Cover Design: Dating back to the 11th century, the Varnhem Abbey Church, Sweden, continues to stand proud. Photographs taken by Susan Danielsson.

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Letter From The Journal Team

Michael R Majerczyk

Hi everyone, the Fall Issue of the *Saber and Scroll Journal* is a selected works edition that features some of the journal’s most popular works in medieval history from the past seven years. For those interested in Charlemagne, and Einhard’s *Life of Charles Magne*, see Aida Dias’s article “Einhard: The Lasting Influence of The *Life of Charles Magne* and Other Works.” Mat Hudson analyzed the sources surrounding the Battle of Hastings in “Conquerors and Conquered: Early Perspectives of the Battle of Hastings,” and for those interested in the crusades, see Noah Hutto’s “The *Franj* Invasion of Islamic Lands: Muslim View of the Crusades.” Because of the cooperation, and shared membership that exists between the Saber and Scroll Historical Society and the AMU & APU Newman Center, members may like to revisit, or read for the first time, Jack Morato’s “The Making of the Medieval Papacy: The Gregorian Mission to Kent.” And for the Military Historian, this issue includes, Patrick S. Baker’s classic, “Charles Martel Turns South: The Hammer’s Campaigns in Southern France 733-737.” Long time members Francis M. Hoeflinger, Kathleen Guler and Geoffrey Fisher provide book reviews that maintain the medieval theme. Also included are updated bios from the authors. For the longstanding members, I hope you enjoy revisiting these articles and book reviews. And for the growing number of new members, I hope you find these article helpful in your endeavors.
Einhard: The Lasting Influence of The Life of Charlemagne and Other Works

Aida Dias

The Carolingian period was of significant importance to the development of medieval history writing. Charlemagne (c.742-814) surrounded himself with scholars in an effort to promote learning and the arts, which had been in decline for centuries. Within this Carolingian Renaissance, there was one scholar who established his place in history by writing a concise but remarkable, and mostly accurate, biography of the greatest king and emperor of the early Middle Ages. This scholar was Einhard (c.770-840), who created impressively original works that had both an immediate and lasting influence on the writing of biographies and hagiographies. A closer look at these works reveals a great deal about the man who wrote them and the social and political climate that shaped them. From his classical education and the influence of Charlemagne’s court, Einhard developed a unique style of writing and created works which, in addition to giving him personal power, had social and political significance for the Carolingians.

Einhard was born around 770 to parents who were landowners, after Charlemagne was already co-ruler of the Frankish kingdom. He was sent to be educated at the monastery of Fulda in Eastern Francia at a young age. His short stature probably made it unlikely that he would succeed in a military career. At Fulda he learned Latin and was educated in the classics and the Bible.¹ When Charlemagne sought capable scholars to promote literacy in his kingdom and to improve its workings and administration, Einhard was recommended. Thus he began his career in the royal court, which brought him alongside great scholars like Alcuin of York, a great teacher who had also been recruited. Einhard’s exact functions are unknown, but he appears to have been involved in the construction of several buildings, perhaps as an architect, in addition to being Charlemagne’s secretary and, apparently, a distinguished poet, according to his contemporaries.² His education, both at Fulda and with the scholars at the royal court, especially Alcuin, profoundly influenced his writings, most of which were completed in the later part of his life after the subject of his main work, Charlemagne, had died in 814.
The *Vita Karoli Magni*, or *The Life of Charlemagne*, was written sometime between 817 and 836. Historians have argued over likely dates and their implications for what sentiments Einhard might have been trying to convey. An earlier date is generally favored, as it had the “immediate purpose of consolidating Louis the Pious’s position as the rightful and appropriate heir to his father’s dominion,” a factor looked at in more detail below. In his preface to *The Life*, Einhard expressed a sense of duty to record the memory of his “lord and foster father,” knowing that no one would be better suited to write Charlemagne’s life and deeds than himself, having been present at the time. He humbled himself, stating his inadequacies as a Latinist and referring to himself as *homo barbarus*, perhaps to excuse not only his writing style but also the content of his work. He lamented that a life as magnificent as that of Charlemagne, a man who had been so kind and generous to him, and so worthy of praise, should be recorded with “Ciceronian eloquence” rather than his feeble attempt. It is clear from Einhard’s words that *The Life* is a work of praise and must therefore be assumed to have been somewhat biased. He was writing the life and deeds of a king to whom he felt indebted, and whose dynasty he served as a member of the court. But historians still generally agree that it is mostly accurate.

Rather than draw on the traditional hagiographies and medieval writings of the time, Einhard modeled his biography on, and at times borrowed heavily from, Suetonius’s *Lives of the Caesars*, especially the *Life of Augustus*. However, as medieval historian Richard Sullivan stated in his study of Carolingian education, “[i] t was not plagiarism but schooling that led Einhard to portray Charlemagne in terms Suetonius had used to describe Roman emperors.” In his essay on Einhard’s portrayal of Charlemagne, the last chair of paleography at King’s College London, David Ganz, praised Einhard’s originality for seeking that “Ciceronian eloquence” which had been rejected by Christians in their hagiographies, noting that by 839, his biography had already inspired a hagiography (Wandalbert of Prüm’s *Life of St. Goar*), “the very genre it had reacted against.” Einhard was undoubtedly familiar with the medieval panegyric style of writing, with kings described in martial terms, but he decided the classical style with more human characterization was more appropriate, drawing some criticism from those who found it too pagan. Einhard wanted to save for posterity the memory of Charlemagne’s great deeds as a great king, but also as a great man, whom he deeply respected.

The biography itself is a very short work, the first half of which details Charlemagne’s deeds (as a *gesta*), and the second half describes his life. Because of its length, it seems to receive more criticism for what it omits than for what it
includes. But Einhard’s writing style proved to be popular with his contemporaries. *The Life* was one of the bestsellers of the ninth century, often paired with annals and other biographies, and later used in the education of future emperors Charles the Bald and Charles the Fat, Charlemagne’s grandson and great-grandson, respectively.¹⁰ Many biographies written shortly after were directly and heavily influenced by it, notably Bishop Asser’s *Life of Alfred the Great* in 893.¹¹ Einhard’s work seems to have also influenced the biographies of Louis the Pious written by the Astronomer, the anonymous writer from Louis’s court, and, especially, that written by Thegan of Trier.¹² One interesting work worth mentioning is *Charlemagne* written by the Monk of St. Gall, generally believed to be Notker the Stammerer (840-912), sometime after 883. While regarded as having little value as a work of history, this collection of anecdotes about Charlemagne as a very pious man seems to have more value as political commentary on Charles the Fat’s time.¹³ But professor Simon MacLean, who specializes in late Carolingian history, argues that “[f]ar from being the naively recorded collection of bizarre anecdotes that it seems to be, Notker’s work was actually a carefully constructed exposition of Einhard’s *Life of Charlemagne*, designed to invert that work’s secular values and place God back at the centre of the reader’s understanding of history.”¹⁴ Regardless of whether it was a direct response to Einhard’s work or not, it shows that “Charlemagne’s biography was turning into legend.”¹⁵

One interesting aspect about *The Life* is that it appears to have circulated for a few decades without its author’s name attached to it.¹⁶ (Some evidence suggests that perhaps Einhard’s preface, where he states his inadequacies, was addressed to Louis’s librarian Gerward, rather than to the general public.¹⁷) Nonetheless, the prologue to *The Life* written by the theologian and poet Walahfrid Strabo in 840 offers great praise to Einhard “not only for his knowledge, but also for the complete integrity of his character. It is also known, since he was present at most of these events, that he made his account even stronger by attestation to the simple truth.”¹⁸ Walahfrid was, then, establishing Einhard as an honest historian, whose works could be consulted with confidence. To facilitate this, he divided the text into individual chapters. It is not known why Einhard left his name out of his work when it seems everyone knew he was the author—he might have been really that modest, or perhaps he wanted others to introduce him as a great and honorable man.

*The Life* was written during Louis the Pious’s reign (814-840), likely at a time of turmoil in the kingdom. Like his father, Louis seems to have held Einhard in great esteem, granting him several properties shortly after Charlemagne’s death, as it was the “custom of imperial Highness to honor those
faithfully serving it with many gifts and to elevate them with great honors.”

Einhard seems to have served all his superiors faithfully and honorably, and remained at court until 830 when, during a time of conflict between Louis and his sons, he retired to serve as lay abbot at his many properties. Medieval historian Rosamond McKitterick argued that The Life served to reinforce Louis’s legitimacy as king and emperor, pointing specifically to the section in which,

Charlemagne repudiates the daughter of Desiderius and marries Hildegard. Louis the Pious, of course, was the only surviving son of Hildegard. It thus serves to reinforce both the legitimacy of Carolingian succession, and the theme of the genealogy which completes the collection, where the Carolingian line from father to son, from its origins in the Trojan and Gallo-Roman past to Louis the Pious, is elaborated.

Einhard was possibly trying to please the king with the mention of his mother. A noticeable omission from The Life, which may reinforce this idea, has been pointed out by Paul Dutton, author of Charlemagne’s Courtier: The Complete Einhard. There is no mention of the “Division of the Kingdom” of 806 (which had been personally delivered to Rome by Einhard), possibly because it “ran counter to Louis’s view (prior to 830) of an indivisible empire . . . to which he had been the sole heir,” since his brothers had died earlier. This suggests that Einhard was certainly aware of the political implications of everything he wrote and, as the faithful servant that he was, did not wish to displease his king. “To recognize the propaganda value of such texts as Einhard . . . is to accept that these works were not simply written for an aloof posterity, but as works of immediate purport, with a vital message for the living and those with power.”

The immediate significance and effect of The Life must, then, be considered.

In addition to asserting Louis’s right to the title, The Life served to affirm the title itself. Einhard began the first chapter of the biography with a piteous depiction of the last Merovingian king, Childeric III, holding the empty title of king and later being deposed supposedly by the pope himself, while the mayors of the palace held the real power over all the affairs of the kingdom. (It has been argued that the records concerning the pope’s involvement in Childeric’s deposition may have been inaccurate, but this would have been from before Einhard’s time.) This served to give legitimacy to the Carolingian line, which began with Charlemagne’s grandfather, Charles (the Hammer) Martel, that great military leader who had been mayor of the palace. When Charlemagne
surrounded himself with scholars, he may or may not have already had in mind that it would be beneficial to have someone describing his “royal prowess on the field of battle; strengthening the bonds of kinship and personal dependence; effective management of royal resources; exemplary personal conduct; administrative assertiveness; and mustering the powers of the Church to carry God’s special favor.” All of this Einhard did with exceptional skill, but not until after Charlemagne’s death in 814.

Einhard described Charlemagne’s military conquests in the first part of the biography. Each of the nations or peoples that the Franks fought was addressed in a separate paragraph (separate chapters after Walahfrid’s addition) in a somewhat Suetonian fashion. While the Royal Frankish Annals described how Charlemagne fought myriad different peoples in one year, The Life painted a picture of a highly organized ruler who seemed to plan a series of conquests to expand the kingdom, suggesting a “grand strategy rather than a policy of plunder.” Einhard repeatedly stressed the royal virtue of steadfastness. “The King, who excelled all the princes of his time in wisdom and greatness of soul, did not suffer difficulty to deter him or danger to daunt him from anything that had to be taken up or carried through, for he had trained himself to bear and endure whatever came, without yielding in adversity, or trusting to the deceitful favors of fortune in prosperity.” The concept of fortune, used here and elsewhere in The Life, is worth noting as a classical and pagan influence in his writing. In addition to valor in conquest, Einhard emphasized Charlemagne’s goodwill toward other kings and nations, and his mercy toward conquered peoples. In describing the long war with the “faithless” Saxons, he pointed out how Charlemagne took 10,000 of them along with their wives and children, resettling them in different parts of Gaul and Germany, but failed to mention the massacre of 4,500 Saxons at Verden. Given the level of detail in the former description, the latter should have been included, and its omission can be assumed to have been intentional.

Einhard got more personal when describing Charlemagne as a family man. He described the affection and devotion he bore his mother, sister, and daughters, the latter whom he never allowed to marry because he could not bear to part with them. Charlemagne seems to have been aware of the sexual scandals involving his daughters but preferred to ignore them. All of this was mentioned only in passing, as if Einhard did not feel it was his place to expose the family troubles. He claimed that even early in his life, Charlemagne “while sharing the kingdom with his brother . . . bore his unfriendliness and jealousy most patiently, and, to the wonder of all, could not be provoked to be angry with him.” No evidence in the historic records suggests that Charlemagne was at all involved in
Carloman’s death, but it is somewhat difficult to imagine that only one of the brothers was jealous and unfriendly. Likely, Einhard’s assessment was a little biased. Some historians have claimed that this portrayal as a devoted family man (his many concubines seem to have been socially acceptable at the time) was a defense against Charlemagne’s critics toward the end of his life, when his injustices, his lust, and his propensity toward war seem to have been under attack. In the mid-820s, a vision or dream of Charlemagne being punished for his lecherous life was widely circulated—advocates of later writing dates for *The Life* think it was a response to that story.\(^{31}\) If Einhard felt a duty to preserve the memory of his beloved king, he certainly felt a need to defend him against those who would speak ill of him, but being as close as he supposedly was to Charlemagne, he could not have failed to notice his faults.

Einhard used personal characteristics and habits to portray Charlemagne as a man of the people. He depicted him as “stately and dignified,” but enjoying simple pleasures like hunting, riding, and swimming. Charlemagne enjoyed the warm springs of Aachen immensely, and liked to invite his sons, nobles, friends and, occasionally, his courtiers and bodyguards, so that at times over one hundred people might be bathing together. Einhard also devoted a chapter to describe how the king preferred to dress in regular, common clothes and only dressed up in royal or imperial garb when the occasion demanded it.\(^{32}\) This section was written in a style used earlier by Paul the Deacon in describing the Lombards’ dress, and used again by Thegan in describing Louis the Pious. This style described dress in an ethnical context in a way not used by earlier medieval writers such as Jordanes, Gregory of Tours, or Bede.\(^{33}\) York historian Guy Halsall described how Thegan, modeling much of his biography on Einhard’s, depicted Louis’s way of dressing as similar, but Thegan’s emphasis was on the rich vestments rather than the common Frankish dress Einhard described. And as Charlemagne had been moderate in food and drink and enjoyed listening to music and readings from scholars over meals, Louis, in turn, detested the “barbarous” songs of old kings his father preserved. While Einhard stressed the “horizontal bonds” between Charlemagne and his people, Thegan copied his model to stress the opposite about Louis.\(^{34}\) But Charlemagne’s sociability was perhaps divinely inspired.

Einhard described how Charlemagne devotedly cherished the Christian religion, and made friends with foreign rulers so that he could help Christians living under their rule. He also welcomed foreigners who came to his country, offering them protection. If Einhard is to be believed, Charlemagne had no intention of ever becoming emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, although he had a very close relationship with the popes Hadrian and later Leo III.\(^{35}\) But, while
Thegan and the Astronomer had described Charlemagne as exceedingly pious, correcting the gospels as he was dying, “Einhard resisted such explicit Christian language, because his sense of greatness could not be simply Christian.”

His version of Charlemagne’s death was more like the secular death of a hero. Einhard reported that before his death there were many signs, such as eclipses, meteors, earthquakes, and lightning strikes that Charlemagne supposedly recognized as omens but pretended were not relevant to him. So Charlemagne was deeply religious but not excessively so, and his greatness was more a personal characteristic.

The man who “hurled scriptural quotations at corrupt officials or worldly clerics” was perhaps more concerned with reform instead. While Charlemagne seems to have done a great deal to fix problems with existing laws and corruption, it was here that Einhard issued one of his few complaints, stating that the king did little more than add a few missing items, and even so, left those in an incomplete state. But the “Renaissance man born seven centuries early” did a great deal to beautify and improve his kingdom. He built his impressive palace and chapel at Aachen, erected schools for peasants and nobles alike, restored churches that needed repairs, built bridges, and assembled fleets to keep watch over both the northern and southern coasts to protect the kingdom from Vikings, Moors, and others. Einhard attributed the relative safety of Italy, Gaul, and Germany to Charlemagne’s great measures. In these matters, the praise for the emperor might be mostly justified.

Before he left the court in 830, Einhard was already distancing himself from the troubles between the emperor and his sons by spending time at his many properties given to him by Louis. *The Translation and Miracles of the Blessed Martyrs, Marcellinus and Peter* was written around 830 but described events from a few years earlier. It went on to influence the creation of a new subgenre of hagiography, that of the translation of saints’ relics, which gained great prominence in the Middle Ages. This work is a delightfully bizarre tale of the relics which Einhard acquired by theft from Rome for his chapel, their retrieval, the displeasure expressed by the saints concerning their location through dreams and bleeding reliquaries, their translations accompanied by devout crowds, and the miracles associated with them. Evident in the tale is the rivalry between Einhard and Hilduin, an abbot who had acquired the relics of St. Sebastian earlier and, therefore, enjoyed the status of being a relic holder. That Einhard used his personal connection with the saints to gain prestige and request favors is evident from the literature. He used his position as savior of these saints—justifying their theft—to request of the emperor that he be excused from court matters and be able to remain at his properties. He also requested the
building of churches and other necessities, asking in his letters to the emperor to keep in mind what heavenly rewards and worldly praise awaited him if he properly venerated the saints.\footnote{But it is perhaps unfair to call him an “adept opportunist” who engaged in the relic affairs strictly for power and prestige.} Convincing evidence supports the genuineness of his religious beliefs.

Einhard began many of his letters and works, including \textit{The Translation}, with “Einhard, a sinner.” While this could have been a standard of the time, it seems to fit with the humble picture he painted of himself. He also often referred to his smallness compared to somebody else’s greatness when addressing them. But the most genuine of Einhard’s surviving documents is a letter concerning the death of his wife, Emma, written to the Benedictine monk, Lupus of Ferrières. He expressed within it his enormous grief as well as his profound disappointment in the fact that the saints, for whom he had cared and ensured proper reverence, had completely ignored his prayers.\footnote{The letter, “On the Adoration of the Cross,” turned into a theological treatise in which he analyzed the differences between prayer and adoration or veneration, and stated concerns with how to pray to the saints and venerate the cross.} While not of significant theological value, it serves to illustrate the authenticity of his beliefs.

