Members of the Saber and Scroll Historical Society, the volunteer staff at the Saber and Scroll Journal publishes quarterly.

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Welcome to the Spring/Summer 2016 issue of the *Saber and Scroll Journal*, produced by the American Public University System. Our all-volunteer group of editors and proofreaders has been hard at work during these incessant heat waves to help our authors review and revise a terrific collection of papers. The Saber and Scroll can continue to take pride in the scholarship produced by its membership.

As always, our members demonstrated their wide range of interests in the submission process. I can already look forward with optimism to the Fall issue, because several papers which remain in progress are queued up for that publication. In this issue, we have two papers related to my own personal era of expertise (the American Civil War), two papers on ancient topics, and American facilities in the Eighteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Warfare is a bit of an unintentional theme of this issue (which results from an open call for papers), but the theme is approached from a series of angles. Studies of Xenophon and John Bell Hood discuss the upper echelon of leadership; examinations of ancient horse cultures and of a World War II bomber plant demonstrate the logistical considerations that make tremendous feats possible; a look at the forts of the Ohio Valley shows the risks of broken logistical systems; and finally, we see how Americans have chosen to remember the suffering on our greatest battlefield at Gettysburg. As we academics all know, the history of war goes far beyond the history of battles themselves. Our Spring/Summer issue sheds light on several of the aspects of history which war touches.

I need to express my great thanks to all of the authors for their hard-work and their patience with our volunteer editors. I also need to express tremendous gratitude to all of my editors and proofreaders and faculty advisors, who make this Journal possible. I was on the move for most of the past few months, between the Carolinas, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut. Without the terrific people that we have on our editorial team, this issue never would have come together as it did. Unlike John Bell Hood (read Chris Schloemer’s paper), I can place my trust in my team and know that the results are going to be superb.

I hope that you all enjoy this issue. Beyond that, I hope that you all will play your own part in keeping this scholarly tradition going by contributing an article today. The Saber and Scroll thrives because of members like you.

Joseph J. Cook
Editor-in-Chief
The Historiography of Xenophon

Christopher Sheline

Introduction

A student of history is by nature a student of ancient Greek historians. Famously, the labors of these pioneers equally influenced the modern world of historical knowledge and inherently developed the world of historical writing. Their work was the beginning of an elaborate pyramid of historical methodology. As time progressed, research methods and writing styles began to focus more on accuracy through scientific analysis, while the often literary and dramatic styles of the ancients faded in academic and historical reliability. For this reason, classical historians and philosophers remain under scrutiny. Nevertheless, the evolution of research and writing methodology does not dilute the importance or influence of the original fathers of history.

Historiography is the documented process of written history and, therefore, any change to that process becomes critical to the historiographical timeline, thus sustaining everlasting value. Xenophon (c. 430 BCE-354 BCE), known for his writings on the Persian Wars, Cyrus the Great, and the March of the 10,000, single-handedly produced several changes to historical writing that altered the very essence of historical thought in a way that challenged even the roots of Herodotus and Thucydides. Carleton L. Brownson, professor of Greek and Latin languages at the City College of New York, formally recognized that, “The most important works ascribed by Xenophon in antiquity are the Anabasis, the Memorabilia (memoirs of Socrates), the Hellenica, and Cyropædia.”\(^1\) This is because each of these texts has great significance not only to Greek and Persian history, but also to the development of historical writing.

Xenophon stepped away from the influence of Thucydides to demonstrate a more independent, often philosophical, perspective. Although he demonstrated various influences in his writings, his individualism brought something to the historical world that no other historian had—philosophical biographies. Xenophon wrote about life, often his own experiences, making him not only an important historical figure, but also a pioneer to historiography. In fact, Robin Waterfield,
classical scholar and translator of ancient Greek texts, referred to him as “a pioneer experimenter in biographical forms.”

Through his development of biographies, Xenophon incorporated philosophy into writing often as a means to teach and defend his position. By doing so, Xenophon changed the view of history and political thinking simultaneously. He was not just viewing and/or interpreting history like those before him; he was living it, documenting it, and analyzing it through the lenses of his former philosophical teachings. Therefore, Xenophon was an important historian because he wrote about life, integrated philosophy into historiography, and thus altered historical writing and political thinking. A brief biography of the life of Xenophon acts as a guideline to understanding his contributions to historiography, as well as why they occurred.

**Xenophon’s Brief Biography**

Born in the rural deme Erchia, Xenophon, son of Gryllus, was a member of the aristocratic political class. He was an Athenian soldier, author, and pioneer. Little information exists regarding Xenophon’s childhood and adolescence, which occurred during the difficult times of the Peloponnesian War (431 BCE-404 BCE). Nevertheless, the fact that he saw so much war during his youth, particularly internal conflict, appears to have driven the potential motives and influences of his historical writing, as much of Xenophon’s texts focused on his perspective of war and politics. What is a certainty about his youth is that he became close to the philosopher Socrates (c. 469 BCE-399 BCE), “whose influence affected his whole life and character.” This explains the philosophical influence in his writing.

By the time Xenophon was old enough to join the military, age nineteen (c. 412 BCE), the Peloponnesian War was nearing its end. During this time, King Agis of Sparta controlled much of Attica. It is unlikely that Xenophon had any part in the war because it consisted primarily of sea battles. As confirmation, Xenophon’s own writings portray events from inside the city during this period. However, he did fight on behalf of Athens, defending the walls against both King Agis and the collective land and naval forces of the Peloponnesians. These are especially useful details when reading Xenophon’s text titled *Hellenica*, which describes the closing years of the Peloponnesian War. This is the first of many examples of Xenophon’s writings that derived from his personal experiences.

Soon after the Peloponnesian War ended, Xenophon embarked on a great expedition with Cyrus the Younger (d. 401 BCE), which sparked *Anabasis*. This
book followed an army of ten thousand Greek mercenaries hired by Cyrus in an effort to seize the throne from his brother, Artaxerxes II. However, while the mission met with some success, Cyrus lost his life thus nullifying the efforts of the Ten Thousand and forcing the army to return to Greece. Xenophon coined this movement the “March of the 10,000.” In 399 BCE, after leading the retreat to Asia Minor, Xenophon joined Thibron, a Lacedaemonian commander at war with the Persians. This led to his service to King Agesilaus (Agesilaus II c. 444 BCE-360 BCE), which allowed Xenophon to witness the battle of Coronea (399 BCE).

During the battle of Coronea, King Agesilaus defeated the Athenians, Thebans, Corinthians, and Argives. Clearly, Xenophon’s experiences during the Persian expedition influenced his decisions as well as his later writings, as Xenophon went from being a dedicated Athenian to fighting alongside the Spartans. This, in addition to the expedition of Cyrus, resulted in Xenophon’s banishment from Athens. In fact, even Socrates warned Xenophon that the Persian expedition might result in his expulsion. In retrospect, the fact that Xenophon returned from the expedition a leader, with motives against the Persians, sparked his decision to support Sparta and led to the writing of his monumental texts. This demonstrates both his relationship to the Persians, and Spartans, and thus his firsthand account of the events that he later described. It also determined the direction he and his family would take personally, socially, and professionally.

After his banishment, Xenophon became such a devout supporter and friend of Agesilaus, and Sparta, that his sons Gryllus and Diodorus trained in the traditional Spartan methods. Later, he received an estate in Scillu and began to hunt, entertain, and write his histories as a Spartan “gentleman.” This lasted until approximately 371 BCE, when Sparta lost its power at the battle of Leuctra. Xenophon ended up retiring in Corinth after the fall of Sparta, where he wrote the majority of his histories. These are relevant facts when considering the various modern impressions of Xenophon as belligerent, well off, and foolish. Clearly, his loyalties changed. He was friend to the Spartan king, and wrote for reasons other than historical accuracy.

**Xenophon and His Predecessors**

A high-level overview of the stylistic differences between Xenophon and his predecessors, primarily Herodotus and Thucydides, helps to identify their individual historiographical contributions. Like Xenophon, Herodotus wrote his first text during his travels. These texts were often patriotic, and involved the use of gods
and other forms of mythology. He often exaggerated various aspects in his writings, added dramatic effect to entertain, and often wrote in the first person. Thucydides, on the other hand, focused on contemporary history and removed any aspect of gods and mythology. Like both Herodotus and Xenophon, his writings derived from the events of his lifetime, yet had a large focus on objectivity. While his writings were scientific and unbiased in nature, Thucydides often used abstracts and opposition to explain an event. This often led to confusion, especially with translating his writings. Many claim his works to be dry because of their scientific accuracy and lack of moral perspective, somewhat opposite of Herodotus.

Xenophon is most famous for writing *Hellenica*, *Anabasis*, and *Cyropaedia*, although he is responsible for many more texts, including *Agesilauς* and *Memorabilia*. Each of these texts carries a common theme; they are books about life. Xenophon added biographies to historical writing not only through his own life experiences, but also by analyzing the lives of others. However, often his books were a compilation of both his life and another’s in many respects. In this short list, there is one book about his perception of the Peloponnesian War, one describing his adventures through Persia, and three texts surrounding specific individuals such as Cyrus of Persia (r. 559 BCE-530 BCE), Agesilaus, and Socrates. Clearly, given the brief biography of Xenophon previously described, these are all people with whom Xenophon had close relations and held in high regard, making them still essential parts of an autobiography. Understanding the general concepts of why Xenophon wrote about whom he did, as well as how his style differed from his predecessors, heightens the historiographical value of his writings.

Analyzing Xenophon’s texts for their historiographical value provides a vast amount of information. Peter J. Rahn, of Mount Allison University, clarified that, early in his career as a historical writer, Xenophon used criteria that resembled those of Thucydides, yet an increasingly independent perspective accompanied the stylistic differences between the two sections of the *Hellenica*. This simply signifies again that, while Xenophon picked up where Thucydides left off, he later took his own writings in a new direction, thus putting his own notch in historical writing. Adding to this, the manner in which Xenophon decided subject matter, and how to present it, is critical in understanding his path to biographical and philosophical writing.

Originally, Xenophon had a tendency to choose subject matter that he described as noteworthy. This indicates the use of at least a partial personal opinion on which information to document. According to Rahn, Xenophon also selected
events from “outside the generally accepted realm of historical material.” The criteria Xenophon utilized when deciding such noteworthy material remained the same as his predecessors, at least in the beginning. Rahn further ascertained that Xenophon himself suggested that noteworthy subjects in history should include “great expenditure, danger, and strategy.” He also emphasized that these criteria most often focused on large and powerful cities, for example, a major polis that set out against another to fight for hegemony. However, over time Xenophon grew distasteful of these criteria, and eventually chose to focus on the individual. After all, the criteria were not that of his own making, deriving from the earlier writings of Thucydides and Herodotus. Thus, the collective works of Xenophon demonstrate his stylistic transition and evolving view of history, making each text significant to the evolution of historical writing.

The Greeks set the pace and foundation for historiography to grow. Categorically, Ernst Breisach defined Herodotus as the historian of Greek victory and glory, and Thucydides as the historian of Greek self-destruction. These alternate perspectives provide political, contemporary, and cultural views of history. Later, these views forced Xenophon to take a new approach, as he desired to document history from a personal and philosophical point of view. As the focus on gods and mythology diminished, Xenophon essentially described the flow of life (biographies). Note that Herodotus was the father of history, Thucydides the father of military, or scientific, history, and Xenophon the father of biographical and philosophical history.

Xenophon’s Books and Their Significance

Anabasis, a Greek term for a military march inland (“going up”), describes the advance of ten thousand Greek mercenaries through miles of hostile Persian territory. Xenophon successfully led the retreat, documented it, and created a historical legend. It is perhaps the most famous of all of Xenophon’s works, as it details “the western world’s first eyewitness account of a military campaign.” Remarkably, this military campaign contributed to Xenophon’s expulsion from Athens, and his subsequent union with Sparta. It is widely known for its dramatic ending when the Greeks finally see the Black Sea and shout in joy.

Anabasis is significant for a number of reasons. In addition to being inspirational, it portrays the tactical and leadership superiority of the Greek mercenaries while deep in hostile territory. The Greeks traveled hundreds of
kilometers north from modern Iraq into the mountains of Kurdistan and northeastern Turkey and down to the coast of the Black Sea. Historically, this does more than demonstrate the military and logistical capabilities of the Greeks. It also shows that Xenophon grew enough to lead, understand the risks ahead, and document the adventure not only for its historical value but also for its biographical contributions. He wanted to defend his position, and make people aware of his leadership success. This makes *Anabasis* critically important to historiography, as it shows the motive, means, and development of historical writing.

Another significant historiographical value of *Anabasis* is that Xenophon referenced himself in the third person. It was clearly an account of his observations and experiences. This is precisely why the *Anabasis* became a primary read for anyone, of any era, studying ancient Greece. Later, Xenophon used the same methods to construct the narrative *Agesilaus*. To add to the list of significant values, while he wrote about life he also integrated philosophy into historiography. *Anabasis* was a stylistic prelude to coming biographies, yet also a fundamental work in political philosophies. In addition to self-discovery, Xenophon described the political problems of how a just community can come into existence, and how philosophy and political power may coincide. He accomplished this by explaining the otherwise implied limitations on politics, and clarifying that philosophy is an essential part of leadership, courage, and integrity. Again, all of these lessons are clear derivatives of his apprenticeship with Socrates, and his experiences during the march. In short, Xenophon provided the first historical autobiography, eyewitness to a military campaign, and use of philosophy in historiography. However, *Hellenica* offered the use of life and philosophy in a much broader scale—the history of Greece.

*Hellenica* follows the writings of Thucydides. It assumes a reader’s familiarity with Thucydides’s work, and shows no delay in loosely picking up where he left off. There is no introduction or otherwise statement of intent aside from the words “And after this,” indicating that Xenophon did in fact aim to complete the unfinished narrative of Thucydides. This is apparent in the first part of the *Hellenica* as Xenophon imitated the methods of Thucydides, while his later parts show no such influence. Perhaps this is most notable in Xenophon’s lack of objectivity, which is precisely where Thucydides focused. However, when he wrote “And after this,” Xenophon referred to the work, not the last event described by Thucydides. *Hellenica* is a compilation of seven total books.

*Hellenica* completes the last segment of the Peloponnesian War, and
describes the fall of Athens in the first two books. This makes it a highly significant primary source for the Peloponnesian War, and the struggles that occurred within Athens after its fall. The third book focuses on the war in Asia Minor (399 BCE-394 BCE) between Sparta and the Persians, and the fourth book focuses on the Corinthian War (394 BCE-387 BCE) in which Athens, Thebes, Corinth, and Argos challenged Sparta. The fifth book addresses the conclusion and aftermath of the Corinthian War. The sixth book describes the peace between Sparta and Athens, and the war between Thebes and Sparta that eventually ended Spartan hegemony at the battle of Leuctra. Lastly, the seventh book continues with the Spartan and Theban war in which all states eventually became involved, and concludes with the final battle of Mantinea (362 BCE). Thus, Xenophon essentially chronicled the history of the Hellenes from 411 to 362 BCE, and portrayed the constant state of warfare that depleted Greece and set the stage for the rise of Macedonia. This work in its entirety provides critical information of each conflict, yet often fails to reach the level of accuracy that Thucydides would likely have achieved.

The series of texts are often pro-Spartan, which coincides with Xenophon’s relationship with King Agesilaus. It is also a direct history of his time, again referencing aspects of an autobiography. However, despite his personal preferences, Xenophon maintained a theme throughout Hellenica that asserted the theory that if the mainland Greeks united under one strong leader to free their Asiatic comrades, they would be strong enough to capture Persia. This is a very important change in thought.

Considering the most common school of thought is that all ancient Greek literature addressed or described an internal struggle for hegemony, Xenophon took a unique approach. His consideration of unity to overcome an external enemy indicates that there was not necessarily any central theme in Greek literature but more so histories and theories revolving around cultural strife. Various, likely biased, authors that either did not or chose not to see the bigger picture presented that strife, and modern schools of thought followed suit. In reality, Xenophon took the idea of a chaotic widespread struggle for power and presented a logical, relatively commonsense means to unified power, thus refuting the modern theory of strictly individualized themes. Xenophon’s histories even included philosophy on how one might resolve said issues. Considering these facts, one begins to recognize Xenophon’s integration of philosophy into historiography more and more. Xenophon further altered historical writing and political thinking with Cyropædia, as it is a highly philosophical biography of Cyrus the Great that details not only his life but
the very essence of Cyrus’s leadership philosophies.

Cyropædia is a Greek term literally meaning “The Education of Cyrus,” and is a biography of Cyrus the Great. This book remains under continued scrutiny for its historical intentions. After all, Xenophon repeatedly documented the Persians as an enemy of Greece, an enemy that he willingly gave up his position in Athens to fight against, then constructed a highly influential biography of a Persian leader. Nevertheless, it became a model for future writers and modern political strategies.

Cyropædia shows a sign of philosophy right in the beginning, as the first book outlines many forms of government that quickly dissolved, such as tyranny or other oppressive measures. This, again, largely stepped away from Xenophon’s contemporaries. Thucydides, for example, made great efforts to remain unbiased in his approach to international politics, and Herodotus often referenced mythology as authoritative figures. Xenophon used very direct and straightforward expressions to make his points. Cyropædia, specifically, is more instructional in intent than anything he or his contemporaries had written. While it depicts the fall of governments, it most adequately describes the person and mind of Cyrus, his education, and the applications of the philosophical leadership that led to the beginning of the Persian Empire. It is as if Xenophon wanted to prove a point, or many for that matter. He made sure to include descriptions of Cyrus as a highly praised, respected, yet humble and heroic figure. In this massive eight-book text, Xenophon concluded with “political observations on the corruption and ruin of the Persian state after the death of Cyrus.” Again, this implies that Cyrus’s philosophical methodology built an empire, and the lack of such methodology caused an empire to crumble. No former historian dared convey such a message. One must reiterate the aforementioned theme repeated throughout Hellenica, in which Xenophon emphasized unity with one strong leader. There is certainly some consistency in Xenophon’s intent.

