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Letter from the Editor

Joseph J. Cook

Welcome to the Winter 2016 issue of the *Saber and Scroll Journal*, produced by the American Public University System. Our all-volunteer group of editors and proofreaders have pulled themselves away from the ongoing saga of election news long enough to put together a terrific volume of articles. The *Saber and Scroll* can continue to take pride in the scholarship produced by its membership. As Editor, the most encouraging thing for me continues to be the collection of new authors who contribute to the *Journal* each issue. I strongly encourage everybody to add their own names to our growing list of authors. With our four calls for papers per year, there are plenty of opportunities for you to show off, improve upon, and publish your work.

On the subject of calls for papers, readers of this issue will notice something new contained within its pages: an opinion piece. This opens an entirely new opportunity for paper submissions, and with the exciting variety of events ongoing in the world today, we welcome well-researched and well-reasoned opinion pieces that will contribute to an academic discussion within our membership's community of scholars.

This issue contains feature articles on a wide array of topics: from Jenkins' Ear to Stonewall Jackson, from the Papacy to an Israeli courtroom, and into the American frontier. Our authors offer exciting new perspectives on topics both well-known and obscure. I need to express my great thanks to all of the authors for their hard-work and patience with our volunteer editors. The *Saber and Scroll Journal* is in good hands with our current team of editors (to whom I owe tremendous thanks), and we can all look forward to many more issues of top-notch scholarship to come.

I hope that you all enjoy this issue. Beyond that, I hope that you all will play your own part in keeping this scholarly tradition going by contributing an article today. The *Saber and Scroll* thrives because of members like you.

Joseph J. Cook

Editor-In-Chief

Plague, Papacy and Power: The Effect of the Black Plague on the Avignon Papacy

Heather Para

Beginning in 1346, the plague killed an estimated one-third of the inhabitants of Europe. The Black Death arrived among the invading Mongols of the Golden Horde. It spread along the trade routes to the lower Volga and the Black Sea, and from there it moved quickly across the Mediterranean and into Europe by way of merchants, sailors, and travelers. Avignon, the seat of the papacy at the time, succumbed in 1348. The coming of the plague was part of a series of events that reduced the papacy from the height of its power to its lowest point in centuries. The plague came at a critical moment for the Church, and the papacy at Avignon did not adequately rise to the challenge. Inevitably, the poor response led to intense criticism, general distrust of the Church, heretical movements, and eventually, the Reformation. Perhaps the papacy was headed along that road already, but the Black Death certainly sped it on its way.

By the thirteenth century, the Roman Curia was a robust and efficient institution, and the papacy was at the height of its influence. Powerful popes such as Innocent III and IV operated much like kings of powerful nations. The Church maintained its power amid the growing strength of Europe's monarchies. People were Christians first, before they were French, English, or Saxon, and therefore, still answered to the Church's authority. While most kings compromised as necessary in their dealings with the papacy, those who did not "were likely to find that the spiritual power of the pope was accompanied by earthly power asserted with force of arms."¹

Much of the pope's power depended on his alliances with powerful secular leaders. The growing nation-states of the fourteenth century eventually overshadowed papal power, and many popes subsequently found themselves pawns in European politics. The papacy's legal and financial dealings garnered criticism across Europe, especially from churchmen who were taxed heavily by Rome. Although the cardinals were excellent administrators, they developed a reputation for being corrupt.²

War between France and England began in 1294, the first major conflict in Europe in eighty years. Soon, both sides realized they did not have the financial resources to support their military costs, and the French and English governments cast about for provisional income. In the past, the Church had given some of the

crusading taxes to royal governments. Both nations determined that this precedent permitted them to tax their clergy in order to pay for their wars. Pope Boniface VIII (r. 1294-1303), however, had not authorized the new taxes, and he perceived it as a violation of canon law. In reaction, Boniface published the papal bull *Clericos Laicos* in 1296, forbidding all taxation of clergy without the express approval of the pope. Ostensibly about clerical taxation, *Clericos Laicos* was more a naked assertion of papal authority over secular authority.³

Bishop Bernard Saisset of Pamiers, France, was accused of treasonous speech against the French king in 1301. The bishop left for Rome but was intercepted, arrested, and jailed while he awaited trial. When King Philip IV “the Fair” of France (r. 1285-1314) realized the violation of canon law at play, he released the bishop and allowed him to continue on to Rome in February, 1302. Pope Boniface, unaware of the bishop’s release, revived the taxation dispute by forbidding the French collection of taxes from the clergy and called a council of French bishops to discuss further action.⁴ Despite great threats and actions against him by both Edward I of England (r. 1272-1307) and Philip IV of France, Boniface shortly thereafter issued a second bull, the *Unam Sanctam*, in 1302, “the most absolute statement of papal supremacy ever made.”⁵ In it, Boniface reaffirmed the pope’s authority as the heir of Peter and declared that, as such, he held supreme spiritual power over all and was to be judged only by God.⁶ Before the pope’s influence caused Philip to lose his throne, the French government assembled a list of charges against Boniface and sent the king’s men to Anagni, Italy to seize the pope from his summer home, intending to bring him to France to face the collection of charges. Pope Boniface died in the process, of what was likely a stroke.⁷ An Italian from Treviso followed as pontiff, taking the name Benedict XI. Unfortunately, he died less than a year later, his primary legacy being the absolution of the French king and his subjects from papal censures incurred by Boniface.

After the extended conflict between Boniface and Philip, it seemed that selecting a Frenchman for the next pope might alleviate tension.⁸ With some influence from Philip, a Frenchman became Pope Clement V (r. 1305-1314). The new pope did not go to Rome to manage his See, for he was fearful of Italian retaliation for the French treatment of Boniface. The Italians, however, claimed the real reason for Clement’s hesitance was that he had a French mistress, the Countess of Périgord, daughter of the Count of Foix. Additionally, the new emperor of Luxembourg, Henry VII, was “pursuing ambitions in Italy opposed to those of the papacy,” which Clement felt were prudent to avoid.⁹ Whether motivated by love or by a practical need to avoid his enemies, Clement arrived at

Avignon in Provence, near the mouth of the Rhône River in 1309. Avignon had been acquired in 1274 by the papacy as part of an expansionist policy.¹⁰ Provence, a fief of the Kingdom of Naples and Sicily, was technically not in France, but it sat within the French area of influence. The pope's decision to live outside of Rome with all of its political intrigue was not in itself unusual, but "the subservience of Clement V to the French king was a radical change in policy."¹¹ Avignon became more than Clement's temporary residence; it became the permanent home of the papacy for the next seventy years.

Things did not necessarily improve under Clement V. The pope pardoned the French in an effort to deter them from exhuming Boniface's body and putting him on trial posthumously. However, Clement was the former archbishop of Bordeaux, and the kings and princes of other European nations watched the interaction between him and the French king with some concern.¹² As a Frenchman and appointee of the French king, Clement was already suspect in his allegiance to France. Stronger evidence yet presented itself before long in the form of papal involvement in the suppression of the Knights Templar.

The Order of the Templars began in the twelfth century as a service organization to provide support to crusaders. They went on to focus on banking services for crusaders and, eventually, the papacy as well. The Templars were international financiers by the thirteenth century, often carrying large sums of money to the papacy from the clergy, primarily the taxes imposed by Rome in 1198. Their banking headquarters was in Paris, and as King Philip was in a financial bind from his war with England, he thought to alleviate some of his burden by appropriating the bank's reserves.¹³ Accusing the Knights of devil worship and witchcraft, Philip seized their property and intimidated Clement V into authorizing trials against them.¹⁴ Brought before a papal inquisition and subjected to torture and interrogation, the Templars confessed to demon worship, ceremonial cannibalism, and unnatural sex acts. Members later tried to retract their confessions, but the damage was already done. The Order was dissolved in 1314, its leaders publicly burned to death as heretics.¹⁵

Clement V survived only nine years as pope, for he went to Avignon already sick with what appears to have been a type of stomach cancer. His papacy was characterized by his fear of Philip, who, having already destroyed one pope, likely would not have hesitated to ruin another. Historian David Chidester observed, "The nine years of his papacy offers a sad demonstration that even being the delegate of the Almighty may be insufficient to shore up an essentially weak man in the face of ruthless earthly power."¹⁶ Clement died less than a month after the last Templar was burned, and Philip the Fair followed him in death seven

months later, at 46, a result of complications from a fall off his horse.¹⁷

While the papacy was far removed and secure from the intrigues and power struggles absorbing Italy, King Philip had his puppet pope close at hand in Avignon, which allowed for the destruction of the Templar Order. This set a precedent, and the Avignon papacy found itself ever more involved in the secular affairs of northern Europe, especially the animosity between France and England, which later developed into the Hundred Years War. Materialism increased as the papacy became more deeply involved in politics, in part due to Clement. He was clearly involved in simony as well as nepotism, and he initiated a tax in which the first year of revenue from the benefices sold went directly to the pope. As a result, the papal treasury increased substantially.¹⁸

Bloodshed, riots, and looting ensued when the beneficiaries of Clement's nepotism—a number of French cardinals who were also his relatives—hired mercenaries to attack the Italian members of the Papal Curia. In the French city of Carpentras, for example, one of the late pope's nephews ran off with a sizeable chunk of the papal treasury. The next French king, Louis X (r. 1314-1316), intervened, but he died before any resolution was found. His successor, Philip V (r. 1316-1322), blockaded the cardinals inside a convent until another pope was elected. Pope John XXII (r. 1316-1334) was also a Frenchman and an expert in canon and civil law. In his seventies at his election, John survived eighteen years, long enough to shape the Avignon papacy.¹⁹ Considered to be the “Midas pope,” John dressed in gold cloth and slept on ermine fur, continuing to prosper even more through simony, the sale of indulgences, and the collection of taxes.²⁰

Avignon became increasingly sumptuous, resembling cities of the wealthiest kingdoms rather than the temporary quarters of the papacy. Pope John moved into the bishop's palace, and during his time in office, the town of Avignon grew five times its size from what it was upon the arrival of Clement V in 1309.²¹ Luxurious living and displays of wealth among the court and the cardinals escalated, beginning with John and continuing with his successors Benedict XII (r. 1334-1342) and Clement VI (r. 1342-1352). The papal palace at Avignon was built during the terms of those same two successors. Begun with the Cistercian austerity favored by Benedict, it was completed in typical largesse under Clement VI. A great appreciator of luxury and wealth, Clement elevated papal materialism to its highest point. Ornate and lavish, the palace included banquet halls and gardens, a steam room for the pope, towers and courtyards, and chapels with frescoes and rose windows.²² Overall, the papal palace at Avignon “had the air of a hedonistic secular court rather than the celibate capital of Christendom,” reflecting the questionable nature of Clement's own morals.²³ This decadence created a

considerable backlash from critics who felt that the Church was straying from its purpose, and that the vice and sin rampant amongst the clergy, embodied most evidently in the pope himself, could lead to no good end. The papacy's spiritual capital suffered as it drew in more wealth.

Within this context, the Black Death began its sweep across Europe in 1348. The plague decimated the population and left the tattered remnants of civilization in its wake, shaken and bewildered. Medieval minds were unaware of the complexities of medicine, and they attributed their woes to divine retribution for sinful living. In looking for an explanation for their unbelievable ordeal, many pointed to the immoderation of the Avignon papacy. The excesses of the papacy, the absence of spiritual leadership, the opulent lifestyles of the papal court, the sinful behavior of bishops and popes, and the simony and sale of indulgences, all added up to what appeared to be the reason for the suffering and losses from the plague.

The plague arrived in Avignon in January 1348. The arrival of the papacy to Avignon some forty years earlier had brought rapid population growth and the associated ills of overcrowding and unsanitary conditions. The plague struck hard and fast, killing 2,000 people in the first few days alone. No one was immune; ordinary residents and members of the papal court died faster than they could be buried. "At a stroke," wrote British author Edwin Mullins, "the glamour and glitter of the capital of Latin Christendom had been swept away, and suddenly Avignon was living under the shadow of death."²⁴

As the plague consumed the city, and despite his moral shortcomings, Clement VI did what he could for the people of Avignon. The pope demanded daily reports of the number of deaths in the city, assigned doctors to various districts, hired men to collect the dead and haul them away in carts, and employed gravediggers to bury the bodies.²⁵ Clement also authorized his surgeon, Gui de Chauliac, to dissect and examine the bodies of plague victims to learn more about the pestilence and how to stop it. This was the first authorization of autopsy outside of medical study in universities ever granted.²⁶ The town burial ground quickly filled up, so Clement gave the city a new cemetery. Eleven thousand people were buried in the new graveyard by March 14 in addition to those buried in churchyards.²⁷ When too few people were left to remove the bodies from the streets and the cemeteries were all filled, Clement consecrated the Rhône River so that the souls thrown in "would not go to their watery grave unblest."²⁸

Amidst the suffering in Avignon, one distraction caused a stir. Townspeople turned out on the streets early on the morning of March 15, 1348 to watch a parade of finely attired nobles and their entourages enter the city. The main

objects of the attention were Luigi of Tarantino and Queen Joanna of Naples and Sicily.²⁹ Joanna's visit during the dangers of the plague was due to her suspected involvement three years before in the death of her husband, Prince Andreas of Hungary.³⁰ Charged with his murder by none other than Andreas's brother, Louis, the King of Hungary, Joanna braved the pestilence in order to clear her name in a papal trial.

Her critics, however, believed Joanna was appealing to Clement VI for protection, for he was one of few with enough power to shield her from the wrath of King Louis.³¹ The Queen's trial was held upon the day of her arrival, and she was found fully innocent of any involvement in the mysterious hanging death of her husband.³² As evidence against her was quite incriminating, it was suggested that Joanna's trial was fixed: several months following the trial, Clement announced that he had purchased Avignon from the Queen, who held title to the city as countess of Provence.³³

The plague and the devastation it wrought on the city exhausted Clement as it did everyone else. After the trial of Queen Joanna, he spent much of his time in the papal chambers, "seated between two roaring fires."³⁴ This treatment was directed by his surgeon, Gui de Chauliac, who believed the fires would purify the air of infection, the suspected cause of the plague. The fires actually did protect the pope, for they warded off fleas, the true carriers of the pestilence.³⁵ In May, Clement fled the city for the papal retreat at Étoile-sur-Rhône. He was not criticized for departing at the time, for all who were able to leave were doing so. One out of every two people died in Avignon in 1348.³⁶ It was not until near Christmas that the survivors began to see a reprieve.³⁷

Clement's benevolence in 1348 showed that his character was not as soiled as some believed. Though he was not an impressively inspirational leader in that time of great horror, he did show generosity and kindness for Avignon's people as they suffered: he purchased a new cemetery for the dead, gave absolution to the dying and the dead, permitted autopsies to explore the causes of the disease, and appointed a committee to calculate the number of casualties across Europe.³⁸

The commonly held belief was that the Black Death was God's judgment upon a world corrupted by sin.³⁹ This sentiment became more forceful with the passage of time as those who remained tried to make sense of the tragedy that befell them. The wealthy papal court, notorious for its blatant sinfulness and extravagant living, presented a prime target for the blame.⁴⁰

While it was accepted that Divine punishment was the cause of the plague, bedraggled and exhausted survivors "still looked for a human agent upon

whom to vent the hostility that could not be vented on God.”⁴¹ The idea that the Jews had a hand in the Black Death originated in the region of southern France and Spain where a third of the 2.5 million Jews of Europe lived. The Jewish communities in that region dated to Roman times and were both manageable and attractive targets. The old Jewish quarters were separated from the surrounding Christian communities by walls. Because they were also relatively affluent areas compared to their neighbors outside the walls, they offered looting potential as an additional incentive for punishment.⁴² Pope Clement VI issued a bull in July of 1348 prohibiting the killing, looting, and forcible conversion of Jews without a trial, which, while it protected the Jews in Avignon and the vicinity, had little effect on the rest of Western Europe.⁴³ “Authorities in most places tried at first to protect the Jews,” according to historian Barbara Tuchman, “but succumbed to popular pressure, not without an eye to potential forfeit of Jewish property.”⁴⁴

Attempts to please God and end the plague led to desperate measures by some. The flagellants began as a group who firmly believed that the plague was an immediate result of human sin. Spreading rapidly from Germany into France, the movement incited plague-stricken towns already agitated by their situations. Historian Norman Cantor detailed some of the extreme behavior of the flagellants who, “proceeded from town to town, whipping each other and bystanders in the streets and causing general mayhem. Bishops hated them, but found it difficult to suppress them because the people took comfort in their displays of humility.”⁴⁵ Their marches were initially permitted by the pope, but Clement VI eventually prohibited such displays when it became evident that the processions were only assisting in the spread of the disease.⁴⁶

As the flagellants grew in number and strength they also grew in confidence, and they began openly attacking the Church. Flagellant leaders heard confessions, granted absolution, and imposed penance. Priests who attempted to put a stop to it were stoned. Author Mark Galli detailed some of the outrageous behavior of the zealots. He noted that they “took over churches, disrupted services, ridiculed the Eucharist, looted altars, and claimed the power to cast out demons and raise the dead.”⁴⁷ The group also reignited the persecution of the Jews, resulting in even more Jewish deaths. Pope Clement VI did what he could to put an end to the hysterical marches, and eventually, upon his call for their arrest, the flagellants disbanded and disappeared.⁴⁸

Pope Clement VI proclaimed 1350 to be a Jubilee Year. Intended to be a centennial event, Boniface VIII had established the first Jubilee Year in 1300 to provide indulgences for repentant pilgrims free of charge. Rome petitioned for the interval to be shortened to fifty years, for the city was feeling the financial loss of

the papacy. Clement granted the early Jubilee Year in a papal bull in 1343. Clement claimed in the same bull that the Church had an unlimited supply of pardons available for those willing to pay the price.⁴⁹ The plague encouraged many to take advantage of this offer, for the purchase of an indulgence assured the repentant sinner of a direct admission to heaven with no stop in purgatory.⁵⁰ The constant specter of death during the plague years increased the value of these indulgences to those willing to pay for them. The pilgrims of 1350 flocked to Rome for absolution and in the process fattened the Church's purse considerably. Sadly, only about a third of Jubilee pilgrims returned home, a consequence of persistent plague outbreaks.⁵¹

Bequests, which were transfers of assets from an individual either on his deathbed or arranged previously, were the largest source of income for the Church.⁵² It was believed that through pious bequests a donor could achieve salvation. The rate of bequests increased dramatically in the mid-fourteenth century as those fearful of dying from the plague while not having atoned for their sins made arrangements in hopes of buying their way into heaven. In October 1348, the Council of Siena suspended its annual taxes for religious charities for two years because they had received so many bequests.

The Black Death was a terrible crisis for the Church. Religious communities such as monasteries, cathedrals, and collegiate chapters suffered higher rates of mortality than the general population. Approximately sixty percent of the clergy perished in the plague, largely because the fleas on the bodies of the dead transferred to those who prayed over them and prepared them for burial.⁵³ Like other social institutions, the Church suffered a tremendous shortage of personnel. This posed a serious threat to the stability and continuity of the papacy. Consequently, the age requirements for the clergy had to be lowered both during and after the Black Death. Ordination into the priesthood was permitted at twenty instead of twenty-five, and new monks were allowed to take their vows at fifteen rather than twenty. The Church ordained priests in groups to fill the vacancies; many of them were men whose wives or families had died. The quality of the regular and secular clergy dropped precipitously. Many of the new clergymen were barely literate. Cantor noted that "It was a younger, much younger Church that came suddenly into being, and one now staffed heavily with undereducated and inexperienced people."⁵⁴

Clement VI was shocked and horrified at the effects of the plague on Avignon and on humanity in general. He died at the age of 61 just before Christmas of 1352. Clement never attempted to conceal his immorality or excessive nature, even sermonizing in the year before his death about having lived

as a sinner amongst sinners.⁵⁵ Further, his death marked the end of an era of excess for the papacy. The pope left Avignon looking beautiful but on the verge of bankruptcy. “It had been Clement’s hand which had always controlled the papal purse, and his hand which had emptied it.”⁵⁶

Again, the cardinals selected a new pope as different from his predecessor as possible. Pope Innocent VI (r. 1352-1362) was somber and restrained, where Clement had been vigorous and lively. Innocent’s primary goal was to balance the papal books. His dramatic changes included putting a stop to the endless feasting and entertaining as well as huge reforms within the papal court. The excesses of the papacy were brought to an end.⁵⁷

Unfortunately, the plague was not yet done with Avignon. The city was besieged in December 1360 by several bands of mercenaries. The plague returned the following April. In part due to the new outbreak, the siege was lifted on April 22, and the mercenaries left for Aragon. This new wave of plague was just as potent as it had been in 1348 and it was followed by famine because the crops surrounding the city were ruined during the months of siege.⁵⁸ The second spate of the plague was quickly followed by a third epidemic in 1368, both causing the deaths of ten to twenty percent of what remained of the population after the initial outbreak in 1348.⁵⁹ The second and third episodes in Avignon further diminished the clergy and brought intellectual and spiritual standards even lower. This contributed to the papacy’s later problems with the anti-clericalist movements of John Wycliffe and his followers, the Lollards, and possibly played an indirect role in shaping the Reformation.⁶⁰

The Black Death created the desire for a more personal relationship with God. Chancies sprung up all across Europe, not merely among the nobility, but also in the homes of the merchant class and professional families. Interest in theology became popular, and mysticism was also on the rise as survivors of the pestilence sought answers and understanding.⁶¹ Through such privatizations of religion, Christians could avoid altogether the problems of papal authority. “The upswing in religious feeling was accompanied by a deepening disillusionment with the Church.”⁶²

Although the populace understood that the clergy suffered and died like everyone else, the people could not accept the churchmen’s neglect in giving the sacraments to the dying and dead. Neglecting the last rites in such a way condemned one to burn in hell for all eternity. Nor could they accept that the clergy overcharged for their services during the plague.⁶³ The pope condemned this behavior of course, but the people were not willing to forgive the Church for turning its back on them in their hour of need.

