wrote to his family on December 27 that on Christmas Day the Germans “even came over to our trenches and gave us cigars and cigarettes and chocolate and of course we gave them things in return.” Another private from the 1st Leicester regiment reported that they exchanged “tins of jam for cigars.” It seems unlikely that hopes for a truce could have realistically encompassed an actual meeting of the combatants and the laying down of arms in honor of the season. Many of the men expressed their utter amazement that such a thing could happen.

Where eatables were not handy, the men found even simpler gifts to exchange. One private wrote that he “got one’s autograph and he got mine, and I exchanged a button with another, and exchanged cigs and got cigars galore.” A sergeant major of the 6th Cheshire Territorials observed that “they greatly admired our equipment and wanted to exchange jack knives and other articles.” A private of the Seaforth Highlanders recalled getting “cigars, cigarettes, and all sorts of presents” from the Germans. “They think the British a very brave lot and fairly gave us a good clapping on the back.”

In some cases even officers were involved in the gift exchanges. A lance corporal of the Berks regiment and a sapper who accompanied him received cigarettes and cigars from three German officers. They were also offered a drink, but the wary sapper insisted that the German officers drink first from the bottle. The lance corporal exchanged “a tin of bully” (corned beef) for a can of pears. One field artillery officer recalled visiting the trenches on Christmas morning and being “staggered to find the Germans and English all crowded up together.” He couldn’t resist joining them. “It absolutely beat cock fighting,” he wrote ecstatically. “Tommy Atkins was swopping [sic] Woodbines for rank cigars and talking a desperate lingo of Cockney French and pidgin English.”

Meanwhile, at home, some families were not entirely left to their own devices to supply gifts. Men of the Hull City Police Force, for example, provided gifts for their members then serving at the front. The gift parcels consisted of
cigarettes, a Christmas card and letter from the police superintendent, and a "sleeping helmet," which resembled a woolen Balaclava. The policemen also made a gift of tea to the wives of the soldiers and provided small toys for the children.\textsuperscript{41}

One group of over 1,500 British officers and men of the First Royal Naval Brigade fared especially well on Christmas. Sent to assist with the defense of Antwerp, the men were interned when that city finally succumbed in October. Cut off from retreat, their commander had wisely led them across the border into neutral Holland. Held at Groningen, the naval men received packages nearly every day in the week leading to Christmas. Along with wagons laden with parcels arriving three or four times a day, the grateful mariners were pleased to receive several thousand letters. Local Dutch performers sang a Christmas Eve concert in English. The following day the dining hall was bedecked with holly and mistletoe. A large Christmas tree with lights and presents and the music of one of the battalion bands also helped set the tone. A veritable feast of turkey with trimmings and English Christmas pudding for dessert crowned the special day. They were among a fortunate few to celebrate in such conditions that year.\textsuperscript{42}

Many others had a relatively peaceful day on Christmas, with tales of an abundance of plum pudding and a flood of parcels from home. “During the last few days,” wrote one correspondent, “many men had five or six to themselves.” The general consensus was that the men had spent their Christmas “very merrily.”\textsuperscript{43}

For many others, the day passed with little notice or fanfare. “You ask how I spent my Christmas,” wrote a private of the Northumberland Fusiliers. “Well,” he said sullenly, “it was just like any ordinary day. We had a small portion of Christmas pudding and that was all . . . . Time and again I have no idea what day it is. It is a very trying life while one has it and one never knows when it might be lost.”\textsuperscript{44} One forlorn private wrote his mother that he “got some bully beef on Christmas Day, and nothing else except a biscuit.”\textsuperscript{45} Some men even tried to discredit talk of the informal truce, apparently having not experienced anything of the sort on their part of the line. “You don't want to believe half what is being said about concerts going on between the Allies and the Germans,” wrote one. “It is all lies. We had a very rough time of it for several weeks.”\textsuperscript{46}

Among those in the trenches who paid little heed to the holiday season was twice wounded Corporal J. Chisholm, who made light of the whole idea of Christmas boxes and exchanges of gifts:
I was in the trenches and we sent the Germans their Christmas boxes and New Year Gifts. I have never given so many New Year gifts and Christmas Boxes as I have done this year. They came over to our trenches for them, and they got them—more than they could carry. Then they wanted to go back and some of them got back. The ones that did get back got their New Year gifts as well as those who remained. They won't come out now they have had plenty of English Christmas boxes. They are so close to us that we have been throwing tins of bully beef at them and they pop their heads up to get the tins we pop them off.47

In many places, as with Corporal Chisholm’s area of the front, fighting never ceased. A lance corporal of the Coldstream Guards wrote his wife of the brave deed he witnessed on Christmas Day:

There was a British soldier out near the German lines wounded. He was lying there for two nights and two days in the rain and snow—and he was shouting for his regiment. I asked a Corporal to come out with me to fetch him in but we saw an Indian officer rush out to the man. Just as he was going to put the man on his back, a German fired and hit the officer. One of the privates in the same regiment ran out and got one on his back and the other in his arms and carried them to safety. I think it was the best bit of work I ever saw.48

In some cases, the fighting was punctuated by temporary spells of holiday recognition. An Englishman serving in the French Foreign Legion recalled a brief Christmas morning songfest. His French compatriots loudly sang the “Marseillaise,” at dawn, which was soon answered by “Watch on the Rhine” wafting across the field from the German trenches. “That died down to the sterner music of volley answering volley, and I emptied my magazine of eight cartridges in that strange concert; but that Christmas was, as if by consent, comparatively free from firing.”49 A corporal of the 8th Royal Scots Territorial Regiment also noted a brief respite on Christmas morning that was marked by banter but no close contact. “Somehow or other a friendly feeling got up between the Germans and us,” recalled the Scotsman, “so we both left our trenches unarmed and exchanged greetings about 300 yards apart. We were all standing in the open for about two hours, waving to each other and shouting, and not one shot was fired from either side. . . . After dinner we were firing and dodging as hard as ever; one could hardly believe that such a thing had taken place.”50
Others did no fighting, but still were unable to engage in the sorts of fraternization that marked some areas of the front. One French soldier wrote wistfully to his mother on Christmas morning filled with the spirit of the season despite the dreary conditions of his existence. He occupied an outpost close to the German lines where he and his comrades were “obliged to show no sign of life, so as to conceal our presence from the enemy.” Despite that, he seemed to have been fully in the melancholy grip of the season:

What a unique night!—night without parallel, in which beauty has triumphed, in which mankind, notwithstanding their delirium of slaughter, have proved the reality of their conscience. During the intermittent bombardments a song has never ceased to rise from the whole line. Opposite to us a most beautiful tenor was declaiming the enemy's Christmas. Much farther off, beyond the ridges, where our lines begin again, the Marseillaise replied. The marvelous night lavished on us her stars and meteors. Hymns, hymns, from end to end. It was the eternal longing for harmony, the indomitable claim for order and beauty and concord. As for me, I cherished old memories in meditating on the sweetness of the Childhood of Christ. . . . I thought of all happinesses bestowed; I thought that you were perhaps at this moment calling down a blessing upon my abode. The sky was so lovely that it seemed to smile favorably upon all petition; but what I want strength to ask for perpetually is consistent wisdom—wisdom which, human though it may be, is none the less safe from anything that may assail it.52

Whether he got his wish is unknown, for within four months the unfortunate Frenchman went missing at the Argonne.

In areas where actual fraternization and gift exchanges took place, it seems the German troops generally initiated the contact. It seems incredible, especially in light of the terrible toll of death and destruction they had seen for the last four months, that one would have the audacity to poke one’s head dangerously above the ramparts to test whether the other side was serious about not firing. Yet they did so on numerous occasions, for the most part taking one another’s word honorably. The effect was unique to that war and would never be repeated. Frequently the appearance of German Christmas trees or singing helped to break the ice.
In some cases, the firing simply petered out on Christmas Eve, and astonished soldiers heard the Germans “shouting across to us, ‘a happy Christmas.’” Soon, Christmas trees “with hundreds of candles” were placed “on the parapets of their trenches.” A sergeant in the 3rd Rifle Brigade was writing in his dug-out when his “chum came bursting in upon me with: ‘Bob! Hark at ‘em!’ And I listened. From the German trenches came the sound of music and singing. . . . ‘They’ve got Christmas trees all along the top of their trenches,’” his friend reported. The sergeant climbed up for a look and “saw a sight I shall remember to my dying day. Right along the whole of their line were hung paper lanterns and illuminations of every description, many of them in such positions as to suggest that they were hung upon Christmas trees.” Another young officer wrote that on Christmas Eve the German trenches “were a blaze of Christmas trees, and our sentries were regaled for hours with the traditional Christmas songs of the Fatherland.” When they met in No Man’s Land the next day, the German officers “even expressed some annoyance . . . that some of these trees had been fired on, insisting they were part almost of a sacred rite.” In other areas where trees were not available the men noted that the Germans “had their trenches all lit up with big bonfires and lanterns.”

In many areas the singing of Christmas Carols, or even bawdy soldiers’ ballads on the part of some suspicious British regiments, provided the means to advance the personal meetings on the field. A Belgian soldier recalled a Christmas Eve “of imperishable beauty. At midnight, a baritone stood up and in a rich resonant voice sang, ‘Minuit Chrétiens.’ The cannonade ceased and when the hymn finished applause broke out from our side and from the German trenches!” Whether or not they comprehended the French lyrics, German and Englishman alike would have recognized the tune of “Oh Holy Night.” Singing and celebrating could likewise be heard from the German side, and the following morning the Belgians were astonished to see a placard displayed over the German trenches wishing them all a Happy Christmas. An even more astounding event occurred when the Germans left their trenches and “unarmed they advanced towards us singing and shouting ‘comrades!’”

A Cheshire sergeant major reported that on Christmas Eve the Germans fired flares, and “as each fireball went up . . . our men shouted ‘Hurrah’ and ‘Let’s have another.’” The men also sang “Christians, Awake!” and other hymns to mark the occasion. Another soldier “stood in wonder” as “a rousing song came over
us—*The Watch on the Rhine*. Our boys answered with a cheer, while a neighboring regiment sang lustily the *National Anthem.*” The singing opened the door for two small parties of combatants to meet between the lines, lit by a German searchlight. Afterwards the men sang through the night, serenading one another in turn. “Give us Tipperary,” [the Germans] cried. Whereupon an adjacent Irish regiment let loose a tremendous ‘whoop,’ and complied with the request in a way as only Irishmen can.”59 A Londoner in the trenches experienced a similar incident that included exchanges of songs. At around 2:00 a.m. on Christmas morning, he noted, “a German band came out of the trenches and played carols, ‘Home Sweet Home,’ etc. It was wonderful to hear.”60 A rifleman of the Queen’s Westminsters recalled the men singing to one another, and one German even played “God Save the King,” on a mouth organ. Again, the overtures led to a total relaxation of discipline. Exploring some ruined houses in rear of their lines, the Westminsters found “old bicycles, top hats, straw hats, umbrellas, etc. We dressed ourselves up in these and went over to the Germans. It seemed so comical to see fellows walking about in top hats with umbrellas up. Some rode the bicycles backwards. We had some fine sport and made the Germans laugh.”61

In many cases, the informal truce was couched in semi-official terms with agreements to allow time to bury the dead that lay in the No Man’s Land between the trenches. A Scotsman recalled having a “short service over the graves, conducted by our minister and the German one. They read the 23rd Psalm and had a short prayer. I don’t think I will ever forget the Christmas Day I spent in the trenches.”62 In some places the dead were numerous and had lain in the open for a week. “It was a ghastly sight,” recalled one soldier as he watched the digging parties laboriously hacking away at the frozen ground to create two common graves. Once the work was completed, “the German officers remained to pay their tribute of respect while our chaplain read a short service. It was one of the most impressive things I have ever witnessed,” he wrote. “Friend and foe stood side by side, bare-headed, watching the tall, grave figure of the padre outlined against the frosty landscape as he blessed the poor broken bodies at his feet. Then with more formal salutes we turned and made our way back to our respective ruts.”63

Though the work of burying the dead was gruesome business and hard labor, the men were undoubtedly glad to do it. In places, the trenches were as little as twenty-five yards apart, with the space sometimes filled with dead bodies. One soldier recalled helping to bury a number of German dead where the lines were so
closely situated that the area was known as “The Death Trap.” It had proved so for a number of hapless German attackers. “We could see the dead Germans half-buried, their legs and gloved hands sticking out of the ground.” In some cases the dead numbered in the hundreds, many lying exposed for a week or more, so the truce, if only for burial of the slain, was welcome at least on that account. A Londoner, repulsed by the sight of the many decaying bodies, welcomed the opportunity to remove them, noting also that the Germans “were good enough to bring our dead out of some ruined houses by their trenches so that we could give them burial here. I personally, shall be very pleased, when we go up tomorrow night not to have the sight before us again.”

For the Germans, withdrawal from their previous line of attack meant that many graves were now behind the Allied lines. A former Bolton postman described how a German officer requested permission to visit the grave of a fallen comrade, then situated far behind the British lines. He was led blindfolded to the gravesite where he stayed a little while before being led back to his own lines.

A few men were fortunate to be able to attend religious services that Christmas. One Gateshead soldier wrote to a friend about having had “Communion this morning in a farm about a half-mile away.” He must have been posted in or very near the front lines, for he recalled that he “set off before daylight to be on the safe side. . . . The farm had been bombarded and consequently it was in a bad way. Where we held the service half the roof was off. I don’t suppose I shall ever go to such another service—it was so reverent and the surroundings so rough.” Other services were held in No Man’s Land amid the detritus of war. A British chaplain from Aberdeen held both a burial service as well as a Christmas service between the lines, “his hearers comprising German as well as British soldiers. . . . After the service a German officer presented the clergyman with a cigar.”

The burial details were not just occasions for solemn services. There was much talk between the opposing combatants, and in one case the meeting of German and Scotsmen degenerated into a friendly free-for-all with the sudden appearance of a rabbit on the field. “Instantly, with the greatest good humour, friend and foe alike joined in a frolicsome chase. They tumbled and pulled each other about, and of course in the midst of all this hilarity Master Hare quietly escaped.”

Many of the British accounts attribute the friendliness of the Germans to the fact that they were Saxons or Bavarians, not more rigid and warlike Prussians. One Leicester soldier complimented the Germans as being “a decent lot of fellows in
front of us now—Saxons; they don’t like the Prussian Guards.” 70 Another man noted after meeting and exchanging gifts with his German foe that he had “heard that this happened all along the British line excepting where the Prussians were opposed to it.” 71 Still another wrote his sister from Belgium that those he met were also Saxons. “It would have been a different tale with the Prussians,” he told her. 72 There was apparently some danger whenever Prussian forces were on the line. One soldier wrote that there were two German regiments in front of him, a Saxon regiment and one of Prussian Guards. An agreement was reached on Christmas morning with the Saxons, but when the British came out of their trenches as agreed, the neighboring Prussians fired on them killing two and wounding several others. Still they persisted in the effort. The Saxons threatened the Prussians if they fired again, and eventually the British and Saxons met halfway. “They were continually falling out with the Prussians,” he said. “They are the people who are the cause of the war. They hate the English very much indeed.” 73 A Medical Corps officer also noted a failed attempt to celebrate Christmas on his part of the front. Some British soldiers left their trench and went towards the German lines, “but the enemy—now thought to be Prussians—told them to go back and fired on them before they had regained their trenches.” 74 A lance corporal of the North Staffordshire regiment met with the more friendly Saxons opposite his lines, whom he claimed apologized for having to fight the English. Saxons “as you know, are more English than German,” he wrote. “It is the Prussians and the Uhlans that are doing the damage. These men in our front are like gentlemen; they would not shoot at us.” 75 Yet another soldier described the Germans in his front as “quite a decent lot,” and noted that several of them had “lived in London and were in business in the city, and one of them found that he went up to the city in the same train as one of our fellows. Another lived in Finchley and so on.” 76

The British soon found they had much in common with those of the enemy they met. Many spoke English and had indeed lived in England before the war. One corporal of the 6th Gordons even had a shave from a German soldier who had been a barber in Southampton. 77 After an exchange of cigars and newspapers with a German, a British soldier noted, “the chap could speak perfect English and he told us he had a wife and three children in Liverpool.” Another German begged an officer to “send his photograph to his sister, who lives in Liverpool.” 78 In some cases an interpreter was required, and after some struggles to communicate, one German regiment finally brought out a man who had lived in America for some time. 79 In
other cases the men spoke French, “since they could not talk our ‘lingo’ nor we theirs.”

The Tommies soon learned that the Germans were apparently not well acquainted with the current status of the war. “They all believed that London had been captured, and that German sentries were outside Buckingham Palace. They are evidently told a lot of rot. We gave them some of our newspapers to convince them.” A Warwickshire private met a German who had been employed for ten years as a waiter at the Grand Hotel Eastbourne who “said he wished he was back again. They have got the idea that they are winning so one of our fellows gave them the latest paper which will open their eyes.” Still, one thing that was frequently remarked upon by those encountering English-speaking Germans was the nearly universal sentiment that they were all quite fed up with the war.

Another commonality was a love of football. Reports of football matches taking place between German and British soldiers during the Christmas truce have grown to mythic proportions. In fact, most of the references in British letters from the period refer either to failed attempts to get up a game, or to British soldiers kicking a ball about in an impromptu manner outside their trenches. There are few if any documented references to an actual match between the combatants, and none from actual participants. Of those claiming a match took place, it is unclear as to whether they actually witnessed it or were repeating hearsay that might have been true or untrue. Undoubtedly, such tales would have spread through the trenches like an urban legend, yet the possibility exists that at least some play took place. The *Carlisle Journal* printed a letter from a man who had a friend who knew an officer in the Medical Corps who reported, “The regiment actually had a football match with the Germans who beat them 3-2.” A Cheshire man told his friends at home that while fraternizing on Christmas Day, “The Scotsmen started the bagpipes, and we had a rare old jollification, which included football, in which the Germans took part.” Such statements leave open to conjecture the question of whether a formal game took place, but it would seem that something happened that made it worth noting. In many cases, it was reported strictly as hearsay: “Elsewhere along the line I hear our fellows played the Germans at football on Christmas Day. Our own pet enemies remarked that they would like a game but as the ground in our part is all root crops and much cut up by ditches, and as . . . we had not got a football, we had to call it off.” The lack of a football was a
deterrent to several well-intended challenges, but in at least one case a scheduled match for Boxing Day “was prevented by our superiors at HQ.”86

Others wrote that some “tried to arrange a football match . . . but I don’t think that came off.”87 Failed attempts are mentioned with some frequency. One soldier wrote his wife, “they wanted to arrange a football match with us but it got rather too late.”88 Another admitted that the “Germans were very sporty and wanted to arrange a football match with us for Christmas afternoon which, however, when the time came fell through.”89 An infantry colonel tried to arrange another truce for New Year’s Day so that a football game could be played between the lines. “They were very full of the football idea of mine,” he reported. “I said if they would like another armistice then I would turn out a team and play them among the shell holes, and they were quite keen. . . . I wonder if it will come off.”90

Statements about games taking place between the British troops were more common. “In the afternoon there was a football match played beyond the trenches, right in full view of the enemy,” recalled one. “They kept the truce honorably.”91 A Scotsman similarly noted that “some of our fellows were playing football along the firing line—a rather curious affair after such revengeful attacks on one another.”92 A Warwickshire rifleman wrote his aunt that on Christmas day he and his mates played football between the two lines of trenches, “the Germans being interested spectators.”93 For drivers in the field artillery, situated more safely behind the lines, the games were less worrisome. “We had three games of football, or I should call it mudlarking as there are very few fields around here that are not like a ploughed field; but never mind it does for us.”94 In some cases, an early morning fog provided safety. “We could not see the German trenches,” a rifleman of the Westminsters reported, “and knowing that they could not see us we blew up the football and had a kick about behind the trenches, but the ground was too hard.”95

Whether an actual game between Germans and Britons took place or not, the war-weary young men on the front lines in 1914 loved the sport, and any opportunity even to entertain the notion of a temporary return to sanity appealed to them greatly. It was generally agreed by all that they wished heartily for the war to be over. A Staffordshire private recalled, “One of them even suggested that we should finish it off at football or throwing mud at each other, as we should not get hurt.”96
Unfortunately, such a friendly end to war could not be. The easy banter and camaraderie that marked the Christmas truce soon was nothing more than a distant memory. Many of those who took part would be numbered among the dead and wounded as the war progressed and simultaneously degenerated into an even more horrific bloodletting. Those who experienced Christmas 1914 on the front lines must have possessed at least some vague hopes that the war would be won in the spring. Perhaps there was hope that warm weather and dry ground would present new opportunities to get into the open and maneuver as armies were supposed to do. Perhaps there was hope for a negotiated settlement. In any event, whatever attitude the men held, it was not so hopeless as it would be in future years when the holidays would pass between the belligerents with hardly a suggestion of a truce and with little trace of the camaraderie that was exhibited in 1914. The steadily mounting butcher’s bill must have been accompanied by an increasing bitterness that prevented any further friendly intercourse with the enemy. Thus, the Christmas Truce of 1914 stands as an anomaly in that war. It was a unique time when the men could still find in one another the things they held in common rather than those that kept them apart. The recently passed one hundredth anniversary of the truce should give us pause not only to remember those young men who suffered in France and Belgium in 1914, but also to remember them for what they were: fathers, sons, brothers, and friends. We can gain some appreciation for their humanity through their letters or diaries and begin to appreciate them not just as distant faces peering from black and white photographs, but as the cream of a generation’s youth. They once lived and breathed, and they once fought a great war, a war to end all wars. Like all young men, they hoped to live. Of that hope, far too many were robbed. It is well that we remember them as we continue the commemoration of the centennial of the First World War.