Influenced by his classical education and the scholarly environment of Charlemagne’s court, Einhard wrote an influential biography which served to affirm the great royal values he attributed to Charlemagne—valor in battle, mercifulness, devotion to family, amiability, and aspiration to improve the kingdom. The political climate during Louis the Pious’s reign played a role in shaping the work, as did Einhard’s affection for his mentor, but the style and structure of the work were almost immediately copied by other writers. Less well known but significant in its own right is his work on the translation of relics that inspired a new type of hagiography. It reflects the religious climate of the age as well as the author’s genuine beliefs. The humble Einhard would have been surprised by the influence his works have had on the writing of history since his time. Or perhaps starting trends was his goal all along.
Notes


2. Ibid., I-3.


22. Rosamond, McKitterick, *The Carolingians and the Written Word* (Cambridge:
30. Ibid., 47-48.
34. Halsall, *Humour, History and Politics in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages*, 137-145.
37. Halsall, *Humour, History and Politics in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages*, 137.
47. Einhard to Lupus of Ferrières, “Correspondence with Lupus of Ferrières,

48. Ibid., 171-174.

Bibliography


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On 14 October 1066, the balance of power on the British Isles shifted when William the Bastard defeated Harold II, the last Saxon king of England, on the field of battle at Hastings. The outcome of a battle or the succession of one ruler from another is easy to define and catalog. However, when the reason for and interpretation of the event become the focus, then the voice of the historian may define the next generation’s understanding and perception of the world created by the outcome. The historiography of the Battle of Hastings provides a glimpse into the mind of those writing the history. The ethics, economics, and social norms of the historians are presented to the reader as their work interprets the past. The generation that fought at Hastings and the generations which followed provided future generations with the root system which supported a tree of knowledge. The world in which Hastings occurred can be heard within these voices of conquerors and conquered.

The concept of divine will played a major role in the Middle Ages. The Anglo Saxon versions of the invasion spoke of divine punishment, while the Norman versions exalted divine retribution and worldly valor. The most visual and well known history of the event, the Bayeux Tapestry (c. 1080), is wrapped in mystery. The patron, or patrons, of the tapestry can only be speculated upon. Prominent early sources concerning Hastings included The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, the pro-Norman works of Wace, and the Anglo-Norman interpretations of William of Malmesbury and Orderic Vitalis. The histories of the Battle of Hastings offered in the decades following the conflict offer the modern world more than just the events of the day; they provide a glimpse into how a story may be told differently based on the point of view of the storyteller.

The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle told of a nation of people that was paying for sins and the misdeeds of their leaders. Captured within the early historiography of the conquest of England was a tale of missteps, retribution, and harbingers of doom. Coincidently, the year 1066 witnessed the return of Halley’s Comet. Man had long viewed comets as the harbingers of doom. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, originally commissioned by Alfred the Great around 890, compiled the works of many church educated authors that spanned generations of effort. Indeed, there are chronicles
originating from monasteries around the kingdom reporting simultaneously upon the events of the same years. Among the events of the year 1066, it was reported that “all over England such a token seen as no man ever saw before.”¹ The conquered Saxons discovered a world in which they became second-class citizens. Unlike the majority of the Viking raids from the previous centuries, this new group of invaders sought more than possessions, wealth, or a mere foothold on the isle. The Normans came to rule, and altered the culture and kingdom of England in the process.

One telling feature of the Saxon account was the manner in which the combatants were identified: King Harold and Earl William, King Edward’s cousin. Although clearly written after the events of the battle, the Saxons still viewed Harold’s claim as legitimate—referring to Harold as King and William as the lower station of earl. Religion played a vital role in eleventh century Europe, and if a king was crowned by someone who had been excommunicated, that king’s reign would be invalidated. The Worcester version of the Chronicle confirmed the legitimacy of Harold due to his having been crowned by Ealdred, archbishop of York; conversely, Norman sources claimed that Harold was crowned by Stigand, archbishop of Canterbury, who had been excommunicated.²

The Saxon account described Harold as gathering a large force, but William “came against him unawares, ere his army was collected; but the king, nevertheless, very hardly encountered him with the men that would support him.”³ The Normans won the day “as God granted them for the sins of the nation.”⁴ The Saxons delayed submission to the victorious William. It was believed that God wanted nothing better for the sins of the Saxons than Norman lords harassing the populace of England and causing increasing levels of misery. The Chronicle delivered a religious morality tale in its effort to explain the loss of Saxon England. In the Middle Ages, the losing side of a conflict or a population suffering plague viewed the misery as divine punishment. Harold’s lack of his full forces and having fought in a major battle at Stamford Bridge just a few weeks before Hastings could rationalize the hard-fought loss described by the Saxons. But that rationalization always came second to divine punishment. For the Saxons, defeat was a predestined divine punishment that neither tactics nor size of force could overcome.

Not surprisingly, the details of the very same battle described by the vanquished as divine punishment were viewed as divine will by the victorious Normans. Often performed by entertainers known as jongleurs, songs of heroic deeds and lineage, chansons de geste, enjoyed immense popularity during the Norman era and were often centered on the age of Charlemagne. A sense of the importance of these songs can be gained by noting that the Domesday Book (1086) mentioned William’s jongleur, Berdic, by name, and told of lands given to him as reward for service. “In Normandy, a country with a resurgent aristocracy advancing
from conquest to conquest, one of the strongest influences was the sense of lineage; the intense interest in family history was fostered by *chansons* in court or castle, and by narrative charters, recording the ancestry of founders in religious houses.” Ascribed to Guy, bishop of Amiens, the *Carmen de Hastingae Proelio* became the *chansons* related to the battle.

The notions of heroic acts and divine justification were found in the writings of the Normans in reference to the conquest of Saxon England. William of Poitiers, personal chaplain of William the Conqueror, wrote of Harold’s sister Edith, wife of King Edward, validating that Edward had wished William become ruler of England. William of Poitiers called Harold a tyrannical ruler and chastised his usurpation of the throne; moreover, he made the claim that the Conquest freed the English from slavery and tyranny. The main argument for Harold’s treachery descended from the Norman assertion as seen in the Bayeux Tapestry that Harold swore an oath of fealty to William while in Normandy on a mission from Edward. William of Poitiers’s account demonstrates the danger of trusting those authors who were too close to the historical actors, and the biased nature that lies within man’s desire to justify his patrons.

An important Norman source of the events of the invasion was Wace (c. 1115- c. 1183), a Norman poet, who wrote in the Norman tradition of songs of heroic deeds and lineage. This could be seen within his two works: *Roman de Brut* (1150-1155), which was more a romance than a history, and *Roman de Rou* (1160- c. 1174), which detailed the greatness of the Norman dukes and the subsequent conquest of England. Wace described that Edward, on his death bed, warned the Saxons that he had promised England to his nephew William despite the desires of the English aristocracy to have Harold rule them. Wace described William as trying to reason with Harold by reminding him of the oath made by Harold in Normandy and by offering to fight in single combat for the throne, but “Harold said he would do neither; he would neither perform his covenant, nor put the matter in judgment, nor would he meet him and fight body to body.” Wace portrayed the two sides the night before the battle in stark contrast; the Saxons were depicted as drunkards and the Normans as pious and penitent. While, on the surface, this may be construed as a vindication of the Saxon account of divine punishment, the Saxons never questioned Harold’s right to the throne; the Saxon account also did not mention any specific sins or drunken behavior. The Normans sought to present the divine justice and right of rule that legitimized their conquest, and were more specific in their criticisms of the conquered than the Saxons were in self-reflection.

The Norman Conquest transformed England in numerous ways. William divided the lands of England among those who fought alongside him. The Normans also brought religious reform across the English Channel. As with any influx of new
people into an area, marriages between the cultures were consummated and the Anglo-Norman world was born. “Some Saxon landholders adapted themselves to the requirements of Norman fighting; there was intermarriage with the invaders, and the remodeling of the church respected most of the ancient ecclesiastical endowments but channeled them to different recipients.”¹⁹ As England changed and two cultures began the slow merger into one, so did the historiography. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle gradually faded into oblivion around 1154. The Norman accounts of bravery remained; however, a new breed of historian grew within these accounts of bravery. The new historians of Anglo-Norman England often descended from a mixed heritage of both Norman and Saxon. Yet, the historiography continued to seek divine providence in the outcome of the conflict. William built a church on the site of his victory over Harold and encouraged the ecclesiastical reform within England. The blending of the two cultures and reform within the churches and monasteries of England provided a new version of the Battle of Hastings to be written—a version that found the divine vindication of the Norman victory, yet managed to provide dignity to the defeated Saxons.

William of Malmesbury (c. 1095-1143) contributed to the new Anglo-Norman histories written by those of both Saxon and Norman blood, his mother being a Saxon and his father a Norman. His interpretation walked the fine line of observing the positives in Norman England while longing to connect to the Saxon history of England. William saw the English church pre-1066 as too secular and praised the Norman influence in revitalizing the church. William of Malmesbury acknowledged William of Normandy as Edward’s chosen heir; however, he also granted Harold praise by speaking of a sound and just ability to rule. “Still, not to conceal the truth, Harold would have governed the kingdom with prudence and with courage, in the character he had assumed, had he undertaken it lawfully.”¹⁰ William of Malmesbury also attempted to be fair and honest with his approach to William the Conqueror. “For my part, as the blood of either people flows in my veins, I shall steer a middle course: where I am certified of his good deeds, I shall openly proclaim them; his bad conduct I shall touch upon lightly and sparingly, though as not so as to conceal it; so that neither shall my narrative be condemned as false, nor will I brand that man with ignominious censure, almost the whole of whose actions may be reasonably excused, if not commended.”¹¹ William of Malmesbury represented the noble efforts of an impartial historiography of the events at Hastings; however, the political landscape within England in the generations after the battle still did not allow for a truly neutral assessment.

William of Malmesbury sought to correct the erroneous accounts of Hastings that he found in both Saxon and Norman histories. William, like many of those writing in Anglo-Norman England, portrayed Harold as an opportunistic
usurper. While he did maintain that Harold was suitable for the throne, William supported the Norman claim to England. He wrote that the inflation in numbers of the Saxon army, which he described as prevalent in Norman accounts, did not increase the glory of the Norman Conquest, but instead it diminished it through its inaccuracy. William’s account also mentioned how the Saxon will to fight died with Harold. “The effect of war in this affair was trifling; it was brought about by the secret and wonderful counsel of God: since the Angles never again, in any general battle, made struggle for liberty, as if the ... strength [of] England had fallen with Harold, who certainly might and ought to pay the penalty of his perfidy, even though it were at the hands of the most unwarlike people.” William’s assessment was not meant to belittle the Normans but to speak of the tenacity of a brave, yet small, army of Saxons defending their homeland. His indication of the Norman people as unwarlike was meant to show them as just and not belligerent conquerors. Yet, the notion of Normans being unwarlike was contrary to the spirit of the popular chansons. William of Malmesbury, though, offered the positive and negative from both Saxons and Normans.

Another of the Anglo-Norman historians and a contemporary of William of Malmesbury was Orderic Vitalis (1075-1142). Like William, Orderic was a monk. He wrote during a period of great contention. Succession questions had yet to be decided for the manner in which the kingdom and the duchy of Normandy would be divided. After William decided on how to divide his territory, he lived to regret it when his oldest son rebelled against him in an attempt to control all of William’s land. Orderic painted a Norman picture with his words on the events of the year 1066. In his account of the Conquest, Orderic saw Harold as the perjurer and William as the liberator of the English. His attempt to provide a true history became entangled with the Norman love of the chansons. “How quickly elements taken from them might creep into the accounts of eye-witnesses and so into the pages of serious history appears repeatedly in Orderic’s work.” Orderic considered Saxon England to be headed toward ruin and the Normans as the great saviors and reformers. “The Normans, although they may have been warlike, troublemaking, ambitious, and deceitful, reformed the English monasteries and upgraded the church on the isle; such sacred and moral considerations must prevail in judgment of past events.” Orderic, like William of Malmesbury, had a Norman father and an English mother, however, Orderic wrote less of Saxon virtue than William. The Anglo-Norman histories existed as a more honest account of events than of those directly involved in the conflict, but the background of the individual still influenced the interpretation.

Housed in Bayeux, France and commissioned by an unknown patron, the Bayeux Tapestry is the most visual source of the events of the year 1066. The
tapestry was likely commissioned by Bishop Odo of Bayeux (c. 1030-1097) and crafted by Anglo-Saxon artisans in Kent. Alternate patrons could have been Count Eustace of Boulogne (c. 1020-1087), another nephew of Edward the Confessor, as well as the tapestry being created as a gift to Odo from the monks of St. Augustine. As mentioned, numerous versions of The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle were written and St. Augustine’s abbey was one of the locations for this venture. The tapestry presents an intriguing mixture of historiography. A Norman or French patron commissioned a tapestry illustrating the glory of the conquest which in turn was then crafted by those who had been conquered. It is valuable to note that Harold is referred to as “Harold Rex” in the tapestry’s depiction of his accession to the throne, which does not present him in the light of a usurper. Throughout the images portrayed on the Bayeux Tapestry, the viewer becomes empowered to interpret the scene as one pleases. If, as the saying goes, a picture is worth a thousand words, then the tapestry becomes the most voluminous tome on the topic. “The truth behind Harold’s mission, and with it King Edward’s crucial wishes towards the end of his reign, was recorded at St. Augustine’s not, on this occasion, in ink scratched upon parchment but with colorful stitches pierced through white linen cloth.”\textsuperscript{16} The early chronicles did not mention the manner of Harold’s death at Hastings; however, the tapestry shows death coming from an arrow to the eye—possibly the first mention of the cause of death. “The story first appears, or seems to appear, in the Bayeux tapestry; it was first recorded in writing in the otherwise unimportant account of the battle by Baudri of Bourgueil in 1099.”\textsuperscript{17} It may be impossible to know how the arrow story came about. The tapestry displays a scene of an arrow and one blow from an advancing knight striking Harold. It seems logical that the images of the tapestry influenced the written records that followed.

While the tapestry portrays a vivid account of the actions between Harold and William, it does not give the whole story. “Its pictorial story of Harold and William and the events leading up to and including the Battle of Hastings is a historic treasure of authentic eleventh century detail such as dress and armor and weaponry, but what it tells of Harold is open to serious question.”\textsuperscript{18} While the picture paints a thousand words, the words come from the viewer’s own interpretation. Motives and opportunities of those involved in the events are lost in the viewing of the tapestry. Moreover, the images chosen in the eleventh century will not have the same meaning to an audience from other eras. With a Norman or French patron and Saxon artisans, the tapestry became a device in which to include subversive images while supporting the cause of the patrons. “It may also be seen as the work of a designer who did not see the issue in quite such black and white terms as his patron.”\textsuperscript{19} In many ways, the tapestry became both a Norman and Saxon source of the battle, but the tapestry can only provide its images as a skeleton of the story.
Written text has provided the story of Hastings with flesh.

The historiography of Hastings has many sides. The Saxon chroniclers found fault in defeat with the sins of the people and the supposed perjury of Harold’s oath of fealty to William. In truth, it is easy now to see fault with the unclear succession plans laid forth by Edward; however, in the eleventh century no fault was to be found in Edward. Those who fought alongside William or benefitted from the conquest elevated William to the status of a liberator and savior of the English from the tyranny and oppression of the usurper Harold. The following generations were able to write more honestly about those involved, yet even then blood and position stood in the way of objective reporting. The heroic spirit of the Normans demanded that songs of lineage and great deeds be sung to honor those at Hastings. Those of mixed blood skirted the fine line between open acceptance of Harold’s right and abilities with the truth of William’s successful policies in England, despite their brutality. The landscape had changed drastically. The history is in the eye of the beholder.

What was the world like in which the history of Hastings was written? A strongly religious atmosphere gripped the British Isles and monastic reform was prevalent. Those conquered searched for meaning in defeat and found it in the sins of its people and in Harold, the king who failed to protect them from the Norman oppressors. The conquerors found vindication and justification in what was felt to be rightfully theirs. For the Normans, England had been promised to them and the attempt to steal it from them served only as a minor bump on the road to London. William evolved from a derisive reputation as a Bastard to a laudatory reputation as the Conqueror. Those who served him desired to commemorate the occasion with a tapestry extolling the greatness of the conquest. The generations which followed, those of mixed blood, searched for a more honest history, yet the entanglements of politics and society often interfered. The world of the historians of Hastings was one of retrospective divine justification and retribution. The question of succession and rule had been decided on the field of battle by divine right. The world made sense and England was to be thankful for its Norman lords. While there were still gentlemen in England filled with contempt and hatred, the successive generations of mixed heritage and Anglicizing of the Norman lords softened the blow. The Battle of Hastings reshaped the landscape of Europe and shifted the influences of the British Isles away from Scandinavia and towards the European Continent. Those who wrote of this lived in a world of change and uncertainty. The historiography of Hastings, whether from the conquerors or from the conquered, found common voice in actions while arguing the motives, oaths, and heirs of a dying culture and kingdom. The Saxon world had ended, replaced by a Norman one—but the conquered Saxons never quite disappeared.
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Notes


3. Ibid., 121.

4. Ibid.


8. Ibid., 89.


11. Ibid., 254.


13. Ibid., 252.


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Europe’s Crusaders first began rallying to Pope Urban II’s call for a Holy War following the Council of Clermont in 1095. He charged Christians to set aside their coreligionist struggles in order to set out and reclaim the holy lands of the Near East, specifically Jerusalem, from the “infidel” Muslims.¹ The first, ill-prepared, non-combatant driven expedition, the “People’s Crusade,” led by Peter the Hermit, was massacred almost to a man in August 1096.² Following that slaughter, Byzantine Emperor Alexius I consolidated the European generals in Constantinople and immediately launched the first “armed pilgrimage.”³ This pilgrimage was not only successful, but provided the undertone of romanticism for further exploits. The rise in popularity and nod to “Christian duty” in the Western world still echoes with the exploits of the Crusader knights on their quest from God. Muslim historiography contradicts this line of thought and treats the “Crusades” almost as a footnote within the greater struggles of warring factions in the region—that they were in fact, “tiny and futile attempts to halt the inevitable expansion of Islam.”⁴ In the beginning of the conflict, the Muslims did not even consider themselves involved in a religious struggle against Christianity.⁵

Aside from a handful of primary sources from some contemporary historians, such as the personal memoirs of Usāmah Ibn-Münqidh⁶ or in the collective works of ‘Izz ad-Din Ibn Al-Athīr, Abu Ya’la Hamza ibn Asad at-Tamimi (also known as Ibn Al-Qalanīṣī), and Nasir ad-Din Ibn al-Furāt,⁷ most surviving historical Islamic sources reference early works that have been lost. Other surviving documents include significant revisions reflecting the views and motives of the author. Although the term jihad was a familiar lexicon in the Muslim world, the term crusader was not a term used by contemporary participants on either side of the struggle. It was not the Crusades, nor the Islamic reaction to them during the two hundred-year struggle, that shapes the modern-day world debate concerning the eternal struggle between Christianity and Islam.