The papacy's inability to bring the Hundred Years War to a peaceable agreement was also viewed as a failure. Clement VI's shortcomings as a pillar of sanctity aside, he may have been the most likely candidate as peacemaker between France and England. He had personal relationships with both rulers, and he devoted much time and energy to the ongoing search for peace between them. The pope was not, however, an impartial negotiator, for the papacy had given large amounts of money to Philip VI between 1345 and 1350 to fund the nearly bankrupt French war efforts.⁶⁴

Anti-clericalism was already on the rise in the thirteenth century, and the papacy's ineffective response to the plague crisis accelerated it even further. The Church faced grave threats to its power and credibility in the two centuries after 1348.⁶⁵

Several attempts were made to return the papacy to Rome in the waning years of the Avignon residency, but none succeeded until 1376 when Pope Gregory XI (r. 1370-1378) decided to return to the Eternal City. Gregory quickly regretted his decision, but he died before he could return to Avignon. Shortly thereafter, two popes were elected to succeed him. Urban VI (r. 1378-1389) was Italian, and it was thought that the Romans would be pleased with that. Urban had other ideas, and upon his election he initiated a harsh campaign against corruption amongst those in high positions.⁶⁶ Urban was unmoved by the vehement protests of the cardinals. This prompted a portion of them to return to Avignon and declare his election invalid. They elected a new French pope, Clement VII (r. 1378-1394), who remained in Avignon and was considered the first antipope. The next forty years saw the Church sundered by this Great Schism between Avignon and Rome.⁶⁷

Coincident with the Great Schism was the attack on the papacy by Oxford instructor John Wycliffe (c. 1331-1384). In 1377, Wycliffe put forth his radical notion to secularize all Church property. He also felt the papacy did not hold the power to exact disciplinary punishments. The pope condemned Wycliffe as a heretic the following year, but the schism drew the papacy's attention away from Wycliffe's dangerous ideas. Wycliffe ignored the papal censure, and with the Schism set in motion, he had little to fear from any pope.⁶⁸ "Wycliffe deviated completely from church teaching regarding the relationship of humanity to God and about the church's task of leading the human person to God."⁶⁹ He argued that the Church was not necessary for achieving salvation. Rather, salvation was dependent on grace, and receiving the sacraments was not required. These ideas were not new ones, and opposition to the Church had long existed in Europe. However, this rise in heretical ideas was a great problem for the papacy, as the

selling of indulgences was a great source of income for the Church, and the neglect of sacraments had become a large bone of contention after the plague.

Wycliffe's anticlerical followers included a group of radical heretics called the Lollards⁷⁰ who complained about the Church's poorly educated clergy. They not only criticized ecclesiastical leadership and immorality, but went so far as to question the spiritual benefit of the Mass. Because many of the Lollards were university graduates, largely from Oxford, they promoted themselves as being far superior to the undereducated priests.⁷¹ The Lollards' preachings became increasingly revolutionary, and they were continually persecuted in England. However, they survived as a minority and reemerged in the 1530s when Henry VIII (r. 1509-1547) broke from Rome to form the Church of England.⁷²

The papacy began its residency in Avignon at the peak of its power and prestige, but that power was partly to blame for its decline. A series of extravagant popes, each more autocratic and less pious than the one before, created a papal palace known more for its opportunities for immorality than for its spiritual leadership. The Black Death first struck Avignon in 1348, and the papacy was ill-prepared to handle the disaster. Tuchman noted that "the plague accelerated discontent with the Church at the very moment when people felt a greater need of spiritual reassurance."⁷³ Widespread criticism and additional plague outbreaks further diminished the once-imposing bastion of papal authority. Distrust of the Church's abilities to intervene with God on behalf of humanity during the plague resulted in an interest in more privatized religious outlets. The papacy's return to Rome was of no help, for it led to the Great Schism wherein two men, and later three, claimed to be pope.⁷⁴ The papacy's weakness was only too apparent during the Schism, and the subsequent loss of prestige opened the door for critics. This display of inefficacy and weakness allowed the heretical ideas of John Wycliffe and the Lollards to take root, and from there aid the development of the Reformation through their attempts to return the Church to piety and morality. "The safest conclusion one can make about the plague's contribution is that, by promoting dissatisfaction with the Church, it created fertile ground for religious change."⁷⁵

Notes

1. Norman Cantor, *The Civilization of the Middle Ages* (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), 487-488.
2. *Ibid.*, 490.
3. Boniface VIII, *Clericos Laicos*, 1296.
4. William Chester Jordan, *Europe in the High Middle Ages* (London: The Penguin Press, 2001), 315.

5. Barbara W. Tuchman, *A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous 14th Century* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1978), 25.
6. Boniface VIII, *Unam Sanctam*, 1301.
7. Jordan, 316.
8. Adriaan H. Bredero, *Christendom and Christianity in the Middle Ages* (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1994), 39.
9. Margot Patterson, "Papal Echoes in Avignon," *National Catholic Reporter* 40, 24 (April 16, 2004): 8A.
10. Ibid.
11. Cantor, *Civilization*, 496.
12. Jordan, 316.
13. Cantor, *Civilization*, 496-497.
14. Tuchman, 43.
15. David Chidester, *Christianity: A Global History* (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 2000), 270.
16. Ibid., 9-10.
17. Tuchman, 44.
18. Edwin Mullins, *The Popes of Avignon: A Century in Exile* (New York: Bluebridge, 2008), 37.
19. Ibid., 45-46.
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A Clash of Empires: The Fight over the Georgia Colony during the War of Jenkins' Ear

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During the colonial period of the Americas, European powers fought a number of wars over territory and trade rights. The War of Jenkins' Ear was one such war, which pitted the British Empire against Spain largely because of the new colony of Georgia. According to the historian Kenneth Coleman, in many respects, Georgia served as a buffer between Spanish Florida and the fertile agricultural area in South Carolina, yet the founding of the new colony immediately created a resounding sense of impending war to all parties involved.¹ In 1739, the British put an end to diplomatic wrangling and declared war, encouraging Brigadier General James Oglethorpe, founder of Georgia, to seize the opportunity to invade Florida and lay siege to the city of St. Augustine. Unfortunately, a variety of issues among the British command created a whirlwind of disappointment and delay.

Tumultuous events plagued British progress, resulting in a failed siege of St. Augustine. After more than a year of careful planning, the Spanish retaliated by invading St. Simons Island. Through the sheer stout bravery of Oglethorpe and his men, accompanied by a bit of luck, the British managed an astounding victory that sent Spain into retreat and established the boundaries and standing of the mighty British Empire. Therefore, while the offensive operations against Spain would fail due to a fractured command structure, the spirited defense of St. Simons Island would not only rout the Spanish forces but would also set the southern boundary of the Georgia colony and tip the balance of power in North America in favor of the British.

Causes for War

As with any war, many compounding influences brought the two empires to arms. However, two circumstances in particular were primarily responsible. First, as both nations expanded their empire into the Americas, tensions continued to develop over trade in the New World. The conflict began when Britain and Spain signed the *Asiento* contract. This contract granted the

British unlimited importation of African slaves, as well as five hundred tons of other goods, into Spanish holdings in the Americas, which led to the development of the South Sea Company in 1729.² Throughout the next decade, this arrangement would push both empires to the brink of war.

Eventually, Spain came to the realization that, although they needed the British to help supply New Spain, the British were causing more trouble than it was worth. When British sailors began engaging in smuggling and piracy, it provoked the Spanish Guardia Costa to seize their ships. One such seizure, in April of 1731, gave the war its name when Spanish Captain Juan de Leon Fandino boarded the *Rebecca* and cut off Robert Jenkins's ear with the instruction to take the ear to the British king and "tell him if he were here I would do the same to him," a punishment that was not common and was due to some undocumented disagreement.³ Things quickly deteriorated diplomatically between the two countries, causing their relationship to become that much more strained when the Spanish boarded and captured smugglers. Each side claimed the other owed large sums of money, with the Spanish accusing the British of not paying duties on slaves and other goods, while the British claimed damages to ships and crew.⁴ While these trade disputes were a major cause of the impending war, the biggest rift between the two countries involved the British settlement of Georgia.

The arguments over Georgia had been going on for many years. In 1670, each side agreed to sign the American treaty, which stated that neither side could claim land they did not already hold. This included land that prevented British settlements in the area until 1720, when King George ordered the Governor of South Carolina to send men to build a fort at the head of the Altamaha River, surprisingly named Fort King George, which was an act that was in direct violation of the treaty.⁵ However, British occupation of the area did not last long. In 1725, the fort burned down, and, to the delight of the mercantilists who wanted peace in order to advance their trade agenda, the area remained free of colonists until James Oglethorpe founded the colony of Georgia in 1733.⁶

Right from the start, doom loomed over the colony of Georgia. Much to the consternation of Prime Minister Robert Walpole, who made sure the last thing he told Oglethorpe was to make sure he did nothing to provoke the Spanish, the colonists embarked on their trip to Georgia.⁷ Naturally, the British incursion into the lands south of the Savannah River immediately offended the Spanish, even though it brought quite a bit of relief to the people of the South Carolina colony.

Tensions between the British and Spanish continued to grow. In 1737, these tensions compelled Oglethorpe to return to Britain to secure a force to defend the new colony from a Spanish incursion, a threat made more real when

news reached Britain of a failed Spanish attack on the area.⁸ This was possibly the worst time for this to happen and resulted in the ratcheting up of forces in the southeastern portion of North America.

Gathering Forces

After receiving news of the attack, Britain braced itself for war. Oglethorpe's request for men to defend Georgia was granted. He received permission to raise an entire regiment, comprised of 246 men from a company of foot stationed in Gibraltar and "the King's Independent Company of Foot in Georgia," a force that completely upended the balance of power in the region.⁹ In response to the news of Oglethorpe's preparations, the Spanish equally prepared to protect themselves in the upcoming war.

In 1737, while Oglethorpe was gathering his forces in Britain, Spanish Minister Don Tomás Geraldino sent a list of grievances that the Spanish Crown had with Britain, along with a warning that Oglethorpe's return to Georgia would constitute an act of war, to Walpole.¹⁰ Of course, the British ignored the warning and continued to prepare the regiment bound for Savannah. During this time, the Spanish began to form in Florida. As the letters of Florida Governor Manuel de Montiano show, the Spanish had exemplary spies among the British, which allowed Montiano to begin begging for troops and supplies from the crown while preparing the undermanned defenses of St. Augustine.¹¹

At this point, both countries nullified the possibility of reconciliation. Unfortunately, a series of events in 1738 only worsened the ordeal. Not only did Oglethorpe return with the troops he assembled in Europe, newly named as a general and causing Cuba and Madrid to reinforce St. Augustine, he set about gathering local forces of both European settlers and friendly native tribes, such as the Creek who disliked the Spanish for allying with tribal enemies.¹² He also showed that he was willing to back up his ideals with his own money all while doing his best to fan the flames of war. Oglethorpe outfitted three regiments of rangers, including two from Georgia and one from South Carolina, with horses and other supplies, put together his own flotilla, and while working to gather these forces, he sent back false claims of Spanish attacks to play on popular anti-Spanish sentiments and push the mercantilists toward war.¹³ Alternatively, the Spanish were not exactly innocent of provocation themselves.

The Spanish decided to revive a royal proclamation from the time of Charles II, which stated that any slave from a British colony that appeared in St. Augustine would be granted his freedom if he converted to Catholicism and

provided four years of public service. Montiano even built a city and fort for these freed slaves called Mose, which held the designation of being the first settlement in North America to be self-governed by African Americans.¹⁴ This announcement caused the fear of every British colonist in South Carolina to come true, as the Spanish proclamation severely limited the amount of support to Oglethorpe's future expedition. In September of 1739, twenty slaves gathered near the Stono River, killed a number of whites, stole their weapons, and set off toward St. Augustine. This movement amassed a following of about one hundred slaves who would meet a violent end before they could leave the colony.¹⁵ This, on top of all the other provocations and reasons for war, drove some in South Carolina to push for a fight against the Spanish they formerly wished to avoid. This was an ingenious tactical move by the Spanish.

With slaves rebelling, the colony of South Carolina had to keep as much manpower at home as possible, which led to a reduced amount of help for Oglethorpe and his expedition to St. Augustine.¹⁶ The lack of help began a long chain of unfortunate events for Oglethorpe in the coming invasion of Florida, an endeavor doomed to fail from the start.

Invasion and Retreat

In 1739, the British Empire officially declared war. However, the Spanish took the initiative by attacking the British on Amelia Island, resulting in the deaths of two soldiers and several attacks on traders operating in the area.¹⁷ Oglethorpe's response was a raiding party of his own, one that left an impression on the Spanish. In January, Oglethorpe unleashed a force augmented with Creek auxiliaries in an attack that scorched Spanish boats on the St. Johns River and seized two forts, one of which they burned and one, Fort Picolata, which they kept garrisoned.¹⁸ This opened the opportunity to march on St. Augustine. However, delays and denials plagued Oglethorpe's advance.

Of the many things that went wrong for the British, the one that hurt their plans for St. Augustine the most was the delay in gathering sufficient forces and supplies. When King George sent orders to attack St. Augustine, instead of the full cooperation of South Carolina and the British military, specifically from the Navy and the Ordinance Command, Oglethorpe found only denial and tardiness.¹⁹ Some of these delays were for good reason at all. Oglethorpe had begged for help from South Carolina as far back as September 1739, but the Assembly did not begin to take up the issue until November. They even supplied fewer men than promised. Considering their fear of another slave uprising, there

was some justification for these decisions.²⁰ The situation with the native tribal allies was just as troublesome. The Cherokees had been hit hard with a smallpox outbreak, and the Creeks were coming and going at will, never leaving the Georgians more than about two hundred men, much fewer than they had originally promised.²¹ This was partly because of the boredom that arose from the lack of progress in the campaign. The delays imposed by South Carolina and the British military establishment were beginning to take their toll.

Eventually, Oglethorpe felt he had enough men to begin the march. By May, the British forces moved toward their target of St. Augustine. In conjunction with the southward march of nine hundred British and nearly eleven hundred native allies of various tribes, the British Navy was to blockade the entrances into the harbor leading to St. Augustine. Unfortunately, they were late executing this task and did not get it blocked until the end of May.²² This delay, coupled with several others, was completely detrimental to Oglethorpe's original plan. He had meant to attack just after this earlier raid in an attempt to hit the Castillo that protected the city before Spain could reinforce it, an action that had already happened in April when a group of Spanish ships out of Cuba brought men and provisions into the city.²³ Nevertheless, the British lost the element of surprise because of their late start, which allotted the Spanish sufficient time to prepare for the coming campaign against them.

While Oglethorpe had valid complaints against his allies, the South Carolinians had plenty to gripe about as well. Their main charge was that Oglethorpe lacked the skills to be a general. This was evident in the fact that all he was capable of doing were useless maneuvers that led nowhere, further diminished by a reoccurring fever that contributed to his inaction.²⁴ In addition, Oglethorpe was certainly guilty of not allowing the natives under his command to fight in their accustomed way. Instead, he tried to force them to fight in a European style that they were unfamiliar with, rather than using them to instill fear in the Spanish with their guerilla tactics.²⁵

All of these incidents, from bickering subordinates to illness, caused Oglethorpe's original plan of a surprise assault on St. Augustine to fail, provoking additional support on the matter. After collaborating with Commodore Vincent Pearse, a naval commander sent from Charleston to provide aid, a new strategy quickly developed. The new plan called for a complete block of all routes into St. Augustine in order to nullify its defenses and starve them out.²⁶ This plan played right into the hands of the Spanish. As Phinizy Spaulding pointed out, the Castillo had been built for this exact contingency, leaving the Spanish in the perfect position to fight off the British invaders.²⁷ Unfortunately for the British, they were

not able to carry this plan out because of a series of blunders, ignored orders, and commanders at odds over how to conduct the siege.

The first blow to this plan was the destruction of a force at Fort Mose, which broke the encirclement to the north of the city. With the site having been abandoned by the Spanish upon Oglethorpe's approach, the Georgians had taken Mose easily in their march on St. Augustine, leaving Colonel John Palmer and a force of ninety-five Highlanders and fifty-two native allies to camp at a different location each night so they were not an easy target for the Spanish.²⁸ However, Palmer did not follow these commands, which resulted in disastrous consequences for the British. In late June, the Spanish counterattacked with six hundred troops, including a large contingent of free blacks that had previously resided in the town, which led to the complete destruction of the British garrison and the loss of seventy men.²⁹ This would prove to be one of the most significant events of the war and resulted in the first break of the British lines around St. Augustine.

The loss of Mose was a terrible blow to the morale of an already fractured command structure. The South Carolinians were also frustrated by this loss and blamed it on Oglethorpe's unfitness for command. Some of the Georgians were baffled by their leader's decision to place the bulk of his troops on Anastasia Island, rendering them useless.³⁰ The final blow came at the end of June.

Though the land-based portion of the siege had been broken, Pearse still had the harbor blocked while Oglethorpe had men stationed on Anastasia Island conducting a bombardment of the Castillo. Unfortunately, Pearse made the mistake of pulling his ships out to sea to avoid high winds, and while the harbor was clear, a Spanish flotilla was able to get through to resupply the town.³¹ This effectively eliminated any chance at taking the city, and after one more abortive attempt at a combined land and sea attack, Pearse called his ships back to port due to the threat of hurricane season despite Oglethorpe's pleas to the contrary.³² With the naval blockade finished, the various British forces returned home and the different parties began to cast blame on each other for the failure. This is just another example of a weak and uncooperative command structure.

Rout in the Marsh

If the only actions taken in the Florida-Georgia theater of the war were the unfortunate events of Oglethorpe's failed invasion, the entire scenario would lack substantial historical notability. However, upon return, the South Carolina

Assembly began a very biased investigation into the actions of Oglethorpe as siege commander, calling only the witnesses it needed to prove its predetermined outcome.³³ While Oglethorpe defended himself, other activities of equal merit occupied his time.

Fearing a Spanish attack, Oglethorpe began extending the already impressive defenses on St. Simons Island. His main outpost on the island, Frederica, had walls twelve feet high and twelve feet thick, with a network of batteries, outposts, forts, and native allies protecting it. This made Frederica the largest British fort in North America, and its elaborate defenses ensured ample warning of virtually any enemy approach.³⁴ Oglethorpe had done as much as possible, leaving a tense waiting game as the only remaining task.

From the moment the British campaign ended, the Spanish were planning their retaliation. In a series of letters between St. Augustine, Havana, and Madrid, the Spanish worked out a plan of attack that sought to close off the northern entrances to St. Simons, destroy the Georgia stronghold, and proceed up the coastal channels to destroy all settlements and plantations through Port Royal while simultaneously working to incite slave revolts along the way.³⁵ While this was a very bold plan, with hopes of going as far north as Charleston, it rested on removing the threat that Frederica represented. Although initial requests for reinforcements of three thousand men were denied, Havana eventually sent one thousand regulars and eight hundred militia to St. Augustine, along with enough rations to sustain the army on their campaign due to begin in early June.³⁶ This number represented a major stretch on the resources of the Spanish in the Caribbean, showing just how important the Spanish thought the mission was. They left only four hundred men in Havana, even fewer in St. Augustine, and sent every ship they could in search of a major victory against a force that the Spanish thought to be secret.

Oglethorpe's fear of Spanish retaliation began to become a reality in June of 1742. Though the Spanish had planned an early June start for their offensive, it was delayed nearly a month due to weather and other factors, a time Oglethorpe used to learn from ships which had passed near St. Augustine of a Spanish fleet.³⁷ During this tense time of waiting, Oglethorpe received a major break. Though it was not much, Britain had sent one hundred grenadiers, who arrived on June 17 on a ship laden with both war supplies and notice of denial for requested artillery.³⁸ The Georgians had received all the assistance they were going to get, leaving the outcome to sheer fate.

Oglethorpe and his army spotted the first Spanish ships off the coast of St. Simons on June 22, which, after fifty-two ships added at St. Augustine,

consisted of around five thousand men total, though many of those had been scattered by a bout of bad weather on the trip north.³⁹ The Spanish spent a few days looking for a proper anchorage, and eventually came to a point near Fort St. Simons, across the island from Frederica. After spotting the size of the invading force, Oglethorpe decided to relocate all his men back to Frederica, allowing a relatively uncontested landing as the Spanish took over the abandoned fort.⁴⁰ The Spanish had made it ashore and established a strong base of operations, firmly planting themselves on Oglethorpe's island. In taking the fort, the Spanish found several guns that Oglethorpe's men did not fully spike as well as a number of other supplies including 190 grenades.⁴¹ Things were looking bleak for the people of Georgia, but the following day would see a reversal of fortunes.

By July 11, Montiano began to send out detachments of scouts to find the best way across the island, but these scouts ran into small yet determined resistance. The Spanish scouts began to make their way down an isolated path between the forts only to meet the British allied natives who began to eliminate the Spanish, even taking out two men seeking water within cannon shot of the fort.⁴² It was into this that Oglethorpe came charging.

Hearing reports of the Spanish scouting parties, Oglethorpe gathered a group of four platoons of infantry, along with a handful of rangers and native auxiliaries, and charged directly into a large force of scouts, breaking their lines and forcing them back to Fort St. Simons.⁴³ Here is an example of Oglethorpe taking charge in battle, discounting the accusations of the South Carolinians that Oglethorpe was a poor commander. It also shows that when not confronted by divisions among his command and a high fever he could take decisive action in battle.