Notes


9. Ibid., 71.


16. Ibid. Britons used the nickname ‘Jack Johnson’ to describe large German shells. Johnson was the hard-hitting world heavyweight boxing champion from 1908-1915. Most likely, the name grew and was used indiscriminately to include any munitions that might cause a large explosion.


19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.


52. Ibid., 125-26.


58. Ibid.


69. Ibid.


Bibliography


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In circa 1400 BC the Hebrew tribes entered the Promised Land with a devotion and ferocity matched by an extraordinary ability to combine religious ideals with effective military art. The people collectively called Canaanites by the biblical chroniclers fell not only under the heels of this covenant society but also into the arms of a cold narrator called history, who records them as defeated peoples whom Israel surpassed during a transitional stage (1380-1050 BC) to a centralized kingdom under David—and later to endure the tests of time that allowed some civilizations to endure, and others to perish. The rich details of these events recorded in the Book of Judges, when Israel warred in order to entrench and dispossess its enemies, present a rare collection of socio-military behaviors of a tribal society, and the very reasons that allowed the Israelites to endure and their opponents to perish.

Israel’s military success during this period resided not only in leadership, the heroic judges that acted as champion-saviors, but in a complementary force emanating from the population. Leadership in depth, master narratives animating the Israelites to fight, and military culture forged in a potent praxis of religious ideology and military art, all created a “bottom up” force structuring and supporting the judges. This paper will analyse these tribal capabilities, the cultural norms, values, and behaviours that shape a tribe’s ability to conduct war and affect the conditions that determine the outcomes of war.

**A Land That Flowed with More Than Milk and Honey**

The Promised Land that the judges hoped to settle may indeed have been “a land that flowed with milk and honey," but it also flowed with blood. The divided Canaanite city-states that battled each other and deployed piecemeal to oppose the early conquests of Joshua, and the absence of large empires during his generation, were strategic advantages of a forgone era that provided little comforts to the successive generations of Israelites under the judges, who contended with more complex threats. Resurgent Canaanite forces, increasing coalitions of
enemies concentrating and massing their armies, rising regional powers, and a synergy of technology and terrain threatened to smash the Israelite tribes between the anvil of local armies and the hammer of freshly arriving invaders like the Philistines.¹

Even the effective response of the Israelites relying on religious devotion and a strong cultural identity presented the potential for exploitation by the Canaanites, for these ideological strengths were themselves targets of the weaponry of Canaanite culture and religion, enticing the Hebrew peoples not only from their God but also from their mission of conquest. Werner Keller, in The Bible As History (1956), observed that during the final days of Moses' leadership the Moabites adapted their tactics in reaction to the defeats suffered by regional kingdoms at the hands of the invading Israelites.²

After magic had failed to stop them, Keller asserted that religion had been used as another unconventional weapon by the Moabites who relied on their very own daughters to sexually entice the Israelites to sacrifice to the Canaanite gods and thus sap the will of these nomads to fight. Throughout the period of Judges, Canaanite religion remained both a deliberate and unintentional weapon against Israel's center of gravity: its unique cultural identity that united these tribes in a covenant relationship to each other and to Yahweh, the God who unabashedly used war as an instrument of justice in the Promised Land.³ The persistent and undulating influence of Canaanite religion, coupled with its asymmetrical appeal to abandon the moral strictures of Judaism, penetrated its cultural resistance at times and likewise eroded the resolve of the Hebrews, which was intimately intertwined with its military zeal.

The Canaanite understanding of a multi-dimensional battle space involved more than just cultural warfare, and included an understanding of the psychological, economic, and human terrains—and denial of resources such as agriculture, iron, and weapons. The Israelite prophets of the period warned their tribal nation not to fear the gods of the Amorites—even though these gods purportedly controlled the very weather and vegetation as well as fertility, and removal of their sacred altars and idols could provoke violent retaliation.⁴ Uprooting the Canaanite presence in the Promised Land therefore involved far more than military conflicts but a corresponding psychological resolve rooted in the deep cultural identity created through religion and a shared mission of conquest.
Moreover, the nomadic Midianites, one of Israel's many nemeses in the 
Book of Judges, demonstrated an acute understanding of economic warfare when 
they pressed Gideon and the tribes of Manasseh, Asher, Zebulun, and Naphtali. 
The Midianites used a coalition with the Amalekites in apparently sequenced 
military operations against these tribes to seize the harvest, control the agricultural 
fields, and force the Israelites into mountain positions where their ingenuity 
adapted to the terrain but generated little more than sustenance—an effect no 
doubt planned by the Midianite coalition.⁵

Deborah, in her famous Song of Deborah extolling the victory over Jabin, 
"King of Canaan," noted her vanquished enemy's previous dominance of the 
human terrain.⁶ This fourth judge of pre-monarchic Israel, and “wife of Lapidoth,” 
called attention to restrictions on movement, the subjugation of village life, and 
prohibition against "spears and shields" (an obvious reference to disarmament 
policy used to weaken the Israelite tribes in the region).⁷ The direct challenge to 
the food security and very quality of life of these tribes therefore provoked the 
very core of its society and created a corresponding reaction supporting the role of 
the judges. Military technology, although in its infancy, posed yet another threat to 
the tribes, who relied on moral force and tactical expertise to offset these 
advantages. Joshua had shown little concern for the iron chariots that he burned in 
triumph over his enemies, offerings to Yahweh who promised such vengeance for 
a condemned society. The Hebrew chief’s command to his followers demonstrated 
an equal contempt: "[You shall] hough their horses, and burn their chariots with 
fire."⁸

But Israel under the judges found their enemy's technological advantage to 
be daunting but not insurmountable. The same presence of iron chariots posed an 
admitted obstacle to possession of the Promised Land, evident in the truncated 
victory of Judah, which spearheaded the military campaigns following the death of 
Joshua.⁹ Massing chariots in open plains where maneuver, speed, and mass posed 
yet another tactical challenge demanded that Barak use the weather (heavy rain) 
and muddy terrain in a three-staged operation to offset this capability. Finally, 
Gideon's account of his battle with the Midianites gives only tangential treatment 
to their inventive use of camels in warfare, but the domestication of these 
perceived wild beasts for combat must have required a tactical countermeasure to 
offset the increased mobility and range—as well as the psychological effects of 
facing the ferocity of mounted warriors using these animals.¹⁰
Thus the Israelites needed tribal capabilities that were flexible enough for broad application to meet these varied attacks on their lives and national purpose, and yet strong enough to endure prolonged periods of convulsive challenges that fluctuated in degrees of intensity and configuration. The security threats, moreover, deeply touched tribal society and therefore aroused a strong reaction that aided and supported the judges in their quest to “defend Israel” and leave their signature on the times.

**The Risen**

And when the LORD raised them up judges, then the LORD was with the judge, and saved them out of the hand of their enemies.

—Judges 2:18; Hebrew Masoretic Text

The Israelite response to the many security threats indeed centered in the emergence and military leadership of the judges, but these judges arose from deep and broad sections of the tribal populations. Hebrew Judges like Ehud, Shamgar, Tola, Deborah, and Gideon came from diverse backgrounds and classes, tribes, and even gender, and received strong support from the people, including middle and lower classes and their groups, which acted as an integrated, inseparable, and complementary force. This leadership in depth, nourished and supported from the rich skills and assets of the grassroots, allowed Israel to brandish the most talented, charismatic, and capable leaders who secured Israel's ascendancy.\(^\text{11}\)

However, failures of leadership and population support did occur. But in relationship to the quality of Canaanite leadership, and the need for successive strategic victories to accomplish the mission of expansion and entrenchment of the Israelite tribes, the leadership in depth proved effective, and among Israel's most valuable tribal capabilities.\(^\text{12}\) One example of several is the invasion and conquest of Eglon, a Moabite tribal chieftan. Eglon’s sweep across the tribal lands of the trans-Jordan and penetration into Israel’s “garden” at Jericho in effect cut the emergent monotheistic nation in two, and threatened its national unity and long term security.\(^\text{13}\) Therefore, Ehud’s victory over Eglon after 18 years of servitude produced more than a local victory.

Judges like Ehud were indeed a unique manifestation of the Israelite people. In fact, the very term "judge," the Hebrew word *sopetim*, describes an individual who leads not from authority issued from family, dynasty, or class, but from popularly recognized abilities.\(^\text{14}\) The popular support base was thus critical to the
very concept of the judges as leaders, and when coupled with the fact that ancient Israel lacked national institutions such as a king and court, military classes and offices, and other state apparatus, the bottom up structure is even more evident.15

The decentralization of power in ancient Israel was not merely an abstract theological ideal based in notions of the rule of Yahweh. The ancient Israelites embraced individualism as both a personal and political expression of the times—and consequently supported their “deliverers” who defended these norms. Judges 21:25 expresses this point definitively of the Israelites and their ruling structures: “In those days there was no king in Israel; every man did that which was right in his own eyes.”16 Other social and political forces pushing power down included an assertive tribal assembly (qahal) comprised of military aged males,17 and the primacy of city-states and their leadership, which ruled over the resources and enterprises emanating from these areas of concentrated networks and commerce. Moreover, the destructive consequences of Israel’s first attempt at kingship under Abimalech, juxtaposed with the vehement rejection of kingship by judges like Gideon, reinforced these structures that permeated Israel’s society.18

The linchpin of the support of the judges, and thus their power base, ensued from popular recognition of their character traits—a recognition heightened during a time of crisis.19 Any of the aforementioned threats to the Israelite tribes—including menacing armies, economic exploitation, physical and psychological abuses (what today would be called human rights abuses) and subjugation—triggered popular support for Israelites who demonstrated a broad range of leadership, religious, military, organizational, and personal qualities and skills—attributes leading to deliverance from Israel’s enemies. Othniel, the first judge of the period, serves as an example.

The term “spirit of the Lord came upon him” occurs seven times in the book of Judges and is noteworthy for its focus on the special character of the judges. The term is always associated with character that leads to action: movements that are not ordinary but under divine direction, leadership over the Israelites, organization of the tribes, and military preparations and combat leading to victory.20 The character of the judges was so unique in its ability to overcome crisis that it endured through time and became a model for Christian faith in the New Testament.21

Moreover, these judges who succeeded Othniel were often similar to him in character (charismatic, skilled decision makers, and ferocious male warriors) but
quite diverse in their backgrounds. Gideon is a striking example. Rising from a poor family, not even the oldest son and thus even low in rank within his family, he arose from the tribe of Manasseh noting this state: "And he said unto him: ‘Oh, my lord, wherewith shall I save Israel? behold, my family is the poorest in Manasseh, and I am the least in my father’s house.’" Jephthah arose from even lower class origins, a son of a "harlot," but a "man of valor." This harmony of lower social class and high character occurred in the minds of the narrator of the Book of Judges but not Jephtha's brothers, who along with the local elders expelled him from Gilead causing him to find refuge in the land of Tola, a decision the elders later reversed.

But the rise of the judges occurred not as a reaction against prominent families or tribal leadership. The people of Israel selected their leaders from a wide range of classes and backgrounds including prominent tribal families. Othniel, embraced by Israel as a capable leader, was a nephew of Caleb, the illustrious warrior who with Joshua led the entrance into Canaan. Also, the death of a particular judge did not immediately create space for a replacement from outside a family line but instead created security gaps, times when leadership was lacking and threats were emergent or pressing. In the case of the death of Joshua, an Ephraimite, the loss weakened the security of the entire group of northern tribes.

Nevertheless, moral obligation is the dominant message of the Book of Judges and therefore subsumes the effective record of population support for these deliverers. Thus losing sight of the role of popular support as an essential part of the success of the judges, and the viability of middle and lower class groups, is easy to do when reading the Book of Judges as this historical record centralizes the unfaithful responses of the Israelites to the leadership of the judges. The theme of apostasy occurs often in the narrative and tempers the depiction of the Israelites to include their negative characteristics: slowness to follow the judges, reacting only when the threat to their security was dire, sometimes responding only to local rather than national threats (or threats to other tribes), and quickly abandoning their cultural values once the particular judge dies.

But the very opposite also holds true: the tribal populations sometimes led the calls for military action rather than followed. The Book of Judges opens with this very fact, when Joshua had died, and Israel was ruled by tribal elders. The narrator records: "[T]he children of Israel asked the LORD, saying: ‘Who shall go up for us first against the Canaanites, to fight against them?’" What follows is nothing less than a national mobilization of not just the tribe of Judah, which spearheaded the
fight, and began its consolidation of southern Israel, but a series of military campaigns (granted of mixed results) by the tribes of Joseph, Benjamin, Ephraim, Asher, Naphtali, and Dan.

The very role of the Hebrew judges appears to be flexible during the pre-monarchic period and not necessarily one of either supreme military, judicial, or government leadership—further evidence of the viability of lower level social structures. Jephthah, the ninth judge, again serves as a notable example. Exiled by his family and the elders of the mountainous area east of the Jordan called Gilead (allotted to the tribes of Gad, Reuben, and the eastern half of the tribal lands of Manasseh), Jephthah returned to Gilead at the request of the same elders who were engaged in a war with the Ammonites. Jephthah had to negotiate his rights to judge the area if victory was achieved, asking the elders for this concession.28

Deborah is yet another example of the diversity of Hebrew judges—neither male or from a warrior class—and complex in function of her office. She rendered judgment in Ephraim and Benjamin and was recognized by the Israelites as a national figure. In addition to being the only female judge, she played a major role in military operations but did not take command of the assembled Israelite armies, rather encouraged Barak to use the strategic terrain of Mt. Tabor to stage the tribal armies and thus separate King Jabin from his military led by Sisera.29 Thus the roles of judge and military commander-in-chief were separate in this case. The diverse roles of the judges, and the division of leadership and social duties among cooperating authorities, appeared to have support in Mosaic law.30

Also, the judges of ancient Israel during the period came from no singular, regional group [north or south] or coalition of tribes, a formation that could provoke the others to react to an unequal distribution of leadership and power. Of the twelve tribes of Israel, eight held the role of judge, including lesser tribes in number and military power such as the tribe of Issachar. This sharing of leadership of the tribes of Israel had the effect of lessening the possibility of internecine fighting as well as outright civil war. With the exception of the slaughter and restoration of the tribe of Benjamin, which occurred from a crime not a leadership issue, the tribes remained relatively united throughout the period.31
The Narratives of a Peculiar People

[And the LORD hath chosen thee to be a peculiar people unto himself.
—Deuteronomy 14:2, King James Version

Leadership in depth, readily drawn from the rich character of Israel's tribal societies, was indeed a preeminent tribal capability but not the only one. Throughout the Book of Judges two master narratives animated these “peculiar people” to fight tenaciously and with purpose: the narrative of return, and the narrative of the Exodus. [Master narratives are the historically based beliefs of a particular people or a society used by these groups and sub groups to provide identity, understanding, and direction, particularly in times of crisis.] These two mutually supporting and intertwined narratives, which predate and postdate the period of the judges, were a potent ideological force invigorating and structuring Israel's resistance and mission of conquest.

The narrative of return remains the most vital to the Book of Judges. This narrative not only occurs as the central theme of the Book of Judges but also answers why military failure and foreign domination occurred during the period: a breach of the covenant relationship with Yahweh. Perhaps as importantly, the narrative explicitly underscores one clear path of remedial action: personal and national reform; and military action against the Canaanites.

The narrative of return motivated the Israelites to fight effectively by embracing a synergistic combination of doctrines stressing personal responsibility and reform, complete rejection of Canaanite culture and rule, and popular support of judges seeking to deliver Israel from oppression through military action or the use of force. Additionally, the narrative of reform used vivid and emotive language to describe the domination of Israel and its misfortunes.

Moreover, the narrative of return contained a time factor that progressively increased its relevancy and potency. Moses warned that presumption and disobedience to Yahweh would lead to Canaanite victory in battle and therefore provided a principle and a precedent for the period of the judges. The word “again” occurs four times in the Book of Judges in relationship to the apostasy of Israel, and thus emphasized the repetition of failure to uphold the covenant with Yahweh, and by extension the narrative of return. Moreover, the narrator of Judges also asserted that the return was not merely a promise of deliverance after a period of disobedience and reform, but a cycle repeating itself particularly after the death of a
Although forty years had transpired from the Exodus of Israel from Egypt in 1445 BC to the entrance into the Promised Land, and an additional seven years of conquest of Canaan by Joshua, the narrative of the Exodus remained a potent message animating ancient Israel's military mission. The two times the narrative of the Exodus occurred in its basic form in the Book of Judges, the message clearly established a historical reminder that military victory over Israel's foes occurred in relationship to the covenant promise of Yahweh, and was contingent upon fidelity to that covenant—and resulted in the conquest of enemy lands. The case of Moses' conquest of Pharaoh's armies near the Red Sea, and conquest of the Ammonites upon entry into the lands east of the Jordan, served as two historical examples used as models in the Book of Judges—examples inspiring military action against the Canaanites.

Jephthah, discussed earlier in this paper, gave the clearest application of the narrative of the Exodus when he confronted the encroaching Ammonite armies, and also demonstrated the potency of that narrative animating and mobilizing the Israelites to fight. Jephthah did not merely assert that the promised land was Israel's for the taking, but outlined a very logical argument that the lands were taken in defense of Israel against Ammonite aggression during the final stages of the Exodus, conquest itself (or outcomes) being viewed as divine judgment by both Israelites and Ammonites. The following event included the assembled armies of Israel with Jephthah defeating the Ammonites in “a very great slaughter,” and a very important strategic effect: “the children of Ammon were subdued before the children of Israel.”

To Teach Them War

Now these are the nations which the LORD left, to prove Israel by them, even as many as had not known all the wars of Canaan. . . to teach them war.

—Judges 3:1-2; Hebrew Masoretic Text

Leadership in depth, and potent master narratives driving the mission to conquer Canaan, combined with yet another tribal capability: comprehensive military skills rooted in socio-military values. Leadership, recruitment, intelligence gathering, planning, deployment of forces, targeting, tactics, sustainment of
operations, and proficiency in weapons were among the many military aspects used effectively by Israel in the Book of Judges. The art of war was indeed taught (and learned) well in ancient Israel.⁴⁰

As importantly, the belief in miracles and divine leadership among the tribes left nothing to chance, underestimation of opponent capabilities, or reckless adventurism when military operations occurred—a problem commonly encountered by other ancient societies relying on mystical and religious beliefs. The praxis of religious cause and military art synergistically combined to create a potent military capability embodied in the Judges and supported by the tribes.

Gideon serves as an outstanding example and case study of this fact.⁴² His battle against the Midianites demonstrated an extraordinary military skill executed within a context of religious experiences including angelic appearances, an alleged miraculous use of his fleece, and prophetic utterances during his military operations. Yet the Hebrew warrior conducted his military operations with finesse and keen awareness of the battlefield of his day—a skill of the highest order.

Gideon initiated his military operations by vetting his forces to create a powerful vanguard, tactical agility, and stealth capability to conduct a night operation against the Midianites. After rising early in the morning with his men he began to thin his ranks by relieving “whosoever is fearful and afraid.” Next he used a clever technique to further thin his ranks by observing how his warriors drank water.⁴³

Gideon followed this preparation with a pre-mission intelligence gathering operation that he personally undertook. Seeking to strengthen his own courage and that of his forces, and to assess the morale of his enemies, Gideon and his servant Phurah approached the Midianite camp and overheard their fears of an impending conquest by the Israelites, a discussion in the camp occurring from a troubling dream and corresponding interpretation. Encouraged by the finding, the Israelite judge “worshipped; and he returned into the camp of Israel, and said: ‘Arise; for the LORD hath delivered into your hand the host of Midian.’”⁴⁴

Gideon’s execution of the night operation against the Midianites likewise demonstrated an adroit understanding of the ancient art of war. Gideon's mobile force of 300 men deployed in three equal units with Gideon and his detachment in the lead. His carefully contrived plan involved striking the night watch as they changed guards—a clever targeting of the opponent's weakness, and asymmetrical use of force.⁴⁵ As Gideon's men blew their trumpets and smashed pitchers
containing the torches, they cried out: “The sword of the Lord and Gideon.” The use of psychological operations caused a panic in the Midianite camp.46

Gideon concluded his operations against the Midianites by aggressively pursuing their retreat and trapping them by the Jordan River. The extraordinary battle can easily be lost in the limelight of Gideon's leadership. But another aspect is salient. Gideon's forces demonstrated two important qualities: responding quickly to pursue the retreating Midianites (a spontaneous action); and additionally, deploying rapidly to the fords of Jordan to cut the Midianite retreat, undoubtedly a complex movement even with Gideon's leadership.47

The tribal capabilities of ancient Israel accounted for much of its military success during the period. The leadership in depth, potent master narratives, and an effective praxis of religious motivated military art all combined to create a preponderance of military capabilities that endured the deliberate and persistent challenges of the Canaanites. The heroic warrior judges were certainly a critical component of Israel's victories, but these military leaders were supported and nurtured by a population animated by a vibrant socio-military culture that created notable tribal capabilities.

