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Book Review: Shields of the Republic: The Triumph and Peril of America’s Alliances
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Global Security and Intelligence Studies

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Aims and Scope. GSIS is a bi-annual, peer-reviewed, open access publication designed to provide a forum for the academic community and the community of practitioners to engage in dialogue about contemporary global security and intelligence issues. The journal welcomes contributions on a broad range of intelligence and security issues, and from across the methodological and theoretical spectrum.

The journal especially encourages submissions that recognize the multidisciplinary nature of intelligence and security studies and that draw on insights from a variety of fields to advance our understanding of important current intelligence and security issues. In keeping with the desire to help bridge the gap between academics and practitioners, the journal also invites articles about current intelligence- and security-related matters from a practitioner perspective. In particular, GSIS is interested in publishing informed perspectives on current intelligence- and security-related matters.

GSIS welcomes the submission of original empirical research, research notes, and book reviews. Papers and research notes that explicitly demonstrate how a multidisciplinary approach enhances our theoretical and practical understanding of intelligence and security matters are especially welcome. Please visit https://www.ipsonet.org/publications/open-access/gsis/instructions-for-authors.
Editorial Welcome

Welcome to the second issue of our Sixth edition! *Global Security and Intelligence Studies* is a double-blind peer-reviewed academic journal that aims to bridge the two-way gap between academia and practitioners. We serve as common ground to a diverse and growing audience ranging from policymakers to academics to operators on the front lines. GSIS strives to provide work pertaining to the most current and relevant topics in an ever-evolving and rapidly expanding threat-scape. To this end GSIS is excited to continue our development of academic discourse by offering works in seminal styles while adhering to strict academic standards of integrity.

The intelligence and security fields are rapidly changing. Our last edition we introduced a change that reflected a shift in academic discourse, our *Critical Analysis* section. Subjected to the same peer review rigor as traditional academic articles the construct of their findings lay outside the traditional quantitative and qualitative methodological analysis. When discussing matters historically referred to as ‘cloak and dagger’ outside-the-box approaches are necessary. In keeping with this spirit and the ever-evolving threat-scape GSIS is introducing the occasional *Intel Dossier*. These articles are intended to speed relevant intelligence insights to practitioners and spark conversation within the academic community. Dossiers distinguish themselves from traditional academic discourse owing to their unique approach, brevity, and often ‘Red’ or adversarial centric perspective.

This issue is a special edition on Great Power Competition. Too often studies into GPC focus on rising powers and competition for future power dominance across the globe. Our investigation of this topic however will take a different approach. We will look at GPC as a constant state of a hyper connected world and the issues that can arise from there. In the spirit of Academic novelty, we have selected excellent scholarship that highlights emerging or often overlooked ideas and strategies on a global scale. We consider a psychological approach to Syria in our Graduate Lectern by Janice Farkas and look to the year 2028 as we peel back a revisionist strategy decade in the making as highlighted by Dan Morabito. Scott Duryea gives us a look at the historical Kosovo conflict and the use of Just War. We then use this as a lens to fast forward to discussions on modern extremism by J.J. Brookhouser and autonomy and AI in warfare from Joshua E. Duke. Just as important as what is being done on a national level is what is not being said by such leaders. William Harlow gives us an excellent look at the importance and impact of strategic silence from global players. And rounding out with modern events Mary Wootan Holst and Cameron Carlson give us an in-depth look at some of the issues facing COVID-19 vaccinations amongst US military members.

We take a moment to also present two policy-oriented pieces focusing on the global triad of the United States, Russia, and China. These pieces were selected

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Global Security and Intelligence Studies strives to be the source for research on global security and intelligence matters. As the global threat-scape evolves over time GSIS is evolving to keep pace. The journal is enhancing its academic edge, impact, and reach. We are working to build stronger bridges between senior leaders, academics, and practitioners. In addition to new content that advances the global discussion of security and intelligence readers can anticipate more special issues with a focus on current security concerns.

Carter Matherly, Ph.D.  
Interim Editor-in-Chief

Jim Burch, D.M.  
Interim Associate Editor

Bienvenida editorial

Le damos la bienvenida al segundo número de nuestra Sexta edición! Global Security and Intelligence Studies es una revista académica de estudios doble ciegos y revisada por pares que tiene como objetivo cerrar la brecha bidireccional entre la academia y los profesionales. Servimos como terreno común para una audiencia diversa y creciente que va desde legisladores hasta académicos y operadores en primera línea. GSIS se esfuerza por proporcionar trabajo relacionado con los temas más actuales y relevantes en un panorama de amenazas en constante evolución y rápida expansión. Con este fin, GSIS se complace en continuar nuestro desarrollo del discurso académico ofreciendo trabajos en estilos seminales mientras se adhiere a estrictos estándares académicos de integridad.

Los campos de la inteligencia y la seguridad están cambiando rápidamente. En nuestra última edición introdujimos un cambio que reflejaba un cambio en el discurso académico, nuestra sección de Análisis Crítico. Sometidos al mismo rigor de revisión por pares que los artículos académicos tradicionales, la construcción...
de sus hallazgos queda fuera del análisis metodológico cuantitativo y cualitativo tradicional. Cuando se discuten asuntos históricamente referidos como “capa y espada”, son necesarios enfoques fuera de la caja. De acuerdo con este espíritu y el panorama de amenazas en constante evolución, GSIS presenta el Dossier de Intel ocasionalmente. Estos artículos están destinados a acelerar la comprensión de inteligencia relevante para los profesionales y generar conversaciones dentro de la comunidad académica. Los expedientes se distinguen del discurso académico tradicional debido a su enfoque único, brevedad y, a menudo, su perspectiva centrada en el “rojo” o el adversario.

Este número es una edición especial de Great Power Competition. Con demasiada frecuencia, los estudios sobre GPC se centran en los poderes crecientes y la competencia por el dominio futuro del poder en todo el mundo. Sin embargo, nuestra investigación de este tema adoptará un enfoque diferente. Veremos GPC como un estado constante de un mundo hiperconectado y los problemas que pueden surgir a partir de ahí. En el espíritu de la novedad académica, hemos seleccionado una excelente beca que destaca las ideas y estrategias emergentes o que a menudo se pasan por alto a escala global. Consideramos un enfoque psicológico de Siria en nuestro Atril de Graduados de Janice Farkas y miramos hacia el año 2028 mientras remontamos una década de estrategia revisionista en proceso, como lo destacó Dan Morabito. Scott Duryea nos da una mirada al histórico conflicto de Kosovo y al uso de la guerra justa. Luego usamos esto como una lente para avanzar rápidamente a las discusiones sobre el extremismo moderno de J.J. Brookhouser y autonomía e IA en la guerra de Joshua E. Duke. Tan importante como lo que se está haciendo a nivel nacional es lo que no dicen esos líderes. William Harlow nos ofrece una excelente visión de la importancia y el impacto del silencio estratégico de los actores globales. Y completando con eventos modernos, Mary Wootan Holst y Cameron Carlson nos dan una mirada en profundidad a algunos de los problemas que enfrentan las vacunas COVID-19 casi miembros del ejército de EE. UU.

Nos tomamos un momento para presentar también dos piezas orientadas a las políticas que se centran en la tríada global de Estados Unidos, Rusia y China. Estas piezas fueron seleccionadas y presentadas aquí como señales de lo que no se está investigando ni se dice en la discusión de GPC. La beca debería hacer que los investigadores y los responsables de la formulación de políticas hagan una pausa y reflexionen sobre qué otros puntos ciegos migratorios deben pasarse por alto. Brendan Potter investiga un aspecto incómodo de la competencia militar entre Estados Unidos y China y cómo Estados Unidos puede, o no, poder contrarrestarlo. A esto le sigue un artículo ruso original de Eugene Vertlieb, traducido por D.T. Faleris, que discute los méritos de un pacto entre Estados Unidos y Rusia mutuamente beneficioso. Cerramos nuestra edición de invierno con una reseña de libro muy apropiada escrita por Cody Schuettes sobre Shields of the Republic: The Triumph and Peril of America’s Alliances.
Global Security and Intelligence Studies se esfuerza por ser la fuente de investigación sobre asuntos de inteligencia y seguridad global. A medida que el panorama de amenazas global evoluciona con el tiempo, GSIS evoluciona para mantener el ritmo. La revista está mejorando su ventaja académica, su impacto y su alcance. Estamos trabajando para construir puentes más sólidos entre líderes senior, académicos y profesionales. Además del contenido nuevo que avanza en la discusión global sobre seguridad e inteligencia, los lectores pueden anticipar problemas más especiales con un enfoque en las preocupaciones de seguridad actuales.

编者按

欢迎阅读《全球安全与情报研究》(GSIS)第6卷第2期！GSIS是一本经双盲同行评审的学术杂志，旨在搭建连接学术界和从业人员的桥梁。我们为多样化且不断增加的读者群体（从决策者到学术界和前线工作人员）提供共同的平台。GSIS致力发表的文章有关于不断发展并快速扩张的威胁局面下最新且最重要的主题。为此，GSIS乐于通过具有重要意义的方式提供学术文章，以期继续发展学术话语，同时遵守严格的学术诚信标准。

情报和安全领域正快速变化。上一期内容中，我们增加了一个反映学术话语转变的版块，即“批判分析”版块。该版块收录的文章同样经过双盲同行评审，并且文章得出的研究发现超出传统定性和定量方法分析所得出的结果。当探讨以往被称为“神秘莫测”的问题时，需要采用新颖的研究方法。为保持这一精神并了解不断变化的威胁局面，本期GSIS增添了特殊的“情报档案”（Intel Dossier）版块。这些文章旨在为从业人员快速提供相关情报见解，并在学术界内引发讨论。情报档案版块收录的文章采用独特方法、内容简洁、并且经常带有“激进”或对立的中心视角，因此有别于传统学术话语。

本期是关于强国竞争（GPC）的特刊。关于GPC的多数研究聚焦于崛起的国家和为争取未来全球权力主导而展开的竞争。不过，我们对该主题的研究将采取不同的方法。我们将GPC视为一个超级互联的世界的恒定状态，从中能产生一系列问题。本着学术新颖性的精神，我们选择了优秀的学术
文章，后者强调了全球新兴的或经常被忽视的观点和战略。我们在“研究生作品展示”（Graduate Lectern）版块衡量了Janice Farkas以叙利亚为研究对象而使用的心理学方法，并衡量了Dan Morabito所作文章中强调的2028年修正主义战略。Scott Duryea分析了科索沃地区的历史性冲突和正义战争的使用。随后，我们以此为视角，快速进入由J.J. Brookhouser探讨的现代极端主义以及由Joshua E. Duke所研究的战争中的自主武器和人工智能。国家领导者未通过言论发表（内容），与国家正在行动的（内容）一样重要。William Harlow出色分析了全球行动者战略沉默的重要性和影响。Mary Wootan Holst和Cameron Carlson深度分析了美国军事成员在2019冠状病毒病（COVID-19）疫苗一事上面临的部分问题，为本期聚焦的现代事件划上句号。

我们还收录了两篇以政策为导向的文章，聚焦于美国、俄罗斯和中国。这两篇文章提示了GPC探讨中未加以研究或未提到的部分。学术文献应引导研究者和决策者思考可能被忽视的盲点还有哪些。Brendan Potter研究了美中军事竞争的令人不安的一面，以及美国如何能或不能抵挡这种竞争。Eugene Vertlieb用俄语撰写了一篇探讨互惠的美俄条约价值的原创文章，由D.T. Faleris翻译为英语。本期内容将于冬季发行，并以一篇书评结尾：Cody Schuettes评论了《共和国之盾：美国联盟的胜利与危险》（Shields of the Republic: The Triumph and Peril of America’s Alliances）。

《全球安全与情报研究》致力成为全球安全和情报事务的研究来源。随着全球威胁局面逐渐发展，GSIS也随之发展。本刊不断提高其学术优势、影响和范围。我们努力在高级领导者、学者和从业人员之间建立更稳固的桥梁。除了促进全球安全和情报讨论的新内容，未来几期内容将为读者带来聚焦于当前安全关切的特刊。

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Psychological Chess: Erdoğan and the Syrian Refugee Crisis

Janice L. Farkas

Introduction

“The mosques are our barracks, the domes our helmets, the minarets our bayonets and the faithful our soldiers ...” This quote is identified as the poem read by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in 1999. The utterance of these words prompted the political figure, the Mayor of Istanbul at that time, to be arrested for inciting religious hatred and jailed for four months (Mays, 2017). Erdoğan, now Turkey’s elected President, is a controversial figure who has had a long political career, serving as its longest leader and well-known on the world stage. In 2018, he was elected President under a new, constitutionally approved Presidential System of Government after serving in many other governmental roles. Erdoğan’s leadership and foreign policies have been the subject of much contention and criticism over the years. The President’s governance style has been remarked to be “autocratic” and he has been referred to as a “wolf dressed in a sheep’s clothing” (Görener and Ucal 2011).

The society and identity of Turkey is neither Western nor Eastern. Its roots are buried deep within the historical Ottoman Empire and is situated “strategically” as a bridge between Europe’s Balkan region, the Middle East nations of Syria, Iran and Iraq, and Eastern European countries formerly part of the Soviet Union. Since the Syrian civil war began in 2011, Turkey has been subjected to accepting a catastrophic number of Syrian refugees. Nearly four million Syrians crossed into Turkey by mid-2020 (Aljazeerah, 2020). As a result, Turkey has sustained outstanding impacts domestically upon its economy and citizenry. Internationally, Turkey was thrust into controversy with the European Union (EU) and other Western nations (Kirisci 2021).

Need

This paper was developed from a need to reflect upon the political policies of President Recep Erdoğan with regard to the Syrian refugee crisis and resultant domestic and international issues. Any recommendations for action must be made with an understanding of the psychological drivers of the leader and his political motivations and actions. This paper will address the noted actions through a review of relevant literature and studies performed upon the following:

a. A background of the country of Turkey, and President Erdoğan’s;

b. A review of the leader’s handling of the influx of Syrian citizens;
c. Theoretical study of psychological motivators and application to President Erdoğan’s policy pertaining to the refugee crisis.

d. Theoretical review of the rational actor theory, power motivation and social identity theory; and

e. Recommendations for issue resolution.

Background

Turkey’s Beginning: The Ottoman Empire

The current nation of Turkey arose from the vestiges of the Ottoman Empire. The First Ottoman Empire came into existence in the form of a religious and financial enterprise. From 1280-1413, the Ottomans began expanding into the Byzantine-held regions of the Balkans and Anatolia, claiming land and riches. While Islamic in nature, the Ottoman Empire developed a system of capturing property and wealth, while allowing the Christian leaders of those regions the ability to maintain leadership through a trade of soldiers and finances to support the Ottoman forces. These forces, known as the Janissary army, were made up of Christian youths from conquered regions, and taught in the ways of Islam, Arabic, and the Ottomans (Shaw 1976).

After a period of political and internal turmoil, the First Ottoman Empire collapsed, and went through a restoration period of rebuilding and resurgence. Campaigns throughout the Balkans, Anatolia and Europe helped re-establish the Ottoman stronghold throughout the empirical region. Wars with Venice, Russia and Safavids allowed the Ottoman Empire to conquer wider regions of territory throughout the Middle East and Europe. By the 1500s, the Empire had expanded well into Europe, toward Russia and into the mid-East regions (see Fig. 1).

These holdings in land and wealth would continue into the late 18th Century, when “the sick man of Europe” began experiencing a loss of its stronghold (Findley 2010). Due to changes within the Empire and “decentralization” of its governance, along with the expansion of European powers, American independence, wars with Russia, and Napoleonic invasion in Egypt, the Ottoman land hold began to diminish. Failed treaties, Janissary rebellions and lost battles weakened the Empire, and permitted regions once held by the Empire be slowly and methodically carved away to a new nation or taken by another European power (Shaw 1976 and Findley 2010).

As the Empire continued to weaken, a series of events occurred that would seal the fate of the Ottomans at the beginning of the 20th Century. World War I, as well as the Young Turks Rebellion, played a large part in the loss of the balance of Ottoman territory and power. As is common with many revolutions, the Young Turks proceeded with an attempt to overthrow and revolt upon a resistance to taxation and corruption in the government of Constantinople, the Ottoman capitol (Zurcher 2019). By this time, Greece
had already won its independence and Albania, Macedonia, Armenia within the Balkans were forcing constitutional reform within the Empire. This revolution influenced other regions to spark rebellions, along with the Italo-Turkish War just prior to World War I, further spurred on the demise of the Ottomans as a global force (Ahmad 2014).

As World War I raged, the Ottomans aligned themselves with Germany, who seemed a sure victor. Germany, too, saw the alliance to be profitable in future endeavors. “Ottoman territory could be pivotal to Germany’s place in the world, connecting the German and Habsburg realms to the Near East and thus the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean” (Aksakal, 2008, 65). The Ottomans signed a “secret treaty” with Germany to ally and fight, a choice that would lead to the Empire’s final demise. The losses sustained by Germany and the Ottomans were irrefutable and, in 1920, the victors of World War I would enter into an agreement known as the Treaty of Sèvres, wherein the territories held by the Empire were divided and distributed among the war’s prevailing nations (Fig. 2).

Despite the replacement of the Treaty of Sèvres by the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, the division of Ottoman lands remained unchanged, and the land remaining the possession of the Ottoman Empire became what is known

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**Fig. 1.** Map showing the expansion of the Ottoman Empire (c. 1300–1700). Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc.
as Turkey today. The disposition of territories provided separation of Persian lands to the Middle East, Armenia to the east - which had suffered great losses characterized by most as a genocide - and provided land to the Kurds in northern Anatolia (Findley 2010). The losses were great, and it thrust the Ottomans into a period of years-long internal struggle for political and military stability. In 1923, the Sultanate form of leadership within the Empire was abolished due to the “undignified behavior” of the last Sultan, Mehmed VI Vahdettin, who was exiled until his death. A new republic was declared on October 23, 1923, and the nation of Turkey was established (Feroz 1993).

Fig. 2. Map of Treaty of Sèvres. Armenpress.

A Nation in Development

For the first time in over 600 years, the new republic would function as a national body, no longer ruled as an Islamic Caliphate. The new ruler, Mustafa Kemal, “preferred to create a new ideology and symbols which would permit Turkey to progress rapidly into the twentieth century” (Feroz 1993 56). In the years that followed Turkey’s establishment, the government began to refine its diplomatic and foreign policies with European nations. Ankara, the new capital of the nation worked to strengthen ties with Moscow and looked to Italy for diversified relations. This developmental period would continue through to nearly the middle of the century, when the second World War would overtake Europe. By that time, Turkey had begun to identify its culture through a religious lens, replacing sharia code with laws based upon a more Western code (Swiss Italian and German law models), and replacing Arabic as the written language with Latin, rendering a majority of the population
illiterate (Feroz 1993). Following World War II, a series of political parties controlled the government of Turkey, witnessed a coup d’état in 1960, another in 1971, and a third in 1980. The time between the 1960s and 1980s was a politically charged time for Turkey. The Justice Party, Democratic Party, Republican Reliance Party, Welfare Party and the Nationalist Action Party all strove for power at different times of this transition period, while the current leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, was beginning his political career (Feroz 1993).

**Recep Tayyip Erdoğan**

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was born in 1954 in Istanbul, Turkey. After receiving his graduation diploma from Marmara University’s Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences in 1981, he began a career in politics, which was notably delayed due to the 1980 coup. However, by 1983, the newest political party, the Welfare Party, was established and Erdoğan appointed Beyoğlu District Head (Biography 2021). The Welfare Party, successor to the National Salvation Party, is an Islamist-based organization. “[T]he Welfare Party fit the classic definition of a ‘populist’ movement as the mobilization of the urban poor by the minority segments of the upper and middle classes into action against the status quo” (Gülalp 2001, 434).

During his initial tenure with the party, Erdoğan touts, in his biography, working to engage women and youth in politics, and bringing awareness of the new party to the Turkish masses. By 1994, Erdoğan was elected Mayor of Istanbul. Focusing upon reforms for critical infrastructure and social issues within the City, as well as financial concerns. In 1997, the leader incited religious discord by reading controversial poetry and was imprisoned, ending his Mayoral term (Mays 2017). Upon release from prison, Erdoğan reestablished his political career and by 2001 saw to the development of the Justice and Development Party (AKP Party), which became the “sole ruling party” of Turkey by 2002 (Biography 2021). In 2003, Erdoğan became the Prime Minister of Turkey, was re-elected in 2007 and 2011 in that parliamentary elections for that position. In 2014, Erdoğan was elected as President of the nation and, in 2018, under a constitutionally amended system, was elected the first President of the Presidential System of Government (Biography 2021).

In between his two most recent elections to power, the President’s position was challenged in a July 2016 coup d’état attempt where unknown factions used military forces to storm the capitol of Ankara and city of Istanbul, as well as television stations. It was also declared that a new constitution was being written. Erdoğan, was on vacation at the time and hurried back to Ankara and thwarted the coup attempt overnight (BBC News, 2016). The leader had called upon his supporters to take to the streets and stop the overthrow. The President accused a Muslim cleric, Fethulleh Gülen, self-exiled in the United States, or organizing the coup. Gülen and his supporters in the United States have been tormented and threatened since that time by Erdoğan supporters,
despite a lack of proof of Gülen’s participation in the coup Adely, 2019). The attempt at a coup d’état is indicative of a deeper issue within Turkey and the leadership of Erdoğan. It signals a deep cleavage in the nation and has identified the President as an autocratic governor and a pugnacious leader who is quick to argue.

Research has indicated a change in Turkey’s foreign policy since President Erdoğan’s rise to power and, more notably, since the attempted overthrow in 2016. Specifically, the modified policy underscored a draw toward Russia, deviance from Western powers such as the United States and leading European nations, and a more independent role in affairs in the Middle East (Haugom 2019). The President has exhibited a willingness to extend military operations beyond its national borders and engage in a more “transactional and interest-based” relationship with other nations (Haugom 2019, 211). Additionally, Turkey has deviated from prior policy regarding the EU, making failed plays to join the alliance. Any attempt to join has been opposed, due to questionable human rights treatments of individuals, both home and abroad, by Turkey (BBC News, 2020). One of the most notable interactions with the EU involved the negotiation of an agreement with the Union regarding management and compensation to republic for harboring the Syrian refugees, affirming the “transactional” nature of the country’s policies under Erdoğan.

**Syrian Refugee Crisis**

Unrest and civil war in neighboring Syria began in or around March of 2011. The conflict plagued the country and, due to the violent and inhumane conditions millions of citizens began to exit the country into neighboring nations. Syria shares its entire northern border with Turkey which resulted in the influx of approximately four million of Syrian’s migrants looking for protection and a better life. This emigration into Turkey, however, thrust the country into great societal and economic dilemmas. This predicament forced President Erdoğan to establish policies, including closing its border with Syria and engaging in diplomatic negotiations and, ultimately, to take a hard line with the EU.

At the initial onset of the crisis, Turkey enacted an “open door policy” and established refugee camps to house migrant populations (Koca 2016). Erdoğan’s initial strategy was reflective of his belief the migrants would return to Syria upon conclusion of the war (Haugom 2019). After years of turmoil, and by 2016, Turkey expressed the need for assistance to support the ever-growing refugee population. Erdoğan compelled the EU through words and actions for help. An agreement was negotiated between the coalition and Erdoğan wherein “the EU offered Ankara 6 billion euros ($7.1 billion) to help Syrian refugees and other incentives to prevent people from leaving Turkey to go to Europe” (Cook 2021).

Initially, “the agreement ... brought social benefits to Syrian ref-
ugees in Turkey and their host communities, financial benefits to Turkey by alleviating its burden, and political benefits to EU politicians by reducing the flow of refugees” (Dempsey 2017). Since that time, however, President Erdoğan has endured a lengthier time of responsibility for the migrants and has chosen to take a strict position with the EU regarding the refugees. In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic took hold, prompting Erdoğan to urge the Syrian population to move toward the border with Greece. This move proved manipulative on behalf of the Turkish government, with reporting by migrants they were told by the Turkish government that the Greek border would be open to them. Upon arrival, however, the Syrians were turned back by the Greeks and treated poorly (The Guardian 2020). Recent discussions between EU leaders and President Erdoğan have resulted in new agreements, despite vocal hesitation by many EU nations due to the manipulative and autocratic behavior of President Erdoğan.

Literature Review

Introduction and Background

Erdoğan is an intriguing political character for study and, while he has a great deal of supporters within the country of Turkey, he also has a large group of adversaries. Erdoğan is heavily motivated by his ideological beliefs in the Islamic faith. He is driven by his identification as a Muslim first, before he is Turkish. Many of his policies and support for nation stem from this association. His psychological drivers are ripe for assessment based upon the three theories noted above.

The republic of Turkey is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), yet has never been admitted to the European Union (BBC News, 2020). The President consistently establishes policies that are controversial, such as his expression of support for force against Bashar Assad and the Islamic State in Syria. In an interview with France 24, Erdoğan stated his frustration with comments made by the reporter regarding “Daish” being referred to as the Islamic State. President Erdoğan commented how it was unfair to refer to a terrorist organization as an Islamic State, since it is disrespectful to the religion of Islam. He further expressed a lack of support for Assad, and no confidence in him and his leadership. The President stated he believes in the right to life, and Assad has no respect for his people's rights to life (France 24, 2015).

Erdoğan has exhibited force against Kurds within Turkey and around the globe. Kurds make up approximately 20% of the population of Turkey, yet they are unable to qualify their existence since there is no “ethnic qualification” allowed in Turkey (Totten, 2015, 5). It is believed that the Turkish President fears Kurds within Turkey shall join with Kurds in Syria and stage an uprising within Turkey. Kurds have historically been tamped down in the nation, since the Ottoman Empire, and continue to be oppressed and silenced. The Turkish government does not allow the Kurdish language in schools and has
moved populations of Kurds to remote parts of the country, causing a “cultural genocide” (Totten, 2015). Recent foreign policies include a long-standing feud with Greece regarding pipelines being run through the Turkish continental shelves, and maritime rights and air space in the Mediterranean with regard to oil stores (Aljazeera, 2021). These policies are evident and explainable through a review of President Erdoğan’s actions and the psychological drivers. Most concerning is the policy surrounding the Syrian refugee crisis. A review of the literature pertaining to the theoretical bases for these drivers and application to the subject will provide additional insight to conduct a predictive analysis to provide strategic guidance for policy recommendations.

**Psychological Constructivism**

Richard Ned Lebow, in his book, “A Cultural Theory of International Relations” examines the political actor through a lens of psychological and self-described as “open-ended” and “fundamental”. He embraces motivations for action on the ever-changing momentum of society, and the need for actors to “push for change on the basis of reflection on their lives and the lessons of the past” (Lebow 2008, 506). His theory further develops the notion that individuals are not born into a set of goals and motives, but that those are developed within the political actor over time.

More specific drivers noted by Lebow include self-esteem, and basic human needs such as appetite, spirit, fear and reason. His concepts, rooted in Greek philosophy, indicate these psychological drivers appeal to the emotional nature of individuals rather than the basic logic of a computer. He draws from real-world examples to identify these qualities in leaders and historical context to identify these psychological drivers at play (Lebow 2008).

In “The arrival of psychological constructivism,” Jacques E.C. Hymans evaluates the theory of psychological constructivism further in terms of international behavior. The author challenges some of the works of Richard Ned Lebow and makes very valid points regarding the application of psychology in international relations and foreign policy. Hymans asserts the motivations for behaviors cannot be denied; “security, appetite, and self-esteem . . . are exogenous to rational choice models” (Hymans, 2010, 462). Underlying drivers of basic human nature form our psychological beliefs and needs. Given these as truths, our inherent needs will inform how individuals deal with others, both within our own society and external through to other societies. The article continues to reflect in contradiction to Lebow’s theory to reinforce states are rational in the assertion that states are not so. States are “hierarchical” groups formed of individuals; individuals who are driven by the motivating behaviors noted. Therefore, states are conglomerations of emotional, influenced creatures driven to act and enact policies based upon those motives. International actors, motivated by their basic human needs and emotion cannot, therefore, be rational. Those individuals cannot rightly identify why they do what they
do; they simply do. This negates the Lebow theory of reason, in many ways. The needs identified such as security, appetite and self-esteem, will drive leaders to strive to ensure their constituents and citizens within their jurisdictions are guaranteed. Under this theory, those basic human needs will most certainly influence the policies enacted within domestic and international systems.

“Rethinking Democracy and International Peace: Perspectives from Political Psychology” evaluate another aspect of psychological constructivism as the works discussed above. Previous discussions regarding the perception of Authors, Hermann and Kegley, evaluate methods of national leaders and discuss how these heads of state perceive other democratic leaders may enact policies as they do if their values are similar. Due to this notion, these states will be less inclined to participate in “aggressive” foreign policy with those nations generally inclined to have similar values. Additionally, during extreme circumstances, those heads of state will be given more latitude as a result of their moderate and tolerant actions.

Hermann and Kegley provide additional insight in democratic identification through their description that these beliefs create a culture of identity that include ingroups and outgroups. The ingroups’ perception of the outgroups involves “whether the other government is viewed as complying with the values and norms that fit the leader’s conception of a “good group member,” or whether the other leaders are perceived as permitting and condoning behavior that is not faithful to “our community’s” values and norms” (Hermann and Kegley, 1995, 519). If the authors are correct in this theory, and additionally apply the concept of Hyman’s theory that nation states are formed of a hierarchy of individuals, these moral guides inherent to our being will then drive nations to form alliances with other states of similar beliefs.

Finally, David Patrick Houghton reviews social constructivism and its role within foreign policy analysis. A review of literature in this regard provides a similar framework as the perceptions noted above. His work states, in part, that when leaders view each other in peace and looking towards peace, the “major obstacle toward stable security cooperation [is] removed” (Houghton 2007, 29). When one perceives another comes in peace, a social construct has made peace possible, and it can be so. Houghton further discusses prior works on constructivism and the “structure/agency” problem. That is, a determination of the true value and effect a leader may have upon actual outcomes of policy and government. That dilemma exists within psychological constructivism, since these theories indicate policies written and enacted based upon perceptions, basic forces and instinct (Houghton 2007).

Rational Actor Theory

Further support for the underlying theory of psychological drivers influencing leaders and global actors are authors Monroe and Maher. In the article, “Psychology and Rational Actor Theory”, the
authors state that “[i]nsofar as we are cultural beings, the range of actions we even consider when making choices is quite constrained” (Monroe and Maher, 1995, 11). Within their discussion, they assert the proposition that humans are not inclined to make decisions based upon conscious choice; rather, their choices are determined based upon inherent cores. Their writing further dives in the evaluation of how moral values and the natural human basis of influences drives our decisions through a subconscious way. Choice is somewhat removed as a factor in the decision-making process, and basic nature takes hold. The theory then follows that there would be a lack of conscious decision-making processes (Monroe and Maher, 1995). The authors are not insinuating there is not thought involved, however, it indicates that our moral bases to which individuals are predisposed drive us to act a certain way. These ideals are, therefore, rational to us. The authors point to many different historical situations and contexts in which alliances and unions of nations formed by similar viewpoints and political policies may be identified. Preservation of moral values and ideologies are innate. The desire to protect those values drive individuals to those sharing a similar goal and viewpoint is inherent. Desires to strengthen one’s position through alliances and joint efforts with others and many more like-minded individuals is indicative of the rational actor theory discussed herein.

On the other side of this coin exists a theory of rational actors that may be distinguished through an evaluation of opposing behaviors. In Mercer’s article “Rationality and Psychology in International Politics”, he reviews rationality and the application of political psychology to understanding biases and their effect upon the rational actor. Cognitive biases can and do exist within government. Mercer’s reviews these biases and their application in policy development with the contention that “[a]nalysts must know what is rational before they can know what is not rational” (Mercer, 2005, 89). Mercer goes on to explain, as well, how despite a rational process to determine policy, it can still have an unfavorable outcome. This is due to the fact that application of rationality may produce a judgment, that judgment is based upon those factors that the individual renders rational based upon their own inherent codes and biases and, therefore, may still not meet the final objective and desired result (Mercer 2005).

Social Identity Theory

The concept of a social identity in psychology places a value on an individual through association with a group or category of individuals. Stets and Burke examine this process, through a comparison to identity theory, in “Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory”. The authors assert that in evaluating oneself, by engaging in a process of self-classification, an individual may place oneself in a group or category, thereby forming an identity. This theory provides a return to the mentality of the ingroup, as being part of a social category will inject an individual into their perceived ingroup. Additionally, Stets and Burke
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indicate that, once associated with the group, individuals will most usually assimilate to the ways of the group, behave as others within the group, and differentiate him or herself from the outgroup.

The authors continue their discussion by distinguishing roles and identities within their groups. They note, specifically, how “[p]eople are tied organically to their groups through social identities; they are tied mechanically through their role identities within groups” (Stets and Burke, 2000, 228).

An important aspect of social identity theory, according to these researchers, involves the depersonalization of the individual. The theory goes on to state that, once a social identity is created and activated by the individual, a resultant acceptance of the membership in the group and behavior with the group will occur. These behaviors are indicated through “group phenomena” such as group action, cooperation and cohesiveness (Stets and Burke 2000). These types of activities result in self-esteem, consistency and efficacy, a theme that has been underlying other theoretical discussion herein.

Christopher J. Devine takes social identity theory one step further in the development of the group mentality. “Ideological Social Identity: Psychological Attachment to Ideological in-Groups as a Political Phenomenon and a Behavioral Influence” investigates the role of ideology in political groups and association of the self. The author purports that ideology is a reliable and influential identifier of group designation and behavior (Devine 2014). He reiterates the basic underlying tenet that individuals define themselves by the group in which they belong and that their basic desire for involvement and positive imagery will provide the basis for this group identification. These associations feed self-esteem and belonging, which psychologically motivates oneself to maintain the group’s ideological standards and ideals through fulfillment of group activities. This theory is specifically applicable when discussing domestic and foreign policies, and individuals’ adherence to an ideological group membership.

Alfred Evans goes one step further in evaluating ideology and its role in social identity theory, a concept central to the study of President Erdoğan. In “Ideological Change under Vladimir Putin in the Perspective of Social Identity Theory”, Evans reflects upon Putin’s conservative ideology at certain times of his political career, and significant changes that occurred during the course of his leadership. The author outlines certain types of “identity management strategies” that leaders use to augment national self-esteem (Evans 2015). Social mobility, social competition and social creativity may exist at different levels within the individual but will be employed in order to elevate the group and social identity to a new level when a negative identity exists. These three management strategies are crucial to the examination of President Erdoğan and are reviewed in more detail during the discussion of the leader.
Theoretical Framework

To establish a basis for the argument and to justify suggested solutions to the research problem posed, several forms of research and review will be utilized. Much of the research performed and literature written pertain specifically to examination of psychological theories and their application to foreign policy theory and group and intergroup relationships. Much of the literature is contemporary and provides recent analyses of subjects adequately suited for comparison to the subject studied herein. A study of the theories noted above and application of factual circumstances of the subject’s behaviors and actions will be reviewed comparatively. A determination of whether these psychological theories have relevance to Turkey’s leader and, if so, whether they provide an insight into the driving forces behind his policies pertaining to the Syrian refugee crises. The discussion of these theories and the evaluation of the particular subject’s actions and behaviors follows.

Findings and Analysis

Having reviewed the theoretical bases for psychological evaluation within foreign policy, President Erdoğan can be studied within the framework established through that lens. Establishing a baseline of the personality and psychological drivers of the leader can provide a general understanding of his underlying motivational factors. “Personality traits affect an individual’s motivation, goals, and values, thereby providing criteria to evaluate external stimuli” (Schoen, 2007, 412).

As previously discussed, Erdoğan is heavily motivated by his ideological religious beliefs, which is not surprising due to the origins of Turkey in the Ottoman Empire, which was a religiously based crusade movement and government. Therefore, much of his policies and support for nations stems from this association. Social identity theory provides a basis for this evaluation, in Erdoğan’s association and his identification as Muslim and disassociation with other cultural groups within Turkey, such as the Turkish nationals and Kurds. Additional studies pertaining to culture where rivalries may exist within two nations are comparative and provide deeper context. Suedfeld and Jhangiani’s study on India and Pakistan identify that, despite a shared history that extends centuries long, can still result in ingroups and outgroups and social identities that conflict (Suedfeld and Jhangiani, 2009).

A review of interviews and social media posts, as well as the leader’s Biography on the nation’s website presents the profile of a devote Muslim who speaks genuinely of his desire to support other Islamic nations and protect welfare and humanity. However, evidence has actually shown that Erdoğan has condemned people within Turkey for having differing views, and since the 2016 coup “more than 50,000 people have been detained, including many soldiers, journalists, lawyers, police officers, academics and Kurdish politicians” (BBC News, 2020). The leader’s
tolerance of condemnation of the out-group, however, further confirms the behavior of the President to be in line with social identity theory’s contention that an individual will support the group through behavior and activity in line with furthering the ingroup and to “stigmatize” the outgroup as much as possible (Evans 2015, 412).

As discussed earlier, psychological constructivism and rational actor theory hinge upon the actor’s belief that he or she can solely impact policy and have an effect upon government. Leaning upon the writings of Fred I. Greenstein in “The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away Underbrush”, Erdoğan presents as an individual who believes he can likely impact policy and governmental actions on his own. Greenstein states, “the impact of an individual’s actions varies with (1) the degree to which the actions take place in an environment which admits of restructuring (2) the location of the actor in that environment, and (3) the actor’s peculiar strength or weaknesses” (Greenstein, 1967, 633-634). Political history confirms this exists for the leader in some way. Erdoğan secured, albeit marginally, a constitutional amendment necessary to effectuate a new form of presidency and democracy in the country. While many argue that this change was only to cement a longer rule over Turkey, the President was successful in garnering the support of his party and citizens of Turkey to vote favorably for the action. Greenstein’s theory confirms Erdoğan’s ability to bring some sort of modification and lasting change in an environment that admits to re-structuring, the location of Erdoğan in the government in the position of influence, and his own strength to influence his people to vote for the governmental structure change.

Additional evidence of the President’s far-reaching influence includes the 2015 establishment of a Muslim party, the Parti Egalité Justice (“Equality and Justice Party”; PEJ), a network of European political parties developed the Turkish leader as an off shoot of his own party, the AKP. It is argued he established this network to provide influence throughout European nations and its Muslim population. This continued identification by the leader with his ideological group first, rather than a nationalist view, provides valuable context (Phil’s Stock World 2017).

Psychological constructivism discussed by Hermann and Hagan further consider how leaders who tend to avoid conflict domestically may seek to accommodate foreign policy (Hermann and Hagan, 1998). Erdoğan is a leader who has demonstrated a tendency to welcome conflict on both fronts. This is evidenced by his consistent engagement in disputes with the EU, especially Greece and Germany, and domestically with the Kurds and the supporters of Gülen. Drawing from this evidence, it is supported that how leaders view themselves within the leadership realm is of the utmost importance to their identification of themselves and within the group. Erdoğan, while not narcissistic per se, has an unyielding confidence and portrays himself in that manner. He is, therefore, taken seriously and respected
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(or feared) as a global leader, despite the disagreement with many in the west and Middle East. In 2016, the leader took on the United Nation’s Security Council by challenging the UN to reconstruct due to the lack of any Muslim country leaders on the council, adding that “Muslim countries should resolve their problems themselves” (Hafizoglu 2016).

Erdoğan’s basic drivers, and underlying personality and leadership styles, were reviewed in a study performed in 2011, which identifies many of the obvious traits of the President. The authors, Görner and Ucal, correctly note that many times foreign policy is expressed without “any consideration of the individuals who occupy key government offices” (Görner and Ucal, 2011, 358). However, literature on political psychology has shown, this is not true. Hermann and Kegley discuss democratic identification, and how ingroups’ perception of outgroups involves “whether the other government is viewed as complying with the values and norms that fit the leader’s conception of a “good group member,” or whether the other leaders are perceived as permitting and condoning behavior that is not faithful to “our community’s” values and norms” (Hermann and Kegley, 1995, 519). Erdoğan’s consistent association to his political part, based in ideological Islam and rooted in his basic needs to maintain that Muslim way of life drives his policies, both domestically and internationally.

Finally, as discussed above, President Erdoğan has long identified himself as a Muslim first, and Turkish second. Research further indicates how religious stability is desired by those who associate with an ideological basis, as that stability group identity of moral and ritualistic frameworks which are confirmed through historical constructs. This strong linkage to a religious group connects President Erdoğan in a way that reduces his ability to highlight those parts of his belief system and align to a nationalist belief. Erdoğan’s consistent oppression of Kurds in the region, despite a 2013 speech in which the leader indicated “we are a government that has trampled on every kind of nationalism” provides confirmation of this argument (Butler, 2021).

Returning to the crisis at hand and subject of discussion herein, President Erdoğan is obviously a leader driven by his basic code as a Muslim; ideological and true to his ingroup, acting in line with theoretical bases inherent to support the group and distinguish it from outgroups that do not identity similarly. Self-esteem and basic human needs of security and spirit motivate this leader to act. The Syrian refugee crisis has plunged Turkey in a state of need and confusion. Millions of individuals have been living in the country for nearly a decade, with no end in sight. Negotiations and agreements with the EU to harbor these migrants provided immediate, yet temporary relief, and conditions cannot and have not been maintained to provide security and well-being for the migrant refugees or the Turkish. Additionally, the policy and international relations of Turkey with its bordering nations has suffered due to the prolonged nature of the crisis.
In October 2019, the President launched a military objective against Kurdish forces in an effort to clear an area in northern Syria to allow for the resurgence of citizens into that region. Erdoğan believed that the establishment of a safe zone within the originating country would provide some relief for up to three million refugees. The offensive action resulted from failed further support by the EU, and the removal of troops by the US in the region that allowed the attacks to commence (Bathke 2019). Erdoğan’s planned safe zone is imagined as depicted in Fig. 3 below.

![Safe zone proposal](image)

**Fig. 3.** Safe zone proposal. (Bathke 2019).

As the President’s hopes for a safe zone failed to develop, and the COVID-19 pandemic took hold, in early 2020, the leader began to threaten mobilization of migrants to the Greek border. By March of that year, buses of refugees were waiting at the entrance to Greece and met with resistance and cruel treatment. Backlash from Greece against the leader came quickly, throwing the countries into further disagreement. Again, in April 2021, “Greece accused Turkey on Friday of trying to provoke it by attempting to push boats carrying migrants into Greek waters, a claim Ankara strongly rejected” (Reuters 2021). Greece insists witnesses viewed Turkish Coast Guard ships assisting the migrant vessels into Greek waters and warned the Turkish government to stand down on the practices. Greece called on Turkey to adhere to the previous agreement with the EU.

The question remains as to whether Syrian refugees will ever return to their native country even after the war concludes. A new deal with the EU does not seem forthcoming and Turkey, its citizenry and the migrants themselves have been thrust into a forced relationship of reliance and trust. Policies must be adjusted and approach to the leader...
conducted in a manner based upon an evaluation of the psychological factors discussed through the theoretical evaluation herein.

**Recommendations**

- **Appeal to the leader’s innate and inherent desire to protect his Muslim ideological bases.** As indicated above, social identity theory contains a facet of ideological approach that drives individuals and, specifically, President Erdoğan. The evidence of his identification of himself as a Muslim in priority to Turkish nationalism provides a basis to leverage those ideals and ideological beliefs in establishing a policy to satisfy his need to protect the citizens of his country. Appealing to the leader’s ideological beliefs, ensuring that policies proposed and agreed-upon protect these ideological bases and reassurance that the needs of the Muslim citizenry will be met will promote a policy with the President that may be more acceptable and enforceable in the future. Recognition of this priority within President Erdoğan shall provide greater applicability to the leader’s social identity. Establishment of an agreement to support his citizenry, identifying the need to protect Islamic values and institutions first, may be key to successfully negotiating an agreement. Revisiting a safe zone and path to return Syrian refugees to their native land would play well into the Muslim leader’s identification with another Muslim state’s citizenry and desire to keep individuals with their ideological groups. Allowing these migrants into Europe would dispel the Islamic faith, however, through Europe, also reinforcing his identified desire to influence European culture and politics, as has been evidenced.

- **Inherent and basic needs drive the rational actor to establish policy.** While the Syrian refugees are also assumed to be Muslim, Erdoğan is also motivated to establish policies as a rational actor. As evidenced in research and literature regarding this theory, most do not recognize the forces underlying actions and behaviors. This theory provides the understand that preservation of moral values and basic needs must be foremost to the development of any policy. In line with the suggested course of action above, ensuring that financial, social and cultural needs are met is imperative to successful policy.

- **Unidentified and other political factors may be at play.** The readings indicated above prove that leaders do not always identify the reasons why they act, and for which the policies they enforce. The President is obviously concerned with the financial and cultural impact the refugees have taken upon his Turkish citizens and the country as a whole. Having negotiated a financial deal with the EU that provided monetary relief in support of the refugees
has confirmed this assumption. It has failed in Erdoğan's eyes, however, or he is using the presence of these displaced individuals as chess pieces in order to manipulate the EU and other nations to provide other forms of political restitution for his harboring of these individuals. There are many underlying disagreements with the country of Greece that seem to have played into the President's recent attempts to flood the borders with migrants. A long-standing feud and failed attempts to rectify these issues due to the impacts upon other facets of the politician's psyche may be drivers to this activity. Further study and an exercise in evaluating further these policies and the political ramifications of a lack of further address is necessary.

**Conclusion**

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is a complex leader who is controversial and viewed by many on the global stage as one who will “push the limits” of domestic and foreign policy in order to make strides for his country. He has proven this through the early stages of his career which saw vast economic growth, as well as the 2018 passage of a constitutional amendment to allow ground-breaking political structural changes. His alliances seem born from identification as Muslim, rather than Turkish; a cultural and inherent core value instilled in him from upbringing. His nationalist identity is secondary to that of his ideological social identity, which drives him to support organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Muslim nations outside of Turkey rather than the entire people that encompass his nation. These traits form the leader one that rules for some, but not for all, in a new democratic presidency that still does not seem quite democratic.

The study conducted herein has provided a basis to evaluate the leader's psychological code and forces that drive him to establish policies for his nation. When looking at the theories presented, psychological constructivism, rational actor theory and social identity theory, it is evident that President Erdoğan is a man that is not as complex as may originally be thought. His actions, words and policies speak volumes of his nature and the group with which he identifies most. His policies are protective of that group and his domestic and foreign policies display and nearly betray his allegiances in a predictable manner.

A man driven by basic needs and protective nature of his Muslim people, one who is ambitious and motivated to seek extension of his policies throughout Europe, can be addressed through those factors. As noted above, while the leader's attempts to join the EU may have been stunted, he has found other avenues to influence governments throughout the Union, by extending his party to other nations. Using the refugees within Turkey to negotiate financial dealings, and to threaten EU nations with a release of these people have brought attention and reaction to Turkey in a manner that may seem undip-
diplomatic to most; yet necessary to him, evident due to the threatening nature the influx of these individuals have had upon his society and culture. The review provided herein, and subsequent recommendations, may provide a basis for future dealings of a more informed and intuitive nature. Ever-changing political landscapes and societal and cultural concerns will influence the leader, however, as indicated in this review, basic ideological core codes and inherent needs will never change and, with that, a firm policy approach may be taken.

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How We Lost the Information War of 2028

Dan “Plato” Morabito

Abstract

Recent US military strategy focuses on a return to Great Power Competition and a recommitment to Large Scale Combat Operations using physical capabilities that were successful in previous military conflicts such as Desert Storm. However, ubiquitous connectivity and the internet of things have nearly eliminated the effect of distance and made geography irrelevant within the information domain. This allows adversaries to bypass traditional military defenses while establishing a presence in American homes and businesses, delivering their content directly to US citizens through their smart phones and devices. The US government’s power comes from those it represents, which makes the attitudes, knowledge, and beliefs of the American people a national center of gravity. “How We Lost the Information War of 2028” uses recent historical events tempered by potential technological advances to postulate a potential arc of history in which China successfully uses Information Warfare to achieve its national interests at the expense of the American people while staying below the threshold of traditional war. It is a warning from the future about today’s adversary, an enemy that lies at your fingertip.

Keywords: Information Warfare, China, Social, Red Team, Future

Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur.

—Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air

Introduction

The following is a transcript from “The Peoples’ Ascendancy” speech delivered by the Great Leader via the secure BeiDou-Quant-Secure network to Most-Favored Party Members on New Year’s Eve, 2028.
to blind. The world’s wealth and future belongs to the party!

Today, we incinerate the last bit of warmth out of the remaining worthless American dollars we can find. We give them to our poorest to feed their ovens so they can cook their meat and bread; they are the tinder we use to heat the Great House of our People. *E pluribus unum* is destroyed. They are “one” no longer, and we are strong and unified.

It is America’s time for humiliation. Do you know that we sent them a pallet of treasure today? Yes, we sent their capital museum a gift from one of our “philanthropic cultural outreach-es:” a pallet of Iraqi Dinar, a dozen ventilators, and the American flag we recovered from the Moon! All delivered aboard a Lockheed, P-3 Orion. All reminders of decades of poor decisions by western leadership. My dear friends, you won’t see this in their news because we won’t allow it. Their embarrassment would be too great. Nor will we use it as propaganda for our people . . . yet. But their leaders know, as we’ve known for a long time, that these were elements of their undoing. This is justice.

America was guilty, as they were so many times before, of ignoring the fight they were in. Their prophet told them as much in 1996 and again in 2010, but they relied on hope as a strategy and believed that their money, technology, and superior “human capital” would save them.¹ We now own all of this. They chose not to see what we saw, that global connectivity had not only flattened the world but shrunk it and, in doing so, profoundly changed the character of war itself. Of course, how could they accept this change when they were blinded and fooled by their presupposed strengths, ethnocentrism, and wishful thinking!

We never wanted a great war. We knew we didn’t need a war to achieve our goals and that such a foolish inferno would only play into America’s strengths while destroying both of us. We knew that great wars make weak winners.

We never wanted what they called “Large Scale Combat Operations,” and we told them, over and over, with our investments in ballistic missiles, hypersonics, and carrier-killer missiles, that this would not be the way. Yet they trained and optimized for it. They focused on every shiny thing that we showed them. Rather than using the wisdom of water and avoiding our strong points while focusing where we are weak, they obsessed with overcoming every obstacle we placed in front of them.² Regardless of the advantage of our geography, organic manufacturing, and land-based, long-range defense systems, they kept building force projection platforms for an expensive, far-away shooting war in our backyard that we never intended to fight. So, in the People’s wisdom, we asked ourselves what decision we wanted the Americans to make, and how we could make this decision easier for them. We decided to set a new Thucydides trap, but one with our special characteristics. They would immolate themselves. We would distract and deter them while the real fight would happen below the threshold of war, on our terms, in their country,
and using the weapons that we chose; the tools of our fathers. We would delay and distract them while using our magic weapons and preparing our assassin’s mace.\(^3\)

Shall I remind you of how we got here?

The world shunned us in 1989 for the heroic stance we took that June against the student protest movement. We responded by retrenching back to our revolutionary roots to convince the world of our good intentions and deeds by using the tools of our fathers. We remembered Mao’s concept of “making the foreign serve China” by cultivating foreign friends who could promote our talking points and carry our image of economic opportunity and good will to other nations.\(^4\) We remembered his magic weapons.\(^5\)

In 1991, we renamed our External Propaganda Leading Group to the boring but friendly “State Council Information Office,” though internally we still called it by its original name. We expanded its mission from encouraging our diaspora to finding ways to directly influence the attitudes and behaviors of other nations.\(^6\) Through its Ministry of Culture and Tourism, we brought foreigners into our country. Free trips for journalists, politicians, and social influencers drew them from abroad and we worked hard to cultivate relationships and dependencies while showing them only the China that we wanted to reflect to the world. We ensured they could be called upon to present a non-critical view of China when their grassroots foreign support was needed.\(^7\)

That spring we watched them in their first Iraqi war, and we were disturbed and inspired by their precision, high-technology weapons.\(^8\) We watched carefully as they integrated their air force and navy with ground maneuver to crush the fourth largest army in the world. We watched how they used their international instruments of power to build a “coalition of the willing” to destroy their enemy. Their success was amazing, yet in the years that followed they seemed to miss the most important lesson that we saw; that the Iraqi army had prepared itself to fight a different kind of war; a kind of war made obsolete by technology, communications, and integration. We resolved that we would never be the ill-prepared “Iraqi army” in an American narrative of “liberation.” No, the global narrative would be our rejuvenation; a return to where we belong. They would have a role to play in our story, but we would define it for them. We were awake and paying attention.

At the same time we sensed our destiny was approaching, that our hundred years of humiliation would soon be redeemed. We started the long march towards the reunification and prosperity of our nation, but soon saw that the path would be frustrated by the Americans.

We looked for opportunities to assert our claims, and we found them. In 1996 we expressed our freedom of action, one-nation policy, and growing strength by test-firing missiles into the Taiwan Strait. The Americans responded by flashing their shiniest weapons,
escalating the situation nearly into war by sending two US Carrier Battle Groups into the region. Our anger grew as they bullied us for, at the time, we could not deter such firepower. It was clear that America would fight according to its strengths. We would fight according to ours, and according to our larger plan. We became determined to build stand-off weapons that could destroy or disable such a flotilla, and that would dissuade America’s ships from coming near our shores. We decided that we would prepare for the bully in the West and build our defense locally, at a fraction of the price it cost the Americans to send their billion-dollar steel coffins into our waters. As the meeker nation, we accepted the truth that strong countries make the rules while rising ones break them and exploit loopholes. While the Americans pursued their revolution in military operations and technology, we would pursue a revolution in military thought. 9 We would perfect a new way of fighting.