Seeing a chance to crush a sizeable chunk of the island's defenses, Montiano began to order more men into the battle. This included three hundred Spanish soldiers, who plunged into battle in a valiant effort to turn back the victorious British force.⁴⁴ Montiano's charge met early success, as the four British platoons were routed and fled back toward Frederica in utter disarray. Though the British had broken in the face of the enemy, they did prove they were a force to be reckoned with.

While Oglethorpe's men had broken, a portion of them regrouped at a bend in the road, encouraging some of the rangers to arrange an ambush. Hiding in dense brush, the rangers faced a marshy area that, unbeknownst to the rangers, was the perfect spot.⁴⁵ Exhausted after a long chase under the hot Georgian summer, the Spanish saw the bend in the road and decided to stop. Assuming the British had rapidly fled to safety, the Spanish decided it was time to rest and fix

lunch before carrying on. They laid down their arms in order to set up a temporary camp, which allowed the British to spring from the bushes and destroy the defenseless force, killing around two hundred, including a number of officers, and chasing the rest into the marshes.⁴⁶ While the Spanish would remain on St. Simons for another week, their consistent failure resulted in their complete withdrawal to St. Augustine.

Aftermath

The British invasion of Florida, and the subsequent destruction of the Spanish forces on St. Simons Island, rippled throughout the world. This fighting marked the last real territorial contest between Britain and Spain on the North American continent with Spain's further inaction unofficially allowing the British to set the border wherever they liked. Nothing became official until after the signing of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle following the War of Austrian Succession in 1748.⁴⁷

The South Carolina Assembly released a report of their investigation, which tried to show the colony's men in the best light possible during the actions in and around St. Augustine. The report heaped most of the blame for the failure at Oglethorpe's feet, which unfortunately stuck with Oglethorpe throughout the passing centuries.⁴⁸ However, a closer look shows that much of what transpired was more because of a fractured and divided command structure. As historian Rodney Baine suggests, when Oglethorpe did not have to butt heads with personalities from South Carolina, or the Navy, he was able to command his men in a much more competent fashion, not to say he did not make his mistakes.⁴⁹ Clearly, Oglethorpe's persistence and bravery eventually secured the British victory.

Regardless of who was to blame, Oglethorpe achieved such a critical victory at St. Simons Island, that he was able to set the southern border of Georgia permanently, relegating the Spanish to a bit player in North America. While modern scholars tend to neglect the relevance of the War of Jenkins' Ear, it had a major impact on North America. It deserves appropriate appreciation as something more than a trade war with Spain. Oglethorpe's efforts portrayed that he was both a founder of a colony and an accomplished military hero in America's colonial history. Therefore, while the offensive operations against Spain would fail due to a fractured command structure, the spirited defense of St. Simons Island would not only rout the Spanish forces but would also set the southern boundary of the Georgia colony and tip the balance of power in North America in favor of the British.

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Shock and Awe: A Summary Account of Brigadier General Griffith Rutherford's 1776 Military Campaign against the Cherokee in Western North Carolina and Its Impact on American Westward Expansion

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Since the guns fell silent following America's successful defense of its claim of independency from Great Britain in the closing decades of the 1700s there has been an immense outpouring of scholarship on the contest and its impact. A basic search of "the American Revolution" within Amazon.com reveals 107,791 results under "books" alone. The titles reflect the focus of researchers and writers on any number of aspects of the war: cultural, economic, military, political, or social; there are consensus macro-histories as well as the more mundane yet illuminating micro-histories.¹ Collectively these works continue to shape the present understanding of the revolutionary period from various contexts, whether from the American, both Tory and Patriot, white and black American, the British, or the Native American viewpoints. In fact, the ongoing outpouring of scholarship reveals a fascination with the revolutionary period of American history that is perhaps exceeded only by interest in the American Civil War era. Yet despite all of the innovation and erudition displayed in framing the collective narrative of the American Revolutionary War era, there remains a surprising dearth of information available that explores and explains the impact of the war on society along the American frontier, especially in western North Carolina, or the lasting impact of the fighting and how it shaped post-war policy.

While clearly scholars have addressed the interactions of individual states and Native American communities during the revolutionary era and while they have also clearly written about the entire frontier region more generally, few have focused on the impact of Brigadier General Griffith Rutherford's 1776 autumn campaign against the Cherokee in western North Carolina.² Known as the Rutherford Trace, his campaign revealed fully the hard hand of total war. Rutherford's campaign also concomitantly helped shape America's collective memory of native peoples as "savages" which, in turn, helped frame America's Indian policies in the years and decades following the conflict. The purpose of this article is to help fill the historiographical gap relative to the nexus of British, American (Tory and Patriot), and Native American interests and designs along the

American Revolutionary frontier. The paper argues that Rutherford's campaign, combined with associated operations in South Carolina and Virginia, helped fuel American post-Revolutionary policy-making, both domestic and foreign, more than any other region of the war.³ Results indicate that Rutherford's expedition was anything but pyrrhic in nature as has been advanced by some recent scholarship.⁴ In fact, Rutherford's actions, in conjunction with armed incursions from the neighboring states of Virginia and South Carolina, were wholly transformative. "Patriot" actions during the American Revolution, such as the Rutherford Trace of this study, aided the continued development of the militia system along the frontier, limited Cherokee abilities to coordinate with or support British or American Tory designs throughout the upcountry, divided the Cherokee between those who supported peace and those who called for armed opposition to American patriots as evidenced by the formation of the Chickamauga Cherokee under Dragging Canoe, and also helped frame and advance a successful blueprint for westward expansion that could be found in concerted, multi-state action—a blueprint that would be used by policy-makers in decades following the Revolution. What follows is a brief account of the impact of the Rutherford Trace campaign on Cherokee peoples and on American westward expansion and policy-making, especially in the post-war era.

The military offensive led by Griffith Rutherford in September 1776—largely remembered today as the Rutherford Trace—sought to eliminate the Cherokee as a potential British ally and to punish them for attacking white settlements along the western North Carolina interior. In less than a month, Rutherford's men destroyed dozens of Cherokee settlements and appropriated or burned hundreds of acres of crops and numerous head of livestock.

While Rutherford's 2,500 men witnessed little loss of life from battlefield wounds during the month-long campaign, largely because they encountered limited resistance from the Cherokee, many would eventually succumb to disease and exhaustion following the expedition, perhaps a natural expectation after trekking over 300 miles through the mountainous terrain often on short rations. The efforts of those who took part in the expedition were as celebrated in their time as they are remembered throughout North Carolina to the present day, as evidenced by the naming of counties and towns like Rutherford, Lenoir, and Buncombe.⁵

Cherokee remembrance of Rutherford's expedition, not surprisingly, is one hardly celebrated because it was marred by loss. Council houses and villages—some thousands of years old—were desecrated or destroyed. The destruction of Cherokee homes and food stores produced little more than a refugee state for the Cherokee people in the winter of 1776 and thus is remembered unto present day for

its harshness and brutality. Whether the clash between red and white in the western reaches of British North America was inevitable remains debatable. What is less debated, however, is the fact that Rutherford's Trace broke any real or perceived alliance between the Cherokee and the British and thus paved the way for further white incursion and settlement into Cherokee country.

In 1775, at the Treaty of Sycamore Shoals (the largest private land sale in U.S. history of 20 million acres including prime Cherokee hunting grounds), a plurality of Cherokee chiefs agreed to turn over much of what is present day Kentucky to white settlers. Dissenting leaders, however, such as the Cherokee war chief Dragging Canoe, spoke out harshly against the treaty and vowed to fight against the growing tide of white settlements. "Whole Indian nations have melted away like snowballs in the sun before the white man's advance," said Dragging Canoe. "We had hoped that the white men would not be willing to travel beyond the mountains. Now that is gone. They have passed the mountains, and have settled upon Cherokee land."⁶

As much as the British attempted to court Dragging Canoe as a leader against the American colonists who considered themselves "Patriots"—even to the point of supplying Dragging Canoe's Cherokee warriors with British guns and ammunition—the British also recognized that the division within the Cherokee camp meant that the Americans might also try to curry Cherokee support against white "loyalists" along the frontier, especially from those Cherokee who stood in opposition to Dragging Canoe. In an effort to ward off any patriot attempts at alliance, the British commissioned Alexander Cameron, their well-known and well-received frontier agent, to push for Cherokee neutrality or perhaps even full, open warfare on American patriots.⁷

While the Cherokee had come to trust Alexander Cameron since his interactions with them during the French and Indian War, they remained suspicious of any soldier who donned a red coat, as Cherokee-British relations had long been anything but smooth or harmonious. During the Anglo-Cherokee War of 1759-1761, British soldiers marched through Cherokee settlements burning villages and cutting crops. A 1761 peace treaty between the Cherokee and British promised no white settlements west of the Blue Ridge. Despite the treaty, American settlers continued moving westward anyway. In time, the Cherokee began to recognize a developing pattern of the white man's ability to outstep agreements via the continued clearing of forests, over-harvesting of game, erection of fences, buildings, and towns, and seemingly one-sided trade deals that exchanged a modest number of European trade goods for hundreds of acres of land.⁸

By the summer of 1776, Cameron used his positive standing among the

Cherokee to help focus their dissatisfaction with white transgressions, most specifically on the white settlers who claimed to support the patriot cause. While he only initially asked the Cherokee to remain neutral in the ongoing fight between the so-styled Tories and Patriots that raged across the upcountry, British pressure from civil and military leaders, along with an increasing number of bloody attacks and equally bloody reprisals across the Cherokee and white borderlands, caused Cameron to rebrand his message into one of open, armed Cherokee support for the British in exchange for powder and arms. Adding personal action to his message, Cameron himself reportedly led a group of some 200 white loyalists and native peoples against frontier patriots.⁹

Even prior to Cameron's direct involvement, the colonial North Carolina militias had been forming throughout the late spring and summer in the wake of the Cherokee incursions and killings along the boundary separating white settlement and the Nations. While revenge against "the savages" remained the primary motive of the militia men, North Carolina's Committee of Safety, including the Council's president Cornelius Harnett, expressed interest in supporting ventures that would contain or perhaps even eliminate those "disaffected to the American cause" along the western reaches of the Old North state.¹⁰

The earnestness of the militias and the Committee of Safety increased in the spring of 1776. News of the intermittent raids on frontier families quickly spread alarm through the Piedmont and even into the Low Country. In June and July, Cherokee raids became even more widespread, adding to the growing concern. To make matters worse, reports indicated that the attacks appeared to be coordinated—and even led by Loyalists such as Cameron—with some of the attacks being conducted on the eastern slope of the Blue Ridge.¹¹

With the Carolinas already under the threat of British invasion via Charleston, it appeared perfectly logical to Griffith Rutherford and other Patriots that the Crown would utilize Cherokees and Tories in the upcountry to force them to fight on two fronts. It is worth noting here that the rumor mill regarding British instigation of the Cherokee only added to the cloud of suspicion surrounding men like the aforementioned Alexander Cameron. Most British officials, however, little approved of the murderous attacks on civilians even if the attacks appeared to have been carried out by younger braves that refused to heed any white man's advice.

In early July, near his home in Salisbury, North Carolina, Rutherford began to exchange letters in earnest with the Council of Safety, the quasi-defense department for North Carolina. While the Council announced its suspicion of British agents, it also advised Rutherford to resist reacting too quickly to avoid an escalation of hostilities with the Cherokee before it could adequately plan a proper

response to the British army's potential movements along the coast. "It is the Intention of this Council," the committee wrote to Rutherford, "that you Cautiously . . . prevent the Inhabitants of this colony from committing any Depredations on the Indians."¹²

As Rutherford tried to calm the fears of some westerners while concurrently preaching patience for those bent on retaliating for lost property and lives of kin, he grew increasingly concerned that the Council of Safety—a Council headquartered in Halifax several days' ride in the saddle and hundreds of miles east of Salisbury—failed to fully understand and appreciate the gravity of the situation in the west. His efforts to secure supplies met with little success and news of more attacks seemed to come in daily. Believing he needed to take the initiative and knowing he lacked authorization to pursue "savages" and Tory hostiles outside of western North Carolina, Rutherford queried the Council with a proposed plan of action.

In addition to reiterating the need for more supplies, especially gunpowder and lead for shot and shell, he called for a combined offensive with aid from forces in Virginia and South Carolina.¹³ Together they would launch a three-pronged assault into the upcountry and across the Blue Ridge Mountains to affect the "Destruction of the Cherroce [sic] Nation" and, with the British preparing to move on Charleston, averting a fight on two fronts.¹⁴

The Council of Safety reacted well to Rutherford's plan. They immediately queried the leaders of Virginia and South Carolina for support in the effort. Both states, reeling from the same types of attacks and harboring the same sorts of concerns as those held by the westerners of North Carolina, needed little prodding. South Carolina's President John Rutledge and Virginia's Lieutenant Governor John Page both agreed to support the joint operations against the Cherokee and began preparations for a combined movement.

While news of support from beyond North Carolina surely aided Rutherford's plans, he also knew that innumerable North Carolinians from the western reaches cared little for the state's move to break from England in the summer of 1776. Further, he recognized that the fighting would enable long-running upcountry feuds—fights that reflected more of a civil war than a war between state actors—to continue unabated. Taken together, Loyalist opposition might prove problematic to movements and success of the expedition.

Yet the Loyalist presence, however unpleasant for Rutherford and the Council of Safety, proved to be a less immediate and less identifiable threat than the Cherokee braves. The Indians, Rutherford stated in a July letter, were "making Grate prograce in Destroying & Murdering in the frunteers"¹⁵ of Carolina. By his

estimates, nearly 40 settlers had been massacred in the past few weeks. Worse, he claimed that one of his officers, along with some 120 people (many women and children), were besieged along the Catawba River, and thus he wanted the Council's approval to march immediately to their support. Reluctant to give Rutherford authority to move en masse before offensive plans could be finalized with Virginia and South Carolina, the Council of Safety agreed to a limited offensive.

With the Council's blessing, Rutherford's militia immediately set off down the Catawba River as far as Davidson's Fort on the leeward side of Blue Ridge (today Old Fort in McDowell County, North Carolina). After establishing a garrison at Davidson's Fort, Rutherford led a contingent of militia through the Blue Ridge against a smaller force of Cherokees at the headwaters of the Catawba. A sharp skirmish ensued but Rutherford's men easily drove nearly 200 Cherokee warriors from their positions thus relieving the besieged settlers. While casualties on both sides were light, the discovery of whites among and alongside the Cherokee casualties did much to substantiate the claim that Tories and British agents such as Cameron were inciting insurrection.¹⁶

As the immediate threat to further Cherokee incursions to the eastern side of the Blue Ridge subsided, Rutherford and the Council of Safety coordinated offensive operational plans with colonial leaders from Virginia and South Carolina. North Carolina sent a packet of letters (really testimonials) that Rutherford had gathered regarding the conduct of the Cherokee in their state's western region. To General Charles Lee, then commanding Continentals at Charleston, the Council of Safety pledged cooperation and optimism. The "Troops Brigadier Rutherford carries with him," they wrote to Lee, "are as chosen Rifle Men as any on this Continent . . . We have every expectation from them."¹⁷

While on the march to Davidson's Fort, Rutherford received word that civil authorities in South Carolina had already ordered Major Andrew Williamson to attack Cherokee "Overhill" settlements beyond the Blue Ridge.¹⁸ Rutherford understood fully, therefore, that his attack constituted one-third of an overarching offensive by authorities in Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina, and that he should try to coordinate plans if practicable. Yet because communication would be nearly impossible given the terrain, the Council, for all intents and purposes, wrote Rutherford a blank check. "[A]ll matters [for the expedition]," they said, "we leave entirely to your discretion."¹⁹

In early August, with Williamson moving against the Cherokee to his south, Rutherford sent word to William Christian, then directing Virginia's forces to the north, that he would begin his march as soon as men and supplies were

gathered at Davidson's Fort. He also expressed his hope that the three armies could link up somewhere in the Overhill district, or in modern-day eastern Tennessee.²⁰

As Rutherford's numbers of men and supplies swelled, he received a letter from Williamson in South Carolina that would be a harbinger of things to come for Rutherford and his band. Aside from mentioning that he hoped to link up with Rutherford in early September near Cowee on the Little Tennessee River in the North Carolina district,²¹ Williamson announced that Cherokee resistance had been scattered and irregular. Few warriors, he said, remained behind to slow his army's advance through the South Carolina backcountry. With the Cherokee resistance nominal, Williamson could insure that "desolation [had been] . . . spread all over the lower towns" as he burned Cherokee homes and crops.²²

Throughout August 1776, Rutherford gathered nearly 2,800 men between the ages of 16 and 60 along with various supplies at Davidson's Fort. Quartermaster reports suggest that some supplies came from as far away as Philadelphia, suggesting that members of the Second Continental Congress likely were aware of the offensive operations against the Cherokee. By the end of the month, Rutherford, the Irish-born, middle-aged, newly appointed brigadier general who had served in the Colonial legislature as well as the Council of Safety, prepared to open the "Rutherford Trace" campaign in his district of western North Carolina.²³

Rutherford left about 400 of his militia to guard Davidson's Fort and the surrounding region as he prepared to set out for western North Carolina on September 1, 1776. He had nearly 1,400 packhorses, a herd of beef cattle, and a small arsenal that included long rifles, hatchets, and a few small field cannons. Lacking official uniforms, militia members took along their own clothing and many used their own hunting rifles. As they moved west, they received an escort and armed support from the native peoples of the Catawba. The Catawba had long been foes of the Cherokee and viewed the American "patriots" as a vehicle to help regain lost lands and prestige. Taken together, Rutherford had enough provisions to last six weeks or until stores were exhausted.²⁴

Within the first week of the campaign, Rutherford's band crossed the Blue Ridge east of Black Mountain at Swannanoa Gap. Wisely, Rutherford continued his march along the Swannanoa River through much of the present-day Biltmore Village area near Asheville, North Carolina, until they reached and subsequently forded the French Broad River.²⁵ In three days, they had covered nearly thirty miles and remained free from attack.²⁶

Having successfully forded both major water arteries, Rutherford's men marched through Canton and then southward along present day North Carolina

Route 110 toward Bethel. Having met little resistance along the river paths, they moved from Bethel up the east side of the Pigeon River and continued on to Waynesville where they made encampment at Sulphur Springs. From Sulphur Springs they marched west through Balsam Mountain Gap into Sylva, the modern-day county seat of Jackson County, North Carolina. On September 8, 1776, Rutherford dispatched a reconnaissance force of about 1,000 from Sylva, many on horseback, southward toward the Cherokee town of Watauga along the Tuckasegee River.²⁷ As had been the case for Williamson in South Carolina, Rutherford's men found resistance very light and the town deserted. As had also been the case with Williamson's men, Rutherford's band burned all the houses and crops, seized or destroyed all the livestock, and killed any Cherokee that put up resistance.²⁸

With Watauga in ashes and with Cherokee warriors nearly non-existent, Rutherford pressed on smartly. He dispatched another group of nearly 900 men to cross the Tuckasegee River and move up the Cowee Gap toward Nikwasi near modern-day Franklin, North Carolina. At Nikwasi, Rutherford rejoined his men and consolidated his army while waiting for Williamson to arrive with his South Carolinians. On the night of September 9, 1776, Rutherford issued orders for 900 men to travel west to burn all Cherokee towns. The general then sent another 600 men to locate Williamson. They, too, had orders to burn any Cherokee towns they might come upon in their expedition.²⁹

On September 11, as Rutherford waited for Williamson, he received a letter from the Council of Safety regarding personal retaliation against Cherokee non-combatants. "[W]e have to desire that you will restrain the Soldierly," they wrote, "from destroying women and Children."³⁰ Sources indicate that little of this type of retaliation and retribution took place against non-combatants, despite the fairly large numbers of elderly men, women, and children that had been present in some of the towns. In William Lenoir's diary within the Southern Historical Collection, however, there is an entry of a Cherokee squaw being scalped. The tragic event seems to have been more the exception than the rule, especially because any unnecessary brutality toward the Cherokee people did meet with harsh punishment from Rutherford.³¹

By September 16, Rutherford's men had destroyed dozens of Cherokee towns—some with as many as 100 homes—and vast stores of food. With little sign of Williamson, Rutherford turned south from Nikwasi and continued his scorched-earth policy. Curiously and largely owing to the incredibly rugged terrain, Williamson's men had been driving north and burning towns on a nearly parallel line as Rutherford's men through much of what is present day Macon County, North Carolina. Finally, on September 26, Williamson and Rutherford joined

forces.³²

After linking forces, Rutherford and Williamson met to determine future action. As veteran leaders and campaigners, they carefully weighed all aspects and decided against any further operations or any movement farther into the Overhill lands of the Cherokee. Several factors weighed into the decision to suspend the campaign, though two seem to have been foremost in Rutherford's mind: first, the terrain through the Smoky Mountains would further strain supply and communication; second, the weather would soon turn and winter in the mountains would surely strain morale, especially should supplies fail. Also, most of his militia men recognized they might not be paid for their service. They realized that any payment they might receive from the Provincial Congress would likely be nearly worthless anyway because of the depreciated value of the underpinning state currency.³³

After saying goodbyes to Williamson and his South Carolinians, Rutherford marched his army back to Davidson's Fort along nearly the same route they had traveled and burned only weeks before. Despite the relatively few battle casualties suffered by Rutherford's 2,500 men during the campaign, records suggest that approximately 10 percent of his men eventually succumbed to illness after they returned home from the expedition. Thus, while Rutherford himself received the gratitude of his state, and while his military and political star had risen with the notoriety he gained from the expedition, it was a bittersweet campaign because of the impact it had on the health of his men, many of whom were his friends.³⁴

For the Cherokee, Rutherford's Trace had been devastating. The colonial militias had burned or destroyed an estimated 55 to 70 settlements throughout the western regions. In addition to the incredible loss of shelter, the Cherokee faced a winter without food that forced them into a near refugee state to use modern parlance. Their condition continued to deteriorate in the ensuing months, when Virginia militia under the command of Colonel William Christian laid further waste to the region even after Williamson and Rutherford turned back their columns. Rutherford, too, sanctioned an additional raid—made in November of 1776 and led by Captain William Moore—that followed his September campaign's line of march with the purpose of destroying any Cherokee efforts to rebuild or re-inhabit settlements destroyed during the Rutherford Trace.