In the modern era the United States faces its chief security challenge in “small wars” in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Africa, places where tribal societies exist as both the environment and the opponent. Understanding a broad range of tribal capabilities will contribute significantly to understanding the complexities of tribal warfare, tribal engagement, and the contemporary operational environment, where tribal capabilities have the potential to shape both positive and negative outcomes.

Notes


Paton, “Canaanite Influence on the Religion of Israel,” *The American Journal of Theology* 8, no. 2 (April 1914): 205-224. Payton notes the opposite also occurred as Canaanite tribes were influenced and even incorporated into the Hebrew tribes and their cities.


6. Although there is no official definition of the term “human terrain,” generally it refers to the demographic and cultural attributes of a people that affect security in their particular location.


27. Judges 1:1 in the Masoretic Text.
41. Doyne Dawson, *The Origins of Western Warfare: Militarism and Morality in the Ancient World* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 40-42. Dawson argues that the God of the Hebrews played a more active role in warfare than other ancient Near Eastern deities and thus the connection to a practical military art devoid of mysticism is all the more relevant.
43. Judges 7:5-6; Gale, *Great Battles of Biblical History*, 31-32. Gale notes the activity of lapping water while crouched and holding one’s weapons indicated the more vigilant Hebrew warriors who “kept[their] eyes open for the enemy, were alert, keen and intelligent.”
44. Judges 7:15 in the Masoretic Text.
45. Judges 7:19.


47. Judges 7:24-25.
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tactics, military leadership, special forces, insurgency, cultural intelligence, and other topics at Henley Putnam University, American Military University, and the Air Command Staff College OLMP.
A myriad of reasons have been presented over the past 150 years for the defeat of the Confederacy in the American Civil War, ranging from a lack of southern industrial might to the failures of southern nationalism, with innumerable reasons listed between. In the mid-nineteenth century, several of the southern states made the perilous decision to separate from the Union, taking a stand against what they perceived as violations of states’ sovereign rights as mandated by the Constitution and the Founding Fathers. This disunion resulted in four tumultuous years of bloody and costly conflict. Whatever the causation of this conflict, one institution above all others contributed to both the start of the war and its costly conclusion. Evangelical Protestantism in the South, brought on by the Second Great Awakening, created airs of religious preeminence and exceptionalism in the southern mind and eventually digressed, after battlefield defeats resulting in astronomical casualties, into the acceptance of a certain religious fatalism. This religious fatalism, shared by rebel soldiers and the southern body politic alike, proved deadly to southern morale and southern will and ultimately led to the downfall of the short-lived Confederacy.

By interpreting the Civil War in religious terms, historians have sought to demonstrate causality while simultaneously underscoring the values that drove a major portion of the South to disavow itself from the America envisioned by the Founders. Indeed, it was this founding vision that caused consternation and angst among southern politicians as their interpretations placed state and individual rights well above any particular national cause. The Right Reverend Thomas Atkinson, referring to the Union’s decision to foray into newly self-established Confederate territory, sermonized in 1861, “We stand today . . . in the midst of circumstances of great doubt and anxiety, with provocations tending to kindle the bitterest and most vehement passions.” Continuing on, the reverend reminded his parishioners, “We [southern Christians] are the servants of Christ, and our master’s eye is upon us in this hour of trial . . . if you endure it to the end you will be saved.” In these words to his congregation on that Sunday in 1861, Atkinson was merely inculcating in his disciples the South’s presupposed favored standing with
God, a status that had been decades in the making in the hearts and minds of the southern body politic. This favored status had its roots fully embedded in the proslavery Christianity and civil religion that evolved in the South during the early decades of the nineteenth century.¹

Both sides, however, throughout the four years of war, maintained that God was on their side and that His divine providence, without doubt, ensured victory. Indeed, the preponderance of the men and women of the Union and Confederacy shared the same religion (Protestantism), the same concept of providence, and the same understanding of God’s wrath and mercy. These men additionally shared the desire to die properly, upholding the tradition of *ars moriendi*—dying the Good Death. For a majority of the combatants, this good death included being right with God, having family or family surrogate close by (e.g. nurses, doctors, close friends), and receiving final absolution in order to receive all benefits of divine grace.²

A vast array of literature pertaining to religion and the American Civil War has become available, particularly in the past two decades, which denotes the aforementioned commonalities, and more than a few noted historians have contended that religious fatalism never held a stranglehold on Confederate soldiers or civilians. In his treatment of the self-perceived invincibility of the Confederate soldier, Jason Phillips has argued that southern soldiers continued to unwaveringly maintain the opinion that God had chosen them for ultimate victory up until (and in some cases, after) the end of hostilities in 1865.³ Additionally, Steven E. Woodworth has posited that “Despite the widespread belief that God was chastening the South [in the years after Gettysburg], most Confederates continued to feel assured that, however severe their punishment might be, God would not, after all, ‘entirely destroy’ the South, His chosen people.”⁴

Conversely, analyzing the effects of religion on the conduct and outcomes of the war was the team of Richard Beringer, Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, and William Still whose work, *Why the South Lost the Civil War*, identified more than a few instances where a pseudo-religious fatalism settled in on the soldiers of the South and likewise on their civilian counterparts. During the last two years of the war, Confederate soldiers, often bereft of supplies and sustenance, took to plundering the homes and farms of fellow southerners “taking more than the people could give.”⁵ Hardship, coupled with mounting casualty lists and an ever-expanding loss of territory depleted the confidence and motivation of the southern
body politic and the Confederate Army, both of which were sustained by a shared religion. Though Samuel J. Watson shares Drew Gilpin Faust’s belief that “evangelical religion provided psychological reassurance to southern soldiers struggling with the daily threat of personal annihilation,” he further argued that religious conviction among Confederate troops was “malleable enough . . . to permit soldiers to give up the representational role that no longer protected their communities and kin.”

This diminution of confidence and motivation arguably created an air of fatalism in and around rebel camps and brought about the need for large-scale revivals held directly in the various bivouacs of the Confederate Army throughout the war but most notably during the last two years of hostilities. In an effort to hasten conversions and cause the formerly pious to recommit themselves to God’s Army, chaplains throughout the South led the charge to wholly Christianize or re-Christianize all who wore grey, keeping with the widely-held belief (among those in the South) that the Confederate Army was “the most Christian army in the history of the world.” Though the revivals appeared successful, with most Confederates believing that they were “a pledge of God’s intent to save the Confederacy,” the initial perceived necessity for the revivals mandates a closer examination of the role of fatalism, particularly religious fatalism, in the downfall of the Confederacy. In light of recent research findings supporting the concept that societies cannot survive short of a culture of optimism, the effects of religious fatalism on rebel soldiers and civilians deserves another look.

Fatalism can be simply defined as the belief that whatever happened (or happens) had to happen, always involving a sense of necessity. Not to be confused with the Christian term of providence, fatalism implies that one’s own actions cannot change the outcome of a particular event—whatever one does or does not do, the outcome will remain the same. Hugh Rice has argued that fatalism is “resignation in the face of some future event or events which are thought to be inevitable.” Theological necessity (or “God’s will”) should not automatically be considered a term synonymous with religious fatalism. For the purposes of this discussion, religious fatalism will entail the perceived will of God (God’s favor or the lack thereof) on the minds of the southern nation, both in the early, more successful years of the war and during the hell that would culminate in defeat and “a stoic acceptance of an inevitable fate.”
Though Union soldiers and civilians themselves questioned God’s acceptance of their stand against the slave-holding South, particularly in the first two years of war, the Union, as a whole, was able to move past this theological dilemma. This perceived will of God, initially utilized by the South to explain the early victories of the Confederacy over a more powerful and better-supplied foe, would be questioned as more and more southerners began to accept that their alleged favor and their entire way of life was not conducive to God’s plan. More than a few who supported the rebel cause would find themselves asking why God had forsaken them and their seemingly righteous basis for slavery, secession, and war.

This righteous basis found its most profound support in the Protestant schisms that occurred between 1837 and 1845. Americans during the early to mid-nineteenth century often looked to scripture to develop and justify their worldviews, whether anti-slavery, slaveholding, or indifferent. Because the church wielded such vast power in southern culture and southern politics, many viewed the splitting of the major Protestant denominations (Baptist, Methodist, and Presbyterian) as a precursor to something much worse.¹⁴ Representing some 94 percent of all churches in the South, these denominations and their “visible fracturing . . . presaged the rupture of the nation.”¹⁵ This division, wholly propelled by the institution of slavery and its practitioner’s belief that “unless condemned by the Bible, slavery may remain among things indifferent, and be classed with that large number of actions whose moral character depends on the peculiar circumstances of each case,”¹⁶ made denominational choice one of sectional necessity. Moreover, southern clerics “forged an impregnable union between religion, morality, and slavery,”¹⁷ perpetuating slavery in the South.

This national rupture over slavery was wholly representative of the division between those living in the North and those residing in the South. Culturally, what would become the Confederate States of America was arguably the antithesis of the states that would later comprise the Union. Much more agrarian in lifestyle, pseudo-paternalistic in its views towards the peculiar institution of slavery, and bound by an archaic and ill-fitting sense of honor, southern Protestants came to espouse, “Northerners, by their wickedness and infidelity, were forfeiting the nation’s right to be God’s chosen people.”¹⁸ Assuming the self-proclaimed role as God’s chosen people, the Confederacy found ways to utilize scripture to justify slavery, secession, and armed revolt. This justification, further strengthened by clerics who “bestowed divine sanction on the South’s peculiar institution . . . securely establish[ing] the
rectitude of human bondage,” served to shape sectional ideology which eventually evolved into armed revolt.

This armed revolt, beginning with the firing upon Fort Sumter on April 12, 1861, found Confederate President Jefferson Davis early on espousing that a certain piety had overcome the people of the Confederacy and that their cause was indeed “just and holy.” This belief that the Confederate cause was God-inspired and God-supported was quickly inculcated into the minds of the southern citizenry. J. William Jones, former Chaplain of Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, in his *Christ in the Camp*, outlined the early confidence of the men in grey, all holding dearly to the belief that God was a fellow rebel and that He would see them through to sure victory. Additionally, soldiers relied heavily on pious southern civilians for prayer and felt that “southern armies could never be conquered by a godless foe.”

Southern piety indeed remained always in the framework of the war, particularly during the first two years of conflict. This piety found its strength in a multitude of “Fast Days,” whereby President Davis directed the citizens and soldiers of the Confederate nation to fast, attend church, and pray diligently for the Confederacy. Early on, from June 1861 to March 1863, Fast Day sermons were replete with messages of God’s will and God’s grace for the Confederate cause in addition to calls for thoughts and prayers for the soldiers of that cause. Bishop William Meade, on the first Fast Day in June 1861, asked his congregants to “remember those who in our defence [sic] are exposing themselves to all the hardships and dangers of the camp and field.” The Bishop completed his sermon with a reminder that God was on the side of the righteous and the Confederacy was indeed God’s selected instrument to maintain this righteousness. In a later Fast Day sermon, it was posited that the war was “a step out of darkness and into the light; and for that He may bless us and give us more light.” Lacy Drury, in the spring of 1863, made the argument that “we are in God’s good time to be elevated to a dignified rank among the nations of the earth . . . We will win a place among the family of nations.” These sermons, and the hundreds like them held throughout the Confederacy on designated Fast Days, doubtlessly assured the citizens and soldiers not only of the necessity of their struggle but, arguably more importantly, assured the entire body politic of God’s blessing and direction during this tumultuous time.

God’s blessing was constantly desired by most of the fighting men of
both the Confederacy and the Union, particularly when attempting to discern the righteousness of their cause or to comprehend the unfathomable death and dismemberment brought by war. “As war continued inexorably onward and as death tolls mounted even higher, soldiers on both sides reported how difficult it became to believe that the slaughter was purposeful and that their sacrifices had meaning.”26 In view of early victories, it certainly appeared to the soldiers and citizens of the Confederacy that God was not always on the side that possessed the most beans, bandages, and bullets. In a letter to his wife in June 1862, in which Robert E. Lee acknowledged the recent death of his grandson, he additionally displayed his religiosity by positing “God grant that we may all join [our grandson] around the throne of our Maker to unite in praise and adoration of the Most High forever.”27 Lee, who had carried his religion on his sleeve since entering the military, early on declared, “My reliance is in the help of God.”28 Lee took his beliefs of providence and his beliefs that the seceded South had the blessing of God to his troops in innumerable ways throughout the conflict—from a quick comment to an enlisted man, to a formal general order concerning observation of the Sabbath. He ably utilized the greatest impediment to his conduct of the war (the death of “Stonewall” Jackson after the battle of Chancellorsville on May 10, 1863) to inspire his men to emulate Jackson’s “indomitable courage and unshaken confidence in God as our hope and strength.”29

This confidence in God and on His protection permeated Confederate Army camps and civilian firesides from 1861 to 1863. As battles were won and lost, soldiers developed an “increased interest in and awareness of religious matters,”30 which naturally manifested itself in public worship. Though often competing with the raucousness that all too often finds itself in military camps everywhere and through every period of history (church services were often held with gambling, drinking, and cursing going on only a few feet away), groups of those professing an unyielding belief and faith in God and His predetermined fate were steadily growing larger. This belief in predestination—that God had long ago predetermined the fate of the world and hence every individual—was wholly Calvinistic but was in keeping with the strictures of the conservative Protestant faith that was manifesting itself in America in the mid-nineteenth century, particularly in the South. Civil War era Christians talked much about predestination, not to be confused with fatalism, and many, as they lay dying, accepted their death as God’s Will.31

This blind acceptance of God’s will took a turn for the worse—for the
Confederacy—after the summer of 1863. With a defeat on the fields of Gettysburg and the surrender of an entire Confederate army at Vicksburg, Confederates, by the thousands, made the decision to abandon their fellow soldiers and absent themselves without leave. Less than one month after the foreboding Independence Day of 1863, Jefferson Davis, in an address to the soldiers of the Confederate States in an effort to entice deserters back into the camps, made the argument that “no alternative is left you but victory, or subjugation, slavery, and the utter ruin of yourselves, your families and your country.”

This sign of resignation to fate would be just the beginning of a more pronounced fatalism cloaked in religion that would find itself the subject of more than a few Fast Day sermons conducted after August 1, 1863.

Less than three weeks after Davis’s plea to his troops, Stephen Elliot articulated from the pulpit that from the beginning of hostilities, the Confederacy “[has] boldly assumed the position that we were fighting under the shield of the Lord of Hosts” and that

A day of darkness and gloominess has unexpectedly settled down upon us, and without being able to perceive any natural causes sufficient to account for it, we are conscious that ‘our hands hang down and that our knees are feeble,’ and that we are in peril for our cause.

Elliot went on to utilize scripture to posit that “The joy of our hearts is ceased; our dance has turned into mourning.” In an effort to implore the Confederate body politic to worship correctly in order to bring God’s blessings back upon the nation, Benjamin Morgan Palmer tasked the South Carolina Legislature to “lead their constituency in an act of solemn worship to Almighty God, humbly imploring Him to withdraw the chastening hand that has fallen so severely upon our common country.”

Less than four months after Palmer’s exhortation to his audience, Stephen Elliot, again calling for the South to redeem itself through the solemn confession of past sins in order to bring God’s grace back upon the Confederacy, passed on to his audience in a wholly fatalistic appeal:

We have so often seen the gathering of our enemies dispersed by God in answers to our humble prayers—scattered and rolled back in blood and confusion – that we come to-day [sic] boldly to the throne of Grace, firmly believing that our prayers, and supplications, if offered with pure hearts and clean lips, will return to us laden with blessings from the Lord of
Hosts, the God of the Armies of Israel. Elliot’s words are replete with a suggestion that the Confederacy had fallen from grace and had gotten itself on the wrong side of God. More and more civilians during this period were themselves becoming disposed to accept “God’s will” that the attempt at nation building would be a failing enterprise for the short-lived Confederate States of America.

This acceptance of defeat, though not always obviously prominent, weighed heavily on the soldiers and civilians of the Confederacy during the last two years of conflict. In attempts to hasten the return to God’s favor, religious revivals became all the rage in the Confederate camps. Though occurring before the summer of 1863, these revivals took on a tone of necessity after the disappointments of Gettysburg and Vicksburg. Historians have historically relied upon J. William Jones’s aforementioned Christ in the Camp as one means to discern the religiosity of the Confederate soldier while encamped and in battle. Jones’s unique view of the Confederate soldier provided a glimpse into the hell that was war and additionally provided a fragment of the fatalism that haunted the soldier towards the end of the war. This fatalism is often difficult to ascertain as Jones had a tendency to make things seem much better than they actually were. In one letter transcribed by Jones (from John Thomas Jones of the Fifth Alabama to his parents), an acceptance of a pre-determined fate (fatalism) becomes clear when it is articulated that “Whether I shall live or die, I believe all will be ordered for the best.” In that same letter, J. Thomas Jones solidly “put his trust in Christ,” clearly delineating a pseudo-religious fatalism that appears to have been more prevalent in the Confederacy than previously admitted.

This religious fatalism, this acceptance of a pre-ordained, God-willed fate, was also evident in letters written by Robert E. Lee after July 1863. Lee told his army’s chaplain, J. William Jones, “We may, therefore, with calm satisfaction, trust in God and leave results to Him.” Lee’s acceptance of his and his country’s fate was additionally evident when he articulated that “We have appealed to the God of battles and He has decided against us . . . Lord, what wilt Thou have me do?” Lee’s calm acceptance of God’s will towards the end of the war belied the undercurrents of southern society which saw psychological tensions elevating due to ever-increasing casualty lists coupled with changing war aims “combined with religious views to undermine fatally the Confederate war effort.”

This deadly combination caused many Confederates and southern
civilians, by mid- to late 1863, to begin questioning the war itself—whether the ends justified the means. With the waning of Confederate military power, “civilian will, now undermined by the doubts of religion, could no longer supplement the force of arms.” Confederate officials blamed high desertion rates after the summer of 1863 on an assortment of man-induced maladies, but it could as easily be argued that the perceived will of God had changed and acceptance of this fact made it clear that the Confederate soldier could do little about it. Believing that their cause was indeed a lost one, numerous Confederate soldiers and civilians began working on acceptance. Though more than a few were willing to continue taking the fight to the Union Army, religious fatalism had entered the psyche of a large portion of the Confederate Army and its surrounding populations.

In entering the hearts and minds of the populace of the Confederate States, religious fatalism existed in the army camp, in the barroom, on the farm, and in the front parlor. It appeared more readily in the diaries and journals kept by those most affected by the war. Famed diarist, Mary Boykin Chesnut, wrote on January 1, 1864, “One more year of Stonewall would have saved us. Chickamauga is the only battle we have gained since Stonewall died, and no results follow as usual.” Chesnut’s acquiescence to the downfall of the Confederacy can be realized in the last five words of her entry. In previous diary entries, Chesnut had repeatedly insisted that God’s favor lay with the Confederacy and that it would be through His favor that the Confederacy would find itself victorious. Laying the blame for the failure of any further meaningful Confederate victories on the death of Stonewall Jackson is further indication of a deeply penetrating fatalism inculcated through the guise of religious pre-eminence and exceptionalism, albeit with a touch of theodicy. Many in the South could not understand why God, who they believed had clearly been on the side of the Confederacy at the beginning of hostilities, had forsaken them, nor why He did not interject Himself on behalf of the Confederate cause.

As has been argued, “God had been steadily withdrawing his favor,” and this withholding would cost the Confederacy considerably. For those who viewed the war through a lens of faith (which, according to the numbers of religious converts in Confederate camps, were many), “an ineffable sadness and quiet resignation descended on [them].” This sadness and resignation could not help but affect the martial spirit of the fighting man and the supportive spirit of the civilian populace. Without a supportive populace and a culture of optimism, could the Confederacy go on?
Because “optimism [has been] found to be closely associated with both psychological and physical health…and it underpinned achievement in many different domains,” was the lack of optimism from a military and civilian perspective a causative factor in the defeat of the Confederacy? Was this lack of optimism derived directly from the teachings of evangelical Protestantism, which permeated the nation in the mid-nineteenth century? The answers to these questions have not been wholly answered in the preceding pages, but evidence exists which can begin to point one finger back in the direction of religious fatalism as a causative factor in the downfall of the Confederacy. Between the changes in the tone of the sermons delivered on mandatory Fast Days to the changed demeanor and unexplainable decisions of General Robert E. Lee from July 1863 on, religious fatalism undoubtedly existed and even prospered in the short-lived Confederacy. Because the fatalist “is interested in the significance of what happen[ed] . . . fitting it into a narrative that makes sense of [their] lives,” the men and women of the Confederacy, particularly after the summer of 1863, more and more adhered to the belief that God withdrew His favor and punished, with defeat, the South for its sins. This “finally broke the spirit of the [southern] people and the army,” causing the downfall of the Confederate nation.

Notes


6. Ibid., 277-279.


10. Woodworth, 277.


22. Rable, 73.


30. Woodworth, 175.

31. Ibid., 175-198.


35. Stephen Elliot, “Gideon’s Water-Lappers,” *A Sermon Preached in Christ Church, Savannah on Friday, the 8th day of April, 1864. The Day set apart by the Congress of the Confederate States as a Day of Humiliation, Fasting and Prayer* (Macon, GA: Burke, Boykin & Company, 1864): 5-6.