America spoke back to us overseas and in the air. They insulted us in 1999 when they violated our sovereignty and barbarously slaughtered our embassy staff in Yugoslavia. In 2000, their newly elected president’s rhetoric escalated to that of “strategic competition” with us, yet they didn’t seem to realize that competition taken to its natural extreme is war. 10 In early 2001 they overplayed their hand when they recklessly killed one of our pilots and accidentally delivered to us one of their P-3 Orion spy planes, while clearly violating our sovereignty. 11 How foolish of them to not understand our history, yet project to the world that our culture was abhorrent. The truth of the full extent of the nation we were rebuilding was ignored by them, and they continued to ignore our warnings. These were but a few events in a long line of insults to our people.

Then a small but radical ideological enemy attacked the United States, and we watched and learned as they invaded Afghanistan and Iraq and refocused their military on a new type of war, a gradual shift towards “Military Operations Other Than War” and counterinsurgency. We watched happily as they spent their technological advantages against a pitifully weaker enemy. Their policies and politics demanded things from their military that were contrary to the nature of war. 12 We were shocked at how efficiently and foolishly they centralized their command and control functions into their Air Operations Centers for persistent, air-enabled fights. We studied how they communicated, and the evolution of their use of unmanned aerial vehicles. We watched as they fumbled in the information domain, multiplying their enemies with each misstep, and undermining their credibility and image across the world. Finally, we studied this “War on Terror” and used it to update our plans while executing our own counter-terror operations locally by defeating our thought enemies and advancing our nationalist morality within our own country.

And we found ways to confound their strength while building our own. We sent our first manned mission to space in 2003, and then showed how easily we could bring any space asset
down with our first anti-satellite launch in 2007. Yes, this was bold, but distracting America with our space achievements forced them to spend more money and gained us global recognition as a space power and a force that must be reckoned with. We used our scientists and cyber forces to capture information about their experimental technologies and soon had our first space station, our “celestial palace” orbiting the earth in 2011. They wouldn’t start their Space Force for another eight years! With the exception of the United States, by 2020 we had launched more satellites into space than any other nation!

We fought an economic information war, using our people for our strength, but arming them with superior information and connectivity. The impact of the internet was a curse and blessing to the West. File sharing services like Napster and Mozilla slashed the incomes of America’s media and entertainment industries while creating an increased appetite around the world for new content. To stop the financial hemorrhaging, they developed authoritarian tools such as Digital Rights Management which controlled the access of digital information. Ironically, this demand to control access and “rights” to information by capitalists was a foreshadowing of the same technology we developed, along with our social credit score system, to firmly control access to information today. We put our people at the center of the new market that emerged as both producers and consumers. Do you know that America’s Hollywood hasn’t made a movie critical of China since 1997? How could they? Our great companies, backed by the Party, invested in their entertainment companies to ensure their fate would be tied to ours. Is it a wonder that academic and commercial publishing companies openly admit that their content is filtered through our censors prior to publication? Why would we allow access to ideas that are contrary to our principles? We pressured their institutions of higher learning to integrate our ideology through our own propaganda organizations, our great teaching institutions, and we made their taxpayers carry part of the burden by demanding that the schools pay half the cost of our propaganda centers. We even infiltrated their sports. Do you remember when the general manager of the Houston Rockets basketball team compromised his loyalty to the NBA when he tweeted support for the Hong Kong separatists? How quickly was the NBA chastised for defending his “freedom of speech!” For his tweet, we took from them $400 million. Perhaps the NBA forgot that we are their second largest market! Through Mao’s wisdom, even their trusted “greats” came to our defense as our friends, serving our interests! Of course, it helped that we’d welcomed him to our country during his off season for each of the preceding fifteen years. Would a person that truly values liberty defend an oppressive, racist organization that publicly insults our one-nation policy? Especially when the consequences include being cut off from our market! Would you bite the hand that feeds?

Most importantly, during those years we started pulling off the greatest
transfer of wealth in history!20 Through our cyber capabilities, the intellectual property of the world’s most brilliant minds was accessed and siphoned through the information environment into our research facilities at a cost to the United States of $250 billion per year for over a decade.21 Esteemed members, can you believe there were years we transferred more intellectual property value than the entire American military budget, exceeding even the combined total profits of their top fifty companies! By 2018, we were investing directly in American companies, participating in up to 16 percent of all venture capital deals for emergent technology and enticing them to move their ventures to our nation, with the catch that they were required to share their information, their intellectual property, with us.22 Of course, we’d been aggressively pulling manufacturing jobs into our country for decades, making other countries’ supply chains dependent on us and dissolving 2.4 million American jobs in the process!

By the late 2010s we captured America’s scientific and technological intellectual treasure and it restored us to the front of the line of technological nations. America was paying closer attention now and struggling to adapt to our economic information war. They replied economically, with sanctions, and tried to shame our nation by naming some of our hackers. We watched them harden and search for us in their military networks, yet we could not be found. Why would we focus on military networks when we could target the soft underbelly of those who deliver the network services and weapon systems to their military; their cleared defense contractors, and the subcontractors who work for them?23 Their military thought they were the center of gravity, the single most critical capability defending the United States from foreign aggression. Such arrogance and self-importance made them blind as we slowly dissolved the civilian-based root-of-trust foundation that held up their network castle walls. Then, we changed the course of human history.

Beginning in December 2019, we waged an aggressive campaign to hide the existence and obscure any perception of our mismanagement of the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan. This was a great opportunity in a clash of power and ideologies for us to convince the world that our response to the virus was a triumph of our authoritarian system and the Party’s leadership.24 Although we knew the history of repeated influenza outbreaks originating from our nation, our initial response was slow, with regional Party leaders leading the response and hiding it out of fear that a replay of the 2003 SARS outbreak could unfold.25 We needed time to determine the nature and scope of the biological threat, as well as determine how to best use it to the Party’s advantage. At the end of December, the false martyr, Dr. Li Wenliang, an ophthalmologist at Wuhan Central Hospital, used his WeChat account to send information and warning about the “SARS-like” virus to several of his medical school classmates. Five days later, a rogue element of cowardly officials stopped him from spreading rumors
and required him to sign a document renouncing his medical warning and admonishing him to “cooperate and . . . stop [his] illegal behavior” with threats of additional consequences if he did not remain quiet. In fact, it was not until January 23, 2020 that we initiated mass quarantine, by which time five million people had already left Wuhan, a city of eleven million. You know how it went, you lived it. It was through your sacrifice and the divine wisdom of the Party that we controlled the sickness. A new great chaos had been injected into the world: a time of death, sickness, and fear; a time of opportunity.

The platitudes that put a pleasant face on America’s internal war of politics were stripped away as their political parties grew more and more divided under the pressure of uncertainty. The fear, the economic damage from the lockdowns, the surging unemployment, and the impotent, inconsistent reaction of their government eroded trust in their institutions and made their society dry and brittle. Racism and the fundamental moral issues of liberty and oppression, of fairness and cheating, would be the sparks that lit America on fire and, fanned by politics of division and misinformation, it would consume them. Our role was merely to spread our truth, to reveal where their moral foundations were compromised and put a microscope on the moral issues connected with their sense of capitalism and democracy; those of care and harm, of fairness and cheating, of authority and subversion, and liberty and oppression.

With America distracted with its own problems, we shifted our focus to advancing the information and technological advantages of the intellectual property that we’d acquired. Our stealthy acquisitions soon made us the lead producer of electronic vehicles, batteries, and autonomous vehicle software; much of which was secretly taken from the initial innovators in America and Europe. The electrical vehicle technology helped offset our hyper urbanization problem which was looming in our great cities, allowing us to build our own suburbs with low-cost, low-pollution transportation. We adapted the autonomous driving algorithms, machine learning, and sensor integration technology to build our drone swarms. It turns out that the same technology that can identify and avoid hitting a child crossing the street makes an incredible assassin drone when combined with facial recognition.

We found ways to make natural resources plentiful. Our futurists predicted that water stress would be one of the major threats to our near-term survival, which is why we quietly bought companies with water rights in America’s New England, Ohio, and The Great Lakes, and put them under Party member control. As it was, technology provided a better answer with discoveries in the early 2020s of how to efficiently and cheaply desalinize water. It was like finding the ancient alchemist’s secret to changing lead into gold! We had to have it. Fortunately, one of our Thousand Talents researchers had access to the research facility. She simply walked out of the building with the
research and, less than 24 hours later, presented it to our Institute of Water Resources and Hydropower Research in Beijing. She is a good soldier in our people’s war! Although it was her duty, for her aggressiveness and bravery we paid her a bonus in gold. A small price for permanent water security!

By 2022 we’d taken over production of 70 percent of the world’s integrated circuit manufacturing. With nearly unfettered access to the world’s best minds through our information collection efforts, we gathered and improved cutting-edge processors while expanding our production capacity to make them. By the end of the year, we were postured to carry our nation deep into the technological future while keeping the rest of the world dependent on us for access to the world’s best hardware. We modified the chips as needed, embedding our rootkit backdoor accesses so deeply in the hardware that it was nearly impossible to find, and absolutely impossible to remove. We were getting ready to lock the rest of the world into our past.

2023 was our breakout year; the year we operationalized quantum computing for unlocking our enemies’ secrets, quantum-secure communications, and establishing our new currency. The quantum breakthrough allowed us to perform the equivalent of a ten-thousand-year calculation in less than two seconds. We immediately and secretly began building hundreds of quantum machines powered by our “artificial sun” nuclear reactor which we’d perfected in 2021. We’d prepared for this leap in computing power for decades by recording in bulk the world’s internet traffic in anticipation that we could someday unlock the world’s secrets. On March 14, 2023 we started unlocking everything.

Quantum was a double-edged sword for us in that it made nearly all previous encryption methods obsolete while providing its own new secure cryptography. For the first time in our history, we could communicate in complete secrecy without concern of enemy eavesdropping.

Perhaps most importantly, it unlocked the information of the financial world. What quantum did for encryption, it also did for crypto—and they worked together as vengeful sisters to destroy America. Using our insight into American encrypted communications, we leaked damaging information about America wherever it fit our agenda and bolstered our American political friends. Once you establish a reputation for truth, a little embellishment goes unnoticed, especially for those who want to believe. Using our media connections in the United States and across the world, it was easy to selectively use this information to discredit the United States and ruin their negotiations with friends and foes alike. We targeted companies friendly to the United States by taking down their leadership when they chose to act in America’s best interests versus our own. As their government tried desperately to patch together their credibility, we sowed chaos in their country by talking directly to the American people. We al-
ready knew the personal data of every current and former federal employee. This, combined with snapchats, meeting recordings, Facebook, emails, and financial records gave us incredible leverage against almost any individual we could pick. The “internet of things” lightbulbs, thermostats, smoke detectors, doorbells, and robot vacuums that they bought from us gave us more information than we could have dreamed of asking for. We knew when they woke up, went to work, when they came home, and even the floor plans of their homes! Their government’s stumbling responses to our technological progress only positioned us more favorably, such as their ham-fisted attempt to ban TikTok, which only made it more popular. Their hate for us was like gasoline which, when lit by their prejudice and bias, consumed their country and destroyed all faith the people had in their government—a feeling that was shared around the world.

When the American dollar started to crash in 2024, everyone was desperate for safe-haven investments and money flowed out of the world’s economies and into gold, silver, precious metals, and cryptocurrency. Of these, crypto emerged as the money of choice for the masses under the mistaken belief that the blockchain was mathematically impervious to theft and manipulation. Our quantum technology proved that assumption false, but sensing the opportunity to build trust and goodwill, we pledged to not manipulate it and to exchange its value, “dollar for dollar,” for our secure currency, what the American’s derogatively called the “CHitCoin.” In exchange, countries would agree to use it as the world reserve currency and guarantee to give their citizens the option of using WeChat for their mobile banking app. The Americans and Europeans were furious and resisted with all their power. They soon introduced their quantum currency, FedCoin. But they were too late. The American dollar was worthless and all trust in the stability of the American government had been shaken by the political protests that had plagued them since 2019. The final blow came when we convinced Amazon and Walmart to accept a small subsidy from us in exchange for giving a 5 percent discount to all shoppers that used our currency, or they would pay 5 percent more to import our products. The companies explained to the public that they weren’t penalizing the American FedCoin, but sensible business practices required them to charge “just a little more” to use FedCoin, as insurance against instability. That was it, within a year, FedCoin joined Etherium and Bitcoin in the digital dustbin and, when the Americans weren’t bartering, they were using CHitCoin for nearly all transactions.

By late 2025 civil unrest reached a peak and Americans with the means were leaving for higher, CHitCoin-paying jobs in Europe, Canada, and here in our great nation. With access to personnel records of the world’s best companies, we actively recruited their best and brightest from their military and their civilian institutions. We paid them to relocate to our new innovation cities where they are building the artificial
intelligence, robotics, energy storage, DNA sequencing, and next-gen quantum platforms that will carry us to the next century!

The civil unrest in the United States was unlike any violence their soft citizens had ever seen. Of course, other nations were struggling mightily as well. However, in this turbulent time we continued to find opportunities to demonstrate the strength, wisdom, and benevolence of the Party.

Venezuela was our posterchild in the Western world. Back in 2008, their president came to us to learn how we use social control to ensure the safety of our people. By 2017 they were paying our companies $70 million to help establish their “fatherland project:” a national identification card and social media/payment tracking app which allowed them better insight into disharmony within their population. In exchange, we required them to share their data with our big data centers. Facial recognition, gait analysis, voice recognition, and geolocation; we were soon tracking every person living in their country, both through the security apparatus, and through their internet of things. Now, this was treasure! Our Artificial Intelligence scientists were even able to extend our language processing capabilities from Mandarin to Spanish and soon we were able to track and analyze popular sentiment using machine learning for each individual person. Having been among the first to transition to CHitCoin, by 2025, Venezuela was the West’s model government, with nearly zero crime and a benevolent government flush with our currency in exchange for regular deliveries of Venezuelan crude. This was our “post-modern authoritarian state in which the country’s population is monitored around the clock through their phones and an ever-growing network of surveillance cameras equipped with facial recognition technology.” Seeing our rising strength, it was no surprise when the Venezuelan president publicly embraced an increasingly close partnership and called for a new political movement of “Venezuelan Communism with Chinese Characteristics.” We were soon exporting our “civil policing and society support” solutions to most South American countries, propping them up, helping to control their population, and establishing a firm foothold in this new world.

In the months leading up to the 2026 United States elections, we tripled our propaganda efforts. The American Dream had died, and we continued to pull only their best and brightest to come work for us in China. It was time for a new dream, the China Dream, and it was coming to us twenty years ahead of our plan. Using the sentiment prediction algorithms we’d spent the last decade tuning, along with the data we gathered from each American citizen, we were able to run each of our truth campaigns through a virtual sentiment simulation, hundreds of times, until we found the right key words, the right conflicts, and the right biases which would make the Americans the most receptive to our messages. We crafted a new American dream based on their fables: the story of the great American
underdog. A “true comeback story.” America would rise from the ashes, but it would leave democracy behind. Clearly the democracy and unfettered capitalism experiment had failed. What was needed was a new socialist elite to lead the country into the brave new world of their future. And so over the last two years we laid the groundwork for the recent presidential election using social media in ways the Americans never thought possible. We destroyed our enemies in the mob rule of public opinion and as of today, I’m happy to announce that we have many new friends of our people who now live in Washington. They have agreed to restore balance to our world, to remove their warships outside our nine-dash line, and to fully support our reintegration of Taiwan by 2030.

Endnotes


7 Ibid., 60.

8 Burke et al., People’s Liberation Army Operational Concepts, 4.


12 Clausewitz, *On War*, 88-89; see also, Donald Stoker, *Why America Loses Wars: Limited War and US Strategy from the Korean War to Present* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 14-15. According to Stoker, “one demonstrates an understanding of the nature of war . . . by possessing a clear political objective (the end), a clear, logical strategy for getting there (the ways), and allocating sufficient strength and resources for achieving the end (the means).” Stoker contrasts the American way of war with Clausewitz’s imperative to understand and fight it according to its nature.


16 Brady, “China Wants Face,” 2.


21 Ibid.


28 Haidt, The Righteous Mind, 178-179, 215. Recall that Haidt’s conclusion is that these
moral foundations strongly motivate political perspectives.


lion-reserves-now-hold-more-gold-than-dollars.


“The views expressed in this essay are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, United States Army, Department of Defense, or the United States Government.”

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In Search of Monsters to Destroy: NATO’s Prosecution of the Kosovo Intervention in the Just War Tradition

Scott N. Duryea

Abstract

Many commentators believe that the NATO bombing campaign in the spring of 1999 in Kosovo answered the call for ethical humanitarian intervention. NATO responded with an aerial bombardment to stop Serbian aggression. Some analysts argue that the NATO response was destructive, costly, and a humanitarian disaster. Others proclaim it as appropriate, necessary, and just. On the specific ethical viewpoint, the just war theory, which has evolved throughout centuries to form the ethical justification for military action, offers strict criteria at the most basic level. Numerous scholars have already touched upon the ethical criteria for going to war. There remains, however, a gap in the literature regarding NATO behavior during the bombing campaign. I argue that, on many occasions, NATO operations violated jus in bello criteria, making the bombing campaign inhumane and ethically inexcusable.

Keywords: Just War Theory, Great Power Competition, Kosovo, Jus In Bello, Ethics

En busca de monstruos para destruir: el enjuiciamiento de la OTAN de la intervención de Kosovo en la tradición de la guerra justa

Resumen

Muchos comentaristas creen que la campaña de bombardeos de la OTAN en la primavera de 1999 en Kosovo respondió al llamado a una intervención humanitaria ética. La OTAN respondió con un bombardeo aéreo para detener la agresión serbia. Algunos analistas sostienen que la respuesta de la OTAN fue destructiva, costosa y un desastre humanitario. Otros lo proclaman como apropiado, necesario y justo. Desde el punto de vista ético específico, la teoría de la guerra justa, que ha evolucionado a lo largo de los siglos para constituir la justificación ética de la acción militar, ofrece criterios estrictos
en el nivel más básico. Numerosos estudiosos ya se han referido a los
criterios éticos para ir a la guerra. Sin embargo, queda un vacío en la
literatura sobre el comportamiento de la OTAN durante la campaña
de bombardeos. Sostengo que, en muchas ocasiones, las operaciones
de la OTAN violaron los criterios del jus in bello, haciendo que la
campaña de bombardeos fuera inhumana y éticamente inexcusable.

Palabras clave: Teoría de la guerra justa, Gran Competencia de
Poder, Kosovo, Jus In Bello, Ética

搜寻并摧毁怪物：北约以正义战争
传统的方式实施科索沃干预

摘要
许多评论者认为，北约于1999年春季在科索沃执行的轰炸行
动响应了对伦理人道主义干预的呼吁。北约用空袭阻止塞尔
维亚的侵略。一些分析师主张，北约的响应具有破坏性且代
价巨大，并且是一次人道主义灾难。其他人则认为北约的响
应是合适的、必要的且正义的。从具体的伦理角度来看，正
义战争理论（经过几百年的演变形成了军事行动的伦理支
持）提供了最基本层面的严格标准。许多学者已研究了诉诸
战争的伦理标准。不过，就轰炸行动“期间”的北约行为而
言，相关研究仍然不足。我论证认为，在许多情况下，北约
行动违反了战时法，让轰炸行动变得不人道且在伦理上不可
饶恕。

关键词：正义战争理论，大国竞争，科索沃，战时法，伦理
学

Introduction

“H
umanitarian war” reads as
a contradiction in terms.
To use lethal force for
humane reasons seems illogical. But,
for centuries, and with the exception
of pacifists, philosophers and theolo-
gians alike have long held that force
is ethically acceptable under certain
strict conditions. Indeed, it is an ethical
duty in some instances to use force to
protect individuals. Ethical, as differ-
entiated from legal, action affects the
individual conscience, and is not sub-
ject to international legal scrutiny. But,
states often appeal to ethical authority to gain popular support for the use of military force. And, many commentators believe that the NATO bombing campaign in the spring of 1999 in Kosovo answered this call for ethical intervention. Serbian forces had been increasingly retaliating against Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) attacks against Serb police forces and presence within Kosovo, alarming the West of a potential massacre waiting to happen. NATO responded with an aerial bombardment to stop Serbian aggression. Some analysts argue that the NATO response was disproportionate. Others proclaim it as appropriate, necessary, and just. How should one interpret the intervention? This article examines the Kosovo intervention through the lens of just war theory. The Catholic Church as well as other ethical authorities recognize the necessity of war in particular circumstances. Just war theory lays out the conditions required to ethically justify military action.

Scholars, including Robert Keohane, consider NATO’s humanitarian intervention illegal yet geopolitically necessary. President Bill Clinton described the war as “an attack by tanks and artillery on a largely defenseless people whose leaders already have agreed to peace.” British Prime Minister Tony Blair defended intervention “to avert what would otherwise be a humanitarian disaster in Kosovo.” Others, mainly in the pacifist camp, saw NATO’s intervention as destructive, costly, and a humanitarian disaster. Scholars and world leaders have judged the intervention according to different measures. Tenets of international law and theories of foreign policy strategy can offer useful yet opposing perspectives on the appropriate course of action. On the specific ethical question, however, just war theory, which has been developed throughout centuries to formulate the ethical justification for military action, offers strict criteria at the most basic level and offers moralists a framework to analyze military conflict. Numerous scholars have already touched upon the ethical criteria for going to war. There remains, however, a gap in the literature regarding NATO behavior during the bombing campaign. On many occasions, NATO operations violated just war jus in bello criteria, making the military action inhumane and ethically inexcusable.

The Just War Tradition

The just war (Bellum iustum) tradition has deep roots. One of the first elaborations of the tenets of just war appeared in the Indian epic Mahabharata around 400 BC. It laid out elementary conceptions of the princi-
ples of proportionality, just means, just cause, and just conduct. Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas further expanded upon the early Indian conception. Augustine posited that one could simultaneously be a soldier and serve God. To do so, individuals should not by default resort to violence. Only when in defense of oneself or others could violence be acceptable. Indeed, failure to act justly in the face of a grave wrong is sinful. Augustine did not enumerate conditions for the just use of aggression but formulated the term “just war” himself in his City of God: “But, say they, the wise man will wage just wars. As if he would not all the rather lament the necessity of just wars, if he remembers that he is a man; for it they were not just he would not wage them and would therefore be delivered from all wars.” Aquinas built off Augustine’s foundation nine centuries later in outlining three conditions for just war. First, a proper authority such as the state, which represents the common good, must wage the war. Second, the war must have a just purpose, not simply for self-gain or exercise of power. And third, peace must be the ultimate goal. These bases formed the framework for the modern conception of just war.

The School of Salamanca and the Catechism of the Catholic Church

further elucidated the Augustinian and Thomist constructions. Spanish and Portuguese theologians in the sixteenth century agreed with their predecessors that unless a greater evil threatened, war should be avoided. In all circumstances a treaty or diplomatic agreement is preferable. But, two parties may wage a “just” war where a negotiated settlement is out of reach. The conditions are: in self defense (with a reasonable chance of success), preventive war against imminent attack, and to punish a guilty enemy. But, in counter to Aquinas, observers cannot judge war to be ethically just or unjust solely based on original motive. There are conditions it must meet. These include proportionality, popular support, fair treatment of civilians and hostages, and exhausting all attempts at negotiating a peaceful settlement before war begins. The Catechism clarified and codified these points in Catholic doctrine:

- the damage inflicted by the aggressor on the nation or community of nations must be lasting, grave, and certain;
- all other means of putting an end to [the possibility of war] must have shown to be impractical or ineffective;

• there must be serious prospects of success;

• the use of arms must not produce evils and disorders graver than the evil to be eliminated. The power of modern means of destruction weighs very heavily in evaluating this condition. 8

International law embodies the spirit of just war theory to try to ensure that great power wars occur in accordance with ethical legal principles. Likewise, international institutions such as the United Nations exist to negotiate disputes and mitigate tension between states, invoking the tenets of self-defense, preemptive war, and proportionality.

**Jus in Bello, not Jus ad Bellum**

Just war theory distinguishes between the conditions necessary for going to war in the first place (*jus ad bellum*) and the conditions for conducting war (*jus in bello*). The seven conditions under *jus ad bellum* are:

**Just Cause**
There must be imminent danger, and intervention must be to protect life.

**Comparative Justice**
There must be significant disparity between the injustices suffered by one party than the other.

**Right Intention**
Force may only be used for the purpose of the just cause and no other, such as material gain.

**Right Authority**
Only public authorities in a political system that practices the rule of law may wage war.

**Probability of Success**
There must be a reasonable chance of success to use force; otherwise, military action is not worth pursuing.

**Last Resort**
All viable alternative to the use of force must be exhausted.

**Proportionality**
The expected benefits of military force must be proportional to the expected harms.

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serious flaws in NATO’s intervention, including the disapproval of the United Nations and violation of Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty through armed force against a sovereign, non-NATO nation-state. Beach (2000) delves into the NATO’s actions during the war. He finds fault in discrimination and the use of cluster bombs. And, finally, Elshtain (2001) argues that NATO’s opening of sorties gave Milosevic an excuse for declaring martial law. The above authors merely give a passing assessment of the *jus in bello* violations of the just war theory. This article explores NATO’s behavior during the war and weighs it against principles of *jus in bello*. The criteria used to measure NATO’s actions during the intervention are:

**Distinction**

Military action should distinguish between enemy combatants and non-combatants. Targeting civilian residential areas that include no military targets and committing acts of terrorism are expressly prohibited. Similarly, combatants must refrain from violence against enemy combatants who have surrendered, been captured, are injured, or are simply not lethally threatening.

**Military Necessity**

The conduct of the war must follow the principle of minimum force. To limit unnecessary death and destruction, any action during the war must be for a military objective, intended for the purpose of military defeat of the enemy, and not excessive.

**Proportionality**

Even in launching an attack against a military objective, civilian injuries and death must be proportional and clearly not excessive in relation to the expected military advantage.

**Fair Treatment**

Prisoners of war and enemy soldiers who surrendered no longer pose a threat and must be treated fairly. Torture or other mistreatment is prohibited.

**No Means Malum in Se**

Weapons or other methods of warfare universally considered to be evil are prohibited. These include mass rape, forcing soldiers to fight against their own side, and using weapons whose effects cannot be easily controlled, such as nuclear and chemical weapons.

**What Were the Circumstances?**

The NATO intervention was part of the broader Kosovo War, which lasted from February 1998 to June 1999. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), a successor state to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that consisted of the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro from 1992 to 2003, controlled Kosovo before fighting began. The FRY fought against Kosovo Albanians, many of whom organized under the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). A radical group, the KLA was established in 1991 as part of a separatist movement in the south of...
Serbia. It began targeting Serbian police stations in Kosovo in 1995-96 and began acquiring large amounts of arms from Albania, as a result of a rebellion and subsequent looting of army posts. Attacks against FRY authorities in Kosovo continued through 1998, when Serbian civilian and military forces began retaliating against KLA members and supporters. Retribution killing intensified, leaving nearly 2,000 Kosovars dead and driving hundreds of thousands out of Kosovo. By March 1999, the US State Department claimed that 500,000 Kosovar Albanians were missing and feared dead. Two months later, US Defense Secretary William Cohen declared, “We’ve now seen about 100,000 military-aged men missing…They may have been murdered.” And, David Scheffer two weeks later made the situation look ever more grim, saying that as many as “225,000 ethnic Albanian men aged between 14 and 59” were missing. Media headlines such as “Flight From Genocide” and “Echoes of the Holocaust” sensationalized the situation. The longer the US and NATO hesitated, the public was led to believe, the more of a chance full-fledged genocide would erupt.

The media and political leaders declared NATO’s campaign in Kosovo a humanitarian intervention. Javier Solana, Secretary General of NATO, directed Supreme Allied Commander Europe Wesley Clark to “initiate air operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” on March 23, 1999. The next day, the bombing began and lasted until June 11. Most NATO members played at least minimal roles in the operation, which saw almost 1,000 aircraft running 38,000 combat missions. Aircraft operated from bases in Italy and aircraft carriers in the Adriatic Sea, and Tomahawk cruise missiles were deployed from aircraft, ships, and submarines. NATO’s goals in the operation were to expel FRY troops from Kosovo, replace them with international peacekeepers, and allow Albanian refugees to return to their homes. A NATO spokesperson articulated the plan, “Serbs out, peacekeepers in, refugees back.”

Strategically, the goal was to destroy FRY air defenses and high-value military targets. Poor weather, and thus visibility, hampered early success. In addition, Milosevic and his forces proved difficult to weaken. Western leaders expected the entire campaign to last no more than a few days, but Milosevic was much more resilient than initially expected. Meanwhile, Milosev-

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vic intensified his ethnic cleansing operation, driving hundreds of thousands of Albanian Kosovars from Kosovo. By April 3, UNHCR officials reported 45,000 Kosovars at the Macedonian border, over half of whom were expelled from Pristina, Kosovo’s capital. Another 25,000 arrived at the Albanian border three days later. Most of the refugees were in poor physical condition. A postwar report issued by the UNHCR concluded that nearly a half million people were expelled from their homes over a two-week period, and the number rose to almost 850,000 in the ensuing weeks.

Aerial bombardment continued as NATO military operations began to attack FRY units on the ground, such as tanks and artillery weapons. But politics in Brussels bogged down this strategy: each of the nineteen member states of NATO needed to approve each military target before engaging. This inefficiency incited British Prime Minister Tony Blair to advocate the use of ground forces, and he pressured other NATO countries, especially the United States, to consider the option. But the United States would be making the largest troop contribution, and President Bill Clinton was reluctant to commit ground troops.

Slobodan Milosevic agreed to the terms of the peace plan and an end to the fighting on June 3, 1999. The North Atlantic Council ratified the agreement a week later, and the coalition peacekeeping Kosovo Force (KFOR) entered Kosovo. Although prepared for combat, KFOR only engaged in peacekeeping. A combination of British, French, German, Italian, and American forces composed KFOR at the outset and presided over the peaceful resolution to the

14 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
15 Solana, "Press Statement."
18 Hakon Lunde Saxi, Norwegian and Danish Defence Policy: A Comparative Study of the Post-Cold War Era (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 2010), 38.
three-month bombing campaign. Were NATO tactics and actions necessary and ethical under the tenets of distinction, military necessity, proportionality, fair treatment, and no means malum in se?

Applying the Criteria

**Distinction, Military Necessity, Proportionality**

The most convincing evidence of unjust military force deals with the failure to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants, attacking non-military targets, and using force beyond that which is militarily advantageous. NATO’s particular method of warfare made these just war rules difficult with which to comply. Aerial bombardment, rather than the deployment of ground forces, may lend itself to a greater degree of disproportionality in achieving a specific military goal. With this method of intervention, in general, extreme discretion and precaution must be used to avoid civilian casualties. NATO, having employed high-altitude bombing and avoiding ground troop deployment, escaped the conflict without a casualty. This was not the case for Serbian troops on the ground. NATO planes rarely flew below 15,000 feet, the minimum altitude specified by the rules of engagement. Pilots could attack a target only on visual recognition, which did not always mean that the pilot could distinguish between a civilian and military object. Aerial bombardment, while relatively safe for NATO personnel, hampered the precision necessary for waging war within the limits of just war and led to unnecessary civilian casualties.

The first case under contention is the bombing of the Grdelica Gorge passenger train. Supposedly a line in a Yugoslav communications supply network, the Leskovac railway bridge in eastern Serbia was the target of a laser-guided bomb on April 12, 1999. Immediately after launching the bomb, the pilot recognized a passenger train heading toward the bridge. The pilot was unable to dump the bomb via remote direction, and it struck the train on the bridge. Upon seeing that the bridge had not been struck, the pilot launched a second bomb, which also hit the train. The incident resulted in ten civilian deaths and fifteen civilian casualties.

NATO General Wesley Clark and the United States Department of Defense shared regret over the “accident.” The pilot claimed he was focused only on the bridge and not the train, which he said had come into his view only after deploying both bombs. The October 2000 Independent International Commission on Kosovo report concluded that the bridge itself was a legitimate target.

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military target but did not determine whether the pilot was reckless in his deployment of the second bomb.

The incident at the Leskovac bridge reveals violations of distinction and proportionality. NATO’s method of attack, aerial bombing via remote viewing on a screen in the pilot’s seat, made verifying that the target had not been compromised by the presence of civilians difficult. Provided that the bridge was a preapproved military target, the method violates simple laws of armed conflict. If the pilot was unable to distinguish between the military target and any civilians that could have been in the area, then aerial bombing should not have been used. But, if he could distinguish, then the pilot could have performed a precautionary flyover or a prior review of train timetables and movements. In addition, NATO forces could have forewarned the FRY public of military targets to prevent civilian casualties. There was no evidence that the pilot or NATO took these measures, violating NATO’s obligations to take all reasonable precautions to prevent loss of civilian casualties.23

The deployment of the second bomb is more troublesome. Whereas the pilot deployed the first bomb without knowing of civilian presence in the area, he dropped the second knowing that the train was on the bridge and traveling in the direction of the target location. Even if smoke concealed the bridge, the pilot should have taken additional precautions to spare civilian lives at all costs. And, if the mission was to destroy the bridge no matter the cost, then the case causes additional concern for the rules of discrimination and proportionality. NATO never revealed any substantial military advantage from the destruction of the bridge in relation to the potential cost to civilians. And, the pilot failed to suspend the attack once the presence of defenseless civilians became apparent, violating Article 57 (2) of the Geneva Convention Additional Protocol I, which says (state and cite). The bombing of the Grdelica Gorge passenger train thus violates the rules of distinction and proportionality.24

The second case involves the bombing of an Albanian refugee convoy on Djakovica-Prizren road two days after the Grdelica incident. The Yugoslav Army and Special Police Forces used this route for supplying and reinforcing troops, and there were claims of ethnic cleansing in the area. The sight of burning villages informed NATO forces that the Yugoslav Army and Special Police Forces were operating there, pushing Kosovars out. At around 10:30 AM, dark green vehicles, assumed to be carrying troops, were seen near one of the newly lit houses. Two F-16 jets bombed the vehicles, starting with the


lead vehicle. A third plane attacked another nearby convoy, claiming it to be an army guard. The assault continued for another two and a half hours until it was called off to review the strikes. NATO bombs killed between seventy and seventy-five Albanian refugees and injured nearly a hundred.\(^\text{25}\)

To avoid Yugoslav anti-aircraft fire, the NATO planes on this day flew higher than 15,000 feet. Sighting their targets with the naked eye instead of remote video technology, the pilots assumed the convoys they saw were military vehicles because of their movement, size, shape, color, and speed. Cockpit video, however, shows that they were tractors. Even though there were claims that Yugoslav forces were operating civilian vehicles, NATO changed its rules of engagement to prohibit attacks on military-use civilian vehicles. This precaution conveys how NATO took necessary steps to prevent civilian death.\(^\text{26}\)

The fault does not lie in the altitude at which the planes were flying. Rather, pilots operating at high altitude and high speed would struggle to distinguish between a military and a civilian vehicle. While flying at a lower altitude may have made NATO aircraft susceptible to Yugoslav air defense systems, the higher altitude made distinction unlikely. Bombing without certainty does not meet the burden of proof for justifiable bombing. Only by flying lower and with clear visibility for distinction would bombing be acceptable. NATO would have had to decide whether the importance of destroying the target outweighed the potential danger to its aircraft. To fly at higher altitudes without the ability to verify bombing objectives and take necessary precautions to protect civilian life proves unjust and is a violation of the rule of distinction.\(^\text{27}\)

The third case is the intentional bombing of the Serbian Radio and Television Station on the night of April 23, 1999. Estimated civilian deaths range between ten and seventeen. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia used the station for military purposes, and, because of its role in the command, control, and communications network in the country, NATO targeted it. NATO also justified the bombing, arguing that Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic used the station as a war propaganda outlet.\(^\text{28}\) NATO considered the station as legitimate target, since it sought to disrupt the communications system of the FRY army.\(^\text{29}\) But the station itself was a civilian object. Rather than attacking urban studios, where civilians worked, pilots


\(^\text{27}\) Ibid.


\(^\text{29}\) McCormack and Durham, *Aerial Bombardment of Civilians: The Current International Legal*
could have targeted electronic transmitters to disrupt the Yugoslav communication network. A list compiled by the International Committee of the Red Cross included broadcasting and television installations as of primary military importance. By themselves, radio and television stations are not military targets. But, if the Serbian station truly contributed to military action, communication, and distribution, then its partial destruction or neutralization provided military advantage as required in the rule of military necessity. But NATO additionally justified the attack because of Milosevic’s propaganda dissemination at the station, which does not adequately justify military action unless the propaganda incited violence. The UN Final Report on the NATO bombing campaign noted,

> While stopping such propaganda may serve to demoralize the Yugoslav population and undermine the government’s political support, it is unlikely that either of these purposes would offer the “concrete and direct” military advantage necessary to make them a legitimate military objective. NATO believed that Yugoslav broadcast facilities were “used entirely to incite hatred and propaganda” and alleged that the Yugoslav government had put all private TV and radio stations in Serbia under military control (NATO press conferences of 28 and 30 April 1999). However, it was not claimed that they were being used to incite violence akin to Radio Milles Collines during the Rwandan genocide, which might have justified their destruction.

If the station engaged in military communications, and thus proved to be a legitimate military objective, the bombing still violated the rules of proportionality. As NATO predicted, the bombing only took communications off the air for a few hours. The attack was part of a larger strategy to destroy the Yugoslav command and control network, rather than an isolated incident. Thus, international observers presumed the bombing to be an appropriate attack. But that the broadcasting station was up and running within a few hours indicates the relative impermanence of the station’s destruction in the overall strategy. It is doubtful that NATO gained significant military advantage in this short amount time that was proportional to the deaths of up to seventeen civilians. It should be noted as well that the FRY should be faulted for placing civilians in harm’s way.

Advanced warnings could have been given in this instance, and there

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30 ICTY, “Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.”
31 Ibid.
are disputes over the extent to which FRY knew that the station was in danger of targeting. NATO reported that it had not issued a warning so as to protect pilots in the area from anti-aircraft fire. Western journalists, however, insist that a CNN contact warned them to stay clear from the station. It seems that NATO hinted to its own personnel as well as media contacts that the station was being targeted but failed to warn Yugoslav civilians and management of the station of the impending attack. The efficacy of the station bombing to the overall strategy of cutting communication lines and the mixed accounts on effectively forewarning civilians breaches the rule of proportionality under just war theory.33

The bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade on May 7, 1999 is the fourth case. Several NATO missiles struck the embassy, causing extensive damage to it and surrounding buildings and killing three Chinese citizens and wounding about fifteen others. The United States government in conjunction with NATO admitted that the bombing was a mistake and that the actual target was the Yugoslav Federal Directorate for Supply and Procurement, which NATO considered a legitimate military target. The confusion over identifying the correct target stemmed from land navigation techniques and faulty military and intelligence databases, both of which failed to provide accurate target information. According to the UN Final Report, “[NATO] used techniques known as ‘intersection’ and ‘resection’ which, while appropriate to locate distant or inaccessible points or objects, are inappropriate for use in aerial targeting as they provide only an approximate location.”34 Allegedly, mid-level intelligence officers suspected that these techniques misidentified the target, yet the officers failed to relay this information to senior managers who may have been able to call off the attack.35 The Chinese government and many of its citizens were outraged by the bombing, holding protests in Beijing for retribution. NATO and President Clinton responded with a formal apology and a compensation payment of $28 million to the Chinese government and $4.5 million to the families of the dead and injured. The United States government also ensured that it took disciplinary and corrective actions to avoid these incidents in the future.36

There is no doubt that the Chinese Embassy was clearly a civilian rather than a military target. Neither aircrew nor senior military commanders were aware of the faulty information, so blame does not fall on their shoulders. Ultimately, whether the attack on the embassy was deliberate may never be

34 ICTY, “Final Report.”
known. Clearly, if the attack was deliberate, the rules of distinction, military necessity, and proportionality, as well as broader laws of armed conflict, would be violated. Even if the attack proved to be a mistake, NATO failed to take adequate precautions to ensure the validity of its target information. Verification of the location of the target on the ground and ensuring the accuracy of the databases and maps used are relatively simple tasks, which NATO personnel seemingly did not perform. Even more distressing is that NATO continued its bombing campaign using the same inaccurate maps and databases instead of temporarily halting the attacks until the problem could be rectified. Proportionality seemed to be an afterthought rather than a precaution in the embassy attack.

The final case is the attack on the village of Korisa on May 14, 1999, which killed eighty-seven civilians, mostly refugees, and injured sixty others. NATO dropped ten bombs intended for a nearby Serbian military camp and command post. The attack occurred at night, which obscured visibility. General Walter Jertz, speaking on behalf of NATO, explained,

the pilot...had to visually identify [the target]...and you know it was by night, so he did see silhouettes of vehicles on the ground and as it was by prior intelligence a valid target, he did do the attack... So for the pilot flying the attack, it was a legitimate target... Of course, and we have to be very fair, we are talking at night. If there is anybody sleeping somewhere in a house, you would not be able to see it from the perspective of a pilot. But, once again, don't misinterpret it. It was a military target which had been used since the beginning of conflict over there and we have all sources used to identify this target in order to make sure that this target was still a valid target when it was attacked.

NATO took all practical precautions to determine the presence or absence of civilians, given the darkness of night. NATO officials believed that civilians were not in the area, and the goal was to attack a legitimate military target.

Some evidence suggests that FRY forces had coerced Kosovar civilians into serving as human shields, placing the blame instead on the FRY military


forces. Nevertheless, civilians died, and NATO was bound by Article 51 (8) of the Additional Protocol I to abide by the rule of distinction in all cases, no matter the reason civilians may be in the area. That Kosovars may have been used as human shields is no excuse under Article 51 (8). NATO repeatedly passed off responsibility because of nighttime darkness, which indicates NATO lowered its standards of distinction. There was no evidence that flying at night was of military necessity. But, NATO, with full knowledge that identifying and distinguishing targets at night would pose difficulties, made the decision for night flying anyway. NATO identified silhouettes of vehicles on the ground and presumed that they were similar to those military objects from prior intelligence reports. But this assumption falls short of the requirement of taking all precautions to prevent loss of civilian life. It is unclear whether FRY forces or military objectives were even present in Korisa at the time of the bombing. Even if the target had been a military installation, NATO failed to take the adequate precautions necessary to account for civilians in the vicinity in accordance with Article 57 (2) of the Additional Protocol I, to “do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects” and “refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. Distinction between civilian and military personnel was lost in the darkness at Korisa.

In the eleven-week period of the intervention, NATO used over 15,000 bombs and munitions in its air campaign, about 13,000 tons of explosive power. Estimated civilian deaths range between 1,200 and 2,000, one for every ten tons of explosives detonated. These staggering numbers compare with major bombing campaigns during the Vietnam War, such as the Christmas 1972 bombing around Hanoi and Haiphong Harbor where 20,000 tons of explosives killed 1,600 civilians.

Even after the ceasefire, NATO still ran into problems of distinction. Undetonated cluster bombs were still producing deaths and casualties months after the end of the Kosovo War. Both the United States and Great Britain acknowledged the use of cluster bombs in the intervention. The Interna-

41 This point does not absolve the FRY military for using human shields, which is a war crime by itself.
43 “ICTY, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign against the FRY, Pr/P.I.S./510-E, 13 June 2000,” 352.
ational Campaign to Ban Landmines reported, “[T]he U.S. dropped 1,000 cluster bombs of the type CBU-87/B, each containing 202 BLU-97/B bomblets and the UK dropped 500 RBL/755 cluster bombs, each containing 147 BL-755 bomblets.” These submunitions within the cluster bombs had a failure rate of about five percent, rendering the bomblets de facto landmines. \(^{45}\) Between June 13 and July 12, 1999, between 130 and 170 civilians were injured or killed in unexploded cluster bomb accidents, according to the World Health Organization. The Mine Action Coordination Center in Pristina disclosed that this rate of about 10 per 100,000 is “comparable to that previously experienced in other emergency situations such as Afghanistan and Cambodia.” \(^{46}\) The high casualty rate is partly a result of the downplaying of the danger. Phil Straw of the HALO Trust, a group of former British Army engineers and explosives experts, remarked, “The mine problem is much higher than…anticipated, far higher.” \(^{47}\) In the months after the war, about 400,000 cluster bombs were spread over uninhabited areas near the southern borders of Yugoslavia, but there were thousands in Kosovo. Inanimate explosives do not distinguish between civilian and combatant.

These five cases and the postwar mine problem point to violations of just war rules of distinction, military necessity, and proportionality and provide the most convincing evidence of unjust military force against Yugoslav and Albanian civilians.

**Fair Treatment**

Because of the nature of air war, combatants do not often meet face to face. This was at least the case for NATO coming into contact with Yugoslav combatants. NATO, however, directly supported the Kosovo Liberation Army, which allegedly engaged in the torture of Serbs and Roma. \(^{48}\) The BBC detailed in April 2009 a secret KLA network of prisons used to carry out torture and murders during and after the NATO intervention. \(^{49}\) Reporter Michael Montgomery revealed in “Crossing Continents” news of thousands of missing ethnic Albanians, Kosovo Serbs, and Roma gypsy civilians. One alleged prisoner of the KLA revealed, “I’ve seen a lot, people beaten, stabbed, hit with steel pipes, left without eating for five or six days. People had bullet proof vests on and were shot to see if it was working, thrown into tombs, beaten up, and killed.” Eight former KLA soldiers admitted that they were appalled by the atrocities that occurred, while others saw the vicious acts simply as retribution. One of the soldiers remembered hiding captured Serbs and Roma civil-

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47 Ibid.
ians as NATO troops passed by, taking them across the border to Albania to be killed. He reflected, “Now, looking back, I know that some of the things that were done to innocent civilians were wrong. But the people who did these things act as if nothing happened, and continue to hurt their own people, Albanians.” Another soldier confessed he drove trucks full of Serbian civilian prisoners to Albania to be tortured and killed. “I was sick,” he said. “I thought we were fighting a war...but this was something completely different.”

Some of these crimes occurred in an abandoned factory in the Albanian towns of Kukes and Burrel, both of which were KLA military strongholds. The International Centre for the Red Cross first heard of allegations of atrocities occurring in Burrel in 2000, when KLA members leaked a story telling of Serb civilians being taken there in 1999, having their organs removed and sold abroad. Following the war, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) investigated claims of human rights abuses, stumbling upon syringes, empty bottles of relaxant drugs, drip bags, and other surgical equipment, all scattered about on a blood-stained floor.

In Kukes, prisoners were housed in detention centers. Jose Pablo Baraybar of UNMIK’s Office for Missing Persons and Forensics admitted, “There were people that are certainly alive that were in Kukes, in that camp, as prisoners. Those people saw other people there, both Albanians and non-Albanians. There were members of the KLA leadership going through the camp. Many names were mentioned, and I would say that that is an established fact.” UNMIK had knowledge of the KLA’s detention centers, but, suspiciously, no investigation followed. Amnesty International Spokesperson Sian Jones accused NATO of neglecting the security of civilians after the war, and said, “the international community was sent in with responsibility for providing a safe and secure environment in Kosovo and these acts happened right under their noses... it was a massive failure to protect minority communities from human rights abuses when that international community was supposed to protect them.” These testimonies of human rights abuses seem much more than hearsay. Indeed, the CIA and U.S. Special Forces worked indirectly with the KLA, using the Albanian 2nd Army as a broker between the two sides. Dana Priest at the Washington Post reported, “U.S. Army Special Forces troops in Kukes and Durres were helping the disjointed, ill-equipped rebels to pass on useful information about Serbian positions.” Blame for these atrocities, then, falls directly on the KLA and at

50 Ibid.
51 Raxhimi, Montgomery, and Karaj, “KLA Ran Torture Camps in Albania.”
52 Montgomery, “Horrors of KLA Prison Camps Revealed.”
53 Ibid.
54 Dana Priest, “Kosovo Land Threat May Have Won War,” Washington Post September 19, 1999,
least indirectly on NATO, thus violating the rule of fair treatment of civilians and prisoners of war.

**No Means Malum In Se**

NATO used depleted uranium (DU) in its munitions. This action possibly violates the principle of no means *malum in se*, because the long-term effects of its use cannot be easily controlled. When DU munitions contact the target, uranium metal partially burns, creating uranium oxide. Wind can then spread the chemical great distances, making the side effects of using DU uncontrolable. Accordingly, Geneva Additional Protocol I 51(4) prohibits indiscriminate harm, but does not specifically comment on DU. 55 Used to make anti-tank shells more deadly and tank armor more rigid, DU is believed to have caused the cancer deaths of nearly thirty former Balkan peacekeepers. These critics point to the 1991 Gulf War, when reports revealed that hundreds of American soldiers suffered DU poisoning, and the high cancer rates of southern Iraqis, who had been exposed to DU shells. Like Iraq, the Kosovo intervention saw widespread DU use. NATO warplanes, including American A-10 “Warthogs,” fired 30mm bullets with DU cores. About 30,000 rounds of these DU munitions were deployed in the ten-week campaign. 56

The presence of DU in bullets and armor used in the war is linked to a high prevalence of leukemia in southern Serbia, Kosovo, and Albania, while the long-term environmental effects are yet to appear. Others, such as Lt. Col. Alexander Willing, a KFOR spokesman rejected these claims, saying, “NATO’s use of DU in the Kosovo conflict did not cause any continuing health risk and therefore no further action was required on our part.” 57 The United Nations sent a team to a few of the sites where NATO found DU munitions in 2000, subsequently issuing a report that also denied contamination of soil and water. But this report is unable to account for longer term dangers. The precautionary principle and the principle of intergenerational equity in environmental law can apply to DU in the absence of scientific certainty on long term health and environmental effects. NATO is responsible for using potentially toxic weapons that could harm future generations. 58 Also, DU bullets are known to penetrate as far down as seven meters, much deeper than some shallow groundwater wells. When uranium comes into contact with water and oxygen, it rusts quickly and can easily contaminate water sources.

Despite competing claims, locals continue to blame the DU munitions (for…). One Kosovo citizen attested,

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57 Ibid.

58 Shah, “Depleted Uranium and International Law.”
“There are many cases of leukemia and so on... A lot of people are getting sick. I think it’s a combination of factors. People are traumatized by the war, but it’s also caused by the weapons used.”

Likewise, Kosovo and Serbia media reports confirm higher rates of leukemia in areas of DU use. But, authorities, especially Kosovo’s Institute of Public Health, have yet to extensively study the issue, citing the lack of reliable data. The World Health Organization does maintain its concern for possible hazardous environmental effects to come and advocates continued monitoring.

The use of DU in general is controversial and has legal ambiguity. Y.K.J. Yeung Silk Yuen presented “Legal Compliance of Weapons Containing DU as a New Weapon” in 2002 to the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. In the report, he contended that the use of DU weapons may be in violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Genocide Convention, the United Nations Convention Against Torture, the Geneva Conventions, including Protocol I, the Convention on Conventional Weapons of 1980, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Charter of the United Nations. He argued,

Annex II to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 1980 (which became operative on 8 February 1997) classifies DU as a category II nuclear material. Storage and transport rules are set down for that category which indicates that DU is considered sufficiently “hot” and dangerous to warrant these protections. But since weapons containing DU are relatively new weapons no treaty exists yet to regulate, limit or prohibit its use. The legality of illegality of DU weapons must therefore be tested by recourse to the general rules governing the use of weapons under humanitarian and human rights law... [P]arties to Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 have an obligation to ascertain that new weapons do not violate the laws and customs of war or any other international law. As mentioned, the International Court of Justice considers this rule binding customary humanitarian law.

While Yuen dictates that the use of DU must meet the burden of proof of clear legality, Louise Arbour, chief prosecutor for the ICTY is doubtful that a DU consensus is forthcoming:

There is no specific treaty ban on the use of DU projectiles. There is a developing scientific debate and concern expressed regarding the impact of the use of such projectiles and it is possible that,

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59 Ibid.

in the future, there will be a consensus view in international legal circles that use of such projectiles violate general principles of the law applicable to the use of weapons in armed conflict. No such consensus exists at present.\textsuperscript{61}

Currently, DU falls into a gray area in international law, where no agreement explicitly bans its use. Instead, to employ or not employ DU weapons is left to ethical conscience and better judgment.

With the ambiguity of international law in mind, the only determination for the ethics of DU use is the environmental and health effects it has on the region in which it is employed. If there is a causal link between depleted uranium and cancer, then NATO should be held accountable for the use of the material. If the link tenuous, however, NATO’s use of the controversial munitions should still be in question because of the humanitarian rhetoric that the US used to justify the intervention. Why would potentially disastrous weapons be used in a campaign intended to prevent such humanitarian disasters? International law vagueness aside, NATO, in presenting itself as an ethical intermediary, did not place itself in an innocent position by using depleted uranium in its weapons and armor. Therefore, NATO at least partially violated the final rule of no means \textit{malum in se}, since no clear framework guides the use of depleted uranium.