The degree to which the Rutherford Trace impacted the Cherokee will to fight and aided future U.S. Presidents such as Andrew Jackson in their desire to push westward remains debatable, but the expedition clearly provided a blueprint of success as it related to westward expansion. This was especially true within the

context of how best to deal with native peoples even if they were deemed civilized. The future success of American westward expansion into territory claimed by native peoples, such as the Indian Removal Act (1830) or Indian Appropriations Acts (1851, 1871, 1885, and 1889), could ultimately be found in concerted, multi-state action akin to that affected in late-1776 and early-1777 during the Rutherford Trace.

Notes

1. Search conducted by the author, accessed January 14, 2016, http://www.amazon.com/s/ref=nb_sb_ss_c_0_23?url=search-alias%3Dstripbooks&field-keywords=the+american+revolution&srefix=the+american+revolution%2Caps%2C130.

2. While a number of studies exist about the nexus of individual state and Native American actions during the American Revolutionary Era, a select few are as follows: For state actions see Edmund Alexander Bacon, *South Carolina, 1775: A Crucible of War* (Staunton, Virginia: American History Press, 2009); Roger A. Ekirch, *Poor Carolina: Politics and Society in Colonial North Carolina, 1729-1776* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1981); Freeman H. Hart, *The Valley of Virginia in the American Revolution, 1763-1789* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1942); For Native American actions see Colin G. Calloway, *The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and Diversity in North American Communities* (New York, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); James H. O'Donnell III, *Southern Indians in the American Revolution* (Knoxville, Tennessee: University of Tennessee Press, 1973); Christina Snyder, *Slavery in Indian Country: The Changing Face of Captivity in Early America* (Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2010).

3. Among the more recent works that address Rutherford's contributions in a well-documented and engaging way is Nadia Dean's, *A Demand of Blood: The Cherokee War of 1776* (Cherokee, North Carolina: Valley River Press, 2012).

4. Richard Blackmon, *Dark and Bloody Ground: The American Revolution along the Southern Frontier* (Yardley, Pennsylvania: Westholme, 2012), 91.

5. Michael Beadle, "Rutherford Trace," *The Smoky Mountain News*, week of August 23, 2006; can be accessed electronically via LEARN NC at the following <http://www.learnnc.org/lp/pages/4298>.

6. Dragging Canoe, Cherokee Leader, 1775 quoted from the Western North Carolina Historical Association, accessed January 7, 2016, <http://www.wnchistory.org/Exhibits/cherokee.html>.

7. John L. Nichols, "Alexander Cameron, British Agent among the Cherokee," *The South Carolina Historical Magazine*, Vol. 97, No. 2 (April, 1996), 94; according to Nichols, the Cherokee were so enamored with Cameron that they referred to him as "Scotchie" a likely reference to his Scotch heritage. It should be noted here that Cameron did push for neutrality at first but by early 1776, he called for Dragging Canoe to take no prisoners in their quest to rid white settlers—who they viewed as squatters—from Cherokee lands.

8. Tyler Boulware, "The Effect of the Seven Years' War on the Cherokee Nation," *Early American Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Fall, 2007), 395; Daniel K. Richter, *Facing East from Indian Country: A Narrative History of Early America* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2001), 186-187.

9. Nichols, "Alexander Cameron," 109.

10. Dean, *A Demand of Blood*, 172.

11. Captain Samuel Ashe, "Rutherford's Expedition against the Indians," in *The North Carolina Booklet: Great Events in North Carolina History*, Vol. 4, No. 8 (December, 1904), 11.
12. Letter from Thomas Jones to James Iredell, July 23, 1776 quoted in Don Higginbotham, ed., *The Papers of James Iredell, 1751-1799* (Raleigh: Division of Archives and History, 1976), 1: 415.
13. It should be noted here that Georgia, too, would send a force under Colonel Samuel Jack against the Cherokee in the Tugaloo River region. He would later serve on the general staff of the Continental-line Georgia Brigade.
14. Letter from Griffith Rutherford to the Council of Safety, July 5, 1776, in William L. Saunders, ed., *Colonial Records of North Carolina* (hereafter *CRNC*), Vol. 10 (Raleigh, NC: Josephus Daniels, 1890), 652.
15. Letter from Griffith Rutherford to the Council of Safety, July 14, 1776, *CRNC*, 10: 669.
16. Ashe, "Rutherford's Expedition against the Indians," 13-14.
17. Letter from the Council of Safety to General Charles Lee, July 16, 1776, in Walter Clark, ed., *State Records of North Carolina* (hereafter *SRNC*) Vol. 11 (Raleigh, NC: Josephus Daniels, 1907), 316.
18. "Overhill" settlements referred to those Cherokee towns and settlements west of the Blue Ridge. It should also be noted that Andrew Williamson is the same person who will earn the unfortunate moniker of "Arnold of Carolina" for his duplicity in 1780. He will narrowly escape being hung, however, because he evidently aided both Americans and British.
19. Letter from the Council of Safety to Griffith Rutherford, July 21, 1776, *SRNC*, 11: 318-319. There is some historical discussion and disagreement as to the amount of input the Council had on Rutherford's expedition despite this letter. While the Council surely sent messages to Rutherford throughout the campaign to pursue a policy of peace whenever possible or even dictating how he should position his troops, this author has found little in the documentation to support such a claim. Rutherford's impetuous nature, coupled with his understanding of Native American warfare, clearly defined how his campaign would be carried out.
20. Letter from Griffith Rutherford to William Christian, August 5, 1776, *CRNC*, 10: 650-651.
21. According to Davy Arch of the Eastern Cherokee Nation, the district included all areas around Franklin, North Carolina of the present day. Unrecorded interview conducted by this author with Davy Arch in September, 2007, in Cullowhee, North Carolina.
22. Letter from Colonel Andrew Williamson to Griffith Rutherford, August 14, 1776, *CRNC*, 10: 745-747.
23. J.G. de Roulhac Hamilton, "Revolutionary War Diary of William Lenoir," *The Journal of Southern History*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (May, 1940), 250.
24. Letter from Griffith Rutherford to the Council of Safety, September 1, 1776, *CRNC*, 10: 788-789. It should be noted that the Lenoir Family Papers in UNC's Southern Historical Collection also include a trove of information and key first-hand accounts of the expedition because William Lenoir was a participant of the so-styled Rutherford Trace expedition.
25. The area of crossing the French Broad is likely near (and just behind) the Biltmore Square Mall today in Asheville, North Carolina.
26. Roy S. Dickens Jr., "The Route of Rutherford's Expedition against the North Carolina Cherokees," *Southern Indian Studies* Vol. 19, No. 4 (October, 1967), 6.
26. The Cherokee town of Watauga is near present-day Webster, North Carolina.

28. Dickens, "The Route of Rutherford's Expedition," 7-8; Ashe, "Rutherford's Expedition," 16.

29. Rutherford's 900 men would eventually burn all Cherokee settlements as far as Hiawassee in modern-day Clay County, North Carolina along the border with Georgia.

30. Letter from the Council of Safety to Griffith Rutherford, September 11, 1776, *SRNC*, 11: 350.

31. It is worth noting here that Cherokee Tribal historical preservationists such as Tyler Howe and Davy Arch maintain that the absence of Cherokee warriors was a byproduct of Williamson's and Christian's attacks which served as a siphon from Rutherford's central district thus leaving many towns undermanned or undefended. Information gathered during personal face-to-face, oral conversations between this author and tribal historical preservationists in Cherokee and Cullowhee, North Carolina, September 2007.

32. Williamson's band was ambushed near the Wayah Gap on September 19, 1776, resulting in the loss of approximately 30 men with 12 of them being killed. With this notable exception, neither Williamson nor Rutherford met any substantial Cherokee opposition.

33. Report of William Sharpe in Letter from the Council of Safety to Governor Patrick Henry of Virginia, October 25, 1776, *CRNC*, 10: 860. Sharpe was a member of the Council of Safety who had been part of Rutherford's expedition.

34. Ashe, "Rutherford's Expedition against the Indians," 14.

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Thomas J. Jackson's Shenandoah Valley Campaign of 1862: Theoretical Origins and Execution

William F. Lawson

In war, the skin of the fox is at times as necessary as that of a lion, for cunning may succeed when force fails.

—Frederick the Great

Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson’s 1862 Shenandoah Valley Campaign is remembered as one of the most brilliant campaigns of the American Civil War and rates favorably among the great campaigns of history. In the spring of 1862, Jackson turned the strategic fortunes of the Confederacy with a relatively small army employed in decisive fashion upon sound principles.

In March 1862, Union General George B. McClellan landed an army of 100,000 men on the Virginia Peninsula formed by the York and James Rivers. His objective was the Confederate capital of Richmond. Richmond was also the rail hub of Virginia and served as a primary manufacturer of munitions for the Southern armies. The city’s capture would precipitate the fall of Virginia and open the road to the Carolinas and the Deep South. Landing on the Peninsula allowed McClellan to bypass the rivers that provided Richmond with natural lines of defense.

To support his move up the Peninsula, McClellan detailed General Nathaniel P. Banks with 23,000 men to secure Manassas Junction and the lower Shenandoah Valley. The Valley was a natural invasion route to the north and Manassas Junction offered control of the rail lines in Northern Virginia. The posting of Banks blocked any potential Confederate move toward Washington and protected the rail link on McClellan’s right flank. Once McClellan invested Richmond, and Washington was deemed secure, Banks would then move on the Confederate capital from the north. Banks was supported by General John C. Fremont’s 15,000 men in the Allegheny Mountains west of Staunton in the upper Valley.¹

To counter the Federal invasion, Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston commanded 57,000 men on the Peninsula and around Richmond. Also under Johnston's command were Jackson’s forces in the Shenandoah, numbering

4,600 men, and General Richard Ewell's division of 8,000 men positioned just east of the Blue Ridge Mountains. A force of 2,800 men under General Edward Johnson kept watch on Fremont in the mountains.² Finally, a 2,500-man brigade under General Charles Field was positioned to watch the Rappahannock River crossing at Fredericksburg.³

Jackson received orders from Johnston to protect the left flank of the main Confederate Army by interposing himself between Richmond and any Federal thrust south from Washington. With his small numbers, Jackson was aware that he stood little chance of blocking a determined move toward Richmond by Banks. With this in mind, and encouraged by Confederate President Jefferson Davis's military advisor, Robert E. Lee, Jackson laid plans for an "offensive-defensive" strategy to occupy Banks in the Valley.⁴

On 11 March 1862, Banks moved on Winchester, where Jackson had spent the winter. Withdrawing before the Federal advance, Jackson held a council of war, where he planned a night attack before Banks could get settled in the town. Thanks to miscommunication among his officers, the attack was never carried out, causing Jackson to decide never to hold another council of war. He held to this decision, to the later detriment of his operations.⁵

After withdrawing from Winchester, Jackson fell back forty-two miles to Mount Jackson to observe Banks. Discerning the size of Jackson's force, Banks decided to split his army, leaving 9,000 men under General James Shields, while moving with the rest of his force toward Manassas to entrain for Richmond. Hearing of the movement, Jackson force-marched his men down the Valley Pike toward Winchester to attack Shields.

Why would Jackson launch an attack against an enemy who possessed twice his strength? The answer may be found not only in Jackson's natural aggressiveness, but in his training at West Point. The primary theoretical influence on American military thought at the time was the Swiss theorist Antoine Henri de Jomini. His works on warfare were taught at West Point through the interpretations of Dennis Hart Mahan and Henry Halleck.⁶ Mahan is best known for his advocacy of battlefield fortifications, but Jomini and Halleck stressed the idea of initiative, which they roughly defined as taking the offensive in a given operation.⁷ By taking action, Jackson set the tone of the engagement and provided himself with options.

The idea of initiative is best expressed within the Jominian concept of the "offensive-defensive." Jackson was well-aware of the advantages of such a strategy. Jomini wrote, "This plan . . . promises many chances of success, but only when the general has the good sense not to make the defense passive: he must not remain in his positions to receive whatever blows may be given by his adversary; he must, on

the contrary, redouble his activity, and be constantly on the alert to improve all opportunities of assailing the weak points of the enemy.” Furthermore, a commander who adopts such a strategy “can with hope of success take the initiative, and is fully able to judge when and where to strike.”⁸

Jackson arrived at the village of Kernstown, four miles south of Winchester, on 23 March, his force reduced by the fast pace of the march to 3,000 men. His cavalry commander, Turner Ashby, informed Jackson that Shields was withdrawing to Winchester and only a small rearguard was left at Kernstown. Jackson attacked immediately, but was eventually repulsed. Ashby’s information had been wrong. Jackson had faced Shields’s entire division and was forced to retire.⁹

Kernstown, though a tactical defeat, proved to be a strategic victory. Convinced that Jackson would not have attacked unless he had superior numbers, Shields reported as much to Washington. Lincoln responded by ordering Banks to return to Winchester and transferred 7,000 men to Fremont in Western Virginia.¹⁰ Lincoln also held General Irvin McDowell’s force of 40,000 men in Washington despite McClellan’s calls that it be sent to the Peninsula.

On the concept of initiative, Halleck wrote: “A commander who [takes the initiative], knowing all the value of acting on the offensive, shakes, by vigor and address of his first movements, the moral as well as the physical force of his enemy, —who . . . confounds his antagonist by enterprises equally hardy and unexpected.”¹¹ The confusion of Shields and the subsequent actions of Lincoln show this to have been the case in Jackson’s attack at Kernstown.

Many accounts of the campaign mistakenly attest that Lincoln held McDowell after Kernstown out of fear for the safety of Washington. Careful analysis, however, shows that Lincoln retained McDowell to adequately protect Manassas Junction as well as occupy the lower Shenandoah. Lincoln had insisted upon this arrangement to McClellan, who felt Banks could accomplish both tasks, during the operation’s planning stages. Lincoln overruled his commander and so retained McDowell. There is no evidence to suggest that Lincoln feared for the safety of Washington in the immediate wake of Kernstown.¹²

Nevertheless, Jackson accomplished his goal of holding Banks in the Valley. His activities had the added benefit of reinforcing Lincoln’s inclination to hold McDowell’s 40,000 men and the move to strengthen Fremont. Even though he suffered a tactical defeat, Jackson’s decision to attack at Kernstown had effectively diverted the attention of nearly 80,000 enemy troops.¹³

After being repulsed at Kernstown, Jackson conducted a month-long fighting withdrawal up the Valley, eventually halting in Swift Run Gap in the Blue

Ridge east of Staunton. Here he rested and refitted. Jackson's primary goals at the time were to prevent Banks and Fremont from joining their commands into a force too large to deal with and to protect Staunton, his base of supply and the transportation hub of the upper Valley.¹⁴

These immediate goals were achieved by concentrating the Confederate forces as prescribed by Halleck, who wrote that, "Concentration requires the main body to be in immediate and supporting reach."¹⁵ Jackson's main force was ensconced at Swift Run Gap with Ewell just to the east and Johnson to the west in the Alleghenies. Any attempt on Staunton by Banks would result in an immediate attack by the Confederate forces on his flanks. Likewise, Jackson was positioned to move in support of Johnson if Fremont advanced on Staunton from the west. If necessary, Jackson could also exit the Valley to the east to support Ewell or even Johnston at Richmond.

The position at Swift Run Gap also met Jomini and Halleck's requirements for an unassailable base. Such a base, according to both men, should provide shelter, contain the possibility of supply and reinforcement, and be situated in such a way as to provide cover for the surrounding theater.¹⁶ Swift Run Gap, with its proximity to Staunton and access to Richmond, met those criteria.

Even before his arrival at Swift Run Gap, Jackson began to recruit, eventually increasing his ranks to 6,000 men whom he drilled hard. One of the new recruits proved instrumental in the Confederate success of the next two months and beyond. Jedediah Hotchkiss was a self-taught cartographer, known to Jackson through his service with Lee in the latter's Western Virginia Campaign of the previous year.

With the addition of Hotchkiss to his staff, Jackson gave himself the capability to efficiently accomplish the aim of strategy according to Halleck: "Strategy . . ." he wrote, "selects the important points in [a] theater, and the lines of communication by which they may be reached."¹⁷ Simply put, the commander that possesses superior knowledge of the terrain and roads in a given theater will have an advantage of initiative over his opponent.

On 26 March, Jackson ordered Hotchkiss to create a detailed map of the Valley from Harper's Ferry to Lexington with "all the points of offense and defense to those points." At the same time, Jackson had tables prepared that showed the precise distance between any two points in his military district.¹⁸ Banks had no such advantages.

On 21 April, word reached Robert E. Lee that McDowell's army was moving to the Rappahannock River opposite Fredericksburg. The Federal advance guard of 5,000 men had already arrived, prompting Field's brigade to burn the river

bridges and withdraw behind several water barriers south of the town. Opposing the troops of McDowell, Banks, and Fremont, Lee had Field's brigade, Jackson's 6,000, Johnson's 2,800, and Ewell's division, now numbered at 8,500, just east of the Blue Ridge near Gordonsville.¹⁹

Douglas S. Freeman wrote that 21 April, 1862 represented the greatest opportunity for a Northern victory that was to be offered them prior to the winter of 1864-65. With Johnston tied down in front of McClellan on the Peninsula, a determined thrust by Banks and Fremont against Jackson and Ewell would have isolated Field at Fredericksburg against McDowell. Field would have been no obstacle to McDowell, who would have had an open road to Richmond, sixty miles to the south. Johnston would have been forced to withdraw precipitately from the Peninsula while being pushed from the front and left flank by superior Federal forces.²⁰ Once forced into Richmond's fortifications, all opportunity for maneuver would have been irrevocably lost.

Lee saw the clear need for a strategic move to hold McDowell at Fredericksburg. Only Jackson and Ewell were capable of such a move at the time. It has been suggested that Lee intended for Jackson to threaten Washington in the belief that Lincoln would panic, but there is no evidence to support such an assertion. Neither Lee nor Johnston considered such a possibility until later in the campaign.²¹ With Jackson not being formally under his command, Lee suggested a move against either McDowell or Banks. In reply, Jackson requested, and received, the attachment of Ewell to his force, and launched the opening moves of his remarkable campaign.

On 2 May, Jackson moved Ewell into the Swift Run Gap position on Banks's left and marched his command south to Port Republic. From there, in full view of Federal scouts, he turned east through the Blue Ridge and exited the Valley via Brown's Gap. This move immobilized Banks as he tried to ascertain Jackson's destination, which he assumed to be Richmond to reinforce Johnston. Banks's assumption was fueled by his belief that Jackson had been seeking to abandon the Valley via Gordonsville for some time. Dispatches to Secretary of War Edwin Stanton on 19 and 22 April stated this belief, with the latter communication expressing the opinion that Jackson had left "permanently."²²

Upon being informed by Banks that Jackson was "bound for Richmond," Stanton ordered McDowell to hold at Fredericksburg until Jackson's intentions became known. Stanton also ordered Banks to send Shields's division to reinforce McDowell. This move reduced Banks's strength to 14,000 men, while Ewell's presence gave Jackson a rough numerical parity in the Valley. Jackson's move halted McDowell once more while denuding Banks of his numerical superiority.²³

Jomini's concepts were based in part on the wars and writings of Frederick the Great of Prussia. In his celebrated *Instructions* to his generals, Frederick wrote, "When our troops are on the point of assembling, we counter-march them in a variety of ways, to alarm the enemy, and conceal from him the spot where we really wish to assemble and force a passage."²⁴ With this in mind, Frederick would have recognized Jackson's initial move of 2 May, as well as subsequent actions in the coming days.

Jackson marched to Meechum's Station on the Virginia Central Railroad line just east of the Blue Ridge. There he entrained his less mobile troops for Staunton, with the rest following close behind by road, arriving on 4 May. Here Jackson linked up with Johnson, who had withdrawn to within a few miles of Staunton before Fremont's advance guard under General Robert Milroy. On 8 May, Jackson's reinforced command attacked Milroy at McDowell, Virginia. While incurring nearly twice as many casualties as Milroy, Jackson forced the Federals to withdraw to Franklin, which the Confederates seized the next day. Fremont was forced back into the mountains to regroup.²⁵

Jackson now turned on Banks, who had advanced cautiously toward Staunton with 10,000 men. Facing Jackson's 17,000, with no immediate support, Banks hastily withdrew to Strasburg, fifty miles down the Valley, where he fortified the approaches from the south. To protect the railroad line to Manassas, Banks detached 1,000 men to Front Royal, ten miles east at the mouth of the Luray Valley.

Jackson then executed his second masterful march of the campaign. Despite being told by Johnston that Banks should be "left in his works," Jackson had a plan to drive Banks out of the Valley altogether. He had received intelligence from Ewell regarding the isolated command at Front Royal. A strike there would render Banks's position at Strasburg untenable and position Jackson to sever the Federal lines of communication.²⁶

With this decision, and the manner by which he would execute it, Jackson showed that he not only understood Halleck's point regarding the importance of a commander's knowledge of the decisive points in his theater of operations, but that he possessed what Frederick referred to as "*Coup D'oeil*"—the ability "to distinguish at first sight all the advantages of which a space of ground is capable."²⁷ Jackson was making the best possible use of Hotchkiss's map.

Dispatching Ewell down the Luray Valley, Jackson sent Ashby's cavalry to demonstrate before the Federal fortifications at Strasburg and screen off Banks's scouts. Convinced that Jackson was rushing down the Valley Pike behind his aggressive cavalry screen, Banks dug in and prepared to meet the expected frontal assault. Jackson, however, turned east at New Market and moved through the Luray

Gap, the only such pass through Massanutten Mountain, to link up with Ewell at Luray.