37. Jones, 1875, 144.


40. Ibid., 293.

42. Rable, 362.

43. Ibid., 364.

44. Oliver Bennett, 116.


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The modern-world system always functioned on hegemonic free-market economic institutions and ideology. The Cold War represented one era in the history of the modern-world system where both superpowers, the United States (US) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) or Soviet Union, pursued parallel international foreign policies confirming their hegemonic positions in the world during the Cold War. The superpowers mirrored each other’s foreign policy because their policies represented actions of subversion and intervention in their respective spheres of influence.¹

The Soviet Union intervened in East Berlin, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, while the United States intervened in Greece, Iran, Guatemala, and Japan. The Soviet Union imposed its dominance on its satellites, and the US imposed its hegemony on “developing” areas of the world, resulting in the domination of newly forming industrial societies. These superpower interventionist tactics created a worldwide expansion of military and economic might with far-reaching negative economic and political consequences for smaller countries.²

The collapse of communist Yugoslavia in the early 1990s produced many scholarly works investigating the reasons for its failure and the ethnic war that paralleled its demise. These works argue about communist Yugoslavia’s internal economic problems, different ethnic groups’ desire for political independence, and ancient ethnic hatreds. While bits and pieces of these works may or may not carry some validity, a global analysis that explains the collapse of Yugoslavia from an alternative perspective has not previously been explored. This alternative approach links Yugoslavia’s collapse to its peripheral position in a global system. Yugoslavia’s dependence on Western financial institution monetary loans after the Tito-Stalin break in 1948 contributed to both the collapse of communist Yugoslavia and the war that followed.
Yugoslavia Expelled from the Soviet Union’s Sphere of Influence

Yugoslavia hoped the Soviet Union would support its change in international status as an independent communist nation during the early Cold War, but it soon saw that hope destroyed when the Soviet Union broke diplomatic relations in 1948. On June 28, 1948, the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) met in Bucharest passing a resolution expelling Yugoslavia from the communist sphere of influence. The Soviet representative Andrei Zhdanov accused the Yugoslav leader Josip Broz “Tito” of being an imperialist spy. Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the international communist community signified the culmination of tension between the two nations dating back to World War II.\(^3\) Communist Yugoslavia found itself in a hostile international system fighting for its very survival.

The Cominform Resolution expulsion of Yugoslavia mirrored the Soviet Communist Party’s criticism of the Yugoslavs as outlined in accusations leveled by the USSR in earlier communiqués. The resolution pointed out that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) deviated from the international workers’ movement because nationalist elements within the party had attained dominant positions with the leadership of the CPY, and that these nationalist elements had broken international traditions and embarked on a road of nationalism. This attitude of nationalism, the Cominform Resolution suggested, had been seen in the CPY leadership’s deficient Marxist theoretical training when they argued that they could attain independence and build socialism without the help of the Soviet Union or the people’s democracies. This poor training, the Soviets argued, was evident in the Yugoslav foreign policy that curried favor with the imperialists in hopes of gaining independence and advancing the state toward capitalism. The Kremlin accused the CPY of advancing the idea of bourgeois-nationalism to build a capitalist state on the basis that the Soviet Union was more dangerous to the independence of Yugoslavia than the capitalist states.\(^4\)

The Soviet Union expressed its dominant position as a core country in its sphere of influence by its announcement of expelling Yugoslavia from the communist world. The resolution warned the Yugoslav leadership that such a nationalistic policy would lead to colonization by the imperialist powers. It then called on all “healthy elements” within the CPY to admit to their mistakes, rectify their deviation, and adhere to the international traditions of the CPY. In
conclusion, the resolution audaciously requested that the healthy elements within the CPY fulfill an honorable task by rebelling and replacing the CPY’s leadership if the leadership did not change its ways. The threat to replace the CPY leadership represents the imperialist Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia. In the modern-world system, only core countries can carry out imperialist policies.

The Cominform Resolution probably shocked and demoralized the Yugoslav leadership. In all likelihood, the CPY leadership would have accepted any compromise not involving its submission and loss of power to Moscow. On the other hand, Stalin would have accepted only complete submission of Belgrade to Moscow and he believed he could oust the CPY leadership by appealing to the loyal Yugoslav Communists and to the international communist community. Stalin’s belief that he could control Yugoslavia was erroneous; this incorrect estimate created momentous political and economic consequences that did not unfold immediately, but would in the future.

Jakub Berman, Undersecretary of State of the Presidium of the Council of Foreign Ministries and a member of the Politburo of the Polish Communist Party, provided insight to the Soviet Union’s hegemonic attitude toward Yugoslavia. The Soviet Union realized that, during this time of relative peace internationally, it needed to clean up its own house and the houses of its satellite countries. Berman stated that the Soviet Union was well aware of its unpopularity in certain satellites. Moscow’s understanding of the strong nationalism that prevailed in certain satellite countries, whether under Turks, Teutons, or Russians, made nationalism a cardinal sin in Communist policy vis-à-vis the satellite countries. Nationalism had always been seen as one of the most dangerous threats to Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe; thus, it “must be extirpated at all costs since, in the last analysis, it might, in time of crisis, be synonymous with disloyalty or wavering loyalty, and the USSR, from its own point of view, must have complete fidelity to the Cause.” The Polish undersecretary believed that Moscow did not want war at that time, but that “the possibilities of peaceful settlement were diminishing” in the international arena.

The Kremlin wanted complete devotion from the countries in its sphere of influence. It became clear that the CPY wanted to pursue an independent path from Moscow. The Yugoslavs pursued a disloyal foreign policy by following their own course of action on the Greek question; they persisted in surrounding themselves with a large powerful army and an effective secret police force and did not put themselves on the frontline at the United Nations. Tito and the CPY seemed to know what they were doing under the difficult conditions, and Stalin more than
likely was astounded that he could not remove Tito at his will. The Western nations were profoundly perplexed as to the importance of the Yugoslav excommunication from the Cominform. The main question to be answered after the excommunication was how the CPY would survive politically, economically, and militarily. Yugoslavia survived by becoming dependent on Western financial institutions. This dependency provided the means for Yugoslavia to survive for decades but it also created one of the conditions that played a role in its demise.\(^\text{10}\)

Yugoslavia’s Road toward Western Dependency

Traditionally, scholars have argued that United States (US) economic aid to Yugoslavia after the Cominform Resolution “kept Tito afloat.” No one would seriously argue that US aid did not help Yugoslavia survive after its exile from the Communist world in 1948. The US wanted Tito to survive as a wedge or with a competing ideology in the Communist movement hoping to weaken Moscow’s international power. This policy of “keeping Tito afloat” meant preventing the Yugoslav economy from collapse. One should not, however, overlook the fact that US aid made Yugoslavia dependent on the West and integrated Yugoslavia into the Western free-market economy playing a crucial role in Yugoslavia’s future economic development and foreign policy decisions.\(^\text{11}\)

The western powers thought about keeping Tito afloat since the Cominform Resolution. The term “keeping Tito afloat” stems from a 1948 speech given by the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin. The British had hoped to use the Yugoslav case for propaganda reasons to argue that a Communist state could survive without interference from Moscow. Furthermore, the British hoped that somehow their economy would benefit from economic relations with Yugoslavia. On the other hand, the US National Security Council (NSC) adopted George F. Kennan’s recommendation suggesting Tito should receive aid if he asked for it. The US wanted to use the Yugoslav economy as a model to show other countries how prosperous they could become if they entered trade agreement with the West. For example, a US State Department policy about Yugoslavia concluded, “[Yugoslavia can] provide an example to those dissatisfied elements in the Communist Parties of the Cominform countries of what they too might have if they embark on Tito’s course.”\(^\text{12}\) The first sign of US assistance began soon after the Cominform Resolution when the US released Yugoslav gold reserves. Another earlier sign was the sale by the US and England of fifty to sixty thousand tons of crude oil to Yugoslavia in July 1948. The United States’ motives and goals for
assisting Yugoslavia were clear. The motive was to integrate Yugoslavia into the Western market economy and hope other Soviet satellite countries would see the benefit of being part of the same market economy. National Security Council Report 18 represented the US as a core country, trying to integrate the Soviet Union’s periphery satellite countries into a Western dominated periphery region.13

The United States, England, and France were giving top priority to Yugoslav needs. President Truman allocated $60 million in the Mutual Security Act of 1951 for Yugoslavia with provisions for an economic mission. At a meeting of the International Security Committee on July 17, 1951, it was agreed that it was of great importance to the security of the United States to furnish additional economic aid immediately to Yugoslavia. Truman recommended $60 million be made available to Yugoslavia for fiscal year 1952. Washington’s objective consisted of keeping Yugoslavia outside of the Soviet sphere of influence.14

The Western powers agreed in principle to cover the foreign exchange requirements for Yugoslavia for the next fiscal year up to the equivalent of $150 million. This agreement was principally supposed to have facilitated a World Bank loan to Yugoslavia, but the President of the World Bank, Eugene R. Black, withheld his final judgment until he saw the Western powers agreement finalized in legal form. Mr. Black, no doubt, played a substantial role in the negotiations both as banker and as political adviser.15

On October 17, 1951, the World Bank extended a $28 million loan to Yugoslavia for specific development projects in conjunction with the Yugoslav Five-Year Plan. These specific projects included electric power, mining, transportation, and forestry. This loan was less than either Yugoslavia or the Western powers would have liked. The loan was far more in line with the preliminary Western trade agreement of about $50 million, not the $150 million, announced in August 1951. Moreover, the British representative to the World Bank voted for the $28 million loan but took the strong position that the bank should see some progress toward the utilization of these funds before any more loans to Yugoslavia be granted. It seemed likely Yugoslavia would request an additional $100 million in 1952 to sustain its economy and the Five-Year Plan, and the US seemed to be the prime source for such financing.16

By November, Yugoslavia began investigating the possibility of the Western powers underwriting the balance required to complete the Five-Year Plan. Knowing that the West was completely committed to Yugoslavia, economically,
politically and militarily, Tito began to put pressure on the US for more money. In December, the Yugoslavs publicly stated that the richer countries should aid the poorer ones. Next, the chairman of the Yugoslav Economic Council, Boris Kidrich, stated that he foresaw a budget deficit of about $185.5 million for the 1952 calendar year. He also commented that Yugoslavia had the moral right to expect economic aid and urged the Western powers and the World Bank to cover the projected deficit.\(^{17}\)

The Western powers gave in to Yugoslavia’s pressure and revised the original agreement to cover the Yugoslav foreign exchange deficit up to $120 million for the fiscal year 1952. The US covered $78 million, England $27.6 million, and France $14.4 million. President Truman obtained the authorization for the first grant as part of his message to Congress on November 7, 1951, notifying Congress of the use of funds under the Mutual Security Act of 1951.\(^{18}\)

The Western powers’ coordinated actions lasted until 1953. During 1953, the West provided $99 million to assist Yugoslavia. The US once again contributed the majority of the funds by providing $78 million. Western power coordination played an important role in lessening the US financial burden to Yugoslavia and discouraged the Yugoslavs from requesting small loans at a moment’s notice. The Western power coordination influenced the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) to look at the Yugoslav situation more favorably. For example, Martin Rosen, an IBRD representative, attended the Western powers’ negotiations in London in 1951. He expressed the bank’s interest in providing a loan so Yugoslavia could pay back their deficits on existing accounts. United States policy makers used the British and French economic commitment to Yugoslavia as an instrument to convince the US Congress that the US needed to keep providing its share. The Yugoslav government believed Western financial help sent Moscow a signal that the West supported Yugoslavia’s independence. Yugoslavia leaders failed to understand they had switched from Soviet hegemony to Western economic dependence.\(^{19}\)

Yugoslavia’s rising deficit after receiving Western financial assistance represents its status as a periphery country. Yugoslavia’s deficit skyrocketed two and one half times more than export earnings in 1953 setting a postwar disparity record. Through the Mutual Security Act, the US provided 31 percent ($122 million) of Yugoslav import value for 1953. Yugoslavia imported $234 million worth of US goods while exporting only $26 million to the US. The Western powers met in April of 1952 agreeing that Yugoslavia should not request any more
international credits without consulting the West. The Yugoslav government grudgingly accepted the Western recommendation to incorporate seven guidelines to reduce investment in key Yugoslav economic development projects; however, by 1953 Western powers made Yugoslavia dependent on the western financial institutions for its survival.20

Yugoslavia faced another financial issue when its currency (dinar) experienced its first post-war devaluation from 50 to 300 dinars on the US dollar creating a more realistic exchange rate. The dinar’s devaluation followed the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) guidelines guaranteeing Yugoslavia a $9 million credit to soften the adjustment. Agriculture collectivization and compulsory produce deliveries stopped and a coupon system of exchange was terminated by 1952. Foreign trade enterprises allowed Yugoslavia to keep forty-five percent of their export earnings in the form of foreign exchange. Due to cutbacks in a centralized bureaucracy, some five thousand officials transferred to lower administrative levels.21

Richard Allen, the head of the US Economic mission in Yugoslavia told his officials that large-scale foreign aid would still be needed by Yugoslavia for a long time to come unless it scaled back on investment and military expenditures. In response to this suggestion by Allen, Yugoslav investment came down gradually from a high 34 percent of net national produce in 1952-1953 to just above 30 percent for the rest of the decade. The Yugoslavs committed four-fifths of these investments in 1952 to key projects. These key projects consisted of developing heavy industry, which the IBRD was against. From the Yugoslav perspective, these key project investments provided the only opportunity for them to cover military needs while accelerating the slow growth of new material production by 2.3 percent a year between 1947-1952. These same years experienced the growth of industrial investment by 16 percent annually and foreign aid accounted for 73.5 percent of that figure. Foreign aid covered 88 percent of Yugoslavia’s current deficit, which resulted from the industrial related imports. The fact that foreign aid only covered 12 percent of the current account deficits made it clear that Yugoslavia still had major reforms to implement if it wanted to stop foreign aid dependency on the West.22

Non-ferrous metals represented the major source of sale to the US. The US expressed interest in those strategic minerals because the West was in short supply. As early as March 1949, Yugoslavia requested a loan of $20 million from Bank of
America and a $40 million loan from Chase Manhattan Bank. The Yugoslavs wanted to use the loans to buy mining equipment. They offered gold reserves to secure the loans but Western banks refused on the grounds that they would only accept gold reserves for security that were held outside of Yugoslavia. Chase Manhattan Bank eventually provided $5 million worth of credit for ninety days at four percent interest in return for exclusive rights to sell Yugoslav exports in the US in 1952. The Yugoslavs did not draw on this credit until 1952. Yugoslavia’s problem in entering the Western market stemmed not only from lack of US commercial credit but also from other obstacles as well.23

Yugoslavia linking its economy to the West forced it to downsize its bureaucratic structure. This downsizing negatively impacted Yugoslavia’s opportunity for economic development. For example, Shell Oil’s plan to establish operations in Yugoslavia in 1952-1953 failed because Shell had to negotiate different contracts with each of the separate republics in Yugoslavia. The US firm Socony-Vacuum reported the same difficulty when dealing with Yugoslav decentralization. Exporting Yugoslav goods to the West was just as problematic. The famous Josef Kras chocolate factory earned a contract to produce chocolate figurines for the US holiday season in 1952. The contract was not fulfilled because Kras management made smaller profits from exports compared to profit from its domestic market. Exports to the Western markets suffered.24

Yugoslavia informed the US that if Yugoslavia had to pay back its Western European short-term debt, its interest and principal payment would rise to twenty percent in 1954 from 7 percent in 1953. The only way the Yugoslavs could afford this bill was to drastically reduce imports for the next two years. The consequences for the Yugoslav state in reducing its trade imports would have meant that its heavy industry and standard of living would have declined. As a result of this dire situation, the US wanted to organize a conference to discuss restricting Yugoslavia’s ability to enter into bilateral agreements with Western Europe. The US wanted this restriction because it felt that bilateral agreements ran counter to the general western movement toward free trade in convertible currencies. The US Embassy in Belgrade argued that a healthy Yugoslav economy provided Western security and security should outweigh any other narrow commercial interest. In addition, the US wanted the Yugoslav government to reduce investment in heavy industry. Previous US influence limited the number of industrial projects in Yugoslavia, but perversely affected the economy by concentrating scarce capital
resources in heavy industry rather than in the development of domestic consumer goods or potential production exports. In the end, the US hoped that the Yugoslav government would embark on a more credit-worthy investment benefiting Western financial institutions.\textsuperscript{25} 

Yugoslavia’s road to dependency began with the intention of “keeping Tito afloat” after the Cominform Resolution and Yugoslavia’s integration into the Western market economy. However, it was not possible for Yugoslavia to enter the Western market on an equal basis. Even if Yugoslavia wanted to enter on an equal basis, the Western powers would not have allowed that to happen. This unequal partnership was exemplified in 1954 when the US embassy argued that western security outweighed any Yugoslav economic interests. The Cominform Resolution forced Yugoslavia to enter into economic relations with Western powers. This relationship evolved into a classic case of establishing Yugoslavia as a periphery country dependent on the core Western powers for survival.

Stalin died in March of 1953 and relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia started to normalize. In 1956, the Belgrade Declaration reestablished normal trade relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia linked its economy to the West by the time of the Belgrade Declaration making it an integral part of its economic strategy. The two decades before the 1980s looked promising for Yugoslavia.

The post-Stalin years saw Yugoslavia’s economy regain some of its strength. From the Belgrade Declaration to Tito’s death in 1980, Yugoslavia slowly regained its economic stability. Its yearly gross domestic product (GDP) growth averaged 6.1 percent, health care was free, the literacy rate was 91 percent, and life expectancy was seventy-two years. Slowly, however, the Western powers under the leadership of the United States started to dismantle Yugoslavia’s economic stability.\textsuperscript{26} 

The US \textit{National Security Decision Directive} 133 dated March 1984 reiterated the same attitude toward Yugoslavia expressed in 1954 about Yugoslavia’s importance in providing security for Western powers. It stated, “an independent, economically viable, stable and militarily capable Yugoslavia serves Western and U.S. interests.”\textsuperscript{27} The \textit{Directive} went further and showed US intentions of keeping Yugoslavia dependent on the West by stating, “We [US] will also continue to encourage Yugoslavia’s long-term internal liberalization . . . [and] promote the trend toward an effective, market-oriented Yugoslav economic structure.”\textsuperscript{28} The idea of liberalization represented a diplomatic way to promote the
free-market and dismantle communism in Yugoslavia.

The implementation of National Security Decision Directive 133 came at a time when Yugoslavia was in the progress of its economic decline. Before 1980, Western powers demanded a financial reform in Yugoslavia so it could pay back its Western creditors. The implementation of the economic reforms started to dismantle Yugoslavia. For example, following these reforms, industrial growth dropped to a negative 10 percent by 1990. The IMF ordered wages to be frozen and real wages collapsed by 41 percent for the first six months of 1990. The IMF forced the Yugoslav central bank to pay its Western creditors instead of transferring state funds to the Yugoslav republics to finance economic and social programs. The lack of sending state revenue to the Yugoslav republics signaled the Western powers’ successful dismantling of the Yugoslav federal communist system.29

Western financial institutions controlled Yugoslav banking institutions and forced massive bankruptcy for Yugoslavia’s industries. From 1989 to 1990, the IMF directed 1,137 total firms toward bankruptcy. These bankruptcies devastated the Yugoslav work force. As many as 614,100 workers out of a total industrial work force of 2.7 million were laid off. Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Kosovo felt the brunt of the layoffs. The World Bank outlook for the remaining Yugoslav industries was dismal. After the initial bankruptcies, the World Bank estimated that there were still over two thousand enterprises that could be closed. The total number of layoffs for both rounds of bankruptcy would exceed 48 percent of the workforce. The economic hardships experienced by Yugoslavs started to become evident in multi-party elections scheduled for 1990.30

The multi-party elections in 1990 dismantled Yugoslavia’s political structure. It provided the platform for nationalist leadership to advance their cause. Representatives from different republics started to blame other ethnic groups for the economic downward spiral. Politicians started to advance the idea of secession to create new nation-states from Yugoslav republics. Outside nationalist militia groups, with Western finances, began to show up in Yugoslavia creating even more instability in the area. Yugoslav President Borisav Jovic pointed to the dire political situation stating, “Citizens have lost faith in its institutions . . . The further deepening of the economic crisis and the growth of social tensions has had a vital impact on the deterioration of the political-security situation.”31 President Jovic made this statement in April of 1991, and by June of 1991, Slovenia and then
Croatia declared independence from Yugoslavia. The federal Yugoslav Army rolled tanks into Slovenia to stop the independence movement but to no avail. The war that ensued after 1991 lasted until the American-brokered Dayton Accord in 1995.32

There are multiple interpretations as to why Yugoslavia collapsed. Some argue from a nationalistic perspective that suppressed ethnic groups rose up to create new nation-states. Others view it as the inherent weakness of a communist system. Others view it as the re-emergence of ancient ethnic hatred seeking revenge for past atrocities committed. All of the above interpretations have some merit. One interpretation that needs further analysis is the incorporation of the modern-world system theory to explain the collapse of Yugoslavia. Susan L. Woodward, a former Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institute, suggested that Yugoslavia’s position in the world from 1948 to 1981 led to its unexpected collapse. She stated:

In the Yugoslav Case, the balance-of payment deficits and dangerously depleted foreign-exchange reserves were the consequences of an external shock—the economic blockade by the Cominform countries in 1948-49—not of domestic prodigality. The decision to seek foreign aid within four years of the socialist revolution was not made easily, but once taken it led to a systematic decentralization of the Yugoslav economy, abandonment of development planning in favor of market, and integration into the world economy in response to the policies dictated by the IMF in exchange for credits over the next 20 years (1951, 1960 and 1965 are particularly important). This dismantling of socialism had been accompanied by persistent balance-of payment deficits, high unemployment, high inflation, and increasing inequality.33

The value of this interpretation is that it incorporates a longer view of Yugoslavia’s history and diplomatic relations. This longer view highlights the fact that Yugoslavia’s dependency on the West after the Tito-Stalin break in 1948 contributed to both its collapse and the war that followed.
Notes

1. The purpose of this article is not to analyze or explain the World-system theory but to use it as a paradigm for analysis to understand the collapse of communist Yugoslavia. The theory in short looks at the “international division of labor” that divides the globe into three categories: core, semi-periphery, and periphery. The core areas control domestic and international capital-intensive institutions while the other areas provide cheap resources and labor for the system to function properly. This system reinforces the core areas political and economic global hegemony. Immanuel Wallerstein advanced the most comprehensive theory of the World-system starting in the 1970s. The French Annales School of historiography in the 1920s laid the foundation for the development of the modern-world system theory. Prominent scholars such as Lucien Febvre, Marc Bloch, and Fernand Braudel founded and advanced the Annales School’s idea.