Discussion and Conclusion

The discussion over the ethics of NATO intervention is not to dismiss the heinous acts and war crimes committed by FRY forces. Clearly, the FRY and the KLA engaged in human rights abuses. But, the focus on NATO is important because of the rhetoric of humanitarian interventionism to prevent ethnic cleansing used to gain support for the campaign. The initial claims of impending genocide seem to contradict the actual conditions on the ground. The \textit{Wall Street Journal’s} own investigation rejected the “mass-grave” thesis and showed that the killing fields the western media had been reporting were actually a series of “scattered killings” in KLA territory. Further, it claimed that “NATO stepped up its claims about Serb ‘killing fields’” when it “saw a fatigued press corps drifting toward the contrarian story: civilians killed by NATO’s bombs.”\textsuperscript{62} The \textit{Journal} also concluded that the KLA was involved in this propaganda dissemination and that some of the most heinous atrocities reported were simply not true. Agence France-Prasse reported that claims of Milosevic’s crimes were often “confused, contradictory, and

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\textsuperscript{62} Daniel Pearl and Robert Block, “Despite Tales, the War in Kosovo Was Savage, but Wasn’t Genocide,” \textit{Wall Street Journal} (December 31, 1999), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB946593838546941319. djm.html.
\end{footnotesize}
sometimes wrong.”63 While the Kosovo War involved “cruel, bitter, [and] savage” behavior, the genocide that media outlets reported was not there.64

Violence escalated as soon as NATO bombing began, contradicting the very purpose of the campaign. While British defense secretary George Robertson claimed that NATO intervened “to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe,” the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe issued a report confirming the Wall Street Journal’s investigation, claiming that most of the crimes against the Albanian population occurred after the intervention began.65 Thus, an escalation of killings was not a cause but a consequence of NATO’s bombing campaign.66 In 1998, before NATO got involved, fighting cost the lives of 1,000 to 2,000 on both sides. In the nearly three months of NATO intervention, the figures rose to many times this number. With the air bombardment came the expulsion of 850,000 Albanians from Kosovo, killings and atrocities against portions of the Albanian population, and some destruction of Albanian property by Yugoslav forces. This is not to suggest that NATO was directly responsible for these atrocities.

But the bombing campaign created a fertile setting for violence to escalate.67 As Christopher Layne reported, the Clinton foreign policy team was explicitly warned by both the Pentagon and the U.S. intelligence community that (1) Belgrade would respond to NATO air strikes by undertaking a forcible mass expulsion of Kosovo’s ethnic Albanians and (2) the bombing campaign would not be able to stop the Yugoslav army from driving ethnic Albanians out of Kosovo. The event that opened the door for the Yugoslav forces to move from counterinsurgency to population expulsion was the withdrawal of the monitors who had been deployed in Kosovo as part of the October 1998 ceasefire. As one monitor said just prior to the withdrawal order: “There is a lot of tension in the area. But while they [the monitors] stay where they are, things are more or less O.K.‘ The monitors were withdrawn on March 19, to ensure that they would be out of harm’s way when the bombing campaign began. The

64 Pearl and Block, “Despite Tales, the War in Kosovo Was Savage, but Wasn’t Genocide.”
administration was told by the intelligence community, and by its own diplomatic representative in Kosovo, William Walker, that withdrawal of the monitors would be taken by Belgrade as a green light to proceed to drive ethnic Albanians out of Kosovo. 68

At first, NATO bombing focused on military targets. As the campaign continued, the bombing in Kosovo became increasingly ineffective. In response, air strikes increasingly focused on infrastructure objectives, such as Serbian economic and civil targets. 69 NATO planes caused massive economic damage in Serbia, hitting 144 civil objectives, including major industrial plants, television stations, and radio networks. In addition, thirty-three medical clinics or hospitals and 344 schools were bombed. The twelve-day raid on the Pacevo petrochemical plant caused widespread pollution, ten thousand times the permitted safety levels in the area. Together, for every five targets hit, three were civilian. Yugoslavia suffered a forty-four percent decline in industrial output and forty percent loss of total production. These findings are additional to the just war violations listed above. 70

Among the five rules of just war _jus in bello_, NATO clearly violated the first three: discrimination, military necessity, and proportionality in the cases explored above. the Grdelica Gorge, Djakovica-Prizren road, Serbian Radio and Television Station, Chinese Embassy, and Korisa village, NATO failed to take the appropriate precautions to avoid unnecessary civilian deaths and casualties, making the entire campaign unhumanitarian in the just war paradigm. These cases show evidence of illegitimate military targets and disproportionate civilian attacks, given the presumed military gain. Regarding the conditions of fair treatment and no means _malum in se_, the verdict is still out. The KLA, supported by NATO, allegedly operated a network of prison camps and torture facilities. Guilt falls on NATO only if these allegations prove true. Likewise, NATO’s use of depleted uranium in its ammunition and armor is in ethical question. Blame depends on the negative effects that it still may have on the population in the area in which NATO left DU fragments. But the evidence shows that NATO violated at least three rules of just war.

That western governments and the media alike proclaimed the ethical duty of NATO to come to Kosovo’s rescue reflects an ethical standard that the intervention did not uphold. Its quest to prevent a humanitarian disaster proved only to exacerbate the ongoing violence. Given the rhetoric projected to the world audience, NATO presented itself to uphold humanitarian and ethical norms, including the criteria of just war theory. The truth is still unraveling about ethical violations on each side,
but the burden of justice falls on the shoulders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which acted on ethical grounds. Just war theory may be a strict doctrine, but in terms of NATO's air campaign in the Balkans in 1999, the very intervention that many claim to be the paragon for all humanitarian wars falls short of just that.

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Bibliography


‘Scapegoat,’ ‘Proxy’ and ‘Base’: A World Powers’ Guide to Domestic Extremist Co-Optation

J.J. Brookhouser

Abstract
Over the last decade the United States, Russian and Chinese governments have each been implicated in internationally recognized plots to subvert domestic and international law to their own benefit in which the individual countries’ interactions with a domestic extremist element played a pivotal role. While each of these events has garnered widespread media and academic attention, little focus has been directed at the way in which each Great Power interacted with domestic extremism in order to advance its goals. This study uses a Webarian comparative analysis to describe the Chinese internment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang, the Russian annexation of Crimea and the radicalization of the Republican party in the United States, and how domestic extremism was in each case co-opted in order to achieve unpopular but critical goals. This study finds that domestic extremist co-optation is a proven strategy commonly employed by powerful authoritarian regimes around the world to achieve the most imperative and sensitive policy goals. Domestic extremist co-optation as a foreign policy strategy is characterized by the spread of disinformation, the promotion of violence and the concealment of the party responsible. This study identifies three archetypes of domestic extremist co-optation: the ‘scapegoat’, the ‘proxy’ and the ‘base,’ and empowers future research to increase that number.

Keywords: Domestic Extremism, Great Power Competition, Uyghur, Information Warfare

“Chivo expiatorio”, “representante” y “base”: una guía de las potencias mundiales para la cooptación de extremistas nacionales

Resumen
Durante la última década, los gobiernos de Estados Unidos, Rusia y China han estado implicados en complots reconocidos...
internacionalmente para subvertir el derecho nacional e internacio-

mal en su propio beneficio, en los que las interacciones de los países

individuales con un elemento extremista nacional desempeñaron un

papel fundamental. Si bien cada uno de estos eventos ha atraído la

atención académica y de los medios de comunicación, se ha presta-

do poca atención a la forma en que cada Gran Potencia interactuó

con el extremismo nacional para promover sus objetivos. Este estu-

dio utiliza un análisis comparativo de Webar para describir el inter-

namiento chino de uigures en Xinjiang, la anexión rusa de Crimea y

la radicalización del partido republicano en los Estados Unidos, y

cómo el extremismo interno fue cooptado en cada caso para lograr

objetivos impopulares. pero objetivos críticos. Este estudio encuen-

tra que la cooptación extremista nacional es una estrategia probada

comúnmente empleada por poderosos regímenes autoritarios alre-

dedor del mundo para lograr los objetivos políticos más imperativos

y sensibles. La cooptación extremista doméstica como estrategia de

política exterior se caracteriza por la difusión de la desinformación,

la promoción de la violencia y el encubrimiento del responsable.

Este estudio identifica tres arquetipos de cooptación extremista na-

cional: el “chivo expiatorio”, el “proxy” y la “base”, y permite que las

investigaciones futuras aumenten ese número.

**Palabras clave:** Extremismo doméstico, Gran Competencia de
Poder, Uigur, Guerra de información

“替罪羊”、“代理人”和“基地”：
世界强国的国内极端操纵之鉴

**摘要**

过去十年，国际社会认为美国、俄罗斯和中国政府各自为谋
取自身利益而颠覆国内法和国际法，其中个别国家与国内极
端主义的相互影响发挥了关键作用。尽管每次事件都吸引了
广泛的媒体关注和学术关注，但几乎没有研究聚焦于这些强
国以何种方式与国内极端主义相互影响，以期实现各自目
标。本研究使用韦伯的比较分析法，描述中国对新疆维吾尔
族的拘留、俄罗斯吞并克里米亚以及美国共和党的激进化，
并描述了这三个事件中国内极端主义如何被操纵，以期实现
不合民意但关键的目标。本研究发现，国内极端主义的操纵
是一项经证实的战略，全球强大的威权主义政权通常会使用
"Scapegoat,' 'Proxy' and 'Base': A World Powers' Guide to Domestic Extremist Co-Optation

Introduction

In less than the space of a decade the world's three greatest powers have each been implicated in internationally recognized plots to subvert domestic and international law in which their interaction with a domestic extremist element within or near their borders played a pivotal role. While extremism has found fertile opportunity in a monopolar world order, recognition of the problem is global. Even the thornier issue of domestic extremism is occupying a greater space in the public perception. But while extremism, its causes, ideologies and organizations are relatively well understood, how existing power structures interact with extremism is less so. Historical examples of Great Power interactions with foreign extremists abound, several prominent examples of meaningful interaction with domestic extremists are also easy to recall, however contemporary literature falls short in describing this critical facet of political policy. While recognition of growing global extremism abounds, understanding of what this means to the status quo is limited to far fewer.

This study seeks to reveal domestic extremist co-optation as a geopolitical strategy exercised by Great Powers the world over and characterized by the appropriation of extremist movements and ideology in pursuit of a geopolitical goal. Three prominent examples of this strategy, occurring in the world's three most powerful countries, have received a great deal of attention from media and academia alike, however few studies have sought to compare them. The fact that three such prominent examples of domestic extremist co-optation happened to occur in the world's three most powerful countries over the past decade may appear to be coincidence or a result of the three countries’ prominent position in world media, in actuality it is an indication of the pervasiveness and utility of domestic extremist co-optation as a geo-political strategy. By studying the mass incarceration of Uyghurs in Xinjiang by the Chinese government, Russia’s annexation of Ukraine and the Republican Party’s metamorphosis into a radical anti-system movement, an understanding can be gained not only of each respective world powers’ interactions with domestic extremist but also in what context

关键词: 国内极端主义，大国竞争，维吾尔族，信息战
that strategy was employed, what factors lead to that decision and what impacts resulted. The utility of this study is plain: without a clear understanding of how existing powers interact with domestic extremism, the international community will remain vulnerable to self-serving distortions of truth, appropriated narratives of aggression and the advancement of unpopular and authoritarian politics.

This study utilizes a Webarian comparative analysis to analyze, compare and contrast three different instances in which one of the World’s Powers was implicated in a plot to subvert domestic or international law in which their interaction with a domestic extremist element played a pivotal role. As recent and prominent examples can be found for China, Russia and the United States within the last decade, these examples are natural subjects for this study. This study will analyze the Chinese internment of the Uyghur ethnic group in Xinjiang post 2017, the Russian annexation of the Crimean peninsula in 2014 and the systematic radicalization of the Republican party over the last two decades to answer the following research question: “how do Great Powers interact with domestic extremism in ways which advance their own interests?” The hypothesis: “Great Powers promote the spread of domestic extremism in order to advance their own interests,” is adopted to guide the analysis. A detailed analysis of each event in isolation will facilitate a deeper understanding of the causes and impacts unique to each situation before the various factors concerning each Great Power’s interactions with extremism are illuminated. Finally, patterns in behavior can be derived from the causes and implications revolving around each Great Power’s decision to interact with extremism.

Chinese Communist Party, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region

Over the last four years in the mislabeling named Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), the CCP under Xi Jinping has conducted an experiment in coercive social engineering the size and aspiration of which is exceeded in scale only by its wanton inhumanity and the genocidal impact it will have on the Uyghur ethnicity. Best estimates place over 1 million Uyghurs currently imprisoned in re-education and labor camps in the XUAR (Anand 2020, 3; Savrun 2019, 7; Smith Finley 2020, 2). Uyghur society writ large has been subjected to arbitrary detention, forced labor, torture and death (Savrun 2019, 7). Families have been separated and children detained in state-run orphanages en masse, subjected to the same conditions and re-education as their parents (Finneg 2020, 12; Savrun 2019, 7; Zainab 2019, 488-491). Young girls have been raped, sterilized or forced to marry ethnic Han men (Savrun 2019, 7). CCP policy in the XUAR conflates extremism with Uyghur cultural identity, justifying the forced Sinicization of all aspects of society in Xinjiang in order to stop the spread of “ideological illness” (Anand 2020, 3; Çaksu 2020, 4-5; Smith...
Conditions in the camps which utilize re-education, forced labor, starvation, lack of sanitation or medical treatment, cultural, religious and linguistic suppression, torture, rape, sterilization, isolation and familial coercion to force the replacement of “religious affiliation and ethnic identity with secular, patriotic political allegiance,” are so abysmal that victim’s belts and shoe laces are confiscated to prevent self harm. (Byler 2018, 3; Çaksu 2020, 10; Smith Finley 2020, 2; Zainab 2019, 6-8). No section of society is spared internment and deaths are common amongst the elderly and infirm (Byler 2018, 3).

The CCP has consistently denied or downplayed the existence of the camps, first denying their existence before insisting they are vocational training schools after their existence was accepted internationally and finally backpedaling further to calling them counter extremism “re-education camps,” when it was determined the camps held young people as well as the elderly, intellectuals and other facets of society who would have no interest in vocational training (Çaksu 2020, 4). The existence of the camps appears to be related to the CCP’s 2014 ‘Strike Hard against Violent Terrorism’ policy, after which state military presence and arrests in the region increased dramatically and restrictions on freedom of movement and assembly enforced (Mumford 2018, 3-4). By adopting official estimates of the number of religious extremists expected to be found in a given village in the XUAR, the CCP enacted a mass system of internment and cultural re-education which was accelerated in 2017 despite the drastic fall in extremist violence in preceding years (Zainab 2019, 7). Sinicization appears to be the primary purpose of internment, which reportedly lasts up to 15 years and is organized into 3 degrees of severity: not speaking Mandarin, possessing religious material, and finally studying religion abroad (Çaksu 2020, 7; Zainab 2019, 7).

Far from being a novel occurrence in China, the CCP has used Internment Camps to quash political opposition since the 1950’s and as recently as the 2000’s against members of the Falun Gong religious sect (Çaksu 2020, 5). While state repression has increased steadily since the Tiananmen Square Massacre, the United States’ ‘War on Terror’ rhetoric has afforded the CCP effective ‘carte blanche’ to target any outspoken minority for counter terrorism operations (Çaksu 2020, 3-4). As a result, contemporary government rhetoric places the blame on the encroachment of Islamic extremism from the Middle East, not any aspirations for political self determination by the Uyghurs in their traditional homeland (Mahmut 2019, 9).

The ten million members of the Uyghur ethnicity compose fifty percent of China’s Sunni muslim population, however unlike other prominent Muslim ethnic groups in China, the Uyghurs hold strong territorial connections to their homeland, over 99.8 percent of Uyghurs live in the XUAR (Byler 2018, 3; Gladney 2021, 96; Bibikova 2019, 2). Uyghurs share similar education and literacy rates as other minority ethnic groups in China and until relatively re-
cently have been allowed to organize public education through the ‘Madrasat Jadid’ (new schools) system which spread across central Asia from Imperial Russia in the early 20th century and blended religious and secular education systems (Savrun 2019, 7). However, since the inception of the CCP, Uyghurs have been targeted for cultural repression more so than other Muslim minority ethnic groups in China primarily because of their land-based claims to autonomy and cultural and ethnic differences from the Han ethnic majority. (Byler 2018, 63). Violence between the CCP and the Uyghur ethnic group has not been uncommon since the cultural revolution and contemporarily is characterized by brutal crackdowns on Uyghur political demonstrations decrying economic prejudice and violent reprisals against state security personnel and Han immigrants (Sohrab and Ali 2018, 4; Gladney 2021, 89-90; Mahmut 2019, 9-10; Soliev 2019, 2; Bibikova 2019, 6).

Past CCP policies in the XUAR have emphasized Han migration, infrastructure development and economic prejudice which has resulted in mass Uyghur disenfranchisement, poverty, protests and extremist attacks (Byler 2018, 4). The CCP’s views of the XUAR are colonial (the XUAR only became Chinese during the Qing dynasty) and prejudiced (Byler 2018, 1; Sohrab and Ali 2018, 4; Zainab 2019, 496). Han are favored for employment and promotion because programs bridging the cultural divide between a Uyghur workforce and Han developers from the East is seen as a drag on the local economy (Zainab 2019, 490). Seen through this lens, the events in the XUAR resemble a colonial genocide in which the colonizer invades and competes for resources while the indigenous community forms a guerilla insurgency and resists before the colonizer reacts by incarcerating them en masse where they succumb to poor conditions and violence (Smith Finley 2020, 5). This latest crackdown by the CCP is motivated by completely geo-political considerations, however (Byler 2018, 6).

The XUAR is not only home to large deposits of oil, gas and precious minerals, it occupies a strategic location along China’s connection to the West and represents a unique opportunity to advance China’s dominance in the surveillance and security industries (Çaksu 2020, 19; Mahmut 2019, 3; Smith Finley 2020, 4; Bibikova 2019, 2; Zainab 2019, 490). By committing genocide against the Uyghur ethnic group in Xinjiang, Xi Jinping intends not only to secure the XUAR’s extensive natural resources, securitize China’s western border and staging point for the CCP’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), an overland pan-Eurasian trade network which would simultaneously establish a Chinese pole of world influence, but also to provide a fertile test bed for China’s explosive surveillance and security industries which China in turn intends to dominate, capitalize and export via the BRI (Byler 2018, 6; Çaksu 2020, 13; Bibikova 2019, 2; Savrun 2019, 8; Smith Finley 2020, 6; Zainab 2019, 489-490). China’s national surveillance network is already extensive, funnelling public and private data mined from apps and smartphones into a massive police da-
Chinese authorities collect biometric data from these apps including facial traits, gait and language, and the surveillance in the XUAR goes even further (Çaksu 2020, 13). This mass surveillance and suppression campaign has been termed ‘terror capitalism’ due to its use of the “terrorism” label to create a space where normal human rights no longer apply and the full weight of the military industrial complex can be brought to bear against a target population (Çaksu 2020, 17). Here too, the influence of United States (US) Government ‘War on Terror’ rhetoric is palpable and is increasingly reflected in CCP policy.

While minority ethnic group rights have been enshrined in every Chinese constitution since 1911 and more recently CCP policy has promoted cultural and religious exchange between ethnic Uyghurs and international Islam, economic and security concerns have increasingly led China to pursue a course of religious and cultural sinicization (Anand 2020, 9-11; Mahmut 2019, 11; Finnegan 2020, 5). The results are policies outlawing the daily expressions not only of Islamic life like prayer, ablutions or abstinence, but also common aspects of secular life such as holidays, social gatherings, refusing to submit to biometric scans, not behaving in a patriotic manner or owning camping equipment (Anand 2020, 3; Çaksu 2020, 14; Finnegan 2020, 8). The policies enacted by the CCP are so restrictive that a growing number of scholars posit that they are intended actually to inflame extremism.

For years CCP policies such as Han migration and economic prejudice have alienated Uyghurs and created fuel for extremism (Sohrab and Ali 2018, 2). More recent policies outlawing aspects of daily life seem designed to increase the divide between Han and Uyghur communities and inflame resistance amongst the Uyghur population (Mahmut 2019, 10). Furthermore, the mass internment of Uyghur society, far from achieving the stated goal of re-education, is expected to result in a future wave of extremist activity (Soliev 2019, 3). Finally the erosion of the tenets of mainstream Islam from the Uyghur community will leave them unprotected from more extremist fringe ideologies (Mahmut 2019, 4-10). Why is there such a disconnect between the CCP’s stated goal of a ‘harmonious society’ and the policies it is enacting in the XUAR? In truth the CCP’s ‘harmo- nious society’ rhetoric is a euphemism for a ‘homogenous society’; and it’s policies reflect this dichotomy (Çaksu 2020, 21). The CCP does not wish to mitigate the issue of Uyghur extremism, but to inflame it with decades of prejudicial economic policies, using the resulting violence to justify the eradication of the Uyghur culture entirely, conveniently establishing a secure, culturally Han base in the XUAR from which to enact it’s regional geo-political aspirations (Çaksu 2020, 8; Finnegan 2020, 9). The CCP plan involved securely containing and agitating an increasingly volatile Uyghur extremist movement at the heart of it’s greatest economic project. The risk was high and CCP leadership needed someone with experience sup-
pressing domestic insurgencies to lead the initiative.

In 2016 Chen Quanguo, Communist Party secretary of Tibet, was transferred to serve as the Party secretary of Xinjiang (Çaksu 2020, 4; Smith Finley 2020, 5). Chen was known for his work in Tibet as the architect of grid-system securitization, a grid like system of security checkpoints and patrols including mass surveillance and profiling, the same system is now at work in the XUAR although on a much larger scale (Çaksu 2020, 4; Smith Finley 2020, 5) The availability of biomedical sequencing technology from western corporations has made biometric surveillance a practical and fruitful option, authorities collect DNA during enforced “free health checks” and employ facial and gait recognition technology en masse (Çaksu 2020, 14). Mosques require identity cards to enter and public places are subjected to mass video surveillance. Chen went further, instituting a social surveillance program including homestays with Uyghur families by Han ‘relatives’ who stay with the family for weeks on end, assessing their culture, language, and religious practices, sometimes over multiple visits before making a recommendation on incarceration (Byler 2018, 1; Çaksu 2020, X11; Zainab 2019, 3)

In sum, the repressive restrictions on daily life, the ever present surveillance and the mass detention all serve to suppress Uyghur society and erode the cultural roots connecting the ethnicity. Families are separated by incarceration, adults imprisoned and re-educated, children raised in state orphanages under much the same conditions (Çaksu 2020, 10; Mahmut 2019, 7; Soliev 2019, 3; Zainab 2019, 494-495). Cultural and religious practices are punishable by imprisonment and re-education, Mandarin is imposed and the traditional language outlawed, children are adopted and raised by the state (Sohrab and Ali 2018, 6; Mahmut 2019, 7). International critics and relatives of those imprisoned living abroad face coercion to return to the XUAR, blackmail to inform on their neighbors or relatives and intimidation to stay silent about their family’s treatment (Çaksu 2020, 10-14; Finnegan 2020, 12; Smith Finley 2020, 19). At a time when the rest of China is loosening its birth restrictions and the birth rate is rising, the birth rate in the XUAR is falling by as much as 24% per year as the result of a mass birth control and sterilization drive resulting in a seven fold increase in sterilizations in the XUAR, more sterilizations than were performed throughout all of China over the last two decades (Smith Finley 2020, 8-14). According to the UN convention on Genocide, separating children from their families, enforcing sterilization, rape, sexual slavery and sexual violence all represent crimes against humanity (Smith Finley 2020, 11). It is clear then that the CCP’s actions in the XUAR are crimes against humanity, but do they constitute genocide?

Despite the hesitancy of much of the international community to attribute the label of genocide to events in the XUAR, often preferring instead the label of cultural genocide, the example
of the CCP’s actions in the XUAR are textbook. This hesitancy to label genocide stems from the misconception that genocide is necessarily bloody or violent, when in fact the eradication of the cultural conception of an ethnic group is frequently enacted through education and isolation (Finnegan 2020, 3-11; Smith Finley 2020, 13). The United Nations defines genocide as “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.” (Finnegan 2020, 3). The events in Xinjiang clearly meet most if not all of the prerequisites. Even the notoriously difficult to satisfy requirement of “intent to destroy, in whole or in part,” is illuminated by CCP rhetoric on the subject.

Having co-opted ‘War on Terror’ messaging for use against ethnic minorities following 2001, CCP rhetoric surrounding the XUAR and the Uyghurs has increasingly taken on the terminology of epidemiology (Smith Finley 2020, 12; Mumford 2018, 5). An official Communist Party communication, obtained in audio by Radio Free Asia (2018) explains how Uyghurs, merely by being muslim, are infected with a religious ideological disease which if left unchecked will spread throughout society like a virus, destroying it. The report continues to say that having gone through re-education and recovering from the ideological disease doesn’t mean one is permanently cured and that repeated imprisonment may be necessary (Radio Free Asia 2018). Clearly the CCP is making a case for the ongoing internment of a significant proportion of the Uyghur population for cultural re-education. While this may not result in the literal deaths of the majority of the Uyghur people, it is expected to enact a cultural trauma so deep that the Uyghur ethnic group will cease to exist (Çaksu 2020, 17).

While the international reaction to the mass internment of the Uyghurs has been vocal, it has largely been symbolic. China is an important economic partner of most countries in the world and wields an exaggerated degree of political influence making meaningful repudiation unpalatable to most countries, although meaningful steps are being made to ban the security products developed as a result of the mass internment of Uyghurs (Byler 2018, 7; Smith Finley 2020, 22). In addition the vocal campaign of antagonistically anti-Chinese rhetoric pursued by then President Trump throughout his administration, muddied the waters of Sino-American relations, making any meaningful dialogue about the XUAR impossible (Smith Finley 2020, 21). In the Biden era, revelations about a phone conversation between then President Trump and Xi Jinping in which Trump encouraged Xi to continue the mass internment of Uyghurs has reinvigorated political support to censure
the CCP (Smith Finley 2020, 22). Until a meaningful international response can be marshalled, CCP assurances that prisoners are being released remain uncorroborated and over one million people remain interned in the XUAR (Finnegan 2020, 13).

Russia United, The Republic of Ukraine

2014 found a multitude of geopolitical stressors old and new converging with explosive consequences in eastern Ukraine. Ukraine’s steadily westward political march in the post-Soviet era was interrupted by the Russian linked Yanukovich administration who reversed course, setting off what would become, amidst a lethal government crackdown, the Orange Revolution. Yanukovich was deposed amid overtures of support from US Obama administration officials (Saluchev 2014, 5). It was not yet known in Ukraine nor the US, but a strategic horizon had just been crossed and a chain of highly rehearsed events, little understood in the US, was set into motion which would see a huge and economically vital portion of Ukraine ceded bloodlessly to Russian annexation before leaders in Kiev were aware of what was happening. Collectively, this chain of events can be described as Hybrid Warfare or New Generation Warfare, a strategy Russia had spent the previous decade perfecting (Iasiello 2017, 10).

Russian interest in the region derived primarily from the deep water port at Sevastopol, and thanks to a highly unpopular contract extension awarded by the Yanukovych government, Russia’s only year-round warm water port and staging point for the Black Sea Fleet for another twenty five years (Grant 2015, 12; Iasiello 2017, 4). However, as the site of a famous World War Two Soviet victory, Sevastopol also possesses a near-mythical status in a resurgent Russian nationalism, Putin’s ruling ideology. Originally annexed by the Russian Empire in 1855, Crimea hosts a substantial Russian diaspora and a Russian leaning polity, to many Russians in Crimea and elsewhere, Sevastopol was a Russian city on a Ukrainian peninsula (Saluchev 2014, 3). However, in 2014 the Russian lease of the base at Sevastopol was under threat of cancellation by an increasingly anti-Russian Ukrainian government which was simultaneously approaching NATO membership, which in itself would pose a dynamic-shifting obstacle to Russian influence in the region (Saluchev 2014, 2). The Russian military, while larger than that of Ukraine, did not possess a numerical or tactical advantage drastic enough to ensure a quick victory, meaning international intervention and either a ceasefire or a long drug out war would be the certain results of an invasion (Motin 2019, 13). Vladimir Putin appeared to be out of options, but to him the decision was clear.

Ukraine’s steady march towards NATO membership represented an existential threat to Russia not only by threatening to eliminate a strategically vital port, but also by challenging Putin’s governing narrative of a Russian Nationalist Revival and the establishment
of a Russian pole of world influence to counter that of NATO (Treisman 2016, 2). In addition, joining NATO would complicate any future Russian intervention (Treisman 2016, 2). NATO membership represented a closing window of opportunity for Putin. In that way the Orange Revolution may have been a signal that a pro-Russian administration could not thrive in Ukraine and that NATO membership was now inevitable. However the political instability resulting from the Orange Revolution and the ouster of a democratically elected, if highly unpopular and repressive leader gave Putin the cover necessary to take action. For years prior to 2014, Russian funded NGO’s had led an anti-West insurgency in Ukrainian politics, funding political parties, media outlets and extremist groups, even distributing Russian passports to the residents of Crimea (Kuzio 2010, 28-38). In this infosphere the Orange Revolution became a suitable pretext for what Putin would later call a “Humanitarian Intervention,” but what was in reality a brazen and opportunistic invasion of Ukrainian National Sovereignty to secure strategic territory and foil an adversarial advance, disguised by a flood of media stories detailing Ukrainian atrocities, murdered Russians and the right to self determination (Kuzio 2010, 35; Treisman 2016, 2).

In the days following Yanukovych’s flight, Russian Special Operations Forces (SOF) left their base at Sevastopol disguised as civilians and made contact with Russian-funded extremists. On February 27th, Russian SOF, disguised as and accompanied by pro-Russian rebels, surrounded Ukrainian military bases and government buildings across the Crimea in what appeared to be a bloodless coup by the Ukrainian citizens of Crimea (Bukkvol 2016, 4-5). Russian information operations boosted this perception, as well as rhetoric of Ukrainian aggression, muddying perceptions of events (Kuzio 2010, 35; Treisman 2016, 2). By the time the Kiev government was aware of Russia’s intentions in Ukraine, a referendum for independence had already been passed in Crimea with overwhelming support, albeit under highly suspect conditions (Gedmin 2014, 2; Iasiello 2017, 7). Before Kiev could even comprehend that its territorial sovereignty was under attack, Russia had already entered Crimea under a fallacious pretext, neutralized any agents of the Ukrainian government that could pose an obstacle to annexation while disguised as a rebel movement and staged an illegal referendum on independence in order to prop up an arguable if ultimately false claim to control over Crimea under international law, solidifying Russian control over the peninsula (Bilkova 2015, 31-37; Gedmin 2014, 2). With Sevastopol secured for the foreseeable future and a growing rebel movement ignited in Ukraine, Putin could then shift focus to the issue of Ukraine’s NATO membership. By infusing the rebel movement in Donbas with equipment, advisors and fighters and massing Russian military forces along the Ukrainian border for ‘military exercises,’ Russia was able to spread the conflict from Crimea to the mainland and destabilize the country in
the first months of the new governmen, simultaneously dashing any hopes for an imminent invitation to NATO (Bukkvol 2016, 4-5; Bilkova 2015, 31-37; Kuzio 2010, 38).

The issues Russia’s actions in Crimea present to the international community are obvious: Russian military forces left their bases in Ukrainian territory, overwhelmed the Ukrainian military stationed there and occupied government buildings before staging illegal referendums on independence and Russian annexation (Billkova 2014, 7). Under the UN General Assembly’s 1974 definition this is prima facie evidence of aggression, or the use of military forces within the territory of another state with the intent of annexing a portion of that state’s territory (Billkova 2014, 7-23; Marxsen 2016, 13). The referendum too falls under question. Although it is a right recognized under International Human Rights Law that citizens may pursue political self-determination, a single referendum on independence is insufficient to grant the territory in question independence, the expected outcome instead being steps towards a semi autonomous relationship with the parent state (Grant 2015, 2-11). The Kremlin’s rhetoric of “protecting ethnic Russians,” and “Ukrainian atrocities,” while false, reflected a narrative perception of the western leaning government in Kiev and its anti-Russian policies in Crimea which alienated the Russian sympathetic population there and lent weight to propaganda claiming the disenfranchisement of ethnic Russians (Katchanovski 2015, 10; Marxsen 2016, 21). Furthermore Western overtures of support before and during the Orange Revolution added to the perception of the movement as a Western proxy, a narrative Kremlin information operations exploited (Saluchev 2014, 6).

This combination of information operations, military force and political coercion used in conjunction is termed Hybrid Warfare and over the last decade and a half has been honed into Putin’s coercive foreign policy instrument of choice (Iasiello 2017, 10). The example of Georgia is informative for Russian actions in Ukraine. First used in Georgia in 2008, Russia’s experimentation with Hybrid Warfare tactics originally made significant use of conventional military forces in conjunction with information operations in an infosphere prepared by Russian funded political NGO’s and extremists (Nilsson 2018, 17). In Georgia in 2008, years of political instability had allowed rebel movements in two separate regions of the country to persist (Kurban and Ergun 2020, 4). Russia sought to solidify a hold over Georgia’s strategic military and economic position while simultaneously delaying the growing movement for NATO membership in Georgia (Hamilton 2018, 22; Kurban and Ergun 2020, 2; Motin 2019, 7; Nilsson 2018, 13). Like in Ukraine six years later, Russia made heavy use of information operations to influence international perceptions of the battlespace, although unlike in Ukraine, Georgia was prepared to counter Russia’s information offensive and Russia was quickly recognized as the aggressor in the situation (Gedmin 2014, 2; Nilsson 2018, 49). Also unlike Ukraine, Russia made extensive use of every branch of
its military in the Georgia operation including artillery, aircraft and the navy (Kurban and Ergun 2020, 6; Lavrov 2018, 25; Motin 2019, 10). In subsequent operations, Russia would come to rely less and less upon the conventional military element, and instead highlight covert action in conjunction with pervasive information operations as it did in Ukraine in 2014 (Iasiello 2017, 9).

Within days Putin’s goals for Ukraine were accomplished. He secured Sevastopol for the Black Sea Fleet, delayed or prevented Ukraine from entering NATO and boosted his Russian Nationalist Revival ideology to Russians and their neighbors (Kolesnikov 2015, 15-25). After the annexation of Crimea, the Russian economy reeled from a combination of punitive sanctions and falling oil prices but support for Putin’s narrative of a resurgent Russia, besieged on all sides by self-serving Western interests, which is the only currency which truly matters to Putin’s hold on power, is greater than ever before (Alexseev and Hale 2019, 12; Kolesnikov 2015, 15).

The Republican Party, The United States of America

For over the past two decades, the modern Republican party has been undergoing a dramatic metamorphosis, initiated before the formation of the Tea Party movement, a reactionary conservative movement formed to protest relief spending during the 2008 financial crisis (Abramowitz 2021, 1). With funding from the Koch Network and other industry donors and support from FOX media, the Tea Party movement became an insurgent faction in the Republican Party which took root into a reactionary conservative movement focused on contemporary social issues in America and opposed to what it perceived as the erosion of White Christian and male hegemony in the Nation (Abramowitz 2021, 1). The movement swept through the Republican party like a wave, replacing the existing party structure with Tea Party insiders (Abramowitz 2021, 1). This combination of industry funding and reactionary conservatism would prove to be a winning combination for the movement which has since dominated the Republican party. Since the early 2000s, increases in industry lobbying which disproportionately target extra-party fringe groups to the exclusion of the mainstream Republican Party has driven a shift in focus, away from traditional Conservative values to an aggressively industry-friendly platform of corporate tax cuts and regulatory rollbacks (Pierson 2017, 12).

The Koch brothers, perhaps the most prolific conservative industry activists in the country, have spent decades building a network of industry friendly political organizations—lobbying groups, think tanks, political action committees and media organizations not to mention dark money groups and litigators, all tasked with dragging the Republican party and with it, American economic policy inexorably to the right, eliminating environmental protections, employee protections and corporate taxes (Skocpol
and Hertel-Fernandez 2016, 5). Since the Tea Party effectively took over the Republican party after 2008, the Koch Network has become deeply embedded within party infrastructure, supplanting the traditional career path for Republican politicians (Skocpol and Hertel-Fernandez 2016, 12). The result is a career path which rewards freshman politicians with lucrative and influential positions in Koch Network political organizations, such as Americans for Progress, which will in turn make the politician even more influential in Republican political circles (Skocpol and Hertel-Fernandez 2016, 12). These positions in Koch Network political organizations serve to indoctrinate young politicians with neo-conservative values like industry sympathy and reactionary conservatism, who carry that influence with them in later posts within the Republican Party (Skocpol and Hertel-Fernandez 2016, 12). By embedding itself within the structure of the Republican party, the Koch Network has created an environment where successful politicians have Koch affiliations and politicians hoping to become successful seek out those affiliations (Skocpol and Hertel-Fernandez 2016, 12). This practice has created a feedback loop in which economic radicalism, while contrary to the wishes of a largely rural and blue collar constituency, is rewarded with greater influence within the Republican party (Skocpol and Hertel-Fernandez 2016, 12). This arrangement, which left unchecked could result in a terminal degree of constituency alienation, necessitated a drastic shift in Republican rhetoric.

Its previous positions on financial conservatism, national security, family values and others abandoned, the Republican party became a party without a platform (Cobb 2021). Rather than advancing a policy vision for America, the Republican party has advanced a doctrine of political polarization by railing against what has been a nearly unbroken trend of gradual liberalization in American politics and culture spanning generations (Cobb 2021). In this fight the ends justify the means and all normal rules regarding decorum and the rule of law have been left behind. The resulting tribalism witnessed the vast majority of Republican politicians locked in goose step behind an authoritarian and white supremacist president whose propensity for racially prejudicial policies was outweighed only by his assertions of political omnipotence (Cobb 2021; Rondeaux 2021; Smith 2021). By amplifying aggressively anti-liberal messages and a sense of political tribalism, conservative media has driven the growth of an ‘outrage industry,’ coercing the reactionary support of a constituency which generally doesn’t benefit from its policies, and is often harmed by them (Gabbatt 2021; Pierson 2017, 4). Blurring the line between political rhetoric and incitement to violence, right-wing media organizations increasingly target the most extreme fringes of society, pandering conspiracy theory and extremist political commentators to an audience that finds itself either increasingly alienated or increasingly enthralled (Brookhouser 2021, 39-42; Gabbatt 2021). The same shift in worldview is reflected in
Republican politicians who, more than ever before, openly support extremist organizations, anti-government conspiracy theories and political violence (Smith 2021; Zitser and Ankel 2021).

While rhetoric has increasingly grown more extreme along the political right, politicians are advertising their support of extremist organizations and an internet anti-government conspiracy gone viral is coagulating into a cohesive political movement (Edmondson 2021; Zitser and Ankel 2021). Security provided by members of militia organizations such as the Proud Boys or Oath Keepers are an increasingly regular facet of Republican rallies, where elected members of congress whip up the crowd with exhortations to violent revolt in the name of preserving American Democracy (Edmondson 2021; Gabbatt 2021). Conspiracy theory is central to this rhetoric and varies from the commonplace (the 2020 election was stolen) to the deranged (Donald Trump is God’s chosen champion, single handedly battling an international diabolic cult of world leaders headed by George Soros, Nancy Pelosi and Hillary Clinton known as the ‘Deep State’ intent on running a global child sex trafficking ring in order to harvest adrenochrome from its victims on an industrial scale) and has permeated mainstream Republican media and political discourse from state legislatures to the White House (Chandler 2020, 2; Papasavva et al. 2021, 2; Zitser and Ankel 2021).

While at first references to the QAnon conspiracy theory made by elected Republicans appeared to be a calculated political move to gain a followership in those movements, believers in the conspiracy theory have become a political force of their own (Zitser and Ankel 2021). Representatives Marjorie Taylor Greene R (GA) and Lauren Boebert R (CO) openly supported the QAnon conspiracy before and during their run for congress and while both have since backpedaled on their beliefs, this is merely a knowing political move to satisfy their critics while assuring their QAnon base that their beliefs are well represented (BBC News 2021; Zitser and Ankel 2021). Furthermore, QAnon’s movement into mainstream politics is advancing at an alarming rate, as of last check 36 QAnon supporters are running for congress across seventeen states in 2022 (Zitser and Ankel 2021).

Among even radical Republican politicians, Trump enjoys a messianic degree of influence among QAnon supporters, a fact which Trump leveraged heavily in the second half of his presidency, whipping up support amongst some of his most extreme constituents in preparation for what he expected would be a fight for the election. Among his prolific Twitter offerings, Trump posted or retweeted posts espousing aspects of the QAnon conspiracy theory 216 times and while it was at times unclear if Trump was familiar with the tenets of the conspiracy theory, it was clear that he was aware of their unwavering support for him and he wasn’t alone (Dickson 2020, X1; Smith 2021). Since 2019, retired Lt. General and past Trump administration National Security adviser Michael Flynn, has weaponized the QAnon conspiracy theory,
using his military experience running psychological operations in Afghanistan and his status as a Trump ‘insider,’ to promote, organize and distill an army of ‘digital soldiers,’ essentially citizen investigators and vigilantes, with a sense of urgent duty to uncover the truth about the Deep State (Rondeaux 2021). Corporate filings show that Flynn had been working on a mass social media influence project as far back as 2017 when he was National Security Adviser for then-President Trump, but supposedly only began working with QAnon in 2019, apparently as a means of mitigating some of his legal fees which resulted from presenting false testimony to the Mueller investigation (Rondeaux 2021).

QAnon originates from an anonymous message board popular with the right-wing extremist community in late 2017 and while its following was initially limited to that message board, conscious efforts to spread the conspiracy theory by some of its supporters resulted in it blossoming into a social media movement with a significant presence on every major platform (Aliapoulios et al. 2021, 9; Amarasingam and Argentino 2020, 39; Zuckerman 2019, 8). Narratively, the QAnon conspiracy theory offers little change from prominent conspiracy theories that have pervaded the zeitgeist over the preceding generation, however organizationally, QAnon represents a paradigmatic shift in the relationship between social media and public perceptions of reality (Aliapoulios et al. 2021, 2; Amarasingam and Argentino 2020, 40; Chandler 2020, 4). Q, the supposed originator of the QAnon conspiracy theory and holder of privileged government clearance, communicates with the public via a series of thousands of vaguely worded posts which the community refers to as ‘breadcrumbs’ (Aliapoulios et al. 2021, 2; Amarasingam and Argentino 2020, 40). A series of community run aggregator sites called ‘bakers,’ collect these breadcrumbs from anonymous message boards and determine their authenticity by comparing the post’s unique tripcode to a list of those thought to have been used by Q (Aliapoulios et al. 2021, 2). The bakers then offer their own interpretation for what that particular breadcrumb means in the wider context of the QAnon conspiracy theory (Aliapoulios et al. 2021, 2). This means that the vast majority of QAnon conspiracy theory adherents have never personally interacted with any of Q's posts, but have merely been exposed to the opinions formulated by other prominent members of the movement.

In QAnon ideology, adherents combat the Deep State by exposing its existence to the world (Amarasingam and Argentino 2020, 4). Individuals advance within this movement by interpreting Q’s drops in ever more convincing or viral ways, the goal of course being to attract as many new adherents as possible (Chandler 2020, 4; Aliapoulios et al. 2021, 11; Amarasingam and Argentino 2020, 39). This means that the QAnon movement, while appearing to be directed from above by the shadowy figure of Q, is in reality driven by the interpretations of a small and ephemeral group of influential activists (Papasavva et al. 2021, 6). This means
that the QAnon movement as a whole, while cohesive to its founding narrative, is incredibly unstable and subject to influence not only from radical members of its own group, but also outside actors seeking to steer a quickly growing and politically extreme voter base in an advantageous direction (Aliapoulios et al. 2021, 2).

One need look no further than January 6th, 2021 for an example of the potential repercussions of this instability. Fearing the possibility of an electoral loss in 2020, then President Trump ramped up rhetoric of election tampering and a possible coup months before the election, firing up a base which became increasingly convinced, despite all evidence to the contrary, that a political coup was taking place and that democratically elected incumbent Donald Trump was being deposed in a blatant attack on American Democracy (Kaplan and Sapien 2021). Energized by this alarmist rhetoric, thousands of citizens receptive to Trump’s message flocked to the Nation’s Capital in January in an attempt to block the certification of President Biden (Kaplan and Sapien 2021). Within hours the mob, which included numerous members of prominent right wing extremist organizations including QAnon, the Proud Boys, the Oath Keepers and the Three Percenters, had broken into the capitol, ransacked and looted its interior and beaten several capitol Police officers, one of whom would die from his injuries (Kaplan and Sapien 2021). While Republican reactions to January 6th have characterized the mob as a peaceful protest or even a tour group, revelations about weapons stockpiling and the organization of tactical ground teams tasked with finding and detaining prominent members of the opposition, as well as then vice president Mike Pence indicate that members of the mob that stormed the Capital on January 6th intended to commit violent insurrection (Lokay, Robinson and Crenshaw 2021, X). Far from being a tipping point, Republican reticence to hold to account the growing extremist element running rampant in its party ensures that January 6th is merely a beginning (Kaplan and Sapien 2021; Rondeaux 2021). The Republican party has accepted the vocal support of extremist organizations and integrated some of the most radical elements of the conservative universe into its very structure (Cobb 2021). These shifts in Republican party values, organization and strategy are tectonic and represent less a normal shift in party politics than a failing party’s co-optation by powerful financial backers and vocal extremist agitators (Karson and Cunningham 2021). As Donald Trump succinctly put it at CPAC 2021, “We have the Republican Party,” and the forces behind its take over are unlikely to alter course (Cobb 2021).

Findings and Discussion

In the XUAR, three goals dominate China’s policy decisions: the establishment of the BRI and thus a Chinese pole of influence, the domination of the security and surveillance industries and finally the ethnic homogenization and thus securitization of a strategically vital border province. The pursuit
of this last goal in particular supports the implementation of the other two by securing the BRI’s base and providing a test population for the security and surveillance industries. This appears to be a situation in which the primary objective of securing the BRI is conveniently supported by the lesser objective of boosting the security and surveillance industries. In pursuit of these goals, China has revived its use of labor and re-education camps, a coercive strategy long favored by the CCP as an answer to dissident elements, complete with torture, rape, murder and forced sterilization. It is evident from China’s actions that its long history of anti-Uyghur policies in the XUAR reflect the party’s intentions now more than ever and that it is willing to go to any length to achieve them, even genocide. If this weren’t concerning enough, the fact that China has successfully shielded itself from international response using a combination of disinformation and economic coercion does not leave much hope for a change in CCP policy.

To justify this mass incarceration of Uyghurs and the suppression of Uyghur culture in the XUAR, China has co-opted extremism by making a ‘scapegoat’ of the Uyghur population. In this view, a relatively small Uyghur extremist movement is blown into Nationally apocalyptic proportions, pervading all aspects of Uyghur culture and necessitating a comprehensive and militaristic reaction. In this narrative China doesn’t want to commit these actions in the XUAR, but is left little choice as a failure to act would mean the death of the Nation. The idea of Chinese culpability in stoking the extremism that actually exists with decades of economic marginalization meanwhile, is replaced with a convenient political zeitgeist provided by the West: Islamophobia. Thanks to easily re-purposed ‘War on Terror’ rhetoric propagated by the US, the CCP scapegoated international Islam, clearing the way for decades of prejudicial policies in the XUAR. It is clear then that China does not desire to mitigate extremism in the XUAR, China seeks to use extremism itself as a scapegoat to justify a final solution for the Uyghur ethnicity.

Putin’s actions in Ukraine also betray a long and familiar relationship with extremism co-optation. Its use first recognized in a modern military context in Georgia in 2008, Russian support of extremist elements in that country provided the diplomatic cover necessary to launch a phony humanitarian intervention which ended with the effective annexation of a significant and growing proportion of Georgia’s territory by Russia. This strategy was repeated, albeit more skillfully in Ukraine when Russia successfully annexed Crimea and stoked a rebellion in the mainland under the cover of a Russian-financed independence movement. Clearly Russia not only engages in extremist co-optation, it favors a ‘proxy’ relationship with those extremists. Furthermore, this strategy of extremist co-optation and support, rather than being a ‘last-ditch’ strategy for when more conventional means have failed, appears to be Putin’s foreign policy tool of choice and can be found in every country in which Russia has a strategic interest including its
neighbors, Europe and the United States (Denning 2021). By infusing extremism with money and influence, Russia aims to destabilize countries it sees as obstacles to its strategic interests. In this way Russia uses extremism as a proxy for its own influence, benefitting from a shield of plausible deniability which complicates reprisals for its actions.

Like China, the goals Russia hopes to achieve using extremist co-optation are primarily geo-political but with lesser economic elements. Russia’s primary geo-political goal is to counter NATO’s influence, simultaneously establishing a Russian pole of world influence under the ideology of a resurgent Russian nationalism. This would have the added benefit of creating a competing trade and treaty organization to that of NATO and further drawing Russia’s neighbors under its economic influence. The deep sea port at Sevastopol also played a large role in Putin’s strategic calculus. As Russia’s only year round warm water port, Sevastopol represented a clinch-pin in Russian national security and Geopolitical and economic interests in the Middle East. The prospect of losing access to this port was a red line to Putin and while approaching NATO membership may have been a more concerning problem overall, the loss of Sevastopol in particular was a more temporally pressing one. This, combined with the fact that a revolution had just taken place in Kiev and a more desirable period of political instability in Ukraine could hardly be imagined, caused Putin to take action and use a previously co-opted Ukrainian extremism as diplomatic cover for an organized, covert military annexation.

In the United States the goal of the Republican Party and its industry financiers is the corporate domination of economic policy in the United States. Insurgent factionalism within the party, funded by a shadowy network of industry backers and promoted by reactionary conservative media resulted in a dramatic shift in party leadership and policy. The GOP’s traditional base, growing more and more alienated as a result of a party no longer responsive to their wishes, had no stake in an ideology which had once touted financial conservatism and family values but now pandered to Billionaire interests at every opportunity. Under the risk of political irrelevance, the Republican party and the financial interests which oversaw its takeover recognized that a new and energetic base was necessary to avoid the party’s dissolution. This is why the example of the Tea Party movement is so instructive. An astroturfed conservative movement, voicing primarily economic grievances was appropriated by a radical conservative wave whose concerns were not only entirely social but were the result of a worldview embedded in paranoid racism. In this ideology, America (specifically white, rural America) is in recession, being drug down by self-serving Liberal policies and under threat of being overwhelmed by the resulting wave of immigrants and refugees. This rhetoric, with its overtures to economic recession, not only resonates with a significant degree of the population during a period of global economic recovery, its
rhetoric of invasion and political conspiracy also incites a smaller and more focused subset of the population to violent radical action (Brookhouser 2021, 39-42).

Thus the answer to the party’s question of relevancy was answered by the co-optation of a new extremist base and corresponding social platform. Where before the neo-Republican party had been dominated by the economic concerns of its financial backers to the exclusion of its constituency, now it cloaked its goals of corporate tax cuts and deregulation in a haze of reactionary social conservatism, casting out invitations to extremist elements of any kind, long alienated by mainstream politics to join its newly co-opted and growing ‘base’. By promoting an extreme conservative media environment, the Republican party could now energize its new base at will, no longer necessitating the inconvenience of a party political platform but instead by demonizing and resisting the opposition and by extension the establishment at every opportunity. The rule of law is forgotten in this contest as every action taken against a liberal establishment, no matter how unpopular, ill conceived or illegal it may be, is justified to the party’s new extremist base (Brookhouser 2021, 39-42). Thus Republican political polarity, adopted as a doctrinal red herring to distract an alienated constituency from unpopular policies and aided by an extremist conservative media landscape, has metamorphosed into a polarized reality in which the world one lives in is not determined by what one sees or feels, but on which side of the political divide one finds themself. In this juxtaposition of reality autocrats are saviors, elections endanger democracy and any attempt to counter this view are dismissed as originating from one who has yet to ‘pierce the veil’.

The similarities between these examples are many. First, each case study involves either an openly authoritarian government, or in the case of the Republican party, a nominally democratic organisation with blatant oversions to authoritarianism. Second, in every case, the motivating factor for engaging with extremism was existential, representing a geopolitical stick so huge that to ignore it would mean terminal injury to the most closely guarded interests of the organization. In addition the relationship each Great Power pursued with extremism is characterized by a desire to increase extremist power. In Ukraine and the United States, a more powerful extremist element reflected greater popular support for the organizations which promoted it. In China, rhetorical CCP goals of alleviating extremism in the XUAR are overshadowed by the reality of decades of prejudicial policies which appear intent on fanning extremist sentiment. In this case, the long term promotion of Uyghur extremism will afford the CCP a convenient and legally plausible justification for ever harsher measures against the Uyghur population, the inevitable result of which will be the annihilation of the Uyghur ethnic group. Cumulatively, this proves the hypothesis: “Great Powers promote the spread of domestic extremism in order to advance their own interests.”
In each case, the primary methods the Great Power used to interact with its co-opted extremist element were via information, where in every case, the Great Power disseminated rhetoric promoting public perceptions of the power held by the extremists, and financial investment. In Ukraine and the US, financial investment went straight to the extremist organizations, while in China, the financial investment instead went to remedial measures to contain the co-opted extremism. Also, the Great Power in every case benefited from a degree of political instability in the environment in which it was operating. In every case this served to muddy perceptions of events and grant the Great Power a greater degree of autonomy through anonymity. Tellingly in each case studied, the Great Power in question adopted a strategy of extremist co-optation as a means of gaining support for what it knew would be very unpopular policy decisions. In China, the CCP inflated the specter of international terrorism to justify a final solution to the long-standing issue of ethnic prejudice and Uyghur colonization. In Ukraine, a Russian backed extremist movement conflated Russian strategic interests with the right to secession of an economically vital portion of a sovereign European. In the United States the Republican Party co-opted an extremist base and reactionary platform to distract from its goal of advancing highly unpopular industry-centric policies. It appears as though the desire for a degree of deniability, if only at face value, permeates the decision to engage in extremist co-optation.

Of special note is the degree of similarity between the Russian example of extremist co-optation and the American example. In Ukraine, Russia cultivated an anti-establishment extremist element with the goal of advancing Russian policies. In the US, the neo-Republican establishment did much the same thing with an existing extremist anti-establishment movement. In light of Russia’s propensity to use extremist co-optation as a tool of foreign policy and revelations about Russian connections to American extremist organizations, it is also possible to see the Republican party’s co-optation of extremism as an element of Russia’s strategy of extremist co-optation within the United States. In this view, Russian links with Republican Politicians and international right-wing extremist movements are leveraged to boost a growing anti-establishment movement, co-opting Republican leadership along the way and simultaneously furthering Russia’s goal of weakening American hegemony and establishing a Russian pole to counter that of NATO. There are problems with this view however, primarily that despite the fact of Russian influence operations in American media and political channels, the sole attribution of America’s growing problem with right wing extremism to a Russian operation not only circumvents America’s historic responsibility in cultivating domestic extremist movements, but negates any possibility of that problematic history being healthily reconciled.
Conclusion

This study has demonstrated how domestic extremist co-optation is a favored tool of Authoritarian regimes around the globe. In a modern context of mass interaction via social media its utility becomes viral. With no more than an influx of capital and media, an interested government (or corporation) receives access to ready made and often self-sustaining political Swiss army knife, able to distort perceptions of reality, justify otherwise inconceivable policy measures and perhaps most importantly, to offer its users anonymity throughout. The fact that the world's three greatest powers trusted this strategy to achieve policy goals so important that to fail would mean an irreversible blow to international power and status indicates that far from being an experimental or specialized strategy, extremist co-optation is mainstream, and a common instrument in authoritarian foreign policy. Portents for its future applicability are dark, as with many things the internet and more specifically social media has influenced global communication channels and the spread of extreme ideologies in unexpected ways, and the recognition of its utility in swaying public opinion in general and extremist rhetoric specifically is rapidly growing. One concerning truth, more than any other, is indicated by the expansion of a commercial extremist co-optation industry. ‘Scapegoat,’ ‘proxy’ and ‘base’ are unlikely to remain the only recognized methods via which extremist co-optation can serve the goals of powerful actors.

While this study sought to present a complete and rounded representation of events across the world, several obstacles stood in the way of that goal. This study is limited to only three prominent examples of extremist co-optation from recent history and which happened to be associated with authoritarian leaning governments. Future studies broadening the scope of sampling to include older and lesser known events carried out by governments of any political ideology would provide a greatly enhanced degree of balance in perceiving extremist co-optation’s historic use and potential utility. Furthermore this study only analyzed instances of domestic extremist co-optation, a broader study analyzing extremist co-optation of all origins, while a historically daunting task, would inevitably yield a deeper, more nuanced and more impactful view of this geo-political phenomenon.

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Autonomous Robotics and the Laws of War: Methods and Consequences of Regulating Artificial Intelligence in Warfare

Joshua E. Duke

Abstract
This article addresses the question of what impact International Humanitarian Law (IHL), the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC), and the international community can or should have on the international development/deployment of autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems, and how the international community can achieve a significant impact with emerging national or cooperative international regulations or laws with regards to the developing relationship between robotics and warfare, without hindering technological developments in other areas of human life. The author, using primarily case studies related to weapon autonomy and robotics in warfare, tests the following theory: Technological advancements related to the development and implementation of autonomous and semi-autonomous weapons in warfare have the potential to be directly impacted by IHL and the LOAC, by using a reactive approach guided by historical underlying principles related to other technologies and the moral spirit of existing laws in order to proactively regulate the field. In testing the theory, the author shows the differences in lasting and effective technological impact of reactive versus proactive international actions. The case studies highlight the effectiveness of reactive international action, while framing the underlying issues of the past in the context of modern autonomous weaponry developments. The article highlights the record of weapon systems with autonomous functions and discusses fully autonomous lethal weapon systems’ inherent inability to comply with international human rights laws.

Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, autonomous weapons, international law, warfare, human rights, LOAC, United Nations
La robótica autónoma y las leyes de la guerra: métodos y consecuencias de regular la inteligencia artificial en la Guerra

Resumen

Este artículo aborda la cuestión de qué impacto pueden o deben tener el Derecho Internacional Humanitario (DIH), las Leyes de los Conflictos Armados (LOAC) y la comunidad internacional en el desarrollo / despliegue internacional de sistemas de armas autónomos y semiautónomos, y cómo la comunidad internacional puede lograr un impacto significativo con las regulaciones o leyes nacionales o cooperativas internacionales emergentes con respecto al desarrollo de la relación entre la robótica y la guerra, sin obstaculizar los desarrollos tecnológicos en otras áreas de la vida humana. El autor, utilizando principalmente estudios de casos relacionados con la autonomía de las armas y la robótica en la guerra, prueba la siguiente teoría: Los avances tecnológicos relacionados con el desarrollo y la implementación de armas autónomas y semiautónomas en la guerra tienen el potencial de verse directamente afectados por el DIH y la LOAC, mediante el uso de un enfoque reactivo guiado por principios históricos subyacentes relacionados con otras tecnologías y el espíritu moral de las leyes existentes para regular proactivamente el campo. Al probar la teoría, el autor muestra las diferencias en el impacto tecnológico duradero y efectivo de las acciones internacionales reactivas frente a las proactivas. Los estudios de caso destacan la eficacia de la acción internacional reactiva, al tiempo que enmarcan los problemas subyacentes del pasado en el contexto de los desarrollos armamentísticos autónomos modernos. El artículo destaca el historial de los sistemas de armas con funciones autónomas y analiza la incapacidad inherente de los sistemas de armas letales totalmente autónomos para cumplir con las leyes internacionales de derechos humanos.

Palabras clave: Inteligencia artificial, armas autónomas, derecho internacional, guerra, derechos humanos, LOAC, Naciones Unidas
Introduction

Throughout the history of warfare, technological advances have consistently created invaluable combat advantages to those who possess them, and as technologies have advanced, warfare has steadily become more automated and less proportionate, often resulting in human rights being sidelined in the process. Since their recognition in the international community, International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) have repeatedly found relevance in debates surrounding tech-
nological inventions and advancements, leading to multiple international conventions and treaties codifying the morality of mankind into what the world recognizes in the modern day as basic human rights – laws that supersede warfare, and which have become a primary underlying moral cause that unites the world in peace even in times of war. When technological developments have the potential to inherently contradict human rights or the laws of war, the international community has formed a habit of moral interference for the sake of mankind, from banning the installation of nuclear weapons in space,\(^1\) to stigmatizing entire categories such as chemical weapons.\(^2\) Recent and potential future developments in the fields of robotics and Artificial Intelligence (AI), specifically as they can be applied to warfare, have sparked a similar debate with regards to applications of robotics with autonomous functions in warfare as they relate to IHL and the LOAC.

The application of lethal autonomous functions to technology in warfare is not a new phenomenon, as the 1907 ban on automatic submarine contact mines shows.\(^3\) While technologies have certainly advanced exponentially since that time, the guiding underlying principles of IHL and the LOAC, clearly evident in the content and intent of the 1907 ban, are the same underlying principles governing the technological applications of autonomy in warfare today. The primary difference is the evolution from automatic functions to autonomous and adaptive AI functions, which essentially have the power to give full or partial decision-making authority over the life and death of humans to machines. A major factor essential in framing the impact and effectiveness of international community IHL or LOAC-centric debates over autonomy in warfare, depends on whether the debate is reactive or proactive in its approach, regardless of the specific topic. This article addresses the question of what impact IHL, the LOAC, and the international community can or should have on the international development/deployment of autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems, and how significant impact can be achieved with regards to the developing relationship between robotics and warfare.

Technological advancements related to the development and implementation of autonomous and semi-autonomous weapons in warfare have the potential to be directly impacted by IHL and the LOAC. Using a reactive approach guided by historical underlying principles related to other technologies and the moral spirit of existing laws in order to proactively regulate the field can illustrate the differences in lasting and effective technological impact of reactive versus proactive international actions—Actions taken after events have occurred, versus actions taken to prevent events that may be possible. The case studies highlight the effectiveness of reactive international action, while framing the underlying issues of the past in the context of modern autonomous weaponry developments. The debate over the future of autonomous robotics in warfare contains both reactive and proactive elements.
Some weapon systems with autonomous functions have already existed long enough to have a significant track record to examine from a reactive perspective, while the proactive side of the debate focuses primarily on potential fully autonomous lethal weapon systems being deployed in the future, and their as yet inherent inability to comply with IHL and the LOAC.

**Theory and Methodologies**

In order to show the effective and reactive nature of the international community when addressing technological developments for warfare with IHL/LOAC implications, two case studies are presented in this article, as well as a theoretical application of adaptive AI to future combat scenarios to highlight the potential negative impact of a proactive general ban in the field of autonomy in robotics. The first case study compares persistent free-floating naval mines and anti-personnel mines, which were banned by The Hague VIII Convention Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines (The Hague VIII Convention), and the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Mine Ban Treaty), respectively, to modern day autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems. The purpose of this first case study is to draw comparisons between these weapons relative to the application of proportionality and distinction required for compliance with IHL and the LOAC. A comparison of the indiscriminate nature of free-floating naval mines and anti-personnel mines, and the machine decision-making process in autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems, also highlights the underlying nature of the IHL/LOAC implications involved in the modern debates over fielding such weapons without appropriate levels of human control.

This first case study also highlights the effectiveness of reactive international actions and emphasizes the need for the international community to have an abundance of historical information before making such a decision, as well as widespread support for it to achieve significant impact. The mine bans offer further international security insights into the reasoning behind banning or regulating technologies with IHL/LOAC implications and highlight enforcement problems which come from attempting to pursue a high impact solution to a possible future problem. A second case study examines the development and deployment of automated robotics, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), in combat situations, and compares these human-controlled robots to computer-controlled robots, while exploring the area in between the two where adaptive AI functions create ambiguity with regards to positive human control, and subsequently with the ability to apply IHL mandates of distinction and proportionality in combat. While UAVs have set a precedent for robotic warfare, as autonomous functions are developed and implemented into them their acceptance is becoming more and more
Information to address the hypotheses was gathered primarily from historical comparisons of related events, through scholarly journals, Government, organizational, and institutional publications. Ongoing debates related to the subject of autonomy in warfare and legal precedents examining relevant areas of IHL/LOAC were also examined through primary source legal documents governing IHL/LOAC. An examination of national policies of the United States with regards to autonomy in warfare, such as the United States Defense Science Board Summer Study on Autonomy (2016), also provided insight into the direct impact that international debate and action can have around the world. Advanced research and development projects are not entirely public, which limited the scope of the author’s research to information available in the public domain, making any conclusions dependent on the non-existence of classified variables which might affect them.

Defining the Environment

What is Autonomy?

Autonomous weapon systems, according to the United States, are weapon systems which can identify targets, select targets, and engage targets without human interface, including weapon systems which are dormant until activated by a human counterpart, and which once activated perform the above listed functions without further human interface. Semi-autonomous weapon systems, also according to the United States, are weapon

controversial. Comparing the properties and functions of UAVs to other existing and potential autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems supports the theory that proactive international actions regarding such weapons can only achieve effective and substantive significant impact in the future by framing the action reactively based on historical precedents.

Finally, a theory is proposed concerning adaptive AI research and how the international debate could inadvertently hinder beneficial technological developments. Adaptive AI research will potentially lead to machine logic, reasoning, emotion simulations, sensory simulations, and cognitive simulations comparable to, or which exceed, humans, making future AI systems potentially legally liable for their own actions, and potentially more capable of IHL/LOAC compliance than humans. Conversely, adaptive AI research may inadvertently result in machines learning things that are averse to the objectives of those employing it, contradictory to IHL and the LOAC, or even anti-mankind. This examination of current and potential adaptive AI technologies and their applications shows the wide range of private sector and military applications potentially enhanced by the field, and how they might be impacted by the international community. A cost/benefit analysis of advancing warfare-based AI and autonomous robotics research subsequently provides insight into the realities of the two extremes of either pursuing these technologies wantonly, or banning them entirely.
systems which contain one or more of the above listed functions, but which require human interface before each target engagement, or continual human interface throughout its activities, including the retention of an interruption feature, giving the human counterpart the power to stop any action of the system immediately at any time. Adaptive AI functions refers to machine learning capabilities which allow machine adaptations to environments and circumstances without human interference. While adaptive AI functions have the potential to degrade human quality and control over the machine to verify and validate the machine’s actions, they also have the potential to increase combat environment flexibility and adaptability to complex combat situations automatically. One of the primary issues in the international debate over the future of autonomous technologies is the lack of a unified definition of autonomy to which all nations subscribe.

Achieving Significant Impact

Reactive and proactive refer to the context within which the international community takes up a subject for debate and produces subsequent actions. The Hague VIII convention discussed below, for example, came into existence because of a problem that already existed with deployed weapons that were indiscriminate in their nature and often resulted in non-combat casualties. This reactive approach by the international community directly impacted the weapon system, resulting in a global ban on specific weapon functions. However, efforts to proactively ban development or deployment of other weapons have not been as effective and will likely continue to be ineffective until something happens which causes the international community to react to such weapon systems. Significant impact refers to the effectiveness of the International community in its actions, including establishing international laws, garnering widespread support for such laws after they are established, and influencing which nations sign any resulting binding treaties. Significant impact has rarely been achieved by proactive international actions without historical precedents to support them.

Current and recent international debates surrounding the applications of autonomy in warfare, opinions of experts, relevant Government and organizational documents, and publications related to the subject have informed this research project. One goal of the research was to determine specifically how IHL and the LOAC apply to weapon systems with one or more autonomous functions in warfare. Robotics with adaptive AI functions in warfare have the potential to be of a higher caliber than possible for humans to achieve by themselves, leading to fewer innocent bystander casualties, and more humane warfare in general. However, machines are still currently, and possibly perpetually, inherently incapable of understanding IHL and the LOAC to an extent possible for them to replicate appropriate levels of distinction and proportionality in combat. Ultimately, this article demonstrates the need for pursuit, or at least the non-hindrance,
of autonomous robotics research and development in order for any potential international action to succeed. To achieve significant impact, substantial and persistent oversight must also be maintained, designed to both inform and facilitate any necessary reactive international approach to future developments, and to prevent a damaging proactive ban encompassing the research and development of adaptive AI or autonomy in robotics.

The Current Debate

**Distinction and Proportionality**

In any discussion of autonomy in warfare, it is important for the international community to collectively distinguish what constitutes autonomy, and more specifically, what the terms autonomous and semi-autonomous mean when referring to technologies in general, and weapon systems in particular. In the most commonly applied definitions, autonomous technologies operate by themselves automatically, without need of human interaction once activated and set to perform a task. When applied to a weapon system, this would include all of the functions required for combat, up to and including identifying targets, and engaging them. There are currently no fully autonomous weapons systems deployed in the world which are designed for engaging humans in combat. Semi-autonomous technologies are those which have one or more automatic functions programmed, but which cannot operate completely without human assistance. When applied to a weapon system, semi-autonomous includes any weapon system which performs automatic combat related functions up to, but not including, target engagement. The American Phalanx CWS and the Dutch Goalkeeper, which automatically identify, target, and engage incoming projectiles, are examples of autonomous weapon systems, but do not engage human targets, while UAVs like the MQ-9 Reaper are examples of semi-autonomous weapon systems which require human input in order to engage a target.

Much of the international debates that have occurred over time related to autonomous functions in weapon systems have revolved around the definition, or lack of definition, of these terms. When it comes to complex and contentious technological issues such as autonomy, it is important to clearly understand the implication of the underlying details. Understanding and clarifying definitions in international debates has often been the underlying structural formation that ends up dictating the outcomes of treaties and conventions on weapons. In defining autonomy, Heather Roff points out that different nations have different definitions of autonomy. France, for instance, takes the stance that no technology is considered fully autonomous unless it operates without human control, independently, with its own decision-making process. Limiting the term to this narrow and explicit view provides a very large amount of room for research and development to expand and grow around any constraints placed on autonomous weaponry, while at the same time allowing autonomous functions
in weaponry to be enhanced right up to the point of full autonomy. Under such a definition, proximity mines and other automated indiscriminate devices which automatically engage targets once activated would ascend to the title of autonomous, while semi-autonomous UAV’s and other human-operated robotics would not.

Other leading experts in autonomy, such as Kenneth Anderson and Matthew Waxman, fear that a ban on autonomous weapons may inadvertently, or intentionally, end up encompassing many of the functions currently labeled as semi-autonomous. This fear is justified, at least in part, simply based on Switzerland’s definition of autonomous weapon systems which already encompasses semi-autonomous systems. In arguing this point, Noel Sharkey points out that some semi-autonomous weapon systems merely provide their human counterparts with the illusion of control, where the machine itself suggests targets, and extracts approval from an automated human cognitive process, rather than the intentionally deliberative process required to appropriately meet IHL requirements. One of the primary factors in IHL and the LOAC is the requirement for those engaging in combat to exhibit appropriate levels of distinction and proportionality. According to Sharkey, this is a solely deliberative undertaking, and one which is subverted when relegated to an automatic human judgement based on machine-generated suggestion. In other words, a situation where machine-suggested targets are approved for engagement by a human in a non-deliberative way, Sharkey argues, essentially equates to the same thing as an autonomous weapon system, and should be labeled as such.

Another part of the autonomy debate is AI, and adaptive AI functions—machine learning capabilities. Ultimately, machines can only adapt to situations they have been programmed to adapt to, which limits adaptive AI functions to programmed adaptations to anticipated situations or environments. Science fiction has convoluted the truth surrounding adaptive AI, as Sharkey points out, leading to an AI mythology that has erroneously worked its way into the official international debate on the subject. Cyber defense mechanisms are programmed to adapt to attacks on the systems they protect, but they are unable to adapt to an unknown attack, which is why all virus protection programs need to be constantly updated with new information as new attacks are learned about. The same is true with combat robotics programmed with adaptive AI functions. Any potential autonomous or semi-autonomous weapons system with adaptive AI placed into a field environment, Human Rights Watch asserts, will only adapt in ways it has been programmed to adapt. This can create advantages, but also unpredictability, because it is nearly impossible to predict with one hundred percent accuracy how the adaptive AI system will interpret the situation, and it is highly unlikely that it will interpret the situation in the same way as a human, or human programmer.
In examining the potential applicability of adaptive AI functions to IHL and the LOAC, autonomy experts have made some intriguing, and sometimes contradictory, assessments. Philosopher Peter Asaro, for example, asserts that there is no possibility now or ever in the future for any programmed system to be capable of the amount of deliberation and humanity necessary to make combat decisions which comply with the IHL requirements of distinction and proportionality. Asaro further explains that compliance with IHL specifically is a uniquely human requirement which cannot be delegated to an automated or autonomous machine, and that therefore any machine which is programmed to autonomously perform tasks regulated by IHL should be illegal. This line of thought is a strong echo of the 1907 Hague VIII Convention, and the more recent 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. Roff’s research supports Asaro’s belief through a qualitative analysis on *Jus ad Bellum* proportionality, concluding that even in a controlled theoretical combat environment, autonomous weapon systems are incapable of achieving appropriate levels of proportionality to meet IHL.

Human-controlled robotics with adaptive AI functions blur the line of distinction between autonomous and semi-autonomous, especially when the ratio between adaptive AI decision-making and human counterpart decision-making is ambiguous. In pursuit of adaptive AI applications to military technologies, Ron Arkin explains how the research and development of adaptive AI can eventually lead to autonomous weapon systems which comply with IHL and the LOAC better than humans. As sensor and programming technologies advance, Arkin sees a future where a machine programmed with IHL and the LOAC will be technologically capable of the appropriate levels of distinction and proportionality to engage autonomously in combat operations. By a combination of calculations, and enhanced sensor technologies which can use a combination of information inputs to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants, an autonomous weapon system with effective and proven adaptive AI functions would, Arkin posits, be the only way to conduct humane warfare in the future. The inherent issue in this theory is that it requires relegating human lives to a mathematical value for the purpose of programming proportionality into an autonomous weapon system. What is the mathematical value of one human life? Can there be one? Should there be one?

**Context Matters**

As the international community has grown, those involved have made attempts to mitigate present and future conflict through two general approaches—reactive and proactive. In the wake of negative major world events or circumstances, the international community has developed a trend of reacting by implementing or attempting to implement measures, usually in the form of treaties or conventions, to protect against a similar event or circumstance happening in the future. While this is technically a proactive approach to ad-
dressing a potential future conflict, the context of the governing treaty or convention is often inherently reactionary and focused on specific historical circumstances or innovations. The 1907 ban on automatic submarine contact mines, for example, as well as the 1997 treaty banning anti-personnel mines, are examples of international actions regarding existing technologies based on historical precedents. This type of international action is reactive, despite its potential proactive impact on future situations.

A large area of the autonomous weapon system debate rests on whether or not the international community and individual state governments should implement a proactive ban on the research, development, and deployment of autonomous weapon systems, as advocated by Sharkey, Asaro, and others. However, autonomy in robotics is not as clear cut as nuclear weapons in space, or laser weapons designed to blind enemy combatants. The entire field of autonomous robotics research bleeds into nearly every realm and aspect of human life on Earth. Proactively regulating a field with such a diverse impact, Anderson and Waxman argue, risks inadvertently affecting developments in a variety of other fields, including combat support as well as engagement. To prevent this, Anderson and Waxman suggest an incremental reactive approach, where any regulations on the field of autonomy in robotics are implemented as the technologies are developed, not before. Arkin differs from Anderson and Waxman in that Arkin believes the field of autonomy in robotics should be fully pursued without regulations, while Anderson and Waxman see regulations, short of a ban, as a necessity moving forward, in order to preserve the integrity of IHL and the LOAC within any developed autonomous warfare systems.

A number of organizations have also become involved in the international debate over autonomous robotics. Many of the organizations promote banning all aspects of autonomous weapons altogether, as they see no way for machines to appropriately judge a situation which could result in the death of a human. The Campaign to Stop Killer Robots is an activist organization created by Human Rights Watch, leading the fight to ban autonomous weapon systems. They have support from the International Human Rights Council (IHRC) and some leading members of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), including former special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, who proposed all nations place a moratorium on Lethal Autonomous Robots (LARs) in 2013. Many individuals have taken a stance for moving research and development on autonomy forward as well, some to promote more humane war, some to promote more effective and accurate combat capabilities, and some to promote machine war instead of human war, where the autonomous weapons systems do not target humans at all, only other machines.

This current debate has been directly impacted by historical reactive and proactive international actions,
and regardless of which side of the debate people are on, moving forward will require additional international actions. In order to achieve a significant impact, two key requisites will need to be achieved, according to historical precedents: 1.) Wide international inclusion and acceptance of whatever terms are reached, particularly from the great powers; and 2.) Factual evidence supporting the terms, including the rationale behind their development, and assurance that such terms will not negatively impact non-related areas of human activity.

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X \# \text{ of Human Lives} = 3.14159265359
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\text{Solve for } X
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While comparing the international debates over mines and autonomous weapons is a comparison of a reactive international action to a potential proactive international action, the qualities inherent in the technologies are very similar from an IHL and LOAC standpoint. Once activated, free-floating automatic submarine contact mines meet all of the basic classifications of an autonomous weapon system as it is generally defined today – they are no longer controlled by a human, they select their targets without assistance, and they engage their targets upon contact without human direction. They also exhibit the worst possible qualities of an autonomous weapon – they are absolutely indiscriminate, and cannot measure proportionality, thereby rendering them inherently contradictory to IHL and the LOAC. In order to achieve the reactive international action that resulted in these weapons being banned, historical evidence was provided that proved these worst traits, something which cannot be done in the present autonomous weapons system debate. A ban on autonomous weapon systems today would be a proactive international action with no historical precedent directly implicative to the types of autonomous systems being discussed.

A truly proactive international action is one which is taken in order to prevent or change a future occurrence, without a historical precedent governing its existence or implementation. An example of a proactive international action is a regulation governing a weapon system which is theoretical, in research and development phases, or which exists already, but which has not been deployed in a combat environment. The 1995 preemptive Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons was a proactive international action. Article IV of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty), banning the installation of nuclear weapons in space or on celestial bodies, was also a proactive international action. Neither of these actions were taken based on historical precedents, but on the theoretical future implications of inaction. Additionally, neither of these specific proactive international actions had a significant potential to impact any area of human life other than nation-state military activities.
The level of impact that international actions have had has varied, from little to no effect, to significant and long-lasting impact. The most significant impacts have come from reactive international actions, not proactive actions. A number of variables affect the level of impact an international action will have, with the primary variable being the nations who agree to any international action, including not just the number, but also which nations participate. While the 1995 blinding laser weapon ban is an example of a significant impact created by a proactive international action, it is the exception, not the rule. Reactive international actions drawing from real-world examples to justify the actions provide the incentives necessary for nations to agree in most cases. Automatic submarine contact mines, for example, were creating a clear and present danger to commercial shipping, for all nations, which provided the necessary incentive for all of the major sea-faring powers to agree that all necessary precautions should be taken to protect everyone's commercial shipping interests. Which nations agree also matters, and it is unlikely that The Hague VIII Convention would have been as impactful if even one of the major sea-faring powers had not signed.

The 1997 Mine Ban Treaty provides an example of the lack of efficacy which results when major powers do not agree to participate in international actions. The United States, Russia, and China are not parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, and the problem of anti-personnel landmines has largely remained unaddressed in many parts of the world, despite populous movements and more than one hundred governments working to fight them. The Hague VIII Convention on the other hand was a reactive international action widely accepted and supported by all major powers and was so effective that it remains in force today, more than a century later, regulating even modern-day sea mines. Part of its long-term success is due to the language used, which encompasses the principles behind the devices, in addition to being specific to technical specifications of the devices themselves. An international action addressing autonomous weapon systems can be influenced by the principles outlined in The Hague VIII Convention and the Mine Ban Treaty, where the qualities of distinction and proportionality required for IHL conformance were as relevant and as central to the debate as they are today.

Autonomous weapon systems are comparable to persistent free-floating mines and anti-personnel mines in several respects, particularly with regards to aspects of their operation relevant to IHL and the LOAC. Autonomy research and development in the sub field of adaptive AI functionality has not progressed far enough to equate machine learning to human reason and situational deliberation. Until this happens, machines, even highly automated machines, are still machines, and are subject to the same limits of distinction and proportionality of automatic contact mines. Fielding such weapons also creates the same type of danger to non-combatants that sea mines did in the early twentieth century, where
targets could be selected and engaged in an indiscriminate manner without human control or direction. Semi-autonomous weapon systems are a different animal. The primary difference in today’s semi-autonomous weaponry from mines is human control and direction, and so long as these qualities are maintained, a weapon system is not autonomous, as the human controller of a semi-autonomous UAV can still implement the required elements of distinction and proportionality into the combat environment.

Remote-controlled robotic combat systems arguably are the starting point from which the idea of autonomous weapon systems has grown, but there are substantial differences between these types of systems, both in their compliance with IHL and the LOAC and in their operational capacities. To start, any remote-controlled system inherently retains a human factor in some way, while an autonomous system may not. By retaining a human factor for deliberation in combat situations, the machine is not responsible for compliance with IHL or the LOAC, just as a rifle cannot be responsible for such compliance. Because of this distinction, a UAV operator, not the UAV itself, is clearly responsible for the actions of the UAV, including combat activities which result in loss of life. Automation blurs this distinction, even when human control remains in place, and adaptive AI has the potential to blur it even more. As programming and sensor capabilities grow, more and more processes within human-controlled weapon systems can be delegated to the system. Regardless of how much programming and sensor technologies improve however, machines are likely to remain permanently incapable of being self-aware to the point of humanity, or of understanding the concepts of life and death to the point of morality. Removing humans from the lethal decision-making process may therefore equate to removing humanity from warfare.

Keeping a human within the decision-making process may become more of a type of plausible deniability necessity rather than a positive control element in future robotic weapons systems. As automation increases in a human-controlled system, the operator inherently relinquishes power to the machine, incrementally over time. Human trust in equipment may also lead to errant automated judgment calls being accepted and acted upon by a human controller, leading to a semi-autonomous weapon’s pseudo-decisions being a major factor in the deliberative step required for IHL compliance. Targeting systems have already demonstrated this problem, known as automation bias, where a human operator accepts incorrect targeting suggestions from a weapon system program simply because the system determined which targets were the best ones, and the operator trusts the machine. The best way to avoid this pitfall is to ensure operator training includes enhancing awareness of this risk, and differentiation between machine and human deliberative capabilities, specifically to highlight the necessity for human deliberation to comply with the IHL requirements of distinction and proportionality.
UAVs and other combat robotics have been allowed to develop fairly free from international regulation, as weapon systems under absolute human control. They have not developed free from scrutiny however, as their use in targeted killing operations has raised their notoriety on an IHL and LOAC basis unrelated to their level of autonomy. UAVs have also raised another point that is highly relevant to potential autonomous weapon systems by lowering the cost of war for those in possession of them. By allowing a nation to wage remote warfare, the political, fiscal, and human life costs of war are dramatically decreased, placing the nation without remote-controlled robotics at a much higher overall risk in a conflict. This process effectively lowers the threshold for going to war and engaging in combat operations—a quality that would be shared by the deployment of autonomous weapon systems. The UAV debate over targeted killing operations, and the inherent lowering of the threshold for conducting such operations, has directly impacted the debate over autonomous weaponry. By showing the inhumanity, reactively, of targeted killings conducted by UAVs, including collateral damage, the prospect of any type of proactive ban on autonomous weapons can be advanced.

If the international community is to proceed with any type of ban on autonomous weapon systems, great care must be taken in the language used, and the specific areas regulated. Adaptive AI functions in general have the potential to enhance and improve a great number of areas of human life aside from combat functions, and a non-specific ban could potentially derail major improvements to human quality of life and health. Likewise, a ban focusing explicitly on military functions and technologies has the potential to prevent the development of dual-use technologies that could also contribute greatly to other areas of life. Even a ban that does not directly or indirectly impact non-military areas of research and development in adaptive AI may hinder future developments that could lead to a breakthrough in successfully programming IHL and the LOAC into an autonomous weapon system, rendering warfare to a permanent state of barbarity. Human rights organizations promote the use of precision munitions in order to mitigate collateral damage and casualties. Increased precision research and development should therefore be an area intentionally protected and preserved, even if it requires autonomy developments to improve. The same human rights organizations would be wise to recognize the dangers of an outright ban on autonomous weapons that would prevent their own cause from advancing.

Fortunately, according to Human Rights Watch, who is the leading international organization promoting a ban on autonomous weaponry, the type of prohibitory ban on fully autonomous weapons being discussed and promoted within the international community “would in no way impede development of fully autonomous robotics technology” in general. Instead, the ban being considered would focus solely on the development of technologies explicit-
ly designed for, and exclusively useful in, autonomous weapon systems, and would not affect autonomy research and development in other fields. This is an important clarification, as it prevents governments from essentially relinquishing control and oversight of the technologies associated with adaptive AI and autonomy. Table 1 illustrates the actual and potential developments for autonomous systems:

Table 1. Projected capabilities for autonomous systems. Copyright (2016), Defense Science Board, Summer Study on Autonomy. (Explains the current, near-future, and potential long-term developments in autonomy research and development.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SENSE: Sensors, Perception, Fusion</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Available today: Full-spectrum sensing (EM, bits, vibration, chemical...); Object recognition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likely available near term: Human senses (sight, smell...); integration of perception with motor skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May be available long term: High-fidelity touch; Scene understanding</td>
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<th>THINK/DECIDE: Analysis, Reasoning, Learning</th>
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<tr>
<td>Available today: High-volume computational throughput and data architectures; Algorithm variety and complexity; Task-specific, rule-based decision; Rules: Learning from training data, sentiment analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likely available near term: Explicit and testable knowledge representation; Anomaly recognition; Option generation, pruning; Social and behavioral models; Culturally informed, values-based reasoning; Transparent decision logic; C2 for many nodes; Learning by doing, watching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May be available long term: Goal definition; Abstraction, Skills transfer; Inference; Empathy; General purpose, idea-based reasoning; Judgment, intuition</td>
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<tr>
<th>ACT: Motion, Manipulation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Available today: Navigation (routing); Strength, endurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likely available near term: Navigation (obstacle avoidance); Agility, dexterity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May be available long term: Navigation (dense, dynamic domains); High degree of freedom actuator control</td>
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<th>TEAM: Human/machine, Machine/machine, Info exchange</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Available today: High man/machine ratio; Rule-based coordination of multiple platforms; High-volume communications and data transfer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likely available near term: Observability and directability; Provably correct emergent behavior; Trustworthiness and trust calibration under defined conditions; Natural language processing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May be available long term: Shared &quot;mental models,” mutual predictability; Understanding intent; Fully adaptive coordination; Implicit communication</td>
</tr>
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A more general ban would most likely result in non-governmental organizations taking the lead, publicly or secretly, and advancing their own programs of autonomy and adaptive AI. Such a development would subsequently be the most likely path towards technologies of this sort ending up on the black market, or in the hands of terrorist organizations. People will pursue these developments regardless of legality now that their existence is possible. Nations and the international community ignoring this fact will only put the world at a disadvantage moving into the future.

One major argument against autonomous weapon systems is that a system with adaptive AI functions may adapt to its environment in ways which contradict legal or moral parameters, and that if a system is truly autonomous, it may not be able to be stopped. This
can be mitigated through a temporal or metric operational limit once activated, which causes an automatic shutdown of the machine unless re-authorized to continue engagements periodically. This would not require continuous communications to remain in place, and so would avoid the pitfalls associated with constant communications.

Burst transmissions could be utilized in both directions in order to decrease communication risks and to increase the fluidity of operations by re-authorizations being sent before shutdown points. Establishing these shutdown parameters would also eliminate all of the risks associated with losing control of the asset physically or losing contact. The system would still be autonomous, it would still adapt to its environment, and it would retain all of the capabilities associated with distance-based conflict acting as a major force multiplier to enhance the lethality of combat operations, but without many of the associated risks.

Conclusions

In order to move the international debate on autonomous robotics designed for warfare in a forward and positive direction, it is clear that several conditions must be met. First, the proposed actions must be framed in a reactive manner, based on either direct evidence pertaining to the systems being discussed, or principally, based on similar historical precedents. Second, the majority of the international community, meaning state governments and their people, must generally agree on both the explicit definitions of autonomous weapon systems, as well as the need for, or at least the acceptance of, the proposed solution. Finally, all of the major powers of the world and all of the leading autonomy-related technology nations must be participants in the solution. The United States has opened the door for the necessary language to be adopted which would allow further research and development in almost every critical area, but while still essentially banning the development of autonomous weapon systems specifically designed to apply lethal force to human targets without positive human control. The 2012 US Department of Defense Directive 3000.09 can be used as a guideline for the necessary language to promote an effective international action on autonomy capable of achieving significant impact.

The international community should proceed, carefully, with a proactive international action from a reactive point of view based on real historical precedents. This can be achieved by focusing primarily on the lowering of the threshold for engaging in combat operations and combining it with the moral dereliction that would be encompassed in a decision to delegate powers over the life and death of human beings to machines. By using the historical principles of The Hague VIII Convention and the Mine Ban Treaty, which clearly identify the differences between human controlled weapons and non-human controlled weapons, the international community can create the illusion of a reactive international precedent to promote a proactive international action.
with regards to regulating or banning autonomous weapon systems. Targeted killing operations by UAVs can be used to show the enhanced combat abilities that come with such technologies, as well as the drastic unbalancing of risk assumption between those with and those without such technologies.

By combining the historical precedents of the autonomous lethal targeting inherent in contact mines with the modern-day autonomous mobility applications, sufficient language can be developed in an explicit and limited ban on autonomous weaponry technologies. In order for such weapon systems to even exist in compliance with IHL and the LOAC, further developments must be made in adaptive AI functions, sensor capabilities, and programming capacities. Because of the eventual potential for these developments to reach the necessary levels for machines to exhibit the necessary IHL levels of distinction and proportionality, a clause should be included in any ban which acknowledges this eventual possibility. By explicitly defining autonomous weapons, the international community can allow research and development to continue in the fields which may eventually lead to the required developments, while still achieving the desired stigmatization of the autonomous weaponry field and preventing development and proliferation of such technologies. Mankind will move forward, and in such a major technology revolution, it is important to protect development while controlling advancements in order to maintain a stable world for the future.

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ties, and Celestial Security” (Wild Blue Yonder, Air University, 2020); “Paid to Kill: An Examination of the Evolution of Combatants for Hire” (Global Security Review, 2020); and “From Missiles to Microchips: Nation-States, Non-State Actors, and the Evolution of Intelligence” (Global Security Review, 2020).

Endnotes


3 “Laws of War: Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines (Hague VIII); October 18, 1907,” The Avalon Project (1907).

4 “Laws of War.”


10 Roff, “Meaningful Human Control or Appropriate Human Judgement,” 1-2.


12 Roff, “Meaningful Human Control or Appropriate Human Judgement,” 1-2.


A state does not become a great power by being seen as great. Rather, it becomes a great power by consistently advancing its interests. Unfortunately, in the United States (as in many other places) leaders are not often rewarded for actually advancing long-term interests in competitions with other powers. Rather, those leaders are rewarded for the popular perception of what they have achieved over a much shorter time period. Additionally, competitions between aspiring powers are not generally settled so neatly as sporting contests with a clear winner. The participants in great power competitions don’t always know when the contest has ended, and the parameters for what constitutes a win can be fuzzy. Even when a win is obvious, it often comes well after a typical term of political office has expired. During the height of the Cold War, for example, the United States and the Soviet Union made a series of competing claims about who was “winning” the struggle for global influence. These claims included numbers of astronauts launched, or the number of countries to which troops were deployed, or the size of economies—truly, the claims included anything which made one side or the other appear to be “ahead.” The problem is that, unlike a sports match with a well-defined score, these claims didn’t actually define who was winning. These claims defined who should be seen as winning, which isn’t the same thing. Rather, it would be something like determining the winner of the match based on whose fans were cheering the loudest.

For great powers, and those states which aspire to be great powers, the important factor is defining their own interests and finding a way to advance those interests. While that might very well involve a public influence campaign, it would not always need to. Indeed, sometimes the way for a great power to win any given competition is to simply let those interests advance without any direct influence. In this essay, I make two arguments. First, I argue that great powers should principally focus on defining and advancing their interests rather than been seen as the winner of some sort of global competition. Second, I argue that being seen to win is sometimes detrimental to actually winning. In order to advance these arguments, I will first define the term “strategic silence,” or the notion that policy actors need not always publicly advocate for their goals. Having defined that term, I provide a framework for understanding it and will review some of the cases when states have attempted to use this strategy to advance their interests. I
conclude with a case study exploring at greater depth the time President George H.W. Bush successfully advanced American interests at the end of the Cold War by practicing strategic silence on the collapse of the Soviet Union. To be clear, my purpose in this paper is not to say that great powers should not publicly advocate for their best interests nor that presidents shouldn’t speak. Of course they should. Rather, the focus of great powers should be the actual advancement of those interests rather than the public advocacy for them.

A Framework for Understanding Silence

A number of studies have attempted to define strategic silence, and this study construes the concept narrowly as the intentional choice of an empowered actor who might have spoken and instead decided to remain silent in order to advance a policy goal. A president of the United States is certainly an empowered actor who could speak and receive significant attention for his words; silence in the sense discussed here would also require that the failure to speak arose from having made an intentional choice in hopes of advancing some policy issue. In other words, President Biden’s failure to announce what he had for lunch is not a strategic silence, but declining to discuss his preferred outcomes for a meeting with Russia’s President Putin might be. This is similar to the definition of silence provided by Barry Brummett (1980, p. 289), who defined “political strategic silence” as “the refusal of a public figure to communicate verbally when that refusal (1) violates expectations, (2) draws public attributions of fairly predictable meanings, and (3) seems intentional and directed at an audience.” Brummett (p. 290) also argued that silence was “relative to what might be said,” and a leader saying less than might otherwise have been said would still be employing silence as a rhetorical tool. Brummett’s definition would thus allow, for example, brief statements and other comments. In the example of an American president, it would also allow for having a statement made by a cabinet officer, press secretary, or some other officials. While any of those officers are important, their words carry less weight than a direct statement from the sitting president.

One of the limits of a strategic silence, at least in the U.S., is that “the public has a powerful expectation the president will speak in response to crises, particularly in foreign policy.” (Harlow, 2018) That begs the question of what constitutes a foreign policy crisis. Denise Bostdorff (1994, p. 205) spoke to this when she noted that, “Contemporary commanders-in-chief promote foreign crises by explicitly advancing a claim of crisis or implicitly treating a circumstance as a crisis in their public discourse.” In other words, there is a public demand for the U.S. president to speak, but that demand often comes from something which the president himself has defined as important. Unfortunately, presidents frequently miscalculate what their response to a foreign policy situation should be. As Kiewe (1994, p. xxxiii) explains:
To a degree, most modern presidents have miscalculated their crisis construction—especially their initial response—often in favor of immediate rewards. The presidency as an institution, with some noted exceptions, has been slow to comprehend the long-range impact of its crisis rhetoric. Indeed, crisis rhetoric has often been executed with immediate image considerations and as a political tool for quick policy goals. The modern presidency, with some exception, does not seem to appreciate the limits of its own crisis rhetoric.

The U.S. public demands that the president speak in response to moments of foreign policy crisis. While there are exceptions, those crises are often perceived as such because the president has talked about them in the first place. When presidents do talk about a foreign policy crisis, they have not historically been very good at knowing what to say. For every time that President Roosevelt asked Congress to declare that a state of war existed between the United States and the Empire of Japan, history is littered with dozens of examples of a president giving a speech which is not particularly helpful. So what studies have been done exploring the concept of intentional strategic silence?

Before Brummett (cited earlier) wrote his article, Johannesen (1974) issued a “plea for communication research” into the functions of silence, and few have answered. While I previously studied the strategic silence of the Saudi coalition in response to the embargo against Qatar (Harlow, 2018b), most of the studies which do exist on strategic silence have examined either a response from a U.S. actor or a response from the United States itself. Gunderson (1961) studied President Lincoln’s silence between his first election and inauguration, concluding that Lincoln used silence well since he did not yet have the powers of the presidency. That meant he would signal intentions to an opponent without having the power to act on his words. Edwin Black (1994) also studied silence by President Lincoln in his Gettysburg address. This helped illustrate Brummett’s concept that silence is relative to what might be said rather than absolute, because President Lincoln certainly did speak on that occasion. However, his speech was less than one-third the length of the opening prayer for the occasion. Lincoln acknowledged that his task was to honor the sacrifice of the fallen soldier, and Black praised Lincoln for limiting his remarks.

Similar to the studies of Lincoln, Kurt Ritter (1994) argued that President Lyndon Johnson did well to stay mostly silent in the immediate aftermath of President Kennedy’s assassination. With the nation in mourning, it would have been awkward for President Johnson to have given speeches advancing a specific policy agenda. Ritter noted that “Johnson said as little as possible in public,” and this allowed him to quietly consolidate his power in the White House while the press portrayed him as a strong leader. President Johnson would, of course, eventually need to
speak to assert the powers of the presidency, but he only gave a major address after the burial of President Kennedy.

Of the limited number of studies on intentional strategic silence, several have focused on U.S. foreign policy. Medhurst (1988) believed President Truman wrong for his silence on Soviet expansion immediately after World War II. Truman was “given multiple opportunities to explain and justify his foreign policy,” and instead failed to “define and regulate the rhetorical environment.” (Medhurst, 1988, p. 52) Medhurst’s argument reminds us that there are times when the interests of a great power, in this case the United States, are indeed advanced by clear public advocacy. Writing in Foreign Policy, John Dugard (1982) reached a similar conclusion. Dugard evaluated President Reagan’s quiet diplomacy in response to apartheid in South Africa. This was, in effect, an intentional strategic silence. Dugard said that some Reagan administration officials believed that the Carter administration’s denunciation of apartheid led to the overwhelming victory by the Nationalist Party in South Africa’s 1977 elections. Dugard (p. 48) disagreed and believed Reagan’s silence to be strategically ineffective: “The United States should focus attention on the growing evidence of renewed discrimination and repression in South Africa. Where quiet diplomacy has failed to produce reform, silence may not be wise.” Examining a later period in U.S.- South Africa diplomacy, I (Harlow, 2011a) argued that President George H.W. Bush did well to not pressure President de Klerk concerning apartheid. President Bush believed that the strategic interests of the United States were with a democratic South Africa, and intelligence reporting told Bush that de Klerk was preparing to release Mandela from prison and hold elections. Bush took extraordinarily heavy criticism for his failure to condemn South African racism, but he also knew that doing so would cause de Klerk to have to show in public that he was standing up to a great power. That would have seriously risked derailing the democratic project in South Africa, which would have directly impacted the expressed interests of the United States.

There are several other essays on the rhetorical choices the Presidents Bush made to remain silent in order to advance American interests. The younger President Bush made a strategically effective choice to not challenge China as loudly as he might have concerning manipulation of their currency (Harlow, 2010), and the elder President Bush made a strategically mixed choice in not challenging China concerning the 1989 massacre in Tiananmen Square (Harlow, 2020). The younger President Bush should probably have been more aggressive in response to the poorly conducted elections in Nigeria in 2007 (Harlow, 2011b). The elder President Bush did extraordinarily important work when he resisted public pressure to celebrate the end of the Cold War on the collapse of the Berlin Wall (Harlow, 2006). Archival documents in the George Bush Presidential Library (hereafter, GBPL) indicate that doing so would have risked angering a still-extant Soviet Union which had previously lashed out in response to similar situ-
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These studies all seem to point in the same direction: If rhetorical intervention by the United States will actually help advance policy goals, then we should be all means have the president and other officials speak loudly and forcefully. The important thing, though, isn’t the speaking—it is the advancement of interests. Sometimes the interests of a great power are better served by not speaking—or by speaking more quietly than they might—in order to allow events to proceed in an already favorable direction. In the next section of this essay, I will examine the choices President George H.W. Bush made at the end of the Cold War to advance the interests of the United States.¹

George H.W. Bush and the Fall of the Soviet Union

My purpose here isn’t to fully explain the actions of President Bush at the end of the Cold War. Instead, my purpose is to explain the choice by President Bush to maintain a strategic silence and show how that choice advanced U.S. policy goals. Specifically, here I want to look at what President Bush didn’t say on the collapse of the Soviet Union. President Bush took significant public criticism for failing to celebrate the downfall of the USSR. He wasn’t seen as great, and his public reputation took a significant hit. Ultimately, he lost his re-election battle the following year (although there were many reasons for that). Rather than being seen as a great leader at the head of a great state, he was concerned with advancing the interests of the United States. As a result, the United States managed a particularly tricky spot at the end of the Cold War and became the unchallenged global power in the years that followed. I have covered President Bush’s response to the collapse of the USSR at different depth and with a different focus in a different outlet (Harlow, 2014), and since that time significant new records have been released which detail the conversations between Bush, Gorbachev, and Yeltsin.

On or about August 19, 1991, leaders in Mikhail Gorbachev’s own government plotted a coup d’etat against him and arrested him at his vacation home. Coup leaders sent tanks into Moscow as a show of force against Gorbachev’s government. The hard-liners did not plan, however, on significant public resistance. Boris Yeltsin, President of Russia—then the largest part of but still subordinate to the Soviet Union—rallied democratic forces in front of the Russian parliament building. An overwhelming surge of democratic sentiment eventually forced the plotters of the coup to stand down, and on August 22 the army withdrew its tanks from Moscow. On that same day, the leaders of the coup surrendered and were arrested. The Soviet military and intelligence forces had significant expe-

¹ From this point forward, all references in this essay to “Bush” or “President Bush” refer to George H.W. Bush, the 41st president who served from 1989-1993. His son, President George W. Bush, the 43rd president who served from 2001-2009 is mentioned briefly in an earlier section but plays no further role in this essay.
rience in asserting their authority, and the downfall of the coup in less than 100 hours was stunning.

Shortly after the failed coup, intense pressure began mounting on George Bush to give a speech in response to those events. The public pressure was to celebrate that the United States was, indeed, on the brink of winning a competition between great powers. President Bush, however, consistently declined to speak in public concerning the coup or his preferred outcomes for the USSR. While there were certainly scattered statements, these very much fit with Brummett's idea that silence is relative to what might be said. The Christian Science Monitor (Robinson, 1991, p. 1) argued that the administration “has moved too slowly to assist the reform movement and is now in danger of contributing to anarchy.” The St. Petersburg Times (Editorial, p. A18) printed an editorial echoing that sentiment:

President Bush has had an oddly passive and cautious reaction to one of the most important and promising events of the 20th century. The past 10 days may have shaken the rest of the world, but they haven’t affected the president’s [golfing] tee times.

If nothing else, one might have expected that a failed Communist coup and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet empire would be enough to provoke a more passionate and articulate response from the president of the United States. Doesn’t the disintegration of an adversary whose nuclear threat has dominated U.S. foreign policy for almost 50 years warrant more emotion and imagination than Mr. Bush’s words have offered so far?

The New York Times (Rosenthal, 1991) noted that, “The White House offered a strikingly low-key response to the event in the Soviet Union today,” and that their “language seemed tepid at a time when the United States is seeing the aim of four decades of foreign policy, the crumbling of Communist power in the Soviet Union, come to pass.” Newspaper editorial criticism from around the country was joined by pressure from leaders in Congress to say something more in response to the historic events in the Soviet Union. Then-Senator Robert Kerrey (D-MA, now former Secretary of State) had largely the same criticism when he said that Bush “didn’t react in an intuitive fashion and say, ‘this is not right.’” (Roberts, 1991, p. A2) Both of those speakers acknowledged that Bush made a statement denouncing the coup several days after it started, but they wanted the president to have said something immediately and more forcefully.

Bush faced sharp criticism from his domestic political opponents as well. In addition to the normal criticism of political opponents, this was due to the notion that great powers should be seen as being great. That would demand the sort of speaking and public positioning which precludes an intentional strategic silence. As the political climate in the Soviet Union quickly worsened, congressional leaders begin to criticize
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Bush. House Armed Services committee chairman Les Aspin (D-WI) demanded just days before Gorbachev’s Christmas resignation that the Bush administration stop “dragging its heels in response to the collapse of the old Soviet Union.” (Dewar, 1991, p. A36) Republican Senator Richard Lugar (IN) even criticized the president for failing to act quickly enough, and asked, “Is there the political will to move on it?” (Curtius, 1991, p. 30) These criticisms, both from the press and from American political leaders, reflected the very heavy pressure Bush faced to publicly celebrate the pending victory of the United States in the Cold War.

Intelligence reporting available in the GBPL, however, show that the public reaction in the U.S. did not grasp the work President Bush was doing out of sight of the cameras. Archival documents from the Bush presidency show that Bush acted as he did because he knew that the Soviet Union was going to break apart regardless of the words or actions of Western leaders. Intelligence reports also indicated, however, that the transition of power was not pre-destined to go smoothly. Indeed, the situation in Moscow was quite unstable, and some reactionary Communists were looking for a reason to launch another coup with potentially devastating consequences. Bush’s challenge was to allow the transition to occur without the United States seeming to interfere, which would have given the Communist hardliners an excuse to rebel against outside influence.

Bush talked to President Yeltsin at 8:18 a.m. D.C. time on August 20, 1991 and got a dire report on the situation. Yeltsin said:

The situation is very complex. A group of eight individuals essentially put together an anti-constitutional coup. President Gorbachev is located in Farps in the Crimea. He is absolutely blocked, no way of reaching him…

The building of the Supreme Soviet and the office of the President is surrounded and I expect a storming of the building at any moment. We have been here 24 hours. We won’t leave. I have appealed to 100,000 people standing outside to defend the legally elected government. (GBPL, August 20, 1991)

It would be the next day before Bush would be able to speak to Gorbachev in person. That call happened at 12:19 in the afternoon while the president was in Kennebunkport. Gorbachev indicated that he had been completely surrounded for 4 days and had all communication cut off, but said that his guards prevented him from being physically captured. Gorbachev stated that he had regained firm control of the government about an hour previously, and that, critically, he held the ministry of defense. Gorbachev also indicated that Yeltsin had been essential to defeating the coup. (GBPL, August 21, 1991). This gave Bush a problem: He knew that the immediate and gravest part of the coup was over, but there were now at least two real centers of power in the Soviet Union—both Gorbachev
and Yeltsin. While Gorbachev said he would be grateful to Bush for publicly acknowledging the conversation, almost anything else Bush said would risk pushing a situation we did not yet fully understand to one side or another while the United States was still trying to identify its own interests.

In the weeks after the August coup, Bush continued to talk to both Yeltsin and Gorbachev. President Bush's primary concerns appeared to be internal stability in the USSR as well as control of the Soviet nuclear arsenal—certainly reasonable policy objectives for the United States. On September 25, Bush spoke with Yeltsin at 7:47 a.m. from the Oval Office. (GBPL, September 25, 1991) The themes of the conversation were building a personal relationship with Yeltsin and verifying that Yeltsin and Gorbachev were communicating internally. Bush started the call by noting that he read Yeltsin had been ill. He offered Yeltsin access to specialists in the United States. Yeltsin responded: “Mr. President, thank you. I am very grateful. Thank you for your personal attention to me. I don’t know how to find the words to thank you… I am taking a rest of ten days. The doctors are looking me over and I am under observation. If things don’t get better, perhaps I could take you up on your offer after consulting with my doctors.” In other words, in private President Bush was clearly trying to build a link with the man he saw as a future ruler of Russia. Yeltsin also faced serious health challenges which complicated the political calculation. In addition, Yeltsin later added, “I want you to know that

Gorbachev and I are working decisively on reform and democratization and in a very friendly fashion. We call each other nearly every day. We are working very closely together.” So long as Yeltsin and Gorbachev were willing to work together, there was very little to be gained from public intervention by the American president.

A conversation between Bush and Gorbachev two days later made plain that Bush was highly concerned with nuclear matters, and that he was closely coordinating his public statements with the Soviet leader. (GBPL, September 27, 1991). That conversation lasted 28 minutes, and in relevant part said:

The President: On dismantling nuclear warheads, where I propose we open discussions on the safe dismantling of nuclear warheads, on how we might enhance the safety and security of nuclear weapons, and how to improve nuclear command and control. I’d like to say you and I agree that this would be a good thing to do.

President Gorbachev: George, thank you for those clarifications. Since you’re urging that we take steps, I can only give an answer in principle—since there is much that must be clarified—and that answer is a positive one.

The President: I understand. How about if I say that I’ve consulted with Mikhail Gorbachev, and although he has had no time to study my initiative, that I am
inclined to believe his response will be positive.

**President Gorbachev:** I think that will be very good.

After the incredibly tense moments of the coup, Bush was talking to both major leaders in Russia. He was being careful to avoid inflaming the situation and was likely hedging his bets about who would eventually become the more prominent leader. He was also working to advance the American policy priority of nuclear stability. Over the next month, however, President Bush came to believe that Yeltsin would succeed Gorbachev and that the Union would fail. Bush recorded in his diary on October 26, 1991, that he thought Gorbachev’s time in office was to be short:

> It is clear to me that things are an awful lot different regarding Gorbachev and the Center than they were. He’s growing weaker all the time. I am anxious to see what his mood is. He’s still important in nuclear matters, but all the economic stuff—it looks to me like the republics have been more and more exerting themselves. It will be interesting to figure out his mood. I remember not so long ago how he couldn’t stand Yeltsin. How he, up at Camp David [in June 1990], made clear that he didn’t think Yeltsin was going anywhere. But, now all that has changed. Reports recently that he might not be around long. The briefing book indicates this may be my last meeting with him of this nature. Time marches on. (Bush and Scowcroft, 1998, p. 548)

The meeting to which Bush referred in his diary occurred over lunch on October 29, 1991 in Madrid, Spain. The event was recorded in a Secret memorandum of conversation (GBPL, October 29, 1991), and the principals in attendance for the United States were George Bush, Secretary Baker, Chief of Staff John Sununu, National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR Robert Strauss, NSC staffer Ed Hewett, State Department staffer Dennis Ross, and interpreter Peter Afanasenko. On the Russian side, President Gorbachev was joined by Minister of Foreign Affairs Boris Pankin, 5 other staffers (including the presidential spokesman), and an interpreter. Yeltsin was not present. Bush asked Gorbachev if the coup perpetrators had gone to trial, to which Gorbachev responded that it was “complicated.” One of the plotters, Yanaev, had previously hosted President Bush in Kiev and was Gorbachev’s “friend from university days.” At that point in the conversation, Bush said, “It was stupid to try to overthrow you.” Gorbachev then pointed out the very real threat of continuing upheaval by pointing to Scowcroft and saying, “This is what generals do sometimes.” Stressing his desire to remain in office, Gorbachev then said, “All the superficial things you see are on the surface—decisions, speeches, etc. They are not crucial things. Speeches are not what we need today. The issue is how we ac-
tually make the transition to a market economy. It will be difficult. The social situation is very tense.” This seems to underscore that President Gorbachev felt intense pressure, and speeches from Bush or anyone else would not be helpful in relieving that pressure.

Very real question were circling concerning the near-term future of the Soviet Union. A secret “National Intelligence Estimate” dated November 18, 1991 laid out four possible futures for the Soviet Union. (Fischer, 1999, p. 123) The only positive option was called “System Change.” Under this scenario, there would be a relatively peaceful transition of power. While there would be economic turmoil, it would ultimately be manageable. Provided that the economic turmoil was properly managed, the Soviet Union would be replaced with several smaller states that were better disposed towards American interests.

The other three possibilities for the Soviet future were substantially worse. Under the “Chronic Crisis” scenario, there would be “political gridlock” and the “economy would verge on breakdown but somehow manage to limp along.” (Fischer, p. 123) With the possibility of “Regression,” hard-liners would impose martial law and the downward economic spiral would accelerate. The worst possibility was “Fragmentation,” under which there would be a “violent, chaotic collapse of system,” “warfare within and between many republics,” and widespread famine (Fischer, p. 123). The CIA was unsure of which of these scenarios would come to pass, but they summarized their findings this way: “In any event, we believe that the USSR in its present form will not exist five years from now.” (Fischer, p. 126) While that estimate of the survival of the Soviet Union was overly generous, the CIA firmly believed that some sort of fundamental change would occur soon.

The question for Western policymakers was how to exert their influence to nudge the Soviet Union to the scenario of “System Change.” This was tricky given that Gorbachev was slowing the movement to a new system for the USSR as he tried to remain in power. Even before the August coup Gorbachev tried to placate potentially reactionary hard-liners in the Soviet Communist Party leadership. A secret CIA document titled “The Soviet Cauldron,” dated April 25, 1991, reported that:

In the midst of this chaos, Gorbachev has gone from ardent reformer to consolidator. A stream of intelligence reporting and his public declarations indicate that Gorbachev has chosen this course both because of his own political credo and because of pressures on him by other

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Fischer's book was published by the CIA is comprised entirely of photocopies of documents the CIA has declassified. The authors of the original documents are unknown, because such information has been redacted by the CIA for security reasons. In this essay, I am attributing those documents to Fischer to help readers find the original documents. The citation is, of course, in the References section at the end of this essay.
traditionalists, who would like
him to use much tougher repres-
sive measures. (Fischer, p. 112)

The further danger of Gor-
bachev’s allowing traditionalist lead-
ers to share power was expressed in
the same CIA document: “Reactionary
leaders, with or without Gorbachev,
could judge that the last chance to act
had come and move under the ban-
er of law-and-order.” (Fischer, p. 113)
This prophecy was fulfilled only a few
months later in the August coup. But
the coup’s failure did not render this
concern moot. As the report indicated,
Gorbachev was acting as he was in part
“because of his own political credo;”—
that is, on his own commitment to
maintaining the USSR as a Communist
state. Additionally, the arrest of the coup
leaders hardly removed all hard-liners
from the Soviet government. Indeed,
facing Boris Yeltsin’s pressure to insti-
tute democratic reforms, the hard-lin-
ers represented a potential source of
support for Gorbachev.

Bush did not speak appears to
be due to the intelligence he was re-
ceiving and the conversations he held
with Yeltsin and Gorbachev. As the CIA
documents indicated, the hard-liners in
the Soviet Union were particularly like-
ly to strike out during this time. With
reference to helping the Baltic repub-
lics break from the USSR, Bush later
recalled that he did not want to “use
the power and prestige of the United
States, not to posture, not to be the first
on board.” (Bush and Scowcroft, p. 539)
He feared that such public posturing,
in the absence of advance discussions
with the Soviets, could have disastrous
consequences. As such, Bush followed
a course of “calculated ambiguity.”
(Whalen, 1993, p. 86) The Soviets had
sent tanks into Hungary in 1958 and
Czechoslovakia in 1968 to secure the
fraternal brotherhood of states seeking
greater independence and liberaliza-
tion, and it is not hard to imagine Mos-
cow doing the same thing in response
to a part of the USSR proper.

The reason for the calculated
ambiguity was the hostility of Soviet
hard-liners to the possible loss of their
positions of privilege. As Joseph Wha-
len (1993, p. 4) put it:

Acute hostility on the conser-
vative right [of the USSR] was
based on the belief that victory
of the reformers would not only
lead to the destruction of the
Soviet Union, but for more self-
ish reasons would deprive them
of the heretofore privileged po-
sitions that they had enjoyed in
the Soviet Union. In effect, this
elite bears an historic similari-
ty to the Tories of the American
Revolution, the American sup-
porters of the British King who
had much to lose by victory of
the colonial revolutionaries.
Ideology was no longer a mo-
tivating force for the “Soviet
Tories.” Rather, as Elizabeth
Teague, a specialist in Soviet
Affairs at the RFE/RL Research
Institute, concluded, the eight
coup leaders represented the
“naked interests” of the conser-
vative ruling elite.
While the leaders of the August coup acted for the naked interests of the ruling elite, there were also more subtle interests at play. Gorbachev faced tremendous pressure from men more conservative than he, and he was himself more conservative than were radical reformers such as Yeltsin. Publicly putting pressure on these actors by celebrating in the way demanded by the American press and much of the U.S. political establishment risked catastrophe. Writing almost four months before the attempted coup, the CIA observed: “Ominously, military, MVD, and KGB leaders are making preparations for a broad use of force in the political process.” (Fischer, p. 114)

Another concern in the months between the August coup and December resignation was economic. A Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) memo written on August 19, 1991—the day of the coup—noted that the recentralization of economic and political control that would happen if those to the right of Gorbachev regained power would have a devastating impact on United States-Soviet relations in the areas of technical assistance, agriculture, energy, trade, special International Monetary Fund status, and Eastern Europe (GBPL, Box 99-0304-F). By August 26, the CEA had concluded that it was critical to economic success that workers in the Soviet Union and investors from other nations have confidence that the hard-liners were truly removed from power (GBPL, Box 99-0304-F). However, it was even more important to the administration that the Soviet transition take place with all possible dispatch. In a memo dated September 3, 1991, the CEA argued that “clarifying the functions of the Union and Republic governments” (GBPL, Box 99-0304-F) was a key to economic success—something that certainly could not happen in an atmosphere filled with external pressure from the United States. Each of the CEA memos noted both great opportunities and profound risks for the Russian economy, and by September 23, 1991, the CEA had drawn up a memo outlining how the Soviet Union would be able to interact with the International Monetary Fund (GBPL, Box 99-0304-F).

The risks of destabilizing the situation in the Soviet Union were profound. The security risks included war among nuclear armed former Soviet republics. The political risks included a return to a hard-line repressive state. The risk of a downward economic spiral could only be alleviated by making sure that a peaceful transition of regime continued. There is a strong possibility that Bush’s words might well have accelerated these risks. National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft stated that even though he favored allowing the Soviet Union to break up, that position could not “be official US policy.”

Such a position would almost guarantee long-term hostility on the part of most Russians, who constituted the majority of the Soviet Union. We could actually do very little one way or the other to influence the outcome and, therefore, the downside of a public position favoring breakup
seemed overwhelming. (Bush and Scowcroft, p. 543)

The position of the United States mattered immensely to the people and leaders of Russia and the other not-quite-yet-former Soviet republics. Some in Russia were still sensitive as a result of an attempted American intervention against the rising Communist government in 1918 (Wright, 1991, p. A1). Gorbachev was particularly sensitive that Bush not say or do anything which would be perceived as supporting the independence of constituent Soviet republics—particularly the Ukraine. In a telephone call between Bush (speaking from Camp David) and Gorbachev on November 30, 1991, Bush made clear that if Ukraine formally voted for independence the United States and the West would have to find a way to acknowledge and support that. Gorbachev responded:

I won’t hide that the leak from the White House saying that serious consideration was being given to recognizing the independence of Ukraine by the U.S.—especially because that leak came on the eve of the referendum—that this was taken negatively. It appears that the U.S. is trying not only to influence events, but to interfere...

We want very much that in this subtle and important question, there is no rush. I would like to recall the situation in Yugoslavia, which has led to the current state of affairs. But, George, the current situation is even more complicated than that of Yugoslavia. If someone in Ukraine says that they are seceding from the Union, and someone says they are supporting them, then it would mean that 12 million Russians and members of other peoples would become citizens of a foreign country. Crimea has already stated that if Ukraine distances itself from the Union, then Crimea will act to review the status of Crimea in Ukraine. The question of Donetsk will also emerge. (GBPL, November 30, 1991)

Gorbachev was hostile to even the perception that the United States might say something which dictated the path the dissolving Soviet Union should take. While the threats concerning Crimea and Ukraine and Donetsk were forestalled for two and a half decades, more recent events make it highly plausible to assume that the Russians might have been willing to use force to annex either of those territories. If Russia was actually willing to carry out those threats, then it becomes much easier to imagine that any number of other catastrophic outcomes might have occurred as Soviet leaders fought desperately to prevent the Union from crumbling. Critically, as Gorbachev said, the United States could not be seen to interfere.

Gorbachev’s hold on power worsened over the next month, although he attempted to fight on until the very end. In a December 13, 1991 call between Gorbachev and Bush, the Soviet leader said that he continued to talk regularly to Yeltsin but that Yeltsin was increasingly asserting independence from
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him. (GBPL, December 13, 1991a) The Union was attempting to negotiate a new relationship amongst the constituent republics, and Secretary of State Jim Baker gave a speech indicating that the USSR was unravelling. To be clear, this would still be a strategic silence in the sense articulated by Brummett—the words of Secretary Baker certainly constituted a relative silence compared to a putative speech from President Bush, and an acknowledgment of facts on the ground—even if poorly worded—is a different thing from a call for a particular action to take place. That led to the following interaction between Gorbachev and Bush on the December 13 phone call:

President Gorbachev: George, I think Jim Baker’s Princeton speech should not have been made, especially the point that the USSR had ceased to exist. We must all be more careful during these times. The main thing is to avoid confrontation.

The President: Let me be clear that I want to avoid confrontation. I don’t want to interfere. I accept your criticism. I do not think Jim said it quite that way—he said only “the USSR as we have known it” would be very different. That is a constructive suggestion that I will pass to him.

Gorbachev was extraordinarily sensitive to outside criticism on this December 13 call, and President Bush was deferential to him. It is hard to imagine a lot of circumstances where the American president would be willing to “accept your criticism” from the Soviet leader. That may have been an attempt to keep Gorbachev from lashing out and acting rashly. That was important, at least in part, due to a conversation Bush had earlier that day with Yeltsin. (GBPL, December 13, 1991b) Yeltsin told Bush that by the end of December or the start of January, the existing structures at the center of the Soviet Union would cease to exist. He also assured Bush that Soviet nuclear forces were accounted for and would be secured in the new commonwealth arrangement. He also said, “We are treating Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev with the greatest respect and warmly. It is up to him to decide his own fate.” Yeltsin repeated similar words later in the same call. It is hard to interpret that last line as anything other than an implicit threat that Gorbachev might fare either well or poorly in the new regime based on his own choices.

In short, during the months from August through December 1991 there was almost nothing that George Bush could say that would make the situation in the USSR better. There were, however, a good number of things he might have said to make the situation worse. If the situation became worse, the consequences were potentially devastating. The Christmas Day call between Gorbachev and Bush (GBPL, December 25, 1991) made clear that Bush and Gorbachev had a warm personal affection for one another, and it is stunning to read President Gorbachev say that his country will cease to exist in 2 hours as he discusses a calm and orderly plan for the handover of the Soviet nuclear
arsenal to Russia. Given all this, and acknowledging the difficulty in arguing the counter-factual case, Bush’s silence prior to Gorbachev’s resignation seems the best strategic choice available. Hurst (1999) provided insight when he argued that:

Most crucially of all, when the Soviet Union finally collapsed, it did so peacefully. While the Bush administration cannot claim all of the credit for this fact, it did play a significant role. Above all, as with the collapse of communism in eastern Europe, the Bush administration deserves credit as much for what it did not do as for what it did. Bush did not gloat, he was not triumphalist, he did not seek to overtly or crudely exploit the Soviet Union’s misfortunes or intervene in internal Soviet affairs. As with eastern Europe, Bush’s concern to ‘do no harm’ served the United States and the rest of the world well. (p. 167)

The situation changed quickly, of course, after Yeltsin assumed power on December 25, 1991. While President Bush made occasional statements concerning Russia and the other former Soviet republics in 1992, those statements continued to be limited and fairly restrained in nature. The United States then had an opportunity to influence a state which very much wanted to view itself as a great power but was cognizant of its own limitations. The newly independent republics also badly needed international financial assistance, and that made them unlikely to retaliate against rhetorical pressure from the U.S. and allied nations. My point in this essay isn’t that presidents should stay quiet and let events run their course—very much to the contrary, I believe American policy goals in the post-Soviet states would have benefitted from the public intervention of President Bush in 1992. My argument is, instead, that great powers needn’t always publicly position themselves as being great. They should seek to advance their policy goals, and sometimes that is better done through a strategic silence. Between the August 1991 Soviet coup and the December 1991 dissolution of the USSR, Bush made the best available choice in practicing an intentional strategic silence. So what does this specific case—and the limited additional work in intentional strategic silence—tell us about contests between great powers?

**Conclusion**

The broad theme which emerges is this—when the rhetorical intervention of a great power would help advance their policy goals, they should by all means do it. For example, in 1992 an economically disintegrating formerly Soviet block badly needed financial help. President Bush might have been able to rally support for a larger aid package which could, theoretically, have stabilized the economic transition without allowing a few well-connected private individuals to control state resources. Similarly, while President Bush did very well to not challenge the Chinese in the immediate aftermath of the Tiananmen Square massacre, at some
later point in 1989 or 1990 there was the opportunity to advance American interests in China. Sometimes a speech from the leader of a great power does indeed serve to advance a policy goal. The critical thing, though, is advancing the relevant interest rather than puffing up one’s chest.

What President Bush was being called to do in the Fall of 1991 was, in essence, puffing up his chest. Of course Americans wished to celebrate our apparent victory at the end of four or five decades of cold war, and George Bush absolutely wanted to position himself as well as possible for his re-election bid the following year. That, however, would have been contrary to the advancement of interests which makes a great power great. Speaking in August 1991 might, for example, have given support to one side or another in Moscow when the American interest was that the military not start shooting (at anyone) and that the nuclear weapons be accounted for. Speaking between roughly Labor Day and Christmas Day might have done the same thing, or it might have caused one side to lash out in a desperate attempt to exert influence or gain position. Those who are on the point of losing positions of privilege in a declining superpower are going to have some reaction to the statement of an external enemy.

This is consistent with the other available cases. The studies on Lincoln and the study on President Johnson generally reached the conclusion that one is best served by remaining silent when their words lack the power to bring about the desired change. While I am not privy to Saudi reasons for maintaining a strategic silence in their blockade of Qatar, it is very likely that is what they did—recognizing that sometimes interests are better advanced through silence. The documents on the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 are exceptionally clear that a speech by Bush would have provoked an unfavorable response from the Soviet Union, and in the following months would have risked angering partners in the western alliance. Great powers should certainly speak when it advances their interests, but they are generally better served remaining silent when they lack the power to change things or when those words would provoke a reaction. That silence might be relative or absolute, but is certainly different from trumpeting one’s successes. In moments of routine international business, states quite frequently have the opportunity to use public diplomacy or other measures to be seen as great powers. In moments of crisis, however, states should seriously question whether having a prominent leader make a forceful public statement actually serves the desired purpose. Great leaders and great powers become such by advancing the interests of their state rather than by seeking to be seen as great. It would have been good to publicly celebrate winning the Cold War, but it was better to actually win it.
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Vaccine Hesitancy Among U.S. Military Service Members: Contributing Factors and Operational Impacts on the Great Power Competition

Mary Wootan Holst and Cameron Carlson

Abstract

The COVID-19 Pandemic has presented the United States military with a unique challenge to maintain a forward presence in support of national security while adhering to critical COVID safety practices. Evidence-based COVID safety practices such as social distancing, sheltering at home, and now vaccinating are critical in protecting service members’ health. Simultaneously, these safety measures are challenging for the U.S. military because service members live and work in close quarters, options for telework are limited, and units must continue to execute worldwide deployments. A Pandemic milestone occurred in December 2020 when the FDA approved the first of several COVID-19 vaccinations under an Emergency Use Authorization (EUA). Force-wide vaccination is critical for the U.S. military to return to unimpeded operations and safeguard units from debilitating outbreaks. While military member vaccination is traditionally compulsory for all Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-approved vaccinations, service members have had the rare choice to accept or decline the EUA COVID-19 vaccine until full FDA approval is granted. The vaccination decisions of individual service members have had significant operational, financial, and logistical impacts throughout the U.S. military. The prevention and mitigation of outbreaks across military units have required significant person-hours and financial obligations to ensure units can operate and deploy safely and on schedule. This paper discusses the historical context and current motivations behind military vaccine-hesitancy, broad operational impacts, and recommendations on addressing vaccine-hesitancy within the U.S. armed forces.

Keywords: military, vaccinations, vaccine-hesitancy, non-compliance, mRNA, COVID-19

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La vacilación de las vacunas entre los miembros del servicio militar de los EE. UU.: Factores contribuyentes e impactos operativos en la competencia de las grandes potencias

Resumen

La pandemia COVID-19 ha presentado al ejército de los Estados Unidos un desafío único para mantener una presencia avanzada para apoyar la seguridad nacional mientras se adhiere a las prácticas de seguridad críticas de COVID. Las prácticas de seguridad de COVID basadas en evidencia, como el distanciamiento social, el refugio en el hogar y ahora la vacunación, son fundamentales para proteger la salud de los miembros del servicio. Al mismo tiempo, estas medidas de seguridad son un desafío para el ejército de los EE. UU. Porque los miembros del servicio viven y trabajan en lugares cerrados, las opciones para el teletrabajo son limitadas y las unidades deben continuar ejecutando despliegues en todo el mundo. Un hito pandémico se produjo en diciembre de 2020 cuando la FDA aprobó la primera de varias vacunas COVID-19 bajo una Autorización de uso de emergencia (EUA). La vacunación en toda la fuerza es fundamental para que el ejército de los EE. UU. Regrese a sus operaciones sin obstáculos y proteja a las unidades de brotes debilitantes. Si bien la vacunación de miembros militares es tradicionalmente obligatoria para todas las vacunas aprobadas por la Administración de Alimentos y Medicamentos (FDA), los miembros del servicio han tenido la rara opción de aceptar o rechazar la vacuna EUA COVID-19 hasta que se otorgue la aprobación completa de la FDA. Las decisiones de vacunación de los miembros individuales del servicio han tenido importantes impactos operativos, financieros y logísticos en todo el ejército de los EE. UU. La prevención y mitigación de brotes en las unidades militares ha requerido importantes horas de trabajo y obligaciones financieras para garantizar que las unidades puedan operar y desplegarse de manera segura y según lo programado. Este documento analiza el contexto histórico y las motivaciones actuales detrás de la vacilación militar a las vacunas, los impactos operativos generales y las recomendaciones para abordar la vacilación a las vacunas dentro de las fuerzas armadas de los EE. UU.

Palabras clave: militares, vacunas, reticencia a las vacunas, incumplimiento, mRNA, COVID-19
美国兵役人员的疫苗犹豫：促进性因素和对大国竞争产生的操作性影响

摘要

2019冠状病毒病（COVID-19）大流行对美国军方保持领先地位以支持国家安全同时遵守关键的COVID安全实践提出了独特挑战。基于证据的COVID安全实践，例如保持社交距离、居家和接种疫苗，对保护服役人员的健康而言是关键的。同时，这些安全措施对美国军方具有挑战性，因为服役人员在近距离的营房中工作和生活，远程工作选项受限，并且部队必须持续执行全球部署。2020年12月迎来了大流行里程碑—食品药品监督管理局（FDA）通过一项紧急使用授权（EUA），批准了首个可用的COVID-19疫苗。以部队为单位的疫苗接种对美国军方重返不受限的行动并保护部队不受病毒爆发而言是关键的。尽管军队成员的疫苗接种在传统意义上必须适用于所有经FDA批准的疫苗，但服役人员在EUA完全批准疫苗之前有权选择接受或拒绝接种EUA COVID-19疫苗，这一选择是罕见的。服役人员的个人疫苗接种决定对美国军方产生了显著的操作性影响、金融影响和后勤影响。预防和缓解病毒在军事部队爆发，要求相当多的人力和金融义务，确保部队能按计划进行安全操作和部署。本文探讨了军方疫苗犹豫（vaccine-hesitancy）背后的历史情境和当前激励、广泛的操作性影响，并就应对美国武装力量的疫苗犹豫一事提出建议。

关键词：军方，疫苗，疫苗犹豫，不服从，mRNA，2019冠状病毒病

Introduction and COVID-19 Explained

The novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2, or COVID-19, was first documented in Wuhan province, China, in Fall 2019, when an unidentified individual was hospitalized for pneumonia-like symptoms that were later attributed to COVID-19.\(^1\) Coronaviruses are positive-stranded Ribonucleic acid (RNA) viruses that traditionally reside in animals, though in recent history SARS and MERS coronavirus-
es were found and treated in humans. While the origin of COVID-19 is not confirmed, a leading theory is that the virus spread from an animal to human host at a wet (fresh or live meat) market in the Wuhan province in China in Fall 2019. In this theory, natural mutations would have enabled COVID-19’s initial zoonotic jump and set the stage for further transmissions of COVID-19 through human-to-human contact. Common to RNA viruses such as the common cold or influenza, transmission is primarily through aerosolization of fluids via coughing or sneezing, and close contact dramatically increases incident of transmission. The infection cycle can last up to 14 days, with common symptoms including shortness of breath, dry cough, fevers, chills, and loss of smell. A COVID-19 infection is often asymptomatic, creating a public health concern when asymptomatic COVID-positive persons unwittingly become a vector. The virus can remain asymptomatic during the initial infection, transmission window, or for the duration of the infection, which complicates carrier identification and close contacts.

Vaccination Types and Vaccine-Induced Immunopathology

The COVID-19 pandemic has had crippling social and economic impacts throughout the world. The two options to achieve herd immunity were mass infection or vaccines, therefore vaccines were the lynchpin to slow the COVID-19 outbreak and returning nations to social and economic normalcy. At the height of the efforts to create a SARS-CoV-2 vaccine, approximately 200 different types of vaccines were in development. As of 20 July 2021, the FDA approved three vaccines under the United States FDA Emergency Use Authorization, Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Section 564: Moderna, Pfizer, and Johnson & Johnson. As discussed below, two are messenger (mRNA) vaccines, and one is a non-replicating viral vector vaccine. All mitigate the threat of an individual becoming ill with severe symptoms from COVID-19, and studies show they are 95% effective at protecting against all known variants of COVID-19, including the Delta variants.

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RNA and Non-Replicating Viral Vector Vaccines

COVID-19 is a positive-stranded RNA virus, and following its discovery in early 2020, the world began a race to develop a vaccine to inoculate against it. Moderna and Pfizer, both mRNA vaccines, were two of the initial vaccines approved against COVID-19. An mRNA vaccine creates immunity based on the premise that a host’s antigen-presenting cells recognize vaccine-introduced mRNA and uses it as a blueprint to produce a humoral and cellular immune response.6

Scientists have been manipulating mRNA since the early 1990s when the first in Vitro (the growth of cells outside of a host, in such a medium as a petri dish or test tube) was accomplished. These cells were injected into mice and protein production could be seen.7 This production of proteins proved that this type of manipulation of cells could be used to produce more advanced techniques in fighting pathogens. However, over the past ten years, the mRNA vaccine and therapies have proven to be more beneficial than their DNA-based counterparts. This is based on the fact that mRNA vaccines have a higher safety profile than DNA vaccines as there are no live or attenuated viruses contained in them which minimizes risk of inadvertent infection. Also, mRNA vaccines are much more effective as various genetic modifications can be made to suit nearly any application required.8 In 2021, multiple mRNA vaccine platforms have been created and validated in the studies of immunogenicity and efficacy. In addition, the engineering of the mRNA sequence has allowed for the development of synthetic mRNA that is highly translatable for modern vaccines such as the ones manufactured by Moderna and Pfizer to fight the COVID-19 virus.9 mRNA vaccines are relatively fast to produce as they utilize single proteins rather than complex replicating or non-replicating viruses, which facilitates rapid, mass distribution, critical during the ongoing Pandemic.

Non-Replicating Viral Vector Vaccines

Non-replicating viral vector (NRVV) vaccines utilize a non-pathogenic virus
as a transport medium to introduce a highly attenuated virus to a host’s immune system and elicit the desired immune response.¹⁰ In the COVID-19 pandemic, Johnson & Johnson was developed with NRVV technology utilizing recombinant adenovirus with multiple layers of viral glycoprotein from the COVID-19 virus. Unlike the mRNA vaccines which required two doses up to 21 days apart, Johnson & Johnson only requires a one-time dose which was a clinical advantage because compliance was not complicated by a return visit.

NRVV vaccination development has been in use since 1937, when scientists first used a recombinant process for an attenuated Yellow Fever vaccination.¹¹ One of the popular viruses now used to develop this style of vaccine is Vesicular Stomatitis Virus (VSV). VSV is an ideal virus for this vaccine method because it does not have a pathogenic effect on the human body yet still elicits a robust immune response from the body. NRVV is popular in immunogenicity and in the development of vaccines due to their relative ease of manipulation, safety, and efficacy.¹² The use of non-replicating viral vectors as a vaccine platform has several advantages over other types of vaccine procedures such as, recombinant protein, and/or inactivated particles.¹³ Unlike mRNA vaccines, viral vectored vaccines retain some characteristics of a live attenuated vaccine, such as their ability to enter target cells and facilitate antigen (Ag) expression and subsequent Ag-presentation in vivo (inside of a living host), but contain additional safety features.¹⁴ In recent history, the non-replicating viral vector Ebola vaccine was used successfully during the 2014-2016 outbreaks in Africa.

**Vaccination Protocols in the United States Military**

Service members are especially susceptible to the spread of infectious diseases due to their close quarters working environment and duties being incompatible with telework or sequestering at home. For example, sailors spend prolonged time embarked on ships or submarines, airmen work in the confines of cockpits or cargo holds, and soldiers live and work in small forward operating bases. This creates a difficult

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¹³ Ibid.

Vaccine Hesitancy Among U.S. Military Service Members

Environment to control a virus unless vaccinations are widely distributed, and public health measures are strictly maintained. Therefore, the U.S. Military has a stringent vaccination program in which certain vaccinations are mandated as a condition of service.

The Department of Defense (DoD) administers 17 mandatory vaccines to all service members on active or reserve duty. The military maintains the legal authority to mandate general and specialized vaccines to all service members and tailor additional vaccine requirements based on military occupation. The DoD Directive 6200.04 delineates how and when these vaccines are given. Per DOD Directive 6200.04, the DoD requires service members to be immunized against diseases, including tetanus, diphtheria, influenza, hepatitis A, measles, mumps, rubella, polio, and yellow fever. In certain situations such as religious objections, vaccination requirements can theoretically be waived, though there is precedent through cases such as United States v. Chadwell where service members’ religious objections to vaccinations were denied. In United States v. Chadwell, two U.S. Marines cited religious belief when refusing smallpox, typhoid, paratyphoid, and influenza vaccines. When brought before the Navy Board of Review court (now the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals), it stated that religious beliefs were not above military orders and that “to permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to military orders, and in effect to permit every soldier to become a law unto himself.” Additionally, even if granted, waivers can be revoked as necessary to accomplish a critical mission.

In considering the COVID-19 vaccination, the DoD Immunization Program Instruction does not address vaccines issued under an Emergency Use Act (EUA) issued by the Director of Health and Human Services (HHS). A declaration of a EUA allows the use of unapproved medical products (i.e., vaccines) or unapproved use of approved medical products in an emergency to diagnose, treat, or prevent serious or life-threatening diseases or conditions during a declared public health emergency. A vaccine can be issued on a voluntary basis under a EUA when HHS declares that a public health emergency exists. This issuance or declaration resulting in an EUA does not mandate a vaccine for any American citizen, including the military, as it is unapproved or has not gone full licensure.

16 Ibid
Historical Implications for Vaccine-Hesitancy

While COVID-19 vaccinations were rapidly developed, concerns among the public about the vaccine's safety profile lead to growing COVID-19 vaccine-hesitancy. Vaccine hesitancy has been a critical consideration within public health since the 1100s. At this time, primitive vaccination was the variolation technique, which saw the introduction of a small amount of infected material (e.g. blood, scabs, pus) into a healthy host to produce a minor but survivable infection and provide immunity. This method was used in the pediatric population in Turkey, Africa, China, and Europe to combat Smallpox. This method of “vaccination” through variolation was utilized until 1879 when Louis Pasteur developed the first attenuated vaccine for Chicken Cholera. After a favorable outcome, this technique was utilized again in 1885 to vaccinate against Rabies.

Initial vaccination hesitancy among the general public was fueled by early vaccines released without appropriate quality or safety standards. For example, in 1901, 13 children died after inoculation with a tetanus-contaminated Diphtheria vaccine. It was not until 1910 that the medical profession adopted stringent vaccination guidelines, education requirements, and qualification and licensing standards. These early unfortunate outcomes during the development of vaccines most likely still inform vaccine-hesitancy today.

When considering the roots of vaccination hesitancy, vaccination programs in public health must also be examined from a socio-cultural standpoint. Many Americans view the current healthcare system as a consumerist system that prioritizes health care on a profit-driven model, where treatment is encouraged to create income for providers. This may lead to concerns about whether a patient truly benefits from treatment or is recommended for profit alone. Also, patients who once subscribed to a paternalistic medical model in which medical professionals directed healthcare are now shifting to an informed patient model where shared decision-making processes and second opinions are encouraged. While patient ownership over their health is valuable and critical, information-seeking behavior may lead to the introduction of unverified or false med-

21 Ibid.
ical information through open sources such as the internet or social media. This unfiltered access to information and social media platforms has given many anti-vaccination forums a prominent voice and may influence a recent rise in vaccination non-compliance. In addition, these forums and voices often provide non-evidenced-based or biased literature on the potentially harmful effects of vaccines and vaccine-treatable diseases.23

US military COVID-19 Vaccine-Hesitancy Impact on The Great Power Competition

In the competition of power, the country that can place its competitors on a loose footing makes the rules. Traditionally, competition between the world powers takes place in an environment with freedom of movement and the ability to congregate military units for decisive, large scale action. What happens when a worldwide pandemic, such as COVID-19, comes to the stage, halts international movement, and disperses troops? Whereas the great powers traditionally focus on adversary deployments and geospatial movements, COVID-19 changed the landscape of threats and turned focus inward. This undermined operational schedules of militaries throughout the world and potentially limited the assets a country could commit to an adversary action. Service member vaccine-hesitancy, which further prevents forces from achieving group immunity, is an additional obstacle forcing countries to rethink how they will effectively counter a foreign adversary in the ongoing Pandemic environment.

It can be a reasonable assumption that if a majority of a nation’s military refused to vaccinate, they would be at risk of exploitation from other nations due to their inability to respond effectively to threats. In the current digital landscape of social media, 24/7 news cycle, and the race of nations to “control the narrative,” propaganda and misinformation reign supreme, and vaccine diplomacy leads the charge. Vaccine narratives naturally developed during the race to develop the first effective vaccine.24 For example, Russia stated that the Sputnik V vaccine was superior to others while spreading misinformation or “cherry-picking” information to discredit other nations. This biased information can be utilized to influence adversary military servicemembers to question vaccine safety and efficiency, increasing vaccine-hesitancy within the ranks and crippling the response capabilities of the great powers.

Had the COVID-19 pandemic occurred during a time of high conflict, it is reasonable to assume that the nation


that responded with strict health protection measures and evidence-based education to encourage high vaccination compliance would ensure rapid return to full operational capacity and potentially military superiority. Therefore, the nation that educates and encourages its service members towards high vaccination compliance is more apt to win a conflict based on personnel numbers and morale alone.

**Economic Impacts of Vaccine-Hesitancy**

As a pandemic progresses, the economic toll will rise. As of 3 April 2020, in only a few short months, the COVID-19 pandemic cost the globe $3.8 trillion and took 147 million jobs.\(^\text{25}\) This downward economic trend will affect virtually all aspects of a government, including the military. As lockdowns and quarantines were implemented, the government was still responsible for critical services requiring in-person work to continue functioning, such as national defense. Training, material maintenance, and readiness of the United States military and conceivably all militaries in the world suffered as personnel could not return to work safely. For forces afloat, COVID-19 restrictions forced them to remain at sea burning expensive fuel. Ashore, units were forced into expensive sequestering options such renting out hotel rooms for prolonged periods.

Military person-hours once reserved for planning and strategy were exponentially dedicated to COVID-19 mitigation. Furthermore, to adhere to COVID-19 safety guidance, military units operated below ideal manning numbers, compromising efficiency and effectiveness. A military ceases to operate effectively without key personnel to provide logistics services, conduct maintenance, or support other functions.

A pandemic, once fully formed, can be potentially stopped in a finite number of ways: contact tracing, isolation or lockdowns, and vaccination.\(^\text{26}\) However, for prolonged pandemics that continue for months, or longer in the case of COVID-19, vaccination becomes the critical route to a return to control the return full operational capacity. Vaccine-hesitancy directly contributes to the prolongation of a pandemic and the effects detailed above, therefore negatively impacting the defense of all nations. The safety of a country is placed at risk from both threats at home and aboard as the militaries lose the agility and capability to respond effectively to external threats.

**Military COVID-19 Vaccination Response**

On 11 December 2020, the U.S. FDA provided the first emergency use authorization (EUA)

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for the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine against COVID-19 in persons 16 years or older. Shortly after, additional vaccines were granted emergency use authorization. These vaccines were initially prioritized within the military to select groups, including health care personnel (HCP) and deploying service members. Among 1,331,523 active component service members serving during December 2020, 361,538 (27.2%) initiated COVID-19 vaccination by 12 March 2021, and among the 110,456 active component HCP included in this number, 60,763 (55.0%) initiating a COVID-19 vaccine series.  

As discussed, due to the nature of the EUA, vaccine initiation among U.S. military service members will remain voluntary until the FDA provides full approval for the vaccination. While there is historical precedent for the DoD administering unapproved, investigational drugs and vaccinations to military members, under the EUA the COVID-19 vaccination is not compulsory for service members. Service members’ response to receiving a voluntary vaccine has fallen across a spectrum from acceptance to hesitancy. The vaccine-acceptance contingent includes active demand of vaccines received by an informed public, and passive acceptance (compliance by a public that yields to a perceived recommendation or social pressures). Meanwhile, vaccine-hesitant groups include those persons who want to delay or decline certain or all vaccinations. The vaccine-acceptance group may include all of the 27.2% of servicemembers to receive the vaccine at the first opportunity and follow-on service members who received the vaccine as it first became available to them. This group may be motivated by active demand, ambivalence, or compliance despite concerns due to social pressure. The vaccine-hesitant contingent is defined by “individuals [who] may refuse some vaccines, but agree to others; they may delay vaccines or accept vaccines according to the recommended schedule, but be unsure in doing so.” In the U.S. military, this group initially encompassed 33% of military personnel who by February 2021 reported they would decline vaccination, and by July 2021, the Pentagon reported that 67% of U.S. service members were vaccinated. Three fundamental mentalities that lead to military vaccine-hesitancy are discussed below.

A preliminary study on vaccine disparities in COVID-19 vaccine initiation among select active-duty service members elucidated some common demographics for the vaccine-acceptance and vaccine-hesitant groups. For the vaccination acceptance group, socioeconomic demographics included “increasing age, greater education levels, and higher rank,” and the study noted, “Asian/Pacific Islanders were the only race/ethnicity group to have had a higher rate of initiation...compared to non-Hispanic Whites.”31 Meanwhile, the vaccination hesitant socioeconomic demographics included “women serving in the military, younger troops, and service members in lower ranks and with less education,” and the study noted “a 29% lower odds of having received the vaccination among non-Hispanic Black U.S. participants in comparison to non-Hispanic Whites, which was similar between the general community and among health care workers.”32

Notably, the vaccine-hesitancy in the military population is similar to those reported in the general U.S. population. Surveys conducted by the CDC from September 2020 to December 2020 showed 32.1% of all adults among most sociodemographic groups displayed vaccination non-intent (defined as not intending to receive a COVID-19 vaccination). Those persons more likely to report lack of intent were “younger adults, women, non-Hispanic black (Black) persons, adults living in nonmetropolitan areas, and adults with lower educational attainment, with lower income, and without health insurance.”33

Concerns Leading to Service Members Vaccination Hesitancy

Vaccine-hesitant service members who did not initiate vaccination or refused vaccination are motivated by complex personal factors such as values, education, experiences, and religious beliefs that cannot easily be generalized. Though more studies are required to enumerate the reasons behind military-specific vaccination hesitancy, as with other vaccine-hesitancy trends, it has been observed to reflect the general population. Among U.S. adults surveyed in December who did not intend to take the vaccine, the leading reasons were concerns about side effects and safety of the COVID-19 vaccine (29.8%), delaying vaccination to evaluate if the vaccine is safe and consider receiving it later (14.5%), lack of

32 Ibid.
trust in the government (12.5%), and concern that COVID-19 vaccines were developed too quickly (10.4%). Below, three notable factors of vaccine-hesitancy in the military population are discussed: COVID-19 vaccination safety, general vaccination distrust, and general non-compliance.

A leading concern for the vaccine-hesitant population specific to the COVID-19 vaccinations is lack of confidence in COVID-19 vaccine safety due to factors such as the speed at which the vaccination was created, implications of the emergency use authorization, and vaccination side effects. Distrust regarding novel vaccination is rooted in recent history when from 1998-2004, the military ran a mandatory anthrax vaccination program in which the non-FDA-approved vaccine Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed (AVA) was distributed to service members. Due to the approval status and concerns over side effects, hundreds of service members refused the vaccine, and punitive repercussions ranged from public shaming to jail time and dishonorable discharges. Ultimately, the program was halted after a federal judge found insufficient approval for AVA to be used against inhalation anthrax and, furthermore, that service-members should be provided informed consent and not be required to take experimental (non-FDA approved) drugs. When weighing service member’s personal liberties against the operational impact of vaccination hesitancy, it is important to consider recent occurrences like this where some service members were punished for refusing an unauthorized vaccine. COVID-19 has established a new precedent in which service members would not be forced to take a non-FDA-approved vaccine. For vaccine-hesitant persons whose concerns center around the EUA, the eventual full FDA approval of current COVID-19 vaccinations may prove to be sufficient and lead to vaccination.

Side effects are also a leading concern among vaccine-hesitant service members, as safety concerns may include rare side effects such as blood clots, anaphylaxis, and myocarditis. One study may seem to validate these concerns due to the identification of rare myocarditis vaccine side-effects in 23 previously healthy military members within four days of a COVID-19 vaccine (Pfizer or Moderna), which was documented as “substantially higher than the expected number.” However, researchers assured that “concerns about rare

adverse events following immunization should not diminish overall confidence in the value of vaccination.”37 Vaccine-hesitancy service members may also include women and men who cite fertility concerns, which became widespread after Dr. Michael Yeadon and Dr. Wolfgang Wodrag filed a petition with the European Medicine Agency citing safety concerns with the SARS-CoV-2 vaccine. These concerns included a negative impact on female fertility because the vaccine induces an autoimmune reaction against syncytin-1 protein, which is involved in placenta formation.38 These concerns have since been found to lack evidence, and in a systematic review published in the Fertility and Sterility international journal, a systematic review found no credible evidence linking COVID-19 vaccine with female infertility. Also, the authors of the review argued that men should receive the vaccine due to infertility risks in contracting actual COVID-19 disease. Ultimately, the potential systemic and long-term effects of COVID-19 disease on male and female infertility have not been fully understood.39

A separate concern for some members of the military vaccine-hesitant contingent is a baseline distrust of vaccinations that will not be alleviated with full FDA approval or further testing of the COVID-19 vaccine. This group may have complied with other mandatory vaccine requirements due to the compulsory nature of many military vaccinations, but they have had to suspend their concerns and discomfort to remain military eligible. This concern echoes a growing movement of vaccine-hesitancy globally. The world’s vaccination rates have declined, evidenced by a global coverage decline from 86% in 2019 to 83% in 2020 among a growing concern around the purpose and efficacy of vaccinations.40 As discussed earlier, this global decline in vaccine uptake may be driven by various factors, including misinformation within popular media campaigns against vaccination or now-debunked vaccination myths such as the link between vaccinations and autism. This global decline may also have been impacted by restrictive safety measures that disrupted the distribution of vaccines during the COVID-19 pandemic.

39 Ibid.
of the vaccine-hesitant military population may refuse vaccination from an inherent desire to non-conform. The foundation of military success is built on uniformity and compliance, therefore service members approach many decision points with a fixed outcome. For example: where to live, what to eat, even medical decisions such as vaccinations or do not resuscitate (DNR) orders. The opportunity to make personal decisions does not exist as commonly as it does in the civilian population. This leads to a subset of the population who are displaying early vaccination refusal and motivated by the novel ability to decline otherwise mandatory healthcare. Appeasing the desire to non-conform with more personal freedom may require a cultural approach not feasible in the military, which fosters and depends upon a uniformed environment and benefits from safety measures such as mass vaccination.

**Discussion and Way Forward**

Due to the massive operational impact of vaccinations on military operations and national security, military leadership must understand and urgently address vaccine-hesitancy within their ranks. As demonstrated on USS Harry S Truman when a crew of 5,461 sailors and airmen returned home with zero cases of COVID-19, prevention from outbreak across military units is possible yet requires detailed coordination and individual commitment to best practices for disease prevention. On the other hand, USS Theodore Roosevelt demonstrates the devastating effect an infectious disease outbreak can have on a crew, platform, and mission. The USS Roosevelt was deployed shortly after USS Harry S Truman and was forced to make port in Guam after a COVID-19 outbreak spread through the crew. Out of a crew of approximately 5,000 people, 1,271 crew members were tested positive for SARS-CoV-2, with 1000 infections first identified within five weeks of the first confirmed infection. The close berthing and working quarters in the shipboard environment facilitated the rapid viral spread, illustrating why compliance with infectious diseases prevention methods such as masks, social distancing, and eventually vaccines is critical. Ultimately, both vessels were forced to alter operational plans, placing a tremendous financial burden on the government and impacting national security posturing abroad. USS Roosevelt was forced to conduct an extended stay in Guam to address the outbreak, limiting the ability to remain at sea to

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support a forward presence critical to the U.S. mission and homeland defense. This is just one example of the profound operational impact COVID-19 has had on national security and emphasizes the importance of thoughtfully addressing vaccine-hesitancy.

While there is no single approach to addressing vaccination hesitancy in the military, a leading strategy is individual and unit-wide education on vaccinations for service members. The front line of this education must be military physicians, physician assistants, nurses, and medical professionals who are trusted and often personally known by the service members they are counseling. By facilitating this education through a trusted agent, military leadership establishes a voice in vaccination education, which can be dominated by non-evidence-based information predominantly promulgated through social media, news outlets, or throughout the internet. When developing strategies to address vaccine-hesitancy, it may be valuable to reflect on the demographics of vaccine-hesitant service members discussed previously to tailor education to their specific concerns and reasons for vaccine-hesitancy.

The military may also consider addressing historical vaccination campaigns and experimental studies that have caused concern amongst the ranks, for example, the recent Anthrax campaign discussed earlier or the infamous Tuskegee Study of Untreated Syphilis in the Negro Male conducted between 1932 to 1972. Following the public exposure of the Tuskegee study, the long-term effects on the Black community were erosion of trust in physicians and the medical system which decreased health-seeking behavior and healthcare utilization for black men. A convergence of the broken trust caused by these two campaigns may be responsible for the highest vaccination hesitancy group of non-Hispanic black (Black) service members. Of concern, several studies found similar trends in vaccination intent and low likelihood of receiving a COVID-19 vaccine among groups disproportionately affected by COVID-19, including Black persons. Distrust of the government is a leading concern for anti-vaccination campaigns in and out of the military, and understanding and addressing these concerns directly may encourage restoration of trust.

Of note, there is a growing conversation around implementing mandatory COVID-19 vaccination across the military before full FDA approval. Some great power nations have also implemented mandatory vaccinations for specific groups or individuals based on their occupations with concerning results. For example, areas of Russia and China implemented mandatory vaccinations and punitive measures for individ-


uals who choose not to receive the vaccine. For example, in Wanning, a city in the southern province of Hainan, China, residents were threatened with loss of government benefits or access to public transportation if they refused vaccinations. This causes widespread criticism, and the Chinese government had to step in over concern over a possible backlash from the population. While the governments of Russia and China promoted the benefits of their nation’s vaccine, they also battle internal division and the spread of misinformation, even from their own public health divisions. Only approximately 11 percent of Russians have been vaccinated against COVID-19, which may be influenced by distrust built by forced vaccinations. U.S. military leaders must consider that this tension created by vaccine mandates can have dire consequences for national security if it feeds into government distrust and fuels anti-vaccination movements. While the recent call for mandating the EUA COVID-19 vaccinations throughout the military may be operationally favorable, forced vaccination will not only disregard hesitancy concerns, it may even perpetuate reasons for vaccination hesitancy.

Additional factors outside the military’s control that may mitigate COVID-19 vaccination hesitancy are the advancement from a EUA to full FDA approval for COVID-19 vaccinations and simply consistent vaccination promotion over time. Multiple studies have shown a decrease in vaccine-hesitancy over time, including a study of vaccine-hesitant among groups prioritized for vaccines that showed an increase in vaccination intent across all surveyed adults and priority groups by approximately 10 percentage points over four months while vaccination non-intent decreased by six percent and across most socio-demographic groups. This decrease in non-intent may be explained by a patient’s ability to see the occurrences of side effects (a leading initial vaccination concern) over time or the loss of novelty. While


48 Ibid


50 Ibid

waiting for vaccine-hesitancy to resolve is not in-of-itself a strategy, it may be helpful to expect that in the specific circumstance of the COVID-19 EUA approval and rapid vaccine production, some service members may only need time to receive anecdotally and study evidence to trust the vaccine.

The U.S. military has successfully and historically made COVID-19 vaccination available to every service member, significantly decreasing the barrier to military-wide vaccination. However, to enable the U.S. military to execute its national security mission and maintain footing in the Great Power competition, leaders must understand the factors leading to vaccine hesitancy and address them thoughtfully with evidence-based vaccination education campaigns provided by trusted health care professionals throughout the ranks.

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Limitations of Military Power to Counter a Rising China

Brendan M. Potter

Abstract

Research finds that a heavy reliance on unaccompanied military deterrence with China is an ineffective solution. The U.S. lacks the requisite industrial power to replicate the winning conditions of its victory in the Pacific during World War Two. Untried developments in military technology create an unacceptable level of uncertainty at the outset of a conflict between two major powers. The study concludes that a more multidimensional approach must be increasingly emphasized by the U.S., incorporating other instruments of national power. The U.S. must increasingly foster security partnerships with allies, rely on the normative pressures from the international community via institutions, and adjust the form and focus of its own military to optimize the efficiency of existing forces without resorting to increased defense spending. Lastly, the U.S. must find common ground with China, reversing feelings of alienation and bullying that influence China to disregard the concerns of other nations.

Keywords: military strategy, military technologies, security policy, naval security

Introduction

If many Americans were asked to think about their own country’s navy fighting a modern conflict in the Pacific Ocean, recollections of a victorious American campaign against Imperial Japan would surely come to mind. It is a forgivable mistake. The prospect of war is often unsettling, and such memories of comfort would be attractive. For those who do not fear being harmed by it, assertive and confident feelings can be easy to entertain. Images of Japanese aircraft carriers burning not long after American entrance to the war, dramatic clashes of surface combatant guns with the ease of hindsight bias, and a long chain of island-hopping Marines winning victories all the way to the Japa-

1 The author would like to acknowledge Dr. William Boettcher of the School of Public and International Affairs at North Carolina State University for tremendous support in reviewing this manuscript and providing critical feedback during its development.
nese islands themselves - these could all provide ready reassurance to that troublesome scenario. The war bond selling picture of the flag being raised on Iwo Jima is now a national icon, enshrined in the American identity and imagination. But would another naval conflict in the Pacific Ocean yield similar, patriotism-swelling experiences? If you are attached to these nostalgic visions, this study is meant for you.

Could the United States bounce back from a crippling strike against its naval forces as it did after the attack on Pearl Harbor? Could the United States grow a stronger military under the sustained losses of a protracted naval campaign against a peer threat? Would the United States need to strike first to assure victory? Can we even have reasonable certainty about the way in which any naval war between major, naval powers would unfold in the modern era? This study examines the limitations of the United States military to optimistically counter China in a predominantly unilateral solution. While maintaining the need for a strong military as a vital component to American foreign policy, it finds a need to place stronger emphasis on alternative solutions in this case.

**Methodology**

This study does not seek to examine the roots or nature of the disputes between China and the United States and the international community. How these disagreements have manifested and how actors have sought resolution is largely beyond the scope of research. Instead, this study is primarily concerned with assessing the limitations of unilateral, military power in the United States as an effective deterrent. It does so with the main conclusion of advocating for alternative approaches to the United States’ handling of the Chinese security problem.

When political science examines armed conflicts or their potential between nations, it is remiss where it ignores or sidesteps an attentive examination of the actual military power of actors. Doubtless, many other factors are relevant to the questions of conflict, which need not be diminished. Much
important research in the field is given over to those factors. However, these are necessarily limited in scope. The main focus of this study is exploring the inadequacies of military power as a reliable answer to the security problems of a rising China. As such, military science is especially relevant in this study.

Military science is nested deeply within the field of political science and can thus be regarded in some ways as near to the core of questions regarding security (Shultz, 2012). This illustration encapsulates the relationship between the disciplines:

This depiction is in no way indicative of a consensus or standardization in thought across the field (Shultz, 2012, p. 7). To the contrary, there is much disagreement about the disciplinary relationships and their individual importance therein (Shultz, 2012, p. 7). What is clear is that, while military science resides close to the ground, and much of political science views macro conditions from far above, a realistic understanding must still be able to at least discern the features of the ground in sufficient detail to ascertain some navigable meaning of the landscape.

Current, historical, and proposed force structures and capacities will be examined from a variety of sources to determine some approximation of not only military power, but the larger trends of direction that military power has taken. In the scope of this study, force structure will predominantly be limited to quantities of different types of naval vessels, and some general descriptions of them. Capacity, the ability to produce and maintain ships, will be examined across a historical timeline. This is not intended to be a comprehensive assessment of military power but will draw sufficient analysis to identify limitations of military power in support of the hypotheses.

The use of historical case study is another important feature of the methodology. In seeking some corollary ex-
perience against which to compare a theoretical, modern naval conflict, we must return to the previous, major one. Usefully, this previous naval conflict was predominantly between the United States and a peer, Asian naval power across the Pacific Ocean. The foundations that facilitated American success will be contrasted with modern conditions. Lastly, this study acknowledges the condition of nuclear arms and the dangers that they impose but does not focus on the nuclear component of a potential conflict with China. Rather, this study treats conventional conflict below the nuclear threshold as the hypothetical scenario, and acknowledges the nuclear question only as a supporting consideration to reinforce the arguments against unilateral, military measures as a solution to the security problems posed by China in the South China Sea.

Literature Review

In examining the shifting attitudes of the United States military, this study relies on current, official documents expressing reforms and visions for new military direction. Security strategy development is a layered process in which lower echelons of strategy are nested within those of the higher authorities. The construction of strategy begins at the executive branch level with the National Security Strategy (NSS), the unclassified portions of which are usually tantamount to a political statement, but which guide the construction of subordinate strategies. Subsequently, the Secretary of Defense publishes a National Defense Strategy (NDS), much of which is unclassified, especially in summaries. At the highest levels of uniformed authority, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) publish the National Military Strategy (NMS). The separate military branches use these guidelines to publish their individual service strategies, which have different names for each service.

This study will examine the unclassified portions of these foundational documents: the NDS (DoD, 2018), and the NMS (JCS, 2018). In the case of the executive NSS, the Trump administration’s NSS will be examined for recent context (Trump, 2017). Since the Biden administration’s NSS is still in development at the time of this study’s writing, the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance will be used (Biden, 2021). It is important to note that revisions to the subordinate strategies will likely be forthcoming in the near future. In the case of the separate military branches, only the Commandant’s Planning Guidance from the Marine Corps will be examined, because it is especially drastic in the changes that it makes to force structure and focus (HQMC, 2019).

John Mearsheimer is a prolific, political scientist who is famous for his brand of realism in international relations, known as offensive realism. Mearsheimer has gained much attention and notoriety for his views advocating that states seek hegemony as an answer to the problem of security. This study’s advocacy for an increased reliance on diplomacy, alliances, and international institutions directly contradict the theories of Mearsheimer, yet his analysis will nonetheless be important to this study. Mearsheimer’s (2001)
cornerstone work *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, which is the foundation in which he outlines his theory of offensive realism, will be called upon to recognize counterarguments and to back assertions made in this study of the relevance of naval power in the case of a Pacific island conflict.

In order to obtain a picture of the current state of the United States military’s recent developments and problems, a variety of defense focused news outlets will be referenced. In a few cases, I will insert my personal experience. For supporting scholarly thought on the contemporary problem set, this study will rely on various think tanks and venues for analysis such as the U.S. Naval Institute, the Center for Global Security Research with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and War on the Rocks. It will be supported by comprehensive analysis by sources such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the RAND Corporation.

**Recognition of the Threat**

There are familiar signs today from a rising China, with a massively expanding naval arm, engaged in acts of expansion and assertion that merit serious security concerns. In 1941, the United States was the victim of a surprise, naval attack that brought it into a major conflict. Yet, shortly after the end of World War One, American policy makers had already recognized Imperial Japan as the main security threat that the United States faced, and for the same reasons that it is today concerned with China (DoS, n.d.). The emphasis that the United States places on the military threat of an expanding China is clear. All of the foundational documents of strategy, from the White House through the Secretary of Defense to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military services demonstrate a clear recognition of the threat. While China’s neighbors raise increasing alarm over the sometimes-unusual encroachments of China, the United States takes notice and has become heavily involved in the region (McCarthy, 2021).

The works of John Mearsheimer could be a source of potential criticism from those who believe in the limited utility of naval power, and thus dispute both the seriousness of a rising Chinese naval power and an emphatically naval response. This author’s work is influential in its modern rebranding of realism and affects strategic thought and policy makers alike. Mearsheimer (2001) is highly critical of naval power as a means of independently coercing a great power to another’s will. Advocating for the primacy of land-based power, Mearsheimer (2001) flatly states that “neither independent naval power nor strategic airpower has much utility for winning major wars” (p. 86). However, Mearsheimer (2001) recognizes the case of naval action against Imperial Japan during World War Two to be an exceptional case for the success and relevance of naval power. Specifically, he refers to naval power aimed against the Pacific power as “the only case in which a blockade wrecked a rival’s economy, causing serious damage to its military forces” and “the only case . . . of successful coercion” (p. 92).
This is important because even those critical of naval power as a coercive instrument must recognize the uniqueness of the location of the Pacific Ocean and the maritime nature of disputes with China in the South China Sea as evidence for a very strong, if not central, role for naval forces in countering China. Moreover, Mearsheimer’s subordinate role of troop transport raises security concerns for China’s developing ability to use naval capabilities to project land power to neighboring territories, as Imperial Japan did throughout the islands of Southeast Asia. There is some merit to Mearsheimer’s critiques. Historically, land power has been the primary coercive instrument in the majority of conflict cases. However, even in the case of a Chinese threat today, there is a clear recognition by the United States for the need to integrate naval, land, and air forces. It just so happens that in this case, independent naval forces have disproportionate importance.

General David Berger (2020), the Commandant of the Marine Corps, has spoken about the changes that confrontation with a peer competitor has brought to the military services. Importantly, there is clear, high level recognition that the United States Navy and Marine Corps have not had a need to work together closely since the close of World War Two (Berger, 2020). This is owing to 1) the wide margin of power that the United States has enjoyed since the end of World War Two, and 2) the effects of a sustained focus on limited scale conflicts during the Global War on Terror (Berger, 2020). With the rise of conventional power and aggression from a great power state, and the winding down of the Global War on Terror as evidenced by the effective defeat of ISIL and a withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan, the Marine Corps now has the catalyst it has so long lacked to renew a close partnership with the navy (Berger, 2020).

This is only at the service level within one of the branches of the United States military. At the national level, there is clear recognition of China as the principal security threat facing the United States today. The Trump administration’s (2017) National Security Strategy mentions China a total of 33 times in its unclassified publication. The document is interesting in that it expresses regret that attempts to be inclusive and supportive of a developing China in hopes of assisting their liberalization have outright failed (p. 25). The Trump administration (2017) expresses the idea that China is aggressive and expansionist, and wholly “antithetical to U.S. values and interests” (p. 25). This is not entirely exclusive to the Trump administration. Although the new Biden administration has significantly different rhetoric than the previous president, the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance still views China as a growing rival (Biden, 2021, p. 6). Additionally, Biden (2021) has identified China as both “rapidly more assertive” and the single nation that is able to muster its national power to challenge the international system (p. 8).

The National Defense Strategy mentions China before it mentions any other country, and it does so at
the beginning of the third paragraph of the introduction (DoD, 2018, p. 1). The NDS lumps China together with Russia as states which are not following the “rules of the road”, implying a sense of aggressive abandon that must be addressed (DoD, 2018, p. 2). Moreover, the Joint Chiefs of Staff level, National Military Strategy lists as the top two bullet points in its observed, global security trends: a reemergence of great power competition and a weakening of the post-World War Two order (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018, p. 2). Whether any of these assessments are completely accurate is beyond the scope of this study. What is clear is that the United States is increasingly becoming focused on China as a security threat, and identifies the conventional, maritime nature of potential conflict. As will be further demonstrated in later analysis of military shifts, the so-called “Asia Pivot” is real, extends beyond the Obama administration, and is only increasing.

**Current Capacities and Limitations**

The United States has an immensely powerful navy. This is especially true when compared with the naval power of other prominent states across the world. However, it is wrong to accept the simple, paper depictions of the United States’ naval power on the basis of its large volume of substantial warships. A navy’s power is far more complex than simple ratios of vessels within a certain class range. As we will see, this is particularly true in the modern age. A more detailed look at the overall conditions will yield details that carry important implications for the state of the United States’ military power in the context of a possible confrontation with China.

**Shipyards and Shipbuilding**

The United States was famously able to escalate a massive industrial war effort after entering hostilities during World War Two. Since the conflicts that comprised the war took place almost exclusively on different continents, its ability to project power across oceans was vitally important. The United States’ opponents, however, were strong naval powers. Moving troops and materiel to Europe required running a gauntlet of U-boat hunting grounds which comprised a Battle of the Atlantic that lasted from before Americans were direct participants, to the conclusion of the war. In the Pacific, Imperial Japanese naval power was a fierce competitor with the United States in subsurface, surface, and air capabilities. This all translated to a need for enormous shipbuilding volumes. Although much has been written about the arguably ineffective attack on Pearl Harbor, it nonetheless succeeded in dealing a serious blow to a substantial portion of the U.S. Navy’s capital ships.

The United States enjoyed important advantages that enabled it to successfully direct its industrial engine towards war. The idea that the United States’ industrial shipbuilding capacity was a result of entering hostilities, however, is a myth. The fact is that political leadership was already in the process of setting the foundations for wartime
production (DoT, n.d.). The Emergency Shipbuilding Program itself was stood up prior to the United States joining the war (DoT, n.d.). Moreover, it was the Emergency Shipbuilding Program that was responsible for the production of the majority of the vessels produced by the United States during the war (DoT, n.d.). By contrast, modern American shipbuilding is a hollow shell of its former figure (Klein, 2015). After World War Two, the United States was at peak shipbuilding and remained the dominant player in this industry for a few decades (Klein, 2015). By the 1970s, already declining production plummeted (Klein, 2015). This is owing to shipbuilding being effectively outsourced as other countries produced vessels more cheaply and invested government subsidies into the industry (Klein, 2015). Notably, China is one of the lead countries most outproducing the United States in shipbuilding (Klein, 2015).

If the United States were called upon today to launch the same level of ocean-shipped, material support to a beleaguered ally in the Pacific, it would not be able to replicate its previous success on the grounds of production limitations alone. This does not even account for the threats posed by China to American shipping at the outset of a conflict. Merchant shipping is important for its utility in war, as demonstrated by the experiences in World War Two. It also has the important effect of freeing up shipyards for producing warships. In this regard, the United States is also suffering from a decayed infrastructure (Riposo, et al., 2008).

The ability of United States Navy shipyards to even maintain existing fleets has been overstretched in recent years (Riposo, et al., 2008). Cost overruns and underestimations of demands on shipyards have been the standard in recent American history (Riposo, et al., 2008). As China’s merchant and military shipbuilding production has been exploding across the modern, historical timeline, the United States has been shrinking and struggling to even maintain existing platforms. Inaccurately projected timelines for the mere maintenance of United States Navy ships has caused not only huge delays, but overtime work has become a consistent issue that contributes to the problem of unpredicted expenses piling up (Riposo, et al., 2008). With these enduring problems, should Congress be easily convinced that further additions to the fleets will be an effective expenditure of tax dollars?

Yet, this is exactly what Congress is being asked to do. The Trump administration backed an enormous increase in ship orders to expand the navy across the board, adding to an already backed up shipyard log (Eckstein, 2020). Plans from the office of the Secretary of Defense have called for an ambitious expansion and modernization of the navy (DoD, 2020). Concessions the navy has been willing to make include the retirement of about 10 of the larger, Ticonderoga class guided missile cruises and certain amphibious assault ships to make a degree of budgetary allowance for sweeping increases in warship production (Eckstein, 2020). The following graph depicts the scope of the changes:
Limitations of Military Power to Counter a Rising China

Notably, the navy is looking to return frigates to its fleets, which have been absent since the former Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates were sold for a supposed lack of relevance (Eckstein, 2020). In addition, the plans include other brand-new, concept ships such as unmanned vessels and Next-generation Logistics Ships (Eckstein, 2020). Meanwhile, lawmakers are aware that the navy’s recent experiments in producing brand new lines of ships such as the Littoral Combat Ship, have resulted in vessels that the navy itself does not know what to do with (Eckstein, 2020). This is without even addressing the fate and plans for the failed Zumwalt class guided missile destroyers, which were intended to replace the Arleigh Burke class workhorses that comprise such a strong majority of American surface warfare combat power (Larter, 2021a).

The United States is trying to increase its number and types of warships, without increasing its already strained and gutted industrial capacity. Yet shipbuilding and acquisitions have been marked by broken processes and repeated failures (Larter, 2021a). If the navy were to find itself in a stand-up fight against a modern, Chinese navy, and sustain great losses, it would lack the infrastructure to quickly replace them. Moreover, production of vessels that the navy wants would need to be halted and re-tooled to replace the ships that it would now need. These are not optimistic conditions for entering a
serious naval conflict with China. The United States, therefore, needs to look at alternatives.

**Distinct Advantages**

One area in which the United States has held a massive advantage over militaries around the world is in its navy. The disparity between American naval power in most of the modern era and that of any other country is difficult to overstate. As an illustration, China and the United Kingdom both have the second largest number of fully fledged aircraft carriers in the world, with two conventionally powered carriers in each country’s navy (CSIS, 2020). The United States has 11, with all of them being nuclear-powered supercarriers, capable of deploying aircraft up to and including fixed wing fighters (USN, 2021). The overwhelming majority of surface combatants in world navies rank at the smaller frigate and corvette class of vessels (CSIS, 2020).

The smallest, primary surface warfare combatant in common usage with the United States Navy is the destroyer (USN, 2021). Once considered a smaller combatant, the destroyer is now the largest combatant in the majority of major navies around the world (CSIS, 2020). In the United States, the 329-crew destroyers are the primary workhorse of the fleets’ “Anti-Air Warfare (AAW), Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), and Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW)” missions (USN, 2021). The United States currently has a whopping 68 Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyers in its fleets (USN, 2021). This is in addition to the two, newer and experimental Zumwalt class destroyers (USN, 2021). On top of this, the fleets currently possess 22 Ticonderoga class guided missile cruisers, even larger and more heavily armed than their destroyer counterparts (USN, 2021). American Littoral Combat Ships, which are an anomaly in world navies, are effectively comparable to corvettes although they were predominately meant to fulfill duties against asymmetric threats and have struggled to find relevance, particularly in conventional settings (USN, 2021).

However, a major part of the security problem posed by China has been the rapid and substantial modernization and expansion of the PLAN. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (2020) charts the current forces and the recent trends of their development across the leading navies of the world.

This chart illustrates the disparity in naval forces between the United States and other powers. While China's naval power has increased dramatically in recent years, this is predominately in the category of naval vessels that fall at or below the threshold of the destroyers. The United States maintains a clear advantage in vessels at the destroyer level and above, as well as aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships (CSIS, 2020). While compelling, the chart does not depict the smaller classes of missile boats, which are capable of swarming large volumes of anti-ship missiles from a variety of short ranged, fast boats (Patch, 2010). Neither is it necessarily predictive of future trends, particularly
with the uncertain fate of the aging U.S. cruiser fleet, which represents a significant portion of the powerful, surface warfare combatants that outclass the Chinese navy (Larter, 2021c).

Submarines are another category where the United States maintains a clear advantage over China (Berger, 2020). The United States operates exclusively nuclear-powered submarines, which are inherently more operationally useful by virtue of their long endurance (CSIS, 2020). By contrast, the overwhelming majority of Chinese submarines are diesel-electric vessels (CSIS, 2020). It is this strong advantage that has led the Marine Corps to, in an unusual turn of military thought, identify subsurface warfare as a specific component for which Marine forces can potentially support and enhance naval power (Berger, 2020). Since existing force ratios, for all their advantages, have clearly not been sufficient to deter China from the disruptive encroach-
ments for which it has gained attention, these types of conventional changes to military thinking are exactly what is called for to reshape, rather than simply enlarge, the United States military to better deter China.

**Changes to the United States Military**

There are many positive changes to the military that are currently happening. These changes should be sustained and built upon to shape the existing forces that the United States has into a more efficient tool of deterrence against China. These changes are characteristically low cost, and often can reduce costs by creating a leaner force rather than simply increasing the size. American defense spending is already massive (Chantrill, 2020). Moreover, it has been enormous for its entire modern history, even at its low points in between conflicts (Chantrill, 2020). Although the temptation to simply spend more money on defense in response to security threats or alarms, or to appease a constituency, might be strong, this does not solve security problems by itself. An already huge amount of defense spending must be focused first on reshaping and restructuring the military to modern threats, while having the discipline and fortitude to discard legacy systems and structures where they no longer enhance lethality.

The Commandant's Planning Guidance for the Marine Corps demonstrates sharp focus on the problem of China (HQMC, 2019). Much of the document's (2019) focus is given over to a radical transformation of the service to address conventional, and specifically naval threats. Because China is the only nation with a navy that can theoretically compete with the United States, it is clear that this attention is intended to address China. First, the document (2019) emphasizes the reintegration of the Marine Corps into more traditional partnerships with the navy (p. 4). Second, the force structure of the Marine Corps is massively overhauled (HQMC, 2019). This force structure change is drastic and unique in part because it calls for equipping Marines with anti-ship weapons, such as missiles, to combat conventional, naval forces (HQMC, 2019).

In addition to adding capabilities, the Marine Corps has determined to eliminate its force of tanks, parting ways with its Abrams Main Battle Tanks in favor of other assets (South, 2021). Tanks have been an integral part of the Marine Corps for close to a century, and their removal from the service is no small signal. The Marine Corps has chosen to become a smaller, more agile force that is meant to operate in small, isolated detachments in support of naval operations. The specific ways in which these changes have manifested indicates a clear focus on addressing the security problems of a naval conflict with China.

Marine Recon and Force Recon are small, elite forces that amount to a special operations force internal to the Marine Corps. These forces have recently begun training for specific missions that address this threat.
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Force Recon has resumed training with submarine-based insert capabilities (Thompson, 2021). From my own personal experience inside these organizations, I can attest that this is very unusual compared to the previous two decades of their work, and indicative of a clear shift in focus. Marine Recon has begun partnering with Air Force Special Operations Forces in training for Military Free Fall parachute operations to land specialized personnel onto remote islands, and rapidly facilitate the air landing of anti-ship missiles (Athey, 2021b). While I can assert from personal experience inside these Marine forces that partnership between Marine Recon and Special Operations Forces from sister services is not new, this specific mission set is a novel development.

The conventional Marine Corps has established other developments in this same vein. For example, the establishment of Marine Littoral Regiments, which are intended to enhance the Marine Corps’ ability to complement and support naval efforts in the Pacific (Shelbourne, 2021). These changes are centered around the recent development of new doctrine for what is called Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations, which centers around Marine units operating in small, distributed networks of island forces that can provide defense and support to naval forces through a wide variety of means (Shelbourne, 2021). The Marine Corps has also spent the last few years investigating needed changes to its basic school of infantry, which has resulted in a massive expansion of the existing School of Infantry (Athey, 2021c). These changes emphasize a conventional threat and are a response to the shifts in refocusing the service to counter China (Athey, 2021a, 2021c). It is clear that the Marine Corps is attempting to redefine its infantry forces into more intelligent, capable individuals who are more effective at operating in small, autonomous teams without clear, structured directions by making foundational changes to a School of Infantry program that now looks radically different from the one I attended in 2010.

Unacceptable Uncertainty

Another major limitation of military power as a coercive instrument against a rising China has nothing to do with the specific structure or forces of the United States military in comparison with China. As has been discussed, the previous experience of a naval conflict was World War Two. There have been no meaningful naval conflicts that have taken place since 1945. Altercations involving naval forces in the post-World War Two era have been miniscule. Minor actions such as the striking of USS Stark with Exocet missiles, and even those involving sinking vessels such as the Falklands War, are so small that they do not register as experiences from which serious, predictive knowledge can be wrought. This leaves us with the problem of theory. All concepts and plans for how a naval conflict with China would unravel, or could be won, are necessarily based on theoretical information.

Military technology has obviously undergone tremendous advancement
since the close of World War Two. In the days of the last naval conflict, surface warfare combatants fought their peers with deck guns. Battleships and cruisers carried the most meaningful firepower in stand-up confrontations. The lightly armed but fast destroyers screened for the larger vessels and skirmished with volleys of shorter ranged, deck launched torpedoes that could channelize an opponent’s movements, or quickly sink the unwary capital ship. Submarines forced ships into groups and necessitated smaller escort vessels that could chase down and depth charge the underwater vessels of the day, whose limited depth and slow speeds rendered them vulnerable once spotted, or once a ship in the convoy had been torpedoed. Naval airpower was the curve ball of the conflict, but one whose implications were quickly grasped.

World War Two was preceded by a substantial amount of near-term, naval experience. The massive Japanese victory at Tsushima kicked off the century, whereafter numerous, large scale naval actions took place. The developing trends of naval technology followed a relatively clear trajectory, along which the great powers were able to understand what made naval forces lethal and how they could compete. The Washington Naval Treaty of the inter-war period made its restrictions on the development of naval power based mostly on tonnages, which followed the general understanding that larger vessels with larger guns were the dominant expression of naval combat power (DoS, n.d.). Next to the complexity of naval forces today, naval combat power of the first half of the 20th century was comparatively formulaic.

The massive, 16-inch guns of World War Two dwarf the sparsely equipped, five-inch upper threshold of modern surface warfare combatants. Yet the 16-inch guns could not conceivably come within range of a modern destroyer or even frigate, with their arsenals of anti-ship missiles whose ability to engage targets is measured in hundreds of nautical miles or more. Additionally, the ability to counter these weapons is almost completely theoretical. Great powers today rely on lab tests, range tests, and the rare SINKEX in which naval forces tow condemned ships out to be test targets in heavily scripted scenarios (USN, n.d.). Moreover, the ordinance is extremely expensive and time consuming to replace compared to the simple sledgehammers of yesterday’s deck guns.

Technical requirements for the employment of these weapons increase the ‘moving parts’ problem of the greater systems in and around them, which inherently increases the quantity of potential vulnerabilities. Countermeasures in the former days of naval action looked closer to a bloody game of dodgeball when contrasted with the innumerable countermeasures that are being explored for modern systems. These countermeasures run the gambit from Electronic Warfare to drones, from cyber to chaff. Missile defense systems range from anti-ballistic missiles, to CWIS guns, to directed energy systems. All of these systems and countermeasures operate on generally
unproven grounds and have never been assessed in real world conflict beyond a limited number of isolated instances.

These are just the basic offensive and defensive systems. Naval forces today are increasingly equipped and augmented with a wide variety of other, emerging technologies. Unmanned systems are both taking to the skies and moving beneath the waves. In the realm of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), the United States is struggling to understand and counter emerging threats, which are exploding onto the scene in the hands of near-peer competitors and non-state actors alike (Mills, et al., 2021). UAS is demonstrating such a diverse array of capabilities, such as the suppression of enemy air defense systems in swarms, that their implications for conflict, particularly in the maritime domain, are still poorly understood by the United States (Mills, et al., 2021). Beyond this, services are pursuing entire vessels that are unmanned (Vavasseur, 2021). This is in addition to the already extensive, unmanned underwater systems that are already being tested and fielded (Larter, 2021c). The simple fact is that, in the modern age of naval technology, no matter how much money is invested in design and testing, militaries simply have no idea how a naval conflict would unfold, owing to the prevalence of technologies that have never been through a serious trial of combat.

**Other Instruments of Power**

The limitations of military power in the case of the United States’ objectives of countering a rising Chinese security threat make it grossly unreliable for the standard framework of deterrence that has shown so much relevance and effectiveness most everywhere else. Elements of “soft power” must be preferred in engaging with China. The United States has numerous allies in the region with whom it has already established relationships and partnerships that may be built upon. Capitalizing on relationships and partnerships is key to the alternatives upon which unilateral, military power must hinge. In my own experience, military cooperation with Pacific-Asian military partners is commonplace across a span of allies. I have personally participated in combined training exercises in the Pacific with partners such as Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea. Whilst active duty in a maritime service for over a decade, I came to know partnerships with many other Pacific partners as routine.

However, I have found in my experience that many of these partnerships are “for the cameras” and lack the substantial integration that would be required at the ground level to successfully conduct combined operations in combat. The United States has much room to expand on its existing military partnerships beyond simply increasing their frequency. The depth of interaction and exchange is an important element of the partnerships that cannot be replaced. Moreover, it can be advertised to increase a sense of both deterrence through a balance of power and by creating a sense of self-exclusion. China’s vacancy in these military partnerships with the United States and its Pacific
allies is audible. This should be looked at as a diplomatic tool that could offer the Chinese a chance at both inclusion and recognition, and thereby a further incentive to distance itself from expansionist ambition. In other words, military matters are not exclusively a realist’s tool for traditional deterrence. How they are undertaken can give them the capacity to carry normative weight.

In the case of alliances writ large, an unusual, but striking example can be seen in the experience of Great Britain during the Napoleonic Wars. Alliances were the vehicle by which Great Britain was finally able to defeat France (Flynn, 2021). It was the very same problem of the expansionist impulses of France that brought the two great powers into conflict (Flynn, 2021). Conflict occurred because of the upset to a comparatively fragile balance of powers on the European continent (Flynn, 2021). China does not benefit from the same level of eager cooperation from allies in the region as does the United States (Flynn, 2021). As Chinese aggression increases, especially as it manifests itself to the economic exclusion of its neighbors, it becomes increasingly alienated (Flynn, 2021).

The United States must enhance these partnerships because there is the real risk that the possibility of “internal woes” could lead China to rapidly become more expansionist as a means of state-preservation (Flynn, 2021). Great Britain’s failure to emphasize these relationships and foster a sense of inclusion provided such a rallying cry for Napoleonic France (Flynn, 2021). It is around this problem that the prospects of peace and war may well hinge. There is a strong temptation for great powers to reach straight over a more moderate solution and grasp hegemony in the fashion of Mearsheimer’s (2001) theories. However, this neglects the very remedy that could prevent war; the same remedy that would surely be reached for at the outset of hostilities to combat the problem that it could have contained. A balance of power, rather than outright hegemony, is the better preserver of peace with China (Flynn, 2021).

With regards to direct diplomacy, the United States must be willing to meet and negotiate with China wherever opportunities exist. Even the Trump administration, which was overtly hostile to China in its rhetoric, expressed a willingness to be ready to “cooperate across areas of mutual interest” with China (Trump, 2017, p. 25). This is vital to the success of the United States in dealing with China, and it must be prepared to make concessions to China in addition to negotiation along these areas of mutual interest. It is clear that Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea carry an enormous amount of historical precedence (Gao & Jia, 2013). This increases the need for the United States to cooperate with China, who may feel slighted by the more modern demarcations of international waters, over mineral and fishing access (Gao & Jia, 2013). This will no doubt bring the United States into the role of a supporting arbiter between China and its neighbors. However, there is real reason to believe that China will be willing to cooperate rather than face the propo-
sition of further alienating its neighbors and increasing the extent to which they entangle themselves in U.S. alliances. The United States has in recent years become increasingly adversarial with China (Nacht, 2018, p. 117). It must be a priority of the United States to engage with China on diplomatic grounds and reassure the country that it is harmonizing, rather than being bullied, into peaceful relationships on the international stage (Nacht, 2018).

Conclusion

Military deterrence is a proven, viable concept, and has played a large role in successfully enhancing the security of the United States over its history. However, as even Mearsheimer (2001) notes, no theory has universal application or explanatory power (p. 10). The modern case of a rising, Chinese naval power is important in one respect because it is anomalous to general theories of military deterrence. That is, military deterrence is not currently effective in this case to the extent that it would normally be elsewhere. The United States must deemphasize it here and lean more heavily on other instruments. Nowhere in this study is it being suggested that the United States is currently engaging in a one-dimensional approach to the security problems posed by China. In fact, it is nowhere suggested here that the United States has ever had a strictly one-dimensional approach to security problems. Various methods and policies outside of military solutions have all had their hand in American conflicts and conflict prevention, just as they do today. Rather, the United States should more heavily favor these alternative instruments than it currently does.

There is evidence that, in some ways, the United States is on a good trajectory towards synthesizing these alternative instruments. The United States seeks cooperation with allies. Military partnerships are being engaged to a degree. International institutions have been sought to resolve disputes. Diplomacy has not yet failed. These elements are reassuring to an extent and should be pursued with increasing vigor. The United States has rough patches with its allies and military partners to smooth over. A new administration must prioritize these relationships and seek the validation of international institutions to create a sense of Chinese self-exclusion that will encourage cooperation with the world rather than sacrificing the gains of friendship for those of some limited ambitions.

Moreover, many of the drastic changes to the United States military are indicative of a more thoughtful approach about leveraging military power, rather than the blunt-instrument solution of hammering the anvil with more money for ever-expanding forces. The United States must do more than maintain a strong military force, it must reshape the force to be calibrated against those threats which it has clearly identified. It must do so by reform that is puritanically practical, with a mind only to its lethality. It must not inflate its already enormous defense spending. Additionally, it must not orient this
force in such an aggressive posture, nor coupled with such antagonistic messag-
ing, that it overcomplicates the simpler arithmetic that a naked, powerful force presents. In this way, it can avoid “the sword drawn to prevent the drawing of swords,” when “one sword keeps anoth-
er in its sheath” (Heinl, 1966: Purchas, 1612; Herbert, 1651, pp. 246-247).

War with China is certainly not inevitable, and it is in everyone’s mutual interest that it be prevented. The United States must exercise a preference for the other means at its disposal to encourage China to shy away from its alienating ambitions, and move towards the har-
mony that its own culture emphasizes. The British demonstrated a success-
ful and resourceful use of alliances to counter an expansionist France. How-
ever, their policies emphasizing unilat-
eral strength of arms failed to prevent the wars from taking place — peace was not had before sustained blood-
shed. The United States recognized the rising threat of Imperial Japan decades before the attack on Pearl Harbor, and again peace was achieved through vio-
ence, this time on a more terrible scale. The story of American involvement in World War Two is often cherished as a great victory in a justifiable war. These narratives are only wrong if they pro-
vide a perverse inspiration to fight another justifiable one. Indeed, as with all forms of human conflict, pride and egos rear their selfish heads. We must hum-
ble them and choose a deliberate com-
munication that prefers some notion of community, balanced with an aware-
ness of the dark and unpredictable con-
sequences for our failures in this great, globalizing challenge of reconciling foreign worlds.

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Project Putin-2024 in the Geostrategy of Confrontation and Internal Challenges

Dr. Eugene Alexander Vertlieb

“The new world order will be built against Russia, on the ruins of Russia, and at the expense of Russia.” (Zbigniew Brzezinski)

Introduction

Franklin Delano Roosevelt left us with the notion that we cannot do without Russia. But in the post-war world, a tough approach to Russia has prevailed, one based on Sir Winston Churchill’s Fulton concept: there can be only a total and uncompromising struggle of the “countries of freedom” against “tyranny.” And you need to have an overwhelming superiority in military power that ensures a “mutual understanding with Russia.”

“More aggression” against Russia and China these days harkens back to naval commander Admiral John Richardson. Balancing on the edge of a razor blade is like balancing on the edge of a collapse into war. But sometimes actions speak louder than words. In the harsh confrontation with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the militant rhetoric of the Americans did not match their scrupulous observance of the “red line” clearly drawn by Pyongyang.

Since a balance of power is the general principle for equilibrium in modern international relations, then conducting wars is justified by concerns over establishing that “balance” or “equilibrium.” With the collapse of the USSR, the balance of mutually- deterrent forces ended and the temptation arose to strike with impunity the weakened, ontological enemy. “The old doctrine of the balance of power is no longer applicable. We cannot afford,” Churchill declared in 1946, “to act from a position of small advantage which tempts us to engage in a test of strength.” And China no longer adheres to its former nuclear doctrine of “minimum deterrence.” Testing the forces and means of the enemy, right up to the point of reconnaissance in force, is becoming a

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1 Former British prime minister Winston Churchill delivered what is known as the “Fulton Speech” or “Iron Curtain Speech” in Fulton, Missouri, on March 5, 1946. In the speech, he stressed the necessity for the United States and Britain to act as the guardians of peace and stability against the menace of Soviet communism.

daily norm in the relationship between the opposing sides. “I’m not going to ask my commanders to take the first blow on the jaw,” recently said Commander of US Naval Forces in Europe and Africa Admiral Robert Burke. And what about the precedent of granting impunity for the Pristina march of Russian paratroopers? So then it is hardly likely that NATO ships in the territorial waters of the Russian Federation will open fire to destroy Russian ships. For nuclear blackmail, the Russian Federation has the “Shkval” torpedo, capable, as is reported in the media, of changing the military balance — “and conquering the whole world.”

The West won the Cold War, but it is losing the Cold Peace. The victors were led astray by their own arrogance and the false belief that the rival center of power had been done away with forever. Frederick the Great warned on this score: “It is easier to kill the Russians off than it is to achieve victory over them.”

It was a huge strategic mistake to let pass the favorable moment for the complete “binding” of Russia to the West at a time when it was ready for it. In the operational language of the military, “H-Hour” was lost.

Russia, hovering on the brink of non-existence, was able not only to endure, but also to successfully compete with the West in hypersonic and space-based weapons — and future conflicts will be resolved in space. The growing strength and resurging aspirations of the Russian Federation became evident in the fighting rhetoric of V. Putin: “Even if we had sunk this ship, the world would not have wound up on the verge of a world war,” the president said about the incident with the British destroyer “Defender.” And China’s usually evasive political narrative suddenly became undiplomatically harsh: “The Chinese people will absolutely not allow any foreign force to bully, oppress or enslave us and anyone who attempts to do so will face broken heads and bloodshed in front of the iron Great Wall of the 1.4 billion Chinese people,” said Xi in a speech during a 1 July 2021 celebration of the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party’s founding.

3 “Russia’s surprise deployment of 200 troops to the Pristina airport on June 12 was part of a scheme to send into Kosovo a contingent of 1,000 or more men who could have tried to stake out a Russian zone in the northwest sector of the province, Western intelligence analysts have concluded.” See (1999, June 25) Secret Russian Troop Deployment Thwarted. Washington Post. Page A1. URL https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/balkans/stories/russians062599.htm.

4 The Battle of Zorndorf was fought during the Seven Years’ War between Russian troops and the Prussian army commanded by King Frederick the Great. The battle was tactically inconclusive, with both armies holding their ground and claiming victory.

5 In June 2021, ‘HMS Defender’, sailing from Odessa to Georgia, passed south of the Crimea peninsula, which Russia annexed from Ukraine in 2014. While Moscow claims the peninsula and its waters are Russian territory, the UK says HMS Defender was passing through Ukrainian waters in a commonly used and internationally recognized transit route. See (2021, June 23) HMS Defender: Russian jets and ships shadow British warship. BBC News Services. URL https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-57583363.

6 (2021, July 1) Xi Jinping Says Foreign Forces Will “Face Broken heads and Bloodshed” if They Bully
The Chinese are almost doubling their nuclear potential. By investing in strengthening its nuclear power, China is pursuing several goals at once: improving nuclear capabilities, conventional forces, and missile defense. Their DF-41 missiles are capable of striking targets at a distance of more than 14,000 kilometers. With an abundance of dummy missile silos, it is difficult to know where the real complexes are — the ones with hypersonic gliding winged elements or interceptor missiles for anti-missile or anti-satellite defense that are hidden away, protected from the first strike. Together with the Russian weapons “Zircon,” “Poseidon,” “Sarmat,” “Dagger,” and “Peresvet,” the arsenal is impressive.\(^7\) In terms used by Eurasianist P. N. Savitsky in 1959,\(^8\) this “breaks the very horn of Western pride at its very root.” The end of the bipolar world order is comparable in effect to a natural cataclysm — as if there was a fracture in the earth’s crust, then the North American and Eurasian tectonic plates diverged, and giant rifts appeared. And now the unipolar American domination no longer suits the Russian Federation or the PRC, but the United States is hindering the formation of a multipolar world, viewing it as a threat to its national security. China, the third in terms of nuclear power, is adopting the concept of a retaliatory strike, similar to the Russian one.

Anti-Russian sanctions and restrictions have proved to be ineffective. And more than that: While the US economy just about stalled — up to 15% of the world’s economy (approximately as was the USSR’s position under Gorbachev), and American monetary assets became not all that stable (experiencing liquidity risks and excess cash), Russia has managed to build up its gold reserves and together with the PRC, withdraw their national currencies from the dollar “risk zone.” And the press is incessantly talking about not only the processes that are disintegrating in Russia, but also about whether the Uni-
ed States of America will dissolve into 51 independent governments — if the District of Columbia is given the status of statehood.

Russia is still considered to be an “Upper Volta with missiles.” President Joe Biden just updated the description: he characterized the country that ranks eighth in the size of its economy as merely one that “has nuclear weapons and oil wells, and nothing else. Nothing else.” “Objectively speaking, Russia is a country that is growing weak in economic and demographic terms,” said the head of British intelligence MI6, Richard Moore. And with such an awful demographic curve like that of the Russian Federation, the country should be thinking about just surviving. And the ruling oligarchy in no way serves as a stimulus for the people to work and achieve. As the Reichsleiter of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels rightly said, “Guns and bayonets are nothing if you do not possess the hearts of a nation.”

The toolkit of Western influence on Russia is unchanging: the alternating of “the carrot and the stick” — engaging with Russia or levying sanctions on it. However, the former libertarian image of the Russian Federation, which flared up in the “dashing 90s” and quickly faded, has never reappeared. And it is unlikely that this specter of false hopes — frightening-to-Russians — will ever reappear again. After all, the “point of no return” for that dogma has passed. Yet the West is not receptive to the new world order that is emerging; it continues to squeeze Russia which cannot be squeezed anymore and acts as the lone arbitrator in serious international disputes regardless of the consensus of other opinions. Judging by the response made by the press secretary of the Russian Federation President, Dmitry Peskov, to the aforementioned statement by Joe Biden, “there is a false knowledge and understanding of modern Russia.” This is a miscalculation of Western systems analytics. Indeed, the inaccurate understanding of the true political and psychological state of the USSR, and the underestimation of the resilience of the Russian will to survive cost Imperial Minister of Foreign Affairs Joachim von Ribbentrop a trip to the gallows. Russia is far from being a “colossus with feet of clay” or “just a gas station country.” When it comes to spiritual strength, it seems to me, it is the Western dominion that is a kind of symbiosis of sub-colony and sub-empire. Russia should not be underestimated.

As Alexander Solzhenitsyn pointed out in his article “Misconceptions About Russia Are a Threat to America,” the manipulation of facts about Russia has left “the entire West in a critical and even deadly position.” It is absurd to accuse Russia of every mortal sin, including the origin of totalitarianism. After all, it was not “Emperor Nicholas I” who came up with the idea of totalitarianism, as Richard Pipes contends. The idea of a

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totalitarian state was first proposed by Hobbes in Leviathan\textsuperscript{10} — the head of state is the master not only over property and life, but also over the conscience of its citizens. Yes, and Rousseau as well laid the groundwork for this, declaring that a democratic state is “a sovereign with no limits not only over property, but also over the identity of its citizens.” As the Russian proverb says, “Don’t blame the mirror if the face is crooked.”

It is a losing proposition for Russia when it winds up being a “pawn” in other’s games, and when it makes its decisions and seeks the approval of both the collective West (the “New Entente”) and China. For Russia, the task to restore its original worldview and geopolitical “code” is first-priority, the “code” being the set of key views held by the Russian people about their place in history and in the world, their foreign policy strategy, and their national priorities. They should do as the Chinese in politics: without fail, in all agreements, the Chinese require “duiden” — parity in relations, measures, and steps. In accordance with the spiritual concept of “yin and yang” (“chaos and order”), they require a ranking of the entities involved — and an end to any chaotic activity.

Russia is aiming to get out of isolation and renew competition among the three world systems. It is preparing for an asymmetric, non-contact war to achieve political goals without any open military hostilities. It is developing the skills needed for net-based cyber warfare, especially against communications and logistics systems as well as developing the ability to counter attacks by the “fifth column” — including sabotage and subversion — and attacks on its financial infrastructure and information operating systems. It tries to keep its gunpowder dry — to be on the alert and ready for anything. After all, the rhetoric of war is growing more and more deafening. On 24 January 2021, the Kremlin said quite emphatically that Moscow was not ready to be dictated to or to put up with rudeness. “You need to play honestly with the Russians or not at all” — words passed down to us by the “Iron Chancellor” Otto von Bismarck.\textsuperscript{11}

The strategies and tactics for influencing enemies and opponents often look unreliable. Thus, simultaneously pressuring Russia and China is hardly advisable since it is not very effective, but instead contributes to the consolidation of these “outcasts.” And with regard to Minsk, the radical tactics of promoting democracy by any means, up to a coup d’état, have turned out to be a losing proposition. As a result of this false start — either an inaccurate gauging of the current situation or an underestimation of the subjective aspects of the case — the plan to change

\textsuperscript{10} Hobbs, T. (1651) The Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil. Commonly called Leviathan, the work concerns the structure of society and legitimate government, and is regarded as one of the earliest and most influential examples of social contract theory.

\textsuperscript{11} Otto von Bismarck served as prime minister of Prussia (1862-73, 1873-90) and founder and first chancellor of the German Empire (1871-90).
the regime collapsed, which has only accelerated the integration of Belarus into Russia's camp. And judging by Vladimir Putin's article “On the historical unity of Russians and Ukrainians,” the Kremlin has its own views on Ukraine as well. The increasingly frequent blunders in its strategic planning and in the implementation of its schemes confirm that its mega-project for unifying non-Western civilizations to universalize common values — an “axiological sterilization” — has noticeably been faltering. In systems analytics, such flaws can be fatal.

But these that have been cited as well as other Western miscalculations — in Syria, Iran, and Afghanistan — are matched by the Russian inability (or unwillingness?) to take advantage of the enemy’s mistakes. Total corruption in the way it makes decisions is evident by the involvement of its “denationalized elite” and deconsolidated society. “Russia can have as many nuclear suitcases and nuclear buttons as it wants,” Zbigniew Brzezinski said sarcastically, “but since $500 billion belonging to the Russian elite is in our banks, you still have to decide: is it your elite or is it ours? I do not see a single situation in which Russia would use its nuclear potential.” The method of subjugating the state by taming its elite has been known since ancient times. Thus the ancient Greeks, who were panicked by the Scythians, tried to, if not conquer them, then at least safeguard their city states from Scythian attacks by introducing their leaders to Greek culture. However, according to Herodotus, if the Scythian kings even began to embrace Greek customs, their subjects would kill them mercilessly.

President Putin would like to see the Russian people united and monolithic. But the yawning gap between the ruling oligarchy and the poor — the rest of the Russian people — is only splitting all the wider. Clearing the electoral field of candidates unsuitable to the ruling circles confirms the fact that V. Putin or a creature of his making who “suits everyone” — S. K. Shoigu — is being readied for the next presidential term. In the event of a force majeure, this person could make use of a military dictatorship to intimidate the “the criminally insane” — and “the low-lifes.”

So then given that the rate of stabilizing the stagnation cannot be changed, both the internal opposition and the West need to be dealt with. Considering the former, with the growth of the protest movement, we can expect repressive measures to intensify to “establish public order”: with the escalation of “unsanctioned activities,” “constitutional order must be restored.” Some of those fighting for a better fu-


13 On 19 June 2021, Putin announced that his foreign minister and his defense minister — Lavrov and Shoigu, respectively — would head the candidates’ list for the dominant United Russia party in September’s parliamentary election. See (2021, June 19) Putin names Lavrov, Shoigu to United Russia elections list. APNews. URL https://apnews.com/article/europe-russia-elections-business-govern ment-and-politics-4c84dc1a80eb3b1feac31b0506e0adde.
ture for Russia would prefer cooperating with the “Putinoids” even while the majority of Russians, cut out from having any dignified sort of life, would be doomed to struggle for existence, to be “marginalized,” and to openly oppose the post-Belovezha T.O.R. — Temporary Occupation Regime. In this version of Russia’s fate, the power that “United Russia” has would most likely be snatched away by the patriots-statesmen of a “united Russian people, that is, the Russian-Ukrainian-Belarusian people.” And the fact cannot be discounted that a small civil war may be needed to open up the post-Belovezha abscess on the body of the Fatherland.

In the cynical language of politics: those supporting a “red-brown” ideology should not do away with the comprador-oligarchic power (as was done when the Poles were expelled from Moscow in 1612). It would be more pragmatic for the West to stop defaming Putin (after all, he is, deep down, very loyal to Berlin though resented by Washington) and view him as an equal in earnest, and try to truly partner with his entourage if only for beneficial tactical reasons — to let the fly get stuck in amber resin. After all, Russia is unlikely to return to the libertarian model, and if genuine government by the people is unacceptable to the Putinists, they will indeed resist it with all their might. In this sense, they are strategic partners with the West. Therefore, would it not be more expedient for Washington and Brussels — since Berlin and Paris have already done so — to change the paradigm of their relations with Russia — at least to not interfere with Putin’s “improvisations” to improve the Russian Federation under the slogan “this is no repeat of 1937 for you!” And with such concurrence in positions, there would be no


15 Temporary Occupation Regime is how the Russian people have long referred to the current official power in the Russian Federation. (E.V.)

16 The patriots-statesmen are a mixture of Orthodox socials and national powers. Among them there are those who would like to see a “USSR-2,” and achieve the unification of the Russian people, i.e., the Russian-Ukrainians-Belarussians.” (E.V.)

17 Melchor, Thorne. (2019, March 28) What is Red-Brownism. [Transcript of Video Segment] URL https://existentialenso.medium.com/what-is-red-brownism-3a67b40fe46 which reads, in part, “One term you may sometimes hear in socialist circles is “red-brownism.” In this color scheme, the red refers to socialism, and the brown refers to fascism — the implication being that the ideology bridges fascist and socialist politics. The most overt example of this is a NazBol or National Bolshevik, a movement that originally started essentially as Nazism for people who idolized Stalin instead.”

18 “On July 31, 1937, one of the most terrible documents in history was signed: the secret operational order of the NKVD No. 00447, which marked the beginning of the events known as ‘Yezhovism,’ although in all fairness one should speak of Stalinism.” N. I. Yezhov was head of the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) — the secret police — under Stalin. See Krechetnikov, Artem. (2017, July 31) Stalin’s Strike: 80 years ago the Great terror started in the USSR. BBC Rus-
need for “subversive activities” as such. After all, there would be a regime that is the most favorable to the West and one with minimum dividends for Russia. The stratagem here is to not interfere when the tree is falling in the right direction. And no matter how paradoxical it sounds, a “left turn” by moderate specialists and statesmen-patriots makes sense: they can truly consolidate the people and raise the economy (like the Primakov-Maslyukov government),\textsuperscript{19} and become an attractive Eurasian-civilizational core-of-the-Earth power.

**The West must adopt a new paradigm**

**Conclusions:** Don’t interfere with Putin (even as concerns the Russian-German gas pipeline); abandon the Chubais-Navalny “liberal dictatorship” since the project has outlived itself, and invest in a real chance for changing power to a technocratic-patriotic one. After all, it was the most reliable approach for the West to deal with Stalinist predictability and positional clarity. The proposed strategy of establishing business cooperation was first used by Kaiser Germany itself; it helped — at the same time — both the Russian Whites (it did not interfere with them) and the Reds (it strengthened them). The Russian man of St. John does not live by “bread alone” — by rationalism — but, rather, by the spirit.

And the principles of *Realpolitik* speak to the same approach: divide and conquer; don’t put all your eggs in one basket. The Americans have more than once brilliantly demonstrated their strategic, multi-faceted vision for the future of global security: In order to minimize the dire consequences of an impending crisis — the Crash of 1929 — the United States secretly decided to take preventive measures to effect the world order. “To do this, it had to provide assistance to Russia so that, once and for all, it could escape devastation — the consequences of its civil war — and it had to help Germany escape from the jaws of the Treaty of Versailles,” cited General Yuri Drozdov, the illegal resident spy\textsuperscript{20}.

Even though the Western establishment has to change its attitude towards Russia, the US Congress is still, by its directives, prohibiting Biden (like Trump before him) from improving relations with Russia, including trying to block (unsuccessfully, as it turns out) the presidential right to waive sanctions on the Russian Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline. First and foremost, this is a business project. And how much it will become a “geopolitical weapon” depends largely on the West itself — on how flexible the control of the gas valve will be. The new round of the Cold War, started by Obama, slowed down under Trump in the wake of Macron’s message

\textsuperscript{19} A reference to economic planning in the 1990s involving Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov and First Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Maslyukov, who also headed the state planning agency.

\textsuperscript{20} An intelligence officer operating in a foreign country without official cover.
“Pushing Russia away from Europe is a profound strategic mistake.” But sound pragmatism did not prevail.

The positions of the conflicting parties are clear. The United States, by maintaining its global dominant role, prevents the rival center of power from growing any stronger. In Russia, the revival of its national identity calls for a return of its society to its Orthodox roots. The obliteration of these roots causes Christian ideals to fade — ideals that consolidate moral and civilizational values. Society becomes chaotic, fragmented, and spiritually deadened. Consequently, social strata break up into conflicting ethno-confessional communities subject to massive de-Christianization and dehumanization — godlessness and destruction. Russia is archaically nationalistic while the West operates on a supranational level, and therefore ceases to act in accordance with the ways of traditional societies and the “outdated norms” of international law. Naturally then some incident flares up which affects the relationship between the West and Russia.

The practice by the US Congress of making taboo the very possibility of rapprochement with the Russian Federation is significant. Just as the Russian Empire in its time was killed off by the injection of alien internationalist ideas that destroyed its beliefs, so the spiritual monolith of the United States became unstable when the American establishment, starting in the 1960s, became addicted to the ideology of the Frankfurt School of Neomarxism. The ruling elite, which had betrayed the then dominant conservative tradition, went crazy. The ideological indoctrination that followed — borrowing Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci’s philosophy of praxis without first critically evaluating it — has backfired today: That theoretical gobbledegook has wreaked havoc by justifying the split of society into patchwork strata and rallying them around the leftist elites under the slogans of fighting “oppression” and granting unlimited freedom. The Democratic establishment is returning to historical justice for one stratum at the expense of infringing on the rights of another. Traditional American society is being deformed beyond recognition by the inoculation of leftist Trotskyism with an admixture of “Hóng Wèibīng-ism” — behavior like the Red Guards during the Chinese cultural revolution — and by class hatred as in “whoever is not with us is against us.”

21 A confessional community is a group of people with similar religious beliefs.
22 The Frankfurt School was a school of social theory and critical philosophy associated with the Institute for Social Research, Goethe University, Frankfurt, 1929. It refers to a group of German-American theorists who developed powerful analyses of the changes in Western capitalist societies that occurred since the classical theory of Marx.
23 Antonio Francesco Gramsci (1891-1937) was an Italian Marxist philosopher, journalist, linguist, writer and politician. He was a founding member and one-time leader of the Communist Party of Italy. He held a humanistic understanding of Marxism, seeing it as a “philosophy of praxis.”
24 “Hóng Wèibīng-ism” or “Red Guard-ism” refers to the fanatical mass student-led paramilitary social movement mobilized and guided by Chairman Mao Zedong in 1966-7 during the first phase of
The United States and Russia have undermined each other, and both superpowers have been undermined by foreign ideologies and are “at the broken trough”²⁵ to the delight of hegemonic, communist China!

If diplomacy is the art of the possible, then the US Congress makes it the art of the impossible with Russia. And where diplomacy stops, war begins. Permanent cold confrontation among the parties in conflict is punctuated — approximately once a century — by an outbreak of a hot war, and then by a detente-type of pause — a respite and “re-boot” to reconcile targets and munitions or to acquire them. Congress has indeed become fixated on a state of war “by other means.”

Every century there is a large-scale war between the West and Russia. In 1612, Minin and Pozharsky expelled the Poles from Moscow. In 1709, Peter the First defeated the Swedish king Charles XII at Poltava. In 1812, Kutuzov stopped the invasion of Napoleon’s armies. In 1914, the First World War began. In 2014, Operation Krymnash²⁶ was transformed into a new type of war — a hybrid one.

And in the geopolitical aspect, Eurasian Russia — the Heartland — is an axis of history and a coveted trophy in confrontations. Eurasia, with its Russian core and with China at the “side of the road,” has been and remains the most important geostrategic target of adversaries. The fundamental thesis of the British geopolitician Sir Halford Mackinder, underlying military and diplomatic efforts, is whoever controls the Heartland controls the whole world.²⁷ There will always be clashes over this core part of the Earth which includes the southern underbelly of Russia (rich in ores and water resources). “British Eurasianism” gained notice in the 18th century through William Jones.²⁸ According to Mackinder, the Great Game is the confrontation between the Chinese Cultural Revolution. The Guard despised traditional culture and customs and sought to identify and eliminate “revisionists,” “monarchists,” “traitors,” and others who were committing “grave crimes against Marxism.”

²⁵ A reference to a line from “The Tale of the Fisherman and the Fish” (1833), a poem by Aleksandr Pushkin. The expression means “to be left with nothing — all hopes have vanished.”
²⁶ “Krymnash” is a neologism that came into being in 2014 to refer to operations leading to the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation. “Krymnash” is a transliterated word combination which translates to “Crimea-our.” Operation Krymnash is, therefore, “Operation Our Crimea.”
²⁷ Geopolitical theorist Halford J. Mackinder “developed his heartland theory in response to the 19th century competition between Great Britain and Russia. This contest was characterised in large part by the Great Game played out in Central and South Asia...Mackinder’s theory is based on the premise that Eurasia is the global pivot point and whoever controls the Eurasian continent—which he refers to as the world island— can exercise global dominance.” See Gilchrist, Mark. (2019, August 12) The Great Game Reinvigorated: Geopolitics, Afghanistan, and the importance of Pakistan. The Strategy Bridge. URL https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2019/8/12/the-great-game-reinvigorated-geopolitics-afghanistan-and-the-importance-of-pakistan.
²⁸ Sir William Jones was an English Orientalist, jurist, and philologist. While a judge on the high
Project Putin-2024 in the Geostrategy of Confrontation and Internal Challenges


And the “Gothic civilization” of the Pan-Germanists lays claim to the Black Sea region, and asserts its right for a geopolitical penetration into Asia. But the great von Bismarck warned: “Even the most favorable outcome of the war will never lead to the disintegration of Russia, which is supported by millions of Russian believers of the Greek confession (Orthodoxy). The latter, even if split apart by international treaties, will reunite just as quickly as separated droplets of mercury.” Churchill tells us: “Russia cannot be defeated by force; it can be destroyed from within.”

The approach used to try to understand the Russian Sphinx is to not see it rationally (as it is), but to view it as an adversary (the way they would like to see it). Therefore, absurd conclusions are drawn such as: “What is good for a Russian, is death for a German.” But these peoples are interconnected, like the German notion of Vaterland and the Slavic deity “Earth Mother.” Germanic ethnographers have considered the Slavs to be Aryans; this can be clearly seen on a 19th century map from the Bibliographic Museum in Leipzig. The artifacts of antiquity from the Rhine to the Upper Volga speak to the Slavic-German common “culture of battle axes (or Corded Ware).” The Teutons have Proto-Slavic genes from the Pomorian, Ruyan, Bodrich, Lyutichi and Lugichan tribes. And according to the “Wielkopolska Chronicle,” Germans and Slavs are blood brothers (germo<Latin *germanus* - bud, seed; having the same parents): where Jan is from the Slavic branch and Kus is from the German branch, and both are sons of Father Yafet.
And yet “East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet,” writes the British poet R. Kipling. However, he admits the possibility of an honest dialogue between them, writing: “When two strong men stand face to face though they come from the ends of the earth!”32

In reality, face-to-face meetings between the leaders of both countries — Russia and the US — have yielded contradictory impressions: Biden did not see the soul in Putin that Bush Jr. saw.33 The Chekist,34 with the credo of “aligning with the judoka,” remains an undeciphered code.

Since “Russia cannot be understood with the mind — intellectually — but know it we must, let us look at what makes it “distinct” from a strategic point of view. Russians, are obviously ethnically, anthropologically and culturally Europeans, yet act and think somehow in a different way. To start with, they are strange in the way that they behave, that is, “with a Byzantine dissenting voice” compared to structured Western rationalists: they invite the Varangians to rule them. Is this not a betrayal of the national elite? Or is it not like the bungling of the “Foolovites”?35 However, it is all quite logical: there was a reason to invite “Varangian guests.” After all, the Swedes taught the “Rusiches” a lot. And from the standpoint of how Russians think, the act is in keeping with “Russianness” — to stay away from the authorities and be indifferent to whatever holds no interest for them. Kind of like “my house is on the edge — I don’t know anything,” which emphasizes a person’s indifference to a particular situation. But this phrase has a double meaning. The accompanying connotation of the proverb is: “My hut is on the edge, i.e., I meet the enemy

32 These are the first and last lines, respectively, of Rudyard Kipling’s poem, “The Ballad of East and West,” published in 1889.

33 Following a June 2001 meeting between President Bush and Vladimir Putin, President Bush reported, “I looked the man in the eye. I found him to be very straightforward and trustworthy. We had a very good dialogue. I was able to get a sense of his soul, a man deeply committed to his country and the best interests of his country.” See (2014, March 2) Why Putin Plays Our Presidents for Fools. The Atlantic. URL https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/03/why-putin-plays-our-presidents-for-fools/461055/.

34 The All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, or “V.Ch.K.” — commonly referred to as “CheKa” — was established in 1917 and was the first of a succession of Soviet secret-police organizations leading up to the Committee for State Security (KGB) in which Putin served. Hence the derogatory reference to him as a member of the secret police. He served for 16 years as a KGB foreign intelligence officer until he resigned in 1991 to pursue politics.

35 This is a reference to the 19th Century satirical novel by Russian author M. Ye. Saltykov-Shchedrin, “History of One Town” (История одного города). The work is a farcical history of “Stupid Town” (Russian: Глупов) that follows the lives of “bungling” Russian “StupidTown-ites” (Russian: Глуповцы) for hundreds of years as they endure the violence and lunacy of their tyrannical rulers.
first.” Regarding the difficulties in understanding Russian allegory in the way Russians talk and act, Churchill, fatally, states, “I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma...”

Russia is a symbiosis of Europe and Asia in mental, cultural and geopolitical terms. She is simultaneously the heiress of Byzantium; the keeper of the spiritual light of Christianity; and of the Golden Horde, the baptizer in battle for victory in wars. Two main ethnic components merged in Russia: the Slavic-Celtic and the Scythian-Sarmatian (Iranian). This synthesis formed a special civilization possessing ethnocultural characteristics that distinguish it from both the European as well as the Asian-Buddhist and Asian-Islamic types. Before the arrival of the Eastern Slavs, Iranian tribes of Cimmerians and Scythians lived in the Ros-Kiev-Dnepr triangle. They passed on their Scythian-Sarmatian ethnocultural code and name to the Rusichi. It is likely that the spirit of their warlike ancestors has been resurrected today in the very naming of the formidable intercontinental ballistic missile RS-28 “Sarmat” — the replacement for the “Voevoda,” a modification of the “Satan” which is capable of defeating any missile defense system, reaching its targets over the North or South Pole. Russian Scythians “...have nothing to lose, // And we are not above treachery!” as the poet Alexandr Blok set down for us on paper. A glimmer of Russian tragic maximalism is on the lips of V. Putin as well when he stated, “Why would we want a world without Russia?” All or nothing. In the ancient Byzantine source, “Strategikon of Mauritius,” it is recorded that the Slavs do not accept slavery — not to any extent “... being freedom-loving, they are in no way inclined either to become slaves or to obey, especially on their own land.” Therefore, with these people, either do business with them on an equal footing, or not at all.

If Russia had taken the Novgorod-Nordic route — a Skandoslaviya, a union of Slavs and Scandinavians — as opposed to Kievan Rus, it would have become more European-oriented. In the Viking-Norman theory of the origin of the Russian people, the “multinationality” of Rurik is strengthened: there is he and the Scandinavian-Dane (King Rör-
ik- Hrorek from Jutland Hedeby-Denmark), the Slavic “falcon” with the generic name Rarog,\textsuperscript{40} and the grandson of the Novgorod Prince Gostomysl (the son of his daughter Umila and a neighboring prince). Russia parted with Europe in the 11th century as a result of the schism of the Ecumenical Church and the separation of Catholics from it. At the same time, Orthodoxy became the basis and core of the Russian mentality; it defined the scale of its values and aspirations. The Russian choice of a Russian-Varangian union became the fundamental basis for the consolidation of the tribes and the formation of the “Russian Land” — the prototype of the Russian Empire, with a Russian God and the Imperial black-yellow-white flag.

Russia has proved itself to be practically unstoppable in wars. That is why its persistent disobedience is tamed from the outside by the “loop of anaconda,”\textsuperscript{41} and from the inside, by the “Fifth-Column” churning up the turmoil of social disturbance. The Fifth-Column collaborators-Smerdyakovites\textsuperscript{42} dream of the occupation of Russia by “enlightened countries” and of the return of the Russian Fed-

\textsuperscript{40} In Slavic mythology, the Raróg is a fire demon often depicted as a fiery falcon. Fire is the symbol of purity of conscience and mind.

\textsuperscript{41} “Today, the West is actively using the arsenal of hybrid war against Russia. Not deciding on a direct military confrontation, the United States and its allies are trying to strangle Russia by other methods, to tighten the Anaconda Loop on its neck. That is how the American Rear Admiral Alfred Mahan called his concept back in 1890.” See (2018, April 24) Will Russia break the ‘Anaconda loop’? Reporter. URL https://en.topcor.ru/1057-razorvet-li-rossiyu-petlyu-anakondy.html.

\textsuperscript{42} “Smerdyakovshchina” (in Russian: «Смердяковщина») is a word describing the contempt and hatred of primarily Russian citizens for Russia; a kind of Russophobia. Those embracing “Smerdyakovshchina” are “Smerdyakovites.” The expression “Smerdyakovshchina” appeared in the 1890s and was associated with Smerdyakov, the hero of F. M. Dostoevsky’s novel The Brothers Karamazov, who said, “’I hate the whole of Russia.”
monious, cheeky hero of Gogol’s Dead Souls. Hence the trace of Russian-ness in someone else’s communist dogma — force a person to be happy. And at the same time, Russians themselves know that “you can’t force people to like you.” Everything is extreme: go right up to the limit — the chasm — and then even lean over to take a look.

The unpatriotic nature of the Russian elite is more than compensated for by the people’s love for the Fatherland under any rulers. “The godless split-off from the state” is a disease of the elite that causes the suffering of the people. The thoughtless transplanting on to Russian soil by the Russian intelligentsia of what is alien has muddied the national psyche.

“Rationalistic utopianism — the desire to arrange life according to reason, divorcing it from the objective principles of history, from the organic foundations of social order, and from the life-sustaining sacred values of the people’s existence” — led to the 1917 revolution, as scientist P. I. Novgorodtsev believes.

The recipe for healing Russian society, according to Dostoevsky, is to stop being insignificant imitators (“strikers”) of Europeanism, liberalism, and socialism, and to return the intelligentsia from cosmopolitanism to the realization that they are part of a common root system with the people. In order to gain victorious unity for the nation, the intelligentsia must realize that “it can no longer be divorced and torn away from its people... We can, perhaps, lose battles, but nevertheless we will remain invincible precisely by the unity of our national spirit and the consciousness of the people. ...if we have the will, we cannot be forced to do what we do not want, and there is no power on the whole earth that could make us.”

But for a long time, Russia has not managed to stay focused on building a state. In 1913, when it ranked first in the world in terms of industrial production growth and fourth in terms of its volume, the First World War, which broke out and turned into the Bolshevik Revolution, destroyed the Russian Empire itself. As concerns the USSR, the 1991 Belovezha Accords turned out to be the destructive force for the collapse of the Soviet Union. Power was seized by a small group of high-ranking officials. The Comprador-Vlasov regime of victorious “democracy” declared Russia’s independence from itself; is this not the realization of the project “Russia without Colonies?” As a result, instead of the mighty Red Empire, we wound up


44 The Vlasovites (in Russian: “власовцы”) were servicemen of the Russian Liberation Army who fought on the side of the Third Reich against the USSR during World War II. Andrey Vlasov was a Soviet Red Army general who fought in the Battle of Moscow and later was captured attempting to lift the siege of Leningrad. After being captured, he defected to Nazi Germany and headed the Russian Liberation Army.

45 According to an article from Svoboda, a New York-based Ukrainian-language weekly, “Igor Sin-
with a small, chipped version — the Russian Federation. A tricolor flew up over the Kremlin resembling the colors of the Dutch—“Vlasov-mercantile” flag of the Provisional Government, which had brought about the fall of the state. The Victory Banner was taken down and stored away like a museum mummy (allegedly “because of the fragility of the satin”) and kept in a horizontal position. The Reichstag has been defeated and the banner of the winners is gathering dust in the museum! And a “copy” of it has been “decommunistized” — the communist aspects of it washed out of its cloth, and, it would seem, washed from the memory of its descendants — the emblems washed out of the original — the “Soviet” sickle and hammer — and then the remake of the banner used for ceremonial processions.

The President of the Russian Federation is perceived by the ruling elite as a top-notch manager “who does not interfere” with the conduct of business. The totality of fiefdoms belonging to the dominant clans forms a kind of state within a state — a deep-oligarchic state (a “deep state”) versus “the Russian Federation.” Despite the coronavirus pandemic and the global systemic crisis, the profits of the rich with ties to the Kremlin, according to the Bloomberg Billionaires Index, grew by $23.9 billion in the first quarter of 2021. As they say, “For some — the war, and for others — the mother is dear.”

The Yeltsin Constitution of 1993, practically thrown together the night before the referendum, legalized lawlessness. It is clear: Any radical changes in the existing process for controlling the “succession to the throne,” including fair democratic elections, would pose a threat to the emerging feudal regime. Therefore, the establishment prefers not to expose its power to the risk of change, adhering to the strategy of “inertial development.” Yeltsin’s system of steering the country with the help of “checks,” “balances,” and “castling moves (shuffles)” remains a guide for Putin’s “vertical of power.”

Vladimir Putin, according to the conservative publicist Mikhail Nazarov,

46 The Bloomberg Billionaires Index is a daily ranking of the world’s richest people.
47 This Russian proverb refers to the fact that “For some, it’s war; for others, it’s the chance to reap profits.” The original Russian is «Кому война, а кому мать родна.»
48 “Vertical of power” refers to the top-down command structure established by Putin during his presidency.
“in essence did not change anything in the established oligarchic regime; he just moved it out of the realm of the ‘Great Criminal Revolution’”49 (S. Govorukhin’s definition) and into the realm of the *superpower criminal stabilization.* In this series of “achievements” by the comprador-oligarchy power structure, there is a “between-the-two-agreed-upon double “castling move” — Putin-Medvedev and back again. People got used to the “succession-to-the-throne-by-conspiracy”: In March 2021, they allowed the nullification of the four previous presidential terms served, giving Vladimir Putin the opportunity to run twice more for the position of head of the government in the elections of 2024 and 2036.

According to political analyst Valery Korovin, the pro-Western elite now “is not standing with Russia; it collaborates with pleasure, and is ready to engage in betrayal, which completely correlates with the situation on the eve of the February Revolution of 1917 when the head of state wound up having no one to rely on. The elite bear a different mentality; it is easy for the West to work with them, which was also characteristic of the pre-revolutionary period.” As the poet Maximilian Voloshin said about the events of the 1917 Revolution, “Russia is finished...And the people dragged their homeland//Like carrion to a reeking landfill.”50

The Red Empire of the USSR was done away with somewhat differently in the “dashing 90s.” First, they seized the foundation cornerstone of the Soviet monolith — Article 6 of the 1977 Constitution identifying the party as “the leading and guiding force of society.” This immediately brought down the “Indestructible Union.”51 Now, when the “red-brown” are gathering together for revenge, the ruling parties of Russia have latched on to Putin so that he, their patron, would not cast them out to be torn apart by the crowd. The thought of a departure of V. V. P. (Putin) from the Kremlin and a left-liberal turn by the state elicits a hysterical reaction from liberal-imperialist A. B. Chubais: “God forbid we should see a revolution in Russia. It would be blood-red...A union of Democrats forming an anti-Putin base would not work.... The slogan ‘Down with Putin’s Police Regime!’ just does not sound serious,” he

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50 The poem “Peace” (Russian: Мир), written in 1917 by Maksimilian Voloshin, starts with “Russia is finished....” The other two lines that follow are from the second stanza of the poem.

51 A reference to the first line of the Soviet National Anthem, “Indestructible union of free republics Great Rus’ has united forever to stand!”
wails. However, the West this time did not heed the warnings of its own creature. The intrigue surrounding the transfer of power remains. But since the state of international relations smacks of a Cuban Missile Crisis-2, why not take advantage of the situation and give Putinism — as Nazarbayev puts it — a “guiding and directing” eternal life? Indeed, in ancient Rome, if faced with extreme danger from outside or from internal turmoil, with the permission of the Senate, the Consuls appointed a dictator. We are still rather far from a nuclear apocalypse. The West is irritated by the persistence of the loser who was defeated in the Cold War but does not acknowledge himself as such. (And in fact, a *Cold War Victory Medal* was awarded to the “Honorary German,” Mikhail Gorbachev.)

**Spiritual and civilizational defense of Russia and Attack of mentality as a factor in complicating conflicts**

At an optimal level, the Russian Federation is protected, but at a proactive level, not quite. For more reliable protection you need both control over the distant borders of the Russian Federation and the souls of the Russian people — a defense against decay and “depatriotization.” Only with the awareness of their deep national values and goals, and only having learned to act according to their life principles can individuals be well-grounded as proactive people. As for projecting force and ensuring security on the far frontiers, “We are quite far from being able to do that,” says analyst Dmitry Evstafiev. We must harness our potential for proactively using force in our economic and political interests before a direct military threat to Russia arises. After all, conflicts are becoming more complicated: mentality itself is already being attacked.

With the help of information-organization weapons, the spiritual belief system of those being attacked can be altered — subjected to “self-disorganization” and “self-disorientation” — for example, the “highly likely” Russian Federation interference in the American presidential elections or the United States’ involvement in organizing “color revolutions.” Military expert D.

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52 An Anglicized rendition of the Russian word *depatriotizatsiya* (in Russian: «депатриотизация»). The word here refers to a loss of love for the motherland.


54 “Color Revolution” is a term that has been used to describe movements that developed in several countries of the former Soviet Union, People’s Republic of China, and the Balkans during the early 2000s. For further information, see, for example, Cordesman, Anthony H. (2014, May 28) Russia and the “Color Revolution”: A Russian Military View of a World Destabilized by the US and the West. *Center for Strategic and International Studies*. URL https://www.csis.org/analysis/russia-and-“color-revolution"."
Lovtsov, an authority on the reflexive technologies of “orgweapons,” claims that by imposing various influences on the enemy, one can make him move in a direction that is favorable to the other side; direct his policy into a strategic impasse; wear down his economy with ineffective (overwhelming) programs; slow down his weapons development; distort the foundations of his national culture; and create a “fifth column” among the intelligentsia that, in every possible way, supports, promotes, and carries out pseudo-reforms, and the like. As a result, an atmosphere of internal political chaos is created within the state which leads to a decrease in its economic, political, and military power, and even to its demise.55

By passing through the consciousness of each member of society, a long-term, massive informational and moral-psychological influence campaign of a destructive nature creates a real threat to the existence of that nation by transforming its historically-established culture, fundamental worldview, and ideological attitudes — a change in its internal “orgenvironment,” which normally determines the vital activities of the state and its armed forces. A stable maintenance of the enemy’s strategic illusion is a condition for victory in a mental-hybrid war. In the context of hybrid warfare, psychological operations are of paramount importance. But how do you carry them out if the target — the psychology of the enemy — is not entirely clear and its vulnerabilities have not been fully identified?

Psych warfare has gone from theoretical innuendo to becoming part of the military’s daily routine. Whether it is something fake or something still “a secret with seven seals,” a reference to a “Dulles Plan” was made in the newspaper “Soviet Russia” for February 20, 1993. Here is what Metropolitan of St. Petersburg and Ladoga John (Snychev) wrote about it: “Having sowed chaos in Russia,” American General Allen Dulles, the head of US political intelligence in Europe who later became director of the CIA in 1945, said “we will imperceptibly replace their values with false ones and make them believe in these false values. How? We will find people who think like we do, our helpmates and allies in Russia itself. Episode after episode and grandiose in its scale, the tragic demise of the most rebellious people on earth will be played out — and finally, the irreversible extinction of their identity. From literature and art, for example, we will gradually erase their social essence. We will break artists, discourage them from dealing in images, from delving into the processes that take place within the depths of the masses. Literature, theaters, cinema — everything will portray and glorify the most base human feelings. We will in every way support and raise up the so-

called creators who will plant and hammer into human consciousness the cult of sex, violence, sadism, and betrayal — in short, all immorality.”

In current instructional materials on undermining the enemy’s combat readiness *from within*, science fiction has become a reality. The primary evil is “those who rule” Russia like a state corporation — like their own fiefdom. The comprador-masters of the Russian Federation, wittingly or unwittingly, also contribute to the disintegration of the “disciplinary socialization” process that their fellow Russian Federation citizens undergo. After this happens, an individual so processed does not obey the more collective-oriented rules. The French philosopher J. Lipovetsky believes that such a hedonized creature is morally shaky, unstable, weak-willed, has a diminished capability for self-restraint and self-control, and possesses a fragmented consciousness lacking high ideals — as well as a will that requires glamor and consumerism, rest and amusement. Such a subject is civilly and politically insignificant, with an atrophied sense of patriotism — and with no idea what it means to give his life for his homeland.

If the strategist Karl von Clausewitz considers the goal of war to be “to force the enemy to fulfill the German will,” then the fortitude of the Russians — their will to resist and win — has now been greatly undermined. Military theorist Andrei Snesarev noted that “at the epicenter of the problems with trying to understand war is the fundamental law of war: the law of the primacy of the spiritual side in the phenomena of battle.” With a flagging fighting spirit, you cannot win. The spirit is like fire: it goes out when not tended to. The Chinese stratagem of achieving victory by destroying the spirit as a pillar of resistance can be described like this: “Pull the firewood out from under the hearth,” which means when the opponent is too strong for an open fight, you can win by destroying his support. Having an indestructible spiritual force is a guarantee of victory.

According to the sociologist A. Yanakov, the spiritual resource of the people finds its expression in certain values, ideals, ideas, theories, concepts, programs and slogans, public symbols, views, traditions, habits, and morals, which, as a rule, are based on national values. “Strengthening the spiritual and civilizational arsenal would enhance the fighting readiness of both the army and the military security elements of the state.”

If in classical wars the goal is to destroy the enemy’s forces, and in modern cyber wars, to destroy the enemy’s infrastructure, then the goal of the new

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56 *The Dulles Plan, or Dulles Doctrine*, is part of a conspiracy theory claiming that former CIA chief Allen Dulles developed a plan for United States to destroy the Soviet Union during the Cold War by secretly corrupting its cultural heritage and moral values. Some maintain that the plan first appeared and was ascribed to Allen Dulles in a 1993 book by John Snychev, Metropolitan of St. Petersburg and Ladoga. Others claim the idea seems to have originated in a novel by Anatoly Ivanov entitled *Eternal Call*, which was popular after the fall of the USSR. See URL https://meduza.io/en/lion/2015/06/08/russian-court-says-fictional-plot-to-destroy-the-ussr-is-extremist.
type of war is to destroy the intellectual and emotional consciousness, to change the mental — civilizational — foundation of the enemy’s society. “I would call this type of war mental,” says Adviser to the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Andrei Ilnitsky. And in this mental war, the results of information-hybrid attacks on the enemy’s mentality may not manifest themselves immediately, but will do so after a generation, when the course that the evolution of consciousness is taking can no longer be reversed. The transformation of Ukraine from “our fraternal brother” to “a follower of Bandera”\(^\text{57}\) is an example of a methodologically poorly controlled alien influence aimed at changing the spiritual code of the nation. For years, corrupt officials of the Russian Federation condoned the anti-Russian nonsense about the “Ukry”\(^\text{58}\) and then condoned their use as “a sacred sacrifice” in someone else’s game. And the fact that Russia did not catch on in time — did not “clean out and close up” the wounds in the relations between Kiev and Moscow, but, rather, allowed a break in their historical commonality — it wound up causing Russia to punish itself. The Kremlin dropped the ball: “I wanted the best possible outcome, but it turned out as it always does.” And when self-willed Ukraine was in the throes of the Bandera dance and “he who does not dance is a Moscow-lover” was the prevailing sentiment, it was too late to lend support to save the Yanukovych\(^\text{59}\) regime: anti-Russianness became widespread. The Initiation by Russia of the Minsk Agreements\(^\text{60}\) — and the Russian Federation normally gives up very little

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\(^{57}\) “The term banderovtsy (in Russian: «бандеровцы») has played a significant role in political discourse over the course of the Ukrainian crisis. Banderovtsy is the Russian word for “banderites” or followers of Stepan Bandera (1909-1959), leader of the revolutionary faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, which, along with its partisan army — the Ukrainian Insurgent Army — strove to eliminate all ethnically non-Ukrainian elements from Ukrainian soil (including Jews, Russians, Poles, Gypsies, etc.) and, for a certain period of time, collaborated with Germans in the hope of achieving this goal.” See (2015, January 29) The Success of Russia’s Propaganda: Ukraine’s “Banderovtsy.” Cambridge Globalist. URL http://cambridgeglocalist.org/?p=573.

\(^{58}\) Some believe the ancient tribes of the Ukry were the forerunners of the modern-day Ukrainian people. Others use the term in a derisive manner to refer to Ukrainians. “Nonsense” was the English word used to convey the author’s use of the word “nashpigovyvaniye” (in Russian: «напшпиговывание») which actually refers to “stuffing” in cooking.

\(^{59}\) Viktor Fedorovych Yanukovych served as the fourth President of Ukraine, from 2010 until he was removed from office in the 2014 Ukrainian Revolution.

\(^{60}\) A peace plan for eastern Ukraine (the Minsk Protocol or Minsk Agreement) was signed in 2014. As fighting continued in 2015, leaders from France, Germany, Ukraine, and Russia agreed to a new ceasefire and a package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk Agreement (the ’Minsk II’ agreement). Since then, progress has been limited. (March 2020) Ukraine: The Minsk agreements five years on. At A Glance. See also (2021, February 26) The future of Minsk agreements: pressing for implementation or withdrawing. Ukraine Crisis Media Center. URL https://uacrisis.org/en/minsk-agreements. The article points out that experts underscore that the Minsk agreements are merely a political accord and are not binding under international law — a sentiment with which Russia disagrees.
— then saved the Ukrainian Army from certain defeat after Debaltsevo.\(^{61}\) And the endless dragging on of the Donbass tragedy is due more to the dividends being reaped by the greedy oligarchy supplying fuel for the tanks of “Independent Ukraine.”

If the West had not constantly harassed Putin, then the bosses of the Russian Federation would have turned over the Donbass “in fulfillment of the Minsk Agreements.” That would have been a blot on the future perspective of the Russian world, analogous to the 1945 Operation Keelhaul,\(^{62}\) when the British, in order to fulfill their Allied obligations to Stalin, used rifle butts to forcibly drive the Cossacks and White émigrés to take a bullet or go to the GULAG. Then, however, when Sir Winston Leonard Churchill himself stood at attention in front of Josif Vissarionovich (Stalin) — let’s say even if only out of respect — it was nothing like today, when US President Joe Biden confirmed, with a nod of his head, that his “colleague” from the Russian Federation was a “murderer.”

How does one reconcile the need to raise the fighting spirit of what looks like and bears the title of a state-forming nation — the Russian Federation — with an environment of a demographic decline in particularly Russians, and a tightening in the enforcement of the punitively-applied, anti-Russian Article 282 of the UKRF (Russian Federation Criminal Code)?\(^{63}\) The Russian will — its unbending spirit plus its size — with its bold sense of daring versus the dreary dullness of moderation and orderliness. The “offspring” of the Russian free spirit is the limitless, free-spirited Russian song by which the philosopher Nietzsche himself was reportedly “intellectually moved”: “I would exchange the happiness of the whole West for the sad strains of a Russian song,” were the words that he reportedly exclaimed. Imposing a framework of permissible indulgences does not suit the Russian sense of free will, and produces a devious creature, and not a warrior of the Light of Orthodoxy.

Part of the confusion over setting national priorities stems from the fact

\(^{61}\) The Battle of Debaltseve (or Debaltsevo) was a military confrontation in the city of Debaltseve, Donetsk Oblast, between the pro-Russian separatist forces of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People’s Republic, and the Ukrainian Armed Forces, starting in mid-January 2015 during the war in the Donbass region. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Debaltseve.

\(^{62}\) “Operation Keelhaul” was carried out in Northern Italy by British and American forces to repatriate Soviet Armed Forces POWs of the Nazis to the Soviet Union between August 14, 1946 and May 9, 1947. The term has been later applied...to other Allied acts of often forced repatriation of former residents of the USSR after the ending of World War II that sealed the fate of millions of post-war refugees fleeing eastern Europe.” For additional information on this operation, see URL https://military.wikia.org/wiki/Operation_Keelhaul.

that the Russian Federation does not know what type of state it is building. What is wanted is one “with a human face.” The uppermost layer of the bureaucracy is already befuddled as it is by the labels “friend or foe,” thinking only about bribery and which foreign passport is in which of their jacket pockets. They substitute the word “enemy” with the toothless euphemism “partner.” And it wasn’t until 13 April 2021, that Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov — after catching a whiff of new emanations from the Kremlin — went out on a limb and called the United States an adversary of Russia. Putin, in his message to the Federal Assembly, compared Russia’s enemies to the heroes of a Kipling tale, noting that some of them cling to the Russian Federation for no reason and, like Tabaqui, howl to appease their sovereign. “I hope,” said Vladimir Putin, “that it would never even occur to anyone to cross the so-called ‘red line’ as concerns Russia. We ourselves will determine in each specific case where the line will be drawn.”64 This new Russian foreign policy manifesto has had the effect of Putin’s Munich speech.65

In approximately the same semantic vein, the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry under Alexander II, Prince A. M. Gorchakov, made it clear to the West that Russia is not giving up its right to vote in European international issues, but is only gathering strength for the future. “La Russie ne boude pas, elle se recueille.” (“Russia is not sulking; she is composing herself”) Said more succinctly, “She is concentrating.” This phrase accurately defined the political position occupied by Russia after the Crimean War. And three years later, Prince Gorchakov said, “Russia is getting out of that position of restraint, which it considered obligatory for itself after the Crimean War.” So now today, Russia has declared its emergence from the stranglehold of a bad agreement with the West made as a result of its defeat in the Cold War; it has declared its geostrategic intentions. It is dangerous to drive the “bear” into a corner. Before you know it, it will mate with a Chinese tiger just to spite of the haughty Euro-Atlantists.

64 President Putin delivered an address to the Russian Federal Assembly on 21 April 2021. In his speech, he cited characters Tabaqui and Shere Khan — a Golden jackal and Bengal tiger, respectively — from Rudyard Kipling’s Jungle Book, saying “And of course, all sorts of petty Tabaquis are running around them like Tabaqui ran around Shere Khan – everything is like in Kipling’s book – howling along in order to make their sovereign happy.” (2021, April 21) Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly. URL http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/65418.

Nationally-oriented power is the key to victory in a mental-hybrid war

The ruling class does a poor job of meeting the national-patriotic needs of society. Russia is still far from a morally healthy, effective social state which can withstand a “mental war.” “For this in Russia,” writes the editor of “Russkaya Ideya” (“Russian Idea”), Mikhail Nazarov, “there must be a healthy government that cares about the country and not about its own ‘galley’ income.” Otherwise, defeat in a world hybrid war is certain.

It is difficult to be a patriot in the Russian Federation given the state ideology of “gas at a discount.” This philosophical framework — as the mobilizer of the people to strive for civic engagement, achievement, and labor — was thrown out of the Fundamental Law of the Russian Federation as “Soviet” junk. Moreover, the 13th Article of the Constitution prohibits the establishment of any ideology — “a state ideology or any that is mandatory.” They left “ideology” in, if only for practical purposes, to manage society, to prevent social chaos and prevent illegal actions. Would that they had learned from the German pragmatists: “What we believe in doesn’t much matter; the main thing is to believe. A people without religion is like a person without breathing.” It is no accident that Minister of Propaganda Goebbels admitted: “My party is my church.”

While the people do not have their own ideology, the nomenklatura has, for its own needs, “a sort of relatively stable and recognizable system of meanings” --a reliance on a certain value-semantic system. The philosopher Olga Malinova writes about this collision between the two situations: “The potential ‘abuse of power’ intended to weaken the competitive chances of opponents is obvious, right up to limiting ideological pluralism by prohibiting the expression of certain ideas in public forums...The ruling elite does not have the right to use state instruments of coercion to impose their own ideas as obligatory or to exclude the right to express different points of view.” The laws adopted by the State Duma, according to the opposition, are often “occupational” in nature: “Practically all forms of public protest have been declared illegal.” The project of capitalism with a human face is failing: the oligarchy is too greedy for superprofits, and the authorities are too stingy to provide any respectable implementation of “social guarantees.”


67 Here, “gas at a discount” is used ironically: In the absence of a real state ideology respected by the people, Russians have to get satisfaction from an ideological surrogate like “discount gas.” Similarly, to gain support of, say, Belarus, the Russian Federation — an anti-people state — has to sell gas cheaply to them. (E.V.)
A more organic course seems to be the saving grace for Russia, the spiritual basis of which will be the Russian idea as a characteristic of national identity and culture.68 The national Russian idea is religious and is one that includes providence and predestination. It is holistic and unchanging at its core. Its categories — Spirituality, Sovereignty and Collegiality (in the Uvarov triad, Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Nationality69) — are intensely interconnected. “Dissection of this trinity,” writes the philosopher V. V. Lazarev, “which was created according to the model and likeness of the triad of Good, Truth, and Beauty, or of the model of the Holy Trinity (an interpretation of the meaning of “the whole made up of three distinct components” or “trinity” as found in Orthodox teachings) — the fragmentation of living spiritual integrity into separate elements — turned this unity into a deathly conglomerate.” Without changing the paradigm for the fundamental direction of the Russian Federation — the “nationalization” of the very logic in its thinking, and the strengthening of the pro-Russian dominant elements — the country will lose not only sovereignty but also vital resources for regenerating the nation. Degradation and depopulation are in full swing. Putin’s mouthpiece, Dmitry Peskov, characterizes the demographic situation in Russia as “very bad.”

Everyone is expecting a miracle from the Russian Federation President — to revive the nation — scrubbing the pores of the Russian State’s “complexion” to rid it of the comprador oligarchy grime that has become imbedded in it. Then the people will stop acting like cattle and once again find their identity as creators of history, and in inspirational ways, will defend their homeland, which had and still has “only two allies — its army and its navy.”70 What is needed is an urgent, radical correction of the current course the Russian state is taking, a shift to a patriot-statesman course. Not excluded is a coup scenario for a change in power as is addressed in Kathryn Belton’s book Putin’s People: How the KGB Took Back Russia and Then Took On

68 “Russian Idea” is a philosophical term for interpreting Russian identity, culture, national and world fate of Russia, its Christian heritage and future, the ways of uniting peoples and transforming humanity. See, among other sources, the entry (no date) Russian Idea. Philosophical Encyclopedia. URL https://dic.academic.ru/dic.nsf/enc_philosophy/9007/русская.

69 “In 1832, a slogan was created by Count Sergey S. Uvarov, Minister of Education...that came to represent the official ideology of the imperial government of Nicholas I...and remained the guiding principle behind government policy during later periods of imperial rule.” See (no date) Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality. Britannica. URL https://www.britannica.com/topic/Orthodoxy-Autocracy-and-Nationality.

According to a report by A. Aslund and L. Gozman, “Russia after Putin: How to rebuild the state,” the libertarian “alternative” — not Mikhail Khodorkovsky, so then Alexei Navalny — will not give up without a fight. Some of the premises of this program that are consonant with the slogans of the communist-patriotic electorate can become a force for consolidating the opposition, for example, with the intention of replacing the “authoritarian kleptocracy” regime or replacing the ruling dynasty of the “Yeltsin Family” which “usurped all the power and most of the wealth” of Russia.

The leadership of the Russian Federation should stop running “a double game — flirting with dwarfs,” as the patriot and systems analyst Sergei Mikheev says. Establish the rule of law. Politically disarm business with ties to government by insisting on “full transparency as to the ultimate beneficial ownership of all enterprises, including media companies.” But is there any hope for such a radical transformation of those in power?

Time is running out. The political dynamics in Russia are noticeably accelerating. If the party in power, “United Russia,” faces defeat, it can


72 Aslund, Anders and Gozman, Leonid. (2021, February 24) Russia after Putin: How to rebuild the state. Atlantic Council. URL: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/event/russia-putin-rebuild-the-state/. The Aslund report projects the end of Putin’s rule and offers thoughts on actions that should be taken by a new government to establish freedom, end repression, establish the rule of law, fix the economy, and build a real democracy.

73 “In 2003, Khodorkovsky argued with Putin at a televised meeting...implying that major government officials were accepting millions in bribes. Unsurprisingly...he was arrested for tax evasion, embezzlement and fraud...and was found guilty...and jailed for eight years.” See Dawkins, David. (2020, 14 March) Putin And Khodorkovsky Trade Blows As Presidential Power Grab Gathers Momentum. Forbes. URL https://www.forbes.com/sites/daviddawkins/2020/03/14/putin-and-khudorkovsky-trade-blows-as-presidental-power-grab-gathers-momentum/?sh=1101621d2b54.


75 The term “communist-patriots” is sometimes used to refer to political forces that preach communist and ultranationalist ideology. Alternatively, terms such as “communofascists” or “red-browns” also appear to be used to describe “communist-patriots. URL https://ru.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Коммунофашисты.

76 The Kremlin is playing a double game in that it wants the support of the “dwarfs” — a euphemism for ‘the liberal minority’ — and also wants the people to be satisfied. (E.V.)
replace the presidential form of government with a parliamentary one. A parliamentary form of government, by definition, is more transparent and democratic, and most importantly, if the country collapses, the responsibility will be borne collectively. Alternatively the presidential form of government could be replaced by a model whereby there is a State Council and a collective leadership — a combination of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the State Council of the People’s Republic of China.

What kind of leader do the people need at a new stage of development? Political scientist Mikheev (member of Zakhara Prilepina’s For Truth party) answered this question in detail: “In foreign policy, there is a more robust project that will restore historical justice... In domestic policy, the economy should be a means for organizing people’s lives, not one for making profit. The shape that national culture takes should not be subject to economic control. In a moral and ethical context, the ideals of traditional religions should be dominant in the formation of informational content and cultural policy. A person who would advance these three hypotheses...I don’t see such people.”

And where can we get such “triadic” leaders if “outsider” candidates are filtered out from the list of candidates running for president, the list which tightly blocks the entry of the “not ours” to political Olympus?! The “production line” of officials possessing the given parameters required by those ruling the Russian Federation forms a “secret stash” for nomenklatura appointments. “Cadres decide everything,” said J. V. Stalin. The difficulty in choosing a worthy presidential candidate possessing the three characteristics (as mentioned in the “triad” discussion above) is understandable, and is the eternal sin of the intellectuals: they are painfully far removed from the people. The “singer” of the people’s monarchy, Ivan Solonevich,77 blamed this social class for its unwillingness to see itself “as a layer subordinate to the main Russian historic lines of development, rather than a cooperative of innovators, vying with each other to promise the Russian people the “stars” — false promises — stolen from non-Russian philosophies and a world that completely reconstructs and alters our thousand-year statehood.”

All spheres of Russian life — its politics, economy, and culture — should become items of national priority. And in international relations, without the ability to defend the interests of the country, there can be no respectable and compelling diplomacy. The negoti-

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77 Ivan Lukyanovich Solonevich authored “The People's Monarchy,” originally published in newspaper installments starting in 1951. The book offers Solonevich’s view of the history of Russia, an analysis of the current geopolitical situation in the world, and an exposition of the ideology of the “People's Monarchist Movement.” Here Solonevich is referred to as a “singer,” a reference to the “singer-poet” in the V. A. Zhukovsky poem “Singer in the Camp of Russian Warriors” (1812). In the poem, the poet who loves his Fatherland...directs a fiery speech to the soldiers...because they have one goal — to protect their country. An analysis of the poem can be found at URL https://en.sodummedia.com/4176103-quot-singer-in-the-camp-of-russian-warriorsquot-zhukovsky-analysis-of-the-poem-the-plot-and-literary-trails.
ation process should operate not within the framework of whatever provides instantaneous benefits for business (as it is now), but within the framework of civilizational-national global interests. Since international security by treaty has not worked in previous regimes, we need to build a new system to handle current situations — a new system for interconnecting states — and one that harnesses the arsenal of tools for averting both direct military aggression as well as indirect forms of aggression such as economic-political and hybrid-ethical ones.

“War is the art of deception,” Sun Tzu said. We will have to proceed from the given that the principle of the non-use of force or the threat of force as an instrument of national policy (the Paris Pact of Kellogg-Briand) has given way to the law of war — jus ad bellum. And the past achievements in the art of virtuoso diplomacy (including the practices of “Mr. No” — Andrei Gromyko) have gone to rust due to their prolonged disuse.

The US strategy of “forward defense” is applicable in “cyber diplomacy” (my term - E.V.) as well. This rapprochement with the enemy is established as close as possible to see what he is planning, and in response, to prepare to or to actually take appropriate measures. This is the actualization of “reconnaissance in force.” Forward-looking, all-encompassing both in strategic planning and in operational development, multiplied by the ability to pursue the enemy during his maneuvering, with an understanding of how he develops as a dynamic object. In this regard, it is important to take into account the updated specifications for diplomacy in an era of globalism and postmodern conflictology put forward by the new head of the CIA, William Joseph Burns: “The conflict among the great powers requires subtle diplomacy; you need to maneuver in the gray zone between peace and war, know the limits of what is possible, build levers of influence, pursue common interests where you can find them, and firmly and consistently confront [Russia] where no common interests exist.” Intelligence under Trump became noticeably politicized. It is precisely the unbiased, objective analysis of Burns, the career diplomat and man who “earned his gray hair on Russia,” that Biden has probably heard and that the Kremlin has sufficiently come to understand. “New thinking” (yes, not as Gorbachev viewed, but rather, the Realpolitik of Bismarck) — one without illusions and ideological dogmas.

The drive to ease tensions in bilateral relations is enticing. Playing cards with an open hand (albeit with hidden trump cards) draws the opponent’s attention away from his “red lines” for the sake of reaching a mutually beneficial compromise. This fact it-

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78 The Kellogg-Briand Pact, sometimes called the Pact of Paris, was an agreement to outlaw war signed on August 27, 1928.
79 The Latin term “jus ad bellum” refers to the conditions under which states may resort to war or use armed force in general. The prohibition against the use of force and the exceptions to it were set out in the United Nations Charter of 1945.
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self is important: the “outcasts” become engrossed in dialogue. And then comes the art of bargaining over multilayered enticements. In doing so, the West unites around a common benefit arising from the dialogue — a benefit both for the EU and one that is in the interests of the United States. This is the test of “reconnaissance in force” initiated by Russia and China to strongly support their integration into a globally pan-civilizational project of unified values and common governance in the post-COVID era. By leveling the separate, distinctive national characteristics and replacing them with soil for compromise, the concept of “enemy” disappears because there is no one to fight with.

Bilateral dialogue sets the jurisdictional boundaries for each of the parties as well as their limits for tactical retreat, which are no further than the distant boundaries of their national priorities. As a result of settling on how agreements and clarifications are handled, the strategic boundaries of a new agile configuration are worked out. This is fluid diplomacy and not a set-in-stone dogma of “having to fulfill marital obligations” by those who have not loved each other for a long time. The time for sluggish geopolitical initiatives and doctrines is over. A confrontation of fully-armed systems calls for reducing tensions among the warring parties.

The strategy of applying compressed pressure (as I would call it - E.V.) corresponds to this situation: Today, the West and China are not in the best condition. And each of the geopolitical actors is seeking to avoid “zeitnot”\(^{80}\) — to not be faced with having to put their stronger players in zugzwang\(^ {81}\) where any move will lead to a worsening of his position. The stakes are high: a global war, or a return to the status quo of “no war, no peace.”

Most likely, Putin’s remarks on “Munich-2”\(^ {82}\) were just brutal patriotic rhetoric. Indeed, in the ruling circles, until their capital abroad is confiscated, entirely different aspirations will prevail: for the Kremlin (Yeltsin) “family,” it is to seek revenge and to maintain the predatory comprador-oligarchic course.

Anything can happen. After all, those in power do not adequately react to serious cataclysms in society: they do not read the signs and signals from the people and therefore lose their already negligible support and legitimacy. The authorities cannot, says expert Valery Korovin, demonstrate “arrogant alienation” and address the people only when elections need to be held or when unrest and riots begin. “The reaction of the authorities is extremely transient, is one

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80 A German chess term meaning time pressure, or literally “time emergency.” If you are playing a timed chess game and you are very close to having used up our entire allowed time for the game, you have a zeitnot on your hands.

81 Zugzwang is a German term that means “a compulsion to move.” In chess, it refers to a player having to take his turn and make a move even though any move will put him in a worse position.

82 A reference to Putin’s appearance on Munich Channel 2 television during which he accused the US of undermining global security in the wake of an international security conference held in Munich in February 2007.
of irritation, is unsettled, and has only a one-time impact on the situation. The powers that be relate to the masses as if they were some sort of set of mechanical implements.” A survey was conducted and statistics were compiled; a decision was made without actually listening to the people, without considering the nuances or the details. As a result, the state has lost its foothold. There is a double zugzwang: the authorities and the opposition; the West and Russia.

As soon as Putin started talking about a red line, Patriarch Kirill warned the authorities against turning into a tyranny. What does the coming day have in store for us?! On the part of the ruling establishment, the continuation of a weak, cowardly, vague policy will provoke an explosion of popular indignation, and the mobilized spurt of support — enthusiasm for the initiative associated with the movement of Krymnash — will wither on the vine.83

It is impossible to test the patience of the nation that has been seeking positive changes for a long period of time. The establishment will wait, it seems, until the people themselves move to storm the regime singing the song “Get up, the country is huge!”84 Then the red line itself will be drawn along the distant security borders of the Homeland. And that line will no longer pass through Kiev, but through Warsaw. More likely than not, Putin, by waiting to attack only at the most suitable, opportune moment, found himself late in responding to the announcement of John Bolton, at the NATO summit in 1999 where he pointed to a red line that then ran from the Baltic to the Black Sea — on one side of which lies “the civilized world, and on the other - Russia.”

A retinue rules as the head of the Russian Federation. Even if Putin wanted to radically change the corrupt oligarchic system, he would be prevented from doing so by the environment that surrounds him — one aimed at operating collaboratively and opportunistically. And most importantly, he himself, fearing the red-brown revenge of a USSR-2, is, we could suppose, more afraid of the systemic popular-patriotic opposition than of any Western expansion. Therefore, he is a priori closer to the West than he is portrayed. The West, then, should correct its course as concerns the Kremlin: it should not denigrate the President of the Russian Federation, but, rather, prolong his rule

83 Goble, Paul. (2015, June 10) “Krymnash” Meme Part of Russian Society’s Return to Late Soviet Times. Euromaidanpress. URL http://euromaidanpress.com/2015/06/10/krymnash-meme-part-of-russian-societys-return-to-late-soviet-times/ According to the article, “‘Krymnash’ [Crimea is Ours] arose as a serious meme in March 2014, an expression of the patriotic pleasure Russians felt in taking Crimea and demonstrating the power of their country. But since then, it has become an ironic expression, one that recalls Soviet times, and the people use it as almost a throw-away line — ‘our toilets don’t work but at least Krymnash!’...And it is an indication that in the minds of the populations ‘whatever happens in Russia, it will all the same remain an unsuccessful state and life will be bad.’”

84 The title and first line of “Get up, the country is huge!” The song was the creation of the poet Vasily Lebedev-Kumach and the composer Aleksandrov, and was composed on the night of 22 on to 23 June 1941. Germany attacked the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941.
of the country by allowing him to gain moderate concessions from the West and in doing so, keep the Russian Federation in its orbit.

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Д-р Евгений Александрович Вертлеб

«Новый мировой порядок будет строиться против России, на руинах России и за счёт России» (Збигнев Бжезинский)

Франклин Делано Рузвельт завещал, что без России не обойтись. Но в послевоенном мире возобладал жёсткий подход к России, основанный на Фултонской концепции Сэра Уинстона Черчилля: только тотальная и бескомпромиссная борьба «стран свободы» с «тиранями». И иметь надо подавляющий перевес в военной силе, который и должен обеспечить «взаимопонимание с Россией». «Больше агрессии» в отношении России и Китая - взывает в наши дни флотоводец адмирал Джон Ричардсон. Балансирование на лезвии бритвы - срыва в войну. Но порой действия говорят громче слов. В жёсткой конфронтации с КНДР воинственная риторика американцев не соответствовала скрупулёзному соблюдению ими «красной линии» чётко прочерченной Пхеньяном.

Поскольку баланс сил - общий принцип равновесия в современных международных отношениях, то ведение войн оправдывается сооружениями установления «баланса» или «равновесия». С распадом СССР закончилось равновесие взаимодействующих сил и возник соблазн безнаказанного удара по ослабевшему онтологическому врагу. «Старая доктрина равновесия сил теперь непригодна. Мы не можем позволить себе, – заявил в 1946 году Черчилль, – действовать с позиций малого перевеса, который вводит во искушение заняться пробой сил». И Китай более не придерживается своей прежней ядерной доктрины «минимального сдерживания». Тестирование сил и средств противника, вплоть до разведки боем становится повседневной нормой взаимоотношения сторон противостояния. «Я не собираюсь требовать от своих командиров принимать первый удар в челюсть», - заявил недавно командующий ВМС США в Европе и Африке адмирал Роберт Беркю. А прецедент безнаказанности приштинского марш-броска российских десантников? Так что вряд ли корабли НАТО в территориальных водах РФ откроют огонь на поражение по российским кораблям. На ядерный шантаж же у РФ есть торпеда «Шквал», способная, как пишут в СМИ, изменить военный баланс – «покорить весь мир».

Запад победил в холодной войне, но проигрывает холодный мир. Победителей подвело высокомерие и ложная уверенность, что с конкурирующим центром силы покончено навсегда. Фридрих Великий
предостерегал на этот счёт: «русских мало убить, нужно ещё и повалить». Большой стратегической ошибкой было упустить благоприятный момент для полной «привязки» России к Западу в пору, когда она была к этому готова. «Время Ч», выражался оперативным языком военных, проиграно.

Россия, удержавшись на грани небытия, смогла не только устоять, но и успешно соперничать с Западом по гиперзвуковому и космическому оружию (будущие конфликты будут решаться в космосе). Растущая сила и возрожденческая устремленность РФ вылились в боевую риторику В. Путина: «Даже если бы мы потопили этот корабль, мир не оказался бы на пороге мировой войны» — заявил президент по инциденту с британским эсминцем Defender. И обычно уклончивый политический нарратив Китая вдруг стал недiplоматично резким: Председатель КНР Си Цзиньпин в речи по случаю столетия правящей Коммунистической партии пригрозил «разбить голову в кровь о стальную стену» тем, кто вмешивается в его внутренние дела.

Китайцы почти вдвое увеличивают свой ядерный потенциал.


Антироссийские санкции и рестрикции оказались мало эффективными. И более того: тогда как в США забуксовала была экономика - до 15% от мировой (примерно как в СССР при Горбачёве), и американские денежные активы стали не столь стабильны (испытывают риски ликвидности и избыток денежных средств), Россия умудрилась нарастить золотой запас и вместе с КНР изъять свои национальные валюты из долларовой «зоны риска». И уже не только о распадных процессах в России пресса талдычит, но
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и о том: а не разведутся ли Соеди-нённые штаты Америки на 51 само-стоятельное государство (если окру-гу Колумбия придать статус нового штата).

Россию не перестали считать «Верхней Вольтой с ракетами». Президент Джо Байден лишь кон-тент актуализировал: охарактери-зовал эту страну с восьмой по раз-меру экономикой в мире как лишь "с ядерным оружием и нефтяными скважинами и больше ни с чем, ни с чем". «Россия — объективно ослабевающая страна в экономическом и демографическом плане» - счита-ет глава британской разведки МИ 6 Ричард Мур. А с такой жутковатой демографической кривой как в РФ стране подумать бы о выживании. Да и правящий олигархат отнюдь не стимулирует народ на труд и под-виг. Как верно сказал Рейхсляйтер пропаганды Йозеф Геббельс, «пушки и штыки — ничто, если вы не облада-ете сердцами нации».

Инструментарий западного воздействия на Россию инерцио-нен: чередование «кнута и пряни-ка» - санкций и вовлечения. Однако былой либертарианский облик РФ, мелькнувший в «лихие 90-е» и вско-ре померкший, так и не воскресает. И вряд ли этот пугающий россиян жупел обманутых надежд явится снова. Ведь пройдена «точка невоз-врата» сей догмы. Ведь недоо-ценивать Россию.

Как показал Александр Сол-женцин в своей статье «Чем грозит Америке плохое понимание России», манипуляция фактами о России привела к тому, что "весь Запад по-пал в критическое и даже смертель-но-опасное положение". Абсурдно обвинять Россию во всех мертвых грехах, в том числе и происхождении тоталитаризма. Ведь вовсе не «импе-ратор Николай I» изобрёл тоталита-ризм, как приписывается Ричардом Пайпсом. Идею тоталитарного госу-дарства первый предложил Гобс в "Левиафане" (глава государства — господин не только над имуществом и жизнью, но и совестью граждан). Да и Руссо давал к тому основания, объявляя демократическое государ-ство «неграниченным сувереном не только над собственностью, но и
над личностью граждан». Как гласит русская пословица, «На зеркало нечая пеньять коли рожа крива».

России проигрышно быть «пешкой» в чужих играх и в принятии своих решений руководствоваться одобрением как коллективно-Запад («новая Антанта»), так и Китая. Для неё первостепенна задача восстановить свой исконный мировоззренческо-геополитический «код», представляющий собой совокупность ключевых представлений россиян о своём месте в истории и мире, внешнеполитической стратегии и национальных приоритетах. Как китайцы в политике: по всем договорам неизменно требует «дуйдэн» — паритета взаимоотношений, мер и шагов. В соответствии с духовным концептом «инь и ян» («хаос и порядок»): упорядочивание сущностей — прекращение действия хаоса.

Россия нацелена на выход из изоляции в возобновление конкуренции уже трёх мировых систем. Она готовится к асимметрично-бесконтактной войне по достижению политических целей без открытых военных действий. Вырабатывает навыки ведения сетевой кибервойны, особенно против коммуникаций и систем логистики; умение противостоять вылазкам «пятой колонны», включая саботаж и подрывную деятельность; атакам на финансовую инфраструктуру и информационные операционные системы. Пытается держать порох сухим. Ведь риторика войны всё громогласнее. 24 января 2021 Кремль заявил довольно решительно, что Москва не готова к диктату и хамству. «С русскими стоит или играть честно, или вообще не играть» - завещал «железный канцлер» Отто фон Бисмарк.

Стратегии и тактики воздействия на противников и оппонентов нередко выглядят сомнительными. Так, одновременный прессинг России и Китая вряд ли целесообразен, поскольку мало эффективен, зато способствует консолидации этих «изгоев». И в отношении Минска радикальная тактика продвижения демократии любым путём, вплоть до госпереворота, оказалась проигрышной. В результате фальстарта, или неточного замера сложившейся ситуации, или недоучёта субъективного фактора случая, рухнул план по смене режима — что лишь ускоряет интеграцию Белоруссии в Россию. А судя по статье Владимира Путина «Об историческом единстве русских и украинцев», понятно, что и на Украину у Кремля есть свои виды. Участвовавшие проколы в стратегическом планировании и в реализации замыслов подтверждают то, что заметно качнулся мега-проект по унификации («аксиологической стерилизации») незападных цивилизаций для универсализации общих ценностей. В системной аналитике такие недочёты могут быть фатальными.

Но указанные эти и другие (по Сирии, Ирану, Афганистану) западные просчёты компенсируются российским неумением (или нежеланием?) грамотно воспользоваться ошибками противника. На принятие решений сказываются тотальная
коррупция, при «денационализированных элитах» и расконсолидированном обществе. «Россия может иметь сколько угодно ядерных чемоданчиков и ядерных кнопок, -- саркастично заметил Збигнев Бжезинский, - но поскольку 500 миллиардов долларов российской элиты лежат в наших банках, вы ещё разберитесь: это ваша элита или уже наша? Я не вижу ни одной ситуации, при которой Россия воспользуется своим ядерным потенциалом». Метод подчинения государства с помощью приручения его элиты известен с античных времён. Так, панически боявшиеся скифов древние греки пытались их если не покорить, то хотя бы обезопасить свои полисы от их набегов, приобщив их вождей к греческой культуре. Однако, как сообщает Геродот, если скифские цари начинали придерживаться греческих обычаев, их подданные безжалостно их убивали.

Президенту Путину хотелось бы видеть российский народ сплочённым и монолитным. Но пропасть разрыва между правящим олигархатом и «нищебродом» (остальным людом РФ) только разрезается. Зачистка электорального поля от кандидатов, неугодных правящим кругам, подтверждает тот факт, что В. Путин готовит на очередной президентский срок, или же его креатура типа «всех устраивающую» - С.К. Шойгу. Этой фигурой в случае форс-мажора можно бы и военной диктатурой припутнуть «маловменяемых» и - «отморозков».


Выражаясь циничным языком политики: чтобы «красно-коричневые» не смели компрадорско-олигархическую власть (на манер изгнания в 1612 поляков из Москвы), Западу прагматичнее было бы перестать иельмовать Путина (он ведь внутренне весьма лоялен Берлину, но обижен Вашингтоном), а попытаться как равновеликого по-настоящему опартнёривать вместе с его свитой – хотя бы по тактическим соображениям выгоды: дать мухе завязнуть в смоле ящеря. Ведь Рос-
сия уже вряд ли вернётся к либерта
рианской модели, а коли подлинное
народовластие путинистам непри
емлемо, они и сдерживают его всеми
силами. Они с Западом в этом смыс
ле стратегические попутчики. Посе-
му Вашингтону и Брюсселю (Берлин
и Париж – уже) не целесообразно
ли было бы сменить парадигму от-
ношения к России - хотя бы не ме
шать путинским импровизациям по
благоустройству РФ под лозунгом
«это вам не 1937 год!». А как тако
вая «подрывающая деятельность» при
таком попутничестве позиций вооб
ще не понадобится. Ведь режим-то
наибольшего благоприятствования
Западу, при минимальных дивиден-
дов России. Стратагема не мешать
падать в нужном направлении. А
помогать, как ни парадоксально, ло
гично «левому повороту» умеренных
спецов и государственников-патри
отов, способных по-настоящему
консолидировать народ и поднять
экономику (как правительство При
макова-Маслюкова) и стать притяга
тельной державой евразийско-циви
лизационной сердцевины Земли.

Выводы: Путину – не мешать (и
что касается российско-германского
газопровода), от Чубайс-Навальных
«либерал-диктатуры» - отказаться
(проект сам себя изжил) и вложить
ся в реальную перспективу смены
власти на технократико-патриоти
ческую. Ведь надёжнее всего было
Западу вести дела со сталинской
предсказуемостью и позиционной
ясностью. Предложенной стратегии
dелового сотрудничества придер
живалась сперва сама Кайзеровская
Германия – помогала одновременно
и «Белым» (не мешала), и «Красным»
(усиливала) России. Русский иоан
новский человек жив не «хлебом еди
ным»-рационализмом, а духом.

Да и принципы реалполитик
ом же: разделяй и властвуй; Не
ставь всё на одну карту. Американ
цы не раз блестяще демонстрира
ли своё стратегически-многоходо
вое видение перспектив глобальной
безопасности. Так, чтобы миними
зировать тяжёлые последствия от
надвигающегося кризиса 1929, США
таяно решили принять превентив
ные меры по изменению расстанов
ки сил в мире. «Для этого понадоби
лось оказать помощь России, чтобы
она окончательно избавилась от раз
рухи - последствий гражданской во
йны, и помочь Германии избавиться
от тисков Версальского договора»,
- констатирует факт разведчик-неле
гал генерал Юрий Дроздов.

Хотя западному истеблиш
менту предстоит менять отношение
c России, Конгресс США пока всё
ещё директивно запрещает теперь
уже Байдену (как раньше Трампу)
улучшать отношения с Россией -
пытаясь заблокировать (оказалось,
безуспешно) президентское право
отказаться от санкций против рос
сийского газопровода «Северный
поток-2». Прежде всего это биз
нес-проект. А насколько он станет
gеополитическим оружием» - зави
сит во многом от самого Запада: гиб
кого управления газовым вентилем.
Новый виток холодной войны, нача
тый Обамой, замедлился было при
Трампе, при макроновском посYLE
«Отталкивать Россию от Европы – это глубочайшая стратегическая ошибка». Но здравый прагматизм не возобладал.

Позиции сторон конфликта понятны. США, сохраняя свою мировую доминирующую роль, препятствуют усилию соперничающего центра силы. В России же возрождение национальной идентичности призвано вернуть общество к православным корням, с забвением которых меркнут христианские идеалы как нравственно-цивилизационный консолидант — социум хаотизируется, фрагментизируется и духовно мертвеет. Поскольку распадаются социальные страты на конфликтующие этно-конфессиональные сообщества, подверженные массированной дехристианизации и дегуманизации — обезбоживанию и деструкции. Россия архаически национальна, тогда как Запад оперирует на наднациональном уровне, переставая коррелировать с традиционными общественными и «устаревшими нормами» международного права. Естественно, вспыхивает казус взаимоотношений между Западом и Россией.

Табуизация Конгрессом США самой возможности сближения с РФ знаменательна. Как Российскую империю в своё время порешил вброс чуждых интернационалистских идей, разрушивших верования, так и духовный монолит США качнулся, когда американский истеблишмент с 1960-х пристрастился к идее неомарксизма франкфуртской школы. Правящую элиту, изменившую тогда главенствующей консервативной традиции, понесло вразнос. Последовавшая идеологическая индоктринация (заимствование чужой доктрины без критического осмысления) «философии практики» (praxis) итальянского марксиста Антонио Грамши аукнулась ныне — сработал тот теоретический вброс: обоснование раскола общества на мозаичные страты и сплочение их вокруг левых элит под лозунгами борьбы с «угнетением» и за безграничные свободы. Демократический истеблишмент возвращает историческую справедливость одной страте за счёт ущемления в правах другой. Традиционное американское общество деформируется до неузнаваемости прививкой левоцентристского троцизма с примесью «хунвейбинизма» (китайской «культурной революции») и классовой ненависти («кто не с нами, тот против нас»). Доподрвали США и Россия друг друга — обе сверхдержавы подорваны чужими идеологиями и у разбитого корыта, на радость гегемонирующему коммунистическому Китаю!

Если дипломатия — это искусство возможного, то Конгресс США делает её невозможной с Россией. А там где останавливается дипломатия, начинается война. Перманентная холодная конфронтация между сторонами конфликта перемежается примерно раз в столетие вспышкой горячей войны, а затем детантной паузой передышки-«перезагрузки» для выверки целей и средств поражения или достижения их. Конгресс и зафиксировал состояние войны «инными средствами».


И «Готская цивилизация» пангерманцев претендует на Причерноморье, с геополитическим проникновением в Азию. Но великий фон Бисмарк предостерегал: «Даже самый благополучный исход войны никогда не приведёт к распаду России, которая держится на миллионах верующих русских греческой конфессии. Эти последние, даже если они вследствие международных договоров будут разъединены, так же быстро вновь соединятся друг с другом, как находят путь друг к другу разъединённые капельки ртути». Черчилль подсказывает: «Россию невозможно победить силой, её можно уничтожить изнутри».

Российский сфинкс пытаются распознать не познавательно (какой она есть), а противопоставительно (какой хотелось бы видеть). Поэтому получаются абсурдные умозаключения, типа: «Что русскому хорошо, то немцу – смерть». А ведь эти народы сопряжены между собой, как Фатерланд и Мать-сыра земля. Германские этнографы сочли славян арийцами; это хорошо видно на карте XIX века из библиографического музея города Лейпциг. Артефакты древности от Рейна до Верхней Волги говорят о славяно-германской общей «культуре боевых топоров (или шнуровой
керамики»). У тевтонцев праславянские гены от племён поморян, руян, бодричей, лютичей и лужичан. А по «Великопольской хронике» немцы и славяне - кровные братья (germo): Ян (славянская ветвь) и Кус (немецкая ветвь). Сыновья отца Яфета.

И всё же «Запад есть Запад, Восток есть Восток, не встретиться им никогда» - пишет британский поэт Р. Киплинг. Однако он допускает возможность честного диалога между ними: «когда двое сильных и смелых мужчин друг другу в глаза глядят»!

В реальности впечатления от встреч лидеров обеих стран с глазу на глаз оказались противоречивыми: Байден не разглядел у Путина душу, которую увидел Буш-младший. Чекист, с кредом «равнения на дзюдоиста», не расшифрован. Русская непредсказуемость.


И ментально поступок соответствует русскости: держаться подальше от начальства и быть индифферентными к «неинтересному» им. Вроде как «моя хата с краю - я ничего не знаю» - подчёркивание безразличия человека к какой-то конкретной ситуации. Но у этой фразы двойной смысл. Сопутствующая коннотация пословицы такая: «моя хата с краю - первым врага встречаю». По поводу трудностей в понимании русской иносказательности в словах и делах Черчилль обречённо констатирует: «Я не могу предсказать действий России. Это головоломка, завёрнутая в тайну, завёрнутую в загадку».

Россия - симбиоз Европы и Азии в ментально-культурном и геополитическом планах. Она – одновременно и наследница Византии - хранительница духовного света Христианства, и Золотой Орды - боевой крестительницы на победу в войнах. В России слились два основных этнических компонента: славяно-кельтский и скифо-сарматский (иранский). Этот синтез образовал особую цивилизацию, по этнокультурным характеристикам отличающийся как от европейского, так и от азиатско-буддистского и азиатско-исламского типов. В треугольнике Рось-Киев-Днепр до прихода сюда восточных славян обитали

Если бы Россия пошла по новгородско-скандинавскому пути -- Скандославия (союз славян и скандинавов) vs. Киевская Русь -- то стала бы более евроориентированной. В викинго-норманской теории происхождения русского народа закреплена «многонациональность» Рюрика: он и скандинав-датчанин (конунг Рёрик-Hrorek из ютландского Хедебю-Дания), и славянский «сокол» с родовым именем рарог, и внук новгородского князя Гостомысла (сын его дочери Умилы и со-седского князя). Россия разошлась с Европой в XI веке в результате раскола Вселенской церкви и отпадения от неё католиков. При этом правило стало базисом и стержнем русского менталитета, определило его шкалу ценности и устремления. Русско-варяжский выбор русичей стал фундаментальной основой консолидации племён и образованию «Земли Русской» -- прообразом Российской Империи, с русским Богом и имперским чёрно-жёлто-белым флагом.

Россия зарекомендовала себя практически неодолимой в войнах. Потому эту строптивую непокорность укрощают из вне «петлёй анаконды», а изнутри - вспениванием смуты социальных потрясений с помощью «пятоколонников»-коллаборационистов-смердяковцев, мечтающих об оккупации России «просвещёнными странами» и о возвращении РФ к пределам «мёртвых топких берегов» малообитаемого Севера. В российском политическом лексиконе таких именуют «гнилой интеллигенцией». Сей термин перекочевал от императора Александра III к В. И. Ленину. Советский лидер Н. С. Хрущёв обозвал художников-авангардистов «педерастами» за их общественно-политическую ничтожность. Безыдейная интеллигенция не нужна была советскому народу и государству, ибо не служила «общепролетарскому делу». Опять же если того же Никиту Хрущёва в контексте действий по Крыму оценить по шкале русской «особности»? Передача Крыма вместе с городом Севастопо-

ими любой шатёр, возьми булат заветный, меч дедов!» - как в арии Кончака из оперы «Князь Игорь» А. П. Бородина. Русская доброта, переходящая в навязчивую ноздрёвщину (Ноздрёв – щедро-азартный, бесцеремонный, завиральный герой «Мётвых душ» Гоголя). Отсюда и русский след в чужой коммунистической догме – заставить человека быть счастливым. И в то же время сами русские знают, что «насильно мил не будешь». Во всём крайностность: дойти до предела-пропасти, да ещё и заглянуть в неё.

Непатриотичность российских элит с лихвой компенсируется народной любовью к Отечеству с любыми правителями. «Безрелигиозное отщепенство от государства» - болезнь элит со страданием народа. Бездумный перенос чужого интелигеницией на русскую почву мутил национальное сознание.

«Рационалистический утопизм, стремление устроить жизнь по разуму, оторвав её от объективных начал истории, от органических основ общественного порядка, от животворящих святынь народного бытия» - привели, как полагает учёный П. И. Новгородцев, к революции-1917.

Рецепт исцеления русского общества по Достоевскому - перестать быть ничтожными подражателями ("стрюцкими") европеизма, либерализма и социализма, и вернуться интеллигенции от космополитизма к осознанию себя частью общекорневой с народом системы. Чтоб обрести победное единство нации, надо интеллигенции осознать, что «ей нельзя уже больше разделяться и разрывать с народом своим».

«Мы можем, пожалуй, проигрывать битвы, но все-таки останемся непобедимыми именно единением нашего духа народного и сознанием народным. ...если мы захотим, то нас нельзя заставить сделать то, чего мы не пожелаем, и что нет такой силы на всей земле».

Но России не удаётся подолгу сосредотачиваться на созидании государства. В 1913-м, когда она занимала первое место в мире по темпам роста промышленного производства и четвёртое по объёму его, разразившаяся Первая мировая война, перешедшая в большевистскую революцию, угробила саму Российскую Империю. Тем же деструктуром в отношении уже СССР стал Беловежский сговор 1991-го по развалу Советского Союза. Власть была захвачена небольшой группой высокопоставленных чиновников. Компрадорско-власовский режим победившей «демократии» провозгласил независимость России от самой себя (не реализация ли это проекта «Россия без колоний»?) В результате вместо могучей Красной империи – сколок РФ. Над Кремлём взметнулся триколор – смахивающий расцветкой на голландско-"вла-
совско-торгашеский» флаг Временного правительства, развалившего державу. Знамя Победы зачехлили, музейной мумией уложили (якобы «из-за хрупкости сатина») и в горизонтальном положении хранят. Рейстаг повержен – а стяг победителей пылится в музее! Ну а «копию» его «декоммунизировали» --- стерев с полотнища, а стало быть из памяти потомков, эмблематику оригинала: «совковые» серп и молот --- и употребляют этот новодел для парадных шествий.

Президент РФ воспринимается правящей элитой как топ-менеджер, «не мешающий» вольготно бизнесменить. Совокупность вотчин доминирующих кланов образует как бы государство в государстве: глубинно-олигархическое («deep state») vs. «Российская Федерация». Несмотря на коронавирусную пандемию и мировой системный кризис, прибыль прокремлевских богачей, согласно Bloomberg Billionaires Index, выросла за первый квартал 2021 года на 23,9 млрд. долларов. Кому война, а кому мать родна.

Ельцинская Конституция-1993, написанная чуть ли не на коленке в ночь перед референдумом, узаконила беззаконие. Совокупность вотчин доминирующих кланов образует как бы государство в государстве: глубинно-олигархическое («deep state») vs. «Российская Федерация». Несмотря на коронавирусную пандемию и мировой системный кризис, прибыль прокремлевских богачей, согласно Bloomberg Billionaires Index, выросла за первый квартал 2021 года на 23,9 млрд. долларов. Кому война, а кому мать родна.

Ельцинская Конституция-1993, написанная чуть ли не на коленке в ночь перед референдумом, узаконила беззаконие. Совокупность вотчин доминирующих кланов образует как бы государство в государстве: глубинно-олигархическое («deep state») vs. «Российская Федерация». Несмотря на коронавирусную пандемию и мировой системный кризис, прибыль прокремлевских богачей, согласно Bloomberg Billionaires Index, выросла за первый квартал 2021 года на 23,9 млрд. долларов. Кому война, а кому мать родна.

По мнению политолога Валерия Коровина, прозападные элиты сейчас «за Россию не держатся, с удовольствием коллаборируют, готовы предавать, что полностью коррелирует с ситуацией накануне Февральской революции 1917, когда главе государства стало не на кого опереться. Они являются носителями другой ментальности, Западу в ними легко работать, что было свойственно и предреволюционному периоду.» «С Россией кончено…И родину народ сам выволок на гноище, как падаль» - сказал о революционном 1917-м поэт Максимилиан Волошин.
Несколько иначе в «лихие 90-е» порешили и Красную империю СССР. Сперва изъяли краеугольный камень фундамента советского монолита – ст. 6-ю Конституции-1977 о партии как «руководящей и направляющей силе общества» что сразу обрушило «Союз нерушимый». Теперь, когда «красно-коричневые» группируются для реванша, то управляющие Россией вцепились в Путина чтоб их покровитель не бросил их на растерзание толпы. У либерал-имперца А. Б. Чубайса уход ВВП из Кремля и левый разворот державы вызывает истеричную реакцию: «Не дай Бог нам увидеть революцию в России. Она будет кроваво-красной... Объединение демократов на антипутинской основе неработоспособно.... Лозунг ‘Долой полицейский режим Путина’ звучит просто несерьёзно» - причитает он. Однако Запад на сей раз не прислушался к предостережениям со стороны своей креатуры. Интрига трансфера власти сохраняется. Но раз в международных отношениях попахивает Карибским кризисом-2, - почему бы не воспользоваться ситуацией и не придать путинизму назарбаевскую «руководящую и направляющую» ве чность? Ведь в Древнем Риме при克莱 внешней опасности или внутренней смятности военспец Д. Ловцов – знаток реф-
лексивных технологий оргооружия утверждает, что с помощью разных воздействий на противника можно заставить его двигаться в угодном для другой стороны русле; направить политику противника в стратегический тупик; измотать его экономику неэффективными (непосильными) программами; затормозить развитие вооружения; искать основы национальной культуры; создать среди интеллигенции «пятую колонну», всереме поддерживаящую, пропагандирующей и проводящую псевдореформы и т.п. В итоге в государстве создаётся обстановка внутрполитического хаоса, ведущая к снижению его экономической, политической, военной мощи и даже к гибели.

Проходя через сознание каждого члена общества, длительное массированное информационное и морально-психологическое воздействие разрушающего характера создаёт реальную угрозу существованию нации в результате трансформации её исторически сложившейся культуры, основных мировоззренческих и идеологических установок, т.е. смены внутренней оргсреды, определяющей жизнедеятельность государства и его вооружённых сил. Стабильное поддержание у противника стратегической иллюзии – условие победы в ментально-гибридной войне. В контексте гибридной войны важнейшее место занимают психологические операции. А как их проводить, если её объект, психология неприятеля, не совсем ясна, а её уязвимые места до конца не выявлены?

Псих-война от теоретических инсинуаций стала военной повседневностью. То ли фальшина, то ли всё ещё тайна за семью печатями, но в газете «Советская Россия» от 20 февраля 1993 была заметка о «плане Даллеса». Вот что написал митрополит Санкт-Петербургский и Ладожский Иоанн (Снычев): «Посеяв в России хаос, — сказал в 1945 году американский генерал Аллен Даллес, руководитель политической разведки США в Европе, ставший впоследствии директором ЦРУ, — мы незаметно подменим их ценности на фальшивые и заставим их в эти фальшивые ценности верить. Как? Мы найдём своих единомышленников, своих помощников и союзников в самой России. Эпизод за эпизодом будет разыгрываться грандиозная по своему масштабу трагедия гибели самого непокорного на земле народа, окончательного, необратимого, необратимого утасания его самосознания. Из литературы и искусства, например, мы постепенно вытравим их социальную сущность. Отучим художников, отобьём у них охоту заниматься изображением, исследованием тех процессов, которые происходят в глубине народных масс. Литература, театры, кино — все будет изображать и проливать самые низменные человеческие чувства. Мы будем всячески поддерживать и поднимать так называемых творцов, которые станут насаждать и вдалбливать в человеческое сознание культ секса, насилия, садизма, предательства — словом, всей безнравственности».

В нынешних инструктивных
материалах по подрыву боеготовности противника изнутри фантастика стала билью. Основное зло – «рулящие» Россией как госкорпорацией – своей вотчиной. Компрадор-властелины РФ сознательно или невольно способствуют также ломке «дисциплинарной социализации» личности сограждан в РФ, после чего такой обработанный индивид не подчиняется более коллективным правилам. Французский философ Ж. Липовецки считает, что такое гедонизированное создание морально шатко, неустойчиво, бессильно, с ослабленной способностью к самоограничению и самоконтролю, с атрофированным поддержанием и самоконтролем, с фрагментарным сознанием, в котором отсутствуют высокие идеалы, а воля требует гламура и потребительства, отдыха и развлечений. Такой субъект гражданской и политической ничтожен, с атрофированным патриотизмом (без понятия что такое отдать свою жизнь за Родину).


По оценке социолога А. Янакова, духовный ресурс народа находится свое выражение в определенных ценностях, идеалах, идеях, теориях, концепциях, программах и лозунгах, общественных символах, взглядах, традициях, привычках, нравах, которые, как правило, базируются на общенациональных ценностях. «Упрочение духовно-цивилизационного арсенала усилило бы боеготовность как воинства, так и военной безопасности государства».

Если в классических войнах целью является уничтожение живой силы противника, в современных кибервойнах — уничтожение инфраструктуры противника, то целью новой войны является уничтожение самосознания, изменение ментальной — цивилизационной — основы общества противника. «Я бы назвал этот тип войны ментальным» — говорит советник Министра Обороны РФ Андрей Ильницкий. Причём последствия информационно-гибридных атак на менталитет могут проявиться не сразу, а через поколение (когда ход эволюции сознания повернуть вспять будет невозможно). Трансформация Украины из «братской» в «бандеровскую» - пример методичного плохо контролируемого чужого воздействия на смену духовного кода нации. Коррумпированные чиновники РФ го- дами попустительствовали антирос-
сийскому нашпиговыванию «укров» для использования затем их как «сакральной жертвы» в чужой игре. А то что Россия во-время не спохватилась – не «сантировала» трещинки в отношениях между Киевом и Москвой, а допустила разрыв исторической их общности -- так сама себя «выпорола». Кремль упустил: «хотел как лучше, а получилось как всегда». А когда уже вся самостийная затряслась в бандеровской пляске «кто не пляшет – тот москаль» - поздно было привязывать «самостийных» поддержкой режима Януковича: антироссийский стала массовой. Российская же инициация Минских соглашений - мало что даёт РФ, зато спасла тогда после Дебальцева от неминуемого разгрома украинскую армию. И несомненность донбасской трагедии – больше из-за дивидендов жадного олигархата, поставляющих горючее для заправки танков «независимой».

Если бы Путина не гнобил постоянно Запад, то начальники РФ давно бы сдали Донбасс «во исполнение минских соглашений». Что было бы срамом для перспектив Русского мира—аналогом операции 1945-го Keelhaul, когда английане прикладами насильственно гнали казаков и белоэмигрантов под пули иль в ГУЛАГ во исполнение союзнических обязательств перед Сталиным. Однако тогда перед Иосифом Виссарионовичем сам Сэр Уинстон Леонард Спенсер Черчилль вытягивался во фрунт – пусть лишь поочения ради, "for respect" (не то что ныне: когда президент США Джо Байден кивком головы подтвердил, что его «коллега» из РФ - “murderer”).

Как увязать необходимость поднятия боевого духа государственнообразующей титульной нации РФ на фоне вырождения в РФ особенно русских и ужесточения наказательно-применительной практики антирусской 282-й статьи УКРФ? Русская воля (неспибавый дух плюс пространство) с удалью молодецкой vs. «умеренность и аккуратность» скучной серости. Порождение вольницы безгранично раздольная русская песня, от которой сам философ Ницше «тронулся умом»: «Я променяю счастье всего Запада на русский песенный лад печали» - вырвалось у него. Так что русскому менталитету воли вольной чуточные послабления со стороны чиновного официоза – оскорбительные. Такие дарованные «свободы» - продуцируют лишь тварь дрожащую, вёрткую, а не бесстрашного богатыря Света Православного.

Сумятицу в формирование национальных приоритетов вносит тот факт, что в РФ не ведают какой тип государственности строят. Хотели бы – нечто «с человеческим лицом». Высшее чиновничество и без того запуталось в категориях «свой-чужой», помня лишь о мздоимстве и в каком из карманов куртки какой иностранный паспорт у них лежит. Они подменяют понятие «враг» беззубым эфемизмом «партнёр». И лишь 13 апреля 2021 замглавы МИД Сергей Рябков, уловив дуновение новых эманаций Кремля, -- рискнул назвать США противником России.

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В своём послании Федеральному собранию Путин сравнил недругов России с героями рассказа Киплинга, отметив, что некоторые цепляют РФ без всяких причин и, как Табаки, подвывают, чтобы задобрить своего суверена. «Надеюсь, -- заявил Владимир Путин, -- что никому не придёт в голову перейти в отношении России так называемую красную черту. А где она будет проходить – это мы будем определять в каждом конкретном случае сами». Этот новый внешнеполитический манифест России произвёл эффект путинской мюнхенской речи.

Примерно в том же смысловом кюче глава русского внешнеполитического ведомства при Александре II князь А. М. Горчаков дал понять западу, что Россия не отказывается от права голоса в европейских международных вопросах, но только собирается с силами для будущего. «La Russie ne boude pas — elle se recueille» (Россия сосредотачивается). Эта фраза точно определяла занимаемое Россией политическое положение после Крымской войны. А три года спустя князь Горчаков заявил: «Россия выходит из того положения сдержанности, которое она считала для себя обязательным после Крымской войны». Так и Россия ныне декларативно вышла, словно из удавки договорняка с Западом в результате поражения в холодной войне, -- заявила о своих геостратегических намерениях. Опасно «медведю» загонять в угол. Глядишь – ещё с китайским тигром спарится назло надменным Евро-Анлантискам.

Национально ориентированная власть – залог победы в ментально-гидридной войне

Правящий класс плохо справляется с удовлетворением национально-патриотических запросов общества. Ещё далеко до нравственно здорового эффективного социального государства, которое только и сможет противостоять в «ментальной войне». «Но для этого в России, - пишет редактор «Русской идеи» Михаил Назаров, - должна быть здоровая власть, забоящаяся о стране, а не о собственных «галерных» доходах». Иначе - поражение в мировой гидридной войне.


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Тогда как у народа нет своей идеологии, номенклатура для своих нужд сохранила «некие сравнительно устойчивые и узнаваемые системы смыслов» -- опору на определённую ценностно-смысловую систему. Об этой коллизии философ Ольга Малинова пишет: «Очевиден потенциал “ злоупотребления властью” для ослабления конкурентных шансов оппонентов, вплоть до ограничения идеологического плюрализма путём запрета на высказывание тех или иных идей в публичных средах. ... Властвующая элита не вправе использовать государственные инструменты принуждения, чтобы навязывать собственные представления как обязательные или исключать право на высказывание иных точек зрения». Принимаемые Госдумой законы, как утверждает оппозиция, нередко носят характер «оккупационных»: «практически все формы общественного протеста объявлены незаконными». Проект капитализма с человеческим лицом не получается: слишком жаден до сверхприбыли олигархат и скупа власть на достойное исполнение «социальных гарантий».

Спасительным представляется для России более органичный курс, духовной основой которого станет Русская идея как характеристика национального самосознания и культуры. Национальная русская идея религиозная, включающая промысел и предназначение. Она целостна и неизменна в основе. Её категории Духовность, Державность и Соборность (в Уваровской триаде: Православие, Самодержавие и Народность) живо взаимосвязаны. «Рассечение указанного триединства, - пишет философ В. В. Лазарев, - созидавшегося по образу и подобию триады Добра, Истины и Красоты или по образу Святой Троицы (истолкование смысла триединства в которой заключено в Православном учении), разрывает живой духовной целостности на отдельные элементы - превращало это единство в мертвый конгломерат». Без смены парадигмы основного курса РФ, «национализации» самой логики мышления и усиления прорусской доминанты – страна утратит не только суверенитет, но и жизненные ресурсы для воспроизведения нации. Деградация и депопуляция идут полным ходом. Демографическую ситуацию в России сам путинский рупор Дмитрий Песков характеризует как «очень плохую».

От президента РФ для её национального возрождения ожидается подвиг: избавление от Государства Российского от въевшегося в неё компрадорского олигархата. Тогда народ из «быдла» вновь обретет облик творца истории и вдохновленно отстоит свою Родину, у которой были и есть «только два союзника — её армия и флот». Необходима срочная радикальная коррекция государственного курса России на подлинный патриото-государственный. Не исключён путчевый сценарий смены власти: как в книге Кэтрин Белтон «Люди Путина: как КГБ захватил Россию, а затем взялся за Запад» (Catherine Belton, “Putin's
Проект Путин-2024 в геостратегии противостояния и внутренних вызовах

People: How the KGB Took Back Russia and Then Took on the West”). И либертарианская «альтернатива» (не Михаил Ходорковский, так Алексей Навальный), судя по докладу А. Аслунда и Л. Гозмана “Russia after Putin: How to rebuild the state” («Россия после Путина: как восстановить государство»), не сдается без боя. Общим консолидантом оппозиции могут стать некоторые тезисы этой программы, созвучные с лозунгами коммуно-патриотического электората, например, в намерении сменить режим «авторитарной клептократии»; или в смене правящей династии «ельцинской семьи», «узурпировавшей всю власть и большую часть богатства» России.

Руководству РФ надлежит перестать вести, как говорит патриот системный аналитик Сергей Михеев, «двойную игру – заигрывание с карликами». Утвердить верховенство закона. Политически разоружить привластный бизнес, настаив на «полной прозрачности конечной бенефициарной собственности всех предприятий, включая медиакомпании». Но есть ли надежда на столь кардинальную трансформацию власть имущих?

Время не терпит. Политическая динамика в России заметно ускоряется. Если правящей «Единой России» будет грозить поражение, могут заменить президентскую форму правления на парламентскую (она по определению более прозрачна и демократична, а главное ответственность за развала страны станет «коллективной»), или на модель Госсовета с коллективным руководством (комбинация Политбюро ЦК КПСС и Госсовета КНР).

Какой лидер нужен народу на новом этапе развития? Политолог Сергей Михеев (партия «За правду» Захара Прилепина) на этот вопрос ответил развёрнуто: « Во внешней политике – более активный проект, который восстановит историческую справедливость... Во внутренней – экономика как способ организации жизни людей, а не способ получения прибыли. Схема национальной культуры не подлежит экономическому регулированию. В морально-нравственном контексте – идеалы традиционных религий должны быть доминирующими в формировании информационного содержания, культурной политики. Человек, который будет двигать эти три ипостаси... Я таких людей не вижу».

А откуда таким «триадным» лидерам и взяться, если кандидатов-«чужаков» отфильтровывают на кадровых президентских программах, наглухо блокирующих попадание «не своих» на политический Олимп?! Поточное изготовление чиновников в заданных параметрах запроса рулящих РФ – «загашник номенклатурных назначений. «Кадры решают всё» - говорил И. В. Сталин. Затруднение с выбором достойной «трёхаспектной» кандидатуры в президенты объяснимо, как сказано ранее, и извечным грехом интеллигенции: уж больно далеки они от народа. Певец народной
монархии Иван Солоневич вменил этому сословию в вину его нежелание рассматривать себя «как слой, подчинённый основным линиям развития русской истории, а не как кооператив изобретателей, наперебой предлагающих русскому народу укранные у нерусской философии планеты полного переустройства и перевоспитания тысячелетней государственности».

Национально-приоритетными должны стать все сферы русской жизни, её политики, хозяйствования и культуры. И в международных отношениях без умения отстаивать интересы своей страны не может быть достойно-убедительной дипломатии. Переговорный процесс должен маневрировать не в рамках сиюминутных бизнес-выгод (как сейчас), а цивилизационно-национальных глобальных интересов. Поскольку международная договорная безопасность не работает в прежних режимах, надо отстраивать адекватную сложившимся обстоятельствам новую систему взаимосвязанности государств – с задействованием арсенала средств предотвращения как прямой военной, так и косвенных -- экономико-политической и гибридно-этической агрессий.

«Война - это искусство обмана», сказал Сунь-дзы. Придётся исходить из данности, что принцип неприменения силы или угрозы силой как орудия национальной политики (Келлого-Бриана пакт 1928 г.) уступил место правы войны -- jus ad bellum). А былые наработки виртуозного дипломатического искусства (включая практики «мистера нет» -Андрея Громыко) за длительным неприменением оных проржавели.

Внедряемая США стратегия «передовой обороны» применима и в «кибер-дипломатии» (моей термин - Е. В.). Это сближение с противником настолько близкое, насколько это возможно, чтобы увидеть, что он замышляет и планирует, и в ответ подготовиться или принять соответствующие меры. Актуализация «разведки боем». Дальневидная всеобъемлемость и в стратегическом планировании, и в оперативных разработках, поможет на умение преследовать противника во время его маневрирования, с пониманием, как он развивается в качестве динамичного объекта. В этой связи важно учесть обновлённые спецификации дипломатии в эпоху глобализма и постмодерновой конфликтологии, выдвинутые новым главой ЦРУ Уильямом Джозефом Бёрнсом: «Конфликт великих держав требует тонкой дипломатии — нужно маневрировать в серой зоне между миром и войной, знать пределы возможного, выстраивать рычаги влияния, преследовать общие интересы там, где мы можем их обнаружить, — и жёстко и последовательно противостоять [России] там, где их нет». Разведка при Трампе заметно политизировалась. Именно непредвзятая объективная аналитика потомственного дипломата и «поседевшего на России» Бёрнса может быть услышана Байденом и адекватно воспринята Кремлем. «Новое мышление» (да
не по Горбачёву, а скорее Realpolitik по Бисмарку) – без иллюзий и идеологических догм.

Манящ настрой на смягчение напряжённости в двусторонних отношениях. Игра с открытыми картами (пусть и со скрытыми козырями) уводит сознание оппонента от его «красных линий» во имя настройки на взаимовыгодный компромисс. Важен сам факт: «изгои» ввязаны в диалог. А дальше уже искусство торг многоуровневых соблазнов. Тем самым консолидируется Запад вокруг вытекающей из диалога общей пользы как с ЕС, так и в интересах США. Это проба «разведки боем» по инициативы России и Китая по-сильно содействовать их интеграции в глобально-всецивилизационный проект единых ценностей и общего управления в постковидную эру. При нивелировании отдельно взятых национальных особостей и заменой их почвой для компромисса исчезнет понятие «враг», ведь вое- вать станет не с кем.

Двусторонним диалогом уточняются границы компетенции каждой из сторон и их пределы для тактического отступления – не дальше дальнейших рубежей своих национальных приоритетов. В результате договорённости о согласовании и уточнении выстраиваются стратегические границы новой подвижной конфигурации. Это и есть текущая дипломатия, а не застывшая доктрина «исполнения супружеских обязательств» давно нелюбящими друг друга. Время вялых геополитических инициатив и доктрин за-кончилась. Противостоянию систем во всеоружии призвано снизить напряжённость между противоборствующими сторонами. Стратегия плотного прессинга (так бы назвал я её) соответствует ситуации: Ныне и Запад, и Россия, и Китай не в лучшей кондиции. И каждый из геополитических актёров стремится не дать свой цейтнот перевести более сильным игрокам в цугцванг – в котором любой ход ведёт к ухудшению позиции. Ставки высоки: глобальная война, или возврат к статус-кво «ни войны, ни мира».

Скорей всего путинская заявка на «Мюнхен-2» лишь брутальная патриотическая риторика. Ведь в правящих кругах, пока у них не конфисковали капиталы за границей, будут царить совсем иные устремлённости: к реваншу прикрестлевской «семьи» и неизменности хищнического компрадорско-олигархического курса.

Всё может быть. Ведь на серьёзные катаклизмы со стороны общества власти не реагируют адекватно: не считают знаки и сигналы от народа, теряя и без того небольшую поддержку, легитимность. Нельзя власти, говорит эксперт Валерий Коровин, демонстрировать «высокоомерную отчуждённость» и обращаться к народу только в ситуации, когда нужно провести выборы, либо когда начинаются волнения и массовые беспорядки. «Реакция власти носит крайне сиюминутный, раздражённый, нервозный характер и оказывает разовое влияние на ситуацию. Власть обращается к мас-
сам как к некоему механическому множеству». Вот провели опрос, составили рейтинг, приняли решение, не слыша людей на самом деле, не вникая ни в нюансы, ни в детали. В итоге у государства потеряна точка опоры. Наблюдается двойной цугцванг: власти и оппозиции, Запада и России.

Стоило Путину заговорить о красной линии, как Патриарх Кирилл предостерёг власть от превращения в тиранство. Что день грядущий нам готовит?! Со стороны правящего истеблишмента продолжение слабой, трусливой невнятной политики спровоцирует взрыв народного негодования, а мобилизационный рывок поддержки -- углублённость инициативой связанный с движением КрымНаш захачнет на корню.

Нельзя долго испытывать терпение нации на позитивные перемены. Дождаться, видать, пока сам народ ни двинется штурмовать режим с песней «Вставай, страна огромная!» Тогда и прочерчится сама собой красная линия дальних рубежей безопасности Родины. И пройдёт она уже не через Киев, а Варшаву. Скорей всего Путин своим выпадом лишь сообразно подходящему моменту запоздало ответил на заявление Джона Болтона в 1999 на совещании НАТО, указавшего тогда на красную линию от Балтики до Чёрного моря, с одной стороны которой расположен «цивилизованный мир, с другой -- Россия».

Головой в РФ правит свита. Даже если бы и захотел Путин кардинально изменить коррумпированную олигархическую систему — ему бы помешало окружение, настроенное оппортунистически и коллегиально. А главное — он сам, боясь красно-коричневого реванша СССР-2 теоретически пуще западной экспансии боится российской народно-патриотической системной оппозиции. Поэтому он априори Западу ближе, чем его изображают. Поэтому Западу и следовало бы скорректировать новый курс по отношению к Кремлю: не гнобить президента РФ, а продлевать его правление страной, методом умеренных уступок со стороны Запада и удержания РФ в своей орбите.

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The Security Issue of the South China Sea

Maj Christian R. Sanchez Hernandez

**Keywords:** China, South China Sea, Island building, Exclusive Economic Zone, Maritime Law

China’s expansion in the South China Sea is not only important for today’s political climate, but also crucial in the international relations arena. China has been able to claim nearly eighty percent of the South China Sea, affecting one third of the global maritime trade routes that occur in the South China Sea. Additionally, building up shoals and islets to expand China’s Exclusive Economic Zone beyond its natural coastal shores and militarizing them, add to the destabilization of the region. Realistic international relation theory asserts that China is currently manifesting and using coercive diplomacy and military projection as instruments of power.

What situation creating a security issue? In its simplistic form, China claims the sovereignty over South China Sea, and the resources that lie within it, a contention which has existed between adjacent coastal countries since the mid 20th century. “In 1947 the Nationalist government of the Republic of China began to publish maps with a U-shaped series of lines in the South China Sea delineating its maritime boundaries.”1 The “nine dash line” far exceeds the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) two hundred nautical miles off a state’s coastal boundary, effectively encroaching in other states sovereign waters in the South China Sea. As a result of the nine-dash line, should China claim sovereignty of nearly eighty percent of the South China Sea2, it may inhibit freedom of maritime navigation. Currently, “South China Sea accounts for at least a third of the global maritime trade.”3 The lack of freedom of maritime trade in the South China Sea not only impacts Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Taiwan in their ability to trade and import/export supplies, it impacts US national security for the same reasons. President Biden stresses the importance of Global Security in which, “Democratic nations are also increasingly challenged from outside by antagonistic authoritarian powers.”4 The attempts by China to expand their EZZ is furthered by claiming jurisdiction of the Spratly and Paracel islands, islets and shoals. This not only effectively extends their EEZ, but also enables a broadened military presence. China’s claim to the islands complies with “general provision of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), however, under Article 121, “it requires that islands support human habitation or economic activity before they can accrue a full two-hundred-mile EEZ rather than twelve.”5 By building islands and establishing military posts and airfields manned by a few military personnel,
China is, to a certain degree, legitimizing its claim and gaining control over South China Sea, by using the legal definition of what constitutes a habitable island per UNCLOS.

**International Relations Theory**

When considering the tenants of International Relations Theory China has displayed many tenets of a Realist perspective. China’s projection into the South China Sea demonstrates many complimentary concepts of realism, such as, Interest, Protect and enhance power, Coercion, among others. Evidence to support China’s coercive tactics in the South China Sea has been seen in, its willingness to deploy “combat-ready patrol ships to escort fishing vessels.” China’s expansion into the South China Sea creates a security issue at an international level due to the encroachment of the Economic Exclusion Zones of Vietnam, Malaysia, Philippines, and Indonesia. And why not? China is simply exerting Morgenthau’s definition of power, “man’s control over the minds and actions of other men” and “a psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised.” China is using the full range of the Instruments of Power (often articulated as the DIME principals; Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic) to assert control over vast portions of the South China Sea and project economic influence and military might. One such example is China’s show of coercive diplomacy to impose economic sanctions that affected the Philippines’s tourism and fruit exports causing the then-President Benigno Aquino III to negotiate a withdraw from the Scarborough Shoal. China is applying a sort of geo-strategy in the South China Sea to apply power to the region and effectively control sea lanes. In essence, China is building its Latent power through strategic resources based in the South China Sea as it is, “a long-standing task for China to safeguard its maritime rights and interests.”

**Proposed United States Led Strategy**

The United States is poised to lead an international strategy countering China’s South China Sea effort; however, it must be both deliberate and legitimate. This is an international dilemma and the United States must first integrate UN and ASEAN partners to begin collaborative development of strategies that would be effective against China. China has been able to successfully exploit international law to claim jurisdiction and sovereignty over the South China Sea, therefore, it is imperative that the United States, along with regional allies, employ the same legal system to de-legitimize China’s claim and therefore, apply pressure for China’s recession of the encroachment. Thus, the lynchpin in the strategies’ mechanism is sound diplomacy. Such diplomacy must first to regain and maintain a balance of power between nations in the South China Sea. Once China’s claim over the nine-dash line has been nullified by due process, (not to imply that it has ever been legit-
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imized), the use of the economic instrument of power can enforce the precedent by applying sanctions for Chinese vessels in foreign EEZs. Undoubtedly, this would create much consternation and militarily tensions between China, the United States, and adjacent nations that share the waters of the South China Sea. This would lead to military use of the instrument of power. Ideally, it would require Vietnam’s, Malaysia’s, Philippines, Indonesia’s, and Taiwan’s military with United States support to deter Chinese aggression in the region. The threat of hostilities would have an inverse relation to the effectiveness of China’s legal claim, the United States must be prudent to ensure the conflict is rightfully perceived an ASEAN conflict with United States, UN, and EU in support, rather than a United States versus China fight. Unfortunately, not all ASEAN countries have a strong and robust military, and as such would be augmented with United States Navy ships or other United States military resources, presenting a large optics issue.

What Does Success Look Like?

Success looks like China receding from the Spratly Islands and islets, its claim of the South China Sea, with China abandoning the “nine dash line,” and a negotiated treaty between China and neighboring states like Vietnam and the Philippines, (primarily with Vietnam), over the Paracel Islands. Yes, this outcome can be considered a “happily ever after” or best-case scenario in favor of regional equilibrium and stabilization of the region.

Conclusion

China’s current doctrine in the South China Sea and their Anti-Access / Area Denial (A2/AD) tactics, will cause any military movement by ASEAN nation(s) with (or without) the US will be taken as an infringement on China’s self-declared legal jurisdiction, and be seen as an act of war. International arbitration over China’s claim of the South China Sea has taken place through established and accepted international court proceedings. In July 2016 the tribunal ruled that China had no legal basis for the area within the nine-dash line. Yet, China has blatantly dismissed the ruling and continues to press forward with territorial claims in the South China Sea. Unfortunately, defining success as a balance of power and resources in the South China Sea among all countries that share the sea, then Chinese leadership would lose face and tarnish the legitimacy in the eyes of the Chinese people. The situation is escalating at a
rapid pace and offers difficulty to find any middle ground. As tensions rise the hope for a resolution that avoids stringent diplomatic action or armed conflict grows narrower and narrower.

Endnotes


7 Ibid.


12 Ibid. 501.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid. 503.
Book Review: Shields of the Republic

Reviewed by Cody R. Schuette


China’s and Russia’s audacious and increasingly destructive transnational behavior is reducing America’s relative global power. To combat this, Mira Rapp-Hooper in Shields of the Republic: The Triumph and Peril of America’s Alliances argues that although the post-World War II alliance system ensured the long-peace, enhanced cooperation with neoteric responses among allies are urgently required. The stated purpose of the book is to counter the recent rise of the populist anti-alliance rhetoric and demonstrate how and why alliances must adapt to contemporary great power competition. As a Senior Fellow for Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and the China Center at the Yale Law School, Rapp-Hooper speaks with authority on these topics and provides pragmatic policy options. Before discussing her policy recommendations though, she leads the reader through an objective and detailed analysis on the benefits of alliances, their place in American foreign policy, and why the current anti-alliance rhetoric only undermines American standing.

Rapp-Hooper begins by providing the initial logic of alliances and describes their benefits over the past seven decades. Supported by declassified government documents from the Cold War era, alliances offered the United States forward defense of the homeland, deterrence against large-scale conflict, the assurance of support, and varying degrees of control of allies. Her persuasive analysis, often relying on counterfactual evidence, concludes alliances were overall successful in their purpose, less costly than establishing and maintaining a disconnected military capacity, and marshaled allies’ decades-long support of American military adventurism. However, despite the clear advantages, there is a growing base of skeptics that question alliance rationale and utility.

Rapp-Hooper makes clear that misgivings of alliances are not new, rather as old as the republic itself. However, tying to the genesis of the book, she illustrates how former President Trump repeatedly and forcefully departed from decades of mainstream bi-partisan agreement on alliances. She specifically calls out his fixation with monetary contributions and yearning for an overwhelming benefit for the United States. With multiple examples, she further spotlights how his rhetoric was often perceived as hostile towards
allies and more comforting towards competitors. As done throughout the book, Rapp-Hooper uses sound reasoning and historical case studies to substantiate her counterargument to those “dangerously misguided” statements (2).

She convincingly shows how the former President’s rhetoric could reduce allies’ commitments to the United States or weaken treaties to such a point, that if the United States entered a conflict, it could enter late, with reduced combined planning and training, and require time to reverse loses. She concludes her argument by recounting that the United States has never been a victim of entrapment and is compensated appropriately for its larger financial contributions with basing access, enhanced trade benefits, and diplomatic backing on contentious foreign policy. She concisely summarizes this overall point; “American defense spending reflects our global strategy, not alliance commitments” (100). Rapp-Hooper then supplements her direct counter to the previous administration’s ostensibly apprehension towards alliances by offering the historical context.

Here, she successfully weaves history, theory, and contemporary events into an informative discussion on why the United States entered alliances for the first time since the Revolutionary War. Simply, it was the rise of the Soviet Union and technological advances that ensured the United States lost its geographic buffer and therefore its “independent foreign policy” (10). Subsequently, America’s grand strategy concentrated on containing the Soviet threat in Europe, primarily through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) collective security guarantee, and a hub and spoke alliance construct throughout Asia. By taking a realist perspective, she argues that America’s strategy maintained a balance of power in Europe and Asia. This system, as beneficial as it has been, nonetheless requires amending to adequately protect against contemporary threats posed by great power competitors.

Rapp-Hooper substantiates how China and Russia are revisionist in strategy and great power rivals of the United States. She succinctly and convincingly lays out how their behavior erodes American preponderance, yet purposefully avoids triggering alliance retaliation. Rapp-Hooper terms these actions “competitive coercion” and most prominently include China’s technological espionage and island-building and Russia’s election interference and cyberattacks; these actions are predicted to continue at best or intensify at worst. That is the lynchpin of her argument and subsequent policy recommendations. Rapp-Hooper asserts that competitive coercion will continue not triggering American defense treaties and, consequently, require transformed defense treaties to adequately address the threat.

In the final section of the book, she offers policy recommendations. Alliances should evolve to prevent the expansion of Chinese and Russian spheres of influence within their re-
spective geography. She argues updated treaties must account for the aforementioned non-traditional threats. Furthermore, she recommends the United States accentuates its mutual interests with allies as a catalyst to counter great power competitors. To negate Chinese actions, the United States should expand the sharing of intelligence, increase foreign military financing, and ambitiously strive for a collective defense structure, analogous to NATO, with Asian allies. Whereas in Europe, the United States should increase the transparency of political interference and address non-democratic movements to mitigate Russian actions. The collective actions of allies would then have the reciprocal benefit of increasing deterrence through strengthened relationships.

Rapp-Hooper is candid with the book’s shortcomings, albeit minor: counterfactual analysis and covering all of America’s alliances without a regional or time-based focus. However, this approach purposefully fills what she sees as an academic gap by providing a holistic understanding of alliances and American foreign policy. Relying on primary and secondary sources, this is an informative and persuasive book that draws from multiple academic disciplines and policy analysis to make logical arguments. The abundance of details on a range of topics remains discernable, even for the novice, especially with her intelligible writing style and end of chapter summaries. Rapp-Hooper illuminates the benefits of alliances and dispels long-standing counterarguments against their rationale, making this book relevant and suitable for students of international relations to foreign policy practitioners.
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Unworkable Conservatism looks at what passes these days for “conservative” principles—small government, low taxes, minimal regulation—and demonstrates that they are not feasible under modern conditions.

**The Politics of Impeachment** Edited by Margaret Tseng

This edited volume addresses the increased political nature of impeachment. It is meant to be a wide overview of impeachment on the federal and state level, including: the politics of bringing impeachment articles forward, the politicized impeachment proceedings, the political nature of how one conducts oneself during the proceedings and the political fallout afterwards.
International or Local Ownership?: Security Sector Development in Post-Independent Kosovo by Dr. Florian Qehaja

International or Local Ownership? contributes to the debate on the concept of local ownership in post-conflict settings, and discussions on international relations, peacebuilding, security and development studies.

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