On the morning of 23 May, Jackson's entire force, its movement screened by the long ridge of Massanutten, descended on the 1,000-man garrison at Front Royal. The Confederates captured 700 enemy soldiers, the rest becoming casualties or fleeing toward Strasburg.²⁸ The news stunned Banks into inaction. Aware of Ewell's advance toward Front Royal, he still believed Jackson to be in his front. Not comprehending the threat to his flank Banks waited until the next day to order a hasty withdrawal. Even then, his justification to Stanton was that Ewell meant to interpose himself between Strasburg and Winchester while Jackson attacked his front.²⁹ While Banks looked south, Jackson was now poised to strike at Winchester with his entire army and cut Banks off completely. Seemingly uncharacteristically, he held back.

Jackson's decision not to immediately move toward Winchester had a firm theoretical basis. Halleck's commentary on Jomini contained the admonition that "It may be well to remark that it is not enough merely to gain the extremity and rear of the enemy, for in that case it may be possible for him to throw himself on our communications and place us in the very dilemma in which we had hoped to involve him."³⁰ While there was probably not much danger of Banks moving to threaten Jackson's communications, there was another concern that fell under the same principle.

Jackson reasoned that a precipitous move on Winchester would open the route for Banks to move via Front Royal toward McDowell or to Washington, actions that could not be permitted.³¹ Therefore, acting according to Halleck's principle, he moved more slowly, sending Ashby's cavalry toward Winchester to cut off Banks while Jackson pursued with his main force. The plan likely would have succeeded but for Jackson's obsessive secrecy.

It has been noted that Jackson took no counsel from his subordinates, nor did he make his plans known to them until absolutely necessary. In this critical area, Jackson heeded Jomini and Halleck both too well and not at all. This paradoxical statement is not made lightly. Jackson was a man of stark contrasts for whom there was very rarely a gray area of opinion. Jomini and Halleck both warned against a commander holding councils of war to reach a decision. They asserted that such councils should only be undertaken among officers who agreed with the commander and could make suggestions to boost his confidence toward his stated objective. Councils serve the positive role of providing the means by which the commander clearly communicates his intentions to his subordinates.

The negative result of Jackson's council of war during the withdrawal

from Winchester in March led him to two primary conclusions. First, that he alone should make command decisions, a conclusion with which Jomini and Halleck would have agreed. Second, councils of war should be dispensed with entirely since he would be the sole decision-maker. This conclusion ran counter to Halleck and Jomini's assertion that subordinate commanders should have intimate knowledge of the plan of action. The communication of such knowledge was crucial to ensure the proper implementation of the commander's designs. This second conclusion made communication of his plans much more difficult and led to confusion where there might otherwise have been clarity.³²

When dispatching Ashby, Jackson merely told him to harass Banks without revealing to him the entire concept of his plan. As a result, Ashby's cavalry engaged in widespread looting of abandoned Federal material, especially horses, which many of the cavalymen rounded up and led to their homes before returning two or three days later. Thanks to this miscommunication, Banks reached Winchester in relatively good order, though Jackson snapped up much of his service and supply train during the pursuit.³³

Though he had arrived at Winchester safely, Banks's position was desperate. He was outnumbered and his men were demoralized. Though he attempted to hold the town on 25 May, Jackson's force was too strong and scattered Banks's troops to the north. Had Ashby's cavalry been present in any strength, Banks may have been bagged right there. In their absence, Jackson had to settle for inflicting approximately 3,000 losses, mostly prisoners, on the Federal force.³⁴

On 16 May, prior to the move against Front Royal, Lee had written to Jackson saying, "Whatever movement you make against Banks, do it speedily, and if successful drive him back toward the Potomac, and create the impression, as far as practicable, that you design threatening that line." It is here that Lee's concept of threatening McDowell's communications along the Potomac River line may be seen. Lee understood that such a threat would hold McDowell at Fredericksburg or even force him to withdraw entirely.³⁵

The concern over communications should not be overlooked. As long as the rail link to Washington could be maintained, McDowell could be reasonably certain that his daily supply needs would be met. If the rail line were cut, he would have to rely upon wagon trains, as well as provide for their security. McDowell's logistical needs were not inconsiderable. The Army of the Potomac standard for the time was approximately three pounds of rations per day for the men and twenty-six pounds per horse. To meet this need, approximately forty-five wagons were required per 1,000 men. The further the force marched from its base of

supply, in this case Washington, the more wagons would be required to compensate for those in transit. These figures do not include the wagons needed for other requirements such as ammunition and medical supplies. Thus, the operational mobility of a Civil War army was determined by the security of its connections to its base of supply. The sixty miles between Fredericksburg and Richmond could become perilous indeed with uncertain communications.³⁶

When Banks dispatched Shields to Fredericksburg, Johnston had advocated Jackson's shadowing of the Federal division along the way to eventually settle in front of McDowell. Lee demonstrated a deeper understanding of Jominian concepts. A "decisive strategic point" is defined by Jomini as a point "whose importance is constant and immense."³⁷ It must be remembered that Jackson's objective was to deny McClellan the support of Banks and McDowell. Lee had identified the Potomac River crossings as decisive in terms of threatening McDowell's lines of communication. Such a threat offered the opportunity to influence McDowell's army in a much more profound way than merely interposing Jackson's command between McDowell and Richmond.

Johnston, to his credit, altered his view after learning of the results at Winchester. He had received news that McDowell had crossed the Rappahannock and was moving south. McClellan had taken Mechanicsville, five miles from Richmond, and was extending his right wing past Hanover Courthouse to link up with McDowell. The trap was closing and Johnston, like Lee, saw Jackson's as the only command that had an opportunity to stop it. The urgency of the situation is evident from two letters to Jackson on 27 May, in which Johnston said, "If you can threaten Baltimore and Washington, do so," and, more ominously,

You cannot, in your present position, employ such an army as yours upon any enterprise not bearing directly on the state of things here—either by preventing the reinforcements to McClellan's army, or by drawing troops from it by divisions. These objects might be accomplished by the demonstrations proposed above [that is, crossing the Potomac], or by a movement upon McDowell, although I fear that by the time this reaches you it will be too late for either.³⁸

By the time this correspondence reached Jackson he had arrived on the Potomac, the tasks set before him by Johnston already accomplished.³⁹

On 28 May, Johnston learned from General J.E.B. Stuart that McDowell had halted his southward advance and was returning to Fredericksburg. This was

the result of an order from Lincoln, originating on 24 May, to send Shields back to the Valley to support Banks. Jackson's aggressive moves had now stopped McDowell for the third time. Lincoln also ordered Fremont to move on Harrisonburg to cut Jackson's avenue of retreat. It has been common to assert that Lincoln issued these orders out of fear for the safety of Washington but their issuance on 24 May, before Banks was routed from Winchester, shows this to have not been the case.⁴⁰ It is clear that Lincoln's orders were aimed at overwhelming Jackson in the Valley.

Jackson, acting on the suggestions of Lee, pursued Banks's beaten army from Winchester all the way to the Potomac at Harper's Ferry. In the wake of the Federal defeat at Winchester and the pursuit to Harper's Ferry, Lincoln and Stanton became concerned that Jackson might threaten Washington, though the capital was not sent into a panic, as has been suggested by some. In fact, on 28 May, Lincoln inquired of McDowell as to the feasibility of renewing his march to the south. McDowell declined, stating that it would be unwise to advance only part of his force and to leave Fredericksburg "other than strongly held, which could not be done as the troops are now posted." With that decision by McDowell, Jackson accomplished once and for all his goal of preventing McDowell's army from joining McClellan.⁴¹

Though Lincoln did not panic, his concern for Washington gave him pause. The threat to the Federal lines of communication did the same for McDowell. As Frederick wrote, "You will be sure of creating jealousy in the enemy, if you threaten places that either communicate with the capital or serve as depots for his provisions."⁴² Jackson had provided such a threat to both Lincoln and McDowell.

Jackson took receipt of Johnston's letters on 30 May. Aware of the movements of Shields and Fremont, now aiming to cut him off, Jackson dispatched a courier to Richmond asking for reinforcements to bring his strength to 40,000 men. Only with such a force could he credibly threaten the cities of the North, an opportunity that had now presented itself. At the same time, he had his army moving south with its captured stores to escape the trap being closed by the two Federal columns, who he expected to link up at Strasburg.⁴³

Though Jackson's forces had much further to travel than the Federals, on 1 June he pushed the last of his men through Strasburg and up the Valley Pike toward Staunton. Jackson's escape, literally under the eyes of Federal advance units, was due as much to the slowness of Fremont as to the alacrity of the now-weary Confederate troops. Instead of advancing on Harrisonburg, Fremont held to the protection of the Alleghenies and moved further north to strike at Strasburg.⁴⁴

Jackson's advance to the Potomac had led the Federals to once again overestimate his strength, so neither Shields nor Fremont was willing to oppose him alone. This caution caused further delays as the two commands tried to coordinate their advances.⁴⁵

Jackson, awaiting word from Richmond, moved up the Valley toward his old bolt hole of Brown's Gap above Port Republic. Fremont pursued him closely. As a precaution, Jackson burned the bridges over the South Fork of the Shenandoah River to block Shields, who was pursuing south through the Luray Valley. Jackson won the race to Port Republic, barely, but instead of retiring to defensive positions in Brown's Gap, decided to turn and fight.

The resulting 8-9 June Battles of Cross Keys, against Fremont, and Port Republic, against Shields, were effectively tactical draws. Jackson fought Fremont to a standstill on 8 June before wheeling to strike Shields the next morning. Jackson's force flanked Shields at Port Republic, inflicting heavy casualties, pushing the Federals nine miles down the Luray Valley to the north. Jackson did not pursue because of the threat of Fremont to the west.

Jackson's 8 June plan was based conceptually on Napoleon's practice of operating on interior lines to destroy one foe before turning on the other. While a good plan on paper, it was poorly executed on the tactical level in terms of the movement of troops across the river, leading to the aforementioned stalemate.⁴⁶ Fremont's dispatches indicate that his men fought well at Cross Keys but, without Shields, he was unwilling to press his perceived advantage.⁴⁷

Though authorized to stay if he felt he had a chance to defeat Jackson, Shields soon withdrew on the excuse that he was expected to march on Richmond with McDowell. Fremont, seeing the withdrawal of Shields and harassed by Confederate cavalry, moved north to Middletown, ten miles south of Winchester, where he joined Banks's reconstituted command. Thus, Jackson's Shenandoah Valley Campaign came to a quiet close.

Elsewhere in Virginia its effects were still being felt. Lee, now in command of the Confederate army before Richmond, wrote Jefferson Davis on 5 June regarding Jackson's request for reinforcements. Lee believed that such an action could "change the character of the war," but felt that he could not spare troops from Richmond for the effort, a notion with which Davis concurred. The reinforcement of Jackson on such a scale would require the transfer of troops from the Carolinas and Georgia, leaving the coast all but defenseless. Lee settled for sending Jackson eight regiments to enable him to clear the upper Valley and then move quickly to Richmond.⁴⁸ Thus, the tactical draw at Cross Keys-Port Republic became a strategic victory for the Confederacy, as Lee was able to relegate Banks

and Fremont to the lower Valley while adding Jackson's force to the upcoming assault on McClellan.

Thanks to Jackson's efforts to halt McDowell at Fredericksburg, McClellan's right flank was unsupported, giving Lee the opportunity to move on this flank at the outset of the Seven Days Battles. McClellan was eventually forced off the Peninsula, though at the cost of 20,000 Confederate casualties. Robert E. Lee rightfully receives credit for the Confederate victory over McClellan, but it was Jackson who provided him the opportunity in the first place.

The reasons for Jackson's success may be framed using Jomini's Fundamental Principle of War.⁴⁹ Jackson employed strategic maneuver to place the full weight of his army on the decisive points and lines of communication of the enemy. Such was the case in the defense of Staunton when Jackson concentrated first on Milroy, then on Banks. It was the case at Front Royal, which forced the evacuation of the Strasburg fortifications and led to the victory at Winchester. In addition, Jackson employed this principle on multiple occasions to threaten Federal communications with the result of holding McDowell away from Richmond.

Jackson used maneuver to concentrate superior numbers against weaker portions of the Federal forces arrayed against him, for example the battles at McDowell, Front Royal, and Winchester. Even at the Battles of Cross Keys and Port Republic, Jackson won a strategic victory due to his ability to keep his adversaries separated and mass against a single opponent. Finally, Jackson repeatedly demonstrated his understanding of the need to strike quickly in order to gain the initiative and attack with positive energy. The application of this concept alone caused, on two separate occasions at Kernstown and Harper's Ferry, the halt of McDowell's force. His lone failure was Ashby's inability to stop Banks from reaching Winchester.

Jackson's long study of the principles of war stood to the forefront during his celebrated Shenandoah Valley Campaign. His sound theoretical base allowed him to develop a theater-wide strategy, which turned the tide of the war, despite being significantly outnumbered by the forces opposing him. This is not to say that Jackson, or Lee, employed Jomini as a battlefield instructional manual. Rather, Jackson and Lee understood their craft so well that they applied Jominian principles on an intuitive level as the circumstances demanded. Banks, a so-called "political general," simply lacked the training and experience of two supremely talented professional soldiers. By seizing the initiative from Banks, Jackson forced the Federals to react to his movements, tying down as many as five times his own number and likely extending the duration of the war by at least two years.

Halleck wrote, “Not infrequently, the results of a campaign depend more upon the strategic operations of an army, than upon its victories gained in actual combat. Tactics . . . is therefore subordinate to the choice of positions.”⁵⁰ The tactics employed by Jackson during the campaign, though beyond the scope of this work, were not responsible for securing his ultimate victory. Rather, it was his application of strategic principle. Halleck perhaps had it right when he referenced Napoleon’s maxim “That success is oftener due to the genius of the general, and to the nature of the theatre of war, than to the number and bravery of the soldiers.”⁵¹

Notes

1. Bevin Alexander, *How Great Generals Win* (New York: Norton, 1993), 127.
2. *Ibid.*, 129.
3. Douglas S. Freeman, *R.E. Lee Vol. II* (New York, London: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1949), 32.
4. *Ibid.*, 37.
5. Robert G. Tanner, *Stonewall in the Valley, Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson’s Valley Campaign, Spring, 1862* (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1996), 110.
6. Edward Hagerman, *The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare; Ideas, Organization, and Field Command* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988), 3-16.
7. Antoine Henri de Jomini, *The Art of War*, trans. G.H. Mendell and W.P. Craighill (El Paso: El Paso Norte Press, 2005), 56.
8. *Ibid.*, 57.
9. United States War Department, *The War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, 128 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1881-1901), vol. 12, pt. 1, p. 379. (Hereinafter cited as OR; except as otherwise noted, all references are to Series I).
10. Alexander, 129.
11. H. Wager Halleck, *Elements of Military Art and Science* (New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1862), Chapter 2.
12. Tanner, 303.
13. Alexander, 129.
14. Walter P. Lang, Jr., J. Frank Hennessee, and William E. Bush, Jr., “Jackson’s Valley Campaign and the Operational Level of War,” *Parameters, Journal of the Army War College* Volume XV, No 4. (1985): 48-58.
15. Halleck, Chapter 2.
16. Jomini, 61-64.
17. Halleck, Chapter 2.

18. Douglas S. Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command, Volume I, Manassas to Malvern Hill* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950), 321-322.

19. Freeman, *Lee, Vol. II*, 33-34.

20. *Ibid.*, 33-34.

21. *Ibid.*, 38, 62.

22. OR, vol. 12, pt.1, p. 446.

23. Alexander, 131.

24. Frederick the Great, *Instructions for His Generals*, translated by Thomas R. Phillips, New York: Dover Publications, 2012, 287.

25. OR, vol. 12, pt.1. p. 10.

26. Freeman, *Lee, Vol. II*, 55.

27. Frederick, 261-262.

28. OR, vol. 12, pt. 1, pp. 701-703.

29. *Ibid.*, 526-528.

30. Halleck, Chapter 2.

31. OR, vol. 12, pt. 1, p. 703.

32. Jomini, 44-45.

33. OR, vol. 12, pt. 1, p. 704.

34. Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants, Vol. I*, 395-407.

35. Freeman, *Lee, Vol. II*, 62.

36. Hagerman, 44-46, 60-61.

37. Jomini, 67.

38. Tanner, 291-292.

39. Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants, Vol. I*, 415.

40. *Ibid.*, 407-409.

41. *Ibid.*, 409, 410.

42. Frederick, 289.

43. Freeman, *Lee's Lieutenants, Vol. I*, 414-419.

44. OR, 11-12.

45. Alexander, 136-137.

46. Lang, Hennessee, and Bush, 56.

47. OR, vol. 12, pt. 1, pp. 654-655.

48. Freeman, *Lee, Vol. II*, 83-84, 94-95.

49. Jomini, 55. Jomini's Fundamental Principle of War consists of four points: 1. To throw by strategic movements the mass of an army, successively, upon the decisive points of a theater of war, and also upon the communications of the enemy as much as possible without compromising one's own. 2. To maneuver to engage fractions of the hostile army with the bulk of one's forces. 3. On the battlefield, to throw the mass of the forces upon the decisive point, or upon that portion of the hostile line which it is of the first importance to overthrow. 4. To so arrange that these masses shall not only be thrown upon the decisive point, but that they shall engage at the proper times and with energy.

50. Halleck, Chapter 2.

51. *Ibid.*, Chapter 2.

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Porter's 1862 Campaign in Northeast Missouri

Jimmy R. Dick

Early in the American Civil War, Union supporters and rebel secessionists sought to gain control of Missouri. By 1862, the Confederate rebels had been driven from the state. The Union victory at Pea Ridge, Arkansas on March 7, 1862 solidified Union control of Missouri for the remainder of the conflict, but small guerrilla forces opposed to the Union remained on the loose to plague the people of the state for three more years. The loss at Pea Ridge resulted in orders for the defeated Confederate forces to move east of the Mississippi River for operations in that theater, which deprived General Sterling Price, commander of the Missouri State Guard, of troops for his army. However, the idea that there were thousands of men with loyalties to the South persisted in Price's imagination. He sent several officers into Missouri to recruit men and bring them back south to join the units under his command. Colonel Joseph Chrisman Porter, a longtime resident of Lewis County in northeast Missouri, was one of these officers. Porter successfully recruited a large group of men and initiated combat operations, which took the Union occupiers by surprise before he was forced to withdraw. In the grand strategic picture of the war, Porter's campaign in northeast Missouri was fairly inconsequential, but he accomplished his primary missions: recruiting soldiers for the Confederacy and causing massive unrest.

Few large battles were fought during the war in Missouri. Rather, small units of Confederate guerrillas or bushwhackers fought against units of Federal troops and militiamen who patrolled the state. This form of war was often brutal and brought out the worst in the men fighting on both sides. The roots of the conflict paralleled those of the larger war, but certain events in the region made a fratricidal guerrilla war possible. Sectional conflict along the Kansas-Missouri border had been ongoing for a decade prior to the Civil War itself. Colonel Porter was assigned by Sterling Price to recruit men in northeast Missouri where many of the underlying conditions that fueled the guerrillas in the western part of the state did not exist. Porter was fortunate, however, because the preponderance of men with ties to the southern states and the actions of Union occupying troops caused many men to join his fledgling force.

One of the issues that aided Porter was the treatment of men with southern sympathies by Union garrison troops. Until the Union's preemptive

moves put a stop to Governor Claiborne Jackson and Sterling Price's efforts to take over the state, many men flocked to the Missouri State Guard. Despite Price's victory at Wilson's Creek in August 1861, pressure by Union troops and the Unionist Missouri Home Guard caused Price and the State Guard to retreat to the Arkansas border where many of Price's men deserted and returned home.¹ Union forces occupying the state as well as Union supporters from Missouri often mistreated the Confederate deserters as well as any others who had voiced support for the Confederacy. This gave many of them a reason to join or assist the guerrilla bands in their home areas.

Many of the people that settled northeast Missouri prior to 1860 came from the South. While most did not bring slaves to the region there were some, concentrated along the Mississippi River. While most of the residents opposed secession, many sided with the South in general. Both sides raised regiments in the region in 1861 and fought a battle at Athens in Clark County on the Des Moines River separating Missouri from Iowa. The volunteer Home Guard regiment, faced by a Missouri State Guard unit that outnumbered them by a four-to-one factor, completely routed the secessionists and drove them from the northeast corner of the state. Both units formally joined their respective militaries and faced each other again on battlefields throughout the South. This was a documented case where neighbor fought neighbor and sons battled fathers.²

The Union force enrolled as the Twenty-First Missouri Infantry Regiment. They spent the winter of 1861 securing northeast Missouri from the actions of various guerrilla bands operating in the area and were quite effective.³ However, when the Twenty-First moved south to join General Ulysses S. Grant's army in March 1862, it thereby reduced the number of pro-Union men in the region, which made it much easier for Porter and his guerrilla force to operate.

The guerrilla war in northeast Missouri had its origins in orders from General Price sent out in November 1861 imploring Missourians to join his depleted Missouri State Guard, when he sent Porter and others north to recruit.⁴ The first attacks had occurred as groups of men wanting to join Price's Guard moved south and cut telegraph lines and destroyed train tracks and bridges in the process. The actions of these guerrillas, the large numbers recruited in the state, and the nature of guerrilla warfare in general caused General Henry W. Halleck, commander of the Union Department of Missouri, to issue a "shoot on sight" order for anyone caught in the act of guerrilla warfare.⁵ This order also contained provisions to punish any Southern sympathizers for property damage in the area. Halleck's order, coupled with the creation of the Missouri State Militia in November 1861, was designed to put pressure on the people of the state to turn

against the guerrillas in their midst. It often provoked the exact opposite reaction. In northeast Missouri, the guerrilla situation seemed to have ceased, but the arrival of Colonel Joseph Porter, sometime in May 1862, ended that period of inactivity.