2. Milan Rai, *Chomsky’s Politics* (London: Verso, 1995), 82-83. Leften Stavrianos in his book *Global Rift* argues that the “third world” (periphery region) made its first appearance in the Balkans and Eastern Europe providing raw materials for the textile and metal industries of England and Holland as far back as the fourteenth century and continued on a path of underdevelopment as trade and investment patterns took their natural course.


5. Ibid., 45; Department of State, *Telegram from Sofia to Secretary of State, June 30, 1948*. File 860H.00/5-3048, Record Group 59 (Washington D.C.: National Archives), 1-2.


8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.


28. Ibid.


30. Ibid.


Bibliography


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Native Americans have made significant contributions to the history of the United States. However, the extent of the contributions of Indian peoples has remained a point of contention in U.S. History classrooms. Throughout the years, Native Americans have been presented in textbooks as either bloodthirsty, soulless heathens standing in the way of American Manifest Destiny, or as children of the forest, living in harmony with nature, cruelly oppressed by white conquerors. The purpose of this paper is to examine the history of historians’ attitudes towards Native Americans. By examining how authors have presented Native Americans, changing attitudes about the first inhabitants of the Western hemisphere can be understood. The author considered a number of textbooks while researching the historiography of Native American studies. Beginning with the earliest accounts, including an American history textbook published in 1827, and concluding with a U.S. history textbook published in 2008, the author examined six textbooks from the primary through the college level, along with other non-textbook sources.

The Vikings who sailed across the North Atlantic and explored the waters around the northeastern part of North America during the eleventh century made the first known encounter with the people of the Western Hemisphere. According to Scandinavian sagas collected by Rasmus Anderson in his 1906 book, *The Norse Discovery of America*, the Norse encountered a people they called Skraelings, which translates in modern Icelandic to “little men” or “barbarians.” Historians believe that the people encountered by the Norse explorers are the ancestors of the Inuit peoples of eastern Canada.

One of the first accounts of Native Americans comes from the Norse saga of Erik the Red, part of a codex known as the *Hauksbook*, named for the book’s first owner, a Norwegian knight. The first to encounter the natives was one Thorfinn Karlsefni. The sagas, in typical conqueror style, derisively described the natives of Newfoundland: “They were swarthy men and ill-looking, and the hair of their heads was ugly. They had great eyes, and were broad of
The saga presents the *Skraelings* as poor traders. According to the account, the Norse sailors were able to take advantage of the natives’ inexperience in trade: “In exchange for perfect unsullied skins, the *Skraelings* would take red stuff (cloth) a span in length, which they would bind around their heads.” The saga tells of an incident between the *Skraelings* and the Vikings that began when a Viking bull bellowed and startled the *Skraelings*, scaring them away for three weeks. The *Skraelings* returned, and the result was the first military encounter between Native Americans and Europeans. During the encounter, Freydis, the pregnant sister of Erik the Red, rallied the Vikings by bellowing a war cry, baring her breasts, and slapping them with the blade of her sword. This action allegedly frightened the *Skraelings* from the field. In the skirmish, only two Vikings died, along with a “number of *Skraelings*.” The sagas present the Natives as a primitive people, not nearly as worldly as the Norsemen. It is as though the Natives are scared, timid children who are in awe of the Norse and their steel weapons and aggressive women.

This view of the Natives continues over the next thousand years or so of contact between Europeans and Natives. One of the earliest U.S. history textbooks was published in 1827 by the American Academy of Language and Belles Lettres. The book, *History of the United States from Their First Settlement to the Close of the War with Great Britain in 1815*, written by Salma Hale, was chosen as a winner of a contest sponsored by the academy to select a “class book for academies and schools.” The first mention of European contact with Natives comes early in the book in the section describing Christopher Columbus’s landing in Hispaniola:

> The natives, who had assembled in great numbers on the first appearance of the ships, stood around the Spaniards gazing in speechless astonishment. The inhabitants appeared in the simple innocence of nature, entirely naked . . . They were shy at first, through fear, but soon became familiar with the Spaniards.

Hale treated Columbus’s greeters as children gazing with dumb wonder at the superior Spaniards. The Indians that Columbus meets are innocents, stupidly giving far too much in trade for far too little. According to Hale, they received with "transports of joy, various trinkets, for which in return they gave such provisions as they had." Hale’s Indians greet the Spaniards with dumbfounded amazement, as if
they had just recently achieved self-awareness. Hale’s book, written just forty years after the signing of the Constitution, continued to address the Natives only as they affect the progress of Europeans. Hale’s children of the forest become merciless savages when the English encounter them in Virginia. The Indians in Virginia are ruthless warriors who are “cunning in stratagem and ferocious in battle.” An interesting observation of Hale’s writing is that when he referred to the first peoples in a positive light (i.e. children of the forest) they were “Natives.” When they were fighting against the white man, they were “Indians.”

Benson J. Lossing’s *Primary History of the United States*, published in 1872, was written for students in the lower grades. This book, written and published after the passage of the Indian Removal Act and four years before the battle of the Little Big Horn, dedicated more discussion to the Natives. Lossing devoted ten pages at the beginning of his book to the pre-Columbian history of America. Overall, the sections on Indian history attempted to examine the history of Indians, but often, Lossing descended into derogatory and derisive comments. The sections became Eurocentric, and presented the Natives as an obstacle that must be overcome: “I will now tell you about the Indians who lived in our country before any white people were here.”

Lossing presented the Indians as a homogenous group spread around the continent, similar in physical appearance. In his descriptions, Lossing made many sweeping statements about the Natives. According to Lossing, in all Native tribes, the men went to war while the women “planted corn and other things and did all the hard work.” Lossing treated the Indians as ignorant savages who were extremely sexist. According to Lossing, one of the major differences between Indians and whites was the attitude of the Indians towards women. Lossing never uses the word “Natives:”

The Indian men played ball, fired at the mark, danced, leaped, played games and had other amusements, but they would never let the women join them. They were not at all polite to the women. I am sure that no right-minded boy, when he gets to be a man, will let his mother, sister or wife do all the hard work, while he hunts, or fishes, or plays; and not let them have any of the fun.

Lossing attempted to examine the differences of the various Indian nations
throughout the United States. He separated the Indians into eight nations and described the culture and tribal arrangements of each. Lossing described each nation according to how it related to the Europeans. He derided the Iroquois and Cherokee peoples for siding with the British during the Revolutionary War, while he described the Catawba nation as a friendly people who assisted the Americans during both the Revolution and the War of 1812. Lossing presented the Indians of the colonial period as savages lurking in the forest, waiting to pounce on the poor colonists. In his discussions of the various military encounters between the Natives and the white settlers, whites were always victims of mindless Native savagery. Lossing described Captain John Smith’s encounter with the Natives in Virginia by stating, “With a few companions, he went up that stream, which the Indians called Chickahominy. While away from his boat, in the woods, some of the Indians, who had been watching the white people, sprang forward and made Captain Smith a prisoner.”

Lossing attempted to present a balanced view of events concerning the 1830 conflict between the southeastern Indians and the United States, saying that the Indians “have given the white people a bit of trouble, but I must confess that the white people have been most to blame, because they have not treated the Indians fairly.” Lossing also expressed concern that European settlers would not allow the natives to live peacefully in the area allocated them in Oklahoma due to the movement of Europeans to the West. Lossing anticipated the impending Indian wars with the prairie tribes in the

Figure 1 Portrait of Tecumseh. By Benjamin J. Lossing c. 1858.
conclusion of his section on Indian history. He described the tribes as fierce and warlike and conceded that they remained on the plains only because the “whites have not wanted it.” Lossing continued, “But the white man will soon tell them to go further west, into the wilderness, because he wishes to raise grain, and build villages and cities where their cabins and wigwams now stand. And they will go.” Lossing had good intentions. He attempted to treat the Natives as a group deserving consideration, but his attempts fell short. His Indians seemed to deserve the treatment given them by the whites. He was a product of the Jacksonian belief in Manifest Destiny. Natives, though most assuredly a culture deserving examination, were a quaint group on the way out. Lossing’s Indians were merely the people who were taking care of the land before Europeans came to live on it.

In the preface to John O’Hara’s *A History of the United States*, published in 1919, the author wrote what he referred to as a “causal history.” O’Hara did not beat around the bush when he told the reader in his preface that a “considerable amount of material of traditional knowledge but of small intrinsic importance has been omitted” so that he could place more emphasis on events of “greater significance.” One can only assume that Mr. O’Hara was the sole judge of what is of “great significance.” O’Hara continued Lossing’s tradition of dedicating early chapters to the discussion of the Natives, and it was evident that some cultural study of Native Americans has taken place in the years between their accounts. O’Hara was less Eurocentric than his predecessors were, but occasionally a derisive comment found its way into the text. O’Hara admitted that the Indians were not the homogenous group presented in earlier writings: “They had many different languages and different ways of life.” O’Hara examined the different tribal groups of Natives according to geographic cultural areas and discussed the customs and culture of each area. In a section entitled “Relations between the Indians and the Whites,” O’Hara expressed an appreciation for the contributions made by Natives to American culture, but the contributions were limited to agricultural lessons: “Tobacco, another gift of the Indian, was of the highest value to the early colonists, giving them a commodity that soon commanded high prices in Europe.” O’Hara dedicated the second chapter to examining the different approaches made by the Spanish and the French to convert the Natives to Christianity. The Spanish attempts in the Southwest stalled when the Natives they were trying to convert met the missionaries with hostility. No mention is made of why the Natives were hostile to conversion. O’Hara described French attempts in
the Northeast as much more successful; however, his description contained European arrogance, as he stated, “The missionaries taught the Indians the arts of civilized life as well as the truths of religion.” O’Hara, too, described the Indians of the colonial time as brutes of the forest who were dedicated to disrupting colonial settlement. O’Hara described King Philip’s War in Massachusetts in 1675 as a senseless attack on settlers by Natives. The subsequent loss of crops led to a brutal famine. O’Hara’s attitude seemed to be that the war happened because that was just how Natives were: brutal, ruthless, and willing to attack Europeans without provocation.

In his discussion of the Indian Removal Act, O’Hara presented the tribes of the Southeast as victims of a cruel United States Government. The tribes were “compelled in great measure by force and fraud, to leave their old homes and cross the Mississippi.” O’Hara stated, “Their expulsion was an act of brutal aggression.” O’Hara examined the Indian Wars of the northern plains which were being fought at the time Lossing was writing his book. O’Hara described the wars as a fight for existence and food supply as white settlers entered the western United States. That encroachment onto tribal lands led to the extermination of the buffalo and forced Natives onto reservations. The officers who led the conflicts against the Natives were products of the education they received at the hands of writers such as Lossing and Hale. American soldiers were described as “competing with the Natives in savagery, refusing at times to give quarter, often killing women and children.” General George Armstrong Custer was described as a victim of Indian trickery, defeated because Sitting Bull concealed most of his force. According to O’Hara, Custer lost because the Indians did not fight fairly. When discussing the policies of President Ulysses S. Grant, O’Hara presented the discriminatory Indian Peace Policy, which settled Indians on reservations and forced them to give up traditional ways of life as a consolation gift to the Natives. O’Hara attempted to present the Natives in an objective light. His discussions on the diversity of Indian culture were fair and balanced, but he sometimes descended into Eurocentrism and generalities when discussing Natives of early colonial American history. He showed a little more objectivity and attempted to report the facts of the situation when discussing events that happened in the past hundred years, presenting both Natives and American policy makers in a more accurate light.
The Oxford History of The American People by Samuel Eliot Morison was written for a college level class and according to the author “for his fellow citizens.” A weighty tome of over a thousand pages, it claimed to be a cultural history, “putting pugilists cheek by jowl with presidents.” Morison lamented the lack of data on early inhabitants of America in 1965 and described the attempt to write the history of the continent before Europeans came as “trying to put together a puzzle with only one percent of the pieces.” But, as Morison declared, “New discoveries are being made almost yearly.” Morison stated on his first page that his history of the American people was to be the history of European immigrants. But, he said, “We can’t ignore the Indians.” Morison separated the Natives of North America into the now familiar language and cultural groups. Morison’s Native Americans were distinct groups, each with its own culture, traditions, and origins, rather than the homogenous Indians of prior writers. Europeans, he wrote, could settle the New World without encountering general Indian hostility. Some tribes were hostile to Europeans, while others welcomed the settlers. In fact, it was the help of some tribes that allowed European settlements to flourish on the continent. Morison placed the importance of Native American contributions to American history on the same level as those of immigrant Americans: “There is no reason to regard the North American Indian as an inferior race. Backward in many respects he was, but he has proved to have every potentiality common to other human beings.” Indians were, in some respects, superior to Europeans and African-Americans according to Morison. Due to their long standing resistance to European pressure, the Native was more “rugged” than the alleged individualists of European descent. According to Morison, Natives were better Christians than Europeans: “As children of the nature . . who give their last bit of bread to an unknown guest, the Indians follow the New Testament better than men who profess and call themselves Christian.”

Of the years of Indian removal, Morison presented President Andrew Jackson as a ruthless leader who did everything in his power to move Natives off land coveted by land-hungry whites in Georgia. That theme continued in the portrayal of the Indian Wars. Morison drew a picture of a wave of white settlers pushing the Natives before them. Morison presented the Indian Wars as a war of genocide. Disease, starvation, and outright slaughter by the U.S. Army systematically destroyed the Natives. Morison made the claim that had the various tribes been able to unify, they might have been able to wear down the Army, but in the face of overwhelming force, the Natives were doomed to failure and
extermination.

Was Morison any better than the writers of the earlier books? His Indians could do no wrong. They were the victims of an overwhelming white force that conquered everything in its path to spread white culture at the expense of Native cultures. No longer were they savages who ruthlessly murdered Europeans, nor were they innocent children of the forest, gazing dumbly at the advance of superior European civilization. Morison’s Indians were noble warriors, struggling to preserve their culture in the face of overwhelming odds, doomed to failure, but still fighting against the decadent ways of the white man.

Modern high school textbooks are not written by a single author as the textbooks of the 1800s were. Today’s books are a group project with several authors, accuracy panels, teacher reviewers, and differentiated instruction consultants. This serves to take the individual perspective out of the book and attempts to remove any appearance of bias or slant. The book used for many high school Junior U.S. History classes is Pearson Education’s United States History. It includes a variety of teaching tools, study questions, activities, and online supplementary material to assist the teaching of American history.

The authors dedicated the first section, much like Morison and O’Hara’s books, to the study of pre-Columbian North America. The authors described the lands inhabited by the different tribes as “culture areas,” separating the various groups along the lines of resource management and religion as influenced by the area in which they lived. The authors described each culture in terms of how they gathered resources in each particular area and introduced the idea of the Columbian Exchange, a term coined in 1972 to describe the transfer of goods, ideas, and people between the hemispheres. The notion is that both groups, Natives and Europeans, contributed to this exchange equally. Pearson’s authors attempted to present the Natives in a neutral light. Some groups were hostile to the arrival of Europeans, while others welcomed the opportunity to expand their trading opportunities. The book presented Columbus as a victim of his time. “As the representative of a Christian nation, Columbus believed he had the right and duty to dominate the people he found.”33 Pearson’s authors followed Morison’s lead in examining the different ways that Europeans interacted with Natives. The differences boiled down to philosophy and economic need. Spain, remembering the success it encountered with the enslavement of Africans, enslaved the Natives it encountered, using a combination of force and Christianity to subjugate them.
France, which needed the assistance of the Natives to collect furs, befriended the Natives. England, in Virginia, at first befriended the Natives, then after conflicts over trade, was forced to go to war against them.

The Trail of Tears is a sad chapter in the history of the United States, but once again, it is the ignorance and greed of the whites that led to the relocation: “In 1829, white settlers discovered gold on Cherokee lands in northwestern Georgia. It was only a matter of time before the government decided to relocate the Cherokee and other natives living in the southeast to other lands.” It was the drive of national expansion and mob mentality of southern whites that led President Jackson to sign the Indian Removal Act. The voters who vaulted him into office expected him to drive the Indians off the land so that white farmers could use the land.

Pearson’s authors attempted to provide a balanced view of the story of Native American conflict with Europeans. Natives were sometimes aggressors, sometimes victims. The textbook was mostly without bias and takes a “just the facts” attitude towards the story. The authors presented neither side as overtly good or bad. The story of American history was a series of causes and effects with no attempt made at a judgment of the morality of the story or the people involved.

The story of Native American history has been a story of conflicting cultures and people. From the first writings of the Vikings, authors have attempted to tell the story of the meeting of European and Native American cultures, some with a greater degree of success than others. The story, like all of history, has its good guys and its bad guys. Who is good and who is bad depends on who is telling the story and who is the intended audience.

In the textbooks from the 1800s, arrogance suffused the story. Lossing and Hale presented the Indians as a homogenous group and placed Natives firmly in the position of the aggressor, ignorantly standing in the way of American Manifest Destiny. As the writing of American history progressed, authors presented Native Americans as separate cultures, each with its own aims and goals when it came to interacting with Europeans. In the late twentieth century, white guilt replaced European arrogance. It appeared that the authors attempted to make up for the slights of the past by presenting Indians as noble savages, waging a war that they are destined to lose.

Modern textbooks take a balanced approach as their authors attempt to present the Indians as distinct cultures. According to modern textbooks, Native
Americans—Columbus’s innocents—had no clue what the next five hundred years held for them. They attempted to repel European invasion, but ended up losing their culture at the hands of an unstoppable juggernaut of technology and philosophy. Writing about Native Americans has been a challenge for authors of American history. The presentation of Native Americans has been an evolving process, and after generations of half-truths, lies, and racism, it will be a long struggle to find an honest, truthful, unbiased presentation.

Notes

1. The author used the terms “Native American,” “Native,” “American Indian” and “Indian” interchangeably throughout this paper. Most Native people prefer to be identified as “American Indian” or by their tribal membership.


4. Ibid., 56.

5. Ibid., 57.


7. Ibid., 9.

8. Ibid., 10.

9. Ibid., 16.

10. Ibid., 9, 17, 19.

11. The Indian Removal Act, signed by President Jackson in 1830, removed Cherokee Indians from ancestral lands in the southeastern United States and forced them to march along the Trail of Tears to reservations west of the Mississippi. Thousands died of starvation, disease, and exposure.

12. The US 7th Calvary, under the command of General George Armstrong Custer, suffered a massive defeat at the hands of the combined Lakota and Northern Cheyenne forces, led by Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse.


15. Ibid., 9.
16. Ibid., 35.
17. Ibid., 15.
18. Ibid., 16.
19. Ibid.
21. Ibid., 29.
22. Ibid., 34.
23. Ibid., 38.
25. O’Hara, 274.
26. Ibid., 245.
28. Ibid., 3.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
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THE WAR OF 1812: THE “FORGOTTEN WAR”

CHRIS SCHLOEMER

The War of 1812 is sometimes called the “forgotten war.” Indeed, military historian, professor of history, and author Donald R. Hickey, in his book, *The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict*, called the War of 1812 “probably our most obscure war.” However, the War of 1812 had a great impact on the development of the fledgling United States. Pulitzer-prize winning historian Gordon S. Wood, in his book, *Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789-1815*, called the war “one of the most important wars in American history.” The War of 1812 impacted the nation in numerous ways, including improving the nation’s national spirit and international reputation, as well as its transportation, manufacturing, and military capabilities. The war also pushed military heroes into the political spotlight and meant doom for many American Indians. The War of 1812 was vital in pushing America towards becoming a powerful, continental country.