Western views dominate the historiography of the Crusades, presenting a one sided view of a topic that is far from black and white. M.R.B. Shaw’s
translation of European noblemen Joinville and Villehardouin does just that. It captures contemporary views of Western Christendom’s involvement in the Crusades. A true discussion of this topic, often misrepresented in modern society, must include viewpoints that shed light on the opposite side of that same coin. There are some remaining contemporary writings, as mentioned above, and a handful of historians have sought to collect and translate additional scripts from either eyewitnesses or Arab historians using works no longer available. These sources, such as Amin Maalouf’s *The Crusades Through Arab Eyes*, and Francesco Gabrieli’s *Arab Historians of the Crusades*, are excellent in painting the necessary picture of conflict from the opposition’s point of view.

Two historians whose works are invaluable are Jonathan Riley-Smith and Carole Hillenbrand. Riley-Smith offers sound research for the Crusades and the overall period, without over-reliance on either the Christendom or Islamic stance. His works, *The Crusades: A History* and *The Oxford Illustrated History of the Crusades*, provided excellent frames of reference for the actual events that transpired in the Levant for over one hundred and fifty years. Hillenbrand, on the other hand, provided a remarkable resource for even the casual historian, capturing the more aloof interpretation of non-Christendom resources. In the second edition of *The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives*, she referenced both the attacks of 9/11 and the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The following quote captures the soul of her work. “These events have had a profound impact on the ‘crusade’ discourse of certain ‘jihadist’ groups active today . . . such matters which are, of course, far removed from the realities of medieval crusading or Islamic history.” It is only through an examination of both perspectives that a solid conclusion exists. The Crusades, as the majority of the population understands them, are skewed by either misrepresentation or an underrepresentation of all parties involved. The present turmoil in the twenty-first century—including the fanatical Islamic terrorists groups with their self-proclaimed jihad against the West, establishes a foundation for the popularity of the propagandist use of the words “jihad” and “crusades.” Both of these words gained momentum in mainstream lexicon of post 9/11 attacks on America. America’s immediate reaction in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 magnified them. However, it was not until the nineteenth century resurgence of Arabic and Ottoman-driven history that the religious conflict of the past gained a link to the ongoing modern struggle.

Before the Latin Church unleashed what modern society terms, “The Crusades,” Islam had spread across the Near East, across North Africa, and across the Mediterranean Sea to the Iberian Peninsula, engulfing the nomadic Turcoman lands that bordered the southern boundary of the Byzantine Empire.
Despite its wildfire spread, it was far from a uniting force that produced anything like a “United Islamic Empire.” When Mohammed died in 632 CE, divided on succession, Islam splintered into two main factions.

Two distinct sects resulted from this splinter. The Shi’ites believe the caliphates, the political and religious leaders within a Muslim community, can derive only from a direct descendant of the Prophet Mohammed. The Sunni belief is contrary to this, believing that caliphates can, and should, rise to power from public demand. At the close of the eleventh century, the Shi’a powerbase was absorbed into the Fatimid Empire in Egypt and extended across Africa and into Palestinian territory. The Sunni powerbase, from a religious leadership point, stemmed from Baghdad with an “elected” caliphate, but its military power rested with the Seljuk Turks. Although based far to the east in present day Iran, the Sunni/Turk influence included portions of present day Iraq, Syria, and Turkey.

When the milites Christi (knights of Christ), or the crusaders, first set out to liberate the city of Jerusalem in 1095, they did so at the height of the struggle between the two Islamic sects. This struggle “took precedence above all other affairs and the power of both Baghdad and Cairo stagnated.” In The First Crusade: A New History, Thomas Asbridge outlined that there was a “pathological hatred that divided the two main arms of the Islamic faith” so much so, that Muslims “had absolutely no intention of opposing the crusaders’ siege” of cities belonging to different sects or kingdoms. He further suggested that because of the constant power struggles between the Muslim sects, the original Franj invasions may have been confused with just another Byzantine campaign. Because of this confusion, there was not a distinction initially, but once the defending Muslims realized that their attackers were from Frankish lands, they identified their opponents as “Franj.” The Arabs described all European settlers and armies as Franj, never distinguishing between their actual nationalities.

In addition to the internal fighting between rival tribes and rulers throughout the Near and Middle East, same-sect power struggles divided Muslims further. Mohammed’s death created a faith-based schism. In the same way, the death of local sultans, Turkish nobility (or atabegs), and caliphates increased the warring between coreligionists. Many lesser lords and rulers were eager to exploit any weakness in their neighbors hoping for an increase of their ownpowerbase.

Two examples outline the extent of the “fratricidal struggles” between the Seljuks (a Sunni Muslim tribe that established a Turko-Persian empire in Iran) and the Fatimids (a Shi’a Muslim tribe that established a dynasty that extended from Atlantic North Africa across Egypt and into Syria and the
Arabian Peninsula). Between these two opposing powerhouses fell the openly hostile city-states that dotted Syria and Palestine. First, between the years 1096 and 1099, control of Baghdad passed from usurper to usurper eight times. This translated to a new ruler every hundred days. Second, the underappreciated contemporary historian Ibn al-Athir authored an accurate reflection that the invading Christian armies, properly referred to by Muslim leaders as the Franj armies, easily seized and controlled large portions of territory. This success stemmed from the Islamic sultans’ inability and unwillingness to work together against a common enemy. The modern Muslim historian Amin Maalouf summed up the deep-seated, individualistic approach of the warring Muslim empires perfectly, “In the eleventh century, jihad was not more than a slogan brandished by princes in distress. No emir would rush to another’s aid unless he had some personal interest in doing so. Only then would he contemplate the invocation of great principles.”

On the eve of the Europeans’ arrival in Asia Minor in 1096, the level of infighting and dissension among Muslims peaked, for “virtually the entire upper echelon of the region’s Islamic authorities [passed away] between 1092-1094.” The Seljuk vizier, or high-ranking political advisor, and Sultan died in 1092. In Egypt, the Fatimid caliph and vizier died in 1094. The vacuum of power in the Muslim world hindered their resistance to European aims. Salahuddin Ayubi, or Saladin, would eventually found the Ayyubid dynasty that spread from his rise to power in Egypt and eventually included Egypt, Syria, and regions across Mesopotamia. In the midst of consolidating power, Saladin found himself in conflict with both Muslim and Christian adversaries. During the Third Crusade, Saladin commented to King Richard the Lionheart: “the land, it is also ours originally. Your conquest of it was an unexpected accident due to the weakness of Muslims there at the time.” Later, to his own confidant and historian, he commented on the fragility of the united Muslim jihad efforts against the Christians, “If death should happen to strike me down, these forces are hardly likely to assemble again and the Franks will grow strong. Our best course is keeping on the Jihad until we expel them from the coast or die ourselves.” So who were these invaders from Europe that arrived in the midst of the region’s greatest internal strife? Muslim historians did not use the word “crusaders” when referencing the European forces. The terms “crusades” and “crusaders” were not contemporary terms of historians on either side of the conflict. Muslims grouped all Europeans into only two categories. Upon first arriving, all Europeans were deemed Franj, or the Franks (Pope Urban was from France). Later, contemporary sources differentiated between the Franj and the Rûm (the Arabic term for the Byzantine Empire). This distinction between
the two did not occur immediately. The historiography reflects that Muslims were not aware that they were dealing with different foes than the Byzantine forces they had defeated without difficulty at Manzikert in 1071. The first indication of Muslim awareness that they were dealing with a different enemy did not occur until their first major defeat at the hands of Christian armies.

Even so, after the Muslims realized who the crusaders were they did not understand their intent. That is, they were unaware that the Franj arrived as Muhjadeen, or soldiers of a (in this case, Christian) Holy War. The only source that survived as the exception to this ignorance are the writings of As-Sulami, a Muslim cleric from Damascus. As early as 1105, As-Sulami recognized the European threat as a Christian jihad and began promoting Muslim unity as a necessary step for launching their own holy war to repel the European invaders. As-Sulami further prophesized that the arrival of the Franj in the Holy Lands was divine intervention. He believed that Muslims had strayed from the teachings of the Qur’an. This combined with the infighting made the European invasion an act of punishment on the Muslim world. He preached that spiritual purification for both the individual and for Islam as a whole rested on a united Turk-Kurd-Arab jihad. His insight received little attention, until some fifty years later with the ascension of Nur al-Din. Nur al-Din demanded a unified counter-jihad to expel the Franj.26 Prior to Nur al-Din, jihad appears intermittently among Arabic historiography. When it does appear, it refers more often as propaganda or as an attempt to smooth over wrinkles stemming from same-sect armies warring with each other.

From the Battle of Manzikert in 1071, until the completion of the First Crusade and the European capture of Jerusalem, Muslims did identify the Franj separately from the Rūm. However, this separation only went as far as the Muslim consensus which indicated the Rūm were mercenary European armies but formed under the banner of the Byzantine Empire, and paid to re-conquer territories lost in 1084.27 In this capacity, contemporaries, such as Yaghi-Siyan, the Muslim ruler of Antioch in 1097,28 even legitimized the arrival of the Christian armies as honorable. It was honorable because they were waging a war to reestablish their original boundaries in Asia Minor.29

By the middle of 1098, after the fall of Edessa and Antioch to a combined European crusader force, the Muslims did distinguish between the Rūm and the Franj. Furthermore, they highlighted the greater military prowess and fanaticism of the Franj.30 Despite actual friendships and even cordial visits among Christian settlements, contemporary historians are quick to riddle their histories with propaganda-based anecdotes. They pay tribute to Franj military skill but often lace the compliment with descriptions and stories that highlighted
the “barbaric” and “backward” mannerisms of the *Franks*. Well known contemporary poet and adventurer, Usāmah Ibn-Munqidh wrote autobiographical accounts both during and after the early Crusades. He captured the life, struggles, and conflicts of the Muslim warriors and the Christian invaders. In his memoirs, he described the *Franks* in the following way, “when one comes to recount cases regarding the Franks . . . he sees them as animals possessing the virtues of courage and fighting, but nothing else.”

Not all observations and opinions were negative. One interesting story from Ibn-Munqidh records a surprising event. The Knights Templar (usually categorized with extreme disdain) extended an apologetic concern when they interrupted Usāmah during his Islamic prayers:

The Templars, who were my friends, would evacuate the little adjoining mosque so that I may pray in it. One day I entered this mosque . . . and stood up in the act of praying, upon which one of the Franks rushed on me . . . and turned my face eastward saying, ‘This is the way thou shouldst pray’. A group of Templars hastened to him, seized him and repelled him from me. I resumed my prayer [whereupon the Frank rushed in at him again]. . . . The Templars . . . expelled him. They apologized to me, saying, ‘This is a stranger who has only recently arrived from the land of the Franks and he has never before seen anyone praying except eastward.’

This fickle relationship between Christian and Muslim armies sheds light on an aspect overshadowed by the simple “us versus them” mentality that accompanies discussions of the Crusades.

When the *Franks* first arrived, the internal power struggles so engulfed the Muslim world of the Near East that Muslims viewed the European armies as just additional players on the field of battle. Almost from the beginning, separate Muslim sultans and *Franks* leaders sought to suppress or defend against internal rivals, often signing treaties and alliances with rival religious armies. In later years, when a rift occurred between the Europeans, there were even Muslim/*Franks* alliances against rival Muslim/*Franks* alliances, and Muslim/*Franks* alliances fighting Muslim/Rūm alliances.

Again, it was not until Nur al-Din finished consolidating his own powerbase by uniting the Sunni areas of Baghdad, Damascus, Mosul, and Syria that a united Muslim front appeared. In 1149, after vanquishing a combined Christian and Muslim force with his victory at Inab, Nur al-Din bathed in the
Mediterranean, a gesture that symbolized his dominance over Syria. This consolidation of power served as the first phase of Nur al-Din’s quest for eliminating the Franj, but as a jihad, against Muslims, it was a contradiction to the term. Ironically, his second phase also did not focus on Christian armies, and was another declaration of “Holy War” against Muslims. Through his upstart, Shirkuh (and later his son, Saladin), Nur al-Din then conquered the Shi’a Fatimids in Egypt, creating an extended unified Sunni caliphate that included Egypt. With the Shi’a subjugated, he turned his attention to the Franj, and the first jihad to eliminate the Christian invaders.\textsuperscript{36}

Since the Muslims did not originally understand that the Crusaders arrived with every intention of bringing a Holy War to the region, it is important to understand the Muslim concept and contemporary view of jihad. The sectarian struggle was so great at this point, that little interest existed in pursuing action that would expand the borders of Islam.\textsuperscript{37} Only an imam, or the Islamic religious and worship leader, can grant permission for an offensive jihad. This forced a multi-tiered leadership structure akin to Stalin’s Red Army, wherein he had both military and commissar leaders in tandem roles. According to the Qur’an, the call for an offensive jihad of such magnitude equated to “the Last Days,” or the Islamic Day of Reckoning. That is, the “Last Jihad” is the final struggle between Muslims and non-Muslims.\textsuperscript{38}

Therefore, the actual concept of pursuing a Holy War against the Christians was foreign to the Shi’a and an afterthought for the Sunni. It was after Nur al-Din prevented the European Second Crusade from gaining momentum beyond strongholds in Syria, and Muslims united under one leader from the Euphrates to the Mediterranean to the Nile, that a true jihad occurred.\textsuperscript{39} Just over eighty years after As-Sulami’s warning, and three decades after Nur al-Din set out to remove the Christians, his successor, Saladin, set out for Jerusalem. Muslim armies marched into Jerusalem as victors over the Franj in 1187. Muslim defenders finally became involved, in every sense of the word, in jihad, and battle for the Levant commenced through a lens of the survival of Islam equated with the destruction of Christianity in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{40}

As the focus shifted from infighting to jihad, so too did Arabic historiography. Rather than the casual mentioning of a conflict with the Franj, specific details emerge concerning prisoner exchange, beheadings, emissary encounters, and other interactions occurring between the two warring religious groups. Religious overtones influenced the historiography. Victories occurred because “God willed it,” or “the infidel’ lack of faith in the One True God.”\textsuperscript{41} In the same way, the Muslims attributed defeat to “God’s Will,” rather than to the Franj’s superior military actions.\textsuperscript{42}
In addition, superfluous adjectives riddle the sources. “Glorious,” or “exalted” precede the names of Muslim warriors, and “May God Damn Them” or “may Allah render them helpless”\(^{43}\) follows mention of the *Franj* “infidels.” The saturation of the historiography with religious overtones stems from the caliber of the historian. They were religious scholars, not historians, or military strategists. As such, they viewed all historical events “through the prism of faith.”\(^{44}\)

The political circles within travel camps influenced contemporary historians. Much of the historiography that survived omits specifics in regards to strategies and tactics of the force-on-force battles or the sieges and countersieges that occurred throughout the Crusades. There were some exceptions, such as historical accounts from military veterans turned historians, but the typical account glances over any worthy description of tactics, strategies, and weapons.\(^{45}\) Still, the greater concentration of writing falls on the Muslim warrior-leaders that led the *jihad* against the *Franj*. The writings reflect a tight focus on their piety, their dedication to the *jihad*, and the Islamic teachings of the Qur’an. Usâmah summed up the Muslim approach to historiography. “Victory in warfare is from Allah and is not due to organization and planning, nor to the number of troops and supporters.”\(^{46}\)

As stated above, many historians traveled in Muslim leaders’ camps and often served as official secretaries or confidants. Thus, their accounts and descriptions are biased and highly propagandist. The genre of Arabic literature during this period was termed *adab*, and the primary purpose of this writing style was capturing a story that was both pleasing and entertaining to read. The writing also intended to teach some life or religious lesson to the reader. It was “not bound by conventions to tell the ‘truth,’ but sought rather to narrate a good story, even if in so doing the truth might be stretched a little, or more than a little.”\(^{47}\)

Nowhere is this more evident than in the surviving accounts of Saladin. Saladin rose to power as Nur al-Din’s lieutenant in Egypt. Once he was successful in overthrowing the Fatimid Caliphate, the two came dangerously close to warring themselves. The sudden death of Nur al-Din prevented the inevitable clash because Saladin claimed the rights as Nur al-Din’s successor. His quick maneuvering allowed for immediate subjugation of any opposition to his designs, and ensured the consolidation of the Egyptian kingdom within the vast empire left by Nur al-Din.\(^{48}\)

Saladin’s first order of business in this consolidation phase was waging war against coreligionists, even among the same sect. The different opinions of Saladin in his own time are relevant today. Those that praise Saladin remark on
his pious approach and dedication to the *jihad*. According to Saladin’s own historian, Baha al-Din Ibn Shaddad, Saladin “was very diligent in and zealous for the Jihad.” He further praised his hero by recording that Saladin once remarked,

> I have it in mind that, when God Almighty has enabled me to conquer the rest of the coast, I shall divide up the lands, make my testament, take my leave and set sail on this sea to their islands to pursue them there until there no longer remain on the face of the earth any who deny God—or die [in the attempt].

His desire for serving the best interest of Islam often skewed Saladin’s treaties and alliances. Ibn Shaddad comments at length on a peace treaty signed by Saladin after a fierce battle outside Acre:

> He continued to resist them [*Franj*], steadfastly, though they were in great numbers, until the weakness of the Muslims became evident to him. He then made peace at their request, for their weakness and losses were greater, although they were expecting reinforcements and we expected none. There was an advantage to us making peace, and that became clear when circumstances and fate revealed what they had kept concealed.

In retrospect, Saladin was successful. He captured and secured Jerusalem from the Christians. Some Muslim historians still record the many treaties, non-aggression pacts, and alliances that occurred between the *Franj* and the Muslims with a negative connotation. The most prominent of these treaties was with Richard the Lionheart in 1192. Even though Saladin secured Jerusalem, the treaty left the coast from Tyre to Jaffa in the hands of the Christians. For this, Saladin suffered a backlash of accusations from contemporary accounts for not “taking the fight” to the infidels and failing to rigorously pursue *jihad*. On the other hand, other Muslim historians recorded this same event in a positive light. They described it as the “nature” in which the relationship between *Franj* and Muslim changed as the local *Franj* inhabitants were fully absorbed into the overall situation and struggles of the Near East. From the outset, the “nature” of war and power struggles throughout the Levant and the Near East suffered from any clarity of who was at war with whom. Muslims, Sunni, Shi’ite, Fatimids, and Christians, *Franj, Rūm*, all hoped for a foothold in the region as an extension of power. It was not a Crusade, nor was it
a *jihad* as defined by Islamic leaders. It was a grasp for power.