That the Confederate Congress sanctioned guerrilla warfare as a legitimate form of war on April 21, 1862 aided Porter's mission. This allowed the Confederate War Department to issue commissions to Southern officers to recruit partisan rangers. The Confederate actions gave the bushwhackers and guerrillas in Missouri an aura of legitimacy, which caused some reluctant, would-be Confederates to envision themselves as patriotic fighters like the Revolutionary War hero, Francis Marion.⁶ The Missouri State Militia responded with General Order 18, which it announced on May 29, 1862. This order reinforced Halleck's "shoot on sight" proclamation for those caught in the act of guerrilla war, but it also created a policy that any guerrilla soldier or recruiting officer could turn himself in and gain protection by taking an oath to not bear arms against the lawful government of the United States or the State of Missouri.⁷

Many southern Missourians took this oath as a mere matter of convenience and later returned to the guerrilla forces. Neither the Union nor the Confederacy made provisions for holding many troops as prisoners of war. The common manner of dealing with prisoners was to give them parole. A paroled prisoner swore an oath not to take up arms again until a proper prisoner exchange occurred and released him from his vow. For captured guerrillas, though, parole meant returning home where Union forces punished them for their guerrilla actions while treating them as inferiors with no protection under the law. Reprisals occurred and often motivated men to break their parole and return to the guerrillas. During the course of Porter's campaign, opposing forces executed many recaptured parole breakers.⁸

Joseph Porter was born in Kentucky in 1819. His family moved to Missouri during his childhood, and he later moved to Lewis County in northeast Missouri, where he resided about four miles east of Newark. When General Price sent out his first call for volunteers, Porter enlisted in the Missouri State Guard. The men of his regiment elected him lieutenant colonel and he served as second-in-command of the regiment under Colonel Martin Green, who had fought at Athens. Following the regiment's defeat, he went south and fought with General Price at Wilson's Creek, Lexington, and Pea Ridge, suffering a head wound at Lexington where he was cited for bravery. He was one of many officers sent to recruit for Price's command in 1862.⁹ Captain Frisby H. McCullough traveled with him. Price sent another Confederate officer, Colonel John A. Poindexter, to counties in northcentral Missouri near Porter's operating area, but his recruits were not part of

Porter's campaign.

Porter swiftly set up a camp and began recruiting men, stockpiling supplies, and building a network of informers. The Southern sympathizers were eager to help Porter and shortly he had over a hundred men in his camp, including his brother Jim. Porter's mission was twofold: first, recruit as many men as he could and return with them to Price; second, engage in irregular warfare with Union forces, thus tying down men that otherwise would have bolstered the Union armies invading the Confederacy.¹⁰

Porter himself did not consider the men under his command to be guerrillas or bushwhackers, but the fact remains that he operated as such and worked in conjunction with the various guerrilla bands in northeast Missouri. While he did not specifically order the destruction of private property or destroy bridges and train tracks except to throw off pursuit, his force was not enlisted in the Confederate Army while it operated in Missouri and therefore fell under the Partisan Ranger Act of the Confederacy.¹¹ This act enabled recruiting officers to recruit irregular troops who would then make their way through Union lines to Confederate units.¹² It fit what Porter and other recruiters were doing, but the discipline was often very poor. More often than not, both sides saw irregulars as nothing more than bandits preying upon the general population. This popular view was seemingly validated in Texas when William Quantrill's men would move south for the winter. Criminal acts such as robbery and murder were commonplace until spring, when the guerrillas would return to Missouri and resume their depredations.

Porter made his presence known on June 17 when he engaged a Missouri State Militia patrol in western Marion County. Porter's men captured and paroled the four-man militia patrol, keeping their weapons.¹³ This was the first indication to the Union that Porter was actively recruiting in the Northeast District. The district was one of eight military districts under martial law that followed the state's congressional district boundaries. The commander of the district for the Union was Colonel Lewis Merrill who had his headquarters in Macon. He had several units of the Missouri State Militia under his command to enforce the martial law that had been in effect since 1861. These units were scattered across the district in small detachments to maintain an uneasy peace and to look for any possible guerrillas. Porter's first action surprised Merrill.

In addition to Porter and his recruits there were several guerrilla bands that operated in the region. Most of those bands joined forces with Porter during his campaign, which gave Porter a sizable force of armed men with a very large base of support in the area. Despite the additional manpower and local advantages, Porter faced two obstacles in accomplishing his twin missions. One was the lack of military weaponry needed to fight Union troops; the second was crossing the

formidable barrier that the Missouri River posed to any movements south.¹⁴ The Missouri River was the primary reason for Porter's campaign occurring as it did. He understood from the beginning of his recruiting that moving a large group of men across the river while engaging enemy forces would require a forced crossing.

He felt that the best way he could accomplish his two objectives was to capture weapons. By doing so, he could arm his recruits to enable them to defend themselves while he continued recruiting. Ultimately, he could force a Missouri River crossing. Porter's actions in the early stages of his campaign showed that he was carrying out that plan of action. The Union commander in Missouri, General John Schofield, discerned the purpose of these Confederate recruiting campaigns and ordered all boats and other means of crossing the Missouri River not under the guard of his troops to be destroyed or placed under the protection of his troops. He also ordered gunboat patrols of the river and limited navigation of the river. Schofield was determined to prevent any large groups of prospective Confederate soldiers from escaping to the south where they could reinforce the Confederate Army.¹⁵

Capturing militia patrols was a slow way for Porter to arm his forces while also causing Union forces to search for his camp. After being tipped off that the small arms at the county courthouse in Memphis were poorly guarded, Porter marched around 125 of his men there and captured the town on July 13. He was rewarded with a haul of about 100 muskets with cartridge boxes.¹⁶ While at Memphis one of Porter's officers, a guerrilla chief named Tom Stacy, whom Porter appointed as a captain, extracted a measure of revenge against a civilian who had bragged about killing two of Stacy's men several days earlier. The civilian, Dr. William Aylward, had spent time with the Missouri Home Guard unit from Clark County in 1861. During the night Dr. Aylward's guards, who happened to be a brother and cousin of the two executed guerrillas, hung Aylward and left his body lying in a field.¹⁷

Actions such as this were rare in Porter's command, but they did occur. There is no evidence that Porter ordered the killing or that he knew it had been done until several days later.¹⁸ The capture of Memphis brought swift action from the Union forces. On July 18, Porter anticipated the pursuit and laid an ambush at Vassar's Hill in southwest Scotland County. The Union's Merrill Horse and 11th Missouri Cavalry suffered eighty-three casualties with twenty-three killed. Porter lost two men, one being Captain Stacy. After the Federals withdrew, Porter held the field and secured the weapons abandoned by his retreating opponent. Porter skillfully executed the ambush and his men fought as a well-disciplined line using volley fire against several rash charges by the militia cavalry led by Major John

Clopper.¹⁹

About this time, Colonel John McNeil assumed command of the Northeast District as the general rise in guerrilla activity throughout Missouri necessitated a restructuring of the command situation and areas of responsibility. McNeil had spent the winter of 1861-62 along the Kansas border where the worst guerrilla actions of the war occurred. By 1862, both sides gave little quarter, and the bloody nature of guerrilla warfare had hardened McNeil. He marked his arrival in northeast Missouri by a dogged pursuit of Porter and his forces and an enforcement of Halleck's "shoot on sight" orders. As McNeil organized his forces at Palmyra, Porter made a long hard ride south in what some interpreted as an attempt to take his force across the Missouri River to Arkansas. By this time, Porter had recruited somewhere between three and four hundred men.²⁰

Porter's lack of a supply train made this ride and other rapid movements possible. His command lived off the land as it went. He considered each man to be his own quartermaster and sympathetic people in the region greatly aided his men. This came at a cost, though. Porter was chronically short of ammunition throughout his campaign and the morale of his men depended upon his ability to avoid battles that were not in his favor. As with any guerrilla force, its ultimate success depended upon its ability to win fights and avoid those that it could not win. Losing battles would result in losing men to desertion and forfeiting support from the population. Porter's force was successful until the ride south.

Porter managed to avoid confronting Union forces until he moved through the village of Florida, which was near two bridges that spanned forks of the Salt River. The Third Iowa Cavalry had a detachment there and a short skirmish broke out. The Third Iowa maintained contact with Porter's force for a couple days while also alerting other militia units of Porter's location. In northern Calloway County, Porter was joined by another guerrilla band led by Captain Alvin Cobb, but was also informed that Colonel Oden Guitar, leading the 9th Missouri Cavalry of the Missouri State Militia, had combined several units and was nearby. Porter had no choice but to engage them. He was able to find a location near Moore's Mill suitable for his force and waited for Guitar's attack, which came on July 28. Two cannon augmented Guitar's force. The battle was a drawn-out affair in which Porter lost in excess of sixty men killed and one hundred-twenty wounded while Guitar only lost twenty killed and fifty-five wounded.²¹

This action greatly demoralized Porter's force, and following the battle, many men left to return home. Cobb and other guerrillas also left to go back to their own home counties to resume their activities. Porter's attempt to cross the Missouri ended. The loss and subsequent defections reduced his command to less

than one hundred men. At this point Porter was at an all-time low in his campaign and could have easily decided to return to disband or to make a rush to join Price. However, the decision of the Missouri governor, Hamilton Gamble, and the Missouri State Militia commander, General Schofield, to try to end the increased guerrilla activity revived Porter's campaign. With Gamble's support, Schofield issued General Order 19, which created a new militia in Missouri, the Enrolled Missouri Militia (EMM). All able bodied men in the state were required to enroll in the EMM regardless of their status, unless they were in the Union army or Missouri State Militia.²² This requirement affected all those who supported the South, including paroled soldiers. The result was that many men who would not have joined the Confederate recruiters now did so. The main point of the plan was to be able to keep those men under surveillance; the plan backfired.

This might have been the biggest blunder made during 1862 in the effort to end the guerrilla war. The issue of secession had divided Missouri in 1861. Few had wanted to secede or go to war over secession, but the actions of Price and others forced the state into the conflict. Schofield's order then forced men to choose sides. Thousands chose the South, especially men who were already being mistreated by federal or militia troops. Many of the men who had been captured and released on parole also slipped back to the guerrillas. The order also resulted in federal troops seizing weapons from those deemed unreliable; these Union soldiers had license to enter homes and steal anything they wanted. While the order did augment federal forces in Missouri, it also created thousands of guerrillas, primarily among men who would have remained neutral.²³

As a direct result of this order on July 22, Porter was flooded with new recruits despite his defeat at Moore's Mill. He acted quickly to secure as many men as he could and sent out small detachments around northeast Missouri to gather up the recruits, eventually to meet at a prearranged place along the Lewis and Knox County line. Porter himself moved north gathering men, and on August 1 reached Newark. There, he attacked two companies of the Eleventh Missouri State Militia hoping to capture them swiftly to avoid casualties and to seize their arms. The seventy-five militiamen were able to take refuge in a few stone buildings and held out for several hours until Porter ordered burning hay wagons to be pushed against the walls. The parties negotiated surrender. The battle left only a few men dead or wounded on either side. Porter was able to gather up all the weapons and ammunition for his force.²⁴

Many more recruits joined Porter that night. At his prearranged meeting point on August 2, he received word that Captain Tice Cain's guerrillas had captured Kirksville. Also at this point, Porter found himself under close pursuit by

Colonel McNeil's force, which had quickly moved into Newark after the guerrillas' departure. Porter and his officers decided to go to Kirksville. McNeil followed and steadily gained on them despite his supply train and five cannon.²⁵ His experiences on the Kansas border had evidently shown McNeil the art of moving swiftly in order to fight the guerrillas. The large body of recruits Porter suddenly had, many of whom were not mounted, slowed the Confederates—further benefiting McNeil. Due to the lack of mounts, Porter's force took four days to reach Kirksville. McNeil's command was right behind him by the time Porter entered the village. At that point, he had no choice but to fight. While Porter now had over two thousand men, only a quarter had military weapons. A quarter had pistols, shotguns, or squirrel guns, while half of the men were completely unarmed. Eyewitnesses say that Porter was not happy about fighting at Kirksville, but the proximity of the Union cavalry prevented him from being able to find a better location. With Porter stopped, McNeil was able to deploy his forces in a battle formation to his liking. McNeil positioned his five cannon to pound the guerrillas, which he proceeded to do. The Battle of Kirksville only lasted approximately three hours, and it was a very one-sided fight.²⁶

Accounts vary as to the number of casualties, but McNeil's official statement indicated that Union forces killed 150 guerrillas and wounded over 300. They took forty seven prisoners. McNeil's force lost five killed and thirty two wounded.²⁷ His cavalry pursued Porter's fleeing men into the Chariton River bottom where the guerrillas escaped pursuit by going into brush that put the cavalry at a disadvantage. However, Porter did not escape pursuit. Over the next few days, other Union forces attacked him as he moved south along the river inflicting more casualties. Porter did manage to ambush his pursuers at least once, inflicting over a hundred casualties, but by August 11, he had to disband his command as it disintegrated around him due to battle losses and desertion.²⁸

Following the Battle of Kirksville, Colonel McNeil had fifteen of the captured guerrillas executed by firing squad on the battlefield, after a short court-martial.²⁹ All fifteen had parole papers on them, which meant they were in willful violation of General Order 18. The executions shocked the region, but they also reflected the growing frustration of Union soldiers and leaders after capturing paroled guerrillas more than once.³⁰ Again, McNeil's time on the Kansas border almost certainly had a hand in this matter. It was common in the western part of the state where guerrilla activity was most prevalent for prisoners on either side to be shot immediately; however, McNeil's actions at Kirksville had not been seen in northeast Missouri until this moment. These were not the only prisoners executed by McNeil's orders in the area. McNeil and his troops worked hard to root out the

guerrillas in the region and shot several other parole violators over the course of the next month.

Porter was resilient and regrouped in Lewis County. His force swelled once again as McNeil and other Union commanders repeatedly swept the region. A patrol of the Knox County EMM captured Porter's fellow officer, Frisby McCullough, now a lieutenant colonel, and took him to Kirksville where by order of McNeil a firing squad executed him. That action may have been in violation of the rules of warfare; however, McNeil suffered no repercussions. McCullough was a commissioned officer of the Confederate Army and was captured in his uniform. There was considerable debate for years about the actual details of McCullough's commission and whether or not he was court-martialed.³¹

Porter tried to get as many men across the Missouri River as he could. He had learned that any attack he made would bring swift pursuit by Union forces. His support from the population was also declining as many of his supporters were under surveillance by federal agents or had been captured. Porter had to keep on the move and apparently arranged a diversionary attack on Palmyra in order to free captured guerrillas and draw attention away from the Missouri River, where many of his recruits were trying to cross over.³² He was successful in releasing the prisoners, but immediately drew the attention of Union forces that pursued him relentlessly, even attacking his camp more than once. McNeil kept the pressure on Porter who decided it was time to leave the region with the men he had left. On October 16, Porter and his men began crossing the Missouri River at Portland in Calloway County. Even then, Union troops caught up with him and prevented many from making the crossing. Porter himself made his way across the river and to the Confederate Army in Arkansas.³³

Porter's capture of Palmyra brought about a government crisis regarding the execution of prisoners. Porter captured a civilian named Andrew Allsman who had been an informant for the Union. Allsman was an older man who had lived in the area for thirty years and had testified regarding the loyalty of various people in Union courts. Regardless of who gave the order, if there even was an order, some of Porter's men murdered Allsman and hid the body.³⁴ There was no evidence that Porter ordered his death. General McNeil was under immense pressure to do something about Allsman's disappearance. On October 8, he published a notice in the *Palmyra Courier* and had copies of letters sent to Porter's home and posted throughout the area.³⁵

The notice stated that unless Allsman returned unharmed to his family ten days from the date of the notice, McNeil would execute ten of Porter's guerrillas whom the Union troops had captured. By this time, Porter was already near

Portland preparing to cross into southern Missouri and he never saw or knew about the notice. Since Allsman was already dead, there was no way to prevent McNeil from carrying out his ultimatum, which he did on October 18; he made a grand show of the event.³⁶ McNeil had once again used extreme measures to counter the guerrilla activity. This time it provoked a reaction from his superiors, after a demand for McNeil to be turned over to the Confederacy to face a trial for murder arrived from no less than the president of the Confederacy, Jefferson Davis. Davis sent a message to the Union commander of the Missouri forces, Major General Samuel R. Curtis, stating that if he did not comply by handing over McNeil, Davis would order ten Union officers to be shot.³⁷ Nothing came of the demand although Abraham Lincoln's cabinet had at least two heated discussions over the incident that became known as the Palmyra Massacre. Although McNeil was not turned over to the Confederates, no Union officers were ever executed as Davis had threatened.

While McNeil earned his nickname, "Butcher McNeil," his actions during the second half of 1862 ended the guerrilla actions in northeast Missouri. Following the executions at Palmyra, guerrilla activity in the district all but ceased.³⁸ The biggest reason for this was that McNeil's relentless pursuit of the guerrillas resulted in the capture of many of them, while many others, like Porter, fled the state. Several of the guerrilla groups disbanded, as Union forces killed their leaders or otherwise wiped out the bands. In addition, the creation of the Enrolled Missouri Militia achieved its purpose despite having caused many men to become guerrillas themselves. A patrol of the EMM captured Porter's fellow Confederate recruiter, John Poindexter, on September 1 after Union cavalry had attacked his force several times, dispersing it.³⁹ For the remainder of the war, the counties of Schuyler, Adair, Knox, Macon, Shelby, Scotland, Clark, Lewis, and Marion saw almost no organized guerrilla activity. Most of the Missouri State Guard units transferred elsewhere and the EMM kept watch over the region.

The number of men that Porter recruited and managed to get to Confederate lines was unknown. There is no record beyond estimates, and they vary. Joseph Mudd claimed that around five thousand men made it to the Confederate Army, but that number seems very high when only approximately thirty thousand Missourians served in the Confederate Army during the war. Mudd took his numbers from a report that indicated Porter raised five thousand men in northeast Missouri, but that does not mean all five thousand made it south.⁴⁰ Major General Thomas Hindman, who commanded the Trans-Mississippi Department of the Confederacy in 1862, said that the actions of Porter and other recruiters raised twelve regiments for the Confederate Army.⁴¹ This could have been possible, but

Hindman's estimation took into consideration all recruiting statewide. Recruits from north of the Missouri River had a difficult time crossing that barrier, though. Mudd countered this by saying Hindman failed to take into consideration the thousands that may have found their way south by going to Illinois and then south across the Ohio River into Kentucky.⁴²

In this regard, the decision of General Sterling Price to send recruiters such as Colonel Porter to Missouri did accomplish part of its mission. Thousands of Missourians did go south and enlist in the Confederate Army in 1862. However, while about thirty thousand Missourians served in the Confederate Army during the war, about 180,000 served in the Union Army. These numbers do not include guerrillas or militia troops. The severe imbalance of those who enlisted in the armies demonstrates that while Price was correct in his judgment that thousands of Missourians would flock to the Confederate cause, he was wrong in thinking that the majority of Missourians supported the Confederacy. What Price did accomplish was to aid in the genesis of a bloody guerrilla war in Missouri, which left bitter hatred in its wake for at least two generations of citizens.

Colonel Joseph Porter made it back to the Confederate Army, but in January 1863, he suffered mortal wounds during a raid into southwest Missouri. He died on February 18. Colonel John McNeil received a promotion to Brigadier General, survived the war to become a postal superintendent in St. Louis, and died in 1891. Porter's mission had turned northeast Missouri into a battlefield and his departure brought about the lessening of the guerrilla war there, but it did not end it. In the larger context of the American Civil War, Porter's campaign had little impact, but for the citizens of northeast Missouri, it—and the actions of the occupying Union troops—forced everyone to choose sides, which only intensified the people's anger and desperation. Although far from the main theaters of the war, guerrillas and recruiting officers such as Joseph Porter brought war's violence to the men and women of northeast Missouri, destroying their illusions of neutrality.

Notes

1. Dino A. Brugioni, *The Civil War in Missouri as Seen from the Capital City* (Jefferson City, MO: Summers Publishing, 1987), 76.

2. *History of Lewis, Clark, Knox, and Scotland Counties, Missouri* (Marceline, MO: Walsworth Publishing Company, 1887), 386. Henceforth referred to as *Four Counties*.

3. Leslie Anders, *The Twenty-First Missouri: From Home Guard to Union Regiment* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975), 58.

4. Richard S. Brownlee, *Gray Ghosts of the Confederacy: Guerrilla Warfare in the West 1861-1865* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Press, 1958), 23.

6. United States War Department, *The War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, 128 vols. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1881-1901), vol. 8, pp. 463-464. (Hereinafter cited as OR; except as otherwise noted, all references are to Series I).

7. Bruce Nichols, *Guerrilla Warfare in Civil War Missouri, 1862* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2004), 60.

8. OR, vol. 13, pp. 402-403.

9. Nichols, *Civil War Missouri*, 61.

10. E. M. Violette, *History of Adair County*, (1911; repr., Kirksville, MO: Journal Printing Co., 1977), 94.

11. Joseph A. Mudd, *With Porter in North Missouri* (Washington, D.C.: National Publishing Company, 1909), 26. A note about this source is required. Dr. Mudd served under Porter through the Battle of Moore's Mill whereupon he left to join the Confederate Army. The nature of Mudd's book is biased toward Porter and the Confederacy consistently. However, it serves as an eyewitness account based on the best recollections of Mudd years after the actual events. Mudd was almost certainly biased as to why things happened the way they did and in his explanations of what went on, but he was very accurate in describing what actually took place. In that respect, his account is quite factual.

12. Michael Fellman, *Inside War: The Guerrilla Conflict in Missouri during the American Civil War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 97-103. There is a degree of conflict in various sources about what to call Porter's force. They were not Confederate soldiers until they were enlisted into the Confederate Army, but could be considered recruits. They fell easily into the definition of what constituted a guerrilla fighter despite objections from southern sources, which insisted they were soldiers. I have used the term guerrillas to denote them in the text, as they were not Confederate soldiers.

13. University of North Carolina, *A Digest of the Military and Naval Laws of the Confederate States, From the Commencement of the Provisional Congress to the End of the First Congress under the Permanent Constitution*: Electronic Edition. Chapel Hill, NC: Academic Affairs Library, 1999. Section XXIII. Partisan Rangers, accessed February 23, 2016, <http://www.docsouth.unc.edu/imls/digest/digest.html>.

14. Nichols, *Civil War Missouri*, 130.

15. Mudd, *With Porter*, 46.

16. OR, vol. 13, pp. 12-13.

17. Mudd, *With Porter*, 54.

18. *Four Counties*, 521.

19. Mudd, *With Porter*, 79. Mudd spent several pages detailing the executions of men who had served with the Missouri State Guard, captured guerrillas, or southern sympathizers as justification for the murder of Dr. Aylward. What he really did was document the brutal nature of retaliation by guerrillas and their opponents in the region.

20. Nichols, *Civil War Missouri*, 132.

21. *Ibid.*, 134.

22. Violette, *Adair County*, 95.

23. Marguerite Potter, "Hamilton Rowan Gamble, Missouri's War Governor," in *The Civil War in Missouri: Essays from the Missouri Historical Review, 1906-2006*, ed. William Parrish (Columbia, MO: State Historical Society of Missouri, 2006), 87.

24. Brownlee, *Gray Ghosts*, 83.

25. *Four Counties*, 693-96.

26. Mudd, *With Porter*, 249. Mudd used eyewitness accounts, official records, and newspaper articles to describe what happened after he left Porter's command following the Moore's Mill battle.

27. E. M. Violette, "The Battle of Kirksville," in *The Missouri Historical Review*, vol. 5, no. 2, January 1911, pp.94-112. State Historical Society of Missouri, accessed August 10, 2012, <http://statehistoricalsocietyofmissouri.org/cdm/compoundobject/collection/mhr/id/926/rec/8>.

28. OR, vol. 13, pp. 211-16.

29. Violette, "Battle of Kirksville," 106.

30. *Ibid.*, 105.

31. *Four Counties*, 135.

32. *Ibid.*, 136.

33. Mudd, *With Porter*, 293.

34. Nichols, *Civil War Missouri*, 197.

35. Edward E. Leslie, *The Devil Knows How to Ride: The True Story of William Clarke Quantrill and His Confederate Raiders* (New York: Random House, 1996), 150.

36. E. F. Perkins, *History of Marion County, Missouri* (St. Louis, 1884), 496-96.

37. *Ibid.*, 495-501.

38. OR, vol. 22, pp 816-19.

39. Nichols, *Civil War Missouri*, 194.

40. OR, vol. 13, pp 13-14.

41. OR, vol. 53, p. 581.

42. Mudd, *With Porter*, 316.

43. *Ibid.*, 317.

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“Ich Bin Adolf Eichmann”
Recalling the Banality of Evil

Joseph J. Cook

The Nazi extermination policy toward the Jewish population of Europe created the greatest tragedy in the history of human conflict. Obviously, the primary perpetrator of the Holocaust was Adolf Hitler. Heinrich Himmler holds his rightful place in the history books sitting at Hitler’s right hand. Yet there was another man—another Adolf, in fact—whose name has become synonymous with the crime against the Jews and the horrifying potential of seemingly regular individuals—the quality which Hannah Arendt referred to as the “banality of evil.”¹ This German officer—despite never rising above the rank of Obersturmbannführer² in the Schutzstaffel (SS)—held “more power at his command than any general in the German Army.”³ He was Adolf Eichmann, the SS “expert on the Jewish question.”⁴ Who was Adolf Eichmann? What was his role in the extermination of the Jews? If he truly was just an ordinary man, what caused him to take part in such a terrible atrocity? Numerous historians and sociologists have attempted to answer this question, particularly since Eichmann’s spectacular trial in the early 1960s. How did Eichmann view his own actions, and how should people in the present and future remember the man?

Upon his capture by Israeli agents in Argentina in 1960, *The New York Times* published a full-page biography of Adolf Eichmann. The newspaper described Eichmann as “The man whose name led most of the rest on the list of the ‘blackest Nazis’” and “the most evil monster of humanity.”⁵ He was not an obvious candidate from the beginning to become such a despicable figure. In the 1930s, he established himself as a German scholar on Jewish matters, particularly Zionism. Hannah Arendt claimed that Theodore Herzl’s *Der Judenstaat* was the first serious book Eichmann ever read in his life, the second was Adolf Bohm’s *History of Zionism*, and the list may have ended there.⁶ In fact, Eichmann, the leader of the list of “blackest Nazis,” was asked in prison if he ever read *Mein Kampf*, to which he replied “Never all of it, and never carefully.”⁷ He also stated that Jews wrote all books he read on Jewish matters, because “No others were of any use to me in my . . . study. My mind was not clouded by previous knowledge.”⁸ He successively was in charge of the Bureau of Jewish Emigration in Vienna and the emigration center in Berlin, and adopted Herzl’s plan for establishing a Jewish homeland in Madagascar.⁹ Eichmann fully believed that

such a plan was feasible, and worked diligently to accomplish it. In his trial, “He asserted that the Viennese Jews who dealt with him ‘knew I wasn’t a Jew-hater’ and insisted that his relations with them had always been ‘decently businesslike.’”¹⁰ Dr. Franz Mayer, a Zionist leader in Berlin prior to the war, testified in Eichmann’s trial that he had often sought and received aid from Eichmann in those early years, shocking most of the members of the audience. “I considered him a quiet man, behaving in a very normal way—a correct person,” said Mayer.¹¹

As part of his duties in the Jewish emigration services, Eichmann became responsible for the transportation of Jews throughout Germany. His efficiency in this task impressed his superior, Reinhard Heydrich, who combined a collection of SS offices into Section IV A 4b of the Reich Security Main Office, nominally called Eichmann Authority.¹² In time, however, war meant—as Eichmann recalled—that “Madagascar was out of the question. It was all over, the plan had been wrecked. I capitulated. The dream was over.”¹³ Eichmann was adamant that the term “Final Solution of the Jewish Question” was already in use at this time, referring first to emigration and then to withdrawal of citizenship and confiscation of property—all of which were the responsibilities of IV A 4b.¹⁴ Soon, however, the solution became a violent one by Hitler’s order (not—as often believed—by Eichmann’s own initiative at the Wannsee Conference, where he represented Heydrich).¹⁵ Eichmann personally witnessed a massacre of Jews at Minsk, and afterward argued with one of his superiors—Heinrich Müller—that:

The solution, Gruppenführer, was supposed to have been a political one. But now the Führer has ordered a physical solution, obviously a physical solution it must be. But we cannot go on conducting executions as they were done in Minsk and, I believe, other places. Our men will be educated to become sadists. We can’t solve the Jewish problem by putting a bullet through the brain of a defenceless woman who is holding her child up to us.¹⁶

So it could be seen that Eichmann—the great architect of the Holocaust—was uncomfortable with the physical violence of it. Speaking in prison of it, he said, “Everything was taken away from me. All the work, all the efforts, all the interest . . . were extinguished.”¹⁷ In short time, however, he would overcome this extinguishment of his previous efforts and enter into the transportation of Jews to the concentration and death camps with the same level of enthusiasm, diligence, and—tragically—efficiency.

For the remainder of the war, Eichmann's IV A 4b was responsible for rounding up and delivering the Jews to the camps for labor and extermination. Eichmann, who had been so disgusted at Minsk by the sight of the massacre of Jews, avoided visiting the camps himself as much as possible. "Eichmann was sickened when he toured the concentration camps, but, in order to participate in mass murder he had only to sit at a desk and shuffle papers."¹⁸ His distance from the actual killing was a fact that Eichmann consistently touted during his imprisonment and trial. On July 13, 1961, Eichmann testified in his trial: "I saw in the murder of the Jews, in the extermination of the Jews, one of the most hideous crimes in the history of mankind." However, he continued on to say, "I had to deal with the transport technicalities, on orders from my superiors . . . I regarded myself as not guilty, and I was glad I had no direct share in the physical extermination of Jews. The part that I had to play was quite enough anyway."¹⁹ And so it could be seen that Eichmann recognized the wickedness of the events, and yet managed to distance himself from them sufficiently in his mind to allow him to do his horrible work. He had taken an oath to the government, and would maintain that oath no matter the circumstances. That, at least, was his defense; whether he truly believed it will never be known. The consistency of his answers in this regard—both in his trial and in his interviews in prison—suggest that this was his honest state of mind, but it must be remembered that he had fifteen years between the fall of the Third Reich and his capture to practice a prepared script for a situation in which he was forced to answer for his deeds.

His efficiency in acquiring trains, assembling SS personnel, rounding up Jews, and keeping shipments of Jews moving to the camps demonstrate that Eichmann had an extremely practical, rational, and active mind and energy. Could he honestly believe that he was not playing an active part in the extermination of the Jews by sending them to the places of their deaths? Could blind obedience to superiors and their orders take such a hold on the mind of a man? He was not predisposed to anti-Semitism, and the scenes of passive violence sickened him. Yet he went about his task with "excellent initiative and the required toughness"—as his last promotion report read.²⁰ Whatever his true motive—be it a new anti-Semitism grown out of a life in the SS or a simple determination to advance his career—Eichmann was responsible for the delivery of millions of Jews to their deaths at Auschwitz, Chelmno, and other locations which have gone down in infamy. He certainly recognized at the end of the war that he would be pursued as a criminal, and for this reason went about the task of sneaking away to Argentina without even his family. It was there, in 1960, that Jewish agents captured Eichmann and snuck him back to Israel for trial.²¹

The question of how Eichmann should be punished for his crimes raised a strong debate in both world opinion and among Jewish intellectuals and religious leaders. While some believed the death penalty should be reduced to a life sentence, many were pleased to see the most prominent remaining Nazi leader executed. There was a feeling, however, that no punishment the court could inflict on Adolf Eichmann would accomplish anything to bring satisfaction and full justice in regards to the crimes that he had committed. C. L. Sulzberger, a correspondent for the *New York Times*, offered his own perspective on the question, writing on 12 April 1961: “Everyone should be pleased to see him brought to justice. The question of what sentence he receives is wholly unimportant. He can’t be hanged 6,000,000 times.”²² A life in prison would not bring a single life back; nor would an execution. Either way, Adolf Eichmann would be removed from the world, but execution would create a much more dramatic scene in the minds of men. Eichmann on the gallows may have been “cold and unyielding to the end,”²³ but the fiery memory of Nazi crimes was reignited. The world was reminded “of the ghastly chasms into which any paths of prejudice may lead.”²⁴ Finally, the possibility of his burial site becoming a shrine for future anti-Semites was swept away by the current of the Mediterranean when his ashes were dumped in international waters.²⁵

It was natural for the world to attempt to forget the horrific atrocities that had been committed in Europe during the Second World War. Fifteen years had passed, and the world had new concerns about nuclear powers in a Cold War. Nazis were a thing of the past. Much of the world had called off any attempt at hunting for Adolf Eichmann within a few years of Germany’s surrender. “Memories of the extermination of the Jews and attitudes towards Nazi war criminals had gone from fierce indignation to indifference”²⁶ by 1950, according to historian David Cesarani. But Jewish leaders refused to allow the world to forget what had happened. As large as his role in the terror had been, the trial of Adolf Eichmann made the man into much more than even he was. He was the embodiment of Nazi Germany, the last of the great names of criminals. His old boss, Heydrich, had been assassinated during the war. His subordinates such as Hoess—who had served as commandant of Auschwitz—had been executed.²⁷ His associates—among them Karl Hermann Frank—had long since been tried and executed.²⁸ But Eichmann remained as “the most wanted Nazi war criminal still at large.”²⁹ Eichmann was the name; Eichmann was the man; Eichmann was the symbol. The Jewish world desired to see Eichmann squirm. From the very start of his trial, when he answered his first question with simply, “Ich bin Adolf

Eichmann” in a “firm clear voice,”³⁰ the fight was launched to paint the image of the Holocaust—in all its horror—into the collective memory of mankind forever. “Adolf Eichmann, you are charged with causing the deaths of millions of Jews in Germany and the enemy-occupied countries in the years 1938 to 1945,” was the charge.³¹ This was not a trial of one man and the question of duty versus conscience. This was a trial on Nazism and all it represented. With the execution of Eichmann in the end, the state of Israel and the Jewish people of the world could claim a kind of pyrrhic victory. The last of the “blackest Nazis” was gone forever, and a complacent world was reminded of the atrocity suffered by them less than two decades earlier.

Eichmann has come to represent a great many things since his death. Without a doubt, he was a terrible criminal. His cog-in-the-machine defense may have represented how he honestly viewed himself, but does not exonerate his part in the horrible tragedy that the Nazis carried out. There can be no plea of ignorance for genocide. The world has seen several instances of genocide in the time since Eichmann. Hatred has no defense. Cesarani explains that each generation has found in Eichmann a person fitting its own needs: totalitarian man of an evil state, an example of the awful capability of man with modern equipment and distance between themselves and targets in a world living in fear of nuclear conflict during the Cold War, and a simple proponent of ethnic cleansing like that which has been seen in areas such as Kosovo and Rwanda in the last fifteen years.³² A more controversial memory of Eichmann came following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, when University of Colorado at Boulder professor Ward Churchill stated that the victims in the Twin Towers were “Little Eichmanns” who simply ignored their own parts in American policy.³³ Undoubtedly, more incarnations of the memory of Eichmann will come with time. The goal of the trial against him was accomplished: Eichmann (along with Hitler, obviously) became the lasting symbol of the Holocaust in the collective memory of mankind. His apparent normality—Hannah Arendt’s “banality of evil”—did and will likely continue to instill fear in the hearts of men about the capacity for evil possible within themselves and their neighbors. In a world of growing mistrust between nations and peoples, with genocide ongoing in the Sudan and the Middle East, and with the creations of new and more complex bureaucracies, one may be forced to accept Cesarani’s conclusion that “Eichmann appears more and more like a man of our time.”³⁴ Yet it may be more accurate to say that Eichmann was a man of all times, as people have never failed to demonstrate their ability to injure and destroy one another. This realization may be much more beneficial for the perspective of the people of the world, because it will encourage vigilance for the emergence of

such men—hopefully with sufficient time to stop their heinous deeds. This is a much better option, indeed, than choosing the route of Eichmann: distancing oneself from the reality, pretending to be powerless and far-removed, and not having the strength of character to stand up to that which is clearly wrong. That is what Eichmann did, and now Eichmann is gone. But the memory of Eichmann must never leave, else he may emerge again in another time, in another place, and enact another terrible crime on humanity in the name of “following orders”—be they orders from a government, a religion, or any other group not yet recognized.

Notes

1. Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (New York: Viking Press, 1964), title page.

2. Lieutenant-colonel.

3. Quentin Reynolds, *Minister of Death: The Adolf Eichmann Story* (New York: Viking Press, 1960), 102.

4. Arendt, 36.

5. “Killer of 6,000,000,” *New York Times*, May 26, 1960.

6. Arendt, 40-41.

7. Jochen von Lang and Claus Sibyll, ed., *Eichmann Interrogated: Transcripts from the Archives of the Israeli Police* (London: Bodley Head, 1983), 36.

8. von Lang and Sibyll, 37.

9. “Killer of 6,000,000,” *New York Times*; von Lang and Sibyll, 69.

10. David Cesarani, *Becoming Eichmann: Rethinking the Life, Crimes, and Trial of a “Desk Murderer”* (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2006), 71.

11. Garven Hudgins, “Witness Tells of Eichmann’s One Kind Act,” *Washington Post*, April 27, 1961.

12. Reynolds, 102. “IV stood for Gestapo, A for internal affairs, 4 for religion, and b for Jews.”

13. von Lang and Sibyll, 68.

14. *Ibid.*, 73.

15. Cesarani, 107.

16. *Ibid.*, 106.

17. *Ibid.*, 107.

18. *Ibid.*, 354.

19. Homer Bigart, "Eichmann Terms Killing of Jews a 'Hideous Crime,'" *New York Times*, July 14, 1961.
20. "Killer of 6,000,000," *New York Times*.
21. "Israelis Seize Nazi Eichmann," *Washington Post*, May 24, 1960.
22. C. L. Sulzberger, "The True Meaning of the Eichmann Trial," *New York Times*, April 12, 1961.
23. Lawrence Fellows, "Eichmann Dies on Gallows for Role in Killing of Jews," *New York Times*, June 1, 1962.
24. Sulzberger, "Meaning of the Eichmann Trial."
25. Fellows, "Eichmann Dies on Gallows."
26. Cesarani, 211.
27. During his trial, Eichmann was questioned in a lively exchange about what his view was of Hoess's guilt. He persistently evaded the question, concluding simply that "I do not care to recall my inner feelings," and stating that Hoess, too, was duty-bound to follow his orders. This interrogation is recorded in: Homer Bigart, "Eichmann Terms Killing of Jews a 'Hideous Crime,'" *New York Times*, July 14, 1961.
28. Jan G. Wiener, *The Assassination of Heydrich* (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1969), 174.
29. "Israelis Seize Nazi Eichmann," *Washington Post*.
30. "Eichmann is Arraigned," *New York Times*, May 24, 1960.
31. Ibid.
32. Cesarani, 368.
33. Michelle York, "Professor Quits a Post over a 9/11 Remark," *New York Times*, February 1, 2005.
34. Cesarani, 368.

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We Are Not the Romans . . . YET

Tom Leamy

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the American Public University System and the Saber and Scroll Historical Society.

For the past decade and beyond, the United States has faced many trials and tribulations that have shaken our great country. Recent events have roused the question of the possibility that the United States may be in the same position as the Roman Empire was near the fall of the Empire in the West during the latter part of the fifth century.

Today, major crises beset America at every turn. We have a generation that does not seem to be aware of the issues we face as a country. Many are blindly obsessed with the self-indulgence that we call social media, a pop culture that litters young minds with superficial nonsense, and a distorted view of the real world. The result is a lackadaisical attitude about the state of our nation. In fact, for many folks across the United States, being a patriot is now considered racist! When did being proud to be an American become offensive? Given that many people who live in America despise this great country, it is easy to see why apathy has grabbed hold of us. Will this trend continue? Only time will tell.

The average citizen of the Western Roman Empire in the late fifth century could have never imagined their Empire falling, let alone its altogether elimination. Rome had faced so many crises and yet emerged stronger. Why would anyone think the problems of the fifth century would be any different? The Romans had faced similar problems in the third century AD when their world began to crumble, and yet they emerged ever victorious.

The northern frontier of the Empire had always been restless for the Romans. Their enemies were the amalgamation of German tribes who wished to settle in a more desirable land that the Roman Empire controlled. The Romans built extensive fortifications to denote the border between the Empire and those they considered barbarians. This stemmed from the failure of the Romans to conquer the German tribes that annihilated three legions in 9 AD at the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest. This forever altered the relationship between the Romans and their northern neighbors. As a result, the Romans would abandon all hope of ever conquering the German tribesmen and they decided to build forts to mark this

boundary. These fortifications became known as the *Limes* and were effective for approximately four hundred years. The fortifications were located along the Danube River from Bavaria to the Black Sea. Those same German tribes, whom the Romans could not conquer, would be the forces that would finally bring down the Empire in the West.

From 92 BC to 62 AD, the Roman and Persian empires disputed the borders of the eastern frontier of the Roman Empire. With the fall of the Parthian Empire in the first years of the third century AD to the Sassanid Persians, the equation changed. The son of Sasan, Shapur, who titled himself King of Kings, had decided to re-establish the glory of Persia in the East at the expense of the Romans. During this time, Rome was fighting its civil wars and did not have the dynamic leadership from their Emperors to combat this new Persian threat.

With pressure on the northern and eastern frontiers, the Romans then faced outright revolts in different regions throughout their Empire. In the years 265-270 AD, they faced the realization that their empire was defeated. The Palmyrene Empire broke away from the Romans in the East while Gaul and Germany chose their own emperor in the West. With all these problems, the Roman Empire appeared to be doomed and yet within five years the Emperor Aurelian put it all back together. He proclaimed himself “restorer of the world” and did just that. Aurelian was rewarded with assassination in 275 AD, but he had accomplished what seemed impossible just a few years before—he saved the Western Roman Empire.

The questions arise: What made the fifth century so different from the third and why did the Romans fail? Are Americans the Romans of the third or fifth century and, with the right leadership, is it possible to put America back on the right track? What problems does America face today? We are in economic turmoil with our GDP stagnant, unemployment consistently high, if the true number is considered, which includes citizens who have stopped looking for work and given up. The U.S. national debt is an unimaginable almost twenty trillion dollars and yet we keep borrowing money. Will this finally doom the United States?

I believe we need a very strong course correction soon or we will become the Romans of the fifth century. That said, the United States can rebound. Our economy can come roaring back if we return to sound economic theory. The current administration does not seem to understand economics and the leaders in Washington refuse to work together. Both the Democrats and Republicans are only concerned with winning. What are they winning? I would dearly love to know. They posture, argue, and obfuscate all the problems of today and refuse to compromise. In fact, the art of compromise is lost on our society. Consider the

definition of “compromise”—an agreement or a settlement of a dispute that is reached by each side making concessions. Since when do the Democrats or the Republicans want to give even an inch? The mechanics of our system of government dictate that there must be compromise or the entire system stalls and fails. America must face its problems right now or they will become too severe to overcome. The one key element we are missing in the United States today is leadership. Leadership requires putting the needs of the country ahead of one’s personal ideology. This brand of leadership is sadly lacking in our federal, state, and local governments. With so many scandals such as Benghazi, and the IRS and the NSA targeting certain specific reporters facing Washington and many more throughout every state, when will true leaders emerge? The latest issue involving the Syrian refugees is frightening, and when people question this policy they are attacked and labeled heartless bigots.

We must ask ourselves, then, how the Romans recovered their empire in the third century. It was through leadership and the belief that all problems have solutions. Why did the Western Roman Empire fall in the fifth century? Let us examine that story now.

In many ways, the citizens of Rome gave up and surrendered to the horrific circumstances of the time. The Romans became so obsessed with their own pursuits, such as excessive leisure time and the accumulation of wealth; they began hiring mercenaries to do their fighting for them. All these factors were an albatross around the neck of the Empire in the West.

In addition, the average Roman aristocratic family, who had always served the empire loyally and well, began to have their sons cut off their thumbs, thus making them ineligible to serve in the legions. This was devastating and many of the aristocrats and well-off citizens of the empire simply did not have the political will to defend that which they had previously gained. The Roman economy had stopped expanding because there was no further land to conquer, “bread and circuses”—that in modern times is known as the welfare state—grew, and the Romans debased their coinage. The entire Roman system of government was corrupt. The assassination of a Roman Emperor was commonplace and considered the rule, rather than the exception. Within fifty years, during the fifth century AD in the Western Empire, twenty nine emperors ruled, which is not conducive to a sound and reliable government.

The aforementioned factors ended the Roman Empire in the fifth century. Historians have set a date of 476 AD, but for many others and me, Rome was doomed by its circumstances a generation before. Regardless of when Rome fell, it is important to note the outcome. The Romans, who ruled the world for over a

thousand years, were overcome and eventually defeated. Now to the main question of this essay: is America the Rome of the third or fifth century?

I firmly believe America can be saved from economic and financial ruin. My hope lies in the average citizen who is proud to be from this great country and does not subscribe to the notion that our country is the source of all the world's problems. America has done more good over the span of our existence than every other nation ever conceived of in the history of this planet. America is certainly not perfect, but our system of government and economy has led to the greatest happiness for most people than anywhere else in the world. As evidence, I use the eye test that I learned in the military long ago. If America is so bad and such an evil place, why does everyone around the world strive to come here? People wish to come here to enjoy the freedoms that many of our citizens take for granted, and the lifestyle that we have strived so hard to build.

The next ten years will decide which direction this nation will take. Will we continue to borrow money at an exorbitant rate? Reader, are you aware that in the five minutes that it took you to read this article, the U.S. Government has borrowed approximately thirty five million dollars? For every one minute, the U.S. Government borrows seven million dollars. This trend is madness and must stop!

I also see hope in our fine military, which sets the standard for excellence around the world. We are still the world's lone superpower but how long can we keep our position with such a weak economy? Other nations are on the rise but have discovered that our system is the most successful. Nations like China, South Korea, and Hong Kong have duplicated our system and have seen growth in their economies like never before. Why do we continue to implement a failed socialistic experiment that is now failing miserably in Europe? This makes no coherent sense. It is time that all Americans, regardless of gender, color, or creed, stand up united and bellow, "stop the madness" and let's fix our problems.

If the Romans were able to recover in the third century, so can we. Either we will recover or we will fall victim to the fate of the Romans and fade into the obscurity of history. I for one remain optimistic and know that America can return to her days of glory for one and for all!

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Claudia Koonz. *The Nazi Conscience*. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2003.

Book Review

Noah Hutto

In *The Nazi Conscience*, historian Claudia Koonz studies the Nazi regime's manipulation through propaganda of the socio-political and intellectual dynamics at work within inter-war Germany. She contends that it was this skillful manipulation that enabled the National Socialist Third Reich to not only permeate the German people's everyday lives but also to infiltrate their norms, beliefs, and values. The result was an entire nation driven towards racist elitism and, eventually, genocide. In her opening remarks, Koonz briefly describes the roots of the word *conscience* and states that it "refers to an ethically attuned part of the human character that heeds the Hippocratic command: 'First, do no harm'" (p. 5). She then adds that the *Nazi Conscience* "describes a secular ethos that extended reciprocity only to members of the Aryan community" (p. 6). These definitions are directly quoted here because, although *The Nazi Conscience* is a well-written and important book, extensively explaining the evolution of the Nazi Party from street thugs to a politico-intelligentsia organization that eventually *re-educated* an entire country, Koonz fails to establish a baseline understanding of conscience as it applies to her book. She provides only a one-sentence definition that actually serves as an antonym for the atrocities committed by the Nazis. This is an overt shortcoming. Without a stronger foundation of what Koonz is implying, it is difficult to comprehend the meaning behind "Nazi Conscience," the very term she used to entitle her book.

In short, *The Nazi Conscience* is an in-depth portrayal of Nazi ideology, but such a brief description does Koonz's fine research and work an injustice. The chapters are arranged in a way that walks the reader from the rise of the Nazi Party in the 1930s, through Hitler becoming Reich Chancellor, and finally, to the eve of World War II. She then adds the back-story of the role Hitler's *Mein Kampf* played throughout various moments in the process. It is important to note, however, that Koonz does not present just another history or pseudo-biography on Adolf Hitler.

She does highlight Hitler's backseat approach on outspoken anti-Semitism after ascending to *der Führer*. She also discusses the impact *Mein Kampf* had upon the racial ideology, eugenics, and ultimately, the survival of the Aryan race that

emerged under the Nazi Party. These discussions are necessary in understanding her approach to the material and why she reduces Hitler to more of a minor character in *The Nazi Conscience*. She does this to illustrate how the overall Nazi machine imposed its ideals upon Germany. Koonz explains that this is very similar to the same role Hitler envisioned for himself—he was a common man, only interested in serving the *Volk*. This is an important aspect of her book.

Koonz establishes that it was Hitler's initial concepts combined with the Nazi Party's intelligent elite that provided the momentum that transformed the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) from a gang of thugs to a legitimate political party. She then discusses how the NSDAP played savior to a post-war, intra-depression, downtrodden population, and used its popularity to transform itself into an all-powerful, anti-Semitic, racially driven program that permeated every facet of German public and private life. In short, she establishes that the population was re-educated to view itself as one unit—the common *Volk*. By embracing their supposed racial superiority and accepting their German right and duty, the *Volk* felt justified in their “annihilation [*Vernichtung*] of the Jewish race in Europe” (p. 254).

Throughout *The Nazi Conscience*, Koonz shows impeccable research using sources from German archives that fully explains both the Nazi ideology of racism and their perceived survival-of-their-race struggle. The inclusion of photographs, propaganda posters/prints, and educational charts and pamphlets from the era further enhances the understanding of how deeply rooted the Nazi influence was in every facet of the German citizen's life. The chapters all flow from one aspect of society to another. She covers the educational institutions, the youth societies, the justice system, the introduction of eugenics, and the perversion of the sciences to “prove” the Nazi ideology correct.

Koonz describes in-depth how the Nazis used the German education system for spreading their racial ideology among the youth of the country. She dedicates an entire chapter, *The Swastika in the Heart of the Youth*, to discussing the brainwashing of the German youth. She further explains how any opposition to the new curricula was quickly crushed through the Party's *Reichminister* of Education and the eventual *Gleichschaltung* (Nazification) and monopolization of the Teachers' Unions.

In other chapters, she explains how key German intelligentsia simultaneously encouraged the Nazi racial ideology and eugenics in the circles of academia. To illustrate this, she focuses on three university professors, the philosopher Martin Heidegger, the political theorist Carl Schmitt, and the theologian Gerhard Kittel. She opines that they incorporated certain aspects of the

Nazi ideology into their own practices, despite their disagreement with other portions of the ideology, specifically as a means of maintaining a certain prestige within the Party as the Nazis continued gaining power.

The Nazis gained influence over the executive branch of the justice system soon after academia. The Nazi Party enacted the *Nuremberg Race Laws* that curtailed many of the everyday rights of German Jews in 1935. As Koonz explains, in 1934 the Nazi Party, Goebbels especially, was aware that they had not completely won over the German public to its radical racism. This was disconcerting as they introduced the *Nuremberg Laws*. The Nazis—once established with legitimate government power—were intent on initial subtlety for exclusion of the Jews from German society. They saw this as a means to legitimize their racism, which in turn led to their solution for the Jewish question, and was an example of progress from the violent methods of the *Sturmabteilung*, the original paramilitary wing of the Nazi Party and the precursor to the *Schutzstaffel*, or SS.

Koonz explains, “Most Germans seemed to accept the ostensibly legal expulsion of Jewish citizens from particular segments of public life” (p. 166) and some major players assisted this undercurrent within the justice system by joining the fight for the Nazi racial order. Interior Minister Frick headed the Committee on Population and Race, and along with passing forced sterilization bills in 1933, he also assisted in determining what percentage of Jewish blood would disqualify a German citizen from being considered a German under the Nazi Reich.

During the 1930s, arguments abounded as to the exact extent one was determined a German citizen or a Jew. The determining factor was dependent upon how many Jewish grandparents were in one’s ancestry. Despite a tough read discussing the Nazi’s unabashed racism, Koonz’s research did uncover at least one positive highlight almost hidden within the text of Nazi hatred. She explains that there were a few Nazi members who realized how deep and wide the tracking of Jewish heritage would cut across the German population, and they served as zealots for a restrained approach on racial treason laws outside of what *Jewish* meant as far as laws and the justice system was concerned. She cites the examples of Franz Gurtner, the Minister of Justice, and Bernard Losener, a Ph.D. in law who was placed in charge of Jewish affairs within the Interior Ministry. Koonz’s tone is not meant to exonerate the two men. Instead, she makes clear that Gurtner and Losener’s positions complimented those of the jurist Roland Freisler. The latter was instrumental in drafting several law proposals that designed to ban sexual relations between Jewish and German citizens.

Her work endows the reader with a greater understanding of just how powerful the Nazi party became as a political entity and how that power facilitated

its emergence as the powerful, “respected” beacon of hope for the rebirth of the German nation. This rebirth provided further feelings of indebtedness among the *Volk*, permeating the thoughts and actions of the German people. In the end, the outer layer of Nazi pseudo-scientific and pseudo-scholarly re-education of society is peeled away exposing the ideology for what it was—naked racism. However, as Koonz explains, “it seems clear that Germans were neither brainwashed nor terrorized. Rather, they conformed to the regulations of which they approved and circumvented those they disliked” (p. 178). The real miracle is that by the outbreak of war, the initial dislike of racism, via anti-Semitism, all but ceased to exist.

As noted earlier, the only real weakness in Koontz’s work is her failure to clearly define her term “conscience” as it applies to her term *Nazi Conscience*. Despite its inclusion within the title, she offers the reader only a cursory explanation of the word conscience in the introductory chapter. Because of this shortcoming, Koonz fails to reveal the real conscience of the German people during the reign of *The Third Reich*. She does outline four “assumptions that underwrote the Nazi conscience” (p. 254) but even this short list is a two-page discussion addressing the following. First, the German *Volk* were united, not only by blood, but also by a historical and cultural heritage. Second, criticism of anything the Nazis felt was detrimental to the *Volk* was deemed unethical. Third, the majority of the German people condemned the Treaty of Versailles thus creating a version of Germany’s own “Manifest Destiny”—that is, the *Volk* now believed they had an inherent right and necessity for expansion eastward. In a way, it provided legitimacy to Hitler’s decree that Germany required *Lebensraum* (additional living space, or essentially, more land). Finally, by appealing to a pre-existing German survival of the fittest mentality, there was the assurance that German bloodlines, history, culture, and land would remain exclusively German—*Deutschland für Deutsche* and *Deutschland über alles*.

Unfortunately, despite her excellent work in outlining the infiltration of the Nazi ideology into every aspect of German society throughout the 1930s and up until the outbreak of World War II, her use of the term *conscience* conjures an image that her initial thesis fails to produce. In fact, as an afterthought, hidden in the Acknowledgments section in the back of her work, she explains that she “identif[ied] the particular strategies by which Nazi persuaders made their contingent and, indeed, chaotic universe appear to be fixed . . . [discussing] fascist collaborators, I causally used the words ‘Nazi conscience’” (p. 344). Again, this still rings of a concept to unearth aspects beyond just Hitler and Goebbels as the intelligentsia driving force behind the Nazi regime. Despite this shortfall, however, she pushes the historiography in a new direction.

Overall, Claudia Koonz proves an incredibly apt researcher of Nazi Germany. She delivers in *The Nazi Conscience* a raw, unabashed look into an evil empire; one that ostensibly preached an emphasis on *Volk* and *Vaterland* yet subtly increased the euphoria of “comfortably numb.” This enabled the German people to ignore or embrace absolute and undisguised racism. The anti-Semitic Nazi principles of racism and hate were slowly accepted as normal German values. The Germans began believing that in order to support the *Volk* and thus, the *Vaterland*, they must embrace Nazism, and through a process of self-Nazification (*Selbstgleichschaltung*), Koonz shows that the “citizens of the Third Reich were shaped by a public culture so compelling that [they] . . . came to accept the existence of a hierarchy of racially based human worth, the cult of the *Führer*, and the desirability of territorial conquest” (p. 273).

As a parting thought, Koonz argues that the racist ideology and political strategy of the Nazis’ quest for “an exclusive community of ‘us’ without ‘them’” (p. 274) has not ended with the defeat of the Third Reich. In the 1930s, “Many Europeans looked on from neighboring countries with envy even if they deplored the Nazi state” (p. 163). Today, the currents of racial hatred and ethnic purity once espoused by the Nazis continue their manifestation in our global society. One needs only to read the headlines emerging from the Middle East describing the horrendous conduct of the Islamic State to see the warning within *The Nazi Conscience*. Koonz provides a chilling image of the unchecked results of a disastrous combination of hate, power, authority, and the psychological vulnerability of a defeated people.

Dominic Lieven. *The End of Tsarist Russia*. New York, New York: Viking, 2015.

Book Review

Daniel Rosko

Russia is a country steeped in rich history and fascinating culture, and to this very day it can be a polarizing country in a global context. Books written about this country tell of the changes in Russia and its government, its impact on the world, and of a distant era when the Czar was the ruling monarch of the Russian people. In his book, *The End of Tsarist Russia*, author Dominic Lieven details three important phases of history: Russian foreign policy prior to the First World War, Russian involvement during the First World War, and the beginning of the Russian Revolution of 1917. One unique characteristic of this book is that it is written from a Russian perspective. The book goes into great detail about Russian foreign policy of the late nineteenth century and the twentieth century, and how it shaped the course of events that ultimately led to the collapse of the Czarist regime. Lieven explains the constant conflict between nationalism and imperialism in Russian foreign policy. For this purpose, Lieven utilizes a number of resources he was able to find within Russia and its Foreign Ministry.

The book details how Russian foreign policy played an integral role in events prior to the start of war in 1914. Lieven explains how, throughout Europe, the major empires were faced with strong nationalism within their kingdoms, and within their spheres of influence. In Russia throughout the late nineteenth century, foreign policy was in favor of Germany for the purpose of maintaining a strong, militaristic empire. Yet, as the new century began, Russian foreign policy drifted towards the entente that Russia had with both France and England. The reason for this change in policy was a strong national opinion within Russia, which called for protecting the Slavic peoples located in the Balkan region. Lieven describes how the foreign policy of the country in the early twentieth century was guided by public opinion. Czar Nicholas II sought to unite his subjects with a revival of Russian history and patriotism. As the book explains, the Slavophile ideology, whether or not it was in the best interest of the country, aided in establishing the political climate in Europe that would lead to war on the continent.

At the beginning of the First World War, nationalism and imperialism presented another problem for Russia. As Lieven points out in the book, the

Ukraine was an important key for the Russian Empire. One of the long-standing worries within Russia was the potential for the Ukraine to seek independence in a nationalist movement. The danger to any imperial nation is the threat of ethnic and nationalist groups within the empire. Along with the threat of nationalism to the empire, recent failed military campaigns also played a significant part in reducing the country's ability to mobilize for war. Russia's military had still not recovered from its defeat in the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War. Lieven describes this failure to recover through the memoirs of men like Baron Roman Rosen. Rosen was an experienced minister who had served in Japan, but when he opposed going to war against that country, his admonition was ignored. This war was a major setback for the Russian military. It showed how inferior its naval fleet was in the Pacific, and it was a huge embarrassment for the people of Russia. This failure a decade prior to the Great War was still felt when Russia entered the cataclysmic struggle against Germany and Austria-Hungary. The inability of Nicholas II and his ministers to retain public favor would have disastrous effects, not only for Russia and its entry into the war, but also for the ruling Romanov family.

The author points out a series of events in 1917 that brought down the Czar and the Romanov family. While contributing factors can be found in insufficient food transportation, social disorder, and the failure of Nicholas II to honor his promises of reform made in 1906, another major factor in the fall of the Romanovs was the military. When a revolution had occurred in Russia in 1905-1906, the Czar had had the backing of his army and its officers. In 1917, Nicholas II lost his key military leaders, and because of this, he was not able to maintain his rule. Lieven goes into detail throughout the book to make the case of how important the military was to Nicholas II. Military matters were closely associated with the Czar, and his diminished military ultimately cost him his crown and his life.

The recommendation to read this book is based on the author Dominic Lieven and how he presented the material within. Although the context of the First World War could not be ignored, the author places the events in the larger context of Russian history. The removal of the Western European viewpoint when it comes to Russia and the First World War is very refreshing, and it provides the reader with a new look at a well-known time period in the world. The source material from Russian diplomats and leaders makes this book about Russian history inherently Russian, and it is a welcome addition to the library of any historian of the twentieth century.

Chris Mackowski and Kristopher D. White. *That Furious Struggle: Chancellorsville and the High Tide of the Confederacy, May 1-4, 1863*. El Dorado Hills: Savas Beatie, 2014.

Book Review

Joseph J. Cook

The Chancellorsville battlefield was a confusing and chaotic place during the bloody days of May 1-4, 1863. The difficulty of navigating the terrain led to one of the Confederacy's greatest setbacks: the death of General Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson. In 2014, the fields at Chancellorsville can still bewilder those trying to maneuver around them. The shifting battle lines and multiple fronts of the campaign (including the adjoining and connected Second Battle of Fredericksburg) can easily disorient a visitor. This is the case for several of the battlefields of the old Virginia Wilderness region—complicated further by modern urban sprawl. In *That Furious Struggle: Chancellorsville and the High Tide of the Confederacy, May 1-4, 1863*, Chris Mackowski and Kristopher D. White attempt to solve that problem of battlefield navigation while providing an in-depth story of Robert E. Lee's greatest Pyrrhic victory.

It is critical to remember the central purpose of *That Furious Struggle*. This is not meant to be the definitive study of the Battle of Chancellorsville (perhaps the most significant historiographical argument of the book is suggested by the subtitle—identifying Chancellorsville as the Confederacy's High Tide rather than the Angle at Gettysburg). It reads much like a high quality tour with a guide, which is fitting considering the backgrounds of the two authors, who have both served as historians at Fredericksburg and Spotsylvania National Military Park. Rather than as a simple linear narrative of the action, the story of the battle is told in a manner that corresponds with tour stops, which sometimes disrupts the sequence of events; however, the authors make these disruptions perfectly clear, and their sensibilities to the needs of the common tourist will be appreciated by the standard reader of this book. As the authors state: "The organization of this book and tour reflects knowledge of those roads [and] takes into consideration related information such as park facilities and the availability of parking" (x). The book functions as a terrific navigator for exploration of the field. Each section concludes with meticulous directions to the next tour stop, including traffic patterns and GPS

coordinates. Those who do not wish to go on frustrating reconnaissance missions through the woods will surely benefit from these details.

All of that is not to suggest that there is not quality history included within the book. The text paints a picture of the battlefield in the manner that an efficient tour guide can do, and the text is aided by over one hundred photographs, which add depth to the scene. Presumably drawing its information from a collection of books listed at the end of the volume—but not providing any citations—as well as from the authors' professional experience at the Park, *That Furious Struggle* conveys stories that inform and intrigue the reader. While the images immerse the reader in the scene, the text brings it to life; there is almost a Ken Burns effect to the whole experience of reading the volume, as the images move between the direct and peripheral vision while reading the sweeping descriptions and quotes from first-hand accounts. To be entirely honest, it makes one truly yearn to be standing on the field—a feat that some other field guides surprisingly fail to achieve.

As already stated, this is not necessarily the book to delve into for the full story of the fight at Chancellorsville. In fact, as mentioned, the book directs readers to several deeper investigations of the battle in its appendices, and uses the opportunity to offer the authors' opinions of those books, including a swipe at Stephen W. Sears as an “unabashed Joe Hooker apologist” who goes to “implausible” lengths for that purpose in his *Chancellorsville* (173). The most valuable appendix for the intended audience of the book—the battlefield tourist—is a full Order of Battle, which is always useful for quick reference on a trek across a battlefield. Also, although not the focus of the book, there are allusions to the other battles fought in the area of Chancellorsville, including directions to the spot where General James Longstreet was wounded by his own men in 1864. All of this adds to the complete picture that the authors were aiming to develop.

Mackowski and White have produced an invaluable resource for the tourist of one of the Civil War's largest and most critical battles. The most refreshing thing about *That Furious Struggle* is that it consistently remains loyal to its purpose. Never aiming to become the definitive book about the Battle of Chancellorsville, it stakes a claim for itself as the definitive book about the battlefield at Chancellorsville. Darkness and the fog of war caused disastrous results for the Army of Northern Virginia in May of 1863; in 2014, one does not need to worry about feeling lost and confused on the fields of Chancellorsville with the assistance of *That Furious Struggle* by Mackowski and White.