For Americans at the time, the War of 1812 was a significant event. For many, it was a final break with Great Britain, and as Wood stated, “The Americans’ emotional connection with Britain was at last broken, and they had acquired a new sense of their own national character.” Some even thought of the war as a continuation of the Revolutionary War—a “second struggle for independence.” Americans at the end of the war who were forty years of age or older and born in America had been born subjects of King George III or of his predecessor Hanoverian monarchs; Americans younger than forty (eighty five percent of the population) were born American citizens. Most Americans came out of this war with a generally negative attitude towards Great Britain. Indeed, shortly after the war, editor and publisher Hezekiah Niles wrote, “In the general prosperity, we behold the downfall of that faction which would have made a common interest with the British, during the late war . . . they are despised by the people they would have given soul and body to serve; . . . they are laughed at by all who consider them too contemptible for serious rebuke.” Americans also developed more pride in the American nation and its political system.
The War of 1812 unified the country and instilled pride and confidence in the United States. The country had been unsure of itself and the war showed that the United States could stand up to a major power. Many Americans had doubted the country’s place in the world. However, the war helped. A September 1815 editorial in the *Niles’ Weekly Register* reported, “A high and honorable feeling generally prevails... and the people begin to assume, more and more, a NATIONAL CHARACTER.” The war gave Americans this feeling, and a new nationalism grew among the population. Albert Gallatin, America’s Minister to France, said that “the war renewed and reinstated the National Feelings and character which the Revolution had given, and were daily lessened.” The war also reinforced the American idea of republican government.

The War of 1812 reassured Americans, who had seemed unsure as to how strong their country was, and if their new form of government could survive long. “The War of 1812 did finally establish for Americans the independence and nationhood of the United States that so many had doubted.” Historian Norman Risjord, in his book *Jefferson’s America*, said “the experiment in republican government—a source of concern to both Washington and Jefferson in their inaugural addresses—had been made to work.” Thomas Jefferson confirmed that the government was solid. He said, “Our government is now so firmly put on its republican tack, that it will not be easily monarchised by forms.” The war increased America’s citizens’ faith in the United States as a nation and in its political system. People also took pride in standing up to a powerful Great Britain.

The results of the war reinforced the nation’s feelings as a strong, sovereign nation. America was confident that it could now assert its authority. Benson Lossing said that the war resulted in “the positive and permanent independence of the United States,” and that the nation would not “tolerate an insult, nor suffer its sovereignty to be questioned.” Americans were “truly free” to begin “on a grand career of prosperity, with marvelous resources, developed and undeveloped – known and unknown.” Hickey postulated, “[T]he heady nationalism and expansionism that characterized American foreign policy throughout the nineteenth century was at least partly a result of the War of 1812.” Although the nation suffered many defeats and really gained nothing in fighting Great Britain to a standstill, many Americans felt they had won. In a special letter to Congress, President James Madison said, “While performing this act I congratulate you and our constituents upon an event which is highly honorable to
the nation, and terminates with peculiar felicity a campaign signalized by the most brilliant successes.”Although brilliant success was not what everyone thought, the United States did gain international respect from the war.

Once again, the United States had fought one of the most powerful nations in the world and survived. This increased the nation’s international standing. Albert Gallatin wrote, “The character of America stands now as high as ever on the European continent, and higher than it ever did in Great Britain.”

John Quincy Adams was a bit reluctant about it all and thought Americans went a bit too far, saying “my country men . . . look too intently to their Triumphs & turn their eyes too lightly away from their disasters . . . rather more proud than they have reason for the War.” However, he still said that the war “was more beneficial than injurious to our Country,” and it “raised our national character in the eyes of all Europe.” Some political groups did not reap success from the war. Although the nation’s mood was positive after the war, during the war, Hickey noted that the War of 1812 was “America’s most unpopular foreign war.”

Politically, the Federalist and Republican parties were deeply divided and the Federalists did not support the war, almost always voting in a bloc against it. They wanted peace with Great Britain and were in favor of accepting early peace offerings with terms that most Americans thought unacceptable. New England states believed that they bore too much of the brunt of the war and worried about their protection—their maritime industry also had suffered. This opposition led to the Hartford Convention. This convention of New England states proposed seven amendments to the Constitution, including one to end the three-fifths law (to lessen southern influence) and one to insist requiring a two-thirds majority Congressional vote to go to war, among others. They also proposed establishment of a New England Confederation “for their own defence.” An extremist group of Federalists (not those at the convention) even talked of secession. This could have had major implications for the country’s political future but fortunately for the United States, the war ended before it got that far. Even though secession was not the position of most, the Federalist Party was destroyed as party. It never overcame the stigma of being considered disloyal during the war. Rufus King ran against James Monroe in 1816 as the party’s last presidential candidate. The controversy ended America’s first two-party system, and the Republican Party dominated politics for the next decade. Still, the United States’ new nationalism and international respect allowed it to look inward and develop its capabilities.
America was forced to develop business and manufacturing by the war. The embargo and Non-intercourse Acts before the war and the war itself meant imported manufactured goods from Britain were in short supply. Additionally, the war had interrupted maritime trade and fishing; “American commerce was driven from the seas.” This forced American investors to look at other avenues. They looked towards manufacturing.

The short supply of manufactured goods resulted in greater demand and higher prices. This led to “a sudden increase in the number of patents and also to an inducement for more and more investors to shift their capital out of overseas shipping into domestic manufacturing.” Before 1808 there were only fifteen cotton mills in the United States; by 1814, 243 cotton mills were operating in fifteen states. Americans started to change their minds about manufacturing. Even Thomas Jefferson, who had been hostile to manufacturing, conceded, “that manufactures are now as necessary to our independence as to our comfort,” and “[o]ur manufacturers are now very nearly on a footing with those of England. She has not a single improvement which we do not possess, and many of them better adapted by ourselves to our ordinary use.” He also said in a letter that “He, therefore, who is now against domestic manufacture, must be for reducing us either to dependence on that foreign nation, or to be clothed in skins, and to live like wild beasts in dens and caverns.” This was a strong turnaround from his earlier position supporting a rural farming culture. The country was ripe for the spread of capitalism.

Because of the war America saw increased governmental expenditure, extensive military mobilization, expanded banking and credit, and growth of domestic manufacturing. These resulted in “hallmarks of capitalism” such as “a heightened sense of individuality, the increasing importance of the consumption of material goods, and extensive geographical and social mobility . . . a decisive moment in the emergence of the United States as a modern capitalist society.” People who had previously seen capitalism and consumption of material goods as evil were changing their tune. Americans also began to focus on the West.

The War of 1812 removed many obstacles to American expansion. The British had always tried to bottle up this urge to expand. For a long time, they had used Indians to prevent American expansion. The British believed that American expansion would “produce Indian war, menace the British fur trade, and even endanger the safety of Canada.” However, Americans were now free to move
into the Ohio and Mississippi valley regions. According to Jesse Buel, editor of the *Albany Argus*, Americans were eager. “What a field for splendid contemplation does our western country unfold! . . . When we consider that nature has strewn her gifts with a bountiful hand over this vast wilderness, and take into view the benign influence of our government and the enterprise of our population, the mind is lost in the magnitude of the objects which seem rising in futurity.” Hickey said that “the war encouraged the heady expansionism that lay at the heart of American foreign policy for the rest of the century.” British observers noticed American expansionism and commented on it. William Hamilton, the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs from 1809 to 1822, noted in December 1815, “Seeds of unlimited expansion . . . have taken root in that country.” Florida was one of the first to feel the urge for expansion.

There had been periodic conflict between Spanish Florida and America for quite some time. After the War of 1812, the Spanish had little hope of retaining Florida. The British had attacked America through these territories and because the Spanish were an ally of Britain, the British had often protected them in disputes. However, Spanish West Florida became the only permanent land acquisition the United States made during the War of 1812. By 1819, Spain had abandoned Florida, as well as a large part of its claims in the Pacific Northwest. This helped make the United States a true continental power. However, transportation through any areas opened up by the war was difficult.

The War of 1812, and the expansion brought on afterwards, spotlighted how weak the nation’s transportation systems were. The war itself had pushed the nation towards developing other transportation options for military reasons. Since transportation by way of the Atlantic Ocean was made hazardous by the strong British Navy, the United States was forced to use internal roads for transportation. The poor condition of these roads “greatly hampered the war effort.” Additionally, Americans travelling west found horrible roads. The need to improve travel and trade in the West, along with military considerations, resulted in renewed calls for the state and national governments to “finance internal improvements, or at least to invest in the stock of various road companies.” The nation “pursued with new vigor” the National Road from Cumberland Maryland to the Ohio River and several states approved canal projects. The war showcased not only military transportation issues, however; the military itself had serious issues.
During the war, the United States military had many problems. Many of the country’s military leaders were incompetent and the country had problems getting enough enlistments. The militia was largely ineffective. In fact, they proved to be “costly and inefficient and repeatedly refused to cross into Canada or to hold their positions under enemy fire.” Militarily, the United States did not achieve any of the goals it had attempted to achieve. It could not conquer Canada or achieve its maritime goals—these issues were not even mentioned in the Treaty of Ghent. Even the acquisition of West Florida came against a neutral power—not from its enemy. However, there were some positive results.

The country realized it needed to make efforts to deal with its military weaknesses exposed during the war. It was obvious the United States could no longer rely upon the militia to defend the country. Americans were also wary of future wars, especially with England, so they continued greater military and naval expenditure after the war. America no longer saw it as beneficial to “rely on the Jeffersonian panaceas of the 1800s.” Madison said, “Experience has taught us that a certain degree of preparation for war is not only indispensable to avert disasters in the onset, but affords also the best security for the continuance of peace.”

The United States established the army at ten thousand men—the largest standing army ever for the country. John C. Calhoun led the reform of the armed forces during his tenure in the War Department (1817-1825). The war had proved the excellence of military training at West Point and Calhoun recognized the importance of professional training for its officers. After 1815 “an education at West Point became an essential requirement for most men who sought a military career.” Henry Adams pointed out that West Point had also developed scientific engineering, and that “none of the works constructed by a graduate of West Point was captured by the enemy . . . perhaps without exaggeration the West Point Academy might be said to have decided, next to the navy, the result of the war.” After the war, Adams noted that improvements “introduced a new and scientific character into American life.” Staff organizations also expanded during Calhoun’s watch. This was especially true with the Corps of Engineers, which embarked on a program to systematically improve coastal fortifications and also to establish arms depots. The navy was also expanded.

American naval power made great strides in the war. Although fighting against one of the premier navies of the world, the American navy showed its worth. They “instantly made improvements that gave them superiority.”
naval capability of the United States began to elicit respect internationally. Indeed, Gallatin said that the United States was “generally respected and considered as the nation designed to check the naval despotism of England.” Realizing the power of a strong navy, the Naval Expansion Act of 1816 led to a marked increase in the size of the navy. The war also enhanced the political careers of many.

The War of 1812 was crucial in the political careers of many American leaders. The war propelled Andrew Jackson and William Henry Harrison towards the presidency—and three men into the vice-presidency—Daniel D. Tompkins, John C. Calhoun, and Richard M. Johnson. Andrew Jackson gained much political capital from the Battle of New Orleans which caused pride and nationalism; “Congress voted him the thanks of the nation, and ordered a commemorative gold medal to be given him.” William Henry Harrison ran for office as “Old Tippecanoe,” and slogans such as “Tippecanoe and Tyler too” touted his status as a war hero. Many others used war records to justify their elections. The Battle of Thames alone produced one president and one vice president, and in the state of Kentucky alone, “three governors, three lieutenant governors, four U.S. senators, and a score of congressmen.” However, not everyone benefited from the war.

The American Indians were the biggest losers in the aftermath of the War of 1812. During the war the American Indians had “made their last great effort to retain at least a portion of the land between the Ohio and the Mississippi Rivers.” It was often difficult for them to decide who to side with, but in the end, it did not matter. The American government did not differentiate much between enemies, and allies after the war and American Indian power was soon destroyed east of the Mississippi. The war was “a decisive defeat with lasting consequences . . . for centuries the tribes had been able to retain much autonomy—economic, political, and military—by playing off the British, French, Spanish, and Americans against each other.” Now they could not. The defeat and death of Tecumseh at the Battle of the Thames and the destruction of the Creeks at Horseshoe Bend “marked the end of the serious military power of the American Indians in the Northwest and Southeast respectively.” The peace treaty between the British and Americans did not help.

The Treaty of Ghent left the door wide open for American expansion. The events after the war showed that “neither accommodation to nor resistance
against American encroachments would suffice to preserve their cultural and political autonomy.”\textsuperscript{45} The Treaty of Ghent promised that both countries would “make peace with the Indians and to restore to such tribes . . . all the possessions, rights, and privileges which they may have enjoyed, or been entitled to, in one thousand eight hundred and eleven previous to such hostilities.”\textsuperscript{46} However, the treaty did not include a permanent reservation for the Indians. This left them at the mercy of a more nationalistic and self-reliant America, “an expansive people determined to engross lands up to and even beyond the Mississippi River.”\textsuperscript{47} Soon the United States “felt free to resume the negotiation of cessions of tribal lands.”\textsuperscript{48} The American Indians were doomed. Even those who had sided with America suffered.

Even tribes that fought as allies of the United States were dealt with severely and often underhandedly. The Choctaw lost their land under treaties of 1816 and 1830. The Cherokee allies suffered much the same fate. Andrew Jackson “extorted a fraudulent treaty with unauthorized Cherokees” in 1816, and the Senate ratified it, unwilling to “defy his popularity with southwestern voters.”\textsuperscript{49} Through a series of treaties, Jackson obtained “vast lands . . . three quarters of Alabama and Florida, one-third of Tennessee, one-fifth of Georgia and Mississippi, and smaller portions of Kentucky and South Carolina.”\textsuperscript{50} American Indian power east of the Mississippi River was irretrievably broken. In fact, Secretary of War Calhoun said they “have, in great measure, ceased to be an object of terror, and have become that of commiseration.”\textsuperscript{51}

In conclusion, although the War of 1812 is often seen as the “forgotten war,” it was an influential war, impacting the nation in numerous ways. The war resulted in a surge in nationalism. Few still clung to Great Britain. Americans enjoyed increased optimism about the United States and its political system. The war also showed that the United States would be a force to be reckoned with internationally. After surviving another war against an international powerhouse, the United States’ prestige throughout Europe was never higher. Forced to turn from maritime interests during the war, the United States began manufacturing more of its own goods. Leaders soon realized that the country’s transportation and communication systems were inadequate, and began diligently working on improvements. All of this resulted in the country looking inward to capitalize on its own internal resources. Capitalism thrived and the country was eager to expand. The War of 1812 also made the nation realize its military was weak. No
longer able to rely on militia to fight its wars, the United States created a standing army that built on its successes like West Point and enlarged the navy, which had proven so vital during the war; America began to be recognized as a naval power. The war also pushed military heroes into the political spotlight; some used this spotlight to catapult themselves into the running for the highest political offices. Unfortunately, the War of 1812 was devastating for many American Indians. In hindsight, it is not difficult to say that Gordon S. Wood was right—the War of 1812 was essential in driving changes that set the stage for the United States of America to become a continental and international power. The nation was primed to chase its (manifest) destiny.

Notes


3. Ibid., 701.


6. Ibid.


30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.
34. Madison, *Special Message to Congress*.
40. Black, *Fighting for America*, 173.
49. Ibid.
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LEADERSHIP LESSONS FROM THE PAST: THE ABILITY TO INSPIRE GREATNESS TRANSCENDS TIME

ANNE MIDGLEY

Great generals are scarce. There are few Morgans to be found.

—Nathanael Greene

A cold winter morning in January 1781 in a cow pasture in the South Carolina backcountry became the setting for one of the most unexpected—and pivotal—battles of the American War for Independence. In less than an hour of intense fighting, Daniel Morgan, in command of the American rebel forces, decisively trounced his opponent, Banastre Tarleton. His victory became known as the American Cannae, for it was the only case of double envelopment in the war. Morgan, with a personal grudge to bear against the British, led a motley mix of Continental soldiers, cavalry, and militia against one of the most feared commanders in the British Army. Morgan’s success was due in large part to his personal leadership.

The essential characteristics of a great leader transcend time; the qualities of an exceptional leader that motivates men to achieve seemingly impossible tasks or to triumph over what appear to be insurmountable odds are on display in leaders as diverse as George Washington, Winston Churchill, and Brigadier General Daniel Morgan of the Continental Army. The same characteristics that brought out the best in the men under Morgan’s command at the Battle of Cowpens on 19 January 1781 are still effective in the twenty-first century and include the capability to inspire others through a combination of vision, foresight, drive, and adaptability.¹

It is worthwhile to compare the leadership qualities of Morgan and his adversary at the Battle of Cowpens, British Lieutenant Colonel Banastre Tarleton. Before doing so, it is important to define the scope of their command responsibilities and identify which characteristics were most appropriate for that level of authority. Both Morgan and Tarleton were field commanders; neither man was responsible for policy or overarching strategy, the province of political
leaders and senior generals. As field commanders, each man was responsible for a limited level of strategic leadership and for “tactical acumen,” which is defined as “the capability to employ one’s forces in a manner that destroys the enemy’s ability to wage war.” To succeed in this realm, the leader must clearly understand and communicate goals and objectives and create a sense of vision and mission for his men that ensures they understand the purpose of the actions called for and the end results to be attained. It is critical that the leader gather and act upon sufficient knowledge of his enemy, the prospective battlefield terrain, and his own resources. The leader must prepare as best he can for the conditions he is likely to face in battle and evidence the adaptability and creativity needed to meet challenging and ever-changing conditions. The successful leader translates goals into understandable and achievable objects for his men and does so in such a manner that takes into account their potential as well as their limitations—he takes the measure of the men under his command and assesses both their strengths and weaknesses. Above all, the leader must inspire trust; men will follow a leader who demonstrates integrity, courage, clear thinking, and who has established a reputation for success.

With these standards in mind, pausing for a brief character sketch of both Morgan and Tarleton is in order. By January 1781, Morgan was forty-four years old and had the benefit of an extensive and varied career as a wagoner, soldier, and military leader. As a young man, he participated in the French and Indian War as a teamster serving under British Major General Edward Braddock during Braddock’s ill-fated 1755 campaign.
against the French and their Native American allies. At some point during that earlier war, Morgan gained a cause for his personal hatred of the British; he lashed out in anger at a British officer and in return, received what was then common punishment for such an indiscretion—he was severely whipped. Morgan carried the marks of the lash the remainder of his life.³

When the simmering dispute between Great Britain and her thirteen mainland American colonies broke into armed rebellion on 19 April 1775, the outburst was largely confined to Massachusetts. However, radical Whig elements in the other provinces quickly galvanized support for the beleaguered colony. Militia from other New England provinces raced to assist those already in Massachusetts to surround and besiege the British troops quartered in Boston. Control of the massed militia exceeded the capabilities of the Massachusetts Provincial Congress—and it soon reached out to the men of the Second Continental Congress gathered in Philadelphia for aid. Congress responded by voting to provide funds for the troops and by establishing a structure to govern them, including appointing George Washington as Commander in Chief of the nascent Continental Army. Congress also issued a call for companies of “expert riflemen;” Morgan responded with alacrity, traveling the region near his home in Virginia to raise marksmen.⁴

Morgan and his Virginia riflemen played a significant role in several major Revolutionary War battles, including the rebel invasion of Canada in 1775-1776 and the pivotal Battle of Saratoga in 1777. Early in the war Morgan was reckless and extremely aggressive; in the battle to seize Quebec, he almost singlehandedly drove back the enemy from Quebec’s Lower Town. His headlong attack stalled when he was overruled by other officers and forced to await reinforcements. The moment lost, Quebec was saved for Britain as the British reinforced their weak defensive position and held off the Americans. By 1781, Morgan was already a legend as a fighter and a captain of men in battle, a man whose mettle had been tested. However, his health was failing him, he suffered from severe attacks of sciatica and at the time of Cowpens, even riding his horse at a walk was a pain-filled experience for him.⁵

In 1781, Tarleton was in some ways a younger Morgan although he came from a vastly different social background and upbringing. Like Morgan, he was headstrong and aggressive; he did not, however, have the benefit of Morgan’s years of experience. The son of a wealthy merchant family, he had been raised in affluence and was well educated. He purchased a commission as a Cornet in April
1775 and swiftly rose through the ranks. At the age of twenty-four, Tarleton was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel of the British Legion, a Loyalist regiment raised in New York.  

France entered the conflict as an American ally shortly after the Battle of Saratoga, which saw British General John Burgoyne surrender almost six thousand men to the victorious Americans. France’s entry significantly changed the nature of the war; Britain was stretched to the breaking point to defend her home islands against possible attack, to protect her rich West Indies islands and her colonial holdings in India and Canada, as well as her strategic positions on Minorca and Gibraltar. Britain re-evaluated her strategy to reclaim the American colonies and looked to the southern colonies, especially South Carolina and Georgia, seeking to regain a foothold. The British were enamoured of the idea that a substantial Loyalist population existed in the South and that galvanizing Loyalist support could provide them with men and matériel to overwhelm the southern rebels. The British Loyalist strategy and their Southern Campaign became the central focus of Britain’s plan to win the war. The initial results of the British campaign in the South were spectacular. Charleston—the largest and wealthiest city in the South—fell to the British in early May 1780 after a land and sea siege, which devastated Major General Benjamin Lincoln’s Continental Army and militia forces. Virtually Lincoln’s entire command was trapped in the city and, in surrendering, gave up thousands of men and enormous amounts of weapons and supplies.  