It is evident from Muslim historiography that the Crusades’ initial success caused a unifying effort through Zengi, Nur al-Din, and finally Saladin. Further, it was the realization that the Europeans were waging their own Holy War that served as the impetus behind their own *jihad*. However, evidence also exists that the *Franj* were not specifically anti-Islamic, and the two religions co-existed before, during, and after the Crusades. Three contemporary sources remark that the *Franj* were tolerant of Islamic practices within the lands they controlled. First, Imad ad-Din commented that the *Franj* “changed not a single law or cult practice of the [Muslim inhabitants].” Second, Yaqut remarked, “the Franks changed nothing when they took the country.” Third, Ign Jubayr echoed Yaqut’s observation, when he wrote, “in the hands of the Christians [the shrine at Ain el Baqar and its] venerable nature is maintained and God has preserved it as a place of prayer for the Muslims.”

Muslims themselves did not have a term for the “Crusades.” Until the nineteenth century, they referred only to “the invasion by the *Franj*.” In the 1890s, the Ottoman Empire suffered humiliating defeats in the Balkans. This brought the end to the last great Muslim Empire. Afterwards, non-Muslim religions surrounded the Muslim Middle East. This caused a rekindled interest in the champions of Islam—namely Nur al-Din and Saladin. Furthermore, the Ottoman Sultan called for the unification of Muslims under one authority. It was not until this resurgence, nested within a romantic notion of the great *jihad* against Christianity, that the term *Hurab al-Salibiyya*, or “Wars of the Crusades,” came into use.

The European “Holy War” and presence in the Near East lasted less than 200 years. This period is minute considering the great and vast history of the cradle of civilization. Ultimately, the Crusades were a failure. Only the initial shock and initial Muslim dissension allowed the First Crusade any real measure of success in the Muslim Near East. Anachronistic manipulation in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries transformed the Crusades into a modern day “rally cry” of Islamic extremists. Thus, terrorists enacted their own warped version of *jihad*. Jonathan Riley-Smith noted that until this modern misrepresentation, “Muslims . . . looked back [on the crusaders] with indifference and complacency. They believed, after all, that they had beaten the crusaders comprehensively . . . [and] had driven them from the lands they settled in the Levant.”

In the 1930s, Muslims claimed, “[The] West is still waging crusading wars against Islam under the guise of political and economic imperialism.” In the 1970s, Islamic Nationalists, under the leading ideologist Sayyid Qutb, defined “crusading” as “any offensive, including a drive for economic or
political hegemony, against Islam anywhere by those who called themselves Christian . . . and to any aggressive action by their surrogates, like Zionists or Marxists.” The argument today that the “Franj Invasion” that began in the late eleventh century is the impetus of today’s claims of a religious war between Christianity and Islam is unfounded. Eastern historiography on the “Crusades” suggests the Muslims of yesterday gave the Franj invasion little attention. Muslims did not inherit bitter, hate-filled accounts of the Crusades from their contemporaries—rather their main interest lay in recording the everyday Muslim views and portraying comic book-esque plights of their heroes and champions of Islam.

Afterword

The concept of this essay arose from the peculiarities of the author’s specific situation when his research was at its infancy. Extensive reading and scribbling of notes occurred in the backseats of Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles while on breaks from traveling, almost daily, from the mission at hand. The author served as a Captain on a United States Army Military Transition Team (MiTT) in the position of Combat Advisor for Iraqi Army Officers. He assisted in the training and rebuilding of the Iraqi Army in 2009. Thus, working hand-in-hand with the Iraqis, daily interaction occurred with both the Iraqi Army counterparts and/or the five interpreters assigned to the team—all of them Muslim. Both the Shi’a and Sunni sects were represented. Having received weeks of cultural awareness and even elementary Arabic language training, the author saw a great opportunity and environment for discovering the Islamic/Arab view of the European Crusades.

Not long after research began, one of the interpreters commented on one of the sources. “Do not trust everything you read, especially in Arabic history—most of it is twisted or is lies, time after time in order for politics and dictators to influence the minds of the Arabic people.” It was an interesting point of view. A few days later, another interpreter, who was also attending Baghdad University for a degree in History, remarked that in his University, and in Iraq in general, historical lessons only concentrate on Classical History, such as the Greeks and Romans. This made sense to him, because “Arabs know that most history after that is just made-up, to give the messages of the people in power.” Because he held this viewpoint with such passion, there was no point in explaining that not only were Greek and Roman historians guilty of manipulation, but also, unless approached from a purely scholarly lens, all history contains biases or propaganda. Within three weeks of the initial research, all five interpreters and
three accompanying Iraqi officers echoed the same sentiment. The “Franj invasion” was hardly a footnote in Arab or Muslim history. All agreed that Saladin is overrated as a hero, having warred against fellow Muslims more than Christians, and that any history regarding Saladin is circumspect at best. One even remarked, through a “thousand-yard stare,” that during Saddam’s reign over Iraq, there was endless comparison of Saddam to Saladin—both from Tikrit and both power-hungry at the expense of their own people and Muslims in general. With that in mind, the author researched the topic and the above article is a product of that work.

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Notes


2. Ibid., 16-18.


12. Ibid.


16. Ibid., 186.


19. Ibid.


22. Ibid.


24. Ibid., 195.


28. Ibid.


36. Ibid., 345.


38. Qur’an. Surat At-Tawbah, 9:5,29. There are numerous references throughout the Qur’an in regards to *jihad* between Muslims and non-Muslims, and the “Last Days.” In 9:5 a particular course of action is outlined and in 9:29, specific reference to the “Last Days” occurs.


42. Ibid.
45. Ibid., 432.
47. Ibid., 261-262.
49. Richards, trans., *The Rare and Excellent History of Saladin*, 27.
50. Ibid., 29.
51. Ibid., 27.
56. Ibid.
64. Ibid., 306.
65. Ibid., 306.
67. A fact that was actually referred to in the Epilogue of Carole Hillenbrand’s *The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives*, page 595. See Bibliography.

**Bibliography**

Since the original publication of this article in 2015, the author retired from the United States Army and earned his Master of Arts in History from the American Military University. He then moved to a small German town to live closer to his children for 18 months while completing a Certificate in German Studies from the University of Maryland. He returned to the United States in November 2017, and currently works as the Academic Operations and Support Chief for the Signal Leader Development College, United States Army Signal School, at Fort Gordon, Georgia.
In the midst of the Western Roman Empire’s collapse, Pope Leo I (r. 440-461) made the monumental assertion that the bishop of Rome was the true head of the Christian Church because Christ had designated Peter, Rome’s first bishop, as the “foundation” of his earthly Church and the “doorkeeper” of his heavenly kingdom.\(^1\) Leo’s reasoning became known as the Petrine Doctrine, an idea that developed into the basis of papal power throughout the Middle Ages and the theological justification for papal hegemony over all bishops and patriarchs of Christendom—both in the Greek East and in the Latin West. In the mid-fifth century, however, the western portion of the Roman Empire had suffered an unrecoverable collapse, and Roman Christianity was supplanted in the provinces with either the pagan animism of the Anglo-Saxons and Franks or the heretical Arianism of the Goths and Vandals. Leo’s bold proclamation of papal and Roman Catholic leadership did not coincide with social and political realities; he was writing at a time when the Roman Church held influence in Italy but little elsewhere. Establishing the authority of the Roman See in the Germanic kingdoms that occupied approximately what is now France, Spain, and Britain required the sustained efforts of successive popes and the churchmen who worked under their auspices. A key part of this long-range effort to translate the Petrine Doctrine from abstraction to reality included the late sixth-century mission to the Anglo-Saxon kingdom of Kent in Britain that Pope Gregory the Great (r. 590-604) organized. The Gregorian mission resulted in the conversion of the pagan Kentish kingdom and the establishment of the Episcopal Church at Canterbury, the first Latin Church in Britain since Roman times. More importantly, the Gregorian mission planted the seed of Latin Christianity in Britain and culminated in the conversion of the whole island less than a century later under the leadership of the pope in Rome.

Pope Leo and Pope Gregory were visionaries who foresaw a universal church that would bring Latin Christianity to the new Germanic kingdoms of Western Europe. In the late sixth century, however, their vision was exactly that and nothing more. The prestige and authority of the Latin Church can be counted among the victims of the Germanic invasions of the fifth century. That the Latin Church was still extant in Gregory’s time was no small miracle in itself. Throughout late antiquity and the early Middle Ages the Church had no army of its own to enforce its
will or guard its interests; it was dependent upon secular authority for protection, the suppression of heresy, and the granting of economic and legal concessions.

The years between 400 and 600 were a transitory period for the Church, even more so perhaps than for Western European society in general. It was a time of tremendous flux in church-state relations that saw the Church in search of secular authorities stable and powerful enough to nurture its interests and protect it from those who would do it harm both physically and spiritually. The Roman Empire had filled this role during the last years of its existence. Emperor Constantine’s conversion in the early fourth century inaugurated the remarkable transformation of Christianity from a persecuted, underground religion of beggars to the state-sanctioned religion of the Caesars. Theodosius I (r. 379-395), the last emperor of any great consequence, vigorously proscribed both Roman paganism and Arian Christianity—the most important spiritual rivals of Latin Christianity. To these gifts were added a number of fiscal and judicial privileges that allowed the Church to develop the independence it later relied upon to withstand the Roman collapse. Members of the clergy were granted substantial tax exemptions, and the Church was allowed to develop its own canon law and hold its own tribunals that effectively meant the Roman state surrendered jurisdiction over members of the clergy. The emperors of the Christian Roman Empire thus ensured the continuity of the nascent Church, and at the end of the Roman era the Latin Church found itself in the unenviable position of being the only institution capable of ameliorating the unsettled society of post-invasion Europe.

The disordered condition of early medieval Europe prevented the popes from exercising any real leadership in the two hundred years following the Roman collapse. Indeed, Leo and Gregory were two anomalies in an otherwise steady decline in papal influence. Most of the fifth and sixth century popes did nothing to advance Pope Leo’s grand vision of papal authority and ecclesiastical leadership. Survival, preservation, and adjustment occupied the intellectual energies of churchmen during this tumultuous period.

Pope Gregory came to the papal throne in the late sixth century at the nadir of papal and Church influence. Gregory was painfully aware of the desperate condition of the Church and the monumental task that stood before him. In a pessimistic letter written shortly after his accession, Gregory compared the Church to an “old and grievously shattered ship,” constantly taking on water and “battered by a daily and violent storm.”

With enemies threatening on all sides, the position of the pope in Italy was precarious at best. The Ostrogoths and their leader Theodoric were defeated during the Gothic War (535-554) and replaced by the Byzantines who, under the direction of Emperor Justinian I (r. 527-565), had sought to reclaim their “authority over the
remaining countries which the ancient Romans possessed...[and were]...lost by subsequent neglect.” Byzantine rule did not last in Italy, its power weakened with the invasion of the Lombards, a particularly barbaric tribe of Germans who invaded northern Italy in 568. The Lombards in Gregory’s day held the whole of Cisalpine Gaul up to the Alpine passes through which Hannibal had trekked some eight hundred years before. They also held Beneventum, Spoletum, and parts of Tuscany in the south. The Byzantines meanwhile retained Ravenna, Istria, Venetia, and Naples in addition to the islands of Sardinia, Corsica, and Sicily. As pope, Gregory maintained possession of the Patrimonium Sancti Petri consisting mainly of lands in the vicinity of Rome, Dalmatia, southern Gaul, and Sicily.

The violence and instability of his surroundings distressed Gregory. He spoke of the terrible “suffering from the swords of the Lombards in the daily plundering and mangling and slaying of our citizens” and complained of the danger he faced and the “confusion of the tribulations which we suffer in this land.” Unlike his ineffectual predecessors, however, Gregory was not one to sit idle. The pope worked through the Christian Lombard Queen Theodelinda to soften the behavior of the Lombards. His efforts eventually paid off. Theodelinda’s son Adaloaldus was baptized a Christian and succeeded his father as king in 616. The Byzantines retained control of North Africa and substantial portions of Italy, but no harmony developed between Rome and Constantinople. The caesaro-papist ideology of the Byzantine emperors meant that both the pope and the Byzantine emperor competed for absolute supremacy in ecclesiastical affairs. Gregory was cordial towards the Byzantine emperor, but in doing so, his aim was not conciliation but placation. The pope was simply buying time while he carried out his important work in Western Europe.

Most of Western Europe had fallen away from the Latin Church. The Visigoths controlled the Iberian Peninsula—what is now Spain and Portugal. They were a primitive tribe that had been among the first to invade Roman territory. They initially subscribed to Arian Christianity, a heretical interpretation of the nature of Christ that orthodox Christians condemned. The Arian heresy had spread virulently throughout the eastern provinces of the Roman Empire before Theodosius’s vigorous persecutions crushed it in 383 and 384. Official persecution, however, came too late to prevent the spread of Arianism beyond the Danube frontier where it contaminated the Goths shortly before their romp through Roman Gaul and Hispania. King Reccared I (r. 586-601) of the Visigoths converted in 587 “from the error of Arian heresy to the firmness of a right faith”—that is, Latin Christianity—shortly before Gregory assumed the Throne of Peter. The conversion of the Visigoths was a cause to celebrate, but it did little for the Latin Church for two reasons. First, the Visigothic kings were singularly inept in the arts of government and administration. The
orthodox Spanish population detested them for this reason and because the kings clung to tribal Arianism for two hundred years after arriving in Spain. The Visigoths, through their incompetence and their alien faith, failed to win the loyalty of the locals. Deprived of support, the Visigothic kingdom eventually succumbed to the Moslem invasion of Iberia in the early eighth century. Second, there is not enough evidence to suggest that Gregory was able to exert any influence over the direction of the Spanish Church or the conduct of the Visigothic kings. Gregory’s letter to Reccared drips of adulation and sermon, and it clearly shows the pontiff’s intent on Christianizing that kingdom and ameliorating the savage behavior of its kings. Gregory also dispatched a letter to a man named Claudius who appears to have been influential in the court of the Gothic king, but the correspondence is vague and refers neither to the good deeds that provoked Gregory’s praise nor to the precise station of Claudius. These two dispatches represent the extent of Gregory’s activism in Spain.

The religious situation in Merovingian France was more optimistic, but even there the condition of the Church was feeble at best. The Salian Franks came into Gaul as pagans, but they converted to Latin Christianity during the reign of Clovis I (r. 481-509). Though Gregory of Tours lauded Clovis as “another Constantine,” the conversion of the Franks ultimately did little to restore papal influence in Gaul. The Franks, like their Germanic cousins elsewhere in Europe, were a primitive and violent people who came to Gaul with unsophisticated legal and political systems and almost no concept of statehood. They possessed a deep-seated hatred for Roman civilization. The political organization of the Germanic tribes at the time of the Roman collapse centered on the war-band, what the medieval historian Norman Cantor called an “irresponsible type of kingship resting . . . upon military prestige.” War chiefs exercised societal leadership by commanding what was essentially an armed gang. Loyalty rested on the leader’s ability to provide opportunities for plunder. Religious conversion could not dilute the primitivism of the Frankish rulers, and the sixth-century Merovingian kings quite literally ran their country into the ground. They did nothing to ameliorate society, and they spent their energies satisfying their base desires and fighting over the throne. The Frankish contempt of Roman institutions meant that they preserved nothing of the Roman administrative structure. As in Spain, the ineptitude of the royal house caused the locals to hate them. Political and economic power began to decentralize in the early sixth century as the Gallo-Roman and Frankish nobility began carving up large, hereditary estates for themselves at the expense of the Merovingian royal family. Preoccupied with their infighting, the ruling house did nothing to stop this process.

The bishops of Gaul initially placed a tremendous amount of faith in their alliance with the Merovingian royal house. They thought it possible to resurrect that happy congruence of secular and ecclesiastical authority that had proved so
beneficial to the Church during the last century of Roman rule. Frankish barbarism precluded such a union, and the Gallic churchmen soon turned away from the Merovingian kings in disgust. Their disappointment is reflected in the unmistakable narrowing of vision among the higher clergy. Deprived of a conscientious secular authority that could bring about a Christian society, the French bishops resigned themselves to building up their own private estates in the manner of the secular Frankish nobility. The bishop and historian Gregory of Tours’s *History of the Franks* is representative of the disillusionment and pessimism of the late sixth century French bishops. The work is peppered with disgust at the destructive behavior of the Merovingian kings and the generally savage conditions that prevailed.

The situation in Spain, Gaul, and Italy imparted a dreary backdrop to Pope Gregory’s chosen task of establishing papal authority throughout Western Europe. The pope’s leaky ship was in need of repair, and he chose Britain as a starting point. The situation in Britain had been perhaps bleakest of all. Christianity had arrived in Britain some two centuries before the Roman collapse, but the coming of the Anglo-Saxons in the mid-fifth century dealt a serious blow to the faith. The Angles, Jutes, and Saxons who arrived in Britain were almost entirely untouched by Roman civilization, and like the other Germanic tribes who came across the frontier, their socio-political and legal systems were rudimentary at best. They were ruled by a warrior chieftain whose hold on power depended upon the size of his army and his abilities as a warrior. No aristocracy or nobility existed to speak of; most people belonged to a large class of free peasant farmers. The Anglo-Saxons were illiterate, and they harbored a special hatred of urban life. They held few qualms over burning libraries, levelling what remained of the Roman cities, and enslaving the Romano-Celtic inhabitants. “Peace,” according to Tacitus, “is repulsive to the race.” The late British historian Jasper Ridley agreed, calling them “the most destructive immigrants who have ever come to Britain.” The native Britons were poor fighters, and their inability to unite amongst themselves meant that they could not match the aggression of the Germanic invaders. The regions that now approximate Scotland, Wales, and Cornwall were all that remained of British territory by the end of the sixth century. Elmet, Rheged, Gododdin, and several other smaller British kingdoms to the west and north of Northumbria fared better than their southern counterparts, but they soon lost their independence to Anglo-Saxon expansionism throughout the seventh century.