Summarizing the historiographical contributions of these three texts, Anabasis, Hellenica, and Cyropædia, is a major task. These brief overviews demonstrate not only how Xenophon differed from Herodotus and Thucydides, but also how and why he differed. Each book takes its approach a bit farther beginning with an elaborate autobiography, and ending with an instructional biography. Xenophon used history as a means to elicit philosophical theories on leadership, politics, and cultural concerns. Thus, he wrote about life, and integrated philosophy into historiography.
Modern Translations

While Xenophon’s work continues to be vital to history and historiography, each contribution endures various translations and interpretations. Most of the modern interpretations focus on Xenophon’s motives, influence, and accuracy, as he was both a student of Socrates and an Athenian soldier turned wealthy landowner in Sparta. A common debate is how much Xenophon’s experience as a soldier, especially amongst mercenaries, altered his perception of the Spartans and Persians alike. In addition, there is much speculation that Xenophon presented history from the perspective of a well-off retiree. Some even believe that he was foolish. All of these criticisms seem to derive from Xenophon’s lack of objectivity and accuracy. While all of these are dramatic over-exaggerations, Xenophon’s writings remain eternal, as they portray his perception of noteworthy material.

Xenophon still receives many criticisms for his lack of objectivity and accuracy. Focusing his attention first on Anabasis, Edward Spelman, nineteenth century translator of Anabasis, prescribed that, “The particulars of the march of Cyrus are indeed so minutely described that it has been thought he was advised to write the account.” This criticism particularly referenced the topography and natural history of the land the Greeks traveled. Wayne Ambler, a twenty-first century author, believed that Anabasis tells a gripping story that provides valuable lessons on ancient politics. Consequently, accuracy in Anabasis comes down to a matter of perspective and on which information a historian wishes to focus.

Hellenica receives similar criticism. While Xenophon picked up where Thucydides left off, it is debatable whether his writing style in Hellenica connected with Thucydides or Herodotus. Some say that Hellenica shows the influence of Herodotus because the narrative exhibits thematic and stylistic charm, while formal speeches observe propriety and moral issues. Moral issues remain a delicate subject within historical writing even in the modern day. Often, modern historical theorists claim that Xenophon wrote this book during his retirement, and only for his friends and those closely associated with the events. They believe it to be very personal to him.

Moses Finley, a late twentieth century author, claimed that Xenophon’s Hellenica is “unreliable, tendentious, dishonest, dreary to read, and rarely illuminating on broader issues.” Experts confirmed this when they repeatedly uncovered the incorrect number of years of war, in addition to the wrong names of two out of five archons and ephors. Brownson, of the early twentieth century,
described the text similarly by stating that the inaccuracies were merely the work of a “careless interpolator.” However, if Xenophon wrote the book for personal use, and for the eyes of only a select few, not necessarily an academic history, it may explain much of his alleged carelessness. *Cyropaedia* actually receives quite the opposite level of feedback.

Because Xenophon depicted Cyrus as benevolent, able to rule and maintain the admiration and loyalty of his subjects, *Cyropaedia* became the first historical and political romance. When assessing this development, Larry Hedrick, a twenty-first century author, surmised, “Xenophon’s approach to Cyrus was broadly creative rather than narrowly historical.” Xenophon’s objective was not to present critical facts. Instead, he aimed to show how a visionary leader could improve the lives of his military officers and the common people alike. Through his dramatizations, he depicted the methods of conducting meetings, negotiations, working with allies, appealing to followers’ self-interest, encouraging performance, and using deeds to back up words. All of these methods, or principles, benefit businesses and governments of any age. This is such a fact that modern authors feel that today’s age requires a renewed interest in Cyrus the Great.

Seeking to encourage his readers, Hedrick declared, “Just as Cyrus’ honesty, integrity, superb strategic planning, and ability to think on his feet guaranteed his success, the reader too can embody Cyrus’ virtues in his own career.” This is an interesting perspective, yet strikingly similar to theories surrounding the use of the Sun Tzu text *The Art of War*. In fact, Cyrus actually preceded Sun Tzu, and in many ways Xenophon’s text surpassed *The Art of War*. This is because while Sun Tzu provided monumental principles on military leadership, he did so through brief, often vague, remarks. Later, other Chinese writers added to or altered Sun Tzu’s writings. The same behavior continues today across the globe. Xenophon, on the other hand, provided a thorough account in order to teach leadership, thus closing the gap that allows for excessive interpretation in translation.

Collectively, Xenophon’s work has received almost as much criticism as it has praise. Simon Hornblower, twenty-first century author of *Greek Historiography*, seemed to scorn Xenophon by denouncing *Hellenica* as “a vivid and personal work of reminiscence, by an Athenian who spent his adult life in the Peloponnese and tilted his works toward Peloponnesian events.” This clearly indicates the tendency for Xenophon to show bias. Luke Pitcher, classical author and proponent of Greek and Roman historiography, agreed when he clarified that Xenophon omitted
references to the foundation of the second Athenian Confederacy and left out several months in the *Anabasis*.\(^{37}\) Xenophon’s writings also confirmed that fiction preceded true biography.\(^{38}\) This is often because of his “moralistic” biographies of Agesilaus and Cyrus the Great. Despite these facts, Xenophon remains one of the primary authors on Greek history, as well as an undeniable example of pivotal changes in historiography and political thinking.

**Conclusion**

Xenophon’s life took him on a path that not only changed his loyalties but also his motives and style of writing. Originally, as an Athenian soldier, his experiences during the Persian expedition made him develop and utilize the philosophy he learned under the tutelage of Socrates in order to become an effective leader. He later found common ground with Spartan King Agesilaus. This led to his expulsion from Athens, and the eventual autobiographical writing of the *Anabasis*, in which he allegedly sought to defend his position. Upon retirement, Xenophon wrote *Hellenica* theoretically from a personal Peloponnesian point of view, in which he picked up from Thucydides’s position and took off on his own in the later portions of the collective text. During the writing, Xenophon clearly avoided objectivity, conflicting with his predecessor’s style.

Xenophon’s “romantic” philosophical history of the life, or education, of Cyrus the Great (*Cyropædia*), not to be confused with Cyrus the Younger from *Anabasis*, portrayed various leadership recommendations. Largely recognized in the modern business world, *Cyropædia* provides more details than the popular Sun Tzu text *The Art of War*. Xenophon’s intention was to show that a good leader could improve the lives of everyone, thus integrating philosophy with historical writing yet again. Collectively, Xenophon’s work took historical writing in a completely new, often controversial, direction, and not only encouraged but also changed political thought. Essentially, these books offer a walkthrough of Xenophon’s life, and changing views of historical writing through the events depicted within the texts. Today, while various forms of biographies and autobiographies exist throughout the world, the weight of Xenophon’s influence remains. Xenophon heavily influenced historical writing because he wrote about life, integrated philosophy into historiography, and thus altered historical writing and political thinking.
Notes


4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., 10.

8. Ibid., 10-11.

9. Ibid., 11.


11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.


15. Ibid. 22.


17. Ibid.


20. Ibid.


22. Ibid., 14.


25. Ibid., xi.


32. Ibid.

33. Ibid., xvi.

34. Ibid., xvii.

35. Ibid.


Bibliography


John Bell Hood was one of the Confederacy’s best brigade and division commanders. However, when promoted to army command in 1864, many of the qualities that served him well in his previous position turned out to be a detriment. Hood’s performance was a classic case of an individual promoted into a position beyond his abilities. Hood’s drive to invade Tennessee and proceed through Kentucky to eventually meet up with General Robert E. Lee failed. Setbacks at Spring Hill, Franklin, and Nashville resulted in the destruction of the Army of Tennessee. Although Hood inherited a difficult situation, considering the state of the Army of Tennessee, his failings as a commander precipitated this disaster. He could not hold Atlanta through the 1864 election and his aggressiveness certainly sped up the loss of that city and created the hopeless situation of the army. All of his bravery and aggressiveness came to naught during the 1864 Tennessee campaign.

Hood was a fighter whose troops respected and admired him. His qualities of physical bravery, aggressiveness, superb combat leadership, and intuitiveness, made him a fine regimental, brigade, and division commander.\(^1\) He distinguished himself in several campaigns and battles, including the Battle of Gaines’s Mill, Second Bull Run, Antietam, Gettysburg, and Chickamauga. Soldiers followed him into battle eagerly. Chaplain Nicholas A. Davis of the Texas Brigade described General Hood in glowing terms: “His commanding appearance, manly deportment, quick perception, courteous manners and decision of character, readily impressed the officers and men, that he was the man to govern them in the camp and command them on the field.”\(^2\) Chaplain Davis said when Hood was promoted to general in 1862 he did not display “that official vanity and self-importance” that could come with such a position, and although a rigid disciplinarian, “he is as much admired and esteemed by the men in his command as any general in the army.”\(^3\) Hood rose through the ranks quickly. By 1864, Hood was serving as a commander under General Joseph Johnston during the battles for Atlanta—the Confederacy was in trouble.

Union General William T. Sherman was on the verge of taking Atlanta and
General Johnston seemed unable, or unwilling, to stop him. Confederate President Jefferson Davis saw Atlanta as vital to the Confederacy. He knew that it had “tremendous transportation and manufacturing importance”4 and “even greater significance to the morale of both sides,” and Johnston’s constant defensive delaying actions frustrated him. Davis decided to replace Johnston with Hood. In only three years, Hood had risen from first lieutenant to full general in command of the Army of Tennessee.5 Confederate Secretary of War James Seddon telegraphed Hood and told him: “You are charged with a great trust. You will, I know, test to the utmost your capacities to discharge it. Be wary no less than bold.”6 However, wariness was not Hood’s style—boldness was. In any case, the situation he encountered was grim.

Hood did fight aggressively, but, considering his very difficult position, quickly lost Atlanta. Hood lingered north, attempting to disrupt Sherman’s lines of communication and logistics, but Sherman’s army was too powerful to attack. Sherman soon realized that he was wasting time trying to pin Hood down. “It was clear that Hood had no intention of staking everything on a major battle in northern Georgia, and it was equally clear to Sherman that it would be counterproductive to continue chasing him into northern Alabama.”7 As such, Sherman planned his famous march through the south. Not only was Hood not strong enough to stop Sherman’s army, he was also too far away. With this in mind, Hood decided on a different strategy—an invasion of Tennessee to put pressure on the Union army and possibly force Sherman to backtrack. In his words, “I continued firm in the belief that the only means to checkmate Sherman, and cooperate with General Lee to save the Confederacy, lay in speedy success in Tennessee and Kentucky, and in my ability finally to attack Grant in the rear with my entire force.”8 Did Hood have alternatives?

Hood did not really have any good choices at this point. He could have followed Sherman and harassed the Union army on its march through the South. The problem with this was distance. Hood was trying to disrupt Sherman’s lines of communication away from Atlanta. By the time he realized Sherman’s intent, Hood was three hundred miles away. It would have required a forced march with an ill-equipped and tired army to catch up. This was not a good option. He also could have stayed where he was, but inactivity would have diminished the morale of his army. Perhaps he could have marched directly towards Virginia to help Lee against Grant, but that does not seem to have been discussed. Without the transportation hubs of Atlanta and Chattanooga, this would have been a logistical nightmare. It seems the invasion of Tennessee was the best of a group of bad options—none with much hope
of success. The key was to conduct a lightning campaign, quickly and decisively defeating the Union in Tennessee. Afterwards, he could move on to Kentucky and maybe Ohio, with the intent to eventually relieve the pressure on Lee. However, Hood did not conduct a lightning campaign.

By the time Hood really got going, it had been eleven weeks since the fall of Atlanta. Delays in river crossings and logistics plagued Hood’s army. This allowed the Union to better ready itself for the campaign. However, Hood outmaneuvered Union General John Schofield, who was waiting on the banks of the Duck River as his superior, General George Thomas, had requested. Hood got around him. Most of Hood’s army was now near Spring Hill in a position to cut off Schofield’s lines of communication and his retreat route. The Confederates seemed finally poised for victory, as they had a stronger force than Schofield had and were between Schofield and Thomas. If they could destroy Schofield, they might have a chance against Thomas. This was Hood’s plan, but it never happened.

Though trapped, Schofield managed to escape through Hood’s lines. A variety of factors caused the errors, including the lack of precise information about Schofield’s positions, lack of communication among Hood’s subordinates, and poor staff work. Hood said that he did not want to waste time to stop and reconnoiter because he was afraid that Schofield would escape his trap. Therefore, he did not know exactly what Schofield was doing. Additionally, there seemed to have been some confusion as to the orders given.

Hood did not generally give orders from the front lines. He gave them from his headquarters and it appears he did not know exactly where his men were or in which direction they faced. He also did not realize that some Union troops had already made it into Spring Hill. Hood blamed it all on his commanders. He said his orders were perfectly clear and said that he twice ordered Benjamin Cheatham to ensure he took the pike at Spring Hill. He concluded that his orders had been “totally disregarded.” Some of this is true. Schofield reported that there were several attacks on the small force Schofield had sent forward to protect Spring Hill, but they were “feeble and repulsed.” There were spirited attempts by the Confederate cavalry to disrupt the line, but without infantry support, they were unsuccessful. Hood’s commanders, including Generals Nathan B. Forrest and Cheatham, never bothered to report to Hood that there were some Union forces in Spring Hill already. Perhaps if they had, Hood would have ordered a general assault on Spring Hill, or moved above it to block Schofield there. Because Schofield’s men were not where Hood thought they were, his orders to subordinate commanders
confused them and actually had effects detrimental to Hood’s overall plan. The bottom line is, Hood needed to be on the front lines to understand the situation and position his men. Because he was not there during the critical last two hours of daylight, the last chance his army had to maneuver, his subordinates made poor decisions that produced negative results. Most of Schofield’s army was able to sneak past Hood’s camped army at night, passing within 600 yards. When Hood and his army woke up, Schofield was gone. This was demoralizing for Hood’s men.

Lieutenant R. M. Collins, from the 15th Texas Regiment, Granbury’s Brigade, Cleburne’s Division, saw the Union troops retreating and said, “We were all astonished at our line not being thrown across the pike, capturing this whole train and completely cutting off Schofield’s retreat.” He went on to say that “Generals Hood, Cheatham, [William B.] Bate and others in high places have said a good deal in trying to fix the blame for this disgraceful failure; but the most charitable explanation is that the gods of battle injected confusion into the heads of our leaders.” Hood was furious. He later said, “The best move in my career as a soldier, I was thus destined to behold come to naught.” However, the key point remains that at a crucial time Hood was not at the front and did not closely supervise his corps commanders. His orders were not clear and his staff seems to have totally broken down. The result was a sound plan executed badly.

When Hood got to Franklin after the Spring Hill debacle, he decided on a frontal attack. His commanders were astonished and protested that an assault would be hopeless. He also told them that there would not be time to wait for the artillery nor General Stephen D. Lee’s corps to deploy. This meant that the army would have to attack over two miles of open ground (for comparison’s sake, the much-better known Pickett’s Charge at Gettysburg had been one mile) without one of their corps or their artillery. The result was that 19,000 infantry attacked in lines so thin that there were no reserves, and they did so without artillery support. It was “one of the most fierce and bloody battles of the war.” Hood’s army assaulted the Union lines again and again and actually broke through at a few points, but after hours of furious fighting, they were not able to defeat the entrenched Union army. Hood meant to renew the attack in the morning, but Schofield slipped across the river during the night. Did Hood have alternatives at Franklin?

Hood’s cavalry commander, General Forrest, thought the army had an alternative. He knew this country well and believed he could cross an upstream ford and the army could go around Schofield’s dug-in forces and flank him as they had done (or tried to do) at Spring Hill. Perhaps this would have been successful,
perhaps not. General James H. Wilson reported to General Schofield that at one point Brigadier General William Jackson's division of Forrest’s cavalry crossed the river at Hughes’ Mill, and that General Edward Hatch whipped him badly and drove him back across the river; so maybe Forrest would not have been successful.27 However, Forrest had generally been able to defeat the Union cavalry, and later Schofield said, “Wilson is entirely unable to cope with him [Forrest].”28 In the end, Hood said the nature of the position was such that a flanking movement was “inexpedient” and decided to attack before Schofield could “make himself strong.”29 He told his troops that if they could defeat Schofield at Franklin nothing would prevent them from going to the Ohio River.30 Hood said later that his commanders agreed with the assault on the defensive positions at Franklin and that they would have succeeded if two of Lee’s divisions had been able to engage before nightfall.31 His men disagreed. Collins said, “Why Hood made this fight, when he could have flanked the enemy out of their position in three hours, is a mystery that will be satisfactorily answered when we all shall have crossed to the other side. Gen. Hood was doubtless a brave, good man, but he lacked a great deal of being a military genius.”32

If Hood had been able to flank Schofield, instead of smashing his army against an entrenched enemy in a frontal attack, which resulted in such a terrible loss, he may have been able to defeat Schofield and prevent him from reinforcing Thomas at Nashville. This probably was his only chance of success. Even if Hood had succeeded in breaking Schofield’s line at Franklin and defeated him, the Union army could much more easily afford the losses than Hood’s army. Frontal attacks on dug-in armies had proved costly throughout the war. Hood lost about seven thousand men at the Battle of Franklin that he could not afford to lose. He lost sixty-six officers above the rank of captain including twelve general officers killed, wounded, or captured—leadership that was already scarce before the campaign.33 Schofield now had more troops by himself than Hood, and when Schofield joined forces with Thomas at Nashville, Hood was heavily outnumbered.34

Ten days after Hood’s self-proclaimed “victory” at Franklin, he reported to have 18,342 infantry left.35 Hood said that he realized that his army was too small to attack the Union troops dug in at Nashville, but also felt it was too small to go around it and cross into Kentucky. He felt his only choice was to dig in, repulse the inevitable Union attack, and then follow up on this victory by entering Nashville “on the heels of the enemy.”36 However, Hood’s army was too small for even this. Days went by as he waited for the attack. In the meantime, a heavy storm passed
through dropping rain, snow, and sleet. This was just another detriment for the poorly equipped Confederate army, many of whom had no shoes or other warm clothing. Ten days later, Thomas’s Union troops attacked. On the second day, they overran the Confederate positions and Hood “beheld for the first and only time a Confederate Army abandon the field in confusion.” The Army of Tennessee “disappeared as an army organization.” Could Hood have used a different strategy?

Perhaps Hood could have bypassed Nashville. Union General Ulysses S. Grant was afraid that Hood would do exactly that and get north of the Cumberland River. Grant said, “If he did this, I apprehended most serious results from the campaign in the North, and was afraid we might even have to send troops from the East to head him off if he got there.” This may have been a better option than laying siege to one of the most heavily fortified cities in the country that protected an army much larger and better equipped than Hood’s. However, Hood’s decision proved wrong, and the enemy destroyed his army. Was the disaster of the Tennessee campaign Hood’s fault? It is possible that Hood’s aggressive character made him unsuitable for commanding an entire army.

Hood was possibly too aggressive for this position. There were clues from both Confederate and Union leaders. When Davis decided to replace Johnston as commander, he telegraphed General Lee to ask Lee’s opinion. In Davis’s telegram he stated, “Johnston has failed, and there are strong indications that he will abandon Atlanta. . . .It seems necessary to relieve him at once. Who should succeed him? What think you of Hood for the position?” Lee replied by telegram the same day, “It is a bad time to release the commander of an army situated as that of Tennessee. We may lose Atlanta and the army too. Hood is a bold fighter. I am doubtful as to other qualities necessary.” Davis also sent General Braxton Bragg to Atlanta to review the situation. Bragg wrote back to Davis, and although General William J. Hardee outranked Hood, Bragg told Davis, “If any change is made Lieutenant-General Hood, would give unlimited satisfaction, and my estimate of him, always high, has been raised by his conduct in this campaign. Do not understand me as proposing him as a man of genius, or a great general, but as far better in the present emergency than any one we have available.” Along with the Confederate leaders’ lukewarm endorsements of Hood, Union leaders also had opinions of Hood’s style.

Some Union generals actually welcomed the arrival of Hood as commander of the Army of Tennessee. When General William T. Sherman heard Hood had taken over the Confederate Army, he said, “Hood is a new man and a fighter and must be watched Closer [sic], as he is reckless of the lives of his men.” Schofield,
Hood’s roommate at West Point, told Sherman that Hood was “bold even to rashness, and courageous in the extreme.” Grant said that the very fact that the Confederates would change commanders in such a situation indicated a change of policy to a more aggressive one, “the very thing our troops wanted.” It seemed that both the Union and the Confederacy had what they wanted—a Confederate general who would fight. However, would he do other crucial tasks well?

Some of the things that allowed Hood to be an effective leader of smaller units led to his downfall as leader of the Army of Tennessee, including “emotionalism, impatience, lack of attention to obstacles, planning, and detail.” He “had no real interest in or appreciation for the essential but tedious staff work.” In fact, he relieved his chief of staff and never hired another or reassembled his staff. So badly had Hood’s administration declined that one officer said that “it was soon impossible to determine if orders issued by Hood reached even the corps commanders.” Often, as at Spring Hill, “he ignored the staff work, unit coordination, and flexibility of maneuver so necessary for complex offensive operations.” This lack of communication was a crucial factor in the debacle at Spring Hill. Hood also had physical issues that hampered communication.

As a result of wounds he received at Gettysburg, Hood had a withered, useless arm. Furthermore, he lost a leg, amputated up to his hip, from wounds received at Chickamauga. To allow him to ride a horse, two aides strapped him into a specially made saddle. He did not have the mobility required to closely supervise a complicated battle. Time and again, good plans ended in disaster because Hood was not there to ensure his orders were understood and carried out. In battles around Atlanta, the same problem had cropped up. Hood did not learn from these mistakes. By being away from the battlefield, Hood was not cognizant of fast-developing battlefield situations. Between the lack of administration and Hood’s absence at critical times, it is no wonder that his orders at Spring Hill were confusing.

The matter of logistics was another problem. Hood planned operations and started to execute, only later discovering that there were no adequate logistical facilities. Unbelievably, as he kicked off his campaign into Tennessee, he actually ordered, “all railroads within forty miles of Atlanta be taken up at once.” In doing so, he destroyed his own line of supply. With poor staff communication and terrible lines of supply, his army was severely hampered and unprepared for the cold of November and December when they shivered outside of Nashville, suffering through an ice storm. Many had no shoes and their supplies were meager. Hood’s failures put his army into desperation.
The general morale of the army was another problem upon which Hood actually had a negative impact. Hood took over an army from a popular general. The army believed the more experienced corps commander, Hardee, was a better candidate for promotion than Hood.\textsuperscript{57} Hood did not do much to improve his relationship with his men. Although he wished to imitate Lee’s tactics, he did not accept blame as Lee did. After each defeat, Hood placed blame on his commanders and his men. Because he believed that Johnston had instilled a defensive mentality in them, he did not seem to respect them.\textsuperscript{58} He also compared the army unfavorably to the Army of Virginia and hinted that they lacked the will to fight that the eastern armies had.\textsuperscript{59} Hood was convinced that the army had fought defensively for so long it had lost its edge. In his own words, the appearance that his army seemed “unwilling to accept battle unless under the protection of breastworks, caused me to experience grave concern. In my inmost heart I questioned whether or not I would ever succeed in eradicating this evil.”\textsuperscript{60} He believed he did his best to combat this tendency. Indeed, Hood stated, “The valor displayed at Franklin, and which deservedly won the admiration of the Federals, was caused by the handling of the troops in a directly opposite manner to that of General Johnston.”\textsuperscript{61} In other words, the army only fought well because he handled them aggressively. However, Hood also lambasted the army’s “disgraceful effort” and added to his reputation as a butcher that sent men on suicide missions, helping to cement his unpopularity with his soldiers.\textsuperscript{62} Nevertheless, many of Hood’s problems resulted from the Confederacy’s existing ailments.

This was not 1861. Even the Army of Northern Virginia under Lee refrained from the aggressive fighting style Hood promoted. For example, when pinned up in Petersburg, Lee used a strategy more similar to that of Johnston. The Confederate armies did not face demoralized Union armies with unsuccessful leaders such as McClellan and Burnside; they were dealing with large, experienced, well-supplied armies with excellent leaders such as Grant, Sherman, and Thomas. It is debatable whether Hood would have done any better against Sherman even if Hood had command of the army instead of Johnston when Sherman entered Georgia. It is also debatable whether he could have beaten Thomas even if he had defeated Schofield. The Union army was large, well led, and well equipped. Finally, and possibly most importantly, Hood had lost the trust of his men.

Because of his inauspicious beginnings as an outsider, brought in to replace a popular general and command the army, Hood never fostered a positive relationship with his men. Sam Watkins, who lived through the campaign, said:
I have never seen an army so confused and demoralized. The Whole [sic] thing seemed to be so trembling and tottering. Every soldier mistrusted General Hood’s judgment. The officers soon became affected with the demoralization of their troops and rode on in dogged indifference. The once proud Army of the Tennessee had degenerated into a mob. Our country was gone, our cause was lost.”

Hood’s actions demoralized instead of rallying his army and in the end, the army ceased to exist as an effective fighting force.

John Bell Hood was one of the most successful Confederate brigade and division commanders of the Civil War. However, as the general in command of an entire army, he was not successful. This resulted in the destruction of the Army of Tennessee in 1864. Hood’s personal qualities of aggressiveness and valor and President Jefferson Davis’s selection of Hood to replace Johnston as commander of the Army of Tennessee did not play out well in the environment of 1864. Hood’s decision to invade Tennessee to take Nashville and enter Kentucky and ultimately link up with Lee at Petersburg, though questionable, was probably the best option. He hoped to force Sherman to backtrack and help Lee defeat Grant. However, Hood’s drive to take Nashville failed at Spring Hill, Franklin, and Nashville, resulting in the destruction of the Army of Tennessee. There were different actions that Hood could have taken that may have resulted in a better outcome. Hood’s aggressive tendencies may have worked well for him as a lower-level commander but did not work for the Army of Tennessee. Hood’s deficiencies in staff work, communication, logistics and his inability to be present ensured poor results. Hood’s manner of leadership had a detrimental impact on the morale of the army and he had a poor relationship with his subordinates. In 1864, the situation Hood encountered was almost hopeless. He had very little room for error. Unfortunately, he made many errors that resulted in the destruction of the Army of Tennessee and his reputation as a general. John Bell Hood was a “fine combat leader in situations where his bravery and example could inspire his followers to deeds of great valor,” but he rose to a position where combat leadership was not enough. He neglected things such as reconnaissance, logistics, and staff work that made him unable to successfully implement a sound plan. He realized too late that a fighting spirit is not the only quality that makes a military leader successful.
Notes


3. Ibid.


16. Ibid., 150.

17. R. M. Collins, *Chapters from the Unwritten History of the War Between the States.* (St. Louis: Nixon-Jones Ptg. Co., 1863), 244-245.

18. Ibid., 246.


21. Ibid.

23. Ibid.


25. McMurry, 176.


28. Ibid., 1168.


32. Collins, 249.


34. Ibid.

35. Hood, 298.

36. Ibid., 299.


38. Hood, 303.


42. Ibid.


45. Coffey, 56.

46. Grant, 435.

47. McMurray, 123.
48. Ibid., 159.


50. McMurry, 153.

51. Connelly, 153.

52. Ibid., 430.

53. Coffey, 71.

54. McMurry, 174.

55. Connelly, 153.


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59. Connelly, 431.

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64. McMurry, 190.
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Introduction

The Ohio Country played an important role to both the British and French during the American colonial period. Its significance was clearly displayed at the confluence of three rivers—the Ohio, the Allegheny, and the Monongahela—where two important forts were constructed. From the early French explorations of Samuel de Champlain, to the settlement of Jamestown by the English, the British and French both saw the North American continent as a way to expand their respective empires. The Ohio Country would be the focal point of friction between France, Britain, and the British colonists. It would also serve as the critical region of overlap between French influence from Upper Canada, and the British influence from Virginia and Pennsylvania. It is important to note that while Britain sought control of the Ohio Country, it was the British colonists who wanted to expand colonial settlements into the frontier. The French built fortifications from Presque Isle, near present-day Erie, Pennsylvania to the Ohio Valley.

In 1754, the French constructed the first fort at the location and named it Fort Duquesne in honor of Ange Duquesne de Menneville, Marquis de Duquesne, the Governor General of New France from 1752 until 1755. By 1761, the British completed construction on Fort Pitt, named after William Pitt, Secretary of State for the Southern Department from 1757 until his resignation in 1761. The British and French battled to gain control of this critical site, which resulted in the loss of French control of the area and the rise of a British fortification. French influence in the Ohio Country was closely tied to New France’s alliance with the local Native American tribes. French influence in the Ohio Country and Fort Duquesne were lost because of inadequate forces and supplies, the increasing unreliability of the local native allies of the French, and the abandonment of Fort Duquesne, which led to British control of the region and the construction of Fort Pitt.
To appreciate how the French lost influence in the Ohio Country, it is important to understand how the French presence began in the region. The power struggle between Britain and France in the Ohio Country began with competing claims by both empires throughout what is now the western part of Pennsylvania. In 1753, as British fur traders encroached on French-claimed lands, Governor Duquesne increased French military presence from Lake Erie to the Allegheny River. Duquesne ordered “[f]ifteen hundred troupes de la marine and Canadian militia [to build] Fort Presqu’ile and two more forts between it and the Allegheny River.”¹ He intended this act to show the British that the region belonged to the King of France, not to the King of England. The French also enlisted the aid of the local native tribes in their fort building campaign including the Seneca, whose “hunters . . . gave some Six Nation support to the venture.”² For the French, establishing
fortifications and securing native support bolstered their land claims, which in turn aided in their efforts to prevent the British from establishing a stronger foothold throughout the Ohio Country. However, France was not the only empire interacting with local tribes and seeking alliances in the region.

While the French were building forts south of what is today Erie, Pennsylvania, the Mingo tribe sought to establish a relationship with the British. Mingo, a term used by the British to refer to the Iroquois, came from the word Minqua in the Delaware language, which means stealthy. From the outset, Europeans settling in the Delaware region forced the natives further into what is now central and western Pennsylvania. Due to the growing presence of Europeans, the “Mingos set up permanent residence in the area between Lake Erie and the Allegheny River.” After the Mingo sent tribe members to negotiate with the British in Virginia, “the Mingo ‘half-king’ Scarouday privately agreed to allow the Virginians to establish a fort at the forks of the Ohio.” While the French worked their way down from the north, the British—now with the support of the Mingo—moved up from the south. Men of both empires headed to the forks of the Ohio to establish their territorial claims and win control of the Ohio Country. In this race to the Ohio, the British were the first to start construction of a fort at the juncture of the three rivers, though that fort would be short lived.

To counter the growing French influence in the Ohio River Valley, and with the blessing of the Mingo; Robert Dinwiddie, governor of Virginia from 1751 to 1758, sent a small militia detachment under the leadership of Captain William Trent to establish a fort on the Ohio River. Dinwiddie ordered Trent “to keep Possession of His Majesty’s Lands on the Ohio; & the Waters thereof.” As Captain Trent and his men constructed the fort, it became clear that they needed more provisions. Trent realized that the Delaware Indians accompanying his venture would not aid the British with food, so Trent departed the construction site to acquire supplies. He left Ensign Edward Ward in command.

During this time, the French moved a sizable force down the Allegheny River towards the forks of the Ohio. On 17 April 1753, the same day that the small British expedition erected the gate of the fort, the French landed at the forks. Ward weighed his options and concluded that “the odds [of] forty English volunteers and carpenters with next to no food in a hastily completed palisade, against a force of professional soldiers that looked to him at least a thousand strong” were dim; his enemies “wield[ed] enough firepower to blow his fort to matchsticks,” thus he “chose the better part of valor.” His decision was rather easy. Ward and his men
were able to leave without any harassment, indignity, or repercussion from the French. Now the French were in control of the Ohio and intended to build a fort, which would bear the name of the Governor General of New France, Marquis de Duquesne.

After Trent’s men under Ensign Ward capitulated, the French destroyed the British fortification, and constructed a new fort at the forks of the Ohio. Designed by Captain Francois Le Mercier, a trained engineer, the fort consisted of 10-20 foot thick earth and log walls to protect the inhabitants from direct cannon and musket fire. An impressive structure for its time, Fort Duquesne measured about 160 feet on each side. It contained four triangular bastions, from which artillery could be fired. In addition to the engineer work of the structure itself, what the fort contained inside also made this fortification unique in the Ohio Country. The intent of the French to control the forks of the Ohio is represented by the interior of the fort, which consisted of “a small central parade ground, a guardhouse, officers’ quarters, supply and powder magazines, a hospital, a blacksmith’s shop, and a bakery.”

![Figure 2. “A Plan of the New Fort at Pittsburgh or Duquesne, 1759,” originally published in “A Set of Plans and Forts in America, 1765.”](image-url)

A private with the French forces, Charles Bonin, was present for the construction. In April 1754 he wrote, “construction was started on this fort which we named Fort
Duquesne,” and “the fort was built of squared timbers twelve feet thick on the land side; its thickness filled with earth; with a strong parapet; and three bastions each mounting four cannon.”10 The construction quality of this new fort far exceeded that of the one hastily constructed by the British.

As construction of the new fort was underway, some of the Delaware peoples that lived around the Ohio Country visited the fort. For the French, this provided a chance to gain some local help from one of the Indian tribes, key to securing their influence in the Ohio Country. Bonin commented that the Delaware “came to Fort Duquesne, were well received, and became attached to the French,” and that “they were rewarded by presents and good treatment which, when continued, aroused the jealousy among their neighbors, the Shawnees.”11

**French and Indian Success against the British**

Just before the completion of the fort, the French received word of a British force from Virginia moving towards the forks of the Ohio. This launched a series of defenses that the French made to protect not only Fort Duquesne, but also their influence in the Ohio Country.

The first confrontation between the British and the French came in an almost accidental way. After the French refused to vacate the Ohio Country, and discontinue their fort building within the region, Governor Dinwiddie “ordered the raising of two hundred men, who would proceed under Washington . . . to the Forks of the Ohio and defend Virginia’s interests against further French encroachments.”12 The advancement of the Virginians caused the French to respond by sending troops from the garrison at Fort Duquesne to establish contact with the colonists. A small French and Indian force under the command of Ensign Joseph Coulon de Villiers de Jumonville and a second group, Virginia militia under Lt. Col. George Washington, headed towards each other with the goal of explaining what each kingdom wanted. In an attempt to explain French intentions in the region, “Jumonville ventured out from Fort Duquesne to reply to the chosen representative of Virginia’s Ohio land claims, George Washington, who was heading west to announce Britain’s intentions.”13 This encounter would not be a cordial, friendly, or even diplomatic meeting. Nor would it prove to be beneficial to Jumonville or to Virginia volunteers under the command of Washington.

The engagement between the British and French would have dire consequences. Of the twenty-one French who were taken prisoner, and ten killed,
one of the fatalities was Jumonville. Upon hearing this news the commander of Fort Duquesne, Captain Claude-Pierre Pécaudy, seigneur de Contrecoeur, dispatched a force to find the British. Led by the older brother of Ensign Jumonville, the French surrounded Washington and his Virginia militia at Washington’s hastily built Fort Necessity, forcing the British colonial troops to surrender. This marked the first victory for the French in the Ohio Country, but it would not be the last. By the following year, the French and their Indian allies claimed a much greater victory against a much larger force.

By 1755, the British and French were on a collision course in North America. After sending word back to Great Britain about the events that had transpired in the Ohio Country, Governor Dinwiddie sought to gain approval from King George II to have troops sent to North America. One man in position to heavily influence George II was Thomas Pelham-Holles, Duke of Newcastle and the Prime Minister of Great Britain from 1754 to 1756. Another was the king’s son, Prince William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland and captain-general of the army. Both dukes were successful in gaining the support of the king, who agreed “to send two regiments of Irish infantry to America under the command of Major General Edward Braddock.” The original plan for Braddock was less aggressive than the one he brought to America. Built upon stages, a strategy based on an incremental progression gave Great Britain the option to continue an open dialogue with the French. But the influence of the Duke of Cumberland would modulate the plan into a less moderate one. The finalized plan resulted in multiple simultaneous attacks across North America, and gave Braddock “command over all existing regular forces in America.” Once Braddock succeeded in capturing Fort Duquesne, the plan called for him to join the northern army, and head towards the fortress at Niagara. This was one of three separate armies to attack the French at different locations. Yet, this was not to happen because of the French and their Indian allies.

The composition of the French force sent to engage Braddock’s troops had much to do with the success that they had, with 637 Amerindians, 146 Canadian militia and 108 troupes de la marine leaving Fort Duquesne to ambush the English and Virginian militia. The French relied heavily on their native allies to achieve success at the Battle of the Monongahela. Since the majority of this force was comprised of Indians, it was possible to use unorthodox tactics against the British that were in contrast to conventional European warfare. In addition to the tactics, the mixture of tribes also aided the French in this battle against the British; these included the Ottawa, Potawatomi, mission Huron and Abenaki, along with Shawnee,
Delaware and Mingo warriors who were previously British and colonial allies. Although this battle kept the British from gaining control along the Ohio Country, it would not be long before the French would start to lose support from the Indians.

Lack of Supplies, Soldiers, and Indian Allies to Protect Fort Duquesne

After Braddock’s defeat at the Battle of the Monongahela, the French presence in the Ohio Country remained strong; yet the lack of provisions, minimal reinforcements, and the loss of Indian support would change this. In 1758, previous Indian allies of the French left and began to side with the British. The first action that precipitated this chain of events happened when “on March 4, 1758 Colonel John Forbes . . . was promoted to brigadier general and given the responsibility to capture the same Fort Duquesne at the Forks of the Ohio that had stymied General Braddock three years earlier.”

At 55 years of age, of Scottish origin, and trained as a physician, Forbes was “an officer of great experience and capacity.” However, he suffered from an inflammatory disease that affected his skin to the point that at times, he could barely move. After years of trying to take control of the Ohio Country, the British gained control of the region in 1758 through Forbes’s expedition. With his promotion and new mission, Forbes had set out to take control of the Ohio Country. He did not want to suffer the same fate or make the same mistakes that his predecessor had. “Throughout the spring and early summer, Brigadier-General Forbes had assembled an army of about 6,000 regulars and provincials.” With this force, Forbes set out to take control of Fort Duquesne.

A meeting that resulted in the loss of Indian support for the French and a gain for the British took place along the Ohio River as five hundred representatives of fifteen tribes gathered in October 1758 to meet with Pennsylvania Governor William Denny, New Jersey Governor Francis Bernard, and Colonel Henry Bouquet, who represented the ill Forbes. Support from the local tribes had been key for the French to maintain control in the Ohio Country. At the conclusion of the meeting, “the Amerindians agreed to withdraw support from the French.” This became a major problem for the garrison at Fort Duquesne. Much as the French were able to sway the local Indians to side with them in 1755, the British had convinced the Indians to switch their allegiance. The biggest loss of allies for the French came from two tribes that lived along the Ohio River. The French could not hold Fort Duquesne, near the site area where the French and Indian War began, without the help of the
Delawares and the Shawnees.\textsuperscript{25} The loss of these two tribes as allies would play a crucial role in the fate of the French in the Ohio Country. But it was not just the loss of allies that put Fort Duquesne in jeopardy. Dwindling supplies also led to the demise of the fort.

For any fortification on the edge of the frontier, supplies were a necessity for keeping a garrison functional. Supplies were even more important for Fort Duquesne, since it was the most distant French fortification in the Ohio Country. The garrison at Fort Duquesne was low on provisions, since the supplies intended for it were destroyed by the British capture of Fort Frontenac in August 1758.\textsuperscript{26} Since the logistical lifeline of Fort Duquesne was through Fort Frontenac, the destruction of that fort put the garrison at Duquesne under a terrible strain. Important food, medicine, clothing, weapons, and ammunition never reached their destination. Another important factor that led to the fall of Fort Duquesne was the lack of reinforcements to the Ohio Country.

One major change that occurred between the British and the French in the 1750s was the strategy of sending soldiers across the Atlantic to North America. While the British believed a larger force was necessary and supporting the colonies was a large priority; the French did not share the same view. The reason for this can be seen in how Canada, “received little reinforcement since 1756”, and in how the French and Canadians witnessed a “severe loss of Amerindian support.”\textsuperscript{27} The loss of the Indian support, coupled with no additional forces arriving from France was a certain disaster. The numerical advantage was leaning heavily in favor of the British, and though superior numbers do not necessarily mean victory, it can put an opponent at a distinct disadvantage. And the alternatives to additional forces were not reassuring.

One solution that the French had in mind was simple, but ineffective. Since it was impossible to transport troops to North America, “the ministry could only advise that women and old men of New France work the fields while all able bodied males were mobilized.”\textsuperscript{28} The idea of conscripting all the capable men in New France to supplement regular forces would not help in maintaining the French presence in the Ohio Country. This would become apparent when Forbes began his march toward the forks of the Ohio to capture Fort Duquesne.

Success of the Forbes Expedition to Fort Duquesne

The outcome of Forbes’s expedition differed from that of Braddock’s,
especially in combat with the French and Indians. Before the main army had reached Fort Duquesne, Forbes dispatched a small number of troops towards the confluence of the three rivers. The French and their allies bloodily repulsed Major James Grant’s misguided attempt to surprise the fort on 14 September, marking the last success that the French had in both keeping the British out of the Ohio River Valley and retaining their presence in the region.29

Due to their lack of provisions, allies, and forces at Fort Duquesne, the French abandoned the fort. All that the French could do was leave the fort and head back up the Allegheny River, and “the remaining three hundred Canadian troops, aware that Forbes’s army was advancing detonated Fort Duquesne and took salvaged cannon and supplies to reinforce Fort Machault (Venango) for the winter.”30 The destruction of Fort Duquesne would be the end of the French presence in the Ohio Country. For Forbes and his expedition, by the time they reached the fort expecting to take it by force, the charred remains of the French fort were all that they found. The fort was destroyed and laid in ruins at the forks of the Ohio.

In a letter to Pennsylvania Governor William Denny, Forbes wrote, “having obliged them to Burn and abandon their Fort, Duquesne, which they effectuated upon the 24th . . . I took Possession with my little Army the next Day.”31 After this victory, the British built another fort at the forks, one that bore the name of the man back in England who helped to change the course of the French and Indian War. William Pitt and his impact on the war came from his “close connection to the heir apparent, the teenage boy who would one day become George III.”32 Although he was not highly regarded by the king or Newcastle, Pitt would compromise with his rival Newcastle; together they formed a ministry that would guide the course of the war. Strategically, Pitt and his views of how to defeat the French were able to be applied to the war effort. Pitt intended for the British to “hold the line against France where it was strongest, in Europe, and while striking at its weakest point, North America.”33 Unlike his predecessors, Pitt valued the use of both soldiers and resources from North America in his plan.

The Construction of Fort Pitt

The ashes of the French fort gave birth to a new British fort along the Ohio River. This new fort would be larger than Fort Duquesne because, “instead of four bastions, Fort Pitt had five; and its shape, therefore, was pentagonal rather than square.”34 Constructed in the style European forts of the time; the main difference in
Fort Pitt was that it was larger than others in North America were. This allowed the British to conduct fur trading, house soldiers that could be deployed to attack other French fortifications along the Great Lakes; in addition, “no other fort on the British frontier, indeed, was quite as impressive as Fort Pitt, although Crown Point was as large, and Oswego only slightly smaller.”

With the establishment of Fort Pitt, the French influence in the Ohio Country was effectively lost. The British now held control of the Ohio River and were able to establish a garrison that could serve in expanding towards other French garrisons throughout the Great Lakes. It would not take much longer for New France to fall to the British and by September 8, 1760, Chevalier de Lévis destroyed his battle flags to prevent the humiliation of his troops surrendering, and Vaudreuil yielded New France to the British Crown. This officially ended the French presence in the Ohio Country and led to the end of the French presence on the North American continent.

Conclusion

Control of Ohio Country depended on control of the Ohio River. Between the British and the French, a struggle for supremacy led to the creation and destruction of the French Fort Duquesne. One reason for this, the French lost the support of their native allies to the British. In addition, the failure to resupply and reinforce their fortifications throughout New France added to the demise of the French fort along the Ohio River. In the shadow of the French fortification and influence along the Ohio River, the British were able to gain control and construct a fort of their own, Fort Pitt. This was made possible because of the influence of William Pitt. Under his guidance and the implementation of his strategy, the British were ultimately able to remove the French from the Ohio Country. Fort Duquesne and French influence in the Ohio Country was lost because of inadequate forces and supplies, the increasing unreliability of the local natives for the French, and the abandonment of Fort Duquesne, which led to British control of the region and the construction of Fort Pitt.

Notes


2. Ibid.


6. Ibid., 49.


9. Ibid.


11. Ibid., 93-94.


16. Ibid., 70.


19. Ibid.


24. Ibid.


27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.


33. Ibid., 212.


35. Ibid.

36. Ibid., 223-224.
Bibliography


Overcoming Fear: Realizing Production at the Willow Run Bomber Plant

Michael R. Majerczyk

Henry Ford’s farm in Ypsilanti, Michigan, twenty-five miles west of Detroit became the site and home to the Willow Run plant. The fourteen-hundred acre farm produced soybeans and included an apple orchard. The farm was something akin to a boys camp. There, boys who had lost their fathers in World War I found a place to study and work during the summer months. In 1941, the trickling sound of the Willow Run creek that ran through the farm and from which the plant took its name, gave way to the sound of machines.¹ Bulldozers began clearing the site in 1941 to make way for the massive Willow Run Bomber Plant.² The main building alone was sixty-seven acres under one roof. By May 1942, thirty-thousand workers had produced their first B-24 Liberator.³ Efficiency continued to improve and by November 1943 Willow Run had produced one-thousand Liberators. A month after D-day Ford Motor Company made good on its promise to build one bomber an hour.⁴ At its pinnacle, Willow Run employed 42,331 workers. When production ceased in June 1945 the plant had produced a total of 8,685 Liberators.⁵ The numbers are impressive but impersonal, because they mask the labor relation and housing difficulties both hourly and salaried employees had to overcome. To realize production at the Willow Run Bomber, workers had to overcome the culture of fear that existed at Ford Motor Company and their fear of an unfamiliar diverse workplace.

Main Sources

In his book, The Arsenal of Democracy: FDR, Detroit, and an Epic Quest to Arm an America at War, A.J. Baime focused on the relationship between Edsel and Henry Ford. Their views differed on politics, business, family, and friends. This created a rather cold father and son relationship. Not content to live a comfortable life outside the company, the ailing Edsel chose to persevere and remain active within the company for three reasons. First, Edsel wanted to make a name for himself in his own right.⁶ Second, he wished to groom the heir of the Ford empire, his son
Henry II. Third, Edsel wanted to shield Henry II from the darker side of the company business. The dark side of the Ford Empire lay with the company's security division, the Ford Service Department, and its master, Harry Bennett. Baime dedicated an entire chapter to this company henchman entitled *The Ford Terror*. Baime also discussed in-depth the large migration of southern workers, both black and white, that came seeking work at the Willow Run plant. When they arrived, they found insufficient housing and public infrastructure; by-products of a defense industry created in short order, at the beginning of the Second World War.

In his memoir *The Brothers Reuther and the Story of the UAW/ A Memoir*, Victor G. Reuther documented the UAW’s role in the labor movement. Victor G. Reuther, together with his brothers Walter and Roy, dedicated their lives to create and strengthen the United Auto Workers union. Both Walter and Victor survived assassination attempts; Walter in 1948 and Victor in 1949, but this did not deter them from striving to create a workplace for UAW members rooted in equality and free of fear. To realize this at Ford Motor Company, they would have to get by men such as Harry Bennett. Bennett's involvement with the Battle of the Overpass in 1937 appears in detail. In addition, an excellent description of labor’s struggle with General Motors provides a broad view of the labor movement during this period. Events such as the Flint Sit-Down Strikes that include the famous Battle of Bulls Run at the Fisher Body Two plant in January 1937 demonstrate a promising and strengthening labor movement.

Robert Lacey’s *Ford: The Men and the Machines* begins with the Ford family arriving in America from Ireland in 1832 and ends with William Clay Ford in the 1980s. Indeed, the work discusses the company’s fight with unionists but details sometimes forgotten figures that played a large part in the company’s success. For instance, Charles E. Sorenson, a high-ranking production boss that provided instrumental leadership at both the Rouge and Willow Run, finds mention through much of the narrative. Henry Ford had offered a job to him in 1905 and he stayed with Ford until 1944. Lacey discussed Henry II in depth. In 1945, Henry II became president of Ford Motor Company with full decision-making power. Nevertheless, he had inherited a company that had fallen well behind General Motors and Chrysler in sales and design. The old guard had run its course and one of Henry II’s first acts as president was to remove Harry Bennett from the payroll. The *Dark Angel*, as Lacey described him, was gone.

In his book *Ford: We Never Called Him Henry*, Bennett places blame for the violence and dirty play on Henry Ford. “Nothing ever happened at the Ford
That he is so adamant about this suggests he is trying to redirect responsibility for his own questionable behavior. Regardless of what Henry Ford knew or did not know about Bennett’s activities, Henry Ford is responsible for giving Bennett a free hand in the affairs of the Company. As it was, Harry Bennett answered only to Henry Ford. He was Henry Ford’s “eyes and ears” of the company. So close was the relationship between Bennett and Henry Ford that Bennett believed Henry thought of him as a son. Indeed, there was much conflict between Edsel and Bennett in this matter. Also discussed are the fights with the unions. So antagonistic did Henry Ford and Bennett find the unions that they refused to name Reuther or Frankensteen, rather, they referred to them as “union bosses.”

Harry Bennett

Henry Ford met Harry Bennett in New York City in 1916 as a matter of coincidence. Ford planned to meet with the noted newspaper journalist Arthur Brisbane at the Ford sales headquarters for New York. Bennett was a sailor. His enlistment was up and he was coming ashore with his friend from the S.S. Nashville in the port of New York the same day. Both men enlisted together and intended to reenlist together but were determined to have some fun as civilians first. The fun began not long after Bennett stepped off his ship. On the dock, a fight involving Bennett broke out. Brisbane saw the fight unfold and were it not for Brisbane convincing the police that Bennett was defending himself and his friend, the police would have taken Bennett to jail. Rather than the inside of a jail cell, Brisbane, clearly intrigued by Bennett, invited him to his appointment with Henry Ford. Ford also found Bennett intriguing and questioned Bennett in matters of toughness and marksmanship. The conversation cascaded into a de facto job interview. When the conversation was over, Bennett had secured Henry Ford’s interest and a position at Ford Motor Company.

Ford intended to send Bennett to the still under construction, River Rouge Plant in Dearborn, Michigan, or as it is more commonly known as the Rouge. With this in mind, Ford instructed Bennett to stay in New York and work under Gaston Plantiff, the New York sales manager. Plantiff did not think much of Bennett and put him to work doing menial tasks with instructions to stay out of the way. Not satisfied with the situation, Bennett, who was originally from Ann Arbor, Michigan, left for Detroit to stay with his aunt. With the help of his personal contact, a Mr.
Stiementz, he secured a meeting with the high-ranking company man Earnest Liebold at the Highland Park plant. Liebold informed Henry Ford that Bennett was poking around the plant asking to meet with him. Now in his charge, Liebold put Bennett behind a desk with no other instructions but to sit and wait. Perhaps this was part of Henry Ford’s plan—to test Bennett’s patience and mettle. As such, Henry Ford refused Bennett’s initial requests to meet with him but kept him around nonetheless. Tired of sitting at a desk doing nothing, Bennett secured a job in the art department. As Bennett was an unknown and favored by Henry Ford, he quickly won the disdain of his co-workers and superiors. When the harassment became more than Bennett wished to deal with, he quit. When Henry Ford found out about it he called him to a meeting and afterwards Bennett would return to his post. This cycle repeated for six months until Bennett had had enough of the hazing and settled matters with his fists. Bennett was five foot seven inches tall and weighed in at a hundred and forty-five pounds. His antagonist, a man under the charge of A.B. Jewett, was twice that but it mattered not. Bennett’s victory in the fight began his career at Ford Motor Company in earnest. Perhaps this is what Henry Ford was waiting for, because soon after the incident, Ford called for Bennett and sent him to the Rouge as his personal liaison.

By 1920, Bennett was head of the Ford Service Department and as such, had at his command one of the largest privately owned security forces in existence. His office was located in the basement of the Rouge, complete with an underground garage. Thus, it was difficult for employees to know when he was there or when he left. Ford employees never knew where Bennett was, but they always knew he or one of his Service Men were close. Workers were terrified of Bennett and his Service Department and as a result, many workers suffered nervous breakdowns and related illnesses such as the “Ford Stomach.” Roscoe Smith, a Ford engineer, recalled the atmosphere at the company. “I think it was just fear that caused this tension in the company. A lot of people, when [Bennett's men] came around and started taking them apart, just couldn't take it. They couldn't stand the pressure.” His staff included ex-convicts, underworld types, and football players all charged with keeping order as defined by Bennett. Through contacts at the Michigan State Prison in nearby Jackson, Michigan, Bennett secured paroled inmates to work for him. Of particular use to Bennett were his spies, and they were everywhere. One never knew whom they could trust and whom they could not. Saying the wrong thing, innocent or otherwise, could mean a beating in the men’s room, on the way out the company gates or at one’s home. Nothing went on at the Rouge without Bennett knowing
about it. So brash was Bennett, that he paraded lions and tigers through the Rouge on a leash. The intimidation aspect of this is clear and so was the message—speed up the line!

The Eccentric Henry Ford

That Henry Ford favored a man like Bennett leads to questions concerning his rationality. One explanation may be eccentricity produced by a brilliant mind, and if nothing else, Henry Ford was eccentric. For example, he so despised Franklin D. Roosevelt that early on he outright refused to help manufacture goods for the war effort. A good example of this is the deal he backed out of in June 1940 to manufacture six thousand Rolls-Royce Merlin aviation engines for the British Spitfire fighter. Yes, Henry Ford was a pacifist, and indeed, he had stated earlier that he would not produce war products for other countries. But to go back on his word two days after the deal was agreed upon and made public, makes it clear he was provoking Roosevelt as a means to retaliate against his New Deal policies. Bennett believed this is why Henry Ford accepted the Nazi Grand Cross of the Golden Eagle medal. Ford believed it would outrage FDR, and in that way, he could strike back at FDR’s policies. Regardless of how eccentric Henry Ford was or how illogical and questionable his decisions were, he still controlled the company outright and he ran it as he saw fit. He intended to do so without the presence of the unions.

The Overpass

With the passage of the Roosevelt-supported Wagner Act in 1935, workers had the legal right to organize. Ford felt Roosevelt’s New Deal policies were an intrusion into his business, and he felt the same way about the unions. That Roosevelt supported the Wagner Act served to deepen Ford’s resentment of both Roosevelt and the unions. Unbeknownst to Henry Ford at that time, his future employees at his Willow Run Bomber Plant would be members of the United Auto Workers. The struggle to unionize Ford Motor Company would not be easy. One of the most famous episodes in UAW-Ford lore is the Battle of the Overpass, May 26, 1937.

To allow its employees quicker access to the Rouge, Ford Motor Company built a pedestrian overpass at Miller Road near gate four. The company had built the overpass at its own expense but leased it to the Detroit Railway Commission. Thus,
it was open for public use and in this way, was not private property.\textsuperscript{37} In early May, 1937, Walter Reuther, the future president of the UAW, applied for a permit to hand out union literature near gate four of the Rouge. The Wagner Act guaranteed unionists the right to do so. Make no mistake, Harry Bennett’s network of spies relayed the information to him probably through a public official the day Reuther applied for the permit.\textsuperscript{38} As it was, the entire city of Dearborn was under the influence of Ford Motor Company.\textsuperscript{39}

As such, Bennett ordered his men to tighten security in the already tense atmosphere of the Rouge. Hourly employees dared not mention anything associated with the union as it was. Being overheard now could provoke a Service Man in the worst way.\textsuperscript{40} Bear in mind, workers did not always know who Bennett’s men were. To counter the fear of the Service Department and help strengthen the courage and resolve of Ford workers, the UAW took the fight right to the gates of the Rouge. Walter Reuther, together with other union officials including Richard Frankensteen, began handing out union literature on the Miller Road overpass during shift change. It was not long before thirty or forty Service Men arrived. They began shouting at the unionists to leave, but they held

\[\text{\textbf{Figure 1}: A copy of the flyer handed out the day of the Battle of the Overpass. Walter P. Reuther Library, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI.}\]
firm. The Service Men attacked. They picked up Reuther and threw him to the ground at least eight times. While he was on the ground, they repeatedly kicked him in the head, groin, and mid-section. Richard Frankensteen fared no better. The Service Men pulled his jacket over his head thereby making him defenseless. Thus, administering the beating was straightforward. Women were not immune from the Service Men. They too were thrown to the ground and kicked. William Merriweather, a union member, tried to help one woman under attack and the Service Men were quick to turn their attention to him. He suffered a broken back. 

However, newspaper cameramen were present but did not intervene. However, newspaper cameramen were on the overpass when the attacks started and were able to capture images while the attacks were taking place. When the images made the newspapers around the country, public opinion turned in favor of the union. Nevertheless, the struggle to organize Ford workers continued for another four years, and were it not for Clara Ford, Henry’s wife, the fighting would have continued. As it was, Clara had had enough of the violence and demanded that Henry settle matters with the union. If not, she was leaving him. Henry was powerless at this point and later remarked, “Don’t ever discredit the power of a woman.”

Figure 2: Harry Bennett. Walter P. Reuther Library, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI.
The Contract

In 1941, Ford workers had union representation and a contract that could counter Harry Bennett and the culture of fear that existed at Ford Motor Company. A copy of the contract with the International UAW dated 1942 offers a look into how the work atmosphere was at Willow Run. A section of the contract concerning a grievance procedure and one on seniority is poignant. Employees with grievances had the right to present their grievance to the company either directly to their foreman or though their union committeeman. With the grievance in hand, both the committeeman and the foreman negotiated in an effort to resolve the problem. If the issue persisted, the grievance went to the plant committee and a company representative. Both the company and the union had two weeks to resolve the issue. If the issue was still not resolved, it went before an appeals board.46

The contract also recognized seniority. Unlike the traditional Big Three Automakers two-week shutdown period in July, in the 1930s there existed an annual indefinite layoff. The layoffs began in June or July. Since there existed no system of seniority, the foreman had full control over one’s fate. The foreman simply sent workers home and told them not to return until instructed to do so. Much to the disgust of their co-workers, if one pandered to the foreman’s whims, he or she might receive an extra week or two of work. When the company issued recalls, workers reported to the Miller Road gate ready for work. The foreman choose who worked. Those not chosen waited outside the plant for an undetermined amount of time, sometimes days or weeks went by. If rehired, there was no guarantee of returning to one’s previous rate of pay. For example, if a worker performed well and received pay raises in the past, he or she may well have to restart at the entry-level rate of pay. Even if employees exemplified quality work in the past, they might still find themselves jobless at rehire time.47 The contract allowed the union local to decide precisely how seniority worked, for example, whether or not seniority was interchangeable within determined departments or plant wide.48 However the local decided to implement seniority; it provided a measure of job security and alleviated the anxiety and uncertainty that accompanied the rehire process. Furthermore, to eliminate spying, Ford Service Men were to wear identifying attire.49

It is easy to see how the old system produced anxiety and fear.50 Walter Reuther was well aware of the working conditions inside the automotive industry. He came to Detroit in 1927 and found work at “the slaughterhouse” or Briggs
Manufacturing Company. Though he was a tool and die maker, he took a position as a drill press operator. Later that year he gained a tool and die position at the Rouge. Without explanation, Ford Motor Company discharged and blacklisted him in 1932. As he was an active organizer and openly supported progressive politicians, it is not hard to understand why. Nevertheless, by 1941 Ford workers were union brothers and sisters. An excerpt from a letter sent to Walter from his former Polish co-workers at the Rouge is telling of the change in attitude workers felt towards one another after unionization. “I thank you, brother Reuther, for what you and UAW has done for me. Once in the Ford plant they called me “dumb Polack,” but now with UAW they call me “brother.”

Housing

The tools the union provided promoted fair play, but it could not fully temper the racial and sectional tension the work force at Willow Run encountered. At the time of Pearl Harbor, a few thousand people were already working in the cavernous Willow Run plant while construction was still going on. But the plant was far from realizing full production. The plant was twenty-seven miles from Detroit, and Edsel Ford, the man responsible for the project, was counting on the Detroit metropolitan area to house and support the forty-thousand workers that would work there. However, in an effort to conserve fuel and rubber, rationing laws forbid the twenty-seven mile commute. This resulted in workers setting up makeshift abodes adjacent to or very near the plant itself. After a short time, the view outside the plant was a maze of tents and trailers that grew daily. The local municipalities were not equipped to endure this mass migration. Public utilities such as sewers, electricity, and drinking water were a luxury to the newcomers, but after twelve years of economic depression, most people accepted the situation. Between 1940 and 1944, over two hundred thousand people migrated to southeastern Michigan to work. So unprepared was rural Ypsilanti for the population explosion it was to endure, township officials scrambled to initiate its first health department. As it was, Ypsilanti Township already had a high infant mortality rate and outbursts of scarlet fever, but conservative officials refused to implement a health department. Nevertheless, the huge migration of defense workers that continued to flow into the area settled the matter. The city of Ann Arbor already had a health department and continued to administrate it. But in June 1941 Washtenaw County realized its first health department.
The limited housing and infrastructure were responsible for high absenteeism thereby limiting the efficiency of the bomber plant. With this in mind, union officials such as Walter Reuther proposed planned communities for Willow Run workers or "Bomber Cities" as far back as 1941. When it came time for planning in 1942, three sites proved promising. Two of the proposed sites were near the cities of Wayne and Inkster and one in Superior Township near Ann Arbor in Washtenaw County. All three sites were within thirteen miles of the bomber plant. Federally funded and coordinated by the newly created Public Housing Authority, the project met no opposition from the cities of Wayne and Inkster. However, conservative Superior Township opposed the project because they feared forty thousand union members would create a progressive voting bloc.

Conservatives won a partial victory in their efforts to prevent Willow Run workers from living in their vicinity. The Federal Housing Commission (FHC) constructed temporary dormitories and apartments within walking distance of the plant not far from the originally desired location in Washtenaw County. The Wayne and Inkster locations received permanent housing structures. Nevertheless, the much-needed housing would come well after the housing shortage was apparent. Until the housing projects were completed, workers had to make due in their shantytowns, living in close proximity with unfamiliar people.

The close quarters in the shantytowns ignited a culture clash. To find able bodies to work at Willow Run, Harry Bennett sent recruiters to the South to distribute bus passes to Willow Run. Indeed, candidates arrived, and with them, southern ideas concerning race. Some openly voiced their opinion of the situation by stating they would rather see Germany or Japan win the war than work next to a black man.

Black Workers and Ford Motor Company

The First World War ended substantial immigration from Europe at a time when manufacturing was gearing up for war production. With this pool of prospective workers cut off, industry realized a labor crisis. Eager for opportunity and to escape the Jim Crow South, southern blacks began moving to the North. This population movement, known as the Great Migration, produced striking numbers. In 1900, five-thousand blacks lived in Detroit. In 1920, there were forty-thousand with more arriving every month. It is worth mentioning that Detroit served as part of the Underground Railroad to Canada. In the first half of the twentieth century, it
still served as a way to escape the oppression of the old South by offering jobs in the automobile industry. Ford Motor Company already had a history of hiring blacks when other car companies would not. For example, in the late 1920s, blacks represented ten percent of the Ford workforce. At Chevrolet, the number was three and one half percent and at Chrysler, it was one and one half percent. Henry Ford’s views on race, particularly his suspicion of the Jews, are well known. However, his reservations did not include blacks whom he vied as solid producers. Nevertheless, the opportunities provided to black workers by Ford Motor Company came at a cost to both blacks and whites. Knowing that blacks had little opportunity outside of Ford Motor Company, Henry Ford was able to squeeze a considerable amount of work out of them. Married black men were the ideal candidates. Known as “Ford Mules,” they were easy to identify by their dirty and exhausted appearance at the end of the workday. To be clear, the moniker “Ford Mule” was not limited to black workers. For example, Walter M. Cuningham, a white Ford worker in the 1920s who worked the midnight shift, overcome with fatigue, fell asleep on the streetcar on the way home. He woke well past his stop with his head resting on a black woman’s shoulder. She noticed his Ford badge and was understanding. She said, “It’s alright white man. My man he done works at Ford’s too, on de night shift so ah know how tired yo all is.” Management regularly pitted black workers against white workers. The pace at the Rouge was unrelenting. Production supervisors drove workers in an effort to speed up the line and out produce the production supervisor of the previous shift. If workers responded with an increase of production, they were expected to beat that mark as were the other shifts. So harsh were the production supervisors, Charles Sorenson earned the nickname Simon Legree. Legree was a slave driver in Harriet Beecher Stowe’s novel Uncle Tom’s Cabin. It was commonplace for supervisors to put black workers and white workers in the same vicinity and drive them. “Get a move on! Are you going to let this [negro] get ahead of you?” Indeed, black workers took jobs at Ford Motor Company whites did not want such as foundry work, but they also held positions in management with authority over whites. This type of labor policy was both progressive and antagonistic. The presence of women workers, both black and white, added to an already unfamiliar diverse workplace.

Women Workers

On June 25, 1941, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802. The
order encouraged companies issued defense contracts to include in its workforce “all citizens of the United States regardless of race, creed, color, or national origin, in the firm belief that the democratic way of life within the Nation can be defended successfully only with the help and support of all groups within its borders.” Nevertheless, Ford Motor Company believed it had final say on whom it hired not the Roosevelt administration. In January 1942, the UAW met with the company to discuss wages at the Willow Run plant and addressed the issue of women workers. At this time, there were no women workers at Willow Run. When it came time to hire women, the UAW urged that the company include black women and that they should represent seven percent of the female workforce. On May 29, 1942, a committee supported by the UAW and composed of community leaders, met with Harry Bennett on the matter of hiring black women at Willow Run. At this time, there were eleven-thousand white women working at the bomber plant but no black women and the UAW wanted to know why. Bennett was not receptive to the committee. It seems Bennett disregarded his own past actions when he stated, “The unions were a bunch of cut-throats and liars and that they [Ford Motor Company] had the payroll locked up and he [the UAW] could not get to it.” Bennett continued and implied the women at the bomber plant were creating scandals and Henry Ford was not going to stand for it. With this in mind, the women at the bomber plant should “go home and stay home.” In a letter to Walter Reuther dated August 20, 1942, Horace Sheffield, a member of the UAW National Defense Employment Committee, updated him on the hiring practices of the company. At that time, there were thirty-thousand workers at the plant. Among them were three thousand women but no black women. Furthermore, the company failed to hire black men to work at the bomber plant. However, they did transfer four hundred and twenty-five black men from the Rouge. Ford Motor Company's stubbornness was clear. They were going to integrate workers at Willow Run at a time of their choosing.

Conclusion

To realize production at the Willow Run Bomber Plant workers had to overcome the culture of fear, in large part, created by Harry Bennett. They also had to overcome their fear and suspicion of one another. UAW leadership, in particular, Walter Reuther, helped organize workers at Ford Motor Company. The Battle of the Overpass in 1937 was a pivotal moment. When the Company recognized the union in 1941 workers had a contract that included among other things a grievance
procedure and a system of seniority. This did much to counter the fear and intimidation workers had of the Ford Service Department. Even so, this did little to help the housing crisis that existed around the plant. This, coupled with the culture clash created by workers from the South and President Roosevelt’s Executive Order 8802 created an unfamiliar diverse workforce. The Federal Housing Commission built the overdue bomber cities. When completed, workers had more suitable housing—a place to call home. This did much to alleviate tension at the plant. On a more personal level, all those involved at Willow Run had to face their fears and overcome their suspicion of one another. Workers had limited housing and public works but they pressed on. The stubborn Henry Ford and his henchman Harry Bennett had to come to terms with union officials like Walter Reuther. White workers from the Jim Crow South found themselves working amongst blacks. In addition, women workers, both black and white, worked at the bomber plant. All of this was something very new in its day and created uncertainty. In 1944, the Willow Run Plant met its goal of producing one B-24 bomber per hour. It is clear workers, both salaried and hourly, overcame their fear.

Figure 3. The Willow Run Bomber Plant. Walter P. Reuther Library, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI.
Notes


2. Ibid., 236.

3. Ibid., 163, 177; Sarah Jo Peterson, *Planning the Home Front, Building Bombers and Communities at Willow Run* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 1.

4. Ibid., 277.

5. Ibid., 286.

6. Ibid., 22.

7. Ibid., 45.


9. Ibid., 285.


12. Lacey, 418.

13. Ibid., 357.


15. Reuther, 204.

16. Bennett, 15.

17. Ibid., 110.

18. Ibid., 287; 292.

19. Ibid., 223.

20. Ibid., 7.

21. Bennett, 2; Lacey, 358.

22. Bennett, 7.

23. Ibid., 10.

24. Lacey, 358; Bennett, 11-13.

25. Lacey, 361; Reuther, 204.
26. Lacey, 368.


30. Bennett, 2.

31. Lacey, 362.

32. Lacey 387; Baime, 78-80.

33. Baime. 80.

34. Lacey 450; 362; 388.


37. Ibid., 363.

38. Ibid., 200.

39. Ibid.

40. Baime, 46.


42. Reuther, 201.

43. Ibid., 203.

44. Lacey, 378.


47. Lacey, 352-353.


49. Lacey, 378.


51. Reuther, 66; Lacey, 355.
52. Reuther, 213.


54. Ibid., 147.


56. Ibid., 148.


58. Ibid.

59. Baime, 156.

60. Ibid., 157.


62. Ibid., 39.

63. Lacey, 220.

64. Bates, 61.

65. Ibid., 222.

66. Ibid., 62.

67. Ibid., 63.


69. Bates, 63.


71. Bates, 64; Lacey, 222.


73. Reuther, 238.


75. Zaio A Woodford, minutes of the meeting with Harry Bennett concerning hiring black women at Willow Run, in the Victor G Ruether collection box 7, at the Walter Reuther Library, Wayne State University in Detroit Michigan.
Bibliography


Woodford, Zaio A. Minutes of the meeting with Harry Bennett concerning hiring women at Willow Run, in the Victor G. Reuther collection box 7, at the Walter Reuther Library, Wayne State University in Detroit, Michigan.
On the vast grassland steppes of Eurasia in the Early Iron Age, a new kind of culture emerged in which everything in life centered on one particular animal: the horse. Evidence suggests that if the incubating grasslands had not existed, these horse-cultures may never have developed. Steppe peoples embraced horsemanship with a skill above that of all other societies. Solid boundaries and enough space and grazing to support herds of horses that swelled into the thousands made this possible. These inhabitants also seeded a wide range of profound advances, skills, and beliefs that impacted peoples of both steppe and non-steppe lands in Europe, the Near East, and far eastern Asia. However, while physical and intangible evidence appear to support the hypothesis that some societies outside the steppes may have adopted enough traits to claim a horse-culture heritage, whether they fully developed into such a culture in a non-steppe environment remains open to conjecture.

Origins: Environment and Development

The Eurasian steppe stretches from Hungary in the west to Mongolia in the east, and in modern terms is an eco-region of the temperate grasslands, savannas, and shrublands biome. The steppe has linked Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia, China, and South Asia through economics, politics, and culture since antiquity. Originally bounded by forest steppe to the north (now removed due to agricultural development), the grasslands grow drier towards the south. The climate is arid and harsh, extremely cold in winter and hot in summer.

In the Pontic steppe, the region north of the Black Sea that covers about 994,000 square kilometers (384,000 sq. mi.), a large number of rivers and their tributaries empty into the sea. In antiquity, people needed to remain close to these freshwater sources in order to survive. Likewise, horses need water and in the wild graze about sixteen hours a day. Moister than the steppes to the east, the Pontic steppe provided more water and better grazing for herds of tough, wiry wild horses. The Greek historian Herodotus, who wrote in the fifth century BC, noted that other animals, in particular donkeys and asses, could not withstand the cold winters but
horses had the hardiness to survive.\footnote{1}

When these wild horses were first domesticated has not been determined. Estimates range anywhere from 4000 to 2500 BC. The process was long, slow, and uneven. Recent studies suggest multiple locations, but historians and archaeologists generally agree its earliest occurrence was on the Pontic steppe. Additional theories support Dereivka in the Ukraine, c.4000-3500 BC, as the initial time and place. Further, historian Philip Sidnell proposes domestication spread quickly, dispersed through “trade, theft or conquest.”\footnote{2} Genetic studies suggest all modern domestic horses descend from the first steppe herds.

Archaeologist Barry Cunliffe cites the middle of the third millennium BC as a period of “movement and interchange quite unlike anything that had gone before or was to come for another two millennia.”\footnote{3} Evidence suggests domesticated horses first reached central and northern Europe by passing through what is now Kiev then moving west to Poland and Germany and on to Denmark and the valley of the Rhine River. Indications support that the Bell Beaker people, so named for the bell-shaped pottery they produced, diffused the animal all across central Europe during their active period, c.2700-2200 BC. From there, other peoples further dispersed them.\footnote{4}

Originally nomadic, hunter-gatherers on the steppes hunted horses for food. As people gradually tamed the wild horse, they shifted into sedentary agricultural and pastoral communities, continuing to use the animal as a source of meat but additionally for hauling and plowing. Though no definitive date has been established, people gradually began to ride, allowing them to move more freely, much farther, and to manage herds more easily. Additionally, on the steppes pastoralists eventually realized that the harsh, endless grasslands were far better suited to grazing than farming. Building on their horsemanship skills and expanding their herds, equine-based cultures developed in which virtually the entire population was mounted. They spread from Hungary to Mongolia.

Of course, not all pastoralists on the steppes embraced the nomadic horse-culture life. Moreover, archaeologist Timothy Taylor cautions that the horse-pastoralists of Eurasia who did adopt this lifestyle were only semi-nomadic. In spite of being highly mobile, they continued to depend on trade with adjacent peoples in the forest steppe and mountain areas. The pastoral elite, as he calls them, became tied to sedentary communities along rivers where they traded horses, milk products, and other livestock in return for metals and wood. They also gave these communities a form of military-like “protection.”\footnote{5}

The horse-pastoralists’ existence is marked by their circular burial mounds,
called kurgans. Along the Black Sea’s north shore, the burials are known archaeologically as the Catacomb culture, characterized by bodies and grave goods placed in side-wall niches inside a narrow shaft that was filled in and covered with a barrow (mound of earth). These date to the first half of the second millennium BC. Farther east, centered on the middle of the Volga River, the Timber Grave people built cabin-like wood structures in pits that they covered with a barrow. The Timber Grave people eventually migrated westward into the area of the Catacomb culture.

Far to the east, in the first millennium BC, the Chinese warily watched pastoralists transform into mounted warriors who were expert bowmen. They knew this meant “swift, repeated raids on the rich Chinese farmlands by mounted barbarian nomads in search of food, women, and, above all, silk cloth.” When bribery failed to keep the nomads at bay, the Chinese decided to adopt the same clothing, including trousers suitable for riding, learn horsemanship, and become archers. Successfully repelling the nomads for a time, the Chinese then began to build defenses that they later incorporated into the Great Wall.

Regarding a western expansion of the pastoralists, Cunliffe observes “the intrusion of nomadic horse-riding peoples coming from the Pontic steppe [settled] along the Lower Danube valley and on the Great Hungarian Plain within the Carpathian Basin.” The steppe people who settled in the Carpathian Basin kept close ties with the east and continued to bring in large numbers of horses. In time, kurgans began to appear on the western end of the Pontic steppe. Small numbers of these graves also appeared along the Danube basin in what is now Romania. As a defensive reaction to this incursion, farming settlements began to be located on promontories and hilltops. Additionally, “On the eastern frontier of farming near Kiev . . . there were massive agglomerated villages of up to two hundred houses, grouped together for defense.”

The survival of Assyrian annals and the fifth-century accounts of Herodotus allowed horse-cultures to emerge into history with more definition instead of being a shadowy concept known only by grave goods. The first equestrian nomads known by the Greeks were the Cimmerians. Of Indo-European stock, they appear to have inhabited the steppe north of the Caucasus and the Black Sea in the eighth and seventh centuries BC. Though not confirmed, the Cimmerians may have descended from the Catacomb people. Not particularly strong, they were pushed out of their lands when other tribes invaded from the east around the beginning of the seventh century. They split, some fleeing south through the Caucasus where they took lands in Urartu (Armenia), Media, Caucasian Iberia, and Anatolia. Others fled to
southeastern Europe where they were absorbed into the Thracian culture. Possibly related, the Cimmerians and Thracians who blended together are sometimes called either Thraco-Cimmerians or the Vekerzug culture, the latter named for a cemetery in Hungary where some of their burials have been excavated.

Other steppe tribes included the Saka, who occupied the eastern steppes and the Tien Shan and Altai Mountains from about the eighth through the third centuries BC. The Massagetae were a sub-group of the Saka. Sauromatians came from the southern Urals of Russia along the Volga and Don rivers during the sixth and fifth centuries. The Sarmatians, a loose confederation of tribes, displaced or absorbed the Sauromatians beginning around the fourth century BC. This group rose and fell through three phases that lasted until about the fourth century AD. These tribes, as well as the Scythians who occupied the Pontic steppe from the seventh to third centuries, likely shared a common Indo-European ancestry.

Herodotus’s account of the Scythians provides a more complete picture of a horse-culture. Evidence suggests they descended from the Timber Grave people and were the tribe that pushed out the Cimmerians. Taylor explains that the seasons bound the pastoralists’ movements and that the steppe environment was “inelastic: pressure at any one point can result in the progressive displacement of population across the whole of the Eurasian steppe belt.” In this matter, he refers to climate change and gives the example of the Mongolian steppe as a main pressure point. In the second half of the eighth century, drought drove Mongolian pastoralists towards the Chinese who repelled them back westward. The Mongolians then moved into what is now Kazakhstan, where they in turn pushed the Massagetae (Saka) on westward. If the Saka pushed out the Scythians, this example could have been the actual event that drove the Scythians to the Pontic steppe and expelled the Cimmerians.

Herodotus wrote that the Scythians, on occupying the Pontic region, evolved into three groups. One group settled into a sedentary, agrarian lifestyle along the riverine basins; a second group remained pastoral and tied to the settlements; and the third, the Royal Scythians, grew into wealthy aristocratic elite warriors. Some or all of the sedentary people may have also been indigenous and Herodotus simply lumped them together with the Scythian agriculturalists. Almost entirely mobile, the Royal Scythians constantly rode across the vast steppe, driving herds of horses and other grazing animals on which they depended for food. They used horses or oxen to pull their wagons in which they either sheltered or carried tents. When they merged with or imposed hegemony over other Black Sea tribes, it
was at this point that their culture truly began to take shape.\textsuperscript{11}

**Physical Evidence: Innovation and Impact**

Scythian kurgans, which date from around 700 BC, have provided clues into the structure and lifestyle of horse-cultures. While much has been written about the beauty and richness of extensive gold treasures found in the burials, the Scythians’ military skills and innovations related to horsemanship influenced neighboring societies the most, albeit in varying degrees. A thorough examination of this physical evidence reveals additional information on the development of steppe horse-cultures, the depth of impact they had on neighboring cultures, and whether those impacts brought those other societies closer to becoming equine-oriented as well.

Scythian weapons included composite reflex bows, armor-piercing arrowheads, iron spears, swords, daggers, battleaxes, and whips, plus armor for both warriors and horses. The recurved bow, made of wood, bone, and animal tendons laminated together with hide glue, was an adaptation to fighting in a hit-and-run guerilla style on horseback. Relatively short at about thirty-two inches, it was much easier to handle than longer bows when galloping at full speed, abruptly changing direction, and turning and twisting while astride. The bow’s taut compression enabled the archer to shoot long distances, perhaps as much as 1700 feet according to inscriptions. Estimates suggest a skilled archer could fire off ten to twelve arrows per minute, equal to medieval archers. The *gorytos* was a case hung from the belt that held the bow and up to seventy-five arrows. Like the short bow, the case was probably developed to increase efficiency while riding in combat. Arrowheads were trilobate (three lobed) in design and were of “strict aerodynamic forms and superbly exact workmanship; the simplicity and perfection of the lines stands comparison with modern rockets.”\textsuperscript{12}

Burials and sculptural evidence indicate every Scythian had a bow and arrows, not only aristocrats and warriors but the average man, plus women and children as well, paralleling the notion that every Scythian also had a mount. While the *gorytos* was unique to the Scythians, the Scythian-style bow and its variations dominated in Europe and Asia until the first century BC. Like these weapons, the horse had become an integral component of the nomads’ warfare. The animal was growing in importance in surrounding societies as well. But to what levels? How much influence came directly from the steppe warriors? How much developed
independently during this early stage?

Since the sixteenth century BC, the horse had been gradually becoming a factor in “successive armies” from Egypt to India. However, in places other than the steppes, horses were very expensive to keep. Poor or the lack of grazing prevented large herds from developing except in some areas of Thessaly, Thrace, Macedonia and parts of central Europe. An army would have had to cut hay and transport it as well as supplementary grain—very time consuming, expensive, and often unavailable. Off the steppes only the elite—aristocracy, nobility, warriors and priests—kept horses.

These factors stalled chances of not only cavalry emerging but of the general population becoming a riding people on the scale of the Scythians and other steppe inhabitants, even though some elements continued to evolve. Various forms of chariots—some the classic two-wheeled cart, others a clumsier four-wheeled vehicle more like a wagon—developed at irregular stages throughout the Near East and Europe. Signs of horse studs and manufacturing of weapons and armor grew along with kings’ armies, but the transition from horse-drawn chariots to ridden cavalry was slow and uneven. Early depictions of riders that date from the second millennium BC appear to show messengers, scouts, or fleeing charioteers rather than cavalry. Herodotus wrote of a 1600-mile Royal Post Road from Susa (western Iran) to Sardis (western Turkey), with 111 stations at fifteen-mile intervals. Herodotus thought the Persians had started postal services like this, but it was actually an Assyrian innovation. Estimates give a galloping courier one week to cover the distance.\(^\text{14}\)

A few manuals on horse training survive. Most noteworthy is Kikkuli’s, dated to \(c.1345\) BC. Kikkuli was a Mitannian horsemaster working for the Hittites. Fragments also remain from Assyrian, Egyptian, and Ugaritic (from the coast of what is now Syria) works on training and veterinary care, and an Indian military manual with sections on horse training. In relation to Greek veterinary skills, Xenophon wrote a horsemanship manual plus quite a bit of other material on horses.

Ninth century Assyrian carvings show what appears to be cavalry, but the figures may actually be the enemy they were fighting—likely the Urartu from the Caucasus who had contact with steppe people to the north. “An inscription of Menua of Urartu (810-785 BC) lists his forces for one expedition as 1600 chariots and 9174 cavalry.”\(^\text{15}\) The numbers may not be accurate but the ratio is telling of steppe cavalry influence. Sculpted reliefs show riders in pairs, one with a bow, one with a spear, and working together like chariot warriors, as opposed to known battle formations
from the steppes that used larger groups of cavalry. In a later battle dated 714 BC, the Assyrians defeated the Urartians instead, using cavalry and only one chariot. In this case, rough country rendered the war carts useless while the horses were much better suited to the terrain. Interestingly, depictions show the warriors sitting far back, nearly on their horses’ rumps.

Body armor had already existed in the ancient Middle East since the mid-second millennium BC. Eighth century BC Assyrian riders are shown with some light body armor. The Scythians copied the design, experimenting and adapting it to their advantage, and creating several variations that suited their horse-archer style. Usually it was comprised of a short-sleeved, shirt-like leather corselet covered with bronze or iron scales. With the metal discs overlapping like fish scales, the armor was nearly impenetrable by sword or spear thrusts because the blade would have had to cut through three or four layers of metal. The Scythians covered their helmets, shields and clothing with scales as well, the sizes of which varied in order to aid freedom of movement. The Sarmatians continued to improve this kind of armor.

Herodotus noted the Massagetae used bronze chest armor on horses. Because the animals can easily overheat, early cavalry horses had no armor; however, some evidence indicates that thick felt aprons or leather “trappers” covered with metal scales were in use by the fifth century BC. Sidnell notes this sort of armor is an indication that training allowed the horses to overcome their innate sense to flee and to charge close in to the enemy during battle. At some point, the Persians adopted horse armor, which the Greeks then adopted from the Persians sometime in the fourth century BC. The Massagetae and Bactrians—related and allied steppe tribes—were using trappers with iron scales on their horses when they fought against Alexander the Great. Alexander’s successor generals in the Hellenistic period adopted horse armor as well.

Probably the most significant innovation of the Scythians was the pre-runner of the saddle. As mentioned earlier, depictions of Assyrian warriors show them sitting almost on the animals’ rumps. Subsequent images show riders on blankets or flexible skins and sitting in the forward position. The blanket eased chafing but it gave no structure for the rider’s seat. In horse-cultures like the Scythians’, of whom a large percentage of the population rode practically all day, every day, the rider would grow sore and fatigued. The horse’s back and flanks would suffer as well. The first structured seat alleviated this. It consisted of two leather cushions attached in front and back to a wooden arch, the cushions resting over the horse’s spine. Moreover, with armor increasing in weight, a more secure
seat would help with balance and ease pressure on the horse. Stirrups did not exist yet, so this proto-saddle had to perform well not only for mounted warriors but all Scythian riders. Oddly, in spite of the profound implications of this innovation, early forms of saddles spread and improved only very gradually.  

Another innovation the Scythians developed due to the increased weight of armor was improvement in breeding bigger, stronger horses to carry the load. Herodotus mentioned two breeds that originated in the steppes. Nisaean (or Nesean or Nysaean) horses supposedly came from “the great Nisaean plain in Media, where horses of unusual size are bred.” The Nisaean plain was supposedly five to six days’ march south of Ecbatana (Hamadan) in northwestern Iran, perhaps in what is known as the Vale of Borigerd. The alfalfa grown there was, and still is, known as “Median grass.” Estimates suggest the horses to have been about sixteen hands high and very muscular.

The second breed came from Bactria and Sogdiana (modern Afghanistan and parts of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) and seems to have been similar to Turcoman and Akhal-Teke horses of today. Around 15.2 hands, they were a bit less bulky than the Nisaean horses. They had great stamina and their coats were chestnut, dun, or bay with a metallic sheen that was said to gleam like gold or copper in the sun. In recognition of this, Bactria’s capital, Balkh, earned the moniker “Bactra of the Golden Horses.” The area best known for this breed was the Ferghana Valley in far eastern Uzbekistan, well east of Scythian lands. The Chinese knew of these horses, calling them heavenly or celestial horses, and attempted to trade for some in the second century BC. When the expedition failed, the Chinese so coveted the highly prized animals that they took 3,000 by force—50,000 men died in the raid.

Scythian royalty appears to have acquired some of these golden horses. Hundreds of preserved horses accompanied high-ranking warriors in kurgans. Excavations have revealed many of these animals were between 14.2 and 15.1 hands high, more muscular than the average animal of the time, red bay in color, and closely resembled the Akhal-Teke breed.

Few places outside the steppes could support great herds of horses. While the Greeks called the Thracians “horse-loving” and their lands “horse-breeding,” a reference to an area with enough range for larger herds, Thrace’s grasslands were still nowhere near on the scale of the nomads’ lands. Thessaly in northern Greece and Macedonia, both under Philip II of Macedon’s control in the mid-fourth century, also had a fair amount of grazing ground. (Thessaly is where Philip’s son, Alexander the Great, obtained his beloved black stallion Bucephalus.) In his iron-fisted effort
to consolidate power, Philip paid a great amount of attention to building an invincible cavalry by bringing in new bloodlines to breed bigger, stronger, and more durable horses. He also studied military tactics in Greece and elsewhere in the years before he came to power. One tactic he copied was the “wedge” formation that the Scythians’ mounted archers had devised. With a narrow front point, the closely grouped horsemen were able to quickly and easily maneuver at speed and break through battle lines. Philip, and later Alexander, were the first to use it extensively and consistently as shock cavalry.

In 339 BC, pressured from the east by Sarmatians, the Scythian king Atheas attempted to take territory in the west from the Thracians. Instead, he came face to face with Philip, died in the ensuing battle, and his forces soundly defeated. Philip took 20,000 Scythian mares to swell his horse-breeding program. He also enslaved about 20,000 Scythians. These nomads, as well as others who migrated into the area as their society was slowly weakening and pushed westward by aggressors like the Sarmatians, mingled with the complex mixture of peoples already settled or moving through the Balkans during the late fourth and third centuries BC.

Migrations of Celtic tribes into southeastern Europe were an increasingly important element during this same period. Hungarian archaeozoologist Sándor Bökönyi notes, “At the end of the Early Iron Age the Scythians introduced masses of excellent eastern horses to the Carpathian Basin, whereas western horses came to the area with the Celts.” Bökönyi echoes both Philip’s seizure of the animals and Cuniffe’s observation mentioned earlier. Excavations of Scythian settlements in Hungary suggest “a people who kept horses and were not too stationary,” and in contrast, “the Celts in Hungary . . . show the animal-keeping of a stationary people.” The Celts appear to have taken to the bigger, huskier eastern horses and continued to develop the breed even further. “Such horses—with Scythian gear—were found in the graves of their western masters.” That Celtic burials contained gear and horses implies the Celts of this region may have adopted a horse-culture mentality. But did they truly become a horse-culture? And what of the Thracians? The Macedonians? Or any of the surrounding peoples, such as the Assyrians or Greeks, who experienced the steppe nomads’ strong influence? Having examined the impacts of numerous horse-based innovations, can any one of these neighboring civilizations be said to have fully emerged as an equine-oriented people?

A horse-culture, as defined by its development discussed here, is one in which the general population of a people was essentially all mounted, not just the elite warrior class, even though the elite always had the best, most noticeable
animals; while in non-horse cultures, at best, only the aristocratic leadership and part of the military rode mounts. Effectively this definition would eliminate the Greeks and the Near East peoples. Nor did the Macedonians embrace a horse-culture lifestyle in spite of the large numbers of horses they captured and bred. For the most part these animals belonged to the military; the civilian populace was as sedentary as the Greeks. That leaves the Thracians and Celts as possible candidates. Both lived in regions that could support large herds of animals; both displayed characterizations that suggest they were developing into horse-cultures, but was that enough to truly fit the definition?

The Ethereal: Iconography and Mythology

How deeply and widespread the horse-culture was rooted in ancient Europe and Asia can be analyzed further through the less tangible elements of mythology and iconography, which may also corroborate material evidence that does not always provide complete answers. With religion and spirituality interwoven in everyday life, to examine the ways in which the people revered horses as gods and goddesses might reveal a fuller portrait of equine-based nomads.

With the diffusion of domesticated horses, images of the animals turned up in just about every early society. The people of the steppes in ancient times were originally animists—believers that anything natural, like animals, the earth, stars, wind, water, and so on, had a spirit. Further, in their free-roaming lifestyle, the nomads came into contact with many other theologies. This resulted in “a polytheistic brew of ancestor worship and animism, perhaps with a little Zoroastrianism thrown in for good measure,” according to archaeologist Jeannine Davis-Kimball. Indeed, the iconography found in burials across the steppes includes thousands of metalwork images of animals in a style so prevalent and distinctive that it earned the designation, “Animal-Style.” Its eastern influence on western art, known as “orientalizing,” is apparent in varying degrees in European art, most clearly in Celtic and Thracian works.

A few of the preserved horses found in kurgan burials wore masks that appear to represent antlers. This created a sort of symbolic “hybrid” creature—part horse, part elk—that would have carried greater power than either animal by itself. Another example is Tamgaly in Kazakhstan, a cultic site for three thousand years. Inhabitants adorned the natural outcropping of slate that rises out of the dry plains with petroglyphs. In the Bronze Age, worshippers etched twenty-one sun gods into
the slate. Later, but before the first millennium BC, figures of horses were added, including ones with antlers similar to those preserved in burials. Judging from adjacent human figures in the scenes, the horses appear to be part of a fertility ritual.25

Archaeologists are unsure if the horse figures in Kazakhstan were meant to be sacred to the sun god figures, but the concept ties in well with the ancient Thracian belief that the horse was either sacred to the sun god, was a sacrificial animal of the sun god, or that the sun itself was a horse. Thracian mythology and folklore are full of tales of horses, especially white ones. Homer wrote of a Thracian king, Rhesus, whose horses were sometimes described as whiter than snow and other times “whiter than the feathers of a river swan.”26 Without his white coursers and their lavish trappings, Rhesus would have greatly lost status, not only in life but in the afterlife, which is why kings (and other nobles) were always buried with their abundant wealth and horses. The dowry of a daughter of another monarch, King Kotys, included two herds of white horses. A king’s guests were required to bring gifts, the highest honor being the white horse. This may have reflected a ritual that deified the king. The Greek historian Thucydides said that nothing could be accomplished in Thrace without giving gifts.

In Thrace, the white horse was also characteristic of the ideology of kingship, which traces the evolution of tribal chieftains into true kingship. As family, clan, and community grew less important and the aristocracy of the tribes grew powerful, the horse became an increasingly important attribute of political, economic, and military power. Ornamentation of the horse became progressively more elaborate and lavish along with the rise of power. Chieftains and nobles decorated their horses with all sorts of ornamental gold and silver plaques that were attached to brow bands, cheek straps, chest straps, and crest pieces.

One of the most iconic Thracian art objects was the classic rhyton, a kind of drinking horn made of gold or silver. On those dating from the fourth century BC, the front half of a galloping horse decorates the narrow lower end (called the protome); the long open-mouthed drinking vessel curves upward from it. Also, art and mythology were deeply intertwined. “The Hero,” a mysterious unnamed figure repeatedly found in Thracian inscriptions, reliefs, and other artwork, always appeared as a hunter on horseback. He seems to have been a universal god worshipped by all the Thracian tribes, each of which had its own private name for him. Additionally, the god Apollo was depicted as a horseman only in Thracian mythology, as seen on many votive tablets.
By the end of the fourth century BC, many Celts, often synonymously called Gauls (from the western European region from which great numbers migrated), were moving into and through southeastern Europe. Though not quite considered fully nomadic (and in spite of Bökönyi’s comment on their stationary trend), the Celts were well known for their high degree of mobility and their keen sense of adopting anything they deemed beneficial. Because of the wide diffusion of domesticated horses by the Bell Beaker culture in the third millennium, Celts had probably mastered horsemanship from their earliest times.

Like the Scythians, the Celts wereanimists. A deep reverence for the horse had already permeated Celtic iconography and mythology. “The horse could represent many things: prestige and sovereignty, war and guardianship, prosperity and plenty,” writes archaeologist Miranda Green. “Horses were important animals in Celtic society, reflective of prestige and esteemed for their beauty, speed, intelligence, and bravery in battle.”

Epona was the Celtic goddess of horses. Her name derives from epos, a Gaulish word for horse. Based originally in Gaul, her cult spread from Britain to the Danube River delta on the Black Sea, reflecting the great distances the Celts traveled and settled. Epona was a peaceful, beneficent goddess and the protector of soldiers and their horses, a testament to the Gaulish aristocrats of Celtic society who were also their elite horsemen. When not protecting the military, she was recognized as a goddess of domestic prosperity and fertility. The latter could not exist without the former, so it appears that warfare, guardianship, fertility, and prosperity were closely linked. Excavations throughout the vast European territory of the Celts uncovered inscriptions as well as carved images of Epona with numerous types of symbols associated with her cult. Oddly, in spite of the heavy orientalization of Celtic art by Scythian and other eastern art, the horse was not one of the predominant icons transmitted to the Celts. Images of horses appear to have already been well established.

In 280 BC, the Celts subjugated the Thracians, and the social structure of the conglomeration of Balkan tribes became Celtic in nature. By the end of the second century, the Hero figure carried a sword instead of a spear, wore a long cloak, leggings, and a torc—characteristics of Celtic customs and art. Most importantly, he was still riding a horse.

As in many other ancient cultures, white horses were considered sacred in Celtic mythology and folklore as well. In the medieval Welsh tales of the Mabinogi, Rhiannon rides a white horse and may be a later incarnation of Epona. The Celts also
held red horses in high regard. They were associated with Annwn, the Celtic concept of the Otherworld. If seen in visions, three red-dressed riders on red horses represented harbingers of the Otherworld. In addition, red represented a solar image, reminiscent of the sun god symbols and fertility ritual scenes in the Tamgaly petroglyphs. Like the horse, “the sun was closely associated with rulership, war, and fertility.”

The Celts and Thracians appear to have come close to having adopted the horse-culture lifestyle and mentality, demonstrated not only by physical evidence but by how deeply entrenched the influence of the steppe horse-culture became in their art, spirituality, and mythology. The lands in which they lived contributed heavily towards the shift to an equine-oriented society as well. The Celts occupied great tracts of Europe, parts of which could be considered steppe-like. However, though they traveled widely, the Celts were more settled than true nomads. Their society consisted mainly of groups of warriors and their families who raided for plunder to gain wealth. When an area played out, the group moved on, resettled elsewhere, and began new raids. They built houses that were often clustered inside defensive structures—not the basic characteristics of horse-culture nomads.

The Thracians lived in the far western end of the Eurasian steppe and were closely related to both the Cimmerian and Scythian cultures they eventually absorbed, but they were hemmed in by mountainous geography and diluted by mixing with many other non-horse cultures. They never truly roamed outside their region and built settlements similar to the Celts. Though apparently closer to becoming a horse-culture than the Celts, especially in their earlier phases, the Thracians probably never quite achieved that status either.

The geographical feature of the Eurasian steppe greatly contributed to the creation of European and Asiatic nomadic equine-based cultures in antiquity. Eventually most disappeared through conquest, assimilation into non-horse cultures, or a return to sedentary ways. Some nomads continued to exist into later times, most notably the Huns and Genghis Khan’s Mongolians in the medieval period. A few small groups survive today, also in Mongolia and in Kazakhstan as well. With the horse as a common link, elements of these ancient cultures were passed on in varying degrees to their neighbors. However, only those who remained on the vast grassland stage can be truly identified as horse-cultures.

Moreover, if the Eurasian steppe had not existed, horse-cultures might never have arisen at all. They could have developed elsewhere, but in different times and different ways. Native-Americans embraced the horse-culture in the central
plains of North America, as did others in the South American pampas, but without the serendipitous introduction of the Spanish horse, neither New World region would have ever given rise to horse-cultures. Without the right combination of conditions—the boundless open grasslands with enough available fresh water, plus sturdy, tough horse breeds—horse-cultures cannot truly and fully develop, let alone thrive. However, in spite of the overall loss of the world’s equine nomads, their legacy lives on in the creation of the saddle and related innovations, their love of fine horses and horsemanship, and in the rich, distinctive and abundant iconography of their Animal-Style art.

Notes


16. Ibid., 21.


22. Ibid., 652.

23. Ibid., 656.


25. Ibid., 82-83.


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In November 1863, thousands descended upon the small town of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, to commemorate the thousands who had descended upon and fallen upon the field around the town four months earlier. They came for a ceremony of official culture: the dedication of a national cemetery for thousands of citizen-soldiers of the Union. Famed orator Edward Everett delivered a classical oration recounting the battle and memorializing the dead, which would make even Pericles proud, and then Abraham Lincoln delivered his immortal 272 words. In the ostensibly secular but popularly religious society of nineteenth century America, it seemed like the embattled nation had a potential pilgrimage shrine for its citizens—a national religious site, in the mode of Canterbury Cathedral in England, which similarly was sanctified by death. Southerners were excluded from this initial commemoration, but in his own, little-remembered Gettysburg address on November 18 (the night before the official ceremonies), Secretary of State William Seward proclaimed the administration’s hope that once again there would “be only one country, having only one hope, one ambition, and one destiny.”\(^1\) Little did any of the people present in November 1863 know the tremendous role Southerners would play in adopting this sacred field for popular pilgrimages in the years after the war. Nor could those on the stage know the extent to which the general populace would appropriate the hallowed ground for their own purposes beyond the purview of official culture.

Popular voyages to battlefields were not a new phenomenon in the post-Civil War era of American history. Thomas A. Chambers outlined this practice in his recent book, *Memories of War: Visiting Battlegrounds and Bonefields in the Early American Republic*. It was not immediately embraced after the Revolution or the War of 1812; “Battlefield tourism did not fully develop until fifty years after the Declaration of Independence. In its formative years attention to battlefields grew alongside the ‘Northern Tour’ and an American fascination with landscape.”\(^2\) Although this grew in popularity in the ante-bellum period, “Americans maintained
an ambivalent relationship with the past.” According to Chambers, Northerners took more direct interest in the battlefields than their Southern counterparts; he specifically traced the history of Yorktown in Virginia as a generally ignored battleground that merited more attention.

When the Civil War broke out, both sides looked back to the Revolutionary generation with increased interest (In *What They Fought For*, James McPherson cited the desire to match their fathers’ and grandfathers’ military exploits as a major motivator for enlistment among young Civil War soldiers). Some from the Northern states took intense interest in seeing the locations of the great victories of the Revolutionary generation. Among these were the men of the 77th New York Volunteer Infantry. Calling themselves the “Bemis Heights Battalion” and hailing from Saratoga, they were intensely aware of the heritage of their home region and their ancestors’ martial fame. During the battles of 1862 and 1864 in Virginia, men wrote to the hometown newspapers with pride about marching the same ground as George Washington and Daniel Morgan. Passing by the grave of General Morgan upon one battleground, Colonel Windsor French of the 77th New York wrote to the *Saratogian* newspaper: “I wondered if his spirit did not hover over this battle-field, fighting to uphold the cause he fought to establish, and to continue the Government he fought to inaugurate. Surely the God of battles must aid our just cause.” Not coincidentally, Morgan was a hero of the Revolutionary War battles at Saratoga—meaning the men of the 77th would be well acquainted with his reputation.

The short lifespan and travel difficulties of the founding generation made long excursions in search of history difficult. Patriotism was typically confined to city squares where few monuments were constructed. “Before the Civil War we had no history in the deepest and most inward sense. There was, of course, the noble vision of the Founding Fathers . . . the dream of freedom incarnated in a more perfect union. But the Revolution did not create a nation except on paper; . . . the vision of the Founding Fathers . . . became merely a daydream of easy and automatic victories.” In short, “There was little awareness of the cost of having a history.” The Civil War, in its totality of involvement and intensity of suffering, provided a lesson in that cost for a vastly larger nation than that of the Revolutionary War, and a nation in which a tremendous number of veterans of that suffering still had decades to live.

Often called the first total war in history, the Civil War did not leave a soul on the continent unaffected. When Americans emerged from this horrible conflict they tried to make sense of the destruction. However, they also celebrated and honored their achievements. In contrast to the people of Western Europe following
World War I, who wished only to think of ensuring peace, Americans were filled with pride over their military exploits; and some, especially in the South, were determined to keep fighting old battles.

The natural setting for these reflective pursuits was the actual terrain on which the soldiers had fought, and Gettysburg came to the fore in the minds of both sections’ citizens. Many in the Union recognized the importance of Gettysburg at the time of the battle in July 1863. Even while the war still raged on, men of the North worked to first create the Gettysburg National Cemetery and then the Gettysburg Battlefield Memorial Association, “whose purpose was to preserve portions of the battlefield as a memorial to the Union Army that fought here.”8 That simple purpose was adopted and accelerated in the post-war period by a new and powerful veterans’ organization, the first of its kind in United States history, the Grand Army of the Republic (GAR). With its ranks open to all veterans of Union armies, the Grand Army of the Republic dominated political life in the decades following the war, and had tremendous financial capabilities as America entered the Gilded Age.

The Grand Army of the Republic’s leadership was determined to leave imprints on the battlefields of the war, and a tremendous market for monuments sprung up in the North after the conflict. This new artistic marketplace sold hundreds upon hundreds of custom monuments to cities, towns, and GAR chapters throughout the North. Monuments embellished city squares and town parks everywhere. The Civil War was a war of the people, with regiments formed in individual communities, and the citizens of those communities were universally resolute to honor their dead and celebrate their returning brothers and sons. “These war memorials, which have re-emerged from the national memory with the sesquicentennial of the start of the Civil War, literally mark a monumental change in how that war was commemorated,” a recent article in the Times Union of Albany stated. “Rather than saluting generals on horseback or poised for battle in earlier wars, they revere the rank-and-file's service to the communities.”9 The designs of the statues reflected even more about the views of manliness developed in Victorian society of America. Randolph Rodgers’s sculpture of a soldier in action began to rival the top-selling soldier-at-rest statue. A committee of veterans in Covington, Kentucky resolved that they would not accept a statue of a soldier “at parade rest, or one that looks as if he were ashamed that he was a soldier.”10 Clearly demonstrating the goal of making popular representations of the Civil War past in commemoration, “Veterans in Jersey City sued (unsuccessfully) to stop the city from erecting Philip Martiny’s Soldiers and Sailors Monument (1899) on the grounds that the seated
Athena-like figure in helmet and armor could not properly commemorate soldiers."\textsuperscript{11}

Over the years, each regiment’s veterans—with the support of state governments—returned to the fields of Gettysburg to dedicate their own monuments and markers. The pageantry and speeches made at the dedication ceremonies reflected the values of the communities from which the soldiers came. The 77th New York Infantry of Saratoga (mentioned earlier), which served only in reserve at Gettysburg, nonetheless held a large monument dedication ceremony on the field to celebrate their mere presence there in July 1863. Colonel French, in his address, again harkened back to the Revolutionary War, as he had when describing the regiment’s battles to the hometown newspapers during the war. He recalled that the victory of the Army of the Potomac at Gettysburg made permanent “the principle which our forefathers then and there fought and established at Saratoga.”\textsuperscript{12} In this public display of official culture, the men sought to place themselves alongside the ghosts of their heroic fathers and grandfathers, fulfilling their popular desire of 1861.

Among Southerners, it was not the former soldiers who took the lead in memorializing the Confederate war effort in emerging national parks on battlefields. Rather, it was the women of the South who took it upon themselves. Although battlefields did not obtain national park status until the 1890s (with Gettysburg among the first handful),\textsuperscript{13} the women of the South wasted no time in the decades between Lee’s surrender at Appomattox and the national park preservation movement. They developed the tradition of Decoration Day, or Memorial Day as veterans preferred to call it, as an annual date on which to venture to battlefields and cemeteries to decorate the graves of Confederate soldiers with flowers. In 1868, in a symbol of unity for the nation in the midst of Reconstruction, General John Logan—serving as commander of the Grand Army of the Republic—ordered that these ceremonies be held on the same date throughout the country, specifying May 30. By 1876, it was a federal holiday. Civil War monuments—present in countless cities and small towns throughout the nation and intended to “shape the symbolic life of a community”—became the focal point of the holiday, but the largest commemorations were reserved for the battlefield parks like Gettysburg.\textsuperscript{14}

Popular poetry and literature sprang forth from all sections of the country in connection with the observance of Memorial Day/Decoration Day. Among the most prominent American poets to contribute to this new trend in popular literature were Sidney Lanier, Abram Joseph Ryan, and Walt Whitman. Poems like Ryan’s “The Conquered Banner” were woven into pieces of art, sold to hundreds of people for hanging in their homes, and spoke of the everlasting popular appeal the Civil War
fields and memory would hold in America:

        Furl that Banner! True, ‘tis gory,
    Yet ‘tis wreathed around with glory,
And ‘twill live in song and story
    Though its folds are in the dust!
For its fame in brightest pages,
    Penned by poets and by sages,
Shall go sounding down the ages.15

Other popular poems like John Albee’s “A Soldier’s Grave” and Henry Timrod’s “Ode at Magnolia Cemetery” (set to music and sung during the Charleston, SC ceremony of 1867) mourned that plainness of individual graves, but the latter proclaimed that,

    Though yet no marble column craves
        The pilgrim here to pause, 16
people everywhere would still be drawn to the site. In “A Georgia Volunteer,” Mary Ashley Townsend demonstrated the moral ambiguity of late nineteenth century/early twentieth century American literature:

    He sleeps – what need to question now
        If he was wrong or right?17

Speaking of a dead Confederate soldier, this signified the increasing sense of reunion and reconciliation spreading throughout the country, which General Logan hoped to promote with his proclamation, and which Nina Silber portrayed in great detail in her book The Romance of Reunion: Northerners and the South, 1865-1900. A similar sentiment was expressed by Henry Peterson in his “Ode for Decoration Day,” in which he concluded:

    Then let your foeman’s grave remembrance share:
        Pity a higher charm to Valor lends,
And in realms of Sorrow all are friends.18
The spirit of reconciliation and common national grieving was not limited to the popular poetry of the era. Novelists also contributed to the national popular culture of commemoration. This trend continued well into the twentieth century. Most notably, it was embraced by the great Southern author, William Faulkner, who wrote not only of the shared sadness of the post-war era, but whose works also contained strong elements of the growing sense of nostalgia for a bygone and romanticized era of history. Writing directly about the centerpiece of it all, Gettysburg, Faulkner captured the new American sense of being a part of history:

“For every Southern boy fourteen years old, not once but whenever he wants it, there is the instant when it’s still not yet two o’clock on that July afternoon in 1863 . . . and it’s all in balance, it hasn’t happened yet, it hasn’t even begun yet, it not only hasn’t begun yet but there is still time for it not to begin...and that moment doesn’t need even a fourteen-year-old boy to think This time. Maybe this time.”

His allusion to the July afternoon in 1863 is referring to the final day of the battle, just prior to Pickett’s Charge commencing and sealing the defeat of Lee’s army at Gettysburg. Americans no longer had the “ambivalent relationship with the past” which Thomas Chambers referred to concerning the post-Revolutionary War generation.

Since the end of the Civil War, Americans had a keen awareness of “the cost of having a history.” Yet obsession with battlefields demonstrated a clear willingness to not only accept that aspect of national heritage, but also to relive it. Younger generations like the one Faulkner wrote about could look with envy at the legacy of their ancestors just as young Civil War soldiers looked with envy upon the martial exploits of their fathers and grandfathers in 1861. But unlike the Revolutionary generation—whose reputation was based primarily on legend—by filling the landscape of the nation with monuments to their own admirable performance, the Civil War generation created an image of American manhood for all to strive for in future years. Nowhere could this be seen more clearly than at the great battlefield of Gettysburg, where over nine hundred monuments ultimately appeared. The original sacred intent of the cemetery and battlefield preservation now was partially co-opted by an effort to shape American memory.

Another mode of attraction to Gettysburg soon appeared, however, beyond
the noble intents of the 1860s townspeople, the veterans, or the federal government. Somewhere along the way in the development of the park, around the turn of the century, merchants recognized the tremendous commercial potential of the battlefield parks. The beautiful aesthetics of the natural landscape drew in some, nostalgia for a bygone era brought others to south-central Pennsylvania, and the quest for inspiration from the Civil War generation was the motivator for many. Yet as the old adage says, it is money that makes the world go ‘round. Memorial Day began a shift toward commercialization and politicization. In 1880, the *New York Tribune* already was complaining about the sacred day falling into “the slough of politics.” As political candidates aimed to identify with the Civil War generation or to compare themselves to the legendary Lincoln, Gettysburg became an attractive location for photographs and stirring patriotic speeches. Much of the solemnity of the holiday was lost during this era. Parades were incorporated and drinking, festiveness, and rowdiness became commonplace.

Modern audiences of the twenty-first century may be shocked by the harshness with which veterans and others looked upon this new era in Memorial Day commemoration, but it mirrored a similar distaste among the traditional actors toward merchants appearing in the vicinity of ceremonies and reunions. “By the 1890s northern and southern veterans frequently lamented that too many Americans devoted the day to recreation rather than remembrance,” echoing a criticism that some still wage today. “No less problematic were special holiday promotions of merchandise for sale.” The distance of time from the Civil War era to 2016 America obliterated these concerns, and modern Memorial Day—falling always on a Monday by federal decree—is seen by the vast majority of Americans as an extra day of vacation at the start of the summer, a day for shopping deals, and a day for premiere athletic events.

Civil War commemoration is certainly not immune from commercialization in the modern era. A quick walk through the town of Gettysburg reveals this simple truth. At the time of the battle, Gettysburg was a small college town composed of many tiny farms that served as the seat of Adams County in south-central Pennsylvania. A century and a half later, while it is still a small college town, it is full of hotels, restaurants, and shops selling a wide array of Civil War-themed items. Families can go on an array of ghost tours. Parents can buy their children teddy bears in tiny Civil War uniforms, toy rifles or a Lee or Lincoln bobble-head. For the adults there are coasters, magnets, keychains and a number of other trivial items. There are even cookbooks; certainly soldiers of the civil war would be amazed at anyone
having the desire to eat like them. There are also CDs available with superficial narratives meant to immerse the tourist in the past. One can only wonder about the feelings veterans of the battle would have over this bizarre commercialism.

Even more perplexing to them may be the popular hobby of Civil War reenactment. While “War reenactment is by no means an American phenomenon,” and, “By all accounts, the impulse to dress up and play Hektor is as old as Hektor himself,” the popularity of it in the United States is bizarre. This is especially true when the nation is engaged in actual wars. Numbers of re-enactors have dropped a bit from their peak in the 1980s and 1990s, but not by much. This effort to simulate or become one with the past suffered a setback in 2006, when the National Park Service banned combat re-enactments on actual battlefield land. “Even the best-researched and most well-intentioned representation of combat cannot replicate the tragic complexity of real warfare,” a NPS statement proclaimed at the time. Veterans of the Civil War would heartily approve of this statement, but not necessarily of what has been left in its wake. Re-enactors now assemble on the old sacred battleground for camp and drill demonstrations. This elicits an image of the Civil War soldier similar to the parade-rest soldier monuments that veterans protested in the 1880s and 1890s. In the same vein as amusement or theme parks, Civil War battlefields now primarily hold an appeal as leisure entertainment locales—the very sort of thing the veterans railed against. In the modern citizen’s desire to connect with and emulate the admirable people of the past, there is a clear disconnect of simulated reality.

Stephen Vincent Benet captured the new direction of Civil War battlefield tourism in his Pulitzer Prize-winning epic poem "John Brown's Body" in 1928, and its relevance to the current situation is remarkable. Interrupting his description of the Battle of Gettysburg, he wrote:

You took a carriage to that battlefield.  
Now, I suppose, you take a motor-bus,  
But then, it was a carriage – and you ate  
Fried chicken out of wrappings of waxed paper,  
While the slow guide buzzed on about the war  
And the enormous, curdled summer clouds  
Piled up like giant cream puffs in the blue.  
The carriage smelt of axle-grease and leather  
And the old horse nodded a sleepy head
Adorned with a straw hat. His ears stuck through it.\textsuperscript{27}

Consider the evolution of Civil War battlefield parks shown in that stanza alone. Benet highlighted the already-long history of the tradition by contrasting the modes of transportation. He alluded to the simple natural beauty that drew the earliest visitors to the park and led to the preservationist movement in America. And he hinted at the bizarre commercialism and popular appeal of the battlefield, with his description of the costumed horse and the comfort food. Finally, and most importantly, he described the guide as slow and buzzing on about the war, suggesting that the educational feature of the experience was secondary to the leisure pursuit.

After this initial description of arrival at the park, Benet moved on to the more serious issues of memory and commemoration. He described how the field was still,

\begin{verbatim}
much as it was, except for monuments
And startling groups of monumental men
Bursting in bronze and marble from the ground
And all the curious names upon the gravestones.\textsuperscript{28}
\end{verbatim}

The veterans had performed their duty as they saw it, and filled the landscape with reminders of duty and honor for the future generations of America. Still the gravestones were nameless, just as the earlier poetry of the Reconstruction era had mourned, but there was now no mention of flowers upon them or any other recognition. The past was in the past, and could not be reached, and tourists had little interest in it beyond superficial attraction to the park and the artwork. He continued on this theme:

\begin{verbatim}
So peaceable it was, so calm and hot,
So tidy and great-skied.
No men had fought
There but enormous, monumental men
Who bled neat streams of uncorrupting bronze,
Even at the Round Tops, even by Pickett’s boulder,
Where the bronze, open book could still be read
By visitors and sparrows and the wind:
\end{verbatim}
And the wind came, the wind moved in the grass,
Saying…while the long light…and all so calm.

“Pickett came
And the South came
And the end came,
And the grass comes
And the wind blows
On the bronze book
On the bronze men
On the grown grass,
And the wind says
‘Long ago
Long
Ago.’”

Despite all the commemorative artwork and the efforts of educators and preservationists, the park was evolving into an attractive piece of nature and nothing more. Again, the ambivalent relationship with the past was on the rise, and the cost of having a history was reduced to the cost of that comfort food and carriage ride in public awareness. This section of Benet’s 1928 poem ended with a coup de grace of mourning for historical memory in the Gettysburg Battlefield Park:

Then it was time to buy a paperweight
With flags upon it in decalcomania
And hope you wouldn’t break it, driving home.30

Commercialism trumped all.

The battlefield park at Gettysburg has seen tremendous changes in the 150 years since the battle that raged there. Preservation efforts have worked to restore the land to its 1863 appearance, and the National Park Service and academics have attempted to limit the popularization of the field. Yet in a manner similar to theme parks like Busch Gardens, where foreign cultures are distortedly experienced through comfortable entertainment and trivial trinkets, Americans accept this new presentation of the past full of commercialism and convenience.31 A luxury hotel stands next to the home where Abraham Lincoln prepared his Gettysburg Address.
George Pickett and his tragic charge that ended the battle are commemorated in the name of an all-you-can-eat buffet. Historians buzz on about the war, while paperweights and other souvenirs are sold in countless gift shops downtown along crowded Steinwehr Avenue. People utilize a park as they see fit, and acres of open fields in a tourist center surrounding a college campus inspire the typical recreation. By various methods, Americans who travel to Gettysburg form connections with the men who descended on those fields 150 years ago. Whether those long-gone men would approve of the uses of their hallowed ground is irrelevant. To re-appropriate Mary Ashley Townshend’s popular poem about the Georgia volunteer: the dead are gone; what need to question now if the living are right or wrong? The park was created by the people of a bygone era, for the people of their ensuing generations, and it continues to meet the demands of the people of the present.

Notes


3. Ibid.


5. Ibid. From *The Saratogian*, October 13, 1864.


7. Many historians, including Mark Grimsley in his seminal work, *The Hard Hand of War*, dispute the assertion that the Civil War was the first total war or even necessarily a total war at all (comparing it to the brutality of the Thirty Years War and others in European history).


11. Ibid.


22. Brown, 43.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.


26. Ibid.


28. Ibid.

29. Ibid, 260-261. The Round Tops were a pair of hills on the southern end of the battlefield that were crucial to the Union army’s defense on July 2, 1863. The bronze book Benet refers to is a monument near the site of General George Pickett’s failed charge on July 3, 1863; the monument lists the units that served in repulsing the assault.

30. Ibid, 261.

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Book Review

Christopher Cyr

*The Rwandan Patriotic Front 1990-1994* by Adrien Fontanellaz and Tom Cooper is the second of a two volume series, which provides insight into the regional conflicts involving Uganda, Rwanda, and their neighbors during the second half of the twentieth century. This volume contains numerous photographs, maps, and imagery to compliment the text. Adrien Fontanellaz is a Swiss-born military historian and author. His co-author, Tom Cooper, born in Austria, is a military-aviation journalist and historian, and a prolific writer and contributor within the field.

Fontanellaz and Cooper give the reader a cursory yet accurate historical account of the political, cultural, and ethnic conditions to provide the necessary context of the environment that led to the rise of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) during the Rwandan Civil War and the genocide of 1994. However, the main contribution and aim of their work is to present a detailed illustration and examination of the military complexities of the conflict, aspects of the events not thoroughly documented in prior literature.

The authors provide the reader with a concise understanding of the history of Rwanda. They briefly explain the implications of its colonial ties to Belgium, its independence in July of 1962, and antagonistic tribal relations between the Hutu and Tutsi populations. The authors are able to illustrate the significant impact that Belgium had on exacerbating the divisions between the Hutu majority and the Tutsis who represented the ruling elite. Although the authors articulate the divide between the Hutus and the Tutsis, they make little mention of the role played by both the Catholic and Protestant churches in aggravating the divisions between the two groups that help to incite the violence.¹ As the primary purpose of the volume is to document the military operations and materials employed during the period, the book is an easier read for those with a military background, although that is not essential. The inclusion of a glossary facilitates a lay reader’s understanding of the acronym-
rich text.

The focus on the military operations of the Forces Armée Rwandaises (FAR) and the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), the military wing of the RPF, allows the reader to develop an appreciation of the ferocity of the conflict whether or not they understand the tactical or doctrinal intricacies of warfare. The authors effectively provide the reader with an understanding of the realities of armed conflict and the chaos that ensues. At times, it is difficult to keep track of the specifics of the units and their equipment as detailed in the book, but this does not detract from the overall intent to define the conflict into its moving parts. Also to their credit, the authors allow the reader to understand the implications of protracted war and the need for militaries to maintain those elements essential to war fighting. They articulate the effects of attrition and the ability to not only maintain morale and the continued will to fight, but the consequences of ineffective training on discipline. They successfully convey the imperative of strong leadership and the repercussions when it is lacking.

Fontanellaz and Cooper’s in-depth account provides the reader with an opportunity to develop a greater understanding of the tragedy that was the Rwandan Civil War. The work is apolitical in nature, focusing on events and outcomes rather than evaluating intent of the participants. Their detailed depiction of the military environment and all that it encompasses leaves the reader with a deeper and clearer picture of the intricacies, tragedies, and realities that impact outcomes of the numerous wars within the African continent, not just within the Rwandan context.

Notes

Bibliography


**Book Review**

Christopher Sheline

During the Mid-1980s, when the concept of world history was in its infancy, Lawrence Keppie made a stout contribution when he published *The Making of the Roman Army: From Republic to Empire*. World Historians seek to identify cross-cultural patterns. These patterns often clarify the processes of cultural development and integration. In its day, ancient Rome gained its power as a direct result of its evolving military might. During the writing of *The Making of the Roman Army*, Keppie combined historical and scientific analysis to identify Roman political, organizational, and military evolution. This shed light on how Rome influenced cross-cultural developments, as well as offered critical insight into the likely trends of established societies worldwide. Consequently, Keppie proved the necessary use of the military at the very foundation of society.

Keppie’s specialization in the Roman Army began when he was laying the groundwork for his doctoral thesis *Colonization and Veteran Settlements in Italy 47-14 BC* (p. 11). Focusing on the transition between Republic and Empire, his thesis discussed the armies of Julius Caesar, the First and Second Triumvirate, and Augustus. He spent most of his career as a professor of Roman history and archaeology at the University of Glasgow, where he resided during the writing of *The Making of the Roman Army: From Republic to Empire*. In addition, Keppie was the senior curator of archaeology, history, and ethnography at the Hunterian Museum in Glasgow, which is home to a highly regarded and extensive collection of Roman artifacts. Keppie also gained considerable experience as an editor for Britannia, a primary publisher of Roman and British studies. During his extensive career, he wrote several books including *Understanding Roman Inscriptions, Scotland’s Roman Remains*, and the *Roman Army in the Early Empire*. Keppie retired in 2003 as a leading authority on the Roman Army. This earned him the opportunity to maintain his influence as emeritus professor of Roman history and archaeology at the University of Glasgow.

*The Making of the Roman Army: From Republic to Empire* outlines the
growth of the Roman Army for its implications of global developmental patterns. Keppie stated, “The theme here is of the army’s growth, and of its developing institutions and traditions, all of which lie behind the familiar imperial army” (p. 11). He accomplished this by describing the original Roman Army as a militia guarding a village on the Tiber, and then detailed its path into the mid-first century AD when the Roman Army was a well-structured professional military power. Keppie covered how tactics and formations changed and developed under various leaders such as Marius, Julius Caesar, and Augustus. Thus, the discussion also included how a maniple compared to other famed formations, such as a phalanx. Much like his aforementioned doctoral thesis, Keppie put specific emphasis on the transition from Republic to Empire. This tumultuous period included the infamous assassination of Julius Caesar, the love affair between Mark Antony and Cleopatra, and the rise of Emperor Augustus. As such, in addition to the Roman army, the book suggests a measure of political evolution to this chaotic period in Roman history.

Using a scientific approach, Keppie leveraged archaeological evidence to build his historical arguments. For example, the first chapter begins with the discovery of oval shields, leather corslets with metal pectorals for chest protection, and conical bronze helmets (p. 14). This led to the conclusion that Rome had an army when it was still a village on the Tiber. Yet, it did not clarify whether that army had any formal organization or structure. Nevertheless, it did ascertain that the army was a necessity for the village to grow, which in turn supported the hypothesis that a civilized society is the by-product of warfare. This discovery added relevance to the book and the new discipline of world history alike. Keppie’s blending of science and history was consistent throughout the text, and proved to be a keen combination.

One thing to note about this book is that while Keppie described the Roman Army from birth to its fame and glory, he did so with minimal illustrations and notes. Those that were present derived from primary sources. In fact, Keppie stated, “In accordance with the criteria laid down for this series, I have kept notes to a minimum, citing for the most part only the basic ancient literary or epigraphic evidence” (p. 12). Despite these restrictions, Keppie still provided a thorough bibliography of either consulted or formally cited sources as well as detailed appendices. And as a result of the limited notes, the archaeological evidence became far more pronounced, as did its critical scientific and academic importance. Perhaps, this was the purpose of the restrictions bestowed upon Keppie.

When taken as a whole, The Making of the Roman Army represents a valuable, single volume representation of the Roman army that supports global
implications of developmental patterns. Archeological discoveries provided irrefutable evidence for Keppie’s arguments. As a result, this book remains relevant to both Roman historians and the discipline of World History simultaneously. Thus, it is a “must read” for anyone seriously seeking a thorough understanding of military development and ethnography. Since the publishing of this book, World History has grown to include any number of focus areas such as technological advances, sociology, and even forms of art and architecture. In some instances, World History even replaced Western Civilization courses. Regarding the particular concepts of World History, Keppie’s work undoubtedly showed the importance of understanding the development of political, military, and social institutions as well as how those developments might appear in other cultures worldwide.