In the clean-up efforts after that overwhelming victory, British commander General Charles Lord Cornwallis sent Tarleton to capture a small American rebel
force that had been en-route to aid Lincoln’s besieged Charleston troops. Tarleton and his men caught up with Colonel Abraham Buford and his Virginia Continentals at the Waxhaws on 29 May 1780, after a furious race to cut them off from their intended retreat to North Carolina. In the pursuit, Tarleton pushed his men ferociously, covering over one hundred miles in less than fifty-five hours. During the fierce fight that followed, Tarleton’s horse was shot out from under him—just as the Americans tried to surrender. Thinking that their commander had been cut down, his men went berserk and bayoneted the Continental soldiers mercilessly, despite their pleas for quarter. As a result of that battle, Tarleton became one of the most infamous and vilified British officers of the American Revolutionary War. His gruesome victory fed the rebel propaganda machine and soon propagated a new rallying cry for the rebels—“Tarleton’s quarter,” which came to mean no quarter for the British and Loyalist troops.8

The incident illustrates that while Tarleton was effective at leading men into battle, as a relatively young and inexperienced commander he sometimes lost control over his men as battle disintegrated into butchery. Tarleton’s commander, Cornwallis, was cognizant of the damage caused by the behavior of Tarleton’s men to Britain’s ability to win the “hearts and minds” of the southern colonists and frequently cautioned Tarleton to exert greater control. Cornwallis sternly warned Tarleton, “I must recommend it to you in the strongest manner to use your utmost endeavors to prevent the troops under your command from committing irregularities.”9 However, Cornwallis thought highly of Tarleton, describing him as “indefatigably laborious and active, cool and intrepid in action, discerns as by intuition, seizes rapidly, and improves with skill the short, but favorable and decisive moments of victory.”10 Tarleton had leadership talent indeed, but his overall effectiveness was hampered by personality qualities which may or may not have been honed and brought under control through additional age and experience.

It was the newest commander of the Southern Continental Army who set the events in motion that quickly led to the Battle of Cowpens. The fourth commander of the Southern Army, Major General Nathanael Greene, assumed control of a much-reduced and demoralized army on 2 December 1780 at Charlotte, North Carolina, replacing General Horatio Gates—a commander whose folly led to the Patriot loss at the Battle of Camden on 16 August 1780. Like
Lincoln’s loss at Charleston, Gates’s debacle at Camden cost the rebel cause in the South dearly; it left as many as eight hundred of the Continentals and rebel militia dead and another thousand taken prisoner.\textsuperscript{11}

One of Greene’s first decisions was a surprise move—on 16 December 1780, he split his meager force, sending Morgan out with some of the best troops in the Southern Army and ordering Morgan to “proceed to the West side of the Catawba river, where you will be joined by a body of Volunteer Militia.” Greene commanded Morgan to “employ [his force] against the enemy on the West side of the River, either offensively or defensively as your own prudence and discretion may direct, acting with caution, and avoiding surprizes [sic] by every possible precaution.” Greene stipulated that Morgan and his men were to “give protection to that part of the country and spirit up the people—to annoy the enemy in that quarter—collect the provisions and forage out of the way of the enemy.”\textsuperscript{12} Greene’s move forced Cornwallis to respond in kind; he did so by dispatching Tarleton “with his corps of cavalry and infantry, of five hundred and fifty men, the first battalion of the 71st [Highlanders] consisting of two hundred, and two three-pounders [small artillery] to counteract the designs of General Morgan, by protecting the country, and compelling him to repass [the] Broad river.” Cornwallis directed Tarleton to chase Morgan down, and finding him, to push in to “the utmost.”\textsuperscript{13}

True to form, Tarleton set off after Morgan—pushing his men swiftly toward his target. Tarleton wakened his troops in the pre-dawn hours, reportedly at 2:00 a.m. daily, and again took up the pursuit. Morgan and his men were aware of Tarleton’s chase; one of Morgan’s men described Tarleton’s advance as an approaching thunderstorm. The speed of Tarleton’s advance limited Morgan’s options. He had to find a suitable place to take a stand.\textsuperscript{14}

Morgan and his adversary, Tarleton, shared some of the same qualities; however, several of the characteristics that clearly set Morgan apart as a resourceful leader were not evidenced by Tarleton. Both Morgan and Tarleton knew the value of acquiring significant intelligence about his adversary; Tarleton “hourly received accounts of the increase of Morgan’s corps,”\textsuperscript{15} as local militia answered Morgan’s call to join his men. In his report to his superior, Greene, Morgan stated “I received regular Intelligence of the Enemy’s Movements from the Time they were first in Motion.”\textsuperscript{16} Both men knew the importance of choosing the type of terrain most likely to provide tactical advantage. In Morgan’s
assessment, his “situation at the Cowpens enabled me to improve any Advantages I might gain, and to provide better for my own Security, should I be unfortunate.” Tarleton reported that his guides were consulted about the ground Morgan had chosen and what lay to his rear and that they “described both with great perspicuity.” Each leader put forth significant efforts to gain the knowledge necessary to prepare for battle. A key difference between the two leaders was the way that each prepared the men that they were to lead into battle. Morgan and his infantry commander, Lieutenant Colonel John Eager Howard, one of the most acclaimed officers in the Continental Army, together with the militia officers on hand, personally rode the Cowpens field to become as familiar as possible with the terrain. Morgan then designed a battle plan that took advantage of the slight elevation changes and that set up three battle lines; the first to be made up of riflemen, a breed of men that Morgan knew well. These sharpshooters were instructed to aim for “the men with the epaulets,” as Morgan knew that bringing down his opponent’s officers would cause confusion in the ranks.

Morgan’s second battle line would be composed of militia. While Morgan understood that militiamen were frequently unreliable in battle, he also knew how to set the men up for success. Throughout the night of 16 January, militiamen responded to Morgan’s call and came into his camp. Morgan spent the night moving from campfire to campfire to welcome the militia and to tell the nervous men what he expected of them. Morgan joked and quipped with the men, calming and inspiring them. Historian John Buchanan related that Morgan even raised his shirt to show the scars he had received from his scouring at the hands of the British years before. He gave them specific instructions to get off two rounds of fire, then to withdraw. Morgan was well aware that Tarleton and his men would perceive the withdrawal as a sign that they had routed the militia and would charge in to destroy them, as this was Tarleton’s standard battle tactic—one from which he seldom strayed. However, rather than running down panicked militia, Morgan intended that Tarleton would race into a trap, for Morgan’s third battle line was composed of his best men—Maryland and Delaware Continentals, led by the formidable Howard. Morgan held in reserve his ultimate surprise, Continental dragoons commanded by Colonel William Washington together with mounted militiamen, who were concealed from Tarleton’s initial view by a slight dip in terrain elevation.

While Morgan had thought out his battle plan well, its success depended
upon the courage of his men to execute it. Morgan did his utmost to prepare his troops mentally and physically for the battle ahead. He ensured that his men were well fed and rested; he personally saw to it that every man understood the role that he was to play in the coming fight and exactly what was expected of him. Morgan reassured his militia and strengthened their resolve; he appealed to the competitive nature of his sharpshooters by calling out “Let me see . . . which are the most entitled to the credit of brave men, the boys of Carolina or those of Georgia.”

Morgan inspired trust among the men; he did not ask more of his men than he himself was willing to provide. To instill both hope and courage in his men, he spent the night before battle moving about the camp to speak with the men. For the militiamen, especially, he set forth a vision of life beyond the battle ahead, promising that Washington’s cavalry would protect them and that if they fulfilled their task honorably, they would return to their homes and to the blessings of the old folks and the kisses of the girls “for your gallant conduct.”

Morgan’s men were as well prepared physically and psychologically as their commander could make them; only the morning would tell if it were enough to withstand Tarleton.

Tarleton’s advance followed his familiar pattern and he approached Morgan’s
camp in his typical style—pushing his men hard. Once again they roused at 2:00 a.m. and made a tiresome four hour march before arriving at Cowpens. Neither well-fed nor rested, Tarleton’s troops faced Morgan and his well-prepared men. Morgan’s measures had stripped Tarleton and his men of a key advantage: the element of surprise. In previous engagements, the furious pace that Tarleton set for he and his men often caught their prey off-guard; this was not the case at Cowpens. Yet Tarleton had the advantage of well-seasoned troops under his command. Tarleton’s lack of leadership finesse showed in his reliance on “one maneuver, the head-on, slam-bang assault.” Thrown off balance by Morgan’s preparations, Tarleton did not adjust. He threw his men into battle before they were organized and prepared. As his plans disintegrated around him, Tarleton called on his reserve—his own Legion dragoons, men he had personally led into numerous battles. Tarleton’s own men “forsook their leader, and left the field of battle.”

Morgan’s personal leadership, his planning and preparation sealed the victory. He was able to lead a combined group of Continentals and militia together successfully, in a manner that recognized both the strengths and weaknesses of the militia and set them up for success. Tarleton, though he had the better tactical weapon at his command in the person of the British regulars, failed to adjust to the circumstances on the battlefield and could not meet the challenges he faced from Morgan’s tactical genius. The leadership exercised by Daniel Morgan makes the Battle of Cowpens memorable and leads to its use even today by the United States Army as a case study for concepts of leadership on the battlefield.

Notes


8. Ibid., 70-71.


20. Ibid., 217.


26. Ibid., 219-220.

27. Pancake, *This Destructive War*, 133.


Bibliography


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During the winter of 1860-61, the ongoing American argument regarding slavery boiled over and seven Southern states seceded from the Union. During the preceding decades, Southerners began to argue for states’ rights in an effort to prevent the concentration of power in the hands of the national government out of fear that such a concentration of power would one day be a threat to the Southern socio-economic system. While endorsing the concept of states’ rights in theory, Southerners did not necessarily support them in action. During the 1841-42 Dorr Rebellion, Southerners spoke out against Thomas Dorr and his supporters, seemingly in opposition to their stated belief in states’ rights. This lack of support indicates that Southerners had little concern for the rights of states unless they were Southern states and were in agreement with them regarding slavery. They did not support the rebellion because many Southerners saw it as a threat to slavery and Southern life in general, and therefore, whatever states’ rights issues were involved became non-important. Opposition to Dorr was less about states’ rights and more about fears that its ideas could be translated to Southern society and lead to black majoritarian rule. Many historians describe the division between Dorr supporters and non-supporters as an example of party politics, with each party claiming that the rebellion supported their party’s platform. This paper argues that the split was less about party politics and more about
sectional differences. While many Democrats supported the rebellion, they were only from the northern branch of the party. Southern Democrats and Whigs opposed the rebellion. While rarely credited as such, the Dorr Rebellion proved to be another crack in the national party system, with the Democrats splitting along sectional lines.¹

The Dorr Rebellion, sometimes called the Dorr War, had its roots in the colonial era. Unlike other states, Rhode Island did not write a new state constitution after the colonies obtained independence from Great Britain. Rhode Island continued to operate under the colonial charter of 1663. While this charter was extremely democratic for its time, by the 1830s changes wrought by the Industrial Revolution and the republican spirit of the age had rendered it much less so. Under the charter, the right to vote, serve on juries, or sue in court was limited to native-born white men who owned $134 worth of real property, and their first-born sons. Historians differ on what percentage of white male Rhode Islanders met these qualifications, with estimates ranging from forty percent to over sixty percent. The charter’s qualifications for “freemanship” adversely affected town and city residents, while clearly benefitting land-owning farmers. In addition to barring many urban residents from voting, the apportionment of the state legislature, based on the population of freemen, was greatly skewed towards areas with smaller populations, but greater numbers of landowners. So while approximately sixteen percent of the state’s population lived in the city of Providence and paid over sixty percent of the state’s taxes, they were represented by only five percent of the state legislators.²

The charter remained unchanged in part because it failed to provide a procedure by which it could be amended. As it was a royal charter, it can be assumed that originally any changes that were needed could have been provided by royal decree. The advent of the American Revolution eliminated that method of change. Additionally, both the Whigs (1840) and the Democrats (1836) had won recent elections and most party members saw no reason for changing the system. Those that did favor reform differed on what should be done. Democrats wanted to expand suffrage to include immigrants but not freed blacks, while Whigs wanted to allow free blacks to vote, but not immigrants. Thus, the original colonial charter remained in force and unchanged.³

With both parties supporting the continued use of the original charter, Thomas Dorr, a Whig state assemblyman, began working outside the two-party
system, helping to found the Rhode Island Suffrage Association in 1840. Dorr and his followers called for a new constitution that granted universal male suffrage. While the Suffragists challenged the two parties in state elections, they never received more than ten percent of the votes.\textsuperscript{4}

In 1841, with no indication that the ruling parties were interested in reform and further supported by poor economic conditions, the Suffrage Association called an extralegal constitutional convention, the “People’s Convention,” which drafted a “People’s Constitution” for the state, granting voting rights to all white men. In December 1841, the People’s Convention authorized a statewide referendum, in which all white men in the state could vote. The referendum, although not officially sanctioned, ratified the new constitution. Although a majority of the voters favored the new constitution, including a majority of those who were legally entitled to vote under the current charter, the referendum had no legal standing since it was held outside of normal channels. Regardless, the Suffragists claimed that since the popular majority favored the new constitution, it was now the official governing document of the state. Dorr and other members of the People’s government expected that once the people ratified the constitution and new officials were elected to office, they would have the support of the national government due to the republican government clause of the Constitution. The state legislature immediately condemned the constitution, calling it illegal. Opponents of the new constitution alleged massive voter fraud during the referendum.\textsuperscript{5}

During April 1842, the new “government” held elections for state officials to replace those currently in office under the Charter. The existing state government promptly declared the election illegal. The reformist voters elected Thomas Dorr as governor and Dorr declared that his election was valid and he would take office in May. Democratic politicians from across the country, including former presidents Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren, supported Dorr. Democratic newspapers warned the charter government that if they tried to suppress Dorr’s government with force, they would fight back.\textsuperscript{6}

Speaking out in support of the actions taken by Dorr and others, Van Buren quoted from the Virginia Declaration of Rights, noting that the people had the right “to reform, alter, or abolish” governments which did not support the rights of the people. He further wrote that any attempt by the national government to interfere in the affairs of Rhode Island would be “a flagrant violation of states’ rights and popular sovereignty.”\textsuperscript{7} Jackson wrote, “The people are the sovereign
power and agreeable [sic] to our system they have the right to alter and amend their
system of Government when a majority wills it, as a majority have a right to rule.”

As a precaution, the legitimate governor, Samuel King, began fortifying
state buildings and purchasing additional arms to secure the state if the People’s
government attempted a takeover. King instructed the militia to be ready to deploy
within thirty minutes. He then learned that many militia units, especially in the area
of Providence, were going to go over to the new government. King requested
assistance from President John Tyler, citing Article IV, section 4 of the U.S.
Constitution.

Tyler was not in favor of the intervention of the national government in
state affairs. He had criticized Andrew Jackson for his undue haste in calling for a
military solution to the Nullification Crisis. He wanted the use of force to be the last
resort. He advised King that he did not have the authority to use military force in
anticipation of domestic violence within a state, there had to be actual insurrection
before the national government could act.

On May 3, 1842, Dorr was inaugurated as governor and a “People’s
Legislature” was seated. The legislature met for two days and then adjourned
without making any plans to confront the legitimate government. The day following
Dorr’s inauguration, Samuel King declared that the state was in the midst of an
insurgency and citing concerns about the reliability of the militia, made a formal
appeal to President John Tyler “to interpose the authority and power of the United
States to suppress such insurrectionary and lawless assemblages, to support the
existing government and laws, and protect the State from domestic violence.”

Tyler refused to supply immediate aid to King, suggesting that King
announce an amnesty for the People’s government and call for a new constitutional
convention. If that failed, the use of force would be justified, and he would intervene
to maintain constitutional authority in the event that actual insurrection materialized,
regardless of “the real or supposed defects of the existing government.” Tyler, while
a Whig, was in the midst of a dispute with the party and was looking for support
amongst Democrats. Since the Democratic Party was supporting Dorr, Tyler was
unwilling to come out strongly against him. However, Tyler did not want to appear
indifferent to a state requesting assistance against insurrection. Additionally, Tyler’s
own state of Virginia had a state constitution that included property qualifications
for voting and a malapportioned state legislature.

After his inauguration, Dorr traveled to Washington to meet with Tyler and
request assistance. By the time Dorr arrived, Tyler had already met with representatives of Governor King on two occasions. During the meeting at the White House, Tyler told him his actions were “treasonable against the state and if they committed any overt acts and resisted the force of the U.S. they would then commit treason against the U.S. and as sure as they did so they should be hanged for treason!” Publicly, however, Tyler’s statements were less inflammatory. To accede to King’s request and refuse Dorr’s would be to deny the legality of the popular movement in Rhode Island. Doing so would open him to charges of opposing democratic governance. However, to refuse to assist the sitting government would be to stand by in the face of lawlessness and rebellion.

During his return trip to Rhode Island, Dorr stopped in New York where local Democrats had a large rally in his honor. He was promised that as many as 5,000 armed men from New York street gangs would go to Rhode Island to support him if needed. The rally and the promise of armed support solidified his resolve at the same time many of his followers were losing their nerve.

As Dorr returned to Rhode Island, he began planning to raid the state arsenal and seize the weapons stored there. In anticipation of the raid, Dorr sent supporters to the Providence Marine Corps of Artillery armory on May 17. They “seized” two cannons from the United Train Artillery Company militia unit stationed there; since most of the men in the militia were Dorr supporters the seizure was in name only. The two guns had allegedly been captured from General John Burgoyne’s forces after the Battle of Saratoga. Dorr planned to march to the arsenal with a large force and convince the defenders to surrender in the face of overwhelming odds. At about midnight on the morning of May 18 as he readied his supporters for the attack, Dorr had approximately 400 men; when they began the march to the arsenal two hours later, about half of the men had faded off into the night. Once Dorr and his men, along with the two guns, arrived at the arsenal, its commander refused to surrender. Dorr’s two guns flashed but failed to fire and his men, apparently having second thoughts about attacking a fortified building with several cannons inside, drifted away. Soon after, Rhode Island authorities arrested Dorr and tried and convicted him of treason against the state of Rhode Island, and sentenced him to life in prison.

Dorr served one year of his prison sentence before the state legislature ordered his release. In 1854, his conviction was annulled. Although his rebellion had failed to incite revolution, his cause ultimately led to the expansion of suffrage and
increased political power for non-land owners. The legitimate state authorities called a constitutional convention of their own, in which they drew up the “Law and Order Constitution.” A referendum in November ratified this constitution by a wide margin, although many of Dorr’s supporters boycotted the vote. The new constitution gave voting rights to all native-born men who paid any taxes and to immigrants who met the property requirements originally laid out in the charter. It also reapportioned the state legislature to provide for equal representation, although the state senate remained unchanged. Both constitutions were similar; however, unlike the “People’s” constitution, the “Law and Order” constitution did not include race as a factor in determining voting rights.17

Some members of the Southern ruling class expressed strong support for the idea of states’ rights as early as the 1790s, at the time of the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions. Support continued to grow during the 1820s, temporarily culminating in the Nullification Crisis of 1832. In the following years, belief in the primacy of states’ rights continued to grow across the South, ultimately finding its way into the secession documents of many Southern states, as well as Confederate President Jefferson Davis’s inaugural address, and the Confederate Constitution.18

There has been some debate regarding Antebellum Southerners’ devotion to states’ rights and whether the states’ rights argument was nothing more than a front to prevent interference in slavery by the national government. Perhaps this explains the lack of Southern support for Thomas Dorr’s rebellion; Southerners purported to support states’ rights, but they did not, by and large, support Dorr. Perhaps rather than evidencing a lack of true belief, the failure to back Dorr was an indicator that Southerners only supported states’ rights when the states involved were Southern, or at least pro-slavery.19

One might assume that Southerners, those great supporters of states’ rights, would support the efforts by the Dorrites to expand voting rights in Rhode Island, without interference from the national government. However, this was not the case. Southerners, almost as a body, either spoke out against Dorr or remained silent. There were several reasons for this. White Southerners were wary of democratic revolution in general because of revolutions that had resulted in the emancipation of French West Indian slaves. Events at home increased their fears, including the emergence of the Free Soil Party in 1848 and radical democratic movements like the Dorr Rebellion.20

While John Calhoun, the South’s leading Democratic spokesman,
supported the enlargement of the franchise, at least amongst whites, he spoke for most of his fellow Southerners when he spoke out regarding the extralegal manner in which the franchise was being expanded in Rhode Island. He declared that it would be a “death-blow of constitutional democracy to admit the right of the numerical majority to alter or abolish constitutions at pleasure” by resorting to extra constitutional means.21

Southerners were concerned that the expansion of the majoritarian right to dictate to the minority would eventually interfere with the rule of their own states and more importantly, the existence of slavery. Southern opposition to the premise of Dorr’s rebellion was in keeping with their fear of majoritarian domination and their wish to protect the rights of the minority under a popular government.22 As John Calhoun wrote, the “doctrine that a majority has a right at all times, according to its will and pleasure, to subvert the Government of a State, and to alter or change its constitution without observing the forms prescribed for its amendment, is revolutionary in its character, and inconsistent with all ideas of Constitutional government.”23 One Southerner described the “People’s Constitution” as an illustration of the “very madness of democracy and was a fine example” of the dangers of the “majority principle.”24

Southern concern over majority rule was closely connected to their concern regarding attacks on slavery and the possibility of abolition. Southerners wanted to repudiate the majoritarian right of revolution and provide support for incumbent state governments. They did not support Dorr because the principles of his rebellion “might be construed to take in southern blacks and to aid the abolitionists.”25

Some Southerners may have believed in Dorr’s cause, but would not publicly speak out for fear of also endorsing general principles of majority rights that they did not support because they feared that they could later be interpreted to include blacks in their own states. Dorr understood the way Southerners felt and realized that was the cause of his lack of support in the Senate, writing, “Some of the Southern members . . . are with the People of Rhode Island, but not with all People in asserting a principle, which might be construed to take in the southern blacks and to aid the abolitionists.”26

In a speech given in North Carolina, Henry Clay expressed the feelings of many Southerners, stating “You can readily comprehend and feel what would be the effects and consequences of Dorrism here in the South, if Dorrism were
predominant, any unprincipled adventurer” could merely “collect around him a mosaic majority black and white, aliens and citizens . . . male and female” and “overturn existing governments and set up new ones at his pleasure or caprice.”