The process of conquest spurred changes in Anglo-Saxon society. A more stable form of semi-hereditary kingship developed in which a male of the royal line succeeded the king. An armed retinue of warrior nobles drawn from prominent families attended the king. By the time Gregory’s missionaries arrived in 597,
Britain south of the River Tyne was a pagan land comprised of more than a dozen independent kingdoms, each governed by its own royal house. The overriding objective of these kingdoms from their formation beginning in the mid-fifth century was to acquire and maintain power at the expense of their neighbors. The result was a period of unabated internecine warfare five centuries long. Nothing, not even the arrival of Christianity, could temper Anglo-Saxon destructiveness.

The British Isles were not devoid of Christianity when Gregory’s mission arrived in Kent under the leadership of his chosen emissary, the Benedictine monk Augustine. It persisted in Ireland, an island so wild that the Romans had never tried to conquer it, yet it became the great preserver of the Christian tradition in the British Isles. Irish monks meticulously copied and preserved great libraries of classical works in their dimly lit monasteries. From these bases at the edge of the world, the sixth-century Irish monks set about converting the Scots, Picts, and English who resided in the wild territories of northern Britain.

Christianity had first come to Ireland in the fifth century through Patricius, a Roman Briton known today as Saint Patrick, the Apostle of Ireland. Abducted at the age of sixteen by Irish raiders, Patrick spent six miserable years as the slave of a pagan Irish chieftain. The traumatic experience of incessant hunger and exposure had a profound effect on him. Like many in such desperate circumstances, he turned to God and developed an intense spirituality and sense of mission. Patrick escaped and eventually found his way back to Britain, but he could not sit still knowing that the Irish remained pagans. He returned and worked tirelessly to convert his former captors until most Irish were Christians by the time of his death around the middle of the fifth century.

From the beginning, the rough nature of Ireland’s apostle set Irish Christianity on an independent course. Patrick spent his entire life at the periphery of civilization and, unlike his counterparts elsewhere in the Romanized world, he was not a scholar. His education was cut short by his abduction, a fact revealed in his simplistic use of Latin rife with grammatical errors. Patrick’s isolated upbringing, coupled with his deficient classical education, ensured the Christianity he brought to the Irish was unencumbered by the legacy of the Greco-Roman world.

Ireland was an illiterate country devoid of urbanization when Patrick arrived, a veritable tabula rasa. While the early Church had emerged within the Roman state and was shaped by it, the reverse held in Ireland. Unlike elsewhere in the Roman world, there was no preexisting infrastructure in Ireland—either political or physical—for Christianity to graft itself upon when it arrived in the fifth century. Therefore, Christianity helped to shape Irish civilization to a much greater extent than in the rest of the former Roman Empire. As the first monks formed monastic communities dedicated to learning and the preservation of classical texts, their religious houses drew thousands of students and converts hoping to benefit from
what the monks had to offer. Unsurprisingly, the nuclei of Ireland’s first urban centers sprang from the monastic repositories of classical learning and holy Wisdom.

Ireland’s isolation shielded it from the tumult unfolding in Britain and gave its Christianity time to crystallize. From their sanctuary at the fringe of civilization, Irish monks spread further afield into Scotland, northern Britain, and continental Europe. Some one hundred years after Patrick’s death, Irish missionaries under the leadership of the unstoppable monk Columba (521-597) arrived in Pictland (Scotland) and succeeded in converting both the Scots and the northern Picts. Columba founded the religious community on the island of Iona in 564, a place that soon became an important center of learning and piety. Columba, along with his intrepid brothers from Iona, then went on to found dozens of monasteries throughout Scotland. Iona became an important base for new missions into Pictland and northern England, and it became a nexus of Celtic Christianity for the next two centuries. Irish monks from Iona were also active in the powerful Northumbrian kingdom in the early seventh century. Among them was Aidan, an Irish monk known as the Apostle of Northumbria for his spectacular success there under the patronage of the Bernician king Oswald (604-641). Significantly, Aidan, an Irishman, was Northumbria’s first bishop. He established his see on the island of Lindisfarne, a place that would later play an important role in ecclesiastical history.

The intellectual and missionary work of the Irish monks would have ordinarily been encouraging for Gregory. However, Celtic Christianity—sometimes called Insular Christianity—differed in a number of ways from the Latin Christianity of the Roman Church. These differences were largely superficial, for both Latin and Celtic Christians agreed on all the major theological points. Still, the peculiar habits of the Insular Christians troubled orthodox adherents of the Roman Church. The ecclesiastical organization of the Celtic Church was unique in that the monastery and not the cathedral dominated the ecclesiastical landscape, and abbots, not bishops, exercised authority. Indeed, there were no dioceses and diocesan clergy at all. Bishops had been sources of stability and leadership since the Roman era, and for many Latin churchmen a hierarchy without bishops was both untenable and unholy. The nature of Insular monasticism was unique as well, based on the loose cenobitic type more commonly found in the eastern Mediterranean in which the abbot enjoyed only a loose control over the individual brothers. Insular monks were also known for their singular knowledge of Greek and their possession of a number of important Greek texts, most of which could not be found anywhere else in early medieval Europe. The two most important points of divergence, judging from their frequent mentions in the Historia Ecclesiastica Gentis Anglorum (Ecclesiastical History of the English People) written in the eighth century by the Northumbrian monk Bede (c. 672-735), were the shape of the tonsure...
and the reckoning of the date of Easter. Celtic churchmen looked different from their Latin counterparts, and this reinforced their “otherness” in the eyes of the Roman churchmen who took issue with it ostensibly because of its association with the biblical heretic Simon Magus. The more important dispute was the different calculation for the date of Easter. Despite incessant appeals from Roman churchmen, Insular Christians persisted in their Celtic interpretation of Easter for over a century after Latin Christianity took hold in Kent.

If the unorthodox practices of Insular Christians were not enough to concern Gregory, the swaggering behavior of the missionary Columbanus (543-615) certainly was. Columbanus was a rough Irish monk with a profound sense of duty much like Saint Columba before him. Columbanus became Irish Christianity’s continental representative, making it his mission to proselytize to the pagans of Europe. His chosen theatre was Gaul, to which he went around 590 to establish as many monastic communities as he could. Columbanus was very successful; his monasteries in Gaul and Lombardy attracted many new adherents to the faith. Soon, however, the Latin bishops of Gaul took issue with his activities within their jurisdiction. The Gallic bishops were a proud and petty lot, much more interested in building up their worldly estates than spreading the Gospel. These men never left the comfort of their dioceses, unwilling to subject themselves to worldly hardships for the sake of preaching to the Frankish masses. The bishops summoned Columbanus to a synod, presumably to assert their authority over him and to correct his erroneous interpretation of Easter, but Columbanus had no intention of appearing before them. Instead, he sent a defiant letter in which he castigated the bishops for their myopic worldliness and lectured them in the virtues of pious humility and clerical poverty.

Intending to plead the case for the Celtic date of Easter, Columbanus wrote to Pope Gregory around the time of his quarrel with the Gallic bishops. His letter was couched in respectful pleasantry, but it clearly revealed that Columbanus had no intention of submitting to the Pope’s authority. He addressed Gregory not as the supreme head of Christendom but as a colleague, urging him to accept the Insular interpretation of Easter. Further, Columbanus prodded the pope to correct the erroneous interpretations of his predecessors and poked fun at Pope Leo’s name in the process. “Better by far is a living dog,” wrote Columbanus, “in this problem than a dead lion.” Gregory’s response is not extant. The pope may have opted for pontifical silence in the face of such insolence, or his reply may have been lost in transit. The source of Columbanus’s boldness is also difficult to ascertain. Perhaps it was, as scholar Thomas Cahill asserted, a consequence of his “Irishness,” his innate playfulness, and honesty. More likely, however, the secular behavior of the Gallic bishops disgusted Columbanus. In any event, Columbanus’s rebellious tone could have only heightened Gregory’s fear of losing control of Britain to the Irish monks.
who were spreading in all directions from their monasteries in Scotland.

His alarm over an impending rift between the two churches aside, Gregory may have been genuinely concerned for the souls of the pagan English. This hypothesis is derived from the well-known tale in Bede’s *Historia* of Gregory’s encounter with some Deiran slave children. According to Bede,

> He inquired whether those islanders were Christians, or still involved in the errors of paganism, and was informed that they were pagans. Then fetching a deep sigh from the bottom of his heart, “Alas! what pity,” said he, “that the author of darkness should own men of such fair countenances; and that with such grace of outward form, their minds should be void of inward grace.” He therefore again asked, what was the name of that nation? and was answered, that they were called Angles. “Right,” said he, “for they have an angelic face, and it is meet that such should be co-heirs with the Angels in heaven.”

The episode, which had occurred before Gregory attained the Throne of Peter, made the pontiff aware of English paganism, and spurred his resolve to bring Christianity to Britain. Evidence suggests that Gregory never forgot those English children he met at the Roman marketplace. In 595, after he became pope, Gregory directed his agent Candidus to use some of the proceeds of the papal estates in Gaul to purchase English slaves there so they could be sent to a monastery for their salvation.

Whether motivated by genuine compassion, power, or both, Gregory understood that he needed to act quickly lest the Irish monks succeed at converting the Anglo-Saxons to their unorthodox version of Christianity. Between the Roman and Irish monks sat pagan England, a prize waiting for whoever could get to the pagan kings first. One of Gregory’s few flaws was his small-minded perspective towards the Celtic monks. Like his contemporaries, he perceived them as rivals instead of allies and the conversion of England as a contest between Rome and Iona. A race for the souls of the English began as soon as Augustine landed in Kent.

Gregory took decisive action, marshaling all the resources at his disposal to ensure the success of his missionaries. He dispatched Augustine together with a small band of forty Benedictine monks in 596 to that “barbarous, fierce, and unbelieving nation” of Kent in southeast Britain. The pope’s many letters to Augustine and others reveal that he was personally invested in the direction of the mission and its outcome. Gregory sent letters urging the bishops and nobility of Gaul, the territory through which Augustine and his brethren needed to travel on their way to Kent, urging them to grant the monks safe passage and whatever...
assistance they could give. Gregory’s entreaties paid off; the Frankish king and clergy welcomed the mission. The Benedictine monks landed on the Isle of Thanet in the following year and immediately made contact with the Kentish ruler Ethelbert. The king ordered them to remain where they were and supplied them with necessities while he decided what to do with them. Ethelbert soon visited, and Augustine seized the opportunity to preach the “word of life” to him. The king was swayed but did not convert immediately. He did, however, give the monks permission to evangelize in his kingdom and allowed them to settle in Canterbury, the main town in Kent. The monks began practicing their simple way of life according to the Rule of Benedict, attracting numerous converts. King Ethelbert was baptized soon after, prompting the Kentish nobility and a large proportion of the population to convert as well. Bede mentioned that the king did not compel his subjects to convert but that they did so out of their own free will. In a jubilant letter dated 597 to Eulogius, the Bishop of Alexandria, Gregory informed him of the conversion of ten thousand English. Gregory made Augustine “archbishop of the English nation” in that same year.

Interestingly, the pagan authorities of Kent received Gregory’s missionaries better than the British churchmen did. Augustine’s early interactions with Celtic churchmen established in southern Britain reinforced Gregory’s suspicions of an inevitable schism. The initial meeting between the Latin monks and the Celtic churchmen was unproductive and peppered with animosity. The Insular monks proved uncooperative and unwilling to preserve “the unity of the church,” according to Bede. They “preferred their own traditions” and “could not depart from their ancient customs,” namely, the Celtic date of Easter. Moreover, Augustine’s inflated perception of his own importance as the representative of the one universal Church caused him to be tactless and arrogant. He failed to rise from his seat at the Celts’ approach, angering them and convincing them that one so pompous could not possibly be the bearer of God’s truth. Failing to reason with them, Augustine subsequently threatened them with divine vengeance, which, predictably, had little effect.

The rivalry between the Insular and Roman Churches is prominently displayed in Bede’s Historia Ecclesiastica. Bede was an Englishman who spent his entire life working in the Northumbrian monastery at Jarrow, a Latin religious house. To a degree, the purpose of his Historia was to highlight God’s workings in the world, and in this way it conformed to the eschatological and linear concept of history prevalent in Christianity since apostolic times. Significantly, however, Bede sought to emphasize the victory of Latin Christianity in Britain and the achievements of Anglo-Saxon Church unity under the leadership of Canterbury—the first and most important Latin Church in Britain. This bias affected his treatment of events. For
example, he downplayed the interactions between the Northumbrian and Celtic kingdoms and overstated Northumbrian interactions with the English kingdoms to the south. He also discounted the contributions of the Irish monks in the conversion of England.

Bede’s coverage of the early seventh-century conflict between the Anglo-Saxon kings Penda of Mercia and Edwin of Deira is a case in point. Edwin converted to Latin Christianity in 627, and his baptism by the Roman monk Paulinus prompted mass conversions of the Northumbrian people. Penda, the pagan king of the aggressive Mercian kingdom in central England, entered into an alliance of convenience with the Welsh prince Cadwallon of Gwynedd, a Celtic Christian. Together, the two defeated and killed Edwin, then proceeded to massacre the newly-baptized inhabitants of Northumbria. Predictably, this inaugurated a period of apostasy as converts renounced their new faith to avoid persecution. Though both Penda and Cadwallon shared guilt for their atrocities, Bede’s ireful pen lashed Cadwallon the hardest:

[O]ne of the chiefs, by whom it was carried on, was a pagan, and the other a barbarian, more cruel than a pagan; for Penda, with all the nation of the Mercians, was an idolater, and a stranger to the name of Christ; but Caedwalla, though he professed and called himself a Christian, was so barbarous in his disposition and manner of living.

Cadwallon—that “unrighteous instrument of rightful vengeance,” as Bede called him—was cast as the ultimate villain, a Christian who had betrayed his brothers in Christ by siding with the pagan warlord Penda. The fact that Cadwallon was a Celtic Christian only served Bede’s purpose in casting Celtic Christianity as inferior to Latin Christianity.

Bede’s hostility to Celtic Christianity is also displayed in his coverage of the earlier slaughter of British monks at Chester in 616. Ethelfrith, the Bernician king of Northumbria, embarked on a punitive expedition to Wales to enforce his overlordship there. When he arrived at Chester, he found approximately two thousand Celtic monks from the monastery at Bangor gathered in prayer against him. They chanted prayers and sang psalms for the victory of the Welsh. Ethelfrith slaughtered almost twelve hundred of them along with the entire Welsh army. Bede’s mention of this failure of Christian prayer highlights that the monks were Celtic rather than Latin Christians. Their death at the hands of a pagan lord was punishment for their earlier failure to submit to the direction of Augustine and the Roman Church. Bede also addressed the animosity between the Celtic and Latin
churchmen directly, noting that even in his own day, some 130 years after the arrival of Roman Christianity, it was “the custom of the Britons to despise the faith and religion of the English, and to have no part with them in anything any more than with pagans.”

Gregory continued to communicate with his missionaries long after their arrival in Kent. Through frequent correspondences, he directed their efforts, provided encouragement, and answered questions. Gregory sent a shipment of supplies to Augustine in 601 consisting of “vessels and altar-cloths . . . church furniture, and vestments for the bishops and clerks.” He also sent instructions for the episcopal organization of Britain. Telling of his great insight, moderation, and practical wisdom, Gregory directed Augustine to be flexible in administering his see. Gregory understood that the English church was in its infancy and that strict adherence to the minutia of orthodoxy might be counterproductive. Gregory’s sensibility and practicality was also on display in his softening of the harsh Augustinian (of Hippo) stance on the nature of free will and salvation. The early Christian theologian and philosopher St. Augustine (354-430) taught that salvation was a consequence of divine grace and that humans could do nothing to earn that grace. This stance would have severely hindered the early medieval church’s effort to convert the pagan masses: if good works did nothing to assure salvation, people would have no incentive to act in accordance with God’s will. The ultimate evangelist, Gregory, took a much more moderate approach. He posited that individuals did not need to worry about salvation as long as they received the sacraments and lived according to the moral teachings of the Church. This was in violation of St. Augustine of Hippo’s position but necessary if the Church was to be successful at converting the Germanic masses.

The conversion of Kent was only the beginning. Gregory praised King Ethelbert for his piety, but he also urged him to “make haste to extend the Christian faith among the peoples under thy sway [and] redouble the zeal of thy rectitude in their conversion. . . . make haste to infuse into the kings and peoples subject to you the knowledge of God.” The pope implored the Kentish king to “build up the manners of thy subjects in great purity of life by exhorting, by terrifying, by enticing, by correcting, by shewing examples of well-doing.” Gregory clearly had grand designs for his new Constantine in Britain, and Ethelbert did not disappoint. The Kentish king set about bringing Christianity to those kingdoms over which he enjoyed influence. King Sabert of Essex converted in 604 due to Ethelbert’s intervention. Ethelbert also built and endowed the original St. Paul’s Church in London according to Gregory’s plan. Further, Ethelbert attempted to convert the East Anglian king Raedwald. Though Raedwald refused and died a pagan, he did erect a Christian altar in his kingdom. The kingdoms of Mercia and Wessex were
slower to accept Christianity owing to their independence from Kentish influence. King Penda of Mercia clung stubbornly to paganism, but he later allowed his son and daughter to marry the Christian children of the Bernician royal house for political purposes. Penda’s children turned Mercia into a Christian kingdom after his death in the Battle of the River Winwaed in 654. Christianity took hold slowest in Wessex. A Frankish bishop named Birinus came to Wessex with the sanction of Pope Honorius I to preach there, and he was successful at winning the conversion of the first West Saxon ruler Cynegils in 635. Cynegils’s son and successor Coinwalch refused to convert initially, but he did later due to the influence of King Anna of the East Angles in whose court he spent a period of exile.

The ecclesiastical history of Northumbria (comprised of Bernicia and Deira in the early seventh century) is second in importance only to that of Kent, as the kings of Northumbria ultimately chose to side with the Latin churchmen of Canterbury at the Synod of Whitby in 664. Latin Christianity came to Northumbria through the conversion of Edwin of Deira (r. 616-633). In 604, the pagan king of Bernicia, Ethelfrith, invaded Deira and slew the Deiran king Ethelric, prompting Edwin, Ethelric’s kinsman, to flee for his life. Edwin spent many years in exile among the southern English where he was drawn into the orbit of Latin Christianity. In 625, Edwin married Ethelbert’s daughter, the Christian Kentish princess Ethelburh. Edwin did not immediately convert, but a condition of the marriage contract required Edwin to provide tolerance of Christians within his kingdom. A Roman monk from Canterbury named Paulinus accompanied Ethelburh to Northumbria, ostensibly to serve as her holy advisor. In reality, however, Paulinus dreamed of converting the Northumbrian king and his people. In this effort, Pope Boniface V assisted Paulinus. The pope sent a letter to King Edwin, urging him to accept Christianity without further delay. He also corresponded with Queen Ethelburh, imploring her to persuade her husband to convert. These efforts eventually bore fruit, and Edwin was baptized by Paulinus on Easter in 627.

The conversion of Northumbria was consistent with the typical modus operandi of the Church in its efforts to convert the Germanic rulers of Western Europe. The Church found it easier to convert the queen of a pagan ruler, then recruit her help in converting her husband. The letter Pope Boniface V wrote to Edwin’s queen Ethelburh, reflected this method:

Persist, therefore, illustrious daughter, and to the utmost of your power endeavour to soften the hardness of his heart by carefully making known to him the Divine precepts; pouring into his mind a knowledge of the greatness of that mystery which you have received by faith, and of the marvellous reward which, by the new
birth, you have been made worthy to obtain…Strive, both in season and out of season, that with the co-operating power of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, your husband also may be added to the number of Christians.  

Bertha, the Merovingian Christian queen of Ethelbert, received a similar letter from Pope Gregory in which he urged her to “strengthen by continual hortation the mind of your glorious husband in love of the Christian faith; let your solicitude infuse into him increase of love for God.” The technique is also revealed in Gregory’s letters to the Christian Lombard queen Theodelinda. Paul the Deacon in his *Historia Langobardorum* claimed that the Lombard king Agilulf’s wife persuaded him to accept Christianity. Even the Christian queen Clotilda persuaded her husband, Clovis I, the first Christian king of the Franks, to abandon his paganism. The church leveraged the influence wives had, and continued to have, over their husbands.

As mentioned previously, King Edwin of Diera in Northumbria was later defeated and killed in a conflict with Penda and Cadwallon. This prompted Northumbria to enter a period of apostasy due to abuses the victors inflicted on Christians. Christianity was restored under Oswald (r. 634-642), a son of Ethelfrith of Bernicia who, unlike his father, was a devout Christian. Bede called Oswald “the most Christian king” for his role in reintroducing Christianity to the Northumbrian kingdom and establishing the important religious center at Lindisfarne. Oswald differed from his predecessor in two ways. Coming from the Bernician royal house, he was heavily exposed to Insular Christianity. While Edwin had fled south, Oswald and his brother Oswiu fled to Ireland and Scotland where they were introduced to Celtic Christianity. Oswiu (r. 642-670) succeeded his brother after Penda killed the latter in 642. Oswiu made the monumental decision to orient his kingdom towards Latin Christianity at the Synod of Whitby in 664. Oswiu called on the conference to settle, once and for all, the dispute between the Celtic and Latin Churches over the dating of Easter. The Northumbrian bishop Colman argued for the Insular side while Wilfrid, a Northumbrian priest educated in Rome, spoke for the Latin side. After hearing the arguments, Oswiu asked Colman whether it was true that God had given Peter the keys to heaven. Colman could not deny the verse in Matthew 16:18—the foundation of the Petrine doctrine which Pope Leo had forcefully posited some two centuries before. Oswiu ruled in favor of the Latin Church with the following reasoning:

I also say unto you, that he is the door-keeper, and I will not gainsay him, but I desire, as far as I know and am able, in all
things to obey his laws, lest haply when I come to the gates of the kingdom of Heaven, there should be none to open them, he being my adversary who is proved to have the keys. 97

Oswiu’s decision to favor Canterbury over Iona is interesting as most of the evidence suggests he favored Insular Christianity. Oswiu had deep ties with the Scots and was fluent in Gaelic. He was baptized by a Celtic churchman, and he was “instructed according to the doctrine of the Scots.”98 Evidence also suggests he spent some of his exile in Ireland as well.99 A Scottish bishop sat at Lindisfarne at the time of the synod, and Northumbria was geographically closer to the Celtic regions of the north than to the Latin regions of the south. The Northumbrians enjoyed an above-average level of cultural, political, and social interaction with the Celtic populations on their western and northern borders.100 Evidence demonstrates, for example, a diffusion of architectural forms between the Celts and the Northumbrians as well as similarities between the organization of Welsh and Northumbrian estates.101 Oswiu’s sister-in-law was a Pictish princess, and Oswiu himself took a British princess for one of his brides.102 Moreover, ties between Northumbria and its Celtic neighbors ran deeper than the royal level. Native Britons integrated into Northumbrian society through their membership in several Northumbrian religious houses, and a large segment of the total Northumbrian population was of Celtic provenance.103

Political considerations may have affected Oswiu’s decision more than any other factor. He was astute enough to see that the future rested with Latin Christianity and the pope in Rome, although the influence of his Latin Christian wife Eanflaed and the fresh memories of Cadwallon’s atrocities could not have helped Bishop Colman’s arguments at Whitby. The Synod marked the beginning of the end for Celtic Christianity in Britain. Thereafter, the Latin churchmen worked steadily to eradicate the unique practices of Insular Christianity from religious life.

Pope Gregory’s mission to Kent turned out to be a resounding success. Latin Christianity was everywhere victorious less than a century and a half after Augustine and his fellow monks landed on the Isle of Thanet. The final bastion of paganism fell when the South Saxons converted in 681.104 In 716, a Northumbrian priest named Egbert persuaded the monks of Iona to adopt the Roman date of Easter and the Roman style of tonsure.105 The transition from paganism to Christianity was not an uninterrupted process. Most of the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms went through periods of apostasy depending on the current disposition of their rulers. However, Anglo-Saxon England, and indeed Britain as a whole, marched steadily towards the Roman Church after the conversion of Kent.
Notes


15. Cantor, The Civilization of the Middle Ages, 94.

16. Ibid., 114-115.

17. Ibid., 116.

18. Gregory of Tours, History of the Franks, 105-6.

19. Gildas claimed that Christianity came in the first century during the reign of the Roman Emperor Tiberius, while Bede assigned the coming of Christianity to the second century. Bede claimed that the inhabitants of Britain preserved the Christian faith continuously until the persecutions of Diocletian. Dorothy Watts, whose Religion in Late Roman Britain was heavily informed by archaeological research, contends that Christianity was established in the second or early third century. The precise date of Christianity’s arrival may be impossible to determine with absolute precision, but the presence of Christianity in Gaul by the second century meant that it was only a matter of time before the underground religion was smuggled over to Britain. Gildas, “De Excidio Et Conquestu Britanniae,” in Six Old English Chronicles, 8; Bede, Historia Ecclesiastica Gentis Anglorum [Ecclesiastical History of the English People], trans. John Allen Giles (London, GBR: Henry G. Bohn, 1859), 10; Dorothy Watts, Religion in Late Roman Britain: Forces of Change (London, GBR: Routledge, 2002), 2, 12-13.


23. Tacitus’s account was probably colored by the traditional Roman contempt of the “wild other” across the frontiers, but it is the most contemporary one available. His insights into Germanic society are particularly valuable. The Germans, according to Tacitus, regarded it a “dull and stupid thing to painfully accumulate by sweat of the brow what might be won by a little blood.” Given the emphasis which the Romans placed on the virtues of honest agriculture, it is easy to see why they detested the Germans as hopeless savages. Tacitus, “Germania,” in Tacitus: The Agricola and Germania, 67-8.


25. Both Gildas and Bede levelled harsh criticisms against the Britons of the early-fifth century. Gildas scolded the Britons for being “neither brave in war nor in peace faithful,” and Bede noted that the “cowardice of the Britons” only encouraged further Anglo-Saxon invasions. Gildas, “De Excidio Et Conquestu Britanniae,” in Six Old English Chronicles, 6; Bede, Historia Ecclesiastica Gentis Anglorum, 1.15.


27. This date is derived from Bede, Historia Ecclesiastica Gentis Anglorum, 1.25.

28. An overall trend of political consolidation prevailed throughout the Anglo-Saxon period as smaller states were accreted into the orbit of larger ones, and by the early ninth century there stood only four large kingdoms: Wessex, Mercia, Northumbria, and East Anglia. The decentralized political structure

29. More moderate interpretations of the Anglo-Saxon invasion have been floated in recent years. Barbara Yorke downplays the impact of the Anglo-Saxon invasions on the economy and society of Roman Britain, contending that the physical, social, and religious deterioration of the island was already well underway before the Anglo-Saxons arrived. She blames the simplification of Romano-British society in the years leading up to the Roman collapse on the complex problems of the declining Roman Empire. Yorke, *Kings and Kingdoms*, 1-9. Similarly, Dorothy Watts claimed that Christianity failed to become fully established in Britain owing to a resurgence of Celtic paganism, the pre-Roman religion of the island, after the apostasy of the Emperor Julian. She contends that British resistance to Romanization throughout the centuries of occupation reinforced this development. If this is true, the impact of the Anglo-Saxon invasion on Christianity may not have been as dramatic as it is often portrayed to be. Watts, *Religion in Late Roman Britain*, 24-95.


32. On this Patrick wrote, “I prayed frequently during the day; love of God and the fear of Him increased more and more, and faith became stronger. . . . In one day I said about a hundred prayers, and in the night nearly the same.” Saint Patrick, “Confessio,” in *The Writings of St. Patrick*, 53.


36. The Scots themselves were Irish immigrants who had come to south-west Pictland in Patrick’s time. Bede, *Historia Ecclesiastica Gentis Anglorum*, 3.4.

37. The Ionan monks had established no less than sixty monastic communities in Columba’s name by the time of his death in the late-sixth century. Bede, *Historia Ecclesiastica Gentis Anglorum*, 3.4; Cahill, *How the Irish Saved Civilization*, 184-5.


39. Ibid., 3.3, 3.5.

40. Ibid.

41. It is telling that Bede, a fierce partisan of Latin Christianity, lavished praise on the Irish churchmen for their “continence, love of God, and observance of monastic rules” and their “piety and chastity” in spite of the fact that they “employed doubtful cycles in fixing the time of the great festival [of Easter].” He excuses their unorthodoxy, asserting that their remoteness prevented anyone from bringing them the “synodal decrees for the observance of Easter.” Bede, *Historia Ecclesiastica Gentis Anglorum*, 3.4.

42. Ibid., 3.4.

43. Cantor, *The Civilization of the Middle Ages*, 163. The conspicuous absence of dioceses reflects the isolated development of Irish Christianity. Dioceses initially followed the provincial outlines
of the Roman Empire, but Rome had never exercised control in Ireland. Therefore, the Irish Church had no territorial framework to use as a model. William E. Dunstan, *Ancient Rome* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2010), 483.


45. The Eastern Greek elements within Irish Christianity came from the throngs of Christian immigrants who escaped to Ireland in the wake of the Germanic invasions. Ireland experienced an influx of fleeing ascetics, monks, and other holy men after Patrick’s time, and many of these came from the Roman provinces in the Near East. Cahill, *How the Irish Saved Civilization*, 180; Cantor, *The Civilization of the Middle Ages*, 145-9, 162.


47. Ibid., 3.4, 3.3, 2.4, 2.19, 3.25, 5.21-22.

48. For an example of such an appeal, see Bede, *Historia Ecclesiastica Gentis Anglorum*, 2.19.


58. Ibid.

59. Ibid.
60. Ibid., 1.26.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
64. Bede, *Historia Ecclesiastica Gentis Anglorum*, 1.27.
65. Ibid., 2.2.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
70. Cantor, *The Civilization of the Middle Ages*, 162.
72. Ibid., 3.1.
73. Ibid., 2.20.
74. Ibid., 3.1.
75. Ibid., 2.2.
76. Ibid., 2.20.
77. Ibid., 1.29.
82. Ibid., 3.24.
83. Ibid., 3.7.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid., 2.9.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid., 2.10-11.
88. Ibid., 2.14.
89. Ibid., 2.11.


95. Ibid., 3.1.
96. Ibid., 3.25.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid., 3.25, 3.1.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid., 85.
103. Ibid., 86.
105. Bede, *Historia Ecclesiastica Gentis Anglorum*, 5.22, 3.4. The Scots and the Picts were persuaded to adopt the Roman custom of tonsure and Easter earlier in the eighth century. See Bede, *Historia Ecclesiastica Gentis Anglorum*, 5.15, 5.21. The British Christians of Wales and Cornwall still refused to abandon their Celtic practices as of Bede’s final entry in 731, but Bede dismissed these nations as politically weak and rapidly losing their independence to their English neighbors to the east. Bede, *Historia Ecclesiastica Gentis Anglorum*, 5.23.

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Charles Martel Turns South: The Hammer’s Campaigns in Southern France 733-737

Patrick S. Baker

Introduction

In 732, Charles Martel defeated the Muslim Moors at the Battle of Tours and stopped the Islamic advance into Western Europe. The victory won him the cognomen Martel or “hammer” for the way he pounded his enemies. In addition to this title, his peers recognized him as the Mayor of the Palace and Prince of the Franks. With the Islamic advance halted, Charles Martel turned his strategic efforts to securing the city of Narbonne and the rest of modern-day southern France. From 720 to 732, he had campaigned extensively throughout what is today northern France, Germany, and the Benelux countries. After 732 until his death in 741, Charles Martel campaigned, almost exclusively, in Aquitaine, southern Burgundy around Lyon, the Rhone Valley to the Mediterranean Sea, and in Septimania, modern-day Languedoc.¹

Before 732, Charles Martel’s primary interest was in establishing himself as the principal leader of the three Frankish kingdoms of Austrasia, Neustria, and Burgundy. After 732, he shifted his strategic focus southward. Charles Martel’s southern strategy was the result of a Moorish-controlled Narbonne. From there they threatened Frankish interests in the Rhone Valley, southern Burgundy, and Aquitaine. To secure his realm, Charles Martel had to eliminate the Moors from what is today southern France.²

Historiography

The primary sources regarding Martel’s move south are a collection of medieval chronicles, histories, and annals primarily written in Latin. For the most part, these works are anonymous. The most important are The Fourth Book of the Chronicle of Fredegar with its Continuations, likely completed in 768, the Annales Mettenses Piores (The Earlier Annals of Metz) compiled about 805, Paul the Deacon’s History of the Lombards completed in the late Eighth Century, the Liber Historiae Francorum (The Book of the History of the Franks) completed in 727, the Chronicon Moissiacense (The Chronicle of Moissac) composed sometime in the
ninth century, and *The Royal Frankish Annals*, likely edited into a final form in the mid-800s. All these works, written some years after the events, used earlier written sources and oral traditions. The *Monumenta Germaniae Historica* (Monument to German History) is a collection of early medieval texts edited and published in a massive set of over ninety volumes.³

For information regarding the Moors, *The Chronicle of 754*, sometimes referred to as the *Mozarabic Chronicle of 754*, is a singularly important source. A Christian, possibly a churchman, composed the Latin *Chronicle of 754* in Moslem Spain. This chronicle, translated and edited by Kenneth Baxter Wolf in 1990, gives a great deal of information about Spain under the Moors and their conflict with the Franks. Other valuable information is contained in Arab sources that are available in either French or English translations. Muhammad Al-Makkari’s *The History of the Mohammedan Dynasties in Spain in 2 Volumes*, completed sometime before the author’s death in 1632, is a compilation of earlier written material, much of which is now lost. This work was translated into English by Pascual de Gayangos in 1840 (Volume 1) and 1843 (Volume 2). Making use of now lost sources, ‘Izz al-Dīn Ibn Al-Athir completed *The Prefect History* in the 1220s. E. Fagnan extracted, edited, and translated into French the sections regarding North Africa and Spain as *Annales du Maghreb et de l’Espagne*, published in 1901. Ibn Al-Qutiya’s *Early Islamic Spain: the History of Ibn al- Qutiya* completed between 961 and 977 records much of the oral tradition about the Moors’ early years in Spain. David James translated the work into English in 2009.⁴

Their brevity often mars the value of the above sources. Oftentimes, a few short lines cover the events of entire years. Furthermore, the “facts” presented in the chronicles cannot always be taken at face value. For example, in his *History of the Lombards*, Paul the Deacon reports that Charles Martel and Eudo, Duke of Aquitaine, fought together at the Battle of Toulouse and killed over 300,000 Moors. Paul confuses the 721 Battle of Toulouse with the 732 Battle of Tours. In addition, the number of Moors reported killed is at least an order of magnitude larger than the greatest possible number of the entire Moorish army involved in the battle.⁵

Many of the Latin primary sources, specifically the *Fourth Book of the Chronicle of Fredegar with its Continuations*, the *Annales Mettenses Priores*, the *Liber Historiae Francorum* and *The Royal Frankish Annals* are unabashedly pro-Frank and pro-Carolingian and are nearly hagiographic in their praise of Charles Martel and his descendants. Christian and Muslim sources are also biased. Ibn Al-Athir’s, Al-Qutiya’s and Al-Makkari’s works are all pro-Muslim. Clearly, none of these sources contains objective writing. Therefore, critical reading is necessary.⁶

Many secondary works explore the military organization, strategy, tactics, weapons, and motivations of the two sides as they battled for control of what is now
southeastern France. For discussions of the Frankish military and political organization Bernard S. Bachrach’s *Merovingian Military Organization*, 481-751 (1972) and *Early Carolingian Warfare: Prelude to Empire* (2001) are invaluable. Also, Paul Fouracre’s *The Age of Charles Martel* (2000) is extremely useful for information on the Frankish realm and Charles Martel. Important secondary sources about Muslims such as *The Arab Conquest of Spain*, 710-797 (1989) by Roger Collins and Hugh Kennedy’s *The Armies of the Caliphs: Military and Society in the Early Islamic State* (2001) are equally valuable for information on the caliphates’ military organization and the internal politics of *al-Andalus*.

**The Theater of War**

**Franks in Francia**

The year 732 marked three hundred years of established Frankish kingdoms in Gaul. The Franks first entered Gaul as Roman auxiliaries and fought the Huns at Chalon in 451. Since then, under the Merovingian kings, the Franks had, at one time or the other, either directly ruled or had formed allied or client relationships with regions from Bavaria to Gascony. However, outside the central kingdoms of Austrasia, Neustria, and Burgundy this control oscillated between direct rule and no control at all.  

This period was known as the time of the *rois faineants* or “Do Nothing” kings. Power centered on the *Maior Domaus*, or Mayor of the Palace. The kings remained in their position as figureheads. Though a selection process existed amongst the nobles, the death of the Mayor of the Palace often produced power struggles. Bloodlines did not guarantee the office. As a result, assassinations, a coup, or outright war decided the matter.

Charles Martel was the third son of Pippin the Middle, the Austrasian Mayor of the Palace. In 715, Charles’s stepmother imprisoned him to prevent him from inheriting his father’s position and passed favor onto his infant nephews. However, Charles Martel managed to escape. With the Austrasian Carolingian clan defeated and the family treasure handed over the rival Neustrians, Charles Martel organized a counterstroke against the Neustrians at Ambleve near Malmedy. He ambushed and inflicted a serious defeat on them just one year after escaping his confinement.

Charles Martel went on to defeat his Neustrian rival, Ragamfred, again in 717 at Vichy. In 718, Charles Martel chased an army of Aquitainians, allied to Ragamfred, back over the River Loire. Later that same year he marched east of the River Rhine and defeated the rebellious Saxons. By 724, Charles Martel was the
master of Francia. He began to reassert control over regions that had slipped loose from the regnum Francorum (Kingdom of the Franks) during the preceding years.\textsuperscript{10}

Despite the chaotic conditions, the Frankish homeland was surprisingly secure, stable, and expansive when compared to other successor states of the old Western Roman Empire. The reason for this is rooted in “the Frankish System” of rule. Even on the periphery of the realm, Frankish rulers operated through local power structures when they could, and sought consensus among the powerful magnates for important decisions. The rulers called meetings of these powerful men, sometimes at the start of the campaign season as a military muster, but also at other times to discuss issues important to the realm. Consensus was an important aspect of the Frankish political system. Failure to engage in dialogue often disrupted the system.\textsuperscript{11}

Moors in al-Andalus

The Muslims, or Moors, as they were known to the Franks, were newcomers to the continent. In fact they were a new force in the world. Motivated by a new religion, Islam, the small, fierce Arab tribes had emerged from the desert and through conversion and conquest had, by 711, ruled half the known world. In the west, the Muslims stood on the south shore of the Straits of Gibraltar and looked north at the Visigoth kingdom of Hispania, modern day Spain and Portugal. Meanwhile, in the east they were fast approaching the gates of Constantinople.\textsuperscript{12}

The Umayyad Caliphate was under a political and religious mandate to take new lands and Hispania was the next logical step of expansion after the conquest of the Berbers of North Africa. However, there is a myth about the Muslim invasion of Hispania. The tale involves the daughter of a powerful Visigoth noble raped by Roderic, the last Visigoth King of Hispania, and in revenge for the crime, the girl’s father invited the Muslims into Spain.\textsuperscript{13}

Either way, the conquest of Hispania was swift. Before the main invasion, the Muslims in North Africa scouted, raided, and pillaged the southern coast of Spain. In 711, Tariq ibn Ziyad arrived in Hispania with a force of about seven thousand men for the Battle of Guadalete, the only large battle fought between the Muslim invaders and the Visigoth army. The Moors almost completely annihilated the Visigoths. A few Visigoth survivors fled. A civil war and a conspiracy within Roderick’s government weakened the Visigoths’ resistance to the Moors. Rivals for the Visigoth throne ultimately betrayed the king.\textsuperscript{14}

An additional force of twelve thousand men led by Musa ibn Nusayr joined Tariq for clean-up operations. Thereafter, large-scale resistance ended. However, some cities continued to resist. Musa besieged, looted, and burned those cities. Musa
and Tariq advanced as far east as Zaragoza. Musa, recalled to Damascus, took Tariq with him, but left his son, Abd al-Aziz ibn Musa, in charge of the newly conquered territory.\textsuperscript{15}

Abd al-Aziz continued the pacification of the peninsula “by subduing several important fortresses and cities.”\textsuperscript{16} However, he was just as happy to sign treaties with local Visigoth nobles; which followed the tradition of similar pacts signed by the Muslims in their earlier conquests. In 713, Abd al-Aziz signed a treaty with the Visigoth nobleman, Theodemir, called Tudmir by the Moors, in which the Muslim leader promised to respect Christian property and religion and vowed to recognize Theodemir’s sovereignty. In return, the Visigoth noble would not hide deserters, would pay an annual per capita tax of hard money, and would provide certain agricultural goods. Arrangements like this treaty allowed the small Muslim armies to deal with armed rebellions and at the same time expand their sphere of influence. These treaty arrangements were so beneficial to both sides that they maintained them for years.\textsuperscript{17}

The Theater of the Conflict

Septimania

Septimania was the part of the Visigoth kingdom of Hispania that extended east of the Pyrenees along the Mediterranean coast, nearly to the Rhone River, and on the north along a line between the cities of Carcassonne and Toulouse. Septimania’s capital was Narbonne. Other important cities were Nimes, Maguelone, Agde, and Beziers. By 507, the Franks destroyed the Visigoth kingdom of Toulouse and occupied all of its territory, except Septimania. A series of back and forth wars in the early 500s saw the Franks take all of the Visigoth territory only to be dislodged again before 548. After the last campaign, the territory remained part of the Visigoth kingdom.\textsuperscript{18}

Following the Muslim invasion of Spain in 711, Septimania, under a Visigoth king named Ardo, maintained some autonomy. However, independence did not last long. In 717, the Moors crossed the Pyrenees Mountains and engaged the Visigoths in frequent skirmishes. By 720, the Muslims occupied Narbonne, and were soon using it as a raiding base.\textsuperscript{19}

From 720 to 759, the Moors saw Septimania as an integrated part of the Caliphate, just like the rest of al-Andalus (Muslim Spain). Furthermore, for two generations, the city of Narbonne was a valuable strategic asset of the Moors. From this stronghold, the Moors launched raids up the Rhone Valley, into Aquitaine, and along the Mediterranean coast, without having to navigate the difficult mountain
passes. As such, Narbonne was a primary strategic target for the Franks.\textsuperscript{20}

**Aquitaine**

Aquitaine, in the eighth century, was a rough pentagon, bound on the southwest by the Pyrenees, by Biscayne Bay to the west, the Loire River on the north and northeast, and an ill-defined line about halfway between Toulouse and Carcassonne on the south. The Frankish king Clovis, in an alliance with the Byzantine Empire, shattered the Visigoth kingdom of Toulouse in 507 at the Battle of Vouille. After Clovis’s victory, Aquitaine became a somewhat troublesome part of the Frankish realms. Sometimes Aquitaine appeared to be an integrated part of the Frankish realms and other times nearly completely independent. Only a long series of campaigns by Charles Martel, his son, King Pippin I, and his grandson, Charlemagne, brought Aquitaine under complete control. Until then, the region enjoyed a singularly ambiguous political situation.\textsuperscript{21}

A number of Frankish kings and queens controlled parts of the region through most of the sixth century. However, after 567, the cities of Aquitaine passed on as an inheritance in a rapid and apparently random fashion to a number of rulers. For example, in a span of just twenty years, five kings and two queens held the city of Cahors. Because of unstable leadership, Aquitaine remained politically disjointed in the late sixth and early seventh centuries.\textsuperscript{22}

When Dagobert I inherited the entire kingdom from his father in 628, Dagobert’s half-brother, Charibert, tried to seize the throne. However, “Charibert … made little headway since he was simple-minded.” Rather than kill his half-brother, Dagobert gave him Aquitaine from the Loire River to the Pyrenees Mountains. This included the cities of Toulouse, Cahors, Agen, Perigueux, and Saintes. In exchange for this generous land grant, Charibert would make no further claims to any other part of his father’s kingdom. During his reign, Charibert extended his rule by conquering Gascony, roughly the area between the River Garonne and the Pyrenees along the Atlantic coast. Charibert died in the ninth year of Dagobert’s reign, and his infant son, Chilperic, died shortly after his father. These deaths drew some suspicion that Dagobert had arranged the assassination of both. The death of Chilperic returned the Kingdom of the Frank to single rule.\textsuperscript{23}

In the confusion that beset Francia in the late 600s, civil war raged in Neustria, open war broke out between Neustria and Austrasia, and at least two kings died a violent death. Aquitaine reclaimed a measure of political, military, and cultural independence from the Kingdom of the Franks. In 691, Pippin the Middle took sole leadership of the Franks. The Aquitainians along with the Saxons, Bavarians, Bretons and other peoples had managed to break away from Frankish
rule. During this time, the Aquitainians also reasserted a certain cultural distinctiveness from the Franks. For example, the Franks referred to the peoples that lived south of the Loire as “Romans.” In contrast, the Aquitainians called the Franks that resided north of the Loire “barbarians.” In addition, Aquitaine retained a distinct and different military tradition and organization from the Frankish lands north of the Loire. Evidence indicates that Aquitaine remained far more influenced by Roman institutions than other parts of Gaul.

However, too much may be made of this supposed separateness. The level of autonomy the Duchy of Aquitaine had is unclear. Certainly, some of the churches and monasteries that held lands in other parts of the Frankish kingdoms also had property in Aquitaine and at least one great churchman of Aquitaine, Ansoald, Bishop of Poitiers, also had land in Burgundy. In addition, a version of Latin was the common written tongue both north and south of the Loire. Through all this, Aquitaine had links to the Kingdom of the Franks through landholding, a common religion, and a common tongue, as well as common social and political structures.

Provence

Eighth century Provence ran south from Lyon along the Rhone River Valley. The region was west of the Alps and east of Moorish Septimania. The area’s major walled cities on the Rhone River were Arles and Avignon, while Marseilles was the region’s major Mediterranean Sea port. Roman roads that ran along both sides of the Rhone connected all of these cities, and bridges at Avignon crossed the river. Since the early 500s, the Franks had had an interest in Provence, fighting both Goths and Lombards to take and maintain control of the area. From the sixth to the eighth centuries, two considerations drove Frankish interests. First, maintaining the lucrative trade along the Rhone River from the Mediterranean Sea into Central Gaul, which the Franks taxed. Second, controlling the Alpine mountain passes into Northern Italy. By doing so, they controlled trade and maintained a defense against possible Lombard invasion.

During the late seventh and early eighth centuries, Provence remained in the Frankish sphere of influence. However, at least some the great men of the province were decidedly anti-Charles Martel and in open conflict with him. For example, the clan headed by Duke Maurontus resisted Charles Martel’s attempt to take direct control of Provence. Meanwhile, another great family headed by Patricius Abbo, supported Charles’s bid to control the area.
The Hammer Moves South

For Charles Martel, the victory at Tours in 732 made him the preeminent Frankish leader. This victory also made Eudo, Duke of Aquitaine, who had previously opposed Charles Martel recognize him as his overlord. In 731, Charles Martel launched two devastating raids into Aquitaine to restrain Eudo. However, Eudo’s disastrous defeat at the hands of the Moors at the Battle of the River Garonne in 732 forced him to turn to his old enemy. For the time being, the arrangement between Charles Martel and Eudo secured Charles Martel’s personal control of Aquitaine. The Frankish Mayor of the Palace, Charles Martel, could now turn his attention to securing southern Burgundy and Provence against the threat posed by the Muslims holding Narbonne and Nimes.29

Burgundy was the third Merovingian Frankish kingdom in importance after Neustria and Austrasia. With no Burgundian Mayor of the Palace, at times, the Merovingian kings directly controlled Burgundy. By the time of the Battle of Tours, some of the lords of northern Burgundy around Orleans were under Charles Martel’s personal authority or closely allied with him, to the extent that he felt powerful enough to direct the area’s churchmen to his satisfaction. However, the area in southern Burgundy around Lyon was not under such control. A year after defeating the Moors, Charles Martel invaded southern Burgundy and appointed his followers as judges and counts to take and enforce his mandate over the locals.30

In 734, Charles Martel had to put down a revolt of the Frisians that included seaborne operations in the North Sea. The year 735 saw Charles Martel back in Aquitaine. Eudo died that year and Charles Martel enforced his control over the area and over Eudo’s heir, Hunoald, by occupying Hunoald’s territory including many of the cities and forts. Because of this military occupation of his lands, Hunoald only ruled Aquitaine with Charles Martel’s “permission.” Furthermore, Charles Martel made Hunoald swear allegiance to his sons, Carloman and Pippin.31 Charles Martel could now move his strategic focus further south.

With affairs settled in Aquitaine, in 736 Charles Martel once more moved south, this time into the Lyonnais. His attempt to exert control over the city of Lyon and the surrounding area three years earlier produced limited success. At this time he was forced to replace many of the previously appointed officials with new men. He then led his forces down the Rhone River Valley all the way to the Mediterranean Sea. This move displaced Duke Maurontus from his position of power in the area.32 With the Frankish military occupying the Rhone Valley, the Moors were now cut-off from easy raiding and further expansion to the east.

Maurontus made common cause with the Muslims of Narbonne to regain his previous position in Provence. He and his followers allowed the Moors into the
strongly fortified city of Avignon. Maurontus then used the Moors to attack his enemies, including Charles Martel’s allies. The *Annales Mettenses Prioress* merely reports the city’s capture by deception and the devastation of the countryside by the Moors without mentioning Maurontus’s role in the action. Nonetheless, in light of other evidence, Maurontus likely had some part in the Moors’ capture of the city. Other sources report that the Muslims also captured Arles. The capture of Avignon and Arles was a serious strategic threat to Charles Martel’s position in the Rhone Valley. It cut him off from his followers in the south, and the Alpine passes into Italy. Furthermore, the Moors could now easily attack up the river into Burgundy and east to the Alps.

The Frankish response to the capture of Avignon was massive. First, Charles Martel dispatched an advanced force under his half-brother, Duke Childebrand, which had a siege train large enough to surround the well-prepared target. Charles Martel arrived with more men and decided to take the city by assault rather than wait for it to surrender, because a second Moorish army was forming near Narbonne.

The Franks had a long tradition of siege warfare. Clovis and his successors conducted sieges at Avignon in 500 and at Comminges in 585. The skills to invest and attack a city were not lost with the rise of the Mayors. Pippin the Middle conducted at least one siege at Namur in 684. The pervasiveness of fortified places throughout former Roman Gaul demanded that any effective army have the means to deal with walled cities and other kinds of fortification. For their time, Frankish siege-techniques were no less effective than the Romans. The willingness of the Franks to engage in sieges indicates they were confident in their abilities.

At Avignon, the Franks used a combination of siege machines, such as battering rams and rope ladders, to assault the city. The battering rams were heavy logs with iron heads attached. They hung from a frame so that it swung back and forth to smash gates or walls. Affixed with wheels, the device sported a protective cover of woven branches, planks, layers of leather, wool, and sand to ward off stones and incendiary devices. The rope ladders were likely just knotted ropes with grappling hooks of some kind. The nature of rope ladders made their use in the attack on Avignon a commando-type or sneak attack. Furthermore, the use of rope ladders indicates that the defending force was relatively small. The attack scenario played out as follows: the Franks pushed battering rams into position against the city’s gates and while the defenders rushed to fend off this attack, other Franks using rope ladders climbed over the now undefended parts of the wall. The Franks used ropes to climb not just the walls but also buildings. It is likely the suburbs had encroached on the city walls, giving the attackers platforms to help them slip over. The Franks captured the city and burned it. Even though the Franks killed and...
imprisoned an unknown number of enemy soldiers, insurgents forced Charles Martel and Childebrand to recapture the city the next year. After taking Avignon, he took the strategic offensive against the Moors. He “crossed the Rhone with his men and plunged into Gothic territory as far as the Narbonnaise.” On reaching Narbonne, Charles Martel also found an unanticipated enemy army encamped outside the city. Commanded by Yusuf Ibn Abd ar Rahman al Fihri, this new army was possibly a relief force meant for Avignon that had not had time to act before that city fell. The Franks then surrounded both the city and the army camp with a rampart and blocked river traffic into the city. Charles Martel’s army also added redoubts and armed camps at intervals to combat Moorish sorties or any attempted breakouts. Furthermore, he placed catapults and batter rams in strategic locations in preparation for an assault on either the city or the camp.

The Moors of Narbonne sent a dispatch to al-Andalus asking for assistance. A large relief force gathered as the great nobles and warlords in Spain gathered another army from their combined resources. Omar ibn Chaled took command of this force. Rather than cross the dangerous Pyrenees, the relief force came by sea. Ibn Chaled landed at what today is Port-Mahon where a Roman-built dock was still useable. Thinking he had achieved surprise, the Moorish general established a fortified camp on some high ground at the base of the Port-Mahon peninsula. He then moved his main force a little distance up the river and rested for the night.

Charles Martel received word of Ibn Chaled’s approach and countered the threat to his rear. Leaving part of his force to maintain the siege of Narbonne, Charles Martel quickly marched the rest of his army along the Via Domitia to the Valley of the River Berre. On reaching the valley, he turned and moved his force toward the sea. This blocked any Moorish attempt to reach the road. Due to good intelligence, Martel knew the location of the Moors. To rest his army, Martel had his men construct the Roman-influenced Frankish camp on the banks of the Berre in the valley of the Corbieres where an earlier Visigoth palace once stood.

The next day as the Franks approached the enemy position they deployed in their traditional infantry lines and attacked. Tradition puts The Battle of the Berre in an area between the Berre River and the marsh now called the Etang de la Palme near the village of Sigean. The location made tactical sense. The Franks secured their flanks with impassable terrain when possible. At the Battle of the Berre, they used the Berre River and the Etang de la Palme Marsh. At the Battle of Tours, they used a heavily wooded hill and the Clain River. The Moors had the sea behind them with their camp occupying the only nearby high ground. Using good tactics, the Franks cut off the Moors from their camp by a straightforward pinch from their right to their left.

In their battle line, the Franks were like a living threshing machine, but
instead of harvesting grain, they reaped the lives of their enemies. The Frankish infantry advanced slowly, systematically stabbing and smashing anything that stood in front of them. As was their custom, they refused to allow a gap in the line and kept moving forward. Both sides fought hard, but when the Franks killed Ibn Chaled, the Moors broke and ran. The retreating Muslims, cut off from their camp, tried to swim or take small fishing boats back to their fleet still at anchor at Port-Mahon. The Franks pursued the defeated Moors in boats, many Moors drowned as they fled. The victorious Franks now turned on the Moors’ camp, which quickly surrendered. The victors captured a great amount of loot and a large number of prisoners.\footnote{41}

After his success at the Berre, Charles Martel lifted his siege of Narbonne. It is possible that his army had suffered a number of casualties in the battle at the Berre River and he did not feel strong enough to attempt a direct assault on both the city and the nearby enemy camp. Starving out either the city or the camp was a slow process and another relief force might appear at any time from Spain. Nevertheless, on his way out of Septimania, Charles Martel and his army captured the Moslem controlled cities of Agde, Beziers, and Nimes. He destroyed the cities and their suburbs.\footnote{42} This rendered those cities useless as military outposts.

**Conclusion**

When Charles Martel died in 741, he had not been able to capture Narbonne, but had left that to his son, Pippin, who accomplished the capture of the city in 759 after a long siege.\footnote{43} However, Charles Martel's southern strategy had largely eliminated the Moorish threat posed to the Kingdom of the Franks and, by extension, all of Christian Europe by Islamic Spain. By driving the Moors west of the Pyrenees, Charles and Pippin secured and established the southern border of what would become France. This border is still in place today.

For good or ill, Charles Martel largely established the Franks as the preeminent Christian military power in Europe. This military dominance passed to his son and his grandson Charlemagne. This power let Charles Martel’s descendants build the Holy Roman Empire and sparked the Carolingian Renaissance.

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Notes


15. Al-Athir, Annales, 35; Chronicle of 754, 54, 56.


27. Geary, Phantoms of Remembrance, 32; Gregory, History of the Franks, 3.6 and 3.21; Jordanes, Gothic History, 138; Paul, History of the Lombards, V.5.

28. Fouracre, Charles Martel, 66; Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, 33.


32. Continuations of Fredegar, 14, 18; Bachrach, Early Carolingian Warfare, 33.


34. Chronicon Moissiacense, p. 292; Continuations of Fredegar, 20.


42. Continuations of Fredegar, 20.

43. Continuations of Fredegar, 24; Chronicon Moissiacense, s. a. 759.
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Since the author published this article in 2015, Patrick S. Baker has retired from the Department of Defense and has focused on writing. He has published more than 20 history and other non-fiction articles in magazines such as Strategy & Tactics Magazine, Modern War Magazine, Military History Magazine as well as New Myths and Electric Athenaeum.

Book Review

Francis M. Hoeflinger

In his book Infantry Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century: Discipline, Tactics, and Technology, Kelly DeVries contends that his analysis and findings differ from most historians of medieval warfare, as he asserts that infantry alone could and did win battles. Through the use of primary and secondary sources, a narrative of fourteen battles, interwoven with contemporary descriptions, is produced which provides a detailed account of the chosen battles that were fought in the first half of the fourteenth century. Each chapter covers one battle and provides, where known, some background on the fight, topography of the battlefield, opposing commanders, and, composition of the opposing armies. Also covered in each chapter is an analysis of the causes of victory and defeat. Additionally the book also contains an appendix titled “Ambushes (p.188).” “Ambushes” details three fights where the victorious army initially used surprise when initiating battle. All of the battles covered in the appendix occurred in the same early fourteenth century time period. The book ends with a chapter titled “Conclusion” that summarizes the authors initial thesis and reinforces the conclusions he reached by the end of his study. Infantry Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century: Discipline, Tactics, and Technology also includes an eleven-page bibliography of primary and secondary sources.

The author uses a wide variety of primary and secondary sources, both literal and poetic that cover an assortment of subjects relevant to the time period studied. It appears from reading the bibliography, and the extensive footnotes found throughout the book that the author used sources that cover the sociology of the period of the high to late middle ages as well as biographies of rulers, leaders, and nobles. Military treaties and contemporary histories are also utilized as well as modern studies on almost every area and aspect of life in medieval Western Europe. The cited sources cover almost every
location in Western Europe. Sources on the political, societal, and military organization and other aspects of life in medieval Western Europe are listed as well. The bibliography is a strong and useful reference on the late medieval time frame and can be used as a springboard for further research and study.

*Infantry Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century* provides not only a contemporary look at early fourteenth century combat, but also a concise analysis of why the victors won and the mistakes made by the defeated armies. DeVries illustrates this point with a description of a ledger account of the defeated French commander at the Battle of Courtrai. The ledger account details how the French commander bought a map of the battlefield that included details of the very trenches that would cause the deaths of so many of his soldiers (p.15). Even though the French commander had knowledge of the trenches dug and camouflaged in front of the Flemish positions, he ordered his attack to be conducted directly into the Flemish positions protected by the trenches. DeVries points out that the combination of disregarding the trenches and stiff Flemish resistance lead to the defeat of the attack and the deaths of the cream of French nobility. DeVries analyzes the tactics, techniques, and weapons used in each battle. The book uses a variety of primary and secondary sources written in both Latin and Middle English to provide as accurate and complete a picture of the battle covered as possible. DeVries also attempts to explain and mitigate any nationalistic prejudice of the sources used. The author uses sources, which conflict with each other, and provides a plausible explanation for the discrepancies. DeVries frames his explanations in a manner that adds to the depth of the battle without confusing the reader.

Many students of medieval military history believe that the armored knight dominated the battlefield and that until the introduction of viable firearms an army of mounted knights would always defeat foot soldiers. Before reading *Infantry Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century* it is easy to picture the armored knight riding down and impaling his enemies with impunity; breaking any infantry formation and cutting down all who would dare to resist him. After reading this book the reader begins to realize that regardless of the time period studied, the terrain and weapons have more of an impact on an army’s chances of victory than almost any other factor. The book also reinforces the belief that the terrain can act as a combat multiplier and increase the effectiveness of weapons and the efficiency
of the battle plan a commander constructs to ensure victory.

This is a very easily read and thoroughly enjoyable book, on a subject that could be very dry and boring. Where appropriate the author provides a level of detail that brings the battle to life, but not so much as to inundate the reader with too much information. Infantry Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century can be read and enjoyed by the casual reader of military history as much as the well-informed student; it makes a significant contribution to the literature of medieval warfare and to a better understanding of the infantry’s role in fighting and winning battles during the first half of the fourteenth century.

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Since 2013 when the Saber and Scroll Journal published this book review, Frank has worked (and resigned) from the US Central Command, welcomed three grandchildren into the world, received a 100 percent disability rating from the VA and started his own business. He and his wife have bought their “forever” home and have adapted to life on Florida’s Gulf coast.
At first glance, the popular impression of King Edward II of England (1284-1327, r. 1307-1327) persists that he was a weak, immature, effeminate failure of a king who lusted after his male “favorites,” was bullied by his powerful father Edward I Longshanks, and loathed by his long-suffering wife Isabella of France (1295-1358). Much material has been produced about Edward, but unfortunately, large amounts of it are twisted versions of reality, perpetuated rumors, or outright falsehoods. Fictionalized modern accounts, found in novels and movies such as Braveheart, further mislead readers’ and viewers’ preconceptions about Edward. Fortunately, historian Kathryn Warner has written an important biography of this king that exposes both his real quirks and the inaccuracies attached to him, all placed within the context of England’s political position in fourteenth-century Europe.

Holding two degrees in medieval history from the University of Manchester, Warner is a well-respected expert on Edward II and the fourteenth century. Her study is based almost completely on primary sources, built on a daunting number of scraps of information found in documents ranging from letters and speeches in Edward’s own words, letters from others surrounding him, itineraries, and various administrative rolls to royal household records, papal letters, and chamber journals. What emerges is not only a richly detailed account of the king’s life, but a fascinating look at his personality that has been hidden behind innuendo and fabrications for centuries.

As the story of Edward’s life unfolds, Warner focuses on the notorious controversies and myths that have grown up around him over time. One of the most persistent was his close bond with his male friends, in particular, Piers Gaveston (c.1284-1312) in the early part of the reign and Hugh Despenser the Younger (c.1286-1326) towards the end of it. Speculation and rumor have plagued writers’ works on Edward from the earliest chroniclers to modern historians, suggesting that his closeness to these men meant he was either bisexual or homosexual. In her chapters on Piers Gaveston, who was the second of four sons of a poor Gascon knight and who had been a squire in Edward I’s household and later a talented


Book Review

Kathleen Guler
soldier in the army, Warner points out that his and Edward’s rapport might have been misinterpreted through the ubiquitous usage of words such as “love.” “The early fourteenth century was an age when men bandied about declarations of love for other men far more easily than in later eras” (p.29), meaning it had a different connotation at that time. Chroniclers of the day designated this closeness as “improper,” but Warner also clearly points out these writers were unreliable sources that had strong biases against the king, reflecting the mood of England’s nobility towards his relationship with Gaveston. The chroniclers likely were trying to gain the aristocracy’s favor. The author also notes that Christopher Marlowe’s play *Edward II*, written c. 1592, a purely fictional rendition, certainly perpetuated the preconceived notion, carrying it into modern times with each of its continued productions. While Warner concedes that from the surviving evidence no absolute proof can be determined whether Edward’s relationships with his favorites were sexual, she notes that both Edward and Gaveston took wives, had children, and even fathered illegitimate children, all in the traditional sense, suggesting that they were simply close friends who chose to defy the growing angst of England’s powerful nobles.

Edward’s queen, Isabella of France (m. 1308), was supposedly long-suffering, ignored, and despised. Here again Warner carefully examines the surviving documentation and reveals strong clues that Edward and Isabella probably had a warm, even loving, marriage for many years. In one of her letters to him, she called him “my very sweet heart” five times, and he called her his “dear heart” (p.47). Whether—or how much—Isabella was exasperated at the presence of Piers Gaveston during the favorite’s years around Edward is not known, but the impression is that she tolerated the situation, whatever it entailed.

How Isabella viewed Edward’s relationship with his second predominant “favorite,” Hugh Despenser the Younger, was quite another matter. Isabella detested him. Unlike the arrogant but apparently tolerable Gaveston, Despenser appears to have been coldly calculating and greedy, gradually gaining control over Edward’s political and financial power. Close to the time that Despenser’s “friendship” with Edward deepened, the king’s marriage began to sour. Although Warner skirts around the possibility that the favorite caused a major rift between the royal couple, she hints that Despenser may have been a catalyst behind Isabella’s departure for France in 1325, never to return to her husband. There, she eventually allied with the exiled nobleman Roger Mortimer, a sworn enemy of both Despenser and Edward. Rumors developed of an affair with Mortimer and whether her eldest child, the future Edward III (1312-1327), could have actually been Mortimer’s son. Warner finds no evidence that Isabella and Mortimer were ever lovers. Instead, the author presents the strong likelihood that they were only political allies. Further, Isabella could not
have met Mortimer until years after her last child was born in 1321. Warner also shows proof that Edward and Isabella were together when each of their four children was conceived. Interestingly, based on the period’s events Isabella allegedly earned the nickname “She-Wolf of France” (p. 39). However, that epithet was actually Shakespeare’s title for Margaret of Anjou, mistakenly applied to Isabella in 1757 by poet Thomas Grey.

Throughout the book, Warner highlights Edward’s inadequacy as a king, the odd hobbies that made him the butt of jokes, and his generosity. On the one hand, Edward paid little attention to his country, neglecting important political issues while he spent time with his favorites. He also placed himself in the company of lowborn tradesmen, preferring their company and performing robust physical labor alongside them. He appears to have disliked any sort of regal and “idyllic” court life, which probably bored him. This caused a great amount of furor amongst his nobles, who disdained such work and considered it inappropriate for a king to enjoy. On the other hand, Edward was extremely generous to those around him—not only to his favorites, to Isabella, and to others of the aristocracy with whom he was pleased—but to strangers, messengers, and others on down the scale to the lowest ranks. While he was generous to a fault, unfortunately this strained his treasury, already depleted due to his father’s wars. To give huge gifts of lands and titles to his favorites, especially the arrogant Gaveston and the hated Despenser, created serious animosity. Warner carefully examines the period when Edward’s power waned: in September 1326, Isabella and Mortimer staged a small-scale but very successful invasion that resulted in Edward’s deposition, Despenser’s execution, and the placement of the young Edward III on the throne under Isabella and Mortimer’s regency. Even while trying to avoid capture and after his imprisonment, Edward continued to show generosity; sometimes he is compared to the image of Nero fiddling away while Rome burned.

In the final chapter, “The Curious Case of the King Who Lived,” Warner addresses the intriguing controversy of when and how Edward actually died. According to fourteenth century chroniclers, he supposedly died in late September 1327, murdered, first by suffocation, then “with a plumber’s red-hot iron inserted through a horn leading to the inmost parts of the bowel, [his killers] burned out the respiratory organs beyond the intestines, taking care that no wound should be discernible on the royal body” (p. 243). This method of murder was handed down in numerous accounts over the years. Warner, however, refutes this as pure falsehood, first citing the unreliability of the chroniclers, and more importantly, laying out strong evidence that Edward may have survived for a few years past his alleged death date, perhaps up to 1330, or even later. While this evidence is not indisputable, it includes traces of at least four conspiracies to rescue Edward, the mysteries of why
no one was allowed to view his body after his alleged death, why he was not buried for three months afterward, and why he was not laid in state like other kings. No details remain of his December 1327 funeral either. Most importantly, Warner cites letters that have surfaced which date to the years after the funeral, stating that Edward was “alive and in good health of body, in a safe place at his own wish [or command]” (p.248). Some conspirators of the time believed he was kept at Corfe Castle in Dorset, prompting armed plots to free him in 1329-1330. Other letters suggest Edward had fled to Italy and lived out his years there.

This biography includes a genealogy tracing from Edward’s grandparents through four generations after him; a useful note on wages and prices of the period; several color plates, mostly of locations important to the biography plus photographs of related documents; and a warm foreword by historian Ian Mortimer, who gives the author a resounding endorsement. The one item missing is a map. Although most of the place names will be familiar to scholars of this period, a map showing their locations would have been a good addition.

Warner has pieced together a richly detailed puzzle that corrects many of the misconceptions about Edward II of England and produces a much more complete portrayal of his personality. Where the truth is unknown due to the lack of surviving evidence, Warner says so. Her approach is remarkably even-handed; while she points out the good things Edward did, she does not gloss over his terrible flaws. Warner’s biography is a welcome addition to the collection of anyone studying this period. She will be following up with a biography of Isabella of France, due in spring 2016.

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Kathleen Guler is the author of a series of historical novels set in fifth century Britain, including, A Land Beyond Ravens, which won the 2010 Colorado Book Award and the 2010 National Indie Excellence Award, both in the historical fiction category. Kathleen earned her Masters Degree in history in 2014. She has also published numerous articles, essays, short stories, reviews, and poems.
Currently, she is currently working on a fifth novel comprised of three interconnected stories, each set in a different time. The author lives in Steamboat Springs, Colorado.
Professor John France of Swansea University owns a lofty reputation in medieval military history circles. His book, *Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades, 1000-1300*, is an attempt to shed light on the socio-economic characteristics of medieval warfare. France’s book presents three fascinating arguments.

First, his discussion about how medieval Europe fought its wars encapsulates how warfare at this time consisted of haphazard engagements. European medieval society was comprised of decentralized governmental systems. France calls the spheres of power in European society the *mouvances*. These consisted of well-heeled medieval families. For example, the Counts of Anjou ruled from Western France, the Baldwins ruled in Jerusalem, the Dukes of Brabant ruled from the south of the Netherlands, and the royal houses of Hohenstaufen and Capetians ruled from Germany and France, respectively. All of this economic, military, and political dispersion made it difficult for any one family to maintain a lasting hold on the European continent. If the political and military leaders wanted to fight wars, then they had to conduct it through indirect means, namely raiding, pillaging, and ambushing one’s opponents. This indirect way of war made a lot of sense since limited logistical abilities of the state restricted large-scale warfare. In addition, a direct conflict jeopardized the nobilities’ position of power should the outcome be negative.

The second argument France discusses is the primacy of the castle. He dedicated two chapters to castles and fortifications and how they impacted wars and sieges. The primacy of the castle can be found in its construction. Castles protected the inhabitants from both domestic and foreign threats. For instance, the castle's walls assisted in helping to protect governments from rebellion by the native populace as well as external coercion.¹ The castle’s defensively strong characteristics often held the advantage in battle and medieval governmental infrastructure helped to maintain the castle's prominent role in European society. France writes that castles held “a military purpose—to defend the life and goods of its owner and to provide his troops with a base.”² The number of castles
increased throughout the Middle Ages and reinforced this basic component of war.\(^3\) One of the benefits of the castle in a war was that it protected the troops from enduring enemy attacks. For example, after ransacking the surrounding landscape the enemy grew tired. Protected from the initial attack, the rested garrisoned troops inside the castle sallied out and laid waste to weakened opponents. During the medieval period, conducting a siege against a garrisoned castle often led to a long and protracted expedition. If a ravaging army decided to besiege an enemy’s castle, they left themselves vulnerable to attack from relief forces. This created a situation where those conducting the siege found themselves surrounded by the besieged and their allies.

The third argument comes at the end of his book where France recognizes a paradox in medieval society. It was highly militarized, but at the same time, it lacked war academies. France is correct to point out that a lack of instruction in war solidified the power of the nobility. When medieval armies did go to war, their political and military leaders sought out conservative objectives. These leaders knew that their armies did not have the resources to conduct an extended war.

His list of sources is impressive. The historiography represented draws from a list of well-known medieval military historians. Bernard S. Bachrach, Kelly Devries, Stephan Morillo, Helen Nicholson, and Michael Prestwich are a few of his secondary sources.

Although this book has an illuminating thesis and fascinating historical arguments, one is bound to find a few criticisms. First, the reader may find that France's book lacks a prologue and an epilogue to introduce and conclude with his main thoughts to the reader. Second, he refers to many battles without equipping the reader with an adequate supply of maps. The great number of battles and sieges France lists makes it easy to get lost in the text. If he had focused only on the most consequential engagements, readers might not get easily lost. Third, the content is advanced and this creates confusion for newcomers to the discipline. For instance, it is easy for the newcomer to get lost when France is discussing the Maciejowski Bible and stone machicolations and how they relate to his central thesis. Diagrams of machicolations in use can be helpful to the reader. For the above reasons the work is in need of revision.

In closing, John France’s book deftly blends the *mouvances* in European society. The socio-economic infrastructure of European culture led to the inability of military and political leaders to execute a plan that resulted in a decisive conflict. Even though the medieval world might seem distant in our technological society, the study of warfare during the Middle Ages is the study of hegemonies vying for control over the continent. European culture needs to acknowledge that “hegemonic” warfare is a historical legacy of Western identity.\(^4\) Any student who
is specializing in medieval warfare would do well to place France’s book on their bookshelf.

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Notes


2. Ibid., 84.

3. Ibid.