Many Southerners believed that if the Dorr Rebellion was allowed to succeed, “then there must be a dissolution of the Union, that the slaves can alter their laws and govern themselves for they are the majority.” Dorr, they believed, opened the door for “any majority without regard to color and condition” to “overturn the existing Government.”

Even Northerners who did not support slavery saw the flaw in Dorr’s ideas. Former Indiana state representative and future congressman Caleb Blood Smith wrote of Dorr’s philosophy, if “the people of one portion of the country can overturn their government, and adopt a new one, where did the gentleman find the authority to exclude from political rights the negroes of South Carolina and Virginia?”

Southern concern regarding Dorr did not end with the idea that his philosophy could be used by some future government to interfere with slavery. There was also a serious concern that the entire suffrage movement was an abolitionist plot. Opponents of Dorr promulgated the idea that the suffrage cause was in fact an abolition movement and that Dorr was one of the leaders of the abolition party. This idea gained credence by the fact that during the 1830s Dorr had been “a most staunch and thorough going abolitionist.” Further supporting the idea of an abolitionist plot, the “People’s” Constitution contained a clause that guaranteed a jury trial for fugitive slaves. Opponents of Dorr’s movement said this clause alone would “dissolve the union.”

That anyone would consider Dorr’s rebellion an abolitionist movement is somewhat ironic since abolitionists were “the most ardently opposed” to the People’s Constitution. The People’s Constitution would not allow blacks to vote and many Rhode Island blacks, angry at being excluded, joined the militia units of the Law and Order coalition, which promised that a new constitutional convention would give them the right to vote. Southerners were also distrustful of Dorr because his attempt to take the arsenal on May 18 was too similar to Denmark Vesey’s abortive 1822 attack on the arsenal at Charleston, South Carolina, and to many Southerners the idea of rebellion reminded them less of 1776 and more of Nat Turner’s 1831 revolt in Virginia.

Dorr and his followers believed that the American Revolution had legitimized extralegal action, citing the sentence in the Declaration of Independence that read, whenever any “form of government becomes destructive of the ends for
which it was established, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it, and to institute a new government." Opponents drew a different conclusion that the Revolution had been about the ends and not the means. The important conclusion to draw from the Revolution was the establishment of free republican governments, not the resistance and revolution that enabled them. Once the Revolution was over, independence from Great Britain had been gained, and constitutional governments had been established, riots, mobs, and other forms of extralegal action would no longer be tolerated. Although Southerners failed to support Dorr, they later justified their secession from the United States in part, using the same language from the Declaration.36

Some Southerners argued that Dorr’s Rebellion was not a question of states’ rights at all. President Tyler had to walk a tightrope concerning his response to the activities in Rhode Island. As a states’ rights man from Virginia, he believed that allowing the revolt of the majority, even on a local level, would have been an unwelcome precedent that could later endanger the South’s slave system. Tyler believed that the national government had to support and uphold legitimate state governments “to prevent Negroes [from] revolutionizing the South.” Tyler, although committed to states’ rights, had earlier rejected the theory of nullification, arguing that if a state believed an act of Congress was unconstitutional, it had to try to have the act overturned by utilizing all legitimate options, and if that failed, they had either to accept the unconstitutional law or to secede from the Union.38

Many white Southerners feared that allowing the federal government to determine which government in Rhode Island was the legitimate one would set a dangerous precedent. Future presidents might utilize this power to disturb the South’s slavery system.39 John Calhoun wrote that if the federal government possessed “the right to establish its own abstract standard of what constitutes a republican form of government . . . it would be made absolute master of the States.”40

At first, it might seem surprising that Southerners, those well-known supporters of states’ rights, as evidenced by their arguments in favor of nullification, and later secession, failed to support Dorr’s rebellion. However, their fears regarding attacks on slavery and perhaps more importantly, their alarm over a black majority seizing power, overrode any states’ rights support.

While modern readers might find the idea that slaves would or could hold a constitutional convention, empower themselves, and seize the reins of state
governments far-fetched, Antebellum Southerners had a tendency to see slave plots with alarming regularity. That on occasion, some plots actually manifested themselves gave some truth to their fears. Opposition to Dorr was less about states’ rights and more about fears that its ideas could be translated to Southern society and lead to black majoritarian rule. Although Southern support for states’ rights was sometimes grudging when the states were not slave states, perhaps as Dorr had written, there was some Southern support for his rebellion; however, fear prevented any expression of such support.

Notes


3. Howe, 600.

4. Howe, 600; Adams, 48.


6. Howe, 601.


8. Andrew Jackson to Francis P. Blair, 23 May, 1842, in Gettleman, 66.


17. Howe, 602.


29. William A. Graham to Paul C. Cameron, May 20, 1842, in Grimsted, 337.


31. Ibid, 666 & 675.

32. Ibid, 670.

33. Ibid, 675.
34. Zinn, 215; Chaput, “Proslavery and Antislavery Politics,” 683.

35. Gettleman, 10


38. Forrest McDonald, States’ Rights and the Union: Imperium in Imperio, 1776-1876 (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 2000), 124.


Bibliography


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Society of Civil War Historians and the Society for Military History. When not doing history, Mike is a government employee. He lives in Northern Virginia with his wife, three daughters, two cats, and one dog.
Ring of Steel’s sheer size, weight, and heft at 832 pages is remarkable in and of itself. Watson's writing and analysis is even more remarkable, however. In this centennial year of the First World War, there is a torrent of new books on the subject. Most books focus on the Western Front and generally seem to narrow their emphasis to the opening moves of the war. Watson instead wades into a subject that is far harder for the typical reader to understand as the average baseline of understanding World War One in the East, the Italian Front, and the Balkans is remote. In fact, what the astute reader will conclude is that the First World War that Watson covers is unlike the First World War we know and that this was really the harbinger of much of what has come to pass in the last one hundred years. This focus on the Central Powers is indeed a most welcome book.

Watson deftly notes for the reader that World War One Imperial Germany and Austria-Hungary unleashed a whirlwind. Watson explores a number of subjects in-depth without drowning in minutiae, such as ethnic cleansing, the ethnic tensions within both Empires and how their alliance with the Ottoman Empire destabilized the Middle East, perhaps leading to Al-Qaeda and ISIS. What Watson, though, seems to conclude early on was despite the fact that this was in many ways an avoidable war, unlike the American Civil War, the internal contradictions facing the Austro-Hungarian Empire were too vast to be easily solved. For a number of years leading up to World War One, the growing ethnic discontent in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, furthered by the regicide in Serbia, Serbian expansion, and the two Balkan Wars that removed the Ottoman buffer allowed for new nationalistic aspirations to arise—none of which benefitted the Empire. Further, Austro-Hungary's leading military figure, General Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, Chief of the General Staff, wanted war not just to teach Serbia a lesson but to solve the internal divisions of the Empire by having the discontented
rally to the flag. No. He was in love with a married woman and hoped that a war would allow him to become a hero, thus allowing her to divorce and then marry him—millions died for one man's fantasy.

Watson's focus on several aspects is quite notable. His in-depth examination of the war as a prelude to World War Two's ethnic cleansing, and post-war population deportations is striking. The reader will learn that over 13,000 East Prussians were scooped up and simply removed from their homes by the Czarist Army, deported to the Volga region—and subsequently forgotten. Hundreds of thousands of ethnic Germans living in the western regions of Czarist Russia were deported—all shades of the future under Stalin. Czarist officials upon "conquering" Galicia, set out to systematically alter the fundamental ethnic composition of Galicia as they again deported Germans as well as Jews to turn it into a Slavic province.

Watson notes that German and Austro-Hungarian policy was not that of the Generalplan Ost with the policy of deliberately starving millions to death, but we do see the antecedents of it here. The Austro-Hungarians and Russians were the worst in terms of savagery, whereas the Germans were generally restrained. He does note that the French removed almost 10,000 men of military age from Alsace-Lorraine during their brief recapture of it in August 1914. Watson gives us a panoramic view of the horror of hundreds of thousands of homeless refugees, again foreshadowing World War Two. In Vienna, swelled by Jewish refugees from Galicia, signs appeared warning them to return to occupy Galicia or face horrible consequences.

The second aspect that Watson speaks to astutely in a ballet of concise prose is the German decision to invoke “Total War” by the U-boat campaign. In part, the U-boat campaign was a byproduct of several failed military and political strategies. The British blockade meant Germany and Austro-Hungary were slowly starving. The German High Command did not want to risk the Imperial High Seas Fleet as intact; it was a future political bargaining chip, despite its lack of military value in terms of decision. Watson speaks to this as the beginning of the end for Germany's options, after the failure of the 1916 Hindenburg Armaments Program. Two areas Watson perhaps could have addressed better were the scope and failure of the Hindenburg rearmament program. He also talks of Brest-Litovsk in some depth but oddly does not examine how Lenin and the Bolsheviks were willing to make a deal with the Germans to attack the Allied expeditionary forces.
In a sense, *Ring of Steel* is a fascinating fusion of military, national psychological and social history. Watson looks at how Germany, France, and Britain's advantage was a more heterogeneous society, which allowed them to endure the strains of the war better. However, the Hapsburg Empire with its polyglot of races and ethnic groups was a different matter. Watson notes how each group interpreted the war within its own prism, leading to competing demands and problems as the war lengthened. The look at the failed efforts by the subjects of the Central Powers for political reform and the extension of the franchise is implied by Watson as one of the reasons for the eventual collapse of national will. The various populations that comprised the Hapsburg Empire wanted simply more autonomy—instead they were met with repression and the imposition of military courts.

Watson's *Ring of Steel* enters esteemed company with Niall Ferguson's *The Pity of War* and Holger Herwig's *The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914-1918* as a must read. Watson moves beyond the orthodox accounts and breaks new ground. In all, a gripping account that will surprise the reader with what he did not know.

LTC Robert G. Smith graduated from Juniata College with a BS in Poli Sci cum laude. LTC Smith attended the Pennsylvania State University, receiving his MA (cum laude) in American Military History in 1982, and a Juris Doctorate in 1992 from West Virginia University. LTC Smith has served in the capacity of an armor officer, logistician, military intelligence and engineer officer. He is a graduate of the Armor Basic Course, the Armor Advanced Course, Command and General Staff College and Army Combined Arms Staff College and the Advanced Joint Professional Military Course in Joint Warfare. (He is currently suffering through Air War College). After 9/11 he was recalled to active duty, serving as the lead Army military historian at the US Army Center of Military History for the attack on the Pentagon. He has subsequently served as the Vth Corps historian for the initial invasion of Iraq and in the Deputy Directorate of Special Operation (DDSO) on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. While on the DDSO he wrote a highly classified study on SOF in the Global War on Terror. He was the CoS of the Army one man GWOT record collector, tasked to collect all the lost records. In 3 years he collected 7 1/2 TB of records. In addition he served as the Deputy Command Historian at CENTCOM. He was appointed as a Kentucky Colonel by the Governor of Kentucky in 2010. He currently is in the Army Wounded Warrior Program.
Among his awards are the Bronze Star, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Global War on Terrorism Medal and Combat Action Badge. He is a frequent contributor to Military Review, Armor Magazine, Fire and Movement, Paper Wars, Line of Departure, Line of Fire and Panzer Digest, where he is the simulation game review editor and editor of the daily FaceBook page. Among his hobbies are coaching baseball, gardening, Stratomatic baseball, golden retrievers and toy trains. He is married to the lovely Katie A. Smith and has two sons, one an Infantryman at Ft Bliss TX, currently deployed to Afghanistan and the other in the ARNG where he is the CSM’s driver. The Smiths have two Golden Retrievers (Grant and Sheridan), the Grand Dog Bandit (Aussie Shepard) and three cats.
The soldiers of the Soviet Union’s Red Army did their best to forget the horrors of World War Two. Indeed, the country’s leadership under Joseph Stalin tried to erase all negative aspects of the war, leaving only the celebrated victory over Nazi Germany for public knowledge. But the soldiers had an important tale to tell. In the book *Ivan’s War: Life and Death in the Red Army, 1939-1945*, historian Catherine Merridale digs beneath Stalinist propaganda to explore the personal side of the soldiers who fought. Her quest is to find the difference between the mythological heroic soldier generically called “Ivan” and the real soldier, the true character of those who suffered beyond imagination.

A highly respected, award-winning writer, Merridale is Professor of Contemporary History at Queen Mary University of London, focusing on the social, political and cultural history of modern Russia. The author employs documents from Soviet military and secret police archives that have opened only since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. In addition, she interviews surviving soldiers, as well as using diaries and letters. Merridale follows the soldiers’ compelling personal stories through their journey from being thrust unprepared and headlong into war, through devastating battles, losses, hopes, dreams, triumphs, to going home to utter disappointment. Further, she cleanly knits together the complex social history of the Soviet Union’s wartime soldiers into the context of communism’s effects on Soviet society and the reality of Stalinism’s brutality and hypocrisy.

Written in chronological order, *Ivan’s War* discusses each stage of the army’s evolution as its capabilities and attitudes changed from an ill-trained, ill-equipped and ill-led force with an initial dream of a swift, decisive win to a much more professionalized army with enough resolve and cohesiveness to defeat the Germans, driving them out of Russia and all the way back to Berlin. Merridale
achieves her greatest strength in addressing psychological themes related to the war’s phases, some of which emerged over time while others continued to plague the army throughout the war and beyond.

Drawing from letters written home to families, the author describes that at the time the Soviet Union entered the war in 1941, soldiers fought in a “collective national trance,” a belief that defending the motherland was a just cause (p. 99). However, this sense of righteousness was bombarded right from the beginning with relentless suffering, one theme that recurs throughout the book. Expected to fight brilliantly, the army could not fulfill this ideal due to numerous factors. Brief and inadequate training involved the use of facsimile wooden guns and cardboard tanks. Real weapons included antiquated rifles from the 1890s. Battle training was neglected in favor of spending hours each day listening to communist ideology. Food was neither enough nor nutritious, dangerously weakening soldiers on long marches across vast distances and making them susceptible to dysentery, typhus and other diseases. Horses were still the main power to pull lighter guns on a tachanka, the three-horse cart used in the civil war that followed the Bolshevik Revolution. Proper clothing, especially boots and winter coats, were in such short supply that men stripped any useful items from dead soldiers. Merridale tells of a man who checked corpses for boots, seeking out the most decomposed bodies so he could break off the legs—the boots were easier to remove from them.

Stalin’s politics, which affected every aspect of life in the Soviet Union, contributed heavily to the army’s problems. Besides ignoring the basic pragmatic needs of the army, he clamped an iron fist on crucial strategic maneuvers in order to maintain what he saw as socialist political correctness. In reality, he was jealously guarding against anything he thought could lead to outside influences, uprisings or anti-Soviet acts. His logic forbade the use of maps, considered secret and effectively blinding his army’s movements. Soldiers were not allowed to develop any kind of rapport or trust with each other. Spied on, they were transferred from one unit to another to prevent conspiracies that might arise—that is, if the men survived the fighting long enough to be transferred. Camouflage was considered a sign of cowardice. Soldiers were only supposed to attack, never defend, forcing them to rush into battle with no strategy.

As massive numbers of the dead piled high, the theme of despair emerges. Stalin’s propaganda machine spewed socialist ideology and kept
negative issues silent. Numbers of the dead were never released, meant to keep the human cost of the war from fomenting revolution. The *politruks*, the army’s political officers, reported how well things were going—negative reports would guarantee their imprisonment or execution, having been blamed for not inspiring good efforts. As the dream of swift victory faded and as finding any suitable reason for fighting grew impossible, the psychological effect prompted thousands of men to desert or to suffer self-inflicted wounds, hoping to be sent to a field hospital, if there had been any. The government absolutely ignored the deteriorating mental condition of the troops.

With discipline crumbling and vast Soviet territory lost to the Germans, Stalin issued Order 227 on July 28, 1942. Its slogan “Not a step back!” represented a turning point. Anyone who deserted or mutilated himself would be shot or sent to a *shraf* unit, a penal battalion that conducted only the most dangerous missions. Fear, the emergent theme for the Red Army that the author next describes, accompanied despair. But, Merridale explains, in spite of an awareness that the army was coming to its last stand, a slow gathering of “rage and hatred” towards the Germans, coupled with new “skills and competence,” began to surface (p. 159). This gradual shift in attitude characterized the beginning of the army’s professionalization. Commanders learned that trust between them and their soldiers helped morale and cohesiveness. Strategic maneuvers replaced old suicidal civil war tactics. Skills became more important than class or ethnicity. Meanwhile, Stalin had been enforcing a supreme effort to get tanks, guns and other equipment manufactured and delivered. Military aid came from the United States as well. Clothing and food improved, though they remained in short supply. Women were recruited, performing duties from conducting sniper missions to flying bomber runs.

A five-month long battle for the city of Stalingrad (known today as Volgograd) ended on February 2, 1943 in the first real decisive Soviet victory, reflecting the army’s newfound strategy and resolve. From this point on, the Soviets began to regain large areas that the Germans had taken deep into Soviet territory since 1941. While marching westward, the soldiers discovered the depth of the Germans’ horrendous scorched-earth destruction of European Russia and Ukraine, intensifying the “rage and hatred” Merridale previously noted. Again drawing from interviews, letters and diaries, she writes of pent-up hatred that exploded. By the time the army reached Eastern European countries such as East-Prussia and
Hungary on their march to capture Berlin, these men took out their hatred on anyone and anything. They stole and destroyed property at will. Of the atrocities, the horrendous number of rapes and killings were the worst. “The first rumors … came out of Hungary … Hungarian women and girls were locked into Soviet military headquarters … and repeatedly raped” (p. 305). Anyone suspected of being German or having colluded with the Nazis was a target. This behavior was encouraged by the Stalinist government, deemed justifiable revenge and reparation for the cost of the war. In her analysis, the author sees the rampage as more than simply an outpouring of rage. The men also drew on the miseries of their own lives prior to the war, the deprivations of the war itself, and grief for the deaths of fellow soldiers. Drunkenness, a longstanding problem in Russian and Soviet society, worsened as a way to “kill the mind, to escape from the war without leaving one’s post” (p. 271). An interviewee reported on a wine cellar, “The floor was knee-deep in wine, and floating in it lay three drowned soldiers. They had used their submachine guns to make holes in the barrels … having tasted [the wine, they] evidently could not stop drinking and became so intoxicated that they drowned in it” (p. 313).

The most compelling section of this book comes in the final chapters in which Merridale discusses the poignant fate of the soldiers following the end of the war. By this time some were addicted to war and could live no other way. Nor could they relate to their families—they had changed too much and could not talk of their experiences. Some, hoping to go home, were kept in Eastern Europe to maintain the Soviet-controlled sectors designated in the war’s settlement. Others were sent to the Far East theatre that was still in operation.

The soldiers who did make it home were hopeful of a utopian life that had been long promised by Soviet leaders. Letters and interviews portray a deep disappointment that in reality nothing had changed. Worst of all, Stalin took the main credit for the Soviet triumph. Staged victory parades rang hollow due to Stalin’s politicization of the war, calling the soldiers “the little screws and bolts in the great engine of his state” (p. 344).

Many of the truths of the Red Army’s life remain hidden. “The violence was on a scale that no one could have overlooked, and yet it disappeared from Soviet consciousness,” Merridale writes (p. 311). Her veterans also explain that they think they must still keep Soviet secrets, perhaps out of habit, perhaps from
fear. For the soldiers personally, they have indeed tried to forget, but most likely without success.

Although *Ivan’s War* specifically addresses the Red Army soldier’s plight, the insights, truths and realities about wartime suffering and psychological disorders are universal. Western readers will likely see a similarity between the Soviet Union’s “Ivan” and the US army’s “GI Joe,” the draftee or enlisted man who started off fighting for the mythic, glorified patriotism that turned into the mud-slogging, bullet-riddled hell of reality. It is a difficult and sad story, but one that is still relevant and needs to have all of its most deeply buried aspects revealed.

Kathleen Guler is the author of the award-winning Macsen’s Treasure series of four novels set in fifth century Britain, the fourth of which, *A Land Beyond Ravens*, won the 2010 Colorado Book Award for Historical Fiction. Drawing from her Welsh and Scottish heritage as well as a long background in history and literature to research her books, the author has also published numerous articles, essays, reviews and poems, is a member of the Historical Novel Society, holds a Master’s Degree in History (Honors) from American Military University, and participates in various writing and academic groups focused on history. She is currently working on a new novel that involves Celtic raiders and nomadic Scythians in the fourth century BC.
The Saber and Scroll is an Online University Historical Research Society affiliated with the American Public University School System. The purpose of this organization is the promotion of historical studies through the encouragement of academic research and the development of a rigorously edited online publication; the broadening of historical knowledge among the membership that includes social communications, topical discussions, historical lectures and the pursuit of other kindred activities in the interest of history; and service opportunities to the school and community. We strive to bring students, faculty, alumni, and historians-at-large together for intellectual and social exchanges, which promote and assist historical research and publication by our